Tan, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No.

136368, January 16, 2002 (retroactive application)

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with
the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder
Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem
the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for
reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement
as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared
and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision
P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was
filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of
the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of
Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and
executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the
120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-
day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from
March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:

What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the
petitioner?

HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is
Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or
final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain
the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a
certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the
proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for
in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies
of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof,
with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct
the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile
the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
period of redemption when he made the redemption.

Sablas v. Sablas, 526 SCRA 292 (liberal application)

Facts:

Petitioner spouses were served with summons and a copy of the complaint, they filed a motion for
extension of time requesting an additional period of 15 days, or until November 5, 1999, to file their
answer. However, they were able to file it only on November 8, 1999. While the trial court observed
that the answer was filed out of time, it admitted the pleading because no motion to declare petitioner
spouses in default was filed.

The following day, respondents filed a motion to declare petitioner spouses in default. It was denied
by the trial court. Respondents moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Thereafter, they
challenged the order in the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari alleging that the admission of
the answer by the trial court was contrary to the rules of procedure and constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The appellate court ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion because, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the trial court had no recourse but to declare petitioner
spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999. Thus, the
Court of Appeals granted the petition, vacated the December 6, 1999 order and remanded the case to
the trial court for reception of plaintiffs’ evidence.

Aggrieved, petitioner spouses now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals in this petition for
review on certiorari.

issue:

Whether there was a valid declaration of default?

held:

No, Where There Is No Motion, There Can Be No Declaration of Default, The elements of a valid
declaration of default are:

1. the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defending party either by service
of summons or voluntary appearance;

2. the defending party failed to file the answer within the time allowed therefor and

3. a motion to declare the defending party in default has been filed by the claiming party with notice
to the defending party.

An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. It can be properly issued
against the defending party who failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the
claiming party files a motion to that effect with notice to the defending party.

Court not yet declared in default, and because of that… plaintiff not acquired vested right to

It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to be
heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of
Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing an
answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period.

First Sarmiento Property Holdings vs. PBCom, G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018 (incapable of
pecuniary estimation)
FACTS:First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a 40 Million loan, which was secured by areal estate
mortgage over 1,076 parcels of land. The loan amount was however increased to 100 Million.
PBCOM filed a petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage. It claimed that it sent
First Sarmiento several demand letters, yet, FirstSarmiento still failed to pay the principal amount
and accrued interest on the loan. First Sarmiento attempted to file a complaint for annulment of real
estate mortgage with the RTC, however, the Clerk of Court refused to accept the Complaint in the
absence of the mortgaged properties’ tax declaration, which would be used to assess the docket fees.
On December 29, 2011, the RTC granted First Sarmiento’s Urgent Motion to Consider the Value of
Subject Matter of the Complaint as not capable of pecuniary estimation, and ruled that First
Sarmiento’s action for annulment of real estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Also, on the same date, the mortgaged properties were auctioned and sold to PBCOM as the highest
bidder.Thereafter, First Sarmiento filed a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage. It claimed
that it never received the loan proceeds of 100 Million from PBCOM yet the latter still sought the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Inits opposition, PBCOM asserted that the RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the First Sarmiento’s complaint because the action for annulment
of Mortgage was a real action, thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market
value of the mortgaged properties.The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because
of the failure of payment of appropriate filing fees. First Sarmiento sought direct recourse with the
SCthrough a Petition for Review under Rule 45. It insists that its complaint for the annulment of real
estate mortgage was incapable of pecuniary estimation. It claims that its complaint for annulment of
real estate mortgage was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation because it merely sought to
remove the lien on its properties, not the recovery or reconveyance of the mortgaged properties. It
insists that it had ownership and possession of the mortgaged properties when it filed its complaint,
hence, it never expressly or impliedly sought recovery of their ownership or
possession.ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC obtained jurisdiction over First Sarmiento’s Complaint
forannulment of real estate mortgage.

RULING:Yes. Section 19 (1) of B.P. 128, as amended, provides RTCs with exclusive, original
jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapableof pecuniary
estimation.”In the case of Lapitan vs. Scandia, the SC held that to determine whether the subject
matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy
sough must first be established. However, where the money claim is only a consequence of the
remedy sought, the action is said to be one incapable of pecuniary estimation.“In determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertainingthe nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of , the principal
relief sought like in suits too have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of litigation may not be estimated
in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.”A careful reading of
First Sarmiento’s complaint convinces the Court that petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of
the properties foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession
over them. Rather it assailed the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered
with PBCOM because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the 100 Million loan
agreement.In the case of Far East Ban vs, Shemberg, the Court ruled that an action for cancellation of
mortgage has a subject that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Where the issue involves the
validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.The registration of the
certificate of sale issued by the sheriff after an extrajudicialsale is a mandatory requirement; thus, if
the certificate of sale is not registered with the Registry of Deeds, the property sold at auction is not
conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption does not begin to run.In the case at bar, the
Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City of Malolos was restrained from registering the certificate of sale with
the Registry of Deeds and the certificate of sale was only issued to PBCOM after the Complaint for
annulment of real estate mortgage was filed. Therefore, even if the properties had already been
foreclosed whenthe complaint was filed, their ownership and possession remained with petitioner
since
the certificate of sale was not registered with the Registry of Deeds. This supports First Sarmiento’s
claim that it never asked for the reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the mortgaged
properties when it filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed ownershipand possession over
them.Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of court, upon the
direction of the Executive Judge, the Court is convinced that the Regional Trial Court acquired
jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage

Roldan vs. Sps. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803 (jurisdiction)

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).

Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for
recovery of money, the court’s jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the property
involved.

As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines
the court’s jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property is only
P13,380.00, the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level
court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against respondents
spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios and respondent Romel D. Matorres. The RTC,
however, dismissed the complaint.

According to the RTC, it appearing from the complaint that the assessed value of the property
mortgaged is only P13,380.00 and the instant case being a real action, the assessed value of the
property determines the jurisdiction. The assessed value of the property involved being below
P20,000.00, it is the first level court that has jurisdiction over the cases. The MR by petitioner was
also denied.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the
RTC when it ordered the dismissal of her foreclosure case without prejudice and denying her motion
for reconsideration. She argues that foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases
filed with it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
No. The RTC dismissed the foreclosure cases finding that being a real action and the assessed value
of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction over the
case and not the RTC.

The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner’s action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that the
loan obtained by respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such
loan which was secured by a mortgage on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in
case of default of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to the court, the property be ordered sold
to answer for the obligation under the mortgage contract and the accumulated interest.

It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has
been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case
of default in payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the
view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a
real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an
order for the sale of the res.

As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines
the court’s jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property is only
P13,380.00, the RTC correctly found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level
court.

Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

We are not persuaded. In the Russell case, we held:

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.

However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission,
which is a counterpart of specific performance.

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed
value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). X XX

Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for
recovery of money, the court’s jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the property
involved.

Iniego vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876 (jurisdiction)

SUMMARY: Defendant (herein petitioner) to an action based on QD filed a Motion to Dismiss the
action against him pending before the RTC on the ground that such court has no jurisdiction over it.
Private respondent asserts otherwise. Respondent judge ruled in favor of the latter, claiming that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over the action. CA affirmed. SC affirmed insofar as
jurisdiction remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed is P490,000
DOCTRINE: Actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions based on pecuniary estimation.
As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the
amount of (all kinds) damages claimed. FACTS:  Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 
Private Respondent Fokker Santos (Everyone, meet Fokker! :D) filed a complaint for quasi-delict
and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, driver of the truck involved in the traffic accident, and against
Artemio Iniego (Petitioner), owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed
from a vehicular accident in 1999, where a freight truck driven by Pinion hit PR’s jitney which
Santos was driving at the time of the accident. (No details given.) The total amount of damages
claimed is P490,000  Santos filed a Motion to Declare Iniego in default for failure of the latter to
file his answer within the final extended period.  Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action. 
Judge Guillermo G. Purganan of the RTC issued the assailed Omnibus Order, which ruled: o The
Motion to Declare Iniego in default must be denied, as Iniego’s failure to file his answer was because
the Order was sent to the wrong address, and so Iniego never received it. o The main cause of action
is not the claim for damages, but quasi-delict. Damages are claimed only as a result of the

alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under Art. 2176 in the case of Pinion, and Art. 2180
for Iniego. But since fault or negligence cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court
(RTC) has exclusive jurisdiction. Iniego moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES + RATIO: 1. WON actions for damages based on QD are capable of pecuniary estimation –
YES They are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages
suffered because of defendant’s alleged tortious acts, therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
According to herein Judge Purganan, since fault or negligence in QDs cannot be the subject of
pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. This is erroneous. It is crystal cear from BP Blg. 129,
as amended by RA 7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary
estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A cause of action is “the
delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff.” On the other hand, the subject matter of the action is “the physical facts, the thing real
or personal…. in relation to which the suit is prosecuted.” In the case of Lapitan v. Scandia, Justice
JBL Reyes, wrote, on the issue of determining whether the subject matter of an action is capable of
pecuniary estimation (rephrased): This Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
capable of pecuniary estimation. And whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of the principal relief sought (ex. specific performance, actions for support, etc.) the subject of
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. Actions for damages based on QDs are actions for
the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious
acts. The damages represent the monetary equivalent of the injury, thus sought to be recovered by the
plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought and is not merely incidental thereto or a
consequence thereof.

CIVIL PROCEDURE | B2015 CASES

Fault or negligence is not actionable by itself. For such fault or negligence to be actionable, there
must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief available is for the reparation, restitution, or
payment of such damage, without which, the alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief.
The fault or negligence, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there
can be no action based on QD without a claim for damages. 2. WON the amount of damages is
within the jurisdiction of the RTC – YES It is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of
determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claim for damages arises from the same or from
different causes of action. The Court concurs with Iniego that actions for damages are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, the total amount of damages still exceeds the
jurisdictional limit of P400,000 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The distinction made
between damages arising from injuries in a QD (actual damages) and those arising from a refusal to
admit liability for a QD (moral and exemplary damages), which Iniego claims, is more apparent than
real, as the damages sought originate from the same cause of action: the QD. (Note: The basis for the
moral and exemplary damages here is supposedly Iniego’s refusal to acknowledge his liability and
pay the corresponding damages. The basis for the actual damages is the accident itself. ) The fault or
negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer are the
seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction. Even assuming that the claims for moral and
exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the QD, their inclusion in the
computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. Rule 2, Sec. 5 (d) provides that
where the claims in joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate
amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Hence, whether or not the different claims for
damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount
thereof which shall govern. HELD: CA affirmed insofar as jurisdiction remains with the RTC,
considering that the total amount claimed is P490,000

Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (estoppel by laches)

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question by laches, which is failure or neglect, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier. Here, the Surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
in the trial court, but it only did so after receiving the appellate court’s adverse decision. Hence, it is
barred by laches.

FACTS:
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a case in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon. As prayed for in the complaint,
a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants’ properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the CFI rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after
the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the CFI issued a writ of
execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for
the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond against which the Surety filed a written
opposition. The CFI denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made
on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the necessary demand was made, and
upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution
against the counter-bond. Upon the Surety’s failure to file an answer to the motion, the CFI granted
the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the
required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the CFI
denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) from such order of denial and
from the one denying its motion for reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of errors raises the
question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.

The CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. After the Surety received notice of the
decision, it filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees’
action was filed in the CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand
does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction
to try and decide the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the Surety is barred from raising the jurisdictional issue by laches.
RULING:
Yes. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it
could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages
of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after
an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. If such conduct is to be sanctioned, the SC would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more.

Velasquez, Jr. vs. Lisondra Land, Inc., G.R. No. 231290, August 27, 2020 (estoppel by laches)

Here, Perfecto originally filed his complaint against Lisondra Land before the RTC which, as
discussed earlier, has jurisdiction over the controversy between the parties. However, Lisondra
Land claimed that the case is within the HLURB’s exclusive authority. It maintained this theory
before the CA which eventually ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Thereafter, Perfecto relied on
the final and executory decision of the appellate court and refiled the action against Lisondra Land
with the HLURB. Lisondra Land actively participated in the proceedings before the HLURB. After
receiving an adverse decision, Lisondra Land questioned the jurisdiction of the HLURB and claimed
that the RTC has the authority to hear the case. This is where estoppel operates and bars Lisondra
Land from assailing the HLURB’s jurisdiction. Lisondra Land cannot now abandon the theory
behind its arguments before Civil Case No. 18146, CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and the HLURB. The
Court cannot countenance Lisondra Land’s act of adopting inconsistent postures —first, by attacking
the jurisdiction of the trial court and subsequently, the authority of the HLURB. Otherwise, the
consequence is revolting as Lisondra Land would be allowed to make a complete mockery of the
judicial system. In fact, Lisondra Land’s conduct had resulted in two conflicting appellate court
decisions in CA-G.R. SP No. 72463 and CA-G.R. SP No. 131359 eroding the stability of our legal
system and jurisprudence.

Briones v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015 (venue)

Facts: A complaint filed by Briones for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note, Loan
Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of TCT No. 290846, and Damages against Cash
Asia before the RTC. In his complaint, Briones alleged that he is the owner of a property covered by
TCT No. 160689, his sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of
possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia. Upon investigation, Briones discovered
that: (a) on December 6, 2007, he purportedly executed a promissory note, loan agreement, and deed
of real estate mortgage covering the subject property (subject contracts) in favor of Cash Asia in
order to obtain a loan in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00 from the latter; and (b) since the said loan was
left unpaid, Cash Asia proceeded to foreclose his property. In this relation, Briones claimed that he
never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living and working in Vietnam since
October 31, 2007. He further claimed that he only went back to the Philippines on December 28,
2007 until January 3, 2008 to spend the holidays with his family, and that during his brief stay in the
Philippines, nobody informed him of any loan agreement entered into with Cash Asia. Essentially,
Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts claiming his signature to be forged.
For its part, Cash Asia filed a Motion to Dismiss, praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s
complaint on the ground of improper venue. In this regard, Cash Asia pointed out the venue
stipulation in the subject contracts stating that "all legal actions arising out of this notice in
connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted tothe
jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati City." In view thereof, it contended that all actions arising
out of the subject contracts may only be exclusively brought in the courts of Makati City, and as
such, Briones’s complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila.
In response, Briones filed an opposition, asserting, inter alia, that he should not be covered by the
venue stipulation in the subject contracts as he was never a party therein. He also reiterated that his
signatures on the said contracts were forgeries.
RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
The CA annulled the RTC Orders, and accordingly, dismissed Briones’s complaint without prejudice
to the filing of the same before the proper court in Makati City. It held that the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in denying Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss, considering that the subject contracts clearly
provide that actions arising therefrom should be exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City
only.
Issue: Whether or not respondent’s motion to dismiss shall be granted by reason of improper venue?
Ruling: No, respondent’s motion to dismiss shall not be granted by reason of improper venue.
Based on Rule 4,secs.1,2,3 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is that the
venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an
exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the parties, thru a written
instrument, may either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be
filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified
by Section 4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the
suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their
suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement,
what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such
stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively,"
"waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the
exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely
an agreement on an additional forum,not as limiting venue to the specified place.
In this relation, case law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms,
conditions, and/or coverage of a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein shall still be binding on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be
properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly
assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue
stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. To be
sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the exclusive venue
stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such stipulation is
contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature,
considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati
City. However, it must be emphasized that Briones's complaint directly assails the validity of the
subject contracts, claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an
implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to the general rules on venue, Briones properly
filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.

Living @ Sense, Inc. v. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 193753, September 26, 2012
(indispensable party)

FACTS

Petitioner Living @ Sense, Inc. sub-contracted to Dou Mac, Inc. (DMI) its underground open-trench
work for the Network Project of Globe Telecom in Mindanao. As required, DMI gave surety and
performance bonds which it secured from respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (Malayan)
which bound itself jointly and severally liable with DMI. The bonds will answer for the loss and
damage to petitioner if DMI fails to perform its obligations under the subcontract.

The excavation and restoration works by DMI was later stopped by the government after it found
DMI's work unsatisfactory. Eventually, petitioner terminated the subcontract and demanded from
respondent insurance company indemnification in the amount of P1.04 million. Respondent Malayan
denied petitioner's claim arguing that the liability of its principal, DMI, should first be determined
before Malayan can be held liable. Thus, petitioner sued Malayan for specific performance and
breach of contract.

Respondent Malayan claimed that the suit should be dismissed because petitioner failed to implead
DMI as an indispensable party. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that respondent is a surety who
is directly and primarily liable to indemnify petitioner, and that the bond is "callable on demand" in
the event of breach of obligation. The Regional Trial Court ruled for the respondent, and the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.

ISSUE

Is DMI an indispensable party in this case?

Why did the SC did not dismissed the case? Although the joinder of an indispensable party is
compulsory, failure to do so does not automatically result in the dismissal of the action. Section 11,
Rule provides: “Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action”.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

RULING
No, DMI is not an indispensable party in this case. Article 1216 of the Civil Code on solidary
obligations allows petitioner, as creditor, to proceed against any of the solidary debtors. Since
respondent Malayan bound itself "jointly and severally" with DMI under the surety and performance
bonds, it is considered a solidary debtor and is therefore not an indispensable party. This is because
petitioner can claim indemnity directly from respondent insurance company who has bound itself
solidarily with DMI for the obligations under the bonds.

An indispensable party is defined as "a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be
had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or defendant." Without it, the court
cannot act on the case not only as to the absent party but also as to those present.

Even if assuming that DMI was indeed an indispensable party, the Regional Trial Court should not
have dismissed the case but should have ordered the petitioner to implead the indispensable party,
which can be done on motion of the party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action.

Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015 (indispensable party)

Divinagracia vs. Parilla

Facts: Conrado, Sr. owned a parcel of land. He had 2 children with his 1st wife and 7 children with
his 2nd wife. He also begot 3 illegitimate children. Both Mateo, Sr. (7 children) and Cebeleo, Sr. (2)
pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. Santiago, who bought the shares of majority of the heirs of a property left
by Conrado, Sr. He filed a complaint for partition but did not implead Mateo, Sr.’s children.

RTC found that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and,
as such, has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, Santiago did not validly acquire
Mateo, Sr.’s share over the subject land, considering that Felcon (son of Mateo Sr.) admitted the lack
of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo, Sr.’s share.

CA dismissed Santiago’s complaint for partition. It held the Mateo, Sr.’s children are indispensable
parties to the judicial partition and thus, their non-inclusion as defendants would necessarily result in
its dismissal.

Issue: WON the action for partition proper without impleading Mateo, Sr.’s children

Held: No because the co-heirs are indispensable parties. They have rights over the subject land and,
as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action for partition.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. (Domingo
v. Scheer). The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

A.M. No. 19-08-14-SC (Admiralty cases)

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 19-08-14-SC
THE RULES OF PR
OCEDURE FOR ADMIRALTY CASES
Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1
980 (
Batas
Pambansa Bilang
129) and to achieve an expeditious determination of Admiralty
cases, the Court resolved to promulgate the following Rules
of
Procedure for
Admiralty Cases.
P
ART
I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1.
Title
. – These Rules shall be known as "The Rules of Procedure for
Admiralty Cases."
Section 2.
Objectives
. – The objectives of
these Rules are:
(a)
To provide Regional Trial Courts with a special and summary pro
cedure
for Admiralty cases as defined by the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of
1980, as amended;
(b)
To provide parties in Admiralty cases a fast, reliable, and eff
icient means
of recourse to Philippine courts; and
(c)
To enhance the administration of justice in Admiralty cases
in
the
Philippines through the developm
ent of judicial expertise.
Section 3.
Definition of Terms
. – As used in these Rules, the following definition of
terms shall apply:
(a)
Action
in rem
– an Admiralty action
in rem
, directed against a specific ship
itself or its particular cargo or freight to satisfy the claim
of the plaintiff out
of the
res.
2
i.
Writ of Summons in Action
In Rem
(writ) – a written command in
the name of the court directed against a person in control or
possession of the property, or against a ship’s Registry, for t
he latter
to act or abstain from acting in some way (See
Annex “A”
).
(b)
Action
in personam
– an Admiralty action
in personam
, directed against a
natural or juridical person who is the owner, charterer, or oth
er person in
possession and/or control of a ship or cargo.
i. Summons in Action
In
Personam
(summons)
- a written command in
the name of the court directed t
o defendant to file an answer.
(c)
Cargo – the load or lading of ship; the goods or merchandise on
board a ship
to be carried to a certain port.
(d)
Charter party – a marine contract by which an entire ship or so
me principal
part thereof is let by the owner to another person for a specif
ied time or use;
this includes “bareboat” or “dem
ise” charters, “time” charters,
and “voyage”
or “trip” charters.
(e)
Freight – the price or compensa
tion paid for the transportation
of goods by a
carrier, at sea, from port to port.
(f)
Limitation action – an action by
shipowners or other persons un
der any written
law for the limitation of the a
mount of their liability in conn
ection with a ship
or other property.
(g)
Limitation fund – a guarantee or deposit made by shipowners to
meet any
damage claim to facilitate the s
tatutory limit of their liabili
ty for the
negligence of their captains, officers, or such other persons o
perating the ship.
(h)
Marine casualty – any damage against third persons which may ar
ise from the
conduct of the captain in the car
e of the goods which the vesse
l carries, as well
as damages caused to persons or to cargo due to a collision thr
ough the fault,
negligence, or lack of skill of
the captain, sailing mate, or a
ny other member
of the complement.
(i)
Maritime lien – legal claim or charge on property, either real
or personal, as a
collateral or security for the payment of some debt or obligati
on. It attaches to
a property by operation of law and once attached, it follows th
e property until
it is discharged.
(j)
Protection and Indemnity Club – A non-governmental, non-profit
mutual or
cooperative association of marine insurance providers to member
s that consist
of shipowners, operators, charter
ers and seafarers of the membe
r companies.
(k)
Relevant person – the person who
would be liable on the claim i
n an action
in
personam.
3
(l)
Ship – includes any description
of a vessel used in navigation
including
hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating c
rafts, and fixed
or floating platforms.
(m)
Vessel – every description of watercraft or other artificial co
ntrivances used,
or capable of being used, as a m
eans of transportation on water
, whether under
its own means or not; it is gener
ally a more comprehensive term
than “ship.”
(n)
Warrant of Arrest of a Vessel,
Cargo, or Freight – court proces
s by which a
ship, cargo, or freight is detained or restricted to secure a m
aritime claim (
See
Annex “B”
).
Section 4.
Applicability
. — These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil actions
before the designated Admiralty
courts involving claims and cas
es in Admiralty filed
on the basis of shipping and othe
r related laws, rules and regu
lations, such as, but
not limited to, the following:
(a)
The Spanish Code of Commerce of 1888, Book III on
Maritime
Commerce;
(b)
An Act on Salvage and Rendering of Assistance to Vessels and Ca
rgoes
(Act No. 2616 [1916]);
(c)
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (C
ommonwealth Act No. 65 [1936]);
(d)
New Civil Code of the Philippines, Title VIII, Chapter 3, Secti
on 3 on
Common Carriers (Republic Act No. 386 [1949]);
(e)
Maritime Industry Decree of 1974
(Presidential Decree No. 474 [
1974]);
(f)
Insurance Code, Chapter II, Title
I on Marine Insurance (Presid
ential
Decree No. 612 [1974], as amended);
(g)
Revised Charter of the Philippine Ports Authority (Presidential
Decree
No. 857 [1975]);
(h)
Marine Pollution Decree as to Ships (Presidential Decree No.
97
9
[1976]);
(i)
Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 (Pre
sidential Decree No. 1521 [197
8]);
(j)
Philippine Overseas Shipping Deve
lopment Act (Republic Act No.
7471
[1992]);
(k)
Domestic Shipping Development
Act of 2004 (Republic Act No. 929
5
[2004]);
(l)
Oil Spill Compensation Act of
2007 (Republic Act No. 9483 [2007
]);
(m)
Philippine Coast Guard Law of
2009 (Republic Act No. 9993 [2009
]);
(n)
Single Maritime Administration for STCW (Republic Act No.
10635
[2014]);
(o)
Liberalization of Cabotage La
w (Republic Act No. 10668 [2015]);
and
(p)
Naval Architecture and Marine E
ngineering Law (Republic Act No.
10698 [2015]).
Likewise, these Rules shall be i
nterpreted and implemented cons
istently with
the international standards and
norms used in the international
shipping industry,
much of the substance of which may be found in the
following in
ternational
conventions and instruments, inc
luding their respective annexes
and protocols:
4
(a)
1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);
(b)
1974 International Convention on th
e Safety of Life at Sea (SOL
AS), and
its applicable annexes and protocols;
(c)
1966 International Convention
on Load Lines (LOADLINES);
(d)
1969 International Convention on
Tonnage Measurement of Ships
(TONNAGE);
(e)
1978/1995 International Conventio
n on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW);
(f)
1973/1978 International Conventi
on for the Prevention of Pollut
ion from
Ships (MARPOL);
(g)
1952 International Convention re
lating to the Arrest of Sea-goi
ng Ships
(ARREST);
(h)
1972 International Convention fo
r Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGS); and
(i)
Other conventions of the International Maritime Organization to
which the
Philippines is a party or signatory.
Section 5.
Admiralty Cases
. – In the implementation or
enforcement of the above
laws, rules and regulations, the
Admiralty jurisdiction of the
court refers to the
jurisdiction to hear and determin
e any of the following maritim
e claims:
(a)
Loss or damage caused by
the operation of the ship;
(b)
Loss of life or personal injury occurring, whether on land or o
n water, in
direct connection with the operation of the ship;
(c)
Salvage operations or any salvage agreement, including, if appl
icable,
special compensation relating to
salvage operations in respect
of a ship
which, by itself or its cargo, h
as threatened damage to the env
ironment;
(d)
Damage or threat of damage caused by the ship to the
environmen
t,
coastline or related interests,
including the carriage of waste
, garbage, or
pollution as cargo into the Philippines; measures taken to
prev
ent,
minimize, or remove such damage;
compensation for such damage;
costs
of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the environment
actu
ally
undertaken or to be undertaken; loss incurred or likely to be i
ncurred by
third parties in connection with s
uch damage; and damage, costs
, or loss
of a similar nature to those id
entified in this subparagraph (d
);
(e)
Costs or expenses relating to the raising, removal, recovery, d
estruction or
rendering harmless of a ship which is sunk, wrecked,
stranded o
r
abandoned, including anything that
is or has been on board such
ship, and
costs or expenses relating to the
preservation of an abandoned
ship and
maintenance of its crew;
(f)
Any agreement relating to the use
of a ship, including bareboat
charter,
charter by demise, time charter,
voyage charter or contract of
affreightment, and maritime cont
ract of carriage, whether of go
ods or
people, including bills of lading;
(g)
General average;
(h)
Towage;
(i)
Pilotage;
5
(j)
Goods, materials, provisions, bunke
rs, equipment (including con
tainers)
supplied or services rendered to the ship for its operation, ma
nagement,
preservation, or maintenance;
(k)
Construction, reconstruction, r
epair, converting or equipping o
f the ship;
(l)
Port, canal, dock, harbor and othe
r waterway dues and charges;
(m)
Wages and other sums due to the master, officers and other memb
ers of
the ship's complement who are not Filipino citizens, in respect
of their
employment on the ship, including costs of repatriation and
soc
ial
insurance contributions payable
 on their behalf, initiated whil
e the vessel
is within Philippine jurisdiction;
(n)
Disbursements incurred on beha
lf of the ship or its owners;
(o)
Insurance premiums (including mutual insurance calls) in respec
t of the
ship, payable by or on behalf of
the shipowner or demise charte
rer;
(p)
Any commissions, brokerages or a
gency fees payable in respect o
f the ship
by or on behalf of the shipow
ner or demise charterer;
(q)
Any dispute as to ownership or possession of the ship;
(r)
Any dispute between co-owners of the ship as to the employment
or
earnings of the ship;
(s)
A mortgage or a "hypothèque" or a c
harge of the same nature on
the ship;
(t)
Any dispute arising out of a contract for the sale of the ship;
and
(u)
Enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in relatio
n to claims,
or judgments and awards rendere
d under the Admiralty and mariti
me
jurisdiction of a foreign court
or arbitral tribunal, and subje
ct to the
procedures under Rule 39, Secti
on 48 of the Rules of Court and
the
requirements of Republic Act No. 9285.
Provided
, that such action, demand or c
laim shall be filed with the des
ignated
first- or second-level Admiralty courts, as the case may be, in
accordance with their
jurisdictional thresholds, as may be determined by law. In case
the action, demand
or claim is within the jurisdic
tional threshold of first-level
courts, the case shall be
filed before the first-level court and the Rules of Procedure f
or Admiralty Cases shall
apply.
Section 6.
Actions in rem
. – Actions
in rem
may be filed, even if the ship may be
located outside the Philippi
nes, in the following cases:
(a)
Any claim to the possession or own
ership of a ship or any share
therein;
(b)
Any question arising between the co-owners of a ship as to poss
ession,
employment, or earnings of that ship, including the
settlement
of any
account outstanding and unsettled
between the parties in relati
on to the
ship;
(c)
Any claim in respect of a mortgage of or charge on a ship or an
y share
therein;
(d)
Any claim for the attachment, forfeiture or condemnation of a s
hip, or for
the restoration of a ship;
(e)
Any claim on the basis of a maritime lien or other charge on an
y ship, or
other property for th
e amount claimed; and
(f)
Enforcement of an arbitral award
or foreign judgment against a
ship.
6
Section 7.
Actions in personam.
– At the plaintiff’s option, an action
in personam
may also be filed where the defendant has his or her habitual r
esidence or place of
business in the Philippines, in the following instances:
(a)
Any claim for damage
done/inflicted by a ship;
(b)
Any claim for damage recei
ved/sustained by a ship;
(c)
Any claim for loss of life or per
sonal injury sustained as a re
sult of:
i.
any defect in a ship or in her equipment; and
ii.
the wrongful acts or omissions of the owners, charterers, or pe
rsons in
possession or control of a ship, or the master or crew thereof,
or any
other person for whose wrongful acts or omissions the
owners,
charterers, or persons in possession or control of a ship are r
esponsible,
provided, that said acts or omi
ssions are conducted in the navi
gation
or management of the ship, in the loading, carriage or discharg
e of
goods on, in or from the ship, or in the embarkation, carriage,
or
disembarkation of persons on, in or from the ship;
(d)
Any claim for loss or damage
to goods carried in a ship;
(e)
Any claim arising out of any agr
eement relating to the carriage
of goods in
a ship or to the use or hire of a ship;
(f)
Any claim in the nature of salvage of a ship, including claims
for services
rendered in saving life from a sh
ip or any aircraft or in prese
rving cargo,
apparel or wreck as are authori
zed to be made in connection wit
h a ship or
aircraft;
(g)
Any claim in the nature of t
owage in respect of a ship;
(h)
Any claim in the nature of p
ilotage in respect of a ship;
(i)
Any claim in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship f
or her
operation or maintenance;
(j)
Any claim in respect of the construction, repair or equipment o
f a ship of
dock charges or dues;
(k)
Any claim by a master, shipper, charterer, or agent in
respect
of
disbursements made on account of a ship;
(l)
Any claim arising out of an act which is or is claimed to be a
general average
act;
(m)
Any claim arising out of bottomry; and
(n)
Any claim arising out of a cha
rter party of whatever kind.
P
ART
II
CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 2
PLEADINGS AND PARTIES
Section 1.
Pleadings and motions allowed
. – The pleadings and motions that may be
filed are the complaint, third-p
arty complaint, answer which ma
y include
compulsory counterclaims and cro
ss-claims, answer to countercla
ims and cross-
claims, motion for intervention, and
motion to avail of discovery procedures.
7
Section 2.
Prohibited pleadings or motions
. – The following pleadings or motions
shall not be allowed:
(a)
Motion to dismiss the complaint;
(b)
Motion for bill of particulars;
(c)
Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or a
ny other paper;
(d)
Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(e)
Dilatory motion for postponement;
(f)
Motion for new trial;
(g)
Petition for certiorari, mandamus,
or prohibition against any i
nterlocutory
order issued by the court; and
(h)
Petition for relief
from judgment.
Section 3.
Verified complaint
. – The verified complaint
shall state or contain:
(a)
A statement that it is a case
in Admiralty jurisdiction;
(b)
The names, addresses, and other re
levant personal or juridical
circumstances of the parties;
(c)
All facts material and relevant
to plaintiff’s cause or causes
of action;
(d)
The law, rule, or regulation re
lied upon, violated, or sought t
o be enforced;
(e)
Specification of all evidence supporting the cause of action,
s
uch as
affidavits of witnesses, authent
icated documentary evidence whi
ch must be
attached to the complaint, and object evidence.
The affidavits shall be in questi
on and answer form and shall c
omply with
the rules on judicial affidavits. All other supporting document
s and
evidence will comply with the rul
es on admissibility of evidenc
e. Official
documents from a foreign jurisdiction shall be considered admis
sible when
duly authenticated in accordance with The Hague Convention
Abol
ishing
the Requirement of Legalization fo
r Foreign Public Documents, o
therwise
known as the Apostille Convention.
All parties are required to dis
close and include all relevant d
ocumentary
evidence, even if such may appear
to contain admissions against
interest;
(f)
The reliefs prayed for. The verif
ied complaint may also includ
e a prayer
for the immediate issuance
ex parte
of a Warrant of Arrest of a Vessel
(WAVe), Cargo, or Freight. In such
cases, it shall also comply
with the
requirements under Rule 6 herein; and
(g)
A certification against forum shopping.
Section 4.
Who may file
. – Any real party in interest, including the government and
juridical entities authorized by law, may file a civil action i
n Admiralty jurisdiction.
Section 5.
Against whom filed
. – A complaint in Admiralty jurisdiction may be filed
against a ship, or against speci
fic cargo or freight, or agains
t the owners, charterers,
other persons in possession or cont
rol of a ship and/or cargo,
or other relevant
persons.
Section 6.
Service of the complaint upon the Ship’s Register or consulate
. – Upon
the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff is required to furni
sh a copy thereof to the
Ship’s Register with which the ship is registered or, in the ab
sence thereof, the
8
consulate of the ship’s flag. Proof of service upon the Ship’s
Register or appropriate
consulate shall be attached to the complaint.
Section 7.
Manner of Service
. – In the case of ships of Philippine registry, service
shall be made by sending a copy of
the complaint and all its at
tachments personally
or by personal courier upon the
duly-designated receiving offic
er of the Maritime
Industry Authority. In the case of ships flying the flag of a
foreign country, service
shall be made by sending a copy of the complaint and all its at
tachments with the
consulate of the ship’s flag State; provided, that if the forei
gn Ship’s Registry allows
service through electronic means
of court processes, legal noti
ces, pleadings and
documents, the party may make us
e of such means subject to proo
f of such service.
Section 8.
Assignment by raffle
. – The complaint shall be referred to the Admiralty
court immediately upon filing if there is only one (1) designat
ed branch in a multiple-
sala
court. If there are two (2) or more designated branches, the C
lerk of Court shall
immediately cause an electronic or special raffle, as the case
may be, among the
Admiralty courts
on the same day the complaint is filed.
Section 9.
Duty of the court
. – Upon referral of the compl
aint by the executive judge,
the Admiralty court to which it was referred or raffled, as the
case may be, may
motu
proprio
dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent theref
rom for the
dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is foun
d, the Admiralty court
shall forthwith issue the writ or summons which shall state
tha
t the Rules of
Procedure for Admiralty Cases shall apply.
Section 10.
Service of writs, summons, or
ders and other court processes
. – Writs,
summons, orders and other court
processes may be served by the
sheriff, his deputy
or other proper officers of the court.
The writs or summons shall be served immediately on the defenda
nt upon
order of the court, together wit
h a copy of an order informing
all parties that they
have ten (10) calendar days with
in which to appear in court and
file an answer.
Writs or summons shall be served in accordance with the Rules o
f Court, except as
provided under S
ection 11 hereof.
Section 11.
Service of writs and summons
. – (a) In an action
in rem
, a Writ of
Summons in Action
In Rem
must be served on the ship against which the action is
brought, except if the ship has been sold by the Sheriff upon l
awful order of a court,
in which case, a sealed copy of the writ must be filed with the
Ship’s Registry and
the same shall be deemed to have
been served on the day on whic
h the copy was
filed. Such service shall be effe
cted against a ship, cargo, or
freight as follows:
i.
by serving the same personally upon the ship’s captain or maste
r on board
the ship while it is within the j
urisdiction of the Philippines
;
ii.
by affixing a copy of the writ for a short time on any mast of
the ship or on
the outside of any suitable part
of the vessel’s superstructure
, visible to all
who may board or enter the vessel;

A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (Judicial Affidavit Rule)

 A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE

Whereas, case congestion and delays plague most courts in cities, given the huge volume of cases
filed each year and the slow and cumbersome adversarial syste1n that the judiciary has in place;

Whereas, about 40% of criminal cases are dismissed annually owing to the fact that complainants
simply give up con1ing to court after repeated postponements;

Whereas, few foreign businessmen make long-term investments in the Philippines because its
courts are unable to provide ample and speedy protection to their investments, keeping its people
poor;

Whereas, in order to reduce the time needed for completing the testimonies of witnesses in cases
under litigation, on February 21, 2012 the Supreme Court approved for piloting by trial courts in
Quezon City the compulsory use of judicial affidavits in place of the direct testimonies of witnesses;

Whereas, it is reported that such piloting has quickly resulted in reducing by about two-thirds the
time used for presenting the testimonies of witnesses, thus speeding up the hearing and adjudication
of cases;

Whereas, the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, headed by Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and the Sub-Committee on the Revision of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, headed by Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, have recommended for adoption a
Judicial Affidavit Rule that will replicate nationwide the success of the Quezon City experience in the
use of judicial affidavits; and

Whereas, the Supreme Court En Banc finds merit in the recommendation;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:

Section 1. Scope. - (a) This Rule shall apply to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the
reception of evidence before:

(1) The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari' a Circuit Courts but
shall not apply to small claims cases under A.M. 08-8-7-SC;

(2) The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari'a District Courts;

(3) The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the
Shari'a Appellate Courts;

(4) The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive
evidence, including the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP); and

(5) The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are
subject to disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of
procedure contravene the provisions of this Rule. 1
 (b) For the purpose of brevity, the above courts, quasi-judicial bodies, or investigating
officers shall be uniformly referred to here as the "court."

Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The
parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, personally or by licensed courier
service, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing
with respect to motions and incidents, the following:

(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such
witnesses' direct testimonies; and

(2) The parties' docun1entary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to
the judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the
complainant or the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the
respondent or the defendant.

(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the original document or object evidence in his
possession, he may, after the same has been identified, marked as exhibit, and
authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to such
affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that original. In addition, the party or witness
shall bring the original document or object evidence for comparison during the preliminary
conference with the attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which the latter shall not
be admitted.

This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.

Section 3. Contents of judicial Affidavit. - A judicial affidavit shall be prepared in the language known
to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by a translation in English or Filipino,
and shall contain the following:

(a) The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;

(b) The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the
witness and the place where the examination is being held;

(c) A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that
he does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury;

(d) Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered,
that:

(1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which
he testifies;

(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents;
and

(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their
authenticity in accordance with the Rules of Court;
 (e) The signature of the witness over his printed name; and

(f) A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.

Section 4. Sworn attestation of the lawyer. - (a) The judicial affidavit shall contain a sworn
attestation at the end, executed by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the examination of the
witness, to the effect that:

(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the
corresponding answers that the witness gave; and

(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the
witness regarding the latter's answers.

(b) A false attestation shall subject the lawyer mentioned to disciplinary action, including
disbarment.

Section 5. Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is
neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a
judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things
under his control available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the
requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces
tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the
witness in this case shall be the same as when taking his deposition except that the taking of a
judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

Section 6. Offer of and objections to testimony in judicial affidavit. - The party presenting the judicial
affidavit of his witness in place of direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the
start of the presentation of the witness. The adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or to
strike out his affidavit or any of the answers found in it on ground of inadmissibility. The court shall
promptly rule on the motion and, if granted, shall cause the marking of any excluded answer by
placing it in brackets under the initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender
of excluded evidence under Section 40 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. - The adverse party shall have the
right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and on the exhibits attached to the same.
The party who presents the witness may also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court
shall take active part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth of his
testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the issues.

Section 8. Oral offer of and objections to exhibits. - (a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his
last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral offer of evidence of his documentary or object
exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order, stating the purpose or purposes for which he
offers the particular exhibit.

(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his
objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling respecting
that exhibit.
 (c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe
and authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their markings
during the offers, the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each
exhibit.

Section 9. Application of rule to criminal actions. - (a) This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:

(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;

(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the
penalty involved; or

(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved
are.

(b) The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five days
before the pre-trial, serving copies if the same upon the accused. The complainant or public
prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence as he may
have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial affidavit, documentary,
or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.

(c) If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of
the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his
witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of
each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence
previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct
testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to testify.

Section 10. Effect of non-compliance with the judicial Affidavit Rule. - (a) A party who fails to submit
the required judicial affidavits and exhibits on time shall be deemed to have waived their submission.
The court may, however, allow only once the late submission of the same provided, the delay is for a
valid reason, would not unduly prejudice the opposing party, and the defaulting party pays a fine of
not less than P 1,000.00 nor more than P 5,000.00 at the discretion of the court.

(b) The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the
scheduled hearing of the case as required. Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause
despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his client's right to confront by cross-
examination the witnesses there present.

(c) The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above. The court
may, however, allow only once the subsequent submission of the compliant replacement
affidavits before the hearing or trial provided the delay is for a valid reason and would not
unduly prejudice the opposing party and provided further, that public or private counsel
responsible for their preparation and submission pays a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 nor
more than P 5,000.00, at the discretion of the court.

Section 11. Repeal or modification of inconsistent rules. - The provisions of the Rules of Court and
the rules of procedure governing investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court
to receive evidence are repealed or modified insofar as these are inconsistent with the provisions of
this Rule.1âwphi1
The rules of procedure governing quasi-judicial bodies inconsistent herewith are hereby
disapproved.

Section 12. Effectivity. - This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 following its publication in two
newspapers of general circulation not later than September 15, 2012. It shall also apply to existing
cases.

Manila, September 4, 2012.

B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691 and further amended by RA 11576 (Expanded
Jurisdiction of MTC)

Republic Act No. 7691             March 25, 1994

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction.

"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;

"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where
such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the
estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00);
 "(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;

"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian
Relations as now provided by law; and

"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action,
 irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots."

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots
where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by
the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in
these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts."

Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in
Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall
be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00):
Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts
shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).

Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be
considered amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-
trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and
metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to
the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the
administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of jurisdiction to the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette
or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 25, 1994

Memorize!!!!!

The civil actions in which the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction.

Rule 1 Section 3a, pars. 1 & 2

Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions,
civil or criminal and special proceedings.

(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary
civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)

Rule 2 Sections 1, 2, 4, & 5

Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of. — Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause
of action. (n)

Section 2. Cause of action, defined. — A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another. (n)

Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a
single cause of action. (3a)

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the
following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules;

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues
or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for recovery of money, the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
Rule 3 Sections 2 & 8

Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. (2a)

Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to
be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a)

Rule 4 Sections 1 & 2

Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the
municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. (1[a], 2[a]a)

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)

Rule 6 Sections 1 & 3

Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and
defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (1a)

Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of
action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
(3a)

Rule 7 Sections 4 & 5

Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or
upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading. (6a)
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt
of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause
for administrative sanctions. (n)