Reliability PDF
Reliability PDF
Reliability PDF
ICAT
Maintenance
3.0
Marine
Accident Rate
Corps
2.0
Navy
Air Force
1.0
Army
0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
#Class A accidents per 100,000 flight hours
.
Figure by MIT OCW. Adapted from: Aviation Week 10/02.
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Safety
ICAT
y Safety Targets/Standards
Civil Air Carrier FAR Part 25 FAR Part 121
Civil General Aviation FAR Part 23 FAR Part 91
Military Mil Spec
y Safety Components
Vehicle Airworthiness
Training and Operating Procedures
Maintenance
Culture
Quality Management Processes
Incident Reporting
Accident Investigation
Liability
y Design Philosophy
Fail Safe
Fail Operational
MIT
Certification
ICAT
y Civil
y Military
Procurement
y Space
Man Rated
MIT
Certification
ICAT
Engines
Propellers
Parts
Instruments
y Software Standards
RTCA DO-178B
y Continued Airworthiness
Inspections
Maintenance
MIT
Federal Aviation Regulations
ICAT
y Part 1 - DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
y Part 11 - GENERAL RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
y Part 21 - CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS
y Part 23 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL, UTILITY, ACROBATIC, AND
COMMUTER CATEGORY AIRPLANES
y Part 25 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
y Part 27 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: NORMAL CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
y Part 29 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY ROTORCRAFT
y Part 31 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: MANNED FREE BALLOONS
y Part 33 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES
y Part 34 - FUEL VENTING AND EXHAUST EMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR TURBINE ENGINE
POWERED AIRPLANES
y Part 35 - AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: PROPELLERS
y Part 36 - NOISE STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT TYPE AND AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION
y http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
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ICAT
y Fail Operational
Adverse Effect
On
Occupants
Airplane
Damage
Emergency
Procedures
Abnormal
Procedures
Nuisance
Normal
Extremely
Probable Improbable
Improbable
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Descriptive Probabilities
ICAT
Probability
(per unit of exposure)
FAR JAR
1
Frequent
10E-3
Probable
Reasonably
Probable
10E-5
Remote
10E-7 Improbable
Extremely Remote
10E-9
Extremely Extremely
Improbable Improbable
1 2 3 4 5
Fission Containment
Pipe Break Electric Power ECCS Product Removal Integrity
From : Leveson
Succeeds
P1
Succeeds
1-P4 Fails
P1 x P5
Succeeds P5
1-P3 Succeeds
P1 x P4
Fails 1-P5
Available P4
Fails
P1 x P4 x P5
1-P2 P5
Initiating Succeeds
Event P1 x P3
Fails 1-P4
P1 P3 Fails
P1 x P3 x P4
P4
Fails
P1 x P2
P2
Opens
Pressure decreases
Pressure Relief valve 1 Relief valve 2
Opens Pressure
too high Pressure decreases does not open does not open
Fails too high
Fails
Explosion
Valve Operator
failure inattentive
Valve Computer does not
failure open valve 1
Operator does not know
to open value 2
F M E A F O R A S Y S T E M O F T W O A M P L I F I E R S I N PA R A L L E L
Failures by Effects
Critical Failure probability Failure mode
mode (%) Critical Noncritical
A A 1 x 10-3 Open 90 x
Short 5 5 x 10-5
Other 5 5 x 10-5
B B 1 x 10-3 Open 90 x
Short 5 5 x 10-5
Other 5 5 x 10-5
PRIM
SEC
PRIM
SEC
PRIM
Ailerons Ailerons
S1 P1 P2 S2 P3 P3 P3 P3 S2 P2 P1 S1
P3 S1 P1 P2 P1 P2 S2 P3
S1 S2 Slats S1 S2
S1 S2 Rudder P1 P2 P3
TLU 1 2 3
Flaps
* Trim Wheels
Yaw damper
P1 S1 THS
P3 S2 Elevator Elevator
* Rudder S1 P2 P1 P1 P2
Trim
pedals S2 S2 S1 S1 S2
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Additional Issues
ICAT
y Emergent Behavior
Plan
ID Hazards
Analysis
Risk
Assessment
Decision
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Operational Reliability
ICAT
y MTBF
y MTBUR
Mean Time Between Unscheduled Replacement
y Dispatch Reliability
Conditional Airworthiness
Minimum Equipment List
y Scheduled Maintenance
y Unscheduled
“Squawks” = Reported Anomalies
Logbook Entries (ACARS)
Line Replacement Units (LRU)
Parts Inventory
F16 Tail
Glass Cockpits
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Logbook Entries
ICAT
y Pilot: Test flight OK, except autoland very rough.
y Mechanic: Autoland not installed on this aircraft.
y Pilot: No. 2 propeller seeping prop fluid.
y Mechanic: No. 2 propeller seepage normal. Nos. 1, 3 and 4 propellers lack normal seepage.
y Pilot: Something loose in cockpit.
y Mechanic: Something tightened in cockpit.
y Pilot: Autopilot in altitude-hold mode produces a 200-fpm descent.
y Mechanic: Cannot reproduce problem on ground.
y Pilot: DME volume unbelievably loud.
y Mechanic: DME volume set to more believable level.
y Pilot: Friction locks cause throttle levers to stick.
y Mechanic: That's what they're there for!
y Pilot: IFF inoperative.
y Mechanic: IFF always inoperative in OFF mode.
y Pilot: Suspected crack in windscreen.
y Mechanic: Suspect you're right.
y Pilot: Number 3 engine missing.
y Mechanic: Engine found on right wing after brief search.
y Pilot: Aircraft handles funny.
y Mechanic: Aircraft warned to straighten up, fly right, and be serious.
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Typical Check Cycles
ICAT
y A-check is done every 350-650 hours and includes more detailed check
of electronics and systems as well as a cabin/haul check
y Airworthiness Directives
y Service Bulletins
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Servicing
ICAT
y Fueling
y Loading
Payload
Stores
y Servicing
Food
Water
Oxygen
Oil
Hydraulics
Air
y Cleaning
y Arming
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Transition training / CCQ
ICAT
100%
25 days