V2 Manila Jockey Club Employees Labor Union vs Manila Jockey Club (2007) G.R.

167601
Facts: Petitioner Manila Jockey Club Employees Labor Union-PTGWO and respondent Manila Jockey Club, Inc., a
corporation with a legislative franchise to conduct, operate and maintain horse races, entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000. In the CBA, the parties agreed to a 7-hour
work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on a work week of Monday to Saturday.
On April 3, 1999, respondent issued an inter-office memorandum declaring that, effective April 20, 1999, the hours of
work of regular monthly-paid employees shall be from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when horse races are held, that is, every
Tuesday and Thursday. The memorandum, however, maintained the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule for non-race days.
Ma. Cecelia Timbal LlB – 2 Rm 402 87 University of San Carlos – College of Law Labor Standards Midterm Case Digests On
October 12, 1999, petitioner and respondent entered into an Amended and Supplemental CBA retaining Section 1 of
Article IV and Section 2 of Article XI, supra, and clarified that any conflict arising therefrom shall be referred to a
voluntary arbitrator for resolution. Subsequently, before a panel of voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB), petitioner questioned the above office memorandum as violative of the prohibition against
non-diminution of wages and benefits guaranteed under Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA which specified the work
schedule of respondent's employees to be from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. The NCMB’s panel of voluntary arbitrators, in a
decision dated October 18, 2001, upheld respondent's prerogative to change the work schedule of regular monthly-paid
employees under Section 2, Article XI, of the CBA. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the panel denied the
motion.

Issue: WON the respondent violated the non-diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

Held: The respondent did not violate the principle of non-diminution of benefits. The provision of the CBA also grants
respondent the prerogative to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work. Petitioner’s argument, therefore,
that the change in work schedule violates Article 100 of the Labor Code because it resulted in the diminution of the
benefit enjoyed by regular monthly-paid employees of rendering overtime work with pay, is untenable. Section 1, Article
IV, of the CBA does not guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work performed in
excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the work week shall be considered overtime
and paid as such." Respondent was not obliged to allow all its employees to render overtime work everyday for the
whole year, but only those employees whose services were needed after their regular working hours and only upon the
instructions of management. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the
Labor Code on prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits.

V4 San Miguel Corp., vs Layoc Jr. Et al., (2007) G.R. 149640

Facts: Respondents were among the "Supervisory Security Guards" of the Beer Division of San Miguel Corporation.
From the commencement of their employment, the private respondents were required to punch their time. Corollary,
the private respondents were availing the benefits for overtime, holiday and night premium duty through time card
punching. However, in the early 1990's, the San Miguel Corporation embarked on a Decentralization Program. The Beer
Division of the San Miguel Corporation implemented on January 1, 1993 a "no time card policy" were no longer required
to punch their time cards. Consequently, on January 16, 1993, without prior consultation with the private respondents,
the time cards were ordered confiscated and the latter were no longer allowed to render overtime work. However, in
lieu of the overtime pay and the premium pay, the personnel of the Beer Division of the petitioner San Miguel
Corporation affected by the "No Time Card Policy" were given a 10% across-the-board increase on their basic pay while
the supervisors who were assigned in the night shift (6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) were given night shift allowance ranging
from P2,000.00 to P2,500.00 a month. Hence, this complaint filed for unfair labor practice, violation of Article 100 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, and violation of Ma. Cecelia Timbal LlB – 2 Rm 402 88 University of San Carlos – College of
Law Labor Standards Midterm Case Digests the equal protection clause and due process of law in relation to paragraphs
6 and 8 of Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether the circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to the rule that supervisory employees
are not entitled to overtime pay.

Held: Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods
shall not apply to managerial employees Generally, managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to
overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Respondents failed to show that the circumstances of
the present case constitute an exception to this general rule. Aside from their allegations, respondents were not able to
present anything to prove that petitioners were obliged to permit respondents to render overtime work and give them
the corresponding overtime pay. Even if petitioners did not institute a "no time card policy," respondents could not
demand overtime pay from petitioners if respondents did not render overtime work. The requirement of rendering
additional service differentiates overtime pay from benefits such as thirteenth month pay or yearly merit increase.
These benefits do not require any additional service from their beneficiaries. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the
definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

V9 Star Paper Corp., vs Simbol (2006) G.R. 164774

Facts:
Simbol was employed by the company on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy to which Simbol
complied.
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the]
3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed
a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married,
one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

Issue: WON the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative?

Held: Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two or more of its
employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to
actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as
a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired
after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. e. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees
married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid
justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived
danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination
based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
AURELIO VS. NLRC ET AL DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

JEAN C. AURELIO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

NORTHWESTERN COLLEGE, BEN A. NICOLAS, ERNESTO B. ASUNCION, JOFFREY AURELIO,
JOSE G. CASTRO, FRANCISCO SANTELLA, ALBA B. CADAY, LILIA PAZ, WILFRED A.
NICOLAS, GLENN AQUINO, LUCIDIA RUIZ-FLOREZ, respondents., G.R. No. 99034, Apr 12, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner started as clinical instructor of the College of Nursing of Northwestern College (NWC) in June 1917.
In October 1979, petitioner was appointed Dean of the College of Nursing. In September 1981, petitioner was
promoted to College Administrator or Vice-President for Administration, retaining concurrently her position of
Dean of the College of Nursing then she was later promoted to Executive Vice-President.
April 10, 1988, petitioner’s husband, Oscar Aurelio, a stockholder of respondent NWC, was elected Auditor.
On May 1, 1988, the individual respondents, as Board of Directors, took over the management of respondent
NWC. This new management unleashed a series of reorganization affecting the petitioner and her husband,
Oscar Aurelio.
Petitioner, wrote a letter informing the President of Northwestern College that she was going on an indefinite
leave. Petitioner sent a copy of the letter to the Secretary of DECS praying for assistance. The Secretary DECS
referred the letter to the DECS Director of Region I and the latter was ordered “to investigate and look into the
problem of NWC College of Nursing, Laoag City immediately. PRC recommends suspension of the operation
of College of Nursing due to lack of Dean and faculty to supervise students.” The representatives of the
Regional Director submitted their official findings and recommendations confirming the truth of the allegations
of petitioner in her letter. The DECS also confirmed the willingness of petitioner to withdraw her indefinite
leave of absence. They refused to accept petitioner. Petitioner filed her complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondents and prayed for reinstatement plus backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees.
On April 30, 1988, the annual regular meeting of stockholders was held at the principal office of the corporation
in Laoag City. New set of Board members were elected. The new Board conducted a preliminary audit which
revealed that the college was financially distressed, unable to meet its maturing obligations with its creditor
bank. The new management embarked on a realignment of positions and functions of the different department
in order to minimize expenditures. As a result of the audit, NWC was compelled to abolish the administrative
positions held by petitioner, which she did not contest.
LA dismissed the complaint. Petitioner went to NLRC which merely modified the decision of LA. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE:
1. whether NWC can validly terminate the administrative position held by petitioner.
2. Whether NWC observed due process in dismissing petitioner.

RULING:
1. YES. As found by the NLR, Petitioner was a managerial employee who has to have the complete trust and
confidence of respondents. While it may be true that complainant was not strictly an accountable employee
primarily responsible for disbursement of whatever funds, respondents had some basis in losing its trust and
confidence in complainant. Respondents’ evidence showed that under the principle of command
responsibility, complainant was in a sense responsible in the monitoring of monetary transactions involving
funds from library collections and from Related Learning Science collection. For it has been held that in
case of termination due to loss of trust and confidence proof beyond reasonable doubt of misconduct is not
necessary but some basis being sufficient.
Petitioner’s claim of constructive dismissal stems from her alleged removal from the positions of Administrator,
Vice President for Administration and Executive Vice President. From the time petitioner assumed the position
of Executive Vice President, she did not possess any legal right to claim security of tenure concerning this
position because she assumed the same without authority from the Board of Directors. Petitioner cannot claim
that she was dismissed from the position of Administrator and Vice-President for Administration because her
continuous occupation of the positions is at the discretion or pleasure of the Board of Directors.
The acquisition of security of tenure by the teacher signifies that he/she shall thenceforth have the right to
remain in employment as such teacher until he reaches the compulsory retirement age in accordance with the
rules of the school or the law. That tenure, once acquired, cannot be adversely affected or defeated by requiring
the teacher to execute contracts stipulating the termination of his/her employment upon the expiration of a fixed
period or term. Contracts of that sort are anathema and will be struck down as null and void.
Now, a teacher may also be appointed as a department head or administrative officer of the school, e.g., as
member of the school’s governing council, as college dean or assistant dean, as high school principal, as college
secretary. Except in the case of a clear and explicit agreement to the contrary, the acceptance by a teacher of an
administrative position offered to him or to which he might have aspired, does not operate as a relinquishment
or loss by him of his security of tenure as a faculty member; he retains his tenure as a teacher during all the time
that he occupies the additional position of department head or administrative officer of the school.
The teacher designated as administrative officer ordinarily serves for a definite term or at the pleasure of the
school head or board of trustees or regents depending on the rules of the school and the agreement he may enter
into with the institution. There is nothing wrong in said practice of having teachers serve as administrative
officials for a fixed term or in a non-permanent capacity.
A distinction should be drawn between the teaching staff of private educational institutions, on one hand —
teachers, assistant instructors, assistant professors, associate professors, full professors — and department or
administrative heads or officials on the other — college or department secretaries, principals, directors,”
assistant, deans, deans. The teaching staff, the faculty members, may and should acquire tenure in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the Department of Education and Culture and the school’s own rules and
standards. On the other hand, teachers appointed to serve as administrative officials do not normally and should
not expect to, acquire a second or additional tenure. The acquisition of such an additional tenure is not normal,
is the exception rather than the rule, and should therefore be clearly and specifically provided by law or
contract.
The management of NWC rests on its Board of Directors including the selection of members of the faculty who
may be allowed to assume other positions in the college aside from that of teacher or instructor. When the then
new Board of Directors abolished the additional positions held by the petitioner, it was merely exercising its
right.
The Board abolished the positions not because the petitioner was the occupant thereof but because the positions
had become redundant with functions overlapping those of the President of the college. The Board of Directors
has the power granted by the Corporation Code to implement a reorganization of respondent college’s offices,
including the abolition of various positions, since it is implied or incidental to its power to conduct the regular
business affairs of the corporation.
Petitioner also failed to rebut the findings of the labor arbiter. In the instant petition, she has again failed to
overturn private respondents’ evidence as well as the findings of the labor arbiter which were affirmed by the
NLRC. Petitioner’s application for an indefinite leave of absence was not approved by the college authorities,
but this notwithstanding, she failed to follow-up her application and did not report for work. Believing she was
dismissed, petitioner filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, underpayment, unpaid wages
or commissions and for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
Employers, generally, are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial
personnel or those of similar rank performing functions which by their nature require the employer’s trust and
confidence, than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file employees.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for “fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly authorized representative.”
Loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for dismissing an employee. Termination of employment on this
ground does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. All that is needed is for the employer to establish
sufficient basis for the dismissal of the employee. Both the LA NLRC found that there is some basis for
respondent NWC’s loss of trust and confidence on petitioner. The dismissal of the petitioner was for a just and
valid cause
1. NO. It appears on record that the investigation of petitioner’s alleged irregularities was conducted only after
the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. Under Section 1, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code, the dismissal of an employee must be for a just or authorized cause and
after due process.
The two requirements of this legal provision are:
1. The legality of the act of dismissal, that is, dismissal under the ground provided under Article 283 of the
New Labor Code; and
2. The legality in the manner of dismissal, that is, with due observance of the procedural requirements of
Sections 2, 5, and 6 of BP Blg. 130.
While the Labor Code treats of the nature and the remedies available with regard to the first, such as: (a)
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights, and (b) payment of backwages
corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement, said Code does not deal at all
with the second, that is, the manner of dismissal, which is therefore, governed exclusively by the Civil Code.
In cases where there was a valid ground to dismiss an employee but there was non-observance of due process,
this Court held that only a sanction must be imposed upon the employer for failure to give formal notice and to
conduct an investigation required by law before dismissing the employee . Employer must be imposed a
sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing
petitioner from employment. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the
omission committed by the employer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.