ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

Ateneo Law School

CRIMINAL LAW I

REVIEW GUIDE
FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION
Atty. Lorenzo U. Padilla

1. Five different thefts were committed. It has been

proved that X, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for
sale was stolen by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her,
advised them thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished
them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on five different
occasions to the realization of the said thefts. The physical
authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age. They acted
upon the suggestions of X without discernment or judgment of
their own. What is the liability of X? (a) X is not criminally
liable because her act would have made her an accessory-
after-the- fact but there can be no accessory without a
principal; (b) X is a principal by inducement, which
inducement not merely favored the execution of the crime
but determined its commission; (c) X is a mere accessory-
after-the-fact for having benefitted from or assisted the
principals (albeit themselves exempt from criminal
liability) in benefitting from the proceeds of the crime; (d)
although not liable under the Revised Penal Code, under
which the liability of an accessory is subordinate to that of
the principal, she is nevertheless liable as a fence under
PD No. 1612.

2. Not among the civil liability arising ex delictu: (a)

Restitution; (b) Reparation for the damage caused; (c)
Indemnification for consequential damages; (d) Fines.

3. Does not prescribe even after ONE (1) YEAR: (a)

offenses under special penal laws punished only by fine or
by imprisonment for not more than one month or both; (b)
libel or other similar offenses; (c) light penalties; (d)
crimes punishable with arresto mayor.

4. The spouses W and Z, coming from Nasugbu, returned

to their house in Balayan, and before entering the same called to
X, W’s sister, who they knew was there. Receiving no reply, they
went up into the house, the husband leading the way and
opening the door, followed by his wife who, once inside, lit a
match and then a small kerosene lamp there was in the house. In
the meantime, the husband approached the place where X was,
1
who, startled, immediately awoke and, believing that her honor
was in danger, seized a pocketknife used in spinning hemp,
which was in a box at her side, and with it, attacked and struck
Z, who was near her, a blow in the breast. Under the
circumstances, can X plead self-defense? (a) No, there was,
in the first place, no real need of wounding with the said
weapon him who had merely caught her arm, and perhaps
did so to awaken her, as she was asleep and had not
replied to her sister's calls; (b) Yes, although the criminal
act is not altogether excusable, she should at least be
entitled to the benefit of an incomplete self-defense
against what, at least, in her mind, she thought to be an
unprovoked unlawful aggression against her chastity; (c)
Yes, because although mistaken, had the facts been as she
had thought them to be, she would have been perfectly
justified in so acting in defense of her honor or chastity;
(d) No, she is not entitled to invoke self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete, because the fact shows the actual
absence of unlawful aggression, which is a primordial or
indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.

5. Not a ground to deny probation: (a) having appealed

the court’s judgment of conviction; (b) having once been
or having previously undergone probation; (c) having been
previously convicted by final judgment of a light felony
(i.e., crime carrying the penalty of arresto menor and/or a
fine not exceeding P200); (d) being sentenced to a
maximum term of imprisonment of six years and one day.

6. Who is entitled to good conduct time allowance? (a)

all prisoners, whether serving sentence by final judgment
or mere detention prisoners; (b) only prisoners serving
sentence by final judgment, assuming good conduct; (c)
detention prisoners only, assuming they have agreed to
abide by the rules applicable to prisoners serving sentence
by final judgment; (d) all detention prisoners, even if they
refused to abide by the rules applicable to prisoner serving
sentence by final judgment, although in the latter case
their entitlement thereto is reduced to 4/5 of time spent
under preventive detention.

7. NP received from JV several jewels. Some of the jewels

were owned by JV and other belonged to strangers; all, however,
came from JV and were delivered to NP to be sold on
commission, with the express obligation on the part of the latter
to pay to the former the proceeds of the sale of said jewels, or to
return them if unsold. NP, however, far from complying with her
duty, pawned the said jewels at various dates during said
2
months, as appears from the pawn tickets issued by the owner of
HF's pawnshop, where the jewels had been pledged. The jewels
were thus misappropriated, and the amount of the loan granted
thereon embezzled, to the prejudice of JV. Under the
circumstances: (a) JV can recover the jewels from the
pawnshop, regardless of whether the latter may have
lawfully acquired the same from NP; (b) JV can no longer
recover the jewels from the pawnshop, which knew nothing
of the arrangement between NP and JV and had thought, at
the time of the pledge, that they were owned by NP; (c) JP
can recover the jewels from the pawnshop only if he is
willing to reimburse the pawnshop for the amount it has
lent to NP; (d) JV’s remedy has been reduced to reparation
since the jewels can no longer be restored to him.

8. A Barangay Captain who, knowing the identity of

persons who committed the crime of arson within his jurisdiction
and who merely remained silent, is – (a) guilty as an
accessory-after-the-fact for concealing the crime of arson;
(b) guilty of concealment of crime if shown to have abused
his official position; (c) guilty of dereliction of duty, not
merely concealment of crime; (d) not guilty of crime, even
as an accessory-after-the fact since mere silence is not a
mode of incurring criminal liability.

9. GJ, JV, and CI together with the two deceased DF and

FR, were fencing the land of GF, father of deceased DF. The place
was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by
GF. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of MN.
At that time, MN was taking his rest, but when he heard that the
walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he
saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, MN would
be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his
ricemill. So, he addressed the group, saying “Pare, if possible
you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over
what is good,” addressing FR, who is compadre of MN. DF,
however, answered: “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.” MN
apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot DF,
hitting him. As DF fell down, FR ran towards the jeep, and
knowing there is a gun on the jeep, MN fired at FR, likewise
hitting him. Both DF and FR died “as a result of the shooting”.
Can MN, after admitting having shot DF and FR from the window
of his house with the shotgun under the foregoing circumstances,
claim that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights,
and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability? (a)
Yes, the assault on MN's property amounts to unlawful
aggression as contemplated by law and, therefore, gives
occasion to the lawful exercise of defense that MN did; (b)
3
No, defense of property is not of such importance as the
right to life and defense of property can only be invoked
when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person
of one entrusted with said property; (c) No, MN's act in
killing the deceased was not justifiable since not all the
elements for justification are present; he should therefore
be held responsible for the death of his victims, although
he could be credited with the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense; (d) No, the defense of
property, whether complete or incomplete, to be available,
must be coupled with an attack by the one getting the
property on the person defending it and, in this case, there
is absolutely no evidence that an attack was attempted,
much less made upon the person of MN, while the mere
utterance "No, gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the
unlawful aggression which entitles MN to the plea of self-
defense.

10. Penalty for an impossible crime: (a) penalty for the

crime intended to be committed in its attempted stage; (b)
penalty for the crime intended to be committed in its
frustrated stage; (c) penalty for the crime intended to be
committed but mitigated by lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong; (d) arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500
pesos.

11. FC was employed by RP, an army officer, to get a girl,

AM, and her aunt, VE, into the army barracks, where RP was. RP
spoke English and could neither speak nor understand the native
language. FC acted as interpreter, translating English to the
native language, to make the woman and the girl understand
RP's desire that AM remain with him as his querida or paramour.
FC, accompanied by several privates, at RP's order, arrested FB
and took him to the barracks to be then turned over to VF who,
obeying orders from the same lieutenant, which orders were
translated by FC in order that it may be understood by VF,
proceeded to kill the prisoner in or near the cemetery of the said
town, by shooting him. Can FC be held liable for participating in
the killing of FB? (a) Yes, as a principal by direct
participation for acting as interpreter to convey the
mastermind’s criminal determination or if not, at least, by
indispensable cooperation, without whose services the
criminal determination of the mastermind could not have
been conveyed to the actual perpetrators of the crime; (b)
Yes, as an accomplice, because by serving as interpreter,
he cooperated in the execution of the crime by previous or
simultaneous act, but not in the manner of a principal; (c)
Yes, but as an accessory-after-the fact only as it was not
4
shown that the accused took a direct part in the crime or
compelled any other person to commit it, or that he
cooperated in its consummation by some act without which
it would not have been committed, or that he lent such
cooperation by means of acts prior or simultaneous to its
perpetration; (d) No, because it cannot be held that the act
of interpreting, in obedience to orders of his superior, the
latter's criminal determination, so that it might be
understood by the actual perpetrator of the crime,
constituted cooperation in the commission thereof.

12. When must the death of an offender, who is charged

with a crime in court, occur in order to extinguish criminal
liability and his personal penalties? (a) before final judgment;
(b) after final judgment; (c) on appeal; (d) anytime.

13. What is the penalty two degrees higher than reclusion

temporal, assuming a case of qualified theft involving the amount
of P2,800,000.00 (representing the value of the truck and cargo
thereof that were stolen by the accused): (a) under Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code, two [2] degrees higher than
reclusion temporal is death; (b) the higher penalty would
be reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties for said
penalty, because Article 74 proscribes the imposition of
the death penalty resulting from the graduation of the
penalty; (c) reclusion perpetua but with the accessory
penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code if the death penalty is commuted, i.e., . perpetual
absolute disqualification and civil interdiction during
thirty (30) years following the date of sentence, applying
Article 74; (d) reclusion perpetua for forty years with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the
Revised Penal Code, which means, in fine, that the accused
is not entitled to pardon before the lapse of the forty-year
period.

14. A light felony prescribes in: (a) one year; (b) five
years; (c) two months; (d) six months.

15. Republic Act 8294 on June 6, 1997, amended certain

provisions of P.D. 1866, a special penal law penalizing illegal
possession of firearms. With the passage of the aforementioned
law, the penalty for simple illegal possession of a low-powered
firearm, such as "paltik", has been reduced to prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). If the accused is entitled to
the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, how is the
maximum of his indeterminate sentence to be determined? (a)
5
the court should sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall be the
maximum fixed by said law; (b) the court should sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law; (c) the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, should be properly imposed under the rules
of the Revised Penal Code; (d) the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence could be anywhere between the
minimum and the maximum term of the penalty fixed by
said law.

16. A disposition under which a defendant, after conviction

and sentence is released subject to conditions imposed by the
court and to the supervision of an officer appointed by the court
to investigate such referral for investigation or to supervise the
convict: (a) suspended sentence; (b) indeterminate
sentence; (c) probation; (d) destierro.

17. Not a ground for partial extinction of criminal liability:

(a) conditional pardon; (b) commutation of sentence; (c)
good conduct time allowance; (d) partial service of the
sentence.

18. Does not prevent the period of prescription for crimes

punishable under special penal laws from running: (a)
institution of proceedings against the guilty person; (b)
non-discovery of the crime, if not known to since the day of
its commission; (c) dismissal of proceedings for reasons
constituting jeopardy; (d) absence of the offender from the
Philippine archipelago.

19. X, a detention prisoner who is not otherwise a

recidivist or a habitual delinquent refused to abide by the rules
and regulations prescribed for convicted prisoners serving
sentence in the institution in which he is detained. Should he be
convicted of the offense he is charged with, would he be entitled
to credit for time spent in preventive detention? (a) No,
precisely because he refused to abide by the rules and
regulations prescribed for convicted prisoners serving
sentence in the institution in which he is detained, which
disqualifies him from that benefit; (b) No, because he is
not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent; (c) Yes, but only
to the reduced measure equivalent to four-fifths (4/5) of
time spent in preventive detention; (d) Yes, to the extent of
the full time spent in preventive detention as his refusal to
abide by the rules and regulations prescribed for convicted
6
prisoners serving sentence in the institution in which he is
detained is irrelevant, understandable and proper
considering that he is a mere detention prisoner.

20. The prosecution seeks to hold four of the accused, XM,

XN, ZS, and US, criminally liable for the killing of JA and YN,
particularly as co-authors thereof by inducement, considering
that they attended the conferences and entered no opposition to
the nefarious scheme while, after the commission of the murders,
they joined with the other accused in celebrating with a fiesta,
although aside from this, these four did not cooperate in the
commission of the crimes, nor is it certain that, as relatives or
retainers of XA, the four had any influence over XS and YS, and
that any of the four said or did anything that determined the
commission of the crimes. Can they be considered as co-authors
within the meaning of article [17] of the [Revised] Penal Code?
(a) Yes, their presence at the conferences and the fact that
they entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme and,
after the commission of the murders, they joined with the
other accused in celebrating with a fiesta, make them
liable as principals by inducement; (b) Yes, because their
presence at the conferences and the fact that they entered
no opposition to the nefarious scheme, being part and
parcel of the development of the crime, could be
considered active participation in the commission of the
crime itself; (c) Yes, because their actions constituted
joining in a conspiracy and where there is conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all; (d) No, because although what
the four did amounted to joining in a conspiracy, the
[Revised] Penal Code, in Article [8], does not punish
conspiracy as such.

21. Where three persons planned to rob a house but in

carrying it out, only two of them went into the house to break
open a trunk and carry off its contents, while the third merely
remained downstairs to engage the owner of the house in a
conversation to distract her attention, the latter – (a) is merely
an accomplice because he did not directly participate in
the robbery nor cooperate therein in an indispensable
manner and there is no proof that robbery was committed
upon his inducement; (b) is a principal because of
conspiracy and direct participation; (c) is not liable for the
robbery by his mere presence at the scene of the crime for,
after all, he did not directly participate in robbing the
house; (d) is a mere accomplice, because while acting
simultaneously with the two who went into the house to
rob it, his act was not indispensable.

7
 22. MB and the victim, EA, were together at a restaurant,
until about 0:00 of the same evening, when MB and EA left for
EA’s house. EP, the housemaid of the victim, opened the door for
them; she saw MB and EA immediately proceed to EA’s room.
The next morning, EP rose to wake her mistress. She knocked at
the door. She found that EA was lying on her bed, facing
downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart, with a
broken figurine beside her head. There was no eyewitness
account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the
accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do
something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started
wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked
up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand
and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face". Although a
figurine was found broken beside the victim’s head, the medical
report, however, does not show any injury or fracture of the skull
and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage. It is established,
however, that MB had anal intercourse with EA after she was
already dead. The muscles of the anus did not close and also the
presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by the
medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the
Laboratory Report, clearly established the coitus after death.
MB had a notorious advantage of height accused had over his
hapless victim, EA, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs.
while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall. Under the
circumstances, the crime committed is: (a) homicide only,
considering that no qualifying or aggravating
circumstance could be proved; (b) murder, qualified by
outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim; (c)
murder, qualified by abuse of superiority and aggravated
by outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim; (d)
murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse of
superiority and scoffing or outraging at the corpse of the
victim.

23. Not entitled to special time allowance for good

conduct: (a) detention prisoners who have escaped from
confinement on the occasion of disorders, conflagrations,
earthquakes, or other calamities mentioned in Art. 158,
RPC, as long as they gave themselves up to the authorities
within 48 hours from the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or
catastrophe therein referred to; (b) all prisoners serving
sentence by final judgment who have escaped from
confinement on the occasion of disorders, conflagrations,
earthquakes, or other calamities mentioned in Art. 158,
RPC, but who gave themselves up to the authorities within
48 hours from the issuance of a proclamation announcing
8
the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe therein
referred to; (c) all prisoners serving sentence by final
judgment who, on account of their loyalty to the penal
institution, refused to escape from confinement even on
the occasion of disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or
other calamities mentioned in Art. 158, RPC; (d) all
prisoners, whether serving sentence by final judgment or
not, who gave themselves up to the authorities after 48
hours from the issuance of a proclamation announcing the
passing away of the calamity or catastrophe therein
referred to.

24. Under Article 70, the period of perpetual penalties is:

(a) twenty years and one day to forty years; (b) forty years;
(c) thirty years; (c) twenty years.

25. The crime of falsification of a public document carries

with it an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00
[Art. 172, Revised Penal Code (RPC)]. Being punishable by a
correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten (10) years [Art.
90, par. 3 (RPC)]. Where the public document allegedly falsified
was a notarized deed of sale registered on May 26, 2000 with the
Register of Deeds in the name of the accused, but filing of the
complaint-affidavit before the Prosecutor’s Office for falsification
of a public document was, however, filed only on October 18,
2011, one month after the victim actually came to know thereof,
then -- (a) the criminal action has prescribed, considering
the lapse of ten [10] years after the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds; (b) the criminal
action has not yet prescribed since the period of ten [10]
years counted from the moment the victim came to know
thereof has not yet lapsed at the time of the filing of the
complaint-affidavit with the Prosecutor’s Office; (c) the
criminal action may be deemed to have prescribed,
considering the lapse of ten [10] years after the document
was notarized, which may be considered its date of
commission; (d) the criminal action has not yet prescribed
because the prescriptive period may only be considered to
have started to run since the victim came to know thereof
(date of actual discovery) and will only be interrupted upon
the filing by of the Information in court.

26. Not necessarily having a duration of six months and

one day to six years: (a) prision correccional; (b) suspension
when imposed as an accessory penalty; (c) destierro; (d)
suspension when imposed as a principal penalty.

9
 27. A father simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!". After the
father spoke those words, his son drew a firearm and shot his
adversary. Under those circumstances: (a) the father is
responsible for the injuries committed by the son after
such advice was given, under the facts presented; (b) the
father is not necessarily responsible unless sufficient facts
be shown upon which to affirm that the father foresaw the
use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke the
words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby
induced him to use said weapon; (c) the father cannot be
held responsible simply for uttering those words in the
excitement of the moment; (d) the father is necessarily
responsible because inducement to the commission of the
crime by means of which a person may be considered a
principal in the same manner as he who executes the act
itself can be founded in commands, sometimes in advice,
or in words of encouragement.

28. A fine of P40,000.00, whether imposed as a single or as

an alternative penalty, is: (a) a light penalty; (b) a grave
penalty; (c) a less grave penalty; (d) a correctional penalty.

29. When is the penalty of arresto menor to be served in

the house of the defendant? (a) never, since arresto menor
means imprisonment from one day to thirty days; (b) if so
provided in the decision of the court; (c) if so requested by
the defendant; (d) if the defendant to be punished with
that penalty is a minor over 15 but under 18, who had
acted with discernment in committing the crime.

30. The deceased, C, coming upon V and L cleaning a caua

said to them, "What of it if you throw away the water as I also
can get water as easily as you can?" V, indignant at this allusion
replied. "Do you want a fight? Wait there." Immediately
proceeding to the house, V procured a revolver and returned to
the field. A brother of V, M, attempted to gain possession of the
revolver and was killed (probably accidentally) for his pains.
Loading the revolver anew, V pointed it at C wounding him in the
stomach. The wife of C tried to succor her husband, but the other
brother, L, stopped her and attacked C with a bolo. C's nephew,
U, was also wounded. Considering that C was wounded by a
pistol fired by V, and it was a mortal wound, and C, almost
immediately after receiving the pistol shot, was wounded with a
bolo by L, this likewise being a mortal wound, and the death of C
could only be attributed to "to the wounds", then: (a) both V
and L should be convicted and held liable as co-
conspirators in causing the death of C because when
10
several persons act in concert conspiracy is implied and
the act of one is the act of all; (b) both V and L should be
convicted but held liable individually in causing the death
of C because where several individuals, acting
independently, do acts which are calculated to produce the
death of another, each is responsible for the consequences
of his own acts; (c) both V and L should be acquitted
because if two or more persons acted independently, and
the actual perpetrator of the homicide cannot be
identified, all must be acquitted, although it is certain that
one of them was guilty; (d) V, who first inflicted the mortal
by firing the pistol shot, should be held liable for causing
the death of C, while L should be acquitted as his act of
inflicting the second mortal would with a bolo was no
longer necessary to kill C.

31. When is the penalty for failure to give bond to keep the
peace, whenever the convict is so obligated under his sentence,
a period of detention not exceeding THIRTY (30) DAYS? (a) if
the accused shall have been prosecuted for a grave felony;
(b) if the accused shall have been prosecuted for a less
grave felony; (c) if the accused shall have been prosecuted
for a light felony; (d) if the accused shall have been
prosecuted for grave threats or light threats under Arts.
282 and 283, respectively, RPC.

32. X, a former Treasurer of a municipality, malversed

public funds, which were carried out of the country by his wife, Y,
and deposited in another country. Under the circumstances, Y,
assuming she knew the source of the funds but had no
participation whatsoever in the commission of malversation,
would: (a) be an accessory-after-the fact under Art. 19,
RPC, but nevertheless exempt, as such, from criminal
liability under Art. 20 thereof; (b) be liable as an
accessory-after-the fact under Art. 19, RPC, being excepted
from the exemption extended under Art. 20 thereof in view
of the nature of her participation; (c) be exempt as an
accessory-after-the fact under the RPC, in view of her
relationship to the principal, but liable for obstruction of
justice under PD1829; (d) not liable as a accessory-after-
the fact as she merely acted as a fence, who is liable,
instead, under PD 1612.

33. AA, EM, and ZM were charged, together with others,

in the killing of VA, but it is claimed that there is no evidence to
show that they took any actual part therein. It appears, however,
that they were present from the time VA was taken from his
house until the time he was killed. Under the evidence in the
11
case, can they be considered as principals? (a) No, immediate
participation in the criminal design entertained by the
slayer is essential to the responsibility of one who is
alleged to have taken a direct part in the killing, as a
principal, but who has not himself inflicted an injury
materially contributing to the death; (b) No, mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not give rise to
criminal liability; (c) Yes, one who shares the guilty
purpose and aids and abets the commission of a crime by
his presence at the time of its perpetration, even though
he may not have taken an active part in its material
execution, is guilty as a principal; (d) No, mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or
conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required for
complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed
passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent.

34. An instance where a penal law favorable to the

accused may not be applied retroactively: (a) the offender is a
habitual delinquent; (b) a final sentence had already been
pronounced upon the offender upon publication of such
law or the offender is already serving sentence by final
judgment at that time; (c) the law fails to expressly provide
for its retroactive application; (d) the offender is already
undergoing probation at the time the law takes effect.

35. The Sandiganbayan found AM guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act in all of eight (8) informations filed by the Provincial Fiscal
against AM and jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan imposed a penalty that totals fifty-six (56) years
and eight (8) days of imprisonment. Under the circumstances:
(a) the Sandiganbayan obviously erred because such
penalties can be impugned as contrary to the three-fold
rule; (b) the Sandiganbayan obviously erred because that
the duration of the aggregate penalties for all convictions
should not exceed forty [40] years; (c) the Sandiganbayan
obviously did not err because courts can impose as many
penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses
committed, since for every individual crime committed, a
corresponding penalty is prescribed by law; (d) it is not
obvious whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred unless
the individual penalties for each convictions are known, as
only then will it be possible to apply the three-fold rule.

12
 36. The rate at which fine will be converted into subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency: (a) one day for each eight
pesos of fine; (b) one day for each amount of fine
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in
the Philippines at the time of finality of the judgment of
conviction; (c) one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines
at the time of conviction by the trial court; (d) one day for
each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate
prevailing in the Philippines at the time such insolvency is
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trial court.

37. Two vehicles collided at an intersection. X, driver of

the vehicle found to be at fault, was convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. Y, the
prevailing party, unable to collect civil indemnity from X, seeks to
enforce the same against X’s employer. Can X’s employer be
held subsidiarily liable for the payment of civil indemnity? (a)
only if X’s employer is engaged in a business or industry
and does not exclusively use the automobile for private
ends; (b) only if X’s employer is found guilty of negligence
in the selection and supervision of X; (c) only if X’s
employer has been charged as co-principal in the crime;
(d) only if X’s employer has been impleaded in the civil
aspect of the criminal case.

38. RB is one of the several persons accused in more than

one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Documents before the Sandiganbayan. In the meantime, RB run
for and was elected as mayor in a town in Cavite. Subsequently,
Batas Pambansa Big. 195 was passed amending, among others,
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, providing that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal-prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. On that basis and in all cases pending before the
Sandiganbayan in which RB is one of the accused, the
prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public
officers "from their public positions or from any other public
office that they may be holding ... for ninety (90) days ". Under
the circumstances: (a) the Sandiganbayan may issue an
order directing the suspension of all the accused including
RB "from their public positions or from any other public
office that they may be holding ... for ninety (90) days", as
long as the informations in question are shown to be valid
13
and regardless of when they were filed as such suspension
does not constitute a penalty; (b) the Sandiganbayan can
issue an order directing the suspension of all the accused
including RB "from their public positions or from any
other public office that they may be holding ... for ninety
(90) days" because such suspension amounts to a penalty
and no penalty can be imposed which was not prescribed
by law for the offense at the time of its commission; (c) to
apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the
herein accused would be violative of the constitutional
guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law and,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan is not obligated to apply the
provisions thereof and grant the motion; (d) being
unfavorable to the accused, the amendatory provision of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 should be applied prospectively;
besides, such suspension deprives the people of the
services of an elected official and may not, therefore, be
applied in this case.

39. On the occasion of a student demonstration being held

in the vicinity of Feati University, tragedy struck unexpectedly.
FS, a 16-year old student of the Philippine Science High School,
along with MF, CL, and EG, also students of the same school,
were hit by a pillbox bomb causing the instantaneous death of FS
and physical injuries to others. "Murder with Multiple Attempted
Murder" was filed against AR, a security guard of Feati
University, who threw the pillbox bomb at the student
demonstrators who were then marching, resulting in an
explosion, which act was so sudden and unexpected. In his
signed confession, AR admitted throwing the pillbox, but only to
scare the student demonstrators; unfortunately, he miscalculated
his aim and distance, as it fell on the head of and killed the
victim, as well as caused physical injuries to three other student
demonstrators. If convicted of murder and multiple frustrated
murder, would it be necessary to consider whether AR should be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed? (a) Yes, since AR
did not aim the pillbox at a particular student and merely
wanted to scare the demonstrators, but unfortunately
miscalculated his aim and distance, it appears, therefore,
that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed, which should be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance; (b) Yes, because the result simply
cannot be expected from the means he employed to
accomplish his purpose; (c) Yes, because there is a
demonstrated disproportion between the means he
employed to attain his purpose and the result obtaining,
which satisfies the indispensable requirement of this
14
mitigating circumstance; (d) No, by committing a complex
crime, the imposable penalty is already raised to the
maximum of the most severe penalty for said crimes, which
is death; hence, there should be no occasion to consider
further any mitigating circumstance.

40. X was pardoned by the Chief Executive, after his

conviction for plunder, for which he was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. X wanted to run for office and feels he can do so
because the terms of the pardon are silent about the matter or
otherwise does not expressly prevent him from doing so.
Therefore -- (a) X can run for public office inasmuch as the
pardon, not being subject to a condition, should be
regarded as absolute and, therefore, extinguished his
criminal liability and all the effects thereof; (b) X cannot
run for public office because though pardon by the Chief
Executive extinguished his criminal liability and the effects
thereof, the right to run for public office can only be
restored if expressly remitted in the pardon; (c) X cannot
run for public office because although pardon extinguished
his criminal liability, it does not erase the effects thereof;
(d) X can run for public office because the pardon in
question extinguished his criminal liability and does not
expressly prevent him from running for a public office.

41. Not a penalty: (a) measures of prevention and

safety under Art. 24, RPC; (b) confiscation and forfeiture of
the proceeds or instruments of crime under Art. 45, RPC;
(c) bond to keep the peace under Art. 25, RPC; (d) fine,
under Art. 25, RPC.

42. Not a pecuniary penalty: (a) restitution; (b)

reparation of damage caused; (c) indemnification of
consequential damages; (d) fines and costs of proceedings.

43. RB was charged with Rape and eventually convicted

thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, RB died. As a result:
(a) both the criminal and civil aspect of the case should be
dismissed as the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes only his criminal liability but
also his civil liability; (b) only the criminal aspect should
be dismissed, while the case may proceed as regards the
civil liability of the accused, the obligation to respond
therefor being transmissible to RB’s heirs; (c) only the
criminal aspect should be dismissed, while the case may
proceed as regards the civil liability of the accused, but the
obligation to respond therefor is transmissible to RB’s
heirs only to the extent of what they may inherit from him;
15
(d) only the criminal aspect should be dismissed while the
survival of the civil liability depends upon whether or not
those who have the right to demand it insist on pursuing
the civil liability against RB’s heirs.

44. Not a mode of extinguishing the penalty of fine: (a)

payment; (b) service of the equivalent period of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency where the financial
circumstances of the offender has improved thereafter; (c)
prescription, whether the crime be punishable under the
RPC or under a special penal law; (d) amnesty.

45. What is the period of probation where the accused is

sentenced to a fine and applies for probation? (a) None,
because probation presupposes that the accused must
have been sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment not
exceeding six [6] years; (b) It depends on the amount of
the fine which is first converted into an equivalent number
of days of subsidiary imprisonment, the length of which
determines the period of probation; (c) It depends on the
period fixed by the court, exercising solely its discretion on
the matter; (d) It depends on the period fixed by the court
but it cannot be less than, nor more than twice, the
equivalent number of days of subsidiary imprisonment.

46. In a murder case committed by several persons, those

who were present from the time the victim was taken from his
house until the time the victim was killed but who did not take
actual part in the said killing, are nevertheless guilty as
principals; however, those who did not accompany the rest of the
party to the place where the victim was killed, but who were
only detailed to guard the victim's companion at a point some
distance from the place where the killing of the victim took place
– (a) cannot be convicted as co-principals, absent proof of
inducement, for lack of actual participation nor
indispensable cooperation therein; (b) can be convicted as
accomplices for having committed acts simultaneous to
the commission of murder, but not indispensable thereto;
(c) cannot be convicted of any crime because mere
presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to give
rise to criminal liability; (d) can be convicted as co-
principals by direct participation because their voluntary
presence lent moral aid to the commission of crime.

47. In case of accident under Article 12(4), Revised Penal

Code -- (a) there is no criminal liability incurred but there
is civil liability; (b) there is neither criminal nor civil
liability incurred; (c) a crime is committed but there is no
16
criminal liability incurred; (d) there is civil liability despite
the absence of crime.

48. The mother of a thief who helped the latter in selling

stolen goods is – (a) always exempt from criminal liability as
an accessory-after-the-fact by reason of her relationship to
the principal of the crime; (b) is liable as an accessory-
after-the-fact if she acted with knowledge of the stolen
character of the goods, but is exempt from criminal
liability in view of her relationship to the principal of the
crime; (c) is liable as an accessory-after-the-fact if she
acted with knowledge of the stolen character of the goods
and is not exempt from criminal liability as such despite
her relationship to the principal of the crime; (d) is a fence
and, therefore, guilty under the Anti-Fencing Law.

49. On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal

cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal presumption
and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound
and authorities are in sharp conflict. In the Philippines, the
following theory applies: (a) insanity as a defense is a
confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime
is established, and when the defense of insanity is not
made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows;
(b) an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a
preponderance of evidence, and therefore, insanity is not
to be established beyond a reasonable doubt; (c) the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt
because, while it is true that the presumption of sanity
exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential
ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity
as one essential ingredients; (d) where the accused claims
and introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the
duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt.

50. A wife who prepared the way for the perpetration of a

crime of rape committed by her husband upon a 12-year old
victim, by conducting her by force and violence to a place apart
among the trees, where she called to her husband, the person
chiefly interested in perpetrating the crime, delivering the victim
to her husband and then going away from the scene of the crime
so that her husband might freely consummate the pre-arranged
rape, as the latter did with violence and intimidation – (a) is a
principal by indispensable cooperation; (b) is a mere
accomplice; (c) is a principal by direct participation; (d) is
a principal by inducement.
17
+ + + THANK YOU – NOTHING FOLLOWS + + +

18