Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC

2/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 694
G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President,

Mr. Alan Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. Nos. 20381819. April 2, 2013.*

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.*

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES (APEC), represented by its President
Congressman Ponciano D. Payuyo, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.*

AKSYON MAGSASAKAPARTIDO TINIG NG MASA,
represented by its President Michael Abas Kida, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
respondent.
G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.*

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA,
INC. (KAKUSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.*

1stCONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY,
INC. (1CARE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
_______________
* EN BANC.
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.*

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON
LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTYLIST, represented herein
by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party’s Secretary General,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(ANAD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.*

1BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD,
INC., (1BROPGBI) formerly PGBI, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.*

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH, Commis
479
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 479

sioner, and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,

respondents.
G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.*

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS
ALLIANCE, INC. (AIPRA), represented by its Secretary
General, Ronald D. Macaraig, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.*

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG
PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as
AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO
AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San
Buenaventura, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.*

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by
Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.*

BANTAY PARTYLIST, represented by Maria Evangelina
F. Palparan, President, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.*

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY represented by
its President Roberto “Ka Obet” Martin, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
480

G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.*

ABROAD PARTY LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO
C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT
S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO
TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
THEIR BEHALF, respondents.
G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.*

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LISTPARTY, represented by its
President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.*

COCOFEDPHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.*

ABANG LINGKOD PARTYLIST, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.*

FIRM 24K ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), petitioner, vs.
481
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 481

G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.*

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND
DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),
respondent.
G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.*

AGRIAGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG
PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its
Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. Enriquez, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,
respondent.
G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.*

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED
FEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN
INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.*

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION
(UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.*

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI),
represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.*

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented by Homer Bueno,
Fitrylin Dalhani, Israel de Castro, Dante Navarro and
Guiling Mamondiong, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO
N.
482

TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,

CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA
CIELO M. PADACA, respondents.
G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.*

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM)
PARTYLIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S.
Abdul Malik, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.*

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING
ADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA),
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,

respondent.
G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.*

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND
TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman,
Carlito B. Cubelo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.*

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONGTAO,
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT
KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO
N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,
CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, in their capaci
483
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 483

ties as Commissioners thereof, respondents.
G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.*

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION (AKIN),
respondent.
G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.*

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by its Secretary
General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.*

BINHIPARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA
MAGSASAKA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.*

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President,
Faye Maybelle Lorenz, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.*

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD, UTILITY HELPER, AIDER,
RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR,
AGENT AND NANNY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(GUARDJAN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.*

KALIKASAN PARTYLIST, represented by its President,
Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances
Q. Quimpo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC, respondent.
484

G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.*

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRYURBAN
POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE
(PACYAW), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.*

1UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1UTAK),
respondent.
G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.*

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS
IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY
LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee and
Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.*

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS
IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS
OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS
BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND MEMBERS OF

THE COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 204426. April 2, 2013.*
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS

ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALAEH),
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS
R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA.
GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities
as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners,
respondents.
485
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 485

G.R. No. 204428. April 2, 2013.*

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary
General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204435. April 2, 2013.*

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY
(1AAAP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC, respondent.
G.R. No. 204436. April 2, 2013.*

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented by its Party
President, Rolex T. Suplico, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
G.R. No. 204455. April 2, 2013.*

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
G.R. No. 204484. April 2, 2013.*

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by
its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204485. April 2, 2013.*

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND
ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),
respondent.
486

G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.*

1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG
SANGKATAUHAN (1 st KABAGIS), petitioner, vs.
G.R. No. 204490. April 2, 2013.*

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), petitioner, vs.
Election Law; PartyList System; The partylist system is

intended to democratize political power by giving political parties
that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives.—The 1987 Constitution
provides the basis for the partylist system of representation.
Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the
House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district,
and another for his or her partylist group or organization of
choice.
Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended
the partylist system to include not only sectoral parties but also
nonsectoral parties.—Indisputably, the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the partylist system to include not only
sectoral parties but also nonsectoral parties. The framers
intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the partylist system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can
participate in the partylist system “[F]or as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.”
Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and

nonsectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative
district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at
least the same number of votes that winning candidates can
garner in legislative district elections.—The common denominator
between sectoral and nonsectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in
487
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 487
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide

elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party
list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of
Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that could
not compete in legislative district elections.
Same; Same; The partylist system is composed of three
different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
—What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in
Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the partylist system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties
belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1)
leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party
list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties
or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent
any particular sector.
Same; Same; “Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,”
Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as
“either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral
party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a
“political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies

for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers
to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct
from each other.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not
require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors.—R.A. No. 7941
does
488
not require national and regional parties or organizations

to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
partylist system to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat,
ideologybased and causeoriented parties from the partylist
system. How will these ideologybased and causeoriented parties,
who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the
electoral process if they are excluded from the partylist system?
To exclude them from the partylist system is to prevent them
from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the partylist
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary
to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. Under the partylist system, an ideologybased
or causeoriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party
and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political
party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their

economic status as citizens.
Same; Same; Same; The economically “marginalized and
underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.—The
phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should refer
only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature,
economically “marginalized and underrepresented.” These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees of
the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must
have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does
not mean one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.”
It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and
underrepresented” are those who fall in the low
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 489
income group as classified by the National Statistical

Coordination Board.
Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in
subsequent partylist elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 partylist elections.—Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from
participating in the May 1988 partylist elections. Thus, major
political parties can participate in subsequent partylist
elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to
the 1988 partylist elections. However, major political parties
should participate in partylist elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties
through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined
political constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the

“marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well
defined political constituencies” as members of the House of
Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
allow major political parties to participate in partylist elections so
as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to
those who “lack welldefined political constituencies.”—The 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in partylist elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to those who “lack welldefined
political constituencies.” The participation of major political
parties in partylist elections must be geared towards the entry,
as members of the House of Representatives, of the “marginalized
and underrepresented” and those who “lack welldefined political
constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to
participate in partylist elections, a major political party that
fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize
a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the
partylist system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party
must have its own constitution, bylaws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom must
belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an
490
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political

party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941, which provides that “component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in
partylist elections) provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the partylist system.”
Same; Same; Same; A partylist nominee must be a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide partylist
nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a
track record of advocacy for such sector.—Section 9 of R.A. No.

7941 prescribes the qualifications of partylist nominees. This
provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee
from the youth sector. Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList
Nominees.—No person shall be nominated as partylist
representative unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a
nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office
until the expiration of his term. A partylist nominee must be a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she
seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide partylist nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for
such sector.
SERENO, C.J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; PartyList System; View that the place of the
partylist system in the constitutional scheme was that it provided
for the realization of the ideals on social justice in the political
arena.—The place of the partylist system in the constitutional
scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals on
social justice in the political arena. The concept is not new, as
discussed by political theorist Terry MacDonald: First, an idea
that has received much
491
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 491
attention among democratic theorists is that representatives

should be selected to ‘mirror’ the characteristics of those being
represented—in terms of gender, ethnicity, and other such
characteristics judged to be socially relevant. This idea has been
advocated most notably in some recent democratic debates
focused on the need for special representation of

disadvantaged and underrepresented social groups within
democratic assemblies. The applicability of this idea of ‘mirror’
representation is not confined to debates about representing
marginalized minorities within nationstates; Iris Young further
applies this model of representation to global politics, arguing
that global representation should be based on representation of
the various ‘peoples’ of the world, each of which embodies its own
distinctive identity and ‘perspective’. In practice, special
representation for certain social groups within a ‘mirror’
framework can be combined with election mechanisms” in various
ways—such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the
selection of these ‘social groups’ for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the
process of selecting legitimate representatives, occurring
prior to the electoral process, such ‘mirror’ representation
is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting
representative agents.
Same; Same; Principle of Subordinate Legislation; View that
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers is largely responsible in empowering the
COMELEC to not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate
certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.
—Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the stability
of our Constitution, because the legislature is certain to find it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may
be met in carrying laws into effect. The growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental
powers is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to
not only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain rules
and regulations calculated to promote public interest. This is the
principle of subordinate legislation dis
492
cussed in People v. Rosenthal and in Pangasinan Transportation

vs. Public Service Commission.
Same; Same; View that the disqualification of a partylist
group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only reasonable
if based on material misrepresentations regarding the nominee’s
qualifications.—I propose the view that the disqualification of a
partylist group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only
reasonable if based on material misrepresentations regarding the
nominee’s qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a
nominee should not disqualify the partylist group
provided that: (1) it meets Guideline Nos. 15 of Ang
Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the basis of the new
parameters set in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as
national, regional or sectoral partylist group); and (2) one
of its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for reasons
explained below. The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall develop
and guarantee a full, free and open partylist system that would
achieve proportional representation in the House of
Representatives by enhancing partylist groups’ “chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature.” Because of this
policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret Section 6 (5)
of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely administrative, quasi
legislative or quasijudicial power to ipso facto disqualify party
list groups based on the disqualification of a single nominee.
Same; Same; View that any disqualification of a partylist
group based on the disqualification of its nominee must be based
on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s
qualifications.—It should also be pointed out that the law itself
considers a violation of election laws as a disqualifying
circumstance. However, for an act or omission to be considered a
violation of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and
willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard cannot
be less for the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC.
Thus, any disqualification of a partylist group based on the
disqualification of its nominee must be based on a material
misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s qualifications. This
also finds support in Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941 which
493
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 493
considers declaring “untruthful statements in its petition” as a

ground for disqualification.
Same; Same; View that partylist groups should have at least
one qualified nominee among its top three nominees for it to be
allowed to participate in the elections.—Partylist groups should
have at least one qualified nominee among its top three nominees
for it to be allowed to participate in the elections. This is because
if all of its top three nominees are disqualified, even if its
registration is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in
the elections, and should it obtain the required numberof votes to
win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it, because the
law does not allow the group to replace its disqualified nominee
through substitution. This is a necessary consequence of applying
Sections 13 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Same; Same; View that only in case of death, incapacity, or
withdrawal does the law allow a partylist group to change the
ranking of its nominees in the list it initially submitted.—Only in
case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal does the law allow a
partylist group to change the ranking of its nominees in the list it
initially submitted. The ranking of the nominees is changed
through, substitution, which according to Section 8 is done by
placing the name of the substitute at the end of the list. In this
case, all the names that come after the now vacant slot will move
up the list. After substitution takes effect, the new list with the
new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who among
the nominees of the partylist group shall be proclaimed, from the
first to the last, in accordance with Section 13.
Same; Same; View that if any/some of the nominees is/are
disqualified, no substitution will be allowed; This means that if
the first nominee is disqualified, and the partylist group is able to
join the elections and becomes entitled to one representative, the
second cannot take the first nominee’s place and represent the
partylist group.—If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified,
no substitution will be allowed. Thus, their ranking remains the
same and should therefore be respected by the COMELEC in
determining the one/s that will represent the winning partylist
group in Congress. This means that if the first nominee is
disqualified, and the partylist group is able to join the elections

and becomes entitled to one representative,
494
the second cannot take the first nominee’s place and represent the
partylist group. If, however, the partylist group gets enough
votes to be entitled to two seats, then the second nominee can
represent it.
Same; Same; View that the primary purpose of an election
case is the ascertainment of the real candidate elected by the
electorate.—In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections, 593 SCRA
139 (2009), it was also held that the primary purpose of an
election case is the ascertaimnent of the real candidate elected by
the electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before there
can be an election case. Since the national and local elections are
still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of automatic review
and summary evidentiary hearing under the Resolution No. 9513
cannot be an election case. For this reason, a prior motion for
reconsideration under Section 3, is not required.
BRION, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; PartyList System; View that the partylist
system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional
framers’ intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system by
giving marginal and underrepresented parties.—The partylist
system came into being, principally driven by the constitutional
framers’ intent to reform the then prevailing electoral system
by giving marginal and underrepresented parties (i.e. those who
cannot win in the legislative district elections and in this sense are
marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect themselves
there, but who—nationally—may generate votes equivalent to what
a winner in the legislative district election would garner) the
chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to elect
themselves to the House of Representatives through a system
other than the legislative district elections.
Same; Same; View that major political parties, if they
participate in the legislative district elections, cannot participate
in the partylist elections, nor can they form a coalition with party
list parties and run as a coalition in the partylist elections.—

Major political parties, if they participate in the legislative
district elections, cannot participate in the partylist elections, nor
can they form a coalition with partylist parties and run as a
coalition in the partylist elections. A coalition is a formal party
participant in the partylist system; what the partylist system
forbids directly (i.e., participation in
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 495
both electoral arenas), the major political parties cannot do

indirectly through a coalition. No prohibition, however, exists
against informal alliances that they can form with partylist
parties, organizations or groups running for the partylist
elections. The partylist component of these informal alliances is
not prohibited from running in the partylist elections.
Same; Same; View that a nominee who does not actually
possess the marginalized and underrepresented status represented
by the partylist group but proves to be a genuine advocate of the
interest and concern of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector represented is still qualified to be a nominee.—Considering
the Constitution’s solicitous concern for the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors as understood in the social justice
context, and RA 7941’s requirement of mere bona fide
membership of a nominee in the partylist group, a nominee who
does not actually possess the marginalized and
underrepresented status represented by the partylist group
but proves to be a genuine advocate of the interest and
concern of the marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented is still qualified to be a nominee. This classification
of nominees, however, is relevant only to sectoral parties and
organizations which are marginalized and underrepresented in
the social justice sense or in terms of their special interests,
concerns or characteristics. To be consistent with the sectoral
representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of the
members of the party must actually belong to the sector
represented, while nominees must be a member of the sectoral
party or organization. Since political parties are identified by
their ideology or platform of government, bona fide
membership, in accordance with the political party’s constitution

and bylaws, would suffice.
Same; Same; View that as a basic constitutional point, the
business and principal function of the Supreme Court (and of the
whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to supplant what the
Constitution and the law expressly provide.—As a basic
constitutional point, the business and principal function of this
Court (and of the whole Judiciary) is not to create policy or to
supplant what the Constitution and the law expressly provide. The
framers of the Constitution and Congress (through RA No. 7941
in this case) provided the policy expressed through the words of
the Constitution and the law,
496
and through the intents the framers; both were considered and
cited to ensure that the constitutional policy is properly read and
understood. The whole Judiciary, including this Court, can only
apply these policies in the course of their assigned task of
adjudication without adding anything of our own; we can
interpret the words only in case of ambiguity. This Court and its
Members cannot likewise act as advocates, even for social
justice or for any ideology for that matter, as advocacy is
not the task assigned to us by the Constitution. To play the
role of advocates, or to formulate policies that fall within the role
of the Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of
our sworn duty.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for
the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court expressly require
that the tribunal must have acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.—For the writ of certiorari to issue, the
Rules of Court expressly require that the tribunal must have
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
requisite grave abuse of discretion is in keeping with the office of
the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the tribunal within
the bounds of its jurisdiction under the Constitution and law. The
term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact definition,
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment

that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; View that in
the adjudication of a case with constitutional dimensions, it is the
letter and the spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme.—
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a case with
constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the spirit of the
Constitution itself that reign supreme. The Court’s previous
ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the resolution of a similar
matter in the future, but this prior ruling cannot inflexibly bind
the Court in its future actions. As the highest Court in our
judicial hierarchy, the Court cannot tie its hands through its past
actions, particularly when the
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 497
Constitution is involved; it is invested with the innate authority

to rule according to what it sees best in its role as guardian of the
Constitution.
Election Law; PartyList System; Prospectivity of Laws; View
that by ordering the remand of all the petitions to the COMELEC
and for the latter to act in accordance with the new ruling laid
down by the Court—i.e., allowing political parties to participate in
the partylist elections without need of proving that they are
“marginalized and underrepresented” (as this term is understood
in Ang Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine
advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly
included in the list of nominees—the Court would not be violating
the principle of prospectivity.—By ordering the remand of all the
petitions to the COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance
with the new ruling laid down by the Court—i.e., allowing
political parties to participate in the partylist elections without
need of proving that they are “marginalized and
underrepresented” (as this term is understood in Ang Bagong
Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine advocate of a sectoral

party or organization may be validly included in the list of
nominees—the Court would not be violating the principle of
prospectivity. The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity
—both in the application of law and of judicial decisions
enunciating new doctrines—is the protection of vested rights and
the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling overrules a prior
ruling, the prospective application of the new ruling is made in
favor of parties who have relied in good faith on the prior ruling
under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
Same; Same; View that in March 1995, Congress enacted RA
No. 7941, the PartyList System Act, as the law that would
implement the partylist election scheduled for May 1998.—In
March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the PartyList
System Act, as the law that would implement the partylist
election scheduled for May 1998. The law at the same time
fleshed out the mechanics for partylist elections, in accordance
with the terms of the Constitution. The law specifically provided
for: a. a declaration of the policy behind the law; b. a
definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national,
political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their
coalitions; c. the requisites and terms for registration; the
grounds for refusal and cancellation of registration; and the
498
certified list of registered parties; d. the nomination and

qualification for partylist representatives; e. the manner of
voting; f. the number and procedure for the allocation of party
list representatives; and g. the proclamation of the winning
partylist representatives, their term of office; the limitation on
their change of affiliation; their rights; and the provisions in case
of vacancy.
Same; Same; View that the aim of the partylist provision,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, is principally to reform
the then existing electoral system by adding a new system of
electing the members of the House of Representatives.—The aim of
the partylist provision, Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, is principally to reform the then existing electoral
system by adding a new system of electing the members of the

House of Representatives. The innovation is a partylist system
that would expand opportunities for electoral participation to
allow those who could not win in the legislative district elections a
fair chance to enter the House of Representatives other than
through the district election system.
Same; Same; View that the members of the House of
Representatives under the partylist system are those who would be
elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of
the system to future legislation.—The members of the House of
Representatives under the partylist system are those who
would be elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the
mechanics of the system to future legislation. They are likewise
constitutionally identified as the registered national, regional,
sectoral parties and organizations, and are the partylist
groupings to be voted under the partylist system under a free
and open party system that should be allowed to evolve
according to the free choice of the people within the limits of the
Constitution. From the perspective of the law, this party structure
and system would hopefully foster proportional representation
that would lead to the election to the House of Representatives of
Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and (2) who
lack welldefined constituencies; but (3) who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are
“proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack of welldefined
constituencies.”
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 499
Same; Same; View that as the constitutional debates and

voting show, what the framers envisioned was a multiparty system
that already includes sectoral representation.—As the
constitutional debates and voting show, what the framers
envisioned was a multiparty system that already includes sectoral
representation. Both sectoral representation and multiparty
system under our partylist system are concepts that comfortably
fall within this vision of a Filipinostyle partylist system. Thus,

both the text and spirit of the Constitution do not support an
interpretation of exclusive sectoral representation under the
partylist system; what was provided was an avenue for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the
electoral system—it is an invitation for these sectors to join and
take a chance on what democracy and republicanism can offer.
Same; Same; View that the nominee is supposed to carry out
the ideals and concerns of the partylist group to which he/she
belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of
the partylist group.—The nominee is supposed to carry out the
ideals and concerns of the partylist group to which he/she
belongs; to the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals
of the partylist group. However, unlike the political parties’
official candidates—who can, for whatever reason, disaffiliate
from his party and run as an independent candidate—the linkage
between a nominee and his partylist group is actually a oneway
mirror relationship. The nominee can only see (and therefore
run) through the partylist group but the partylist group can see
beyond the nomineemember.
Same; Same; View that what the 1987 constitutional framers
simply wanted, by way of electoral reform, was to “open up” the
electoral system by giving more participation to those who could
not otherwise participate under the then existing system.—What
the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by way of
electoral reform, was to “open up” the electoral system by giving
more participation to those who could not otherwise participate
under the then existing system—those who were marginalized in
the legislative district elections because they could not be elected in
the past for lack of the required votes and specific constituency in
the winnertakeall legislative district contest, and who, by the
number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the district
elections, showed that nationally, they had the equivalent of what
the winner in the legislative district would
500
garner. This was the concept of “marginalized and

underrepresented” and the “lack of political constituency” that
came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to the present

wordings of the Constitution. RA No. 7941 subsequently faithfully
reflected these intents.
REYES, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); View
that under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is recognized
as the sole authority in the enforcement and administration of
election laws.—Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is
recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and
administration of election laws. This grant of power retraces its
history in the 1935 Constitution. From then, the powers and
functions of the COMELEC had continuously been expounded to
respond to the call of contemporary times.
Same; Same; View that essentially, the COMELEC has
general and specific powers. Section 2(1) of Article IXC partakes
of the general grant of the power to the COMELEC to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”—
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific powers.
Section 2(1) of Article IXC partakes of the general grant of the
power to the COMELEC to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall.” The authority given to the
COMELEC under this provision encapsulates all the other powers
granted to it under the Constitution. The intention in providing
this general grant of power is to give the COMELEC a wide
latitude in dealing with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to
unduly delimit the performance of its functions. Undoubtedly, the
text and intent of this constitutional provision is to give
COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. The rest of the enumeration in the mentioned
provision constitutes the COMELEC’s specific powers.
Same; Same; View that the COMELEC does not simply
register every party, organization or coalition that comes to its
office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections.
Registration entails
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 501
the possession of qualifications. The party seeking registration

must first present its qualifications before registration will follow
as a matter of course.—The power to register political parties,
however, is not a mere clerical exercise. The COMELEC does not
simply register every party, organization or coalition that comes
to its office and manifests its intent to participate in the elections.
Registration entails the possession of qualifications. The party
seeking registration must first present its qualifications before
registration will follow as a matter of course. Similar with all the
specific powers of the COMELEC, the power to register political
parties, organizations and coalitions must be understood as an
implement by which its general power to enforce and administer
election laws is being realized. The exercise of this power must
thus be construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in
fulfilling its duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is held
exclusive to those who possess the qualifications set by the law.
Same; PartyList System; View that consistent with the
principle that the right to hold public office is a privilege, it is
incumbent upon aspiring participants in the partylist system of
representation to satisfactorily show that they have the required
qualifications stated in the law and prevailing jurisprudence.—
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold public office is
a privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring participants in the
partylist system of representation to satisfactorily show that they
have the required qualifications stated in the law and prevailing
jurisprudence. Specifically, a partylist group or organization
applying for registration in the first instance must present
sufficient evidence to establish its qualifications. It is only upon
proof of possession of qualifications that registration follows. The
process, however, does not end with registration. Partylist groups
and organizations that are previously allowed registration and/or
accreditation are dutybound to maintain their qualifications.
Same; Same; View that similar to individual candidates,
registered partylist groups, organizations and coalitions must
also establish their continuing compliance with the requirements
of the law which are specific to those running under the partylist
system of representation. Registration does not vest them the
perpetual right to participate in the election.—The fact that a
candidate was previously allowed to run or hold public office does
not exempt him from estab
502
lishing his qualifications once again in case he bids for reelection.

He must maintain and attest to his qualifications every time he is
minded to join the electoral race. Thus, he is required to file a
certificate of candidacy even if he is an incumbent elective official
or previously a candidate in the immediately preceding elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered partylist groups,
organizations and coalitions must also establish their continuing
compliance with the requirements of the law which are specific to
those running under the partylist system of representation.
Registration does not vest them the perpetual right to participate
in the election. The basis of the right to participate in the
elections remains to be the possession of qualifications. Resolution
No. 9513 is a formal recognition of the COMELEC’s duty to
ensure that only those who are qualified must be allowed to run
as partylist representative. It cannot be defeated by a claim of
previous registration.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Res
Judicata; View that the COMELEC cannot be precluded from
reviewing pending registration and existing registration and/or
accreditation of partylist groups, organizations and coalitions on
the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly cited in a long
line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res judicata applies only
to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.—The COMELEC cannot be precluded
from reviewing pending registration and existing registration
and/or accreditation of partylist groups, organizations and
coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been repeatedly
cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings, not
to the exercise of administrative powers. Moreover, the
application of the doctrine of res judicata requires the concurrence
of four (4) elements, viz.: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action.
Same; Same; View that the partylist system is a social justice
tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become
verita
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 503
ble lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the

enactment of laws designed to benefit them.—The partylist
system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to
enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves,
empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws
designed to benefit them. It is not simply a mechanism for
electoral reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for
reforming the already working and existing electoral system is a
superficial reading of RA 7941 and the Constitution, from which
the law breathed life. The idea is that by promoting the
advancement of the underprivileged and allowing them an
opportunity to grow, they can rise to become partners of the State
in pursuing greater causes.
Same; Same; View that considering that the provisions on
partylist system of representation are not selfexecuting, the
Congress enacted RA 7941.—Considering that the provisions on
partylist system of representation are not selfexecuting, the
Congress enacted RA 7941. The said law defined the parameters
of the partylist system, the procedural guidelines and the
qualifications of those intending to participate in the exercise. In
enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean to depart from the
impetus which impelled the members of the Constitutional
Commission to provide for this scheme of representation—social
justice. The underlying principle remains to be the reduction of
political inequality by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power. Certainly, there could be no other intended beneficiaries
for this provision than the powerless and underprivileged. It could
not have been intended for those who already have the power and
resources who may be lesser in number but are in command of the

machinery of the government.
Same; Same; View that the intent of the Constitution to keep
the partylist system exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is
to frustrate the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold
inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the
Constitution.—The intent of the Constitution to keep the party
list system exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to frustrate
the spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold
inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded in the
Constitution. In the same line, RA 7941 must
504
not be interpreted as merely a mode for electoral reform.

It could not have been that too simplistic. Far from being
merely an electoral reform, the partylist system is one concrete
expression of the primacy of social justice in the Constitution. It is
well to remember that RA 7941 was only implementing the
specific mandate of the Constitution in Section 5, Article VI. It
should not be disengaged from the purpose of its enactment. The
purpose of the mentioned provision was not simply to reform the
electoral system but to initiate the equitable distribution of
political power. It aims to empower the larger portion of the
populace who sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a
chance to participate in legislation and advance their causes.
Same; Same; View that a marginalized and underrepresented
sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or
condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata.—RA
7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the party,
organization or coalition must represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. A marginalized and underrepresented
sector is a group of individuals who, by reason of status or
condition, are drawn towards the bottom of the social strata.
Remote from the core of institutional power, their necessities are
often neglected and relegated to the least of the government’s
priorities. They endure inadequacies in provisions and social
services and are oftentimes victims of economic, social and

political inequalities.
Same; Same; View that while a partylist group is allowed to
represent various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to
address the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it
represents.—It is likewise imperative for the partylist group to
show that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a partylist group is allowed to represent
various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is able to address
the multifarious interests and concerns of all the sectors it
represents. That a multisectoral partylist group undertakes
projects and activities that only address the interests of some of
the sectors, neglecting the concerns of the other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it supposedly represents, is nugatory to
the objective of giving a meaningful and effective representation
to the marginalized and underrepresented.
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 505
Same; Same; View that the majority of the membership of the

partylist group, organization or coalition belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector. This means that a
majority of the members of the sector must actually possess the
attribute which makes the sector marginalized.—Equally
important is that the majority of the membership of the partylist
group, organization or coalition belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector. This means that a majority of the
members of the sector must actually possess the attribute which
makes the sector marginalized. This is so because the primary
reason why partylist groups are even allowed to participate in
the elections of the members of the House of Representatives, who
are normally elected by district, is to give a collective voice to the
members of the sectors who are oftentimes unheard or neglected.
This intention is put to naught if at least the majority of the
members of the partylist do not belong to the same class or
sector. Thus, it is incumbent upon the partylist applicant to
present all the evidence necessary to establish this fact. Without a
convincing proof of legitimate membership of a majority of the
marginalized, the COMELEC has no reason to believe otherwise
and may thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing

registration.
Same; Same; View that political parties shall only be allowed
to participate in the partylist system if they do not field
candidates in the election of legislative district representatives.—I,
however, agree with the view of the majority that it is unjustified
to absolutely disqualify from the partylist system the major
political parties solely by reason of their classification as such.
Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to them shall not be
without reasonable restrictions. Political parties shall only be
allowed to participate in the partylist system if they do not field
candidates in the election of legislative district representatives.
The justification therefor is reasonable. The partylist system was
adopted by the state purposely to enable parties which, by their
limited resources and citizens base per district, find difficulty in
placing representatives in Congress. Major political parties that
field candidates for district representatives can do so with ease,
given that they satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No.
7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their
classification, to wit: (a) the established record of the said parties,
coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into account,
among other things, their showing in past elections; (b) the
number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety
(90) days before
506
the election; (c) their identifiable political organizations and

strengths as evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability
to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to
the position of the President; and (e) other analogous
circumstances that may determine their relative organizations
and strengths.
Same; Same; View that the move to open the partylist system
freeforall will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the
doors even to illegitimate organizations.—The move to open the
partylist system freeforall will create a dangerous
precedent as it will open the doors even to illegitimate
organizations. Organizations aspiring to join the partylist
election can simply skirt the law and organize themselves as a

political party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance.
The organization need only to register as a political party to
dispense with the stringent requirement of representing a sector.
It will automatically be off the hook from the danger of being
disqualified on the ground that it is not representing a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Other organizations,
even those organized as sectoral parties, may follow through and
may even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to
become political parties instead because it is the easier way to be
allowed participation in the partylist elections. Thus, once again,
the causes of the marginalized and underrepresented are lagged
behind.
Same; Same; View that owing to the peculiarity of the party
list system of representation, it is not required that the nominee be
a resident or a registered voter of a particular district since it is the
partylist group that is voted for and not the appointed nominees.
—Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee are
practically the same as those required of individual candidates for
election to the House of Representatives. He must be: (a) a
naturalborn citizen; (b) a registered voter; (c) a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; (d) able to read and write; (e)
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days before the day of election;
(f) at least twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g)
in case of a nominee for the youth sector, he must at least be
twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of election. Owing to the peculiarity of the partylist system of
representation, it is not required that the
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 507
nominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular district

since it is the partylist group that is voted for and not the
appointed nominees. He must, however, be a bona fide member of
the partylist group at least ninety (90) days before the elections.
Same; Same; View that aside from the qualifications similarly
required of candidates seeking to represent their respective
districts, the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the

party, a status he acquires when he enters into the membership of
the organization for at least ninety (90) days before the election.—
To be consistent with the letter of the law, it must be harmonized
with Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with the
qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned provision, aside
from the qualifications similarly required of candidates seeking to
represent their respective districts, the nominee is required to be
a bona fide member of the party, a status he acquires when he
enters into the membership of the organization for at least ninety
(90) days before the election. From the point in time when the
person acquires the status of being a bona fide member, he
becomes one “belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.” It is my view that the foregoing
interpretation accommodates two (2) types of nominees: 1. One
who actually shares the attribute or characteristic which makes
the sector marginalized or underrepresented (the first type); 2. An
advocate or one who is genuinely and actively promoting the
causes of the sector he wishes to represent (the second type).
Same; Same; View that there are instances when one or some
of the nominees are disqualified to represent the group but this
should not automatically result to the disqualification of the latter.
To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same significance
which the law holds for the partylist groups of the marginalized
and underrepresented.—Indeed, there are instances when one or
some of the nominees are disqualified to represent the group but
this should not automatically result to the disqualification of the
latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the same
significance which the law holds for the partylist groups of the
marginalized and underrepresented. It is worthy to emphasize
that the formation of partylist groups organized by the
marginalized and underrepresented and their participation in the
process of legislation is the essence of the partylist system of
representation. Consistent with the purpose of the law, it is still
the fact that the partylist group satisfied the
508
qualifications of the law that is material to consider. That one or

some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the qualifications for the
position should not unreasonably upset the existence of an
otherwise legitimate partylist group. The disqualification of the
nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an
office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the
qualifications of the partylist group itself with defect.
Same; Same; View that the selection of nominees depends
upon the choice of the members of the partylist group. It is a
matter which cannot be legislated and is solely dependent upon the
will of the party.—It is worth emphasizing that the selection of
nominees depends upon the choice of the members of the party
list group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is solely
dependent upon the will of the party. More often than not, the
choice of nominees is grounded on trust and confidence, not on the
vague or abstract concepts of qualifications under the law. The
method or process by which the members of the partylist group
choose their nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules
or guidelines can be imposed upon them by the Court or the
COMELEC in selecting their representatives lest we be charged
of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that for
an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order
or resolution with grave abuse of discretion.—For an
extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the tribunal or
administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order
or resolution with grave abuse of discretion. In Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), the Court
recognized that along with the limited focus that attends petitions
for certiorari is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non
reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion.
LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; PartyList System; View that national political
parties may participate in party list elections, provided that they
have
509
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 509
no candidate for legislative districts.—National political parties

may participate in party list elections, provided that they have no
candidate for legislative districts. The constitution disqualifies
political parties, which have candidates for legislative districts,
from the party list system. I also agree that they need not be
organized sectorally and/or represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented.”
Same; Same; View that there is no constitutional requirement
that all those who participate in the party list system “must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups” as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941.—There is no constitutional
requirement that all those who participate in the party list
system “must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups” as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941. This law is
unconstitutional in so far as it makes a requirement that is not
supported by the plain text of the Constitution. There is also a
constitutional difference between the political parties that
support those who are candidates for legislative districts and
those that participate in the party list system. It is inconsistent
for national political parties who have candidates for legislative
districts to also run for party list. This, too, is the clear
implication from the text of article VI, section 5(1) of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; View that the party list system is an attempt to
introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where voters
choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate
nominees secondarily.—The party list system is an attempt to
introduce a new system of politics in our country, one where
voters choose platforms and principles primarily and candidate
nominees secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the party
list system’s intentions are broader than simply to “ensure that
those who are marginalized and represented become lawmakers
themselves.”
Same; Same; View that it is the party or the organization that
is elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully
through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is
also the party list group that can delist or remove their nominees,
and hence replace him or her, should he or she act inconsistently
with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their

organization.—The party list system was introduced to challenge
the status quo. It could not have been intended to enhance and
further entrench the same system. It is the party or the
organization that is
510
elected. It is the party list group that authorizes, hopefully

through a democratic process, a priority list of its nominees. It is
also the party list group that can delist or remove their nominees,
and hence replace him or her, should he or she act inconsistently
with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine
political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable true
representation, and hence, provide the potential for us to realize a
“democratic and republican state.”
Same; Same; View that to require that all the seats for party
list representatives remain sectoral in one form or the other is
clearly and patently unconstitutional.—Surely, it should be the
electorate, not the COMELEC, which should decide whether their
groups should participate in our legislative deliberations. That
these groups could be excluded even before the vote is not what
the party list system is all about. These two instances arising
from the consolidated petitions we are considering clearly show
why the text of article VI, section 5 (2) provides: “(2) The partylist
representative shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to partylist
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sectors.” (emphasis
provided) What is plain from a reading of the text is that the
qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the “three
consecutive terms after the ratification” of the Constitution. Only
onehalf of the seats within that period is reserved to the “sectors”
that were enumerated, clearly implying that there are other
kinds of party list groups other than those who are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for party list representatives remain
sectoral in one form or the other is clearly and patently
unconstitutional. It is not supported by the text. Its rationale and
its actual effect is not in accord with the spirit of these provisions.
Same; Same; View that to claim that the framers of the
Constitution left it to Congress to complete the very framework of
the party list system is to question the fundamental character of
our constitution.—The 1987 Constitution is a complete document.
Every provi
511
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 511
sion should be read in the context of all the other provisions so

that contours of constitutional policy are made clear. To claim
that the framers of the Constitution left it to Congress to complete
the very framework of the party list system is to question the
fundamental character of our constitution. The phrases “in
accordance with law” and “as may be provided by law” is not an
invitation to the members of Congress to continue the work of the
constituent assembly that crafted the Constitution. Constitutional
policy is to be derived from the text of the constitution in the light
of its context in the document and considering the contemporary
impact of relevant precedents.
Same; Same; View that with respect to existing registered
party list groups, jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).—With
respect to existing registered party list groups, jurisdiction to
disqualify is clearly reposed on the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution in article VI, section
17 clearly provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members...” A more
specific provision in the Constitution with respect to disqualifying
registered political party list groups should prevail over the more
general powers of the COMELEC to enforce and administer
election laws. Besides, that the HRET is the “sole judge” clearly
shows that the constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fernando Teodulo T. Ortigoza III for petitioner Atong
Paglaum, Inc. in G.R. No. 203766.
Raul L. Lambino and John Carlo Gil M. Sadian for
petitioner Ang Galing Pinoy in G.R. No. 204428.
Mark Albert B. Maquiraya for petitioner in G.R. No.
204367.
512

George Erwin M. Garcia for petitioners in G.R. Nos.

204370, 204435, 204436, 204100, 204484, 204485, 203981
and 204220.
Charita R. Agdon for petitioner Binhi in G.R. No.
204374.
Francisco B. Sibayan and Yasser B. Lumbos for
petitioners Guardian and Firm 24K in G.R. Nos. 204394
and 204236.
Arturo M. De Castro for petitioner Alaeh in G.R. No.
204426.
Grace Valentine A. Merino for petitioner PAKYAW in
G.R. No. 204408.
A. Martin S. Antero and Raymund J.I. O. Mendoza for
petitioner 1st Kabagis in G.R. No. 204486.
MyraDiwata A. RiveraCaroy for petitioner Manila
Teacher Savings & Loan Associations, Inc. in G.R. No.
204455.
Elmer Joseph R. Guerzon for petitioner Kalikasan
Partylist in G.R. No. 204402.
Hernan G. Nicdao for petitioner Coalition of Senior
Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. in G.R. No. 204425.
Salvador B. Belaro, Jr. for petitioner A Party List in
G.R. No. 204263.
Salvador B. Britanico and Francesco Britanico for
petitioner Animad in G.R. No. 204318.
Cheloy VelicariaGarafil for petitioner Aani in G.R. No.
204321.
Gilbert Ray C. Navarro, Meiline C. MedallaMaquiling

and Lloyd M. Lequin for petitioner Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy
[PPP] in G.R. No. 204490.
Donald B. Diaz for petitioner 1Utak in G.R. No.
204410.
513
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 513

Romeo C. Manalo for petitioner Senior Citizen Party

list in G.R. No. 204421.
Rean Mayo D.V. Javier for 1Ganap/Guardians in G.R.
No. 204122.
Rolando Cipriano for petitioner Anad in G.R. No.
204094.
Berteni Cataluña Causing for petitioner in Alam in
G.R. No. 204139.
Harlin Gleeper FJ. Abayon II and Neil P. Esponilla for
petitioner Aangat Tayo in G.R. No. 204174.
John R. Castriciones for petitioner Bayani in G.R. No.
204323.
Carroline M. Cruz Sabio for petitioner Ako Bahay in
G.R. No. 204364.
Oliver B. San Antonio for petitioner Butil in G.R. No.
204356.
Michael Jobert M. Marasigan for Aama in G.R. No.
204358.
Vicente V. Mendoza for petitioner AKB in G.R. No.
203818.
Alfredo B. Molo III and Candice A. Cabrido cocounsels
of petitioner AKB in G.R. Nos. 20381819.
Jose Ismael B. Valmores for petitioner in G.R. No.
204216.
Eduardo L. Antonio for petitioner Greenforce in G.R.
No. 204239.
Manuel Iral for petitioner Kakusa in G.R. No. 203958.
Ray Jean D. Tamayo for petitioner 1Care in G.R. No.
203960.
514

Bernardita S. Fortuno for petitioner Araro in G.R. No.

203976.
Ricardo M. Ribo for petitioner ARC in G.R. No. 204002.
Diosab B. Formilleza for Bantay Party List in G.R. No.
204141.
Wilfredo L. Bathan for petitioner Abroad Party List in
G.R. No. 204158.
Francisco R. Muñez for petitioner Alim in G.R. No.
204341.
David D. Erro for petitioner in G.R. No. 204153.
Rogelio Dones Evasco for petitioners Asin, AIpra, KAP,
ABP, and SMART in G.R. Nos. 204379, 204126, 204238,
204359 and 204240.
Yeshter Donn P. Baccay and Sherwin D. Visconde for
petitioner APEC in G.R. No. 203922.
Manuelito R. Luna for petitioner AkmaPTM in G.R.
No. 203936.
John R. Gonzalo for petitioner AIpra in G.R. No.
204125.
Ramil Joselito B. Tamayo for petitioner Agri.
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them
_______________
1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
515
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 515

from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections,

either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
partylist system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as partylist organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the
Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3
27 November 2012,4 4 December 2012,5 11 December
2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
The Facts
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941
(R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and
9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the
13 May 2013 partylist elections.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for
registration of the following groups and organizations:
G.R. SPP Group Grounds for Denial

No. No.
A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the
COMELEC Division’s resolutions approving registration
of groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 204379 12099 Alagad ng The “artists” sec

_______________
2 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 20381819), pp. 10791080.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), pp. 176177.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 145148.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 203766), unpaginated.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), pp. 2635. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C.
Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
516

(PLM) Sining (ASIN)

tor is not considered
marginalized and
underrepresented;
Failure to prove track
record; and Failure of
the nominees to qualify
under RA 7941 and Ang
Bagong Bayani.
Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
2 204455 12041 Manila A nonstock savings
(PLM) Teachers and loan association
Savings and cannot be considered
Loan marginalized and
Association, underrepresented; and
Inc. (Manila The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not
teachers by profession.
3 204426 12011 Association of Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local members belong to the
Athletics marginalized; and
Entrepreneurs Failure of the nominees
and to qualify.
Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALAEH)
Resolution dated 27 November
201210
_______________
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 204455), pp. 3855; Rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 127
144. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph
dissenting; Commissioner Armando C. Velasco also concurred except for
AlaEh.
517
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 517

4 204435 12 1 Alliance

Failure of the nominees to
057 Advocating
qualify: although registering
(PLM) Autonomy
as a regional political party,
1 Party
two of the nominees are not
(1AAAP)
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
5 204367 12 Akbay Failure of the group to
104 Kalusugan show that its nominees
(PL) (AKIN), belong to the urban poor
Inc. sector.
6 204370 12 Ako An Failure to represent a
011 Bisaya marginalized sector of
(PP) (AAB) society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
Constituency has district
representa
_______________
518

tives;
Lack of track record in
representing peasants
and farmers; and
Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 204436 12 Abyan Ilonggo Failure to show that the
009 Party (AI) party represents a
(PP), marginalized and
12 underrepresented sector,
165 as the Province of Iloilo
(PLM) has district
representatives;
Untruthful statements
in the memorandum; and
Withdrawal of three of
its five nominees.
8 204485 12 Alliance of Failure to establish that
175 Organizations, the group can represent
(PL) Networks and 14 sectors;
Associations of

_______________
Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim with Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca took no part.
519
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 519

the The sectors of

Philippines, homeowners’ associations,
Inc. (ALONA) entrepreneurs and
cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for
reconsideration of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions
denying registration of groups and organizations
9 204139 12 Alab ng Failure to prove track
127 Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(PL) (ALAM) Failure to show that the
group actually represents
the marginalized and
Failure to establish that
the group can represent all
sectors it seeks to
represent.
Resolution
dated 7
November
201216
_______________
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca took no part.
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
520

10 204402 12 Kalikasan PartyList The group

061 (KALIKASAN) reflects an
(PP) advocacy for the
environment, and
is not
representative of
the marginalized
and
underrepresented;
There is no proof
that majority of its
members belong to
the marginalized
and
underrepresented;
The group
represents sectors
with conflicting
interests; and
The nominees do
not belong to the
sector which the
group claims to
represent.
11 204394 12 Association of Guard, Failure to prove
145 Utility Helper, Aider, membership base
(PL) Rider, Driver/ and track record;
Domestic Helper, Failure to present
Janitor, Agent and activities that
Nanny of the sufficiently
Philippines, Inc. benefited its
(GUARDJAN) intended
constituency; and
The nominees do
not belong to any
of the sectors
which
_______________
Armando C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official
business.
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim.
Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
521
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 521

the group seeks to represent.

12 204490 12 Pilipinas Failure to show that the
073 Para sa group represents a
(PLM) Pinoy marginalized and
(PPP) underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the

COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in
the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections
because PBB does not represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector; PBB failed to apply for
registration as a partylist group; and PBB failed to
_______________
18 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204490), pp. 7178. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph,
and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Rene
V. Sarmiento concurred but took no part in Ang Ating Damayan.
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
522

establish its track record as an organization that seeks to

uplift the lives of the “marginalized and
20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALAEH,
1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on
7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded
the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 partylist elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the
COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The
_______________
20 PBB’s petition is docketed as G.R. No. 204484 before this Court, and
as SPP No. 11002 before the COMELEC.
21 In the Matter of Clarifying the Inclusion in the PartyList Raffle of
New Groups Denied Accreditation but were Able to Obtain a Status Quo
Ante Order from the Supreme Court.
22 (2) To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the
Commission En Banc, for purposes of determining their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in
the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if noncompliant, cancel the registration
of the following:
(a) Partylist groups or organizations which are already registered
and accredited and will participate in the May 13, 2013 Elections,
provided that the Commission En Banc has not passed upon the grant of
their respective Petitions for Registration; and
(b) Partylist groups or organizations which are existing and retained
in the list of Registered PartyList Parties per Resolution No. 9412,
promulgated on 27 April 2012, and which have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the PartyList System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections. (Boldface and italics in the
original)
23 412 Phil. 308; 359 SCRA 698 (2001).
423
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 423

COMELEC disqualified the following groups and

organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party
list elections:
G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818 12154 AKO Retained registration and
19 (PLM)12 Bicol accreditation as a political
177 Political party, but denied
(PLM) Party participation in the May
(AKB) 2013 partylist elections
Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
_______________
24 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 20381819), pp. 8387. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
70; Rollo (G.R. No. 204002), pp. 5376; (G.R. No. 204318), pp. 2346.
Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito
N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S.
Lim. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
524

2 203766 12 Atong Cancelled registration

161 Paglaum, Inc. and accreditation
(PLM) (Atong The nominees do not
Paglaum) belong to the sectors
which the party
represents; and
The party failed to file
its Statement of
Contributions and
Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12 Association for Cancelled registration
187 Righteousness and accreditation
(PLM) Advocacy on Failure to comply, and
Leadership for violation of election
(ARAL) laws;
The nominees do not
represent the sectors
which the party
represents; and
There is doubt that the
party is organized for
religious purposes.
4 204002 12 Alliance for Cancelled registration
188 Rural and accreditation
(PLM) Concerns Failure of the nominees
(ARC) to qualify; and
Failure of the party to
prove that majority of its
members belong to the
sectors it seeks to
represent.
5 204318 12 United Move Cancelled registra
220

525
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 525

(PLM) ment tion and accreditation The

Against sectors of drug counsellors
Drugs and lecturers, veterans and
Foundation the youth, are not
(UNIMAD) marginalized and
underrepresented;
Failure to establish track
record; and
Failure of the nominees
to qualify as
representatives of the
youth and young urban
professionals.
6 204100 12 1Bro Cancelled registration
196 Philippine Failure to define the sector
(PLM) Guardians it seeks to represent; and
Brotherhood, The nominees do not
Inc. (1BRO belong to a marginalized
PGBI) and underrepresented
sector.
7 204122 12 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
223 Nationalist The party is a military
(PLM) Philippines, fraternity;
Inc.
_______________
26 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204100), pp. 5267; Rollo (G.R. No. 204122), pp. 36
51; Rollo (G.R. No. 204263), pp. 2843. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
526

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS) The sector of

community
volunteer workers
is too broad to
allow for
meaningful
representation;
and
The nominees do
not appear to
belong to the
sector of
community
volunteer
workers.
8 204263 12 Blessed Federation of Cancelled
257 Farmers and Fishermen registration
(PLM) International, Inc. (A Three of the
BLESSED PartyList) seven nominees
do not belong to
the sector of
farmers and
fishermen, the
sector sought to
be represented;
and
None of the
nominees are
registered voters
of Region XI, the
region sought to
be represented.
9 203960 12 1st Consumers Alliance Cancelled
260 for Rural Energy, Inc. registration
(PLM) (1CARE) The sector of
rural energy
consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
The party’s track
_______________
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.
Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
527
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 527

record is related to
electric cooperatives
and not rural energy
consumers; and
The nominees do
not belong to the
sector of rural
energy consumers.
10 203922 12201 Association of Cancelled
(PLM) Philippine registration and
Electric accreditation
Cooperatives Failure to
(APEC) represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector; and
The nominees do
not belong to the
sector that the party
claims to represent.
11 204174 12 Aangat Tayo Cancelled
232(PLM) PartyList registration and
Party (AT) accreditation
The incumbent
representative in
_______________
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 203922), pp. 92101. Signed by Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph,
and Christian Robert S. Lim. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned a
Separate Concurring Opinion. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
29 Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), pp. 158164. Signed by Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R.
Yusoph. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also concurred but did not
sign. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. penned an extended opinion.
528

Congress failed to
author or sponsor bills
that are beneficial to
the sectors that the
party represents
(women, elderly, youth,
urban poor); and
The nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
288 Rural and and accreditation
(PLM) Agrarian The interests of the
Reconstruction, peasant and urban poor
Inc. (ARARO) sectors that the party
represents differ;
The nominees do not
belong to the sectors
represent; Failure to
show that three of the
nominees are bona fide
party members; and
Lack of a Board
resolution to
participate in the
_______________
Armando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
took no part.
529
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 529

partylist elections.
13 204240 12 AgriAgra na Cancelled registration
279 Reporma Para The party ceased to
(PLM) sa Magsasaka exist for more than a
ng Pilipinas year immediately after
Movement the May 2010 elections;
(AGRI) The nominees do not
belong to the sector of
peasants and farmers
represent;
Only four nominees
were submitted to the
COMELEC; and
Failure to show
meaningful activities
for its constituency.
14 203936 12 Aksyon Cancelled registration
248 Magsasaka Failure to show that
(PLM) Partido Tinig majority of its members
ng Masa are marginalized and
(AKMAPTM) un
_______________
150; Rollo (G.R. No. 204126), pp. 5173; Rollo (G.R. No. 204364), pp. 3456;
Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), pp. 3153; Rollo (G.R. No. 204408), pp. 4668;
Rollo (G.R. No. 204153), pp. 2446; Rollo (G.R. No. 203958), pp. 2648.
Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V.
Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle. Armando C. Velasco, Commissioner Elias
R. Yusoph also voted in favor. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but inhibited in KAKUSA. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
530

2/26/2018 g g SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 694
derrepresented;
Failure to prove that
four of its nine nominees
actually belong to the
farmers sector; and
Failure to show that
five of its nine nominees
work on uplifting the
lives of the members of
the sector.
15 204126 12 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
263 Nagkakaisang The Manifestation of
(PLM) Agilang Intent and Certificate of
Pilipinong Nomination were not
Magsasaka signed by an appropriate
(KAP) officer of the party;
Failure to show track
record for the farmers
and peasants sector;
and Failure to show
that nominees actually
belong to the sector, or
that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.
16 204364 12 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
180 Kilusan ng Failure to show that
(PLM) Ordinaryong nominees actually
Tao Para sa belong to the sector, or
Lupa, that they have
Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay activities for the
at Kaunlaran
(AKO

531
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 531

BAHAY) sector.
17 204141 12 The True Marcos Cancelled

229 Loyalist (for God, registration Failure
(PLM) Country and to show that
People) majority of its
Association of the members are
Philippines, Inc. marginalized and
(BANTAY) underrepresented;
and
Failure to prove
that two of its
nominees actually
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12 Pilipino Cancelled
217 Association for registration Change
(PLM) Country – Urban of sector (from
Poor Youth urban poor youth to
Advancement and urban poor)
Welfare necessitates a new
(PACYAW) application;
Failure to show
track record for the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
Failure to prove
that majority of its
members and
officers are from the
urban poor sector;
and
The nominees are
not members of the
urban poor sector.
19 204153 12 Pasang Masda Cancelled
277 Nationwide Party registration
(PLM) (PASANG The party
MASDA) represents drivers
and operators, who
may have conflicting
interests; and
532
Nominees are either

operators or former
operators.
20 203958 12 Kapatiran Cancelled registration
015 ng mga Failure to prove that
(PLM) Nakulong majority of its officers and
na Walang members belong to the
Sala, Inc. marginalized and
(KAKUSA) underrepresented;
The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to
the sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
record for the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized
_______________
and Armando C. Velasco. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim also
concurred but did not sign. Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph also voted in
favor but was on official business at the time of signing. Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
533
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 533

21 204428 12 Ang Galing Cancelled registration

256 Pinoy (AG) and accreditation
(PLM) Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
record for the
marginalized and
The nominees did not
appear to be
marginalized and
underrepresented.
185 Nationalism and accreditation
(PLM) and Failure to represent an
Democracy identifiable
(ANAD) marginalized and
underrepresented
sector;
Only three nominees
were submitted to the
COMELEC;
The nominees do not
belong to the
marginalized and
Failure to submit its
Statement of
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners Armando
C. Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca were on official business.
534

Contribution and
Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239 12 Green Force for Cancelled
060 the Environment registration and
(PLM) Sons and accreditation
Daughters of The party is an
Mother Earth advocacy group and
(GREENFORCE) does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
Failure to comply
with the track record
requirement; and
The nominees are
not marginalized
citizens.
24 204236 12 Firm 24K Cancelled
254 Association, Inc. registration and
(PLM) (FIRM 24K) accreditation
The nominees do not
belong to the sector
that the party seeks
to represent (urban
poor and peasants of
the National Capital
Region);
Only two of its
nominees reside in
_______________
34 Rollo, (G.R. No. 204239), pp. 2542; Rollo (G.R. No. 204236), pp. 57
74; Rollo (G.R. No. 204341), pp. 2946. Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C.
Velasco was on official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
535
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 535

the National Capital

Region; and
Failure to comply with
the track record
requirement.
25 204341 12 Action Cancelled registration
269 League of and accreditation
(PLM) Indigenous Failure to establish that
Masses its nominees are
(ALIM) members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and
Cordilleras sector that
the party seeks to
represent;
Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and
Cordilleras; and
Three of the nominees
do not appear to belong
to the marginalized.
26 204358 12 Alliance of Cancelled registration
204 Advocates in The sector it represents
(PLM) Mining is a specifically defined
Advancement group which may not be
for National allowed
Progress
(AAMA)
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
536

registration under the

partylist system; and
Failure to establish
that the nominees
actually belong to the
sector.

27 204359 12 Social Cancelled registration
272 Movement for The nominees are
(PLM) Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the
Transparency sectors that the party
(SMART) represents;
Failure to comply with
the track record
requirement; and
There is doubt as to
whether majority of its
members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
28 204238 12 Alliance of Cancelled registration
173 Bicolnon Party and accreditation
(PLM) (ABP)
_______________
Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioner Christian
Robert S. Lim also concurred but was on official business at the time of
signing. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
537
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 537

Defective registration and

accreditation dating back to
2010;
Failure to represent any
sector; and
Failure to establish that
the nominees are employed
in the construction industry,
the sector it claims to
represent.
29 204323 12 Bayani Cancelled registration and
210 Party List accreditation
(PLM) (BAYANI)
Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia
538

30 204321 12 Ang Cancelled registration and

252 Agrikultura accreditation
(PLM) Natin Failure to establish a
Isulong track record of enhancing
(AANI) the lives of the
marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to
represent; and
More than a majority of
the party’s nominees do
not belong to the farmers
sector.
31 204125 12 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and
292 Indigenous accreditation
(PLM) Peoples Failure to prove that its
Rights five nominees are members
Alliance, of the indigenous people
Inc. (A sector;
IPRA)
Failure to prove that its
five nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party;
and
Failure to prove that its
five nomi
_______________
Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official
business.
Elias R. Yusoph, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Armando C.
Velasco was on official business. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
539
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 539

nees are bona fide

members.
32 204216 12 Philippine Cancelled registration

202 Coconut and accreditation
(PLM) Producers The party is affiliated
Federation, with private and
Inc. government agencies
(COCOFED) and is not marginalized;
The party is assisted
by the government in
various projects; and
members of the
marginalized sector of
coconut farmers and
producers.
33 204220 12 Abang Cancelled registration
238 Lingkod Failure to establish a
(PLM) PartyList track record of
(ABANG continuously
LINGKOD) representing the
peasant farmers sector;
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca. Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim penned a separate Concurring Opinion.
Commissioner Armando C. Velasco was on official business.
540

Failure to show that its

members actually belong
to the peasant farmers
sector; and
Failure to show that its
nominees are
marginalized and
underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers,
and adhere to its
advocacies.
34 204158 12 Action Cancelled registration and
158 Brotherhood accreditation
(PLM) for Active Failure to show that the
Dreamers, party is actually able to
Inc. represent all of the sectors
(ABROAD) it claims to represent;
Failure to show a
complete track record of
its activities since its
registration; and
part of any of the sectors
which the party seeks to
represent.
_______________
541
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 541

35 204374 12 BinhiPartido Cancelled registration

228 ng mga and accreditation
(PLM) Magsasaka The party receives
Para sa mga assistance from the
Magsasaka government through the
(BINHI) Department of
Agriculture; and
Failure to prove that
the group is
marginalized and
underrepresented.
36 204356 12 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration
136 Party and accreditation
(PLM) (BUTIL) Failure to establish
that the agriculture and
cooperative sectors are
marginalized and
The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong
to the sectors they seek
to represent, nor to have
actively par
_______________
542

ticipated in the
undertakings of the
party.
37 204486 12 1st Kabalikat Cancelled registration

194 ng Bayan and accreditation
(PLM) Ginhawang Declaration of
Sangkatauhan untruthful statements;
(1st
KABAGIS) Failure to exist for at
least one year; and
None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban
poor indigenous cultural
communities sectors
which it seeks to
represent.
38 204410 12 1United Cancelled accreditation
198 Transport The party represents
(PLM) Koalisyon (1 drivers and operators,
UTAK) who may have
conflicting interests;
and
_______________
Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle
penned a Dissenting Opinion and joined by Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph. Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca took no part.
543
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 543

The party’s
nominees do not
belong to any
marginalized and
underrepresented
sector.

39 204421, 12157 Coalition of Cancelled
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens registration
12191 in the The party violated
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. election laws
(SENIOR because its
CITIZENS) nominees had a
termsharing
agreement.
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL,

ARC, UNIMAD, 1BROPGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED PartyList, 1CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMAPTM, KAP, AKOBAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE,
FIRM 24K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
AIPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD,
BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1UTAK, SENIOR
CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction
from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the
names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 partylist elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated
petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders,
namely:
_______________
28. Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim, and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R.
Yusoph, dissenting.
544

G.R. SPP No. Group

No.
203818 12154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

19 (PLM) 12
177
(PLM)
203981 12187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy
(PLM) on Leadership (ARAL)
204002 12188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
(PLM)
203922 12201 Association of Philippine Electric
(PLM) Cooperatives (APEC)
203960 12260 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural
(PLM) Energy, Inc. (1CARE)
203936 12248 Aksyon MagsasakaPartido Tinig ng
(PLM) Masa (AKMAPTM)
203958 12015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang
(PLM) Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)
203976 12288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian
(PLM) Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
204094 12185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(PLM) (ANAD)
204125 12292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights
(PLM) Alliance, Inc. (AIPRA)
204100 12196 1Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
(PLM) Inc. (1BROPGBI)
204141 12229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God,
(PLM) Country and People) Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY)
204240 12279 AgriAgra na Reporma Para sa
(PLM) Magsasaka ng Pilipinas Movement
(AGRI)
204216 12202 Philippine Coconut Producers
(PLM) Federation, Inc. (COCOFED)
545
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 545

204158 12 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

158 (ABROAD)
(PLM)
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
204122 12 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
223 (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
(PLM)
203766 12 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

161
(PLM)
204318 12 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation
220 (UNIMAD)
(PLM)
204263 12 Blessed Federation of Farmers and
257 Fishermen International, Inc. (A BLESSED
(PLM) PartyList)
204174 12 Aangat Tayo PartyList Party (AT)
232
(PLM)
204126 12 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang
263 Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)
(PLM)
204364 12 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao
180 Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at
(PLM) Kaunlaran (AKOBAHAY)
204139 12 Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
127
(PL)
204220 12 Abang Lingkod PartyList (ABANG
238 LINGKOD)
(PLM)
204236 12 Firm 24K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24K)
254
(PLM)
204238 12 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
173
(PLM)
204239 12 Green Force for the Environment Sons and
060 Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)
(PLM)
204321 12 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
252
(PLM)
204323 12 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
210
(PLM)
204341 12 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
269
(PLM)
546

204358 12 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

204 for National Progress (AAMA)
(PLM)
204359 12 Social Movement for Active Reform and
272 Transparency (SMART)
(PLM)
204356 12 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
136
(PLM)
204402 12 Kalikasan PartyList (KALIKASAN)
061
(PL)
204394 12 Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
145 Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
(PL) and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204408 12 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
217 Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
(PLM)
204428 12 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
256
(PLM)
204490 12 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
073
(PLM)
204379 12 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
099
(PLM)
204367 12 Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
104
(PL)
204426 12 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
011 and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALAEH)
(PLM)
204455 12 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
041 Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers)
(PLM)
204374 12 BinhiPartido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa
228 mga Magsasaka (BINHI)
(PLM)
204370 12 Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
011
(PP)
204435 12 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
057 (1AAAP)
(PLM)
547
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 547

204486 12 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

194 Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
(PLM)
204410 12 1United Transport Koalisyon (1UTAK)
198
(PLM)
204421, 12 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the
204425 157 Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
(PLM)
12
191
(PLM)
204436 12 Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
009
(PP),
12
165
(PLM)
204485 12 Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
175 Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)
(PL)
204484 11 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
002
204153 12 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
277 MASDA)
(PLM)
The Issues
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the
partylist system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as partylist organizations;
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the
partylist system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT)
should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 partylist elections.
_______________
49 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
548

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections. However, since
the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties
under the partylist system, thereby abandoning the
rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all
the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who
are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The PartyList System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party
list system of representation. Simply put, the partylist
system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in
the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her partylist group or
organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on
_______________
50 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 566567 (1 August 1986).
549
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 549

the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as

provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to
partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Sections 7 and 8, Article IXC
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the partylist system as provided in this
Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the partylist system, shall not be represented in
the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors,
boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall
be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of

the partylist system, stressed that “the partylist system
is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation.”51 The constitutional provisions on the
partylist system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the
proposal for the partylist system is not synonymous with
that of the sectoral representation. Precisely, the partylist
system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who
constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on
the
_______________
51 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 8586 (22 July 1986).
550

partylist system, we were made aware of the problems precisely

cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved
seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would
mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they
will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved
seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as
we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the
farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business,
military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as “sectoral
representatives” to be represented in this Commission. The
problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in
the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include
other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of
which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And
as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more
limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration
we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had
the problem of who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the
farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens
who are called “hyphenated citizens.” A doctor may be a farmer; a
lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of
the person to say “I am a farmer” so he would be included in that
sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat
system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in
effect, giving some people two votes and other people one vote. We
sought to avoid these problems by presenting a partylist system.
Under the partylist system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party
or a sectoral organization that will then register and present
candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially,
under the partylist system, every voter has two votes, so there is
no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be
asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be
represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of
the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered
with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This
can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need
not be a farmer to say that he wants the farmers’ party to be
represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party.
At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes
that
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 551

had been garnered by each party or each organization—one does

not have to be a political party and register in order to participate
as a party—and count the votes and from there derive the
percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are
assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the partylist system.
So, we have a limit of 30 percent of 50. That means that the
maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When
the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They
have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet
the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National
Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated,
one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or
15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets
2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the
vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these
parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who
has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the
National Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that
has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group that
has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special
interest group, should not have a voice in the National Assembly.
It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only
one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled
to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they
really have a common interest, they should band together, form a
coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have two
seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a partylist

system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of
sectoral representation while at the same time making sure that
those who really have a national constituency or sectoral
constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National
Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the
constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may
not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will
have votes on a nationwide basis.
552

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,

we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000
votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of
the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this
way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of
the partylist system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in
interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though
we refer to sectors, we would be referring to sectoral party list
rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the
party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors because
the sectors would be included in the partylist system. They can
be sectoral parties within the partylist system.
x x x x
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we
suggested or proposed the partylist system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the partylist system.
x x x.
x x x
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the

198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is
this: Are we going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the partylist concept or must they be
under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these
parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 553

20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the

seats that we are allocating under the partylist system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats
can field district candidates and can also participate in
the partylist system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the
party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the partylist system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under
BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the
partylist system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang
linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the partylist
election if they can prove that they are also organized
along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all
political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base

of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang
UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the partylist at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang partylist system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors.
Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
554

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run

there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the partylist system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field
sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may
be allowed to register for the partylist system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo
if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato
ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer?
Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying
to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My
question is: Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he
qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of
whether or not a political party is really organized along a
specific sectoral line. If such is verified or confirmed, the
political party may submit a list of individuals who are
actually members of such sectors. The lists are to be
published to give individuals or organizations belonging
to such sector the chance to present evidence
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or
to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral

organizations or parties. This proceeding shall be
conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this
matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
52 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 8586 (22 July 1986), 256257
(25 July 1986).
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 555

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution

intended the partylist system to include not only sectoral
parties but also nonsectoral parties. The framers intended
the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the partylist system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties
can participate in the partylist system “[F]or as long
as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.”53
In fact, the framers voted down, 1922, a proposal to
reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of
Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the partylist
system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained
by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang
Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section

5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two
staunch positions—the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta,
advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress
to be allocated to partylist representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting
the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view that
reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors would stunt their development into fullpledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the

sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the
other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and
lessmoneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like
placing babes in the lion’s den, so to speak, with the bigger and
more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up.
R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the first five
major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives from participating in the partylist
system for the first partylist elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically
_______________
53 II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 257 (25 July 1986).
556

lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for

permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort
towards a compromise—that the partylist system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was
further whittled down by allocating only half of the seats under
the partylist system to candidates from the sectors which would
garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 1922, the proposal for permanent seats,
and in the alternative the reservation of the partylist
system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution,
by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify their
electoral base and brace themselves in the multiparty electoral
contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent

reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only
allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There can
be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the
partylist system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and

that they clearly intended the partylist system to include
both sectoral and nonsectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non
sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes
that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections. The partylist system will be the entry point to
membership in the House of
_______________
54 412 Phil. 347, 350; 359 SCRA 698, 735736 (2001).
55 PartyList System: The Philippine Experience, Fritzie Palma
Tangkia and Ma. Araceli Basco Habaradas, Ateneo School of Government
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Philippine Office, April 2001,
http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/philippinen/50076.pdf (accessed 30
March 2013).
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 557

Representatives for both these nontraditional parties that

could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to include in the partylist system both
sectoral and nonsectoral parties is clearly written in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed

of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal

clear that there shall be “a partylist system of
organizations.” The commas after the words “national[,]”
and “regional[,]” separate national and regional parties
from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at
the same time sectoral, they would have stated “national
and regional sectoral parties.” They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the partylist
system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly
wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party
list system is composed of three different groups, and the
sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The
text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that
national and regional parties are separate from
sectoral parties.
Thus, the partylist system is composed of three
different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are dif
558

ferent from sectoral parties or organizations. National and

regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, “onehalf of the seats allocated to party
list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.” This provision clearly shows again that
the partylist system is not exclusively for sectoral parties

for two obvious reasons.
First, the other onehalf of the seats allocated to party
list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral
partylist representatives, clearly negating the idea that
the partylist system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the “marginalized and underrepresented.”
Second, the reservation of onehalf of the partylist seats to
sectoral parties applies only for the first “three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution,” clearly
making the partylist system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type
of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the partylist system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and
partylist structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be
disputed: the partylist system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for nonsectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the PartyList System Act,
which is the law that implements the partylist system
prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 559

Section 3. Definition of Terms.—(a) The partylist system is a

mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the partylist system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which,
as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders

and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either

a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a
sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a “political party refers to an organized
group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and
560

policies for the general conduct of government.” On

the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that
a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A.
No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a
sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct
from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To
require all national and regional parties under the party

list system to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideologybased and causeoriented parties from the
partylist system. How will these ideologybased and cause
oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the partylist system? To exclude them from
the partylist system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the
armed struggle. To exclude them from the partylist system
is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary
to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the partylist system, an ideologybased or cause
oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There
is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political
party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or
platform, or the same governance principles and policies,
regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that “the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cul
561
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 561

tural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,

veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.”56 The
sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily
“marginalized and underrepresented.” For sure,
“professionals” are not by definition “marginalized and
underrepresented,” not even the elderly, women, and the
youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may “lack welldefined political constituencies,” and
can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their

respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling
reason for holding that the law does not require national or
regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented.” Section 6 provides the grounds for
the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of
parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
_______________
56 Section 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may register as a
party, organization or coalition for purposes of the partylist system by filing with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition
verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party
list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not
later than sixty (60) days before election.
562

interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing,

the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,

foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly
or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections
or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the partylist system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration

refers to nonrepresentation of the “marginalized and
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented”
appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on
Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks “to promote
proportional represen
_______________
57 Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the
563
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 563

tation in the election of representatives to the House of

Representatives through the partylist system,” which will
enable Filipinos belonging to the “marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack welldefined political constituencies,”
to become members of the House of Representatives. While

the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly
refers to “marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties,” the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the
sectors, organizations or parties must be “marginalized and
underrepresented.” On the contrary, to even interpret that
all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are “marginalized
and underrepresented” would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy
declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific
implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented”
should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are,
by their nature, economically “marginalized and
underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar
sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members
of the sectoral party must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented.” The nominees
of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for
the sector represented. Belonging to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector does not mean
_______________
State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provided
the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis supplied)
564

one must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is

sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle
class. More specifically, the economically “marginalized and
underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination

Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as
well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be “marginalized and
underrepresented” will allow small ideologybased and
causeoriented parties who lack “welldefined political
constituencies” a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” the sectoral parties
for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the
“marginalized and underrepresented” an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multiparty system where those “marginalized and
underrepresented,” both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the partylist system honest
and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well
off partylist representatives to masquerade as “wallowing
in poverty, destitution and infirmity,” even as they attend
sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
_______________

58 The National Statistical Coordination Board (NSDB) classifies the
population into three income groups: the high income, the middle income,
and the low income group. See Table 2. Annual Family Income of the Low,
Middle, and High Income Classes: 1997,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ncs/10thNCS/papers/contributed%20papers/cps
12/cps1201.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013).
565
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 565

The major political parties are those that field

candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the partylist
elections since they neither lack “welldefined political
constituencies” nor represent “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the partylist system are
necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the partylist system to those
who “lack welldefined political constituencies,” giving
them the opportunity to have members in the House of
Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its
second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the
partylist system, that “while even major political parties
are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the partylist system, they must comply with
the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors
x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives.’
“However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its
second guideline, that “the political party x x x must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented,”
automatically disqualified major political parties from
participating in the partylist system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been
compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral
wings officially organized by major political parties.
BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it
expressly prohibited major political parties from
participating in the partylist system, even through their
sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the
“first five (5) major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May
1988 party
566

59
list elections. Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent partylist elections since
the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988
partylist elections. However, major political parties
should participate in partylist elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties
through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members
are “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“welldefined political constituencies,” will facilitate the
entry of the “marginalized and underrepresented” and
those who “lack welldefined political constituencies” as
members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major
political parties to participate in partylist elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented”
and to those who “lack welldefined political
constituencies.” The participation of major political parties
in partylist elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack
welldefined political constituencies,” giving them a voice in
lawmaking. Thus, to participate in partylist elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the
legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing,
like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the partylist
system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have
its own constitution, bylaws, platform or program of
government, officers and members, a majority of whom
must belong
_______________
59 Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 provides in part:
x x x For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall
not be entitled to participate in the partylist system.
x x x.
567
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 567

to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an

independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major
political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed
by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that
“component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently (in partylist elections) provided
the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the partylist system.”
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications
of partylist nominees. This provision prescribes a special
qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees.—No person

shall be nominated as partylist representative unless he is a
naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read
and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
in office until the expiration of his term.
A partylist nominee must be a bona fide member of the

party or organization which he or she seeks to represent.
In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide
partylist nominee one must either belong to the
sector represented, or have a track record of
advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the
criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang
Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying
those who desire to participate in the partylist system:
568

First, the political party, sector, organization or

coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the
partylist system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” x x x.
x x x x
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the
partylist system. x x x.
x x x x
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.”
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. x x x.
569
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 569

x x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of
the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
“SEC. 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees.—No
person shall be nominated as partylist representative
unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.”
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 87 in BANAT, this Court stretched

the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from
participating in partylist elections,60 abandoning even the
lipservice that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties
can participate in partylist elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major
political parties can participate in the partylist system
through
_______________
60 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258
citing CONSTITUTION, Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
570

their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that

“[e]xcluding the major political parties in partylist
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent
of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This
Court cannot engage in sociopolitical engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the partylist elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law.”61 The experimentations in socio
political engineering have only resulted in confusion and
absurdity in the partylist system. Such experimentations,
in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following
prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In
following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could
not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for
the coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections, we must now
impose and mandate the partylist system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new
formula in the allocation of partylist seats, reversing the
COMELEC’s allocation which followed the then prevailing
formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the
Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here
that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the
criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining
who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 partylist elections. For this purpose, we suspend
our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion.
_______________
61 Id., at p. 251.
62 Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
571
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 571

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the

COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent partylist elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party
list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in partylist
elections provided they register under the partylist
system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in partylist elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the partylist system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“welldefined political constituencies.” It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack “welldefined
political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
572

underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized

and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “welldefined
political constituencies” must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“welldefined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13
May 2013 partylist elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector
they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by
the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they
are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the “marginalized and underrepresented.” Also, petitioners’
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent
may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise,
nominees of nonsectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one
or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party
has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees,
573
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 573

under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987

Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution,
apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in
socioeconomic or political experimentations contrary to
what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does
not include the power to rewrite the Constitution. Thus,
the present petitions should be remanded to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 partylist elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are
GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted
Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction
to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only
for determination whether petitioners are qualified to
register under the party list system under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in
the 13 May 2013 partylist elections. The. 41 petitions,
which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include
the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register
under the partylist system and to participate in the 13
May 2013 partylist elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections
may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ.,

concur.
574

Sereno (C.J.), I dissent; Ang Bagong Bayani should be

upheld, not reversed. See Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to relative’s participation
in partylist election.
LeonardoDe Castro, J., I concur and also with the
additional grounds cited in Justice Brion’s concurring
opinion for reverting the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling and his
erudite analysis of the aim of the Partylist system under
the Constitution and law and its implications on political
parties, partylist registration and nominee.
Brion, J., See: Separate Opinion.
Peralta, J., I join Separate Opinion of J. Brion.
Abad, J., I join J. A.D. Brion in his Separate Opinion.
Mendoza, J., I concur to remand but these was a grave
abuse of discretion but only with respect to the
disqualification of nominees separate from the party
organization.
Reyes, J., With Separate Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
PerlasBernabe, J., On leave.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:
The partylist system is primarily a
tool for social justice.
I believe that the ponencia may have further
marginalized the already marginalized and
underrepresented of this coun
575
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 575

try. In the guise of political plurality, it allows national and

regional parties or organizations to invade what is and
should be constitutionally and statutorily protected space.

What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that the partylist
system under the 1987 Constitution and the partylist law
or RA 7941 is not about mere political plurality, but
plurality with a heart for the poor and disadvantaged.
The creation of a partylist system under the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941 was not done in a vacuum. It
comprehends the reality of a Filipino nation that has been
and still is struggling to come to terms with much social
injustice that has been perpetrated over centuries against a
majority of its people by foreign invaders and even by its
own governments.
This injustice is the fertile ground for the seeds which,
watered by the blood spilled during the Martial Law years,
ripened to the revolution of 1986. It is from this ferment
that the 1987 Constitution was born. Thus, any reading of
the 1987 Constitution must be appropriately sensitive to
the context from which it arose. As stated in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the

intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it
has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished
by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason.which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.1
(Emphasis supplied)
_______________
1 G.R. Nos. 83896, 83815, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA 317.
576

The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the Article on

Social Justice. This is appropos since it is a document that
not only recognizes but tries to heal the wounds of history.
To harken to the words of Cecilia MuñozPalma, President
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
THE PRESIDENT: My distinguished colleagues in this

Assembly:
x x x x x x x x x
My colleagues, in all humility, but with profound pride, I vote in
favor of the Constitution drafted by this Constitutional
Commission because I believe that the document is a worthy and
inspiring legacy we can hand down to the Filipino people of today,
tomorrow, and for posterity.
The reasons I will give have been given by most of the Members of
this Constitutional Commission this evening. But permit me to
restate them just to stress the reasons why I am voting in favor.
For the first time in the history of constitutionmaking in
our country, we set forth in clear and positive terms in the
Preamble which is the beacon light of the new Charter, the
noble goal to establish a just and humane society. This must
be so because at present we have to admit that there are so few
with so much and so many with so little. We uphold the Rule of
Law where no man is above the law, and we adhere to the
principles of truth, justice, freedom, equality, love and peace. Yes,
for the first time and possibly this is the first Constitution where
“love” is enshrined. This is most significant at this period in our
national life vthen the nation is bleeding under the forces of
hatred and violence, brothers fighting against brothers, Filipinos
torturing and killing their own countrymen. Without love, there
can be no peace.
The new Charter establishes a republican democratic form of
government with three branches each independent and coequal of
each other affording a check and balance of powers. Sovereignty
resides in the people.
x x x x x x x x x
For the first time, and possibly this is the first and only
Constitution which provides for the creation of a Commission on
Human Rights entrusted with the grave responsibility of
investigating violations of
577
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 577
civil and political rights by any party or groups and

recommending remedies therefor. The new Charter also sets forth
quite lengthily provisions on economic, social and cultural rights
spread out in separate articles such as the Articles on Social
Justice, Education and Declaration of Principles. It is a
document which in clear and in unmistakable terms
reaches out to the underprivileged, the paupers, the sick,
the elderly, disabled, veterans and other sectors of society.
It is a document which opens ‘an expanded improved way
of life for the farmers, the workers, fishermen, the rank
and file of those in service in the government. And that is
why I say that the Article on Social Justice is the heart of
the new Charter.2 (Emphasis supplied)
That is why Section 1, Article XIII, provides that: “The

Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.”3 As explained by this Court:
Further, the quest for a better and more “equal” world calls for
the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial
intervention.
Equality is one idea] which cries out for bold attention and
action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims “equality”
as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in
Article II, Section 10, in “all phases of national
development,” further explicitated in Article XIII, are
clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in
the direction of greater equality.... [There is thus in the
Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a
more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable
measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital
social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over
_______________
2 Vol. V, R.C.C No. 105, 12 October 1986.

3 Emphasis supplied.
578

backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on

the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection
to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.4
(Emphasis supplied)
That is also why the 1987 Constitution is replete with

other social justice provisions, including Sections 9, 10, 13,
14, 18 and 22 of Article II, Section 2 of Article V, Section 5
(1) (2) of Article VI, Sections 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 of
Article XII, and Article XIII. As aptly pointed out by
Commissioner Guingona in his sponsorship speech for the
approval of the entire draft of the 1987 Constitution, social
justice was the underlying philosophy of the drafters when
crafting the provisions of the fundamental law. Thus:
MR. GUINGONA: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

This sponsorship speech is for the entire draft of the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Today, we have completed the task of drafting a Constitution
which is reflective of the spirit of our time a spirit of nationalism,
a spirit of liberation, a spirit of rising expectations.
On June 2, fortyeight men and women met in this hallmen and
women from different walks of life with diverse backgrounds and
orientations, even with conflicting convictions, but all sharing the
same earnest desire to serve the people and to help draft a
Constitution which will establish a government that the people
can trust and enthusiastically support, a Constitution that
guarantees individual rights and serves as a barrier against
excesses of those in authority.
x x x x x x x x x
579
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 579

A Constitution of the people and for the people derives its

authenticity and authority from the sovereign will; the power of
the people precedes it. As such, it should reflect the norms, the
values, the modes of thought of our society, preserve its heritage,
promote its orderliness and security, protect its cherished
liberties and guard against the encroachments of wouldbe
‘dictators. These objectives have served as the framework in the
work of drafting the 1986 Constitution.
x x x x x x x x x
A significant innovation, as far as the legislative department is
concerned, refers to the composition of the members of the House
of Representatives. Representation in the Lower House has been
broadened to embrace various sectors of society; in effect,
enlarging the democratic base. It will be constituted by members
who shall be elected in the traditional manner, representing
political districts, as well as by members who shall be elected
through the partylist system.
x x x x x x x x x
The institutions through which the sovereign people rule
themselves are essential for the effective operation of government.
But these are not enough in order that the body politic may evolve
and progress. There is need for an underlying socio
economic philosophy which would direct these political
structures and serve as the mainspring for development.
So it is that the draft Constitution contains separate
Articles on Social Justice and National Economy and
Patrimony.
Talk of people’s freedom and legal equality would be empty
rhetoric as long as they continue to live in destitution and misery,
without land, without employment, without hope. But in helping
to bring about transformation, in helping the common man break
away from the bondage of traditional society, in helping restore to
him his dignity and worth, the right to individual initiative and to
property shall be respected.
The Social Justice Article, to which our Commission
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muñoz Palma, refers to
as the “heart of the Constitution,” provides that Congress
shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that would reduce social, economic and political

inequalities. The same
580

article addresses the problems of (1) labor—local and overseas,

organized and unorganized—recognizing the rights of all workers
in the private as well as in the public sector, the rank and file and
the supervisory, to selforganization, collective bargaining and
peaceful and concerted activities including the right to strike in
accordance with law; (2) the farmers, the farm workers, the
subsistence fishermen and the fishworkers, through agrarian and
natural resources reform; (3) the underprivileged and homeless
citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas, through urban
land reform and housing; (4) the health of the people, through an
integrated and comprehensive approach to health development;
(5) the women, by ensuring the fundamental equality of women
and men before the law, and (6) people’s organizations, by
facilitating the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms.
x x x x x x x x x
These are some of the provisions which we have
constitutionalized. These are some of the innovations that we
have introduced. These are the ideas, values and institutions
which we have drawn and which we trust would serve as the
foundation of our society, the keystone of our national
transformation and development, the driving force for what we
pray would be our irreversible march to progress. In brief, this is
what the men and women of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
have drafted under the able, firm and dedicated leadership of our
President, the Honorable Cecilia Muñoz Palma.
The Constitution that we have drafted is a practical instrument
suited to the circumstances of our time. It is also a Constitution
that does not limit its usefulness to present needs; one which, in
the words of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall,
and I quote, “is intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”
As we present the proposed fundamental law, we pray that our
efforts would pave the way towards the establishment of a
renewed constitutional government which we were deprived of
since 1972, that these efforts would ensure that the triumph at
EDSA so deservingly won by the people shall continue to be
enjoyed by us and our posterity for all time, that these efforts
would result in the drafting of a democratic Constitution—a
Constitution which is the repository of the people’s inalienable
rights; a Constitution that enshrines
581
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 581

people’s power and the rule of law; a Constitution which would

seek to establish in this fair land a community characterized by
moral regeneration, social progress, political stability, economic
prosperity, peace, love and concern for one another; a Constitution
that embodies vital living principles that seek to secure for the
people a better life founded on liberty and welfare for all.
Mr. Presiding Officer, on behalf of this Commission’s Sponsorship
Committee, I have the honor to move for the approval of the draft
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on Second
Reading.5
It is within this historical and textual millieu that the

partylist provisions in the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted. Every provision should be read in the context
of all the other provisions so that contours of constitutional
policy is made clear.6
The place of the partylist system in the constitutional
scheme was that it provided for the realization of the ideals
on social justice in the political arena.7
The concept is not new, as discussed by political theorist
Terry MacDonald:
First, an idea that has received much attention among

democratic theorists is that representatives should be selected to
‘mirror’ the characteristics of those being represented—in terms
of gender, ethnicity, and other such characteristics judged to be
socially relevant. This idea has been advocated most notably
in some recent democratic debates focused on the need for
special representation of disadvantaged and
underrepresented social groups within democratic
assemblies. The applicability of this idea of ‘mirror’
representation is not confined to debates about representing

marginalized minorities within nationstates; Iris
_______________
4 Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
148208, 15 December 2004, 446 SCRA 299.
5 VOL. V, R.C.C No. 106, 12 October 1986.
6 See Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, 17 July 2012, 676
SCRA 579.
7 CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO PUNO, EQUAL DIGNITY & RESPECT: THE SUBSTANCE OR
EQUAL PROTECTION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2012), 265 [hereinafter, PUNO].
582

Young further applies this model of representation to global

politics, arguing that global representation should be based on
representation of the various ‘peoples’ of the world, each of which
embodies its own distinctive identity and ‘perspective’. In practice,
special representation for certain social groups within a ‘mirror’
framework can be combined with election mechanisms” in various
ways—such as by according quotas of elected
representatives to designated social groups. But since the
selection of these ‘social groups’ for special representation
would nonetheless remain a distinct element of the
process of selecting legitimate representatives, occurring
prior to the electoral process, such ‘mirror’ representation
is still recognizable as a distinct mechanism for selecting
representative agents.8 (Emphasis supplied)
Two months after their initial debates on the form and

structure of government that would best promote equality,
the Commission broke ground on the promotion of political
equality and provided for sectoral representation in the
partylist system of the legislature. Commissioner
Villacorta opened the debates on the partylist system.9
MR. VILLACORTA: On this first day of August 1986, we shall,

hopefully, usher in a new chapter in our national history by
giving genuine power to our people in the legislature...
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo explained the circumstances

the partylist system sought to address:10
MR. TADEO: Ang Cory government ay iniakyat ng people’s power.

Kayo kami naririto sa ConCom ay dahil so people’s power—nasa
amin ang people, wala sa amin ang power. Ganito ito kahalaga.
…
_______________
8 TERRY MACDONALD, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND REPRESENTATION
BEYOND LIBERAL STATES (2008), at 166167.
9 Puno, 265.
10 Id.
583
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 583

The Legislature is supposed to implement or give flesh to the needs

and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Ganoon kahalaga ang National Assembly kaya’t napakahalaga
noong Section 5 and Section 31 rig ating Constitution. Our
experience, however, has shown that legislation has tended to
benefit more the propertied class who constitutioes a small
minority in our society than the impoverished majority, 70 percent
of whom live below the poverty line. This has come about because
the rich have managed to dominate and control the legislature,
while the basic sectors have been left out of it. So, the critical
question is, how do we ensure ample representation of basic sectors
in the legislature so that laws reflect their needs and aspirations?
RA 7941 was enacted pursuant to the partylist

provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Not only is it a “social
justice tool”, as held in Ang Bagong Bayani,11 but it is
primarily so. This is not mere semantics but a matter of
legal and historical accuracy with material consequences in
the realm of statutory interpretation.
The ponencia gives six (6) parameters that the
COMELEC should adhere to in determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
partylist elections. I shall discuss below my position in
relation to the second, fourth and sixth parameter
enunciated in the ponencia.
“Marginalized and underrepresented”

under Section 2 of RA 7941 qualifies
national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Under the second parameter, “‘[n]ational parties or
organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.” In a nutshell, the ponencia interprets
“marginalized and underrepresented”
_______________
11 G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
584

in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify only sectoral parties or

organizations, and not national and regional parties or
organizations.
I dissent for the following reasons.
First, since the partylist system is primarily a tool for
social justice, the standard of “marginalized and
underrepresented” under Section 2 must be deemed to
qualify national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. To argue otherwise is to divorce national
and regional parties or organizations from the primary
objective of attaining social justice, which objective
surrounds, permeates, imbues, and underlies the entirety
of both the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
Second, Section 2 of RA 7941 states that the partylist
system seeks to “enable Filipino citizens belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations: and parties . . . to become members of the
House of Representatives.” On its face, it is apparent that
“marginalized and underrepresented” qualifies “sectors”,
“organizations” and “parties”.
Third, even assuming that it is not so apparent, in
terms of statutory construction, the import of “social
justice” that has developed in various decisions is that
when the law is clear and valid, it simply must be applied;
but when the law can be interpreted in more ways than

one, an interpretation that favors the underprivileged must
be favored.”12
Lastly, deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
show that the partylist system is a countervailing means
for the weaker segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more entrenched and well
established political parties. To quote:
_______________
12 See PerezRosario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140796, 30 Jun
2006, 494 SCRA 66; Bernas, PRIMER ON THE 1987 CONSTITUTION (2006), 488.
585
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 585

MR. OPLE:So, Commissioner Monsod grants that the basic principle

for a partylist system is that it is a countervailing means for
the weaker segments of our society, if they want to seek
seats in the legislature, to overcome the preponderant
advantages of the more entrenched and wellestablished
political parties, but he is concerned that the mechanics might be
inadequate at this time.
MR. MONSOD:Not only that; talking about labor, for example—I
think Commissioner Tadeo said there are 10 to 12 million laborers
and I understand that organized labor is about 4.8 million or 4.5
million—if the laborers get together, they can have seats. With 4
million votes, they would have 10 seats under the partylist system.
MR. OPLE:So, the Commissioner would favor a partylist system that is
open to all and would not agree to a partylist system which seeks
to accommodate, in particular, the socalled sectoral groups that are
predominantly workers and peasants?
MR. MONSOD:If one puts a ceiling on the number that each party can
put within the 50, and I am assuming that maybe there are just two
major parties or three at the most, then it is already a form of
opening it up for other groups to come in. All we are asking is that
they produce 400,000 votes nationwide. The whole purpose of
the system is precisely to give room for those who have a
national constituency who may never be able to win a seat
on a legislative district basis. But they must have a
constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the

National Assembly.13 [emphasis supplied]
_______________
13 Volume II, R.C.C., 258259, 25 July 1986.
586

However, the second parameter would allow the more

entrenched and wellestablished political parties and
organizations to compete with the weaker segments of
society, which is the very evil sought to be guarded against.
The ponencia’s second parameter is premised on the
following grounds, among others.
First, the ponencia explains that the text of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941, and the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission evince an indisputable intent to
allow national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations to participate in the partylist system. To
require national and regional parties and organizations to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented makes
them effectively sectoral parties and organizations and
violates this intent.
The error here is to conclude that if the law treats
national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations
the same by requiring that they represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” they become the
same. By analogy, people can be treated similarly but that
does not make them identical.
Second, the ponencia rules that since under the Section
5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only 50% of the
seats are allocated during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
to representatives from the labor, peasant, urban poor, etc.,
it necessarily follows that the other 50% would be allocated
to representatives from sectors which are nonmarginalized
The error here is to conclude that the latter statement
necessarily follows if the former is true. This is not so since
the latter 50% can very well include representatives from
other nonenumerated sectors, or even national or regional

parties and organizations, all of which can be
“marginalized and underrepresented.”
Third, the ponencia adds that it would prevent ideology
based and causeoriented parties, who cannot win in
legisla
587
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 587

tive district elections, from participating in the partylist

system.
The error here is to conclude that such ideologybased
or causeoriented parties are necessarily nonmarginalized
or underrepresented, which would in turn depend on how
“marginalization and underrepresentation” is defined. The
ponencia appears to be operating under a preconceived
notion that “marginalized and underrepresented” refers
only to those “economically” marginalized.
However, there is no need for this Court to define
the phrase “marginalized and underrepresented,”
primarily because it already constitutes sufficient
legislative standard to guide the COMELEC as an
administrative agency in the exercise of its discretion to
determine the qualification of a partylist group.
As long as such discretion is not gravely abused, the
determination of the COMELEC must be upheld. This is
consistent with our pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani
that, “the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only
those Filipinos that are ‘marginalized and
underrepresented’ become members of the Congress under
For as long as the agency concerned will be able to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, and that these
regulations are germane to the objects and purposes of the
law and not in contradiction to but in conformity with the
standards prescribed by the law, then the standard may be
deemed sufficient.”14
We should also note that there is a time element to be
considered here, for those who are marginalized and
underrepresented today may no longer be one later on.

Marginalization and underrepresentation is an ever
evolving concept, created to address social disparities, to be
able to give life to the “so
_______________
14 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, No. L76633, 18 October 1988, 166
SCRA 533.
588

cial justice” policy of our Constitution.15 Confining its

definition to the present context may unduly restrict the
COMELEC of its quasilegislative powers which enables it
to issue rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may
expressly be delegated to it by Congress.”16
Flexibility of our laws is a key factor in reinforcing the
stability of our Constitution, because the legislature is
certain to find it impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate situations that may be met in carrying laws into
effect.17 The growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations,
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the
rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers
is largely responsible in empowering the COMELEC to not
only execute elections laws, but also promulgate certain
rules and regulations calculated to promote public
interest.18 This is the principle of subordinate legislation
discussed in People v. Rosenthal19 and in Pangasinan
Transportation vs. Public Service Commission.20
This is consistent with our pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani that, “the role of the COMELEC is to see to
it that only those Filipinos that are ‘marginalized and
underrepresented’ become members of the Congress under
Fourth, the ponencia holds that failure of national and
regional parties to represent the marginalized and
underrepre
_______________
15 Gandara Mill Supply v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 126703, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 702.
16 Bedol v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, 3 December
2009, 606 SCRA 504.
17 The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA, G.R. No.
114714, 21 April 1995, 243 SCRA 666.
18 Id.
19 G.R. Nos. 46076, 46077, 12 June 1939, 68 Phil. 328.
20 G.R. No. 47065, 26 June 1940, 70 Phil. 221.
589
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 589

sented is not” a ground for the COMELEC to refuse or

cancel registration under Section 6 of RA 7941.
The error here is that under Section 6 (5), the
COMELEC may refuse or cancel if the party “violates or
fails to comply with laws.” Thus, before the premise can be
correct, it must be first established that “marginalization
and underrepresentation” is not a requirement of the law,
which is exactly what is at issue here.
Fifth, the ponencia makes too much of the fact that the
requirement of “marginalization and underrepresentation”
appears only once in RA 7941.
The error here is to conclude that the phrase has to
appear more than once to carry sufficient legal significance.
“Marginalization and underrepresentation” is in the nature
of a legislative standard to guide the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative powers. This Court has held
that to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The
standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered
as a whole.21 Consequently, we have held that “public
welfare”22 and “public interest”23 are examples of such
sufficient standards. Therefore, that it appears only once in

RA 7941 is more than sufficient, since a standard could
even be an implied one.
_______________
21 Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPASWFTU)
v. Ople, No. L67573, 19 June 1985, 137 SCRA 108.
22 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 725 (1940).
23 People v Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 323 (1939).
590

National, regional and sectoral

parties or organizations must both
represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and lack “well
defined political constituencies”.
The fourth parameter in the ponencia states:
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be

“marginalized and underrepresented.” or lacking in “welldefined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “welldefined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
I dissent for the following reasons.

First, Section 2 of RA 7941 clearly makes the “lack of a
welldefined political constituency” as a requirement along
with “marginalization and underrepresentation.” They are
cumulative requirements, not alternative. Thus, sectoral
parties and organizations intending to run in the partylist
elections must meet both.
Second, the ponencia appears to be operating under
preconceived notions of what it means to be “marginalized
and underrepresented” and to “lack a welldefined political
constituency.” For reasons discussed above, the exact
content of these legislative standards should be left to the

COMELEC. They are ever evolving concepts, created to
address social disparities, to be able to give life to the
“social justice” policy of our Constitution.
The disqualification of a nominee
should not disqualify the partylist
group provided that: (1) it meets
Guideline Nos. 15 of Ang Bagong
591
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 591

Bayani (alternately, on the basis of

the new parameters set in the po
nencia, that they validly qualify as
national, regional or sectoral
partylist group); and (2) one of its
top three (3) nominees remains
qualified.
I concur with the ponencia that an advocate may qualify
as a nominee. However, I would like to explain my position
with regard to the sixth parameter set forth in the
ponencia with respect to nominees.
To recall, the sixth parameter in the ponencia provides:
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least
one nominee who remain qualified.
I propose the view that the disqualification of a party
list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is only
reasonable if based on material misrepresentations
regarding the nominee’s qualifications. Otherwise, the
disqualification of a nominee should not disqualify
the partylist group provided that: (1) it meets
Guideline Nos. 15 of Ang Bagong Bayani
(alternately, on the basis of the new parameters set
in the ponencia, that they validly qualify as national,
regional or sectoral partylist group); and (2) one of
its top three (3) nominees remains qualified, for
reasons explained below.
The constitutional policy is to enable Filipinos belonging

to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. Consistent
therewith, R.A. No. 7941 provides that the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open partylist
system that would achieve proportional representation in
the House of Representatives by enhancing partylist
groups’ “chances to compete
592

for and win seats in the legislature.”24 Because of this

policy, I believe that the COMELEC cannot interpret
Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941 as a grant of purely
administrative, quasilegislative or quasijudicial power to
ipso facto disqualify partylist groups based on the
disqualification of a single nominee.
It should also be pointed out that the law itself considers
a violation of election laws as a disqualifying circumstance.
However, for an act or omission to be considered a violation
of election laws, it must be demonstrative of gross and
willful disregard of the laws or public policy. The standard
cannot be less for the rules and regulations issued by the
COMELEC. Thus, any disqualification of a partylist group
based on the disqualification of its nominee must be based
on a material misrepresentation regarding that nominee’s
qualifications. This also finds support in Section 6 (6) of
R.A. No. 7941 which considers declaring “untruthful
statements in its petition” as a ground for disqualification.
As regards the second qualification mentioned above,
partylist groups should have at least one qualified
nominee among its top three nominees for it to be allowed
to participate in the elections. This is because if all of its
top three nominees are disqualified, even if its registration
is not cancelled and is thus allowed to participate in the
elections, and should it obtain the required numberof votes
to win a seat, it would still have no one to represent it,
because the law does not allow the group to replace its
disqualified nominee through substitution. This is a
necessary consequence of applying Sections 13 in relation

to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.
Section 13 provides that partylist representatives shall
be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on “the list of
names submitted by the respective parties x x x according
to their ranking in the said list.” The ranking of a partylist
group’s
_______________
24 Section 2, Republic Act No. 7941.
593
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 593

nominees is determined by the applicability or the

inapplicability of Section 8, the last paragraph of which
reads:
x x x No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees

shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws
in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case
the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Thus, only in case of death, incapacity, or withdrawal

does the law allow a partylist group to change the ranking
of its nominees in the list it initially submitted. The
ranking of the nominees is changed through, substitution,
which according to Section 8 is done by placing the name of
the substitute at the end of the list. In this case, all the
names that come after the now vacant slot will move up the
list. After substitution takes effect, the new list with the
new ranking will be used by COMELEC to determine who
among the nominees of the partylist group shall be
proclaimed, from the first to the last, in accordance with
Section 13.
If any/some of the nominees is/are disqualified, no
substitution will be allowed. Thus, their ranking remains
the same and should therefore be respected by the
COMELEC in determining the one/s that will represent the
winning party list group in Congress. This means that if
the first nominee is disqualified, and the partylist group is

able to join the elections and becomes entitled to one
representative, the second cannot take the first nominee’s
place and represent the partylist group. If, however, the
partylist group gets enough votes to be entitled to two
seats, then the second nominee can represent it.
Allowing a partylist group, which has successfully
passed Guideline Nos. 15 of Ang Bagong Bayani25
(alternately, pursuant to the present holding of the
ponencia, that it qualifies as a national, regional or sectoral
party or organization) and
_______________
25 Supra.
594

has established the qualification of at least one (1) of its top

three (3) nominees, to participate in the elections is a
better interpretation of the law. It is fully consistent with
the policy of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and
open partylist system that would achieve proportional
representation in the House of Representatives by
enhancing partylist groups’ “chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature”26 while providing sufficient
disincentives for partylist groups to flood the COMELEC
with nominees as Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 only requires
that they submit not less than five (5).
It must be noted that this method, together with the
seatallocation system introduced in BANAT v.
COMELEC,27 will allow more partylist groups to be
represented in Congress.
Let us use a hypothetical scenario to illustrate.
The table below uses the seatallocation system
introduced in BANAT. It assumes the following facts: (1) 35
partylist groups participated in the elections; (2) 20
million votes were cast for the partylist system; and (3)
there are 50 seats in Congress reserved for the partylist
representatives.
The succeeding paragraphs will explain how the BANAT

method will operate to distribute the 50 seats reserved in
the House of Representatives given the foregoing facts and
the number of votes obtained by each of the 35 partylist
groups.
Rank Party Votes % 1st Round 2nd Round Total

list Garnered (guaranteed (additional # of
group seats) seats) seats
1 AAA 1,466,000 7.33% 1 2 3
2 BBB 1,228,000 6.14% 1 2 3
3 CCC 1,040,000 4.74% 1 1 2
4 DDD 1,020,000 3.89% 1 1 2
_______________
26 Section 2, Republic Act. No. 7941.
27 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
595
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 595

5 EEE 998,000 3.88% 1 1 2

6 FFF 960,000 3.07% 1 1 2
7 GGG 942,000 2.92% 1 1 2
8 HHH 926,000 2.65% 1 1 2
9 III 910,000 2.57% 1 1 2
10 JJJ 796,000 2.57% 1 1 2
11 KKK 750,000 2.42% 1 1 2
12 LLL 738,000 2.35% 1 1 2
13 MMM 718,000 2.32% 1 1 2
14 NNN 698,000 2.13% 1 1 2
15 OOO 678,000 2.12% 1 1 2
16 PPP 658,000 2.06% 1 1 2
17 QQQ 598,000 2.02% 1 1 2
18 RRR 482,000 1.95% 1 1
19 SSS 378,000 1.89% 1 1
20 TTT 318,000 1.54% 1 1
21 UUU 294,000 1.47% 1 1
22 VVV 292,000 1.44% 1 1
23 WWW 290,000 1.43% 1 1
24 XXX 280,000 1.37% 1 1
25 YYY 274,000 1.37% 1 1
26 ZZZ 268,000 1.34% 1 1
27 1A 256,000 1.24% 1 1
28 1B 248,000 1.23% 1 1

29 1C 238,000 1.18% 1 1
30 1D 222,000 1.11% 1 1
31 1E 214,000 1.07% 1 1
32 1F 212,000 1.06%
33 1G 210,000 1.05%
34 1H 206,000 1.03%
35 1I 194,000 1.02%
20,000,000 17 33 50

We explained in BANAT that the first clause of Section

11(b) of R.A. 7941 guarantees a seat to the partylist
groups “receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
Votes cast for the partylist system.” In our hypothetical
scenario, the party list groups ranked 1st to 17th received
at least 2% of the 20 million Votes cast for the partylist
system. In effect, all 17 of
596

them were given guaranteed seats. The distribution of

these socalled guaranteed seats to the “two percenters” is
what BANAT calls the “first round of seat allocation.”
From the first round of seat allocation, the total number
of guaranteed seats allocated to the two percenters will be
subtracted from “20% of the members of the House of
Representatives” reserved by the Constitution for partylist
representatives, which in this hypothetical scenario is 50
seats. Assuming all 17 of the two percenters were able to
establish the qualification of their first nominee, the
remaining 33 will be distributed in what BANAT termed as
the “second round of seat allocation.”
These remaining 33 seats are called “additional seats.”
The rules followed in the distribution/allocation of those
seats are fairly simple. If a partylist group’s percentage is
multiplied by the total number of additional seats and the
product is no less than 2, then that partylist will be
entitled to 2 additional seats. This is to keep in line with
the 3seat limit rule. In our hypothetical scenario as shown
by the table above, only the top two partylist groups, AAA
and BBB are entitled to 2 additional seats. Assuming,

again, that the 2nd and 3rd nominees of both AAA and
BBB are qualified, then only 29 will be left for distribution.
In distributing the remaining 29 seats, it must be kept
in mind that the number of votes cast in favor of the
remaining partylist groups becomes irrelevant. At this
stage, the only thing that matters is the group’s ranking.
The partylist group that comes after BBB will be given 1
additional seat and the distribution of one seat per party
list group, per rank, continues until all 50 seats are
accounted for; the second round of seat allocation stops at
this point. In the table above, the 50th seat was awarded to
IE the partylist group that ranked 31” in the election.
In the foregoing discussion, all the nominees of the
partylist groups are qualified. What happens if one or
some of the nominees are disqualified? Following the
proposed method, if
597
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 597

one or two of the partylist groups with guaranteed seats

have a disqualified first nominee, their second nominee, if
qualified, can still represent them in Congress based on the
second round of seat allocation.
In the event that some of the nominees of partylist
groupswhether or not entitled to guaranteed seats—are
disqualified, then those partylist groups, which without
the disqualification of these nominees would not be entitled
to a seat, would now have a higher chance to have a
representative elected in Congress.
If, for example, the first nominee of BBB is disqualified,
then it forfeits its guaranteed seat and the additional seats
for distribution in the second round will be increased by 1.
With 34 seats to be allocated, IE will now qualify to obtain
a seat in its favor, assuming that its first nominee is
qualified. If IE’s first nominee is disqualified, then we will
proceed to the partylist nextinrank, which is IG. This
method is followed down the line until all 50 seats are
allocated.
If we follow the proposed method, this would yield a

higher number of partylist groups represented in
Congress, but with fewer representatives per group.
This proposed method can be further illustrated through
another example, this time using a “nontwo percenter”
partylist group. In the table above, RRR failed to garner at
least 2% of the total votes. However, in the second round of
seat allocation, it was granted 1 seat. To be able to send a
representative in Congress, RRR’s first nominee should be
qualified to sit. Assuming that its first nominee was
disqualified, its second or third nominee cannot occupy said
seat; instead, it will forfeit the seat and such seat will now
go to IE. Again, this method is followed down the line until
all 50 seats are allocated.
In conclusion, I submit that a partylist group should be
allowed to participate in the elections despite the
disqualification of some of its nominees, provided that
there remains a
598

qualified nominee out of the top three initially submitted.

Not only is this the better policy, but this is also the
interpretation supported by law.
Only nine of the petitions should
be remanded.
Given the circumstances abovementioned, I respectfully
dissent on the remand of all petitions to the COMELEC for
reasons to be discussed below.
The ponencia justifies the remand of all petitions in this
wise, viz.:
x x x Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the

COMELEC not because COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners
may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 partylist elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The “new parameters” set forth in the ponencia’s

guidelines focus mainly on two (2) grounds used by the
COMELEC to cancel registration: (1) the standard of

marginalized and underrepresented as applied to national,
regional and sectoral parties and organizations; and (2) the
qualification of nominees. From such examination, we can
conclude that, in relation to the other grounds used by
COMELEC to cancel registration (other than those two
grounds mentioned above), the doctrines remain
unchanged. Thus, a remand of those petitions is
unnecessary, considering that the acts of the COMELEC
pertaining to their petitions are upheld. The ponencia even
admits that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners.
Consequently, the remand should only pertain to those
partylist groups whose registration was cancelled on the
basis of applying the standard of “marginalized and
underrepresented” and the qualification of nominees
wherein the “new parameters” apply. If other grounds were
used by COMELEC other than those with
599
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 599

“new parameters,”—say, for example, failure to prove track

record, a remand would be uncalled for because the
doctrine pertaining to the other grounds remain
unchanged.
Despite the new doctrine set forth in the ponencia, at
the Very least, only nine (9) petitions should be ordered
remanded to the COMELEC. In these nine (9) petitions,
the COMELEC cancelled the registration of the partylist
groups solely on the ground that their nominees are
disqualified. In making such a pronouncement, the
COMELEC merely used as yardstick whether the nominees
actually belong to the marginalized and underrepresented,
and not whether they could qualify as advocates, and for
this reason, I recommend that the following cases be
REMANDED to the COMELEC. These are:
1. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reonstruction, Inc.
(ARARO)
2. Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc.

(AIPRA)
3. Aangat Tayo (AT)
4. A Blessed PartyList (a.k.a Blessed Federation of
Farmers Fishermen International, Inc.) [A
BLESSED]
5. Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)
6. Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
7. Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran (AKO
BAHAY)
8. Akbay Kalusugan, Inc. (AKIN)
9. 1UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1UTAK)
Assuming for the sake of argument that we agree with
the ponencia’s take that the phrase “marginalized and
underrepresented” qualifies only sectoral parties, still, a
remand of all
600

the petitions remain uncalled for. Out of the 52 petitions,

there are only 11 partylist groups which are classified as
national or regional parties.28 Thus, if we were to strictly
apply the ponencia’s guidelines, only 20 petitions ought to
be remanded.
The COMELEC did not violate
Section 3, Article IXC of the
Constitution.
It bears stressing that COMELEC Resolution No. 9513
does not violate Section 3, Article IXC of the Constitution
which requires a prior motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC can decide election cases en banc. To recall, the
Resolution allows the COMELEC en banc, without a
motion for reconsideration, to conduct (1) an automatic
review of a decision of a COMELEC division granting a
petition for registration of a partylist group or
organization; and (2) a summary evidentiary hearing for
those already accredited and which have manifested their
intent to participate in the 2013 national and local
elections for the purpose of determining their continuing
compliance with the requirements of RA No. 7941 and the

Ang Bagong Bayani29 guidelines.
Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is exercising
its quasijudicial powers which can be found in Section 2 (2)
of the same article. However, since the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing is an
exercise of
_______________
28 The national parties are Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD), Bantay PartyList (BANTAY), and Alliance of Bicolnon Party
(ABP). On the other hand, the regional parties are Ako Bicol Political
Party (AKB), Akyson Magsasaka–Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMAPTM),
Ako an Bisaya (AAB), Kalikasan PartyList (KALIKASAN), 1 Alliance
Advocating Autonomy Party (IAAAP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI), Partido
ng Bayan and Bida (PBB), and Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP).
29 G.R. No. 147589, 25 June 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
601
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 601

COMELEC’s administrative powers under Section 2 (5),

the prior motion for reconsideration in Section 3 is not
required.
It is in this light that I would like to further elucidate
why the power under Section 2 (5) is not quasijudicial but
administrative in nature in order to help clarify the true
distinction between the two. In a number of cases, this
Court has had the ‘opportunity to distinguish quasijudicial
from administrative power. Thus, in Limkaichong v
COMELEC,30 we held that:
The term “administrative” connotes or pertains to

“administration, especially management, as by managing or
conducting, directing or superintending, the execution,
application, or conduct of persons or things.” It does not entail
an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing
of evidence’, and a decision or resolution thereon. This is to
be distinguished from “quasijudicial function”, a term which
applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,

and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. [emphasis supplied]
However, there are administrative proceedings, such as

a preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor,
that also entail the “opportunity to be heard, the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon,” but are not considered quasijudicial in
the proper sense of the term. As held in Bautista v. CA:31
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary

investigation performs a quasijudicial fiinction, citing Cojuangco
v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial Fiscal of
Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this
Court held that the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is quasijudicial in nature; But this
statement holds true only in the
_______________
30 G.R. Nos. 17883132, 179120, 17913233, 17924041, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA
1.
31 G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 360 SCRA 618.
602

sense that, like quasijudlicial bodies, the prosecutor is an

office in the executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court. Here is where the similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is
very different from other quasijudicial proceedings. A
quasijudicial body has been defined as “an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the
rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making.”
x x x x
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule
making functions. Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering

the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime
and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While
the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to
be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasijudicial body;
necessarily, its decisions approving the filing of a criminal
complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43. Since the ORSP has the power to resolve appeals with finality
only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not exceed
prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only
remedy of petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,
is to present her defense in the trial of the case. (emphasis
supplied)
While the exercise of quasijudicial and administrative

power may both involve an opportunity to be heard, the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or
resolution thereon, the distinction I believe is that the
exercise of the former has for its purpose the adjudication
of rights with
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 603

finality.32 This makes it akin to judicial power which has

for its purpose, among others, the settlement of actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.33
Another way to dispose of the issue of the necessity of a
prior motion for reconsideration is to look at it through the
lens of an election case. The phrase “all such election cases”
in Section 3 has been read in relation to Section 2 (2) of
Article IXC, viz.:
What is included in the phrase “all such election cases” may be

seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which
states:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.34
As to the nature of “contests,” the Court has already

defined it under the penumbra of election as follows:
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in

reference to a postelection scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election” protest or a quo warranto which,
although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view,
i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office.
_______________
32 Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30 November, 2006, 509
SCRA 332.
33 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
34 Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191034, 25 March 2010, 616
SCRA 443.
604

x x x x
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the “President” or “VicePresident”, of the Philippines, and not of
“candidates” for President or VicePresident. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office. In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a postelection scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post

election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
would not include cases directly brought before it,
questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vicepresidency before the elections are held.
(Emphasis supplied)35
In Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,36 it was also

held that the primary purpose of an election case is the
ascertaimnent of the real candidate elected by the
electorate. Thus, there must first be an election before
there can be an election case. Since the national and local
elections are still to be held on 13 May 2013, the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary hearing under
the Resolution No. 9513 cannot be an election case. For this
reason, a prior motion for reconsideration under Section 3
is not required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the
following cases: ARARO, AIPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM,
BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1UTAK. The Petitions
of all the other Petitioners should be dismissed.
_______________
35 Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004,
424 SCRA 277.
36 G.R. No. 181478, 15 July 2009, 593 SCRA 139.
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 605

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I submit this SEPARATE OPINION to reflect my views
on the various questions submitted to the Court through
consolidated petitions before us.
For ease of presentation and understanding, this
Separate Opinion is laid out under the following structure:
I. The Case and the Issues
II. Summary of Positions: Substantive Aspect of the

Petitions
A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani and its
Guidelines.
1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong
Bayani
2. Effects on the Components of the Partylist
System
B. Nominees
C. On the observation of the Chief Justice
D. Grave abuse of discretion and Conclusion
III. Preliminary Matters
A. The suspension of Rule 64; the existence of
jurisdictional error that warrants reviewing
COMELEC’s action
B. COMELEC’s power to register and to cancel
registration of a partylist group is an exercise of its
administrative powers
IV. Discussion: Merits of the Consolidated Petitions
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Partylist
System
606

a. The Constitutional Text.

b. Constitutional text summarized
c. Purpose Behind the Partylist Innovation
B. RA No. 7941, the PartyList System Act
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. Ang Bagong Bayani
b. Banat
D. The Partylist System of elections under the
constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong
Bayani and its errors
a. The Aim or Objective of the PartyList System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.
a.2. From the statutory perspective
b. Party participation under the partylist system
b.1. Impact on political parties
c. The parties and their nominees
c.1. Refusal or cancellation of registration

due to nominee problems
c.2. party nominee relationship
E. Chief Justice Sereno’s Reflections
F. The ElevenPoint Parameters for COMELEC Action
I.A. The Cases
The Court resolves fiftythree (53) consolidated

petitions for certiorari/prohibition filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court by various partylist groups and
organizations. They commonly assail the COMELEC’s
resolutions, either cancelling their existing registrations
and accreditations, or denying their new petitions for
partylist registration.
607
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 607

Of the 53 petitions, thirteen (13) were instituted by

new partylist applicants under Republic Act (RA) No.
7941 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 (dated February
21, 2012). These petitions were denied by the COMELEC
En Banc upon its review of the COMELEC Division’s
resolutions.
The other forty (40) petitions were similarly brought
by previously registered and accredited partylist
organizations whose registrations/accreditations have
been cancelled. These petitioners participated in previous
elections and cannot participate in the May 2013 election if
the cancellation of their registration/accreditation would
stand.
The consolidated petitions, uniformly citing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC and the
disregard of the relevant provisions of the
Constitution and RA No. 7941, variously questioned—
a. the COMELEC En Banc’s authority under COMELEC Resolution
No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of its Division’s rulings
despite the absence of motions for reconsideration, in disregard of
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
b. with respect to the cancellation of previous

registration/accreditation of partylist groups or organizations, the
denial of due process and the violation of the principle of res
adjudicata; further, the COMELEC’s cancellation of their existing
registration/accreditation is claimed to be an exercise of its quasi
judicial powers that the COMELEC Division, not the COMELEC
En Banc, can exercise at the first instance;
c. the COMELEC En Banc’s appreciation of facts and its application of
the guidelines of Ang Bagong Bayani, which either addressed
defects or deficiencies on the part of the parties or of their nominees
and which resulted in the refusal or cancellation of
registration/accreditation.
608

I.B. The Issues

Based on these cited grounds, the issues for the Court’s
consideration may be condensed as follows:
1. Whether the COMELEC En Banc may automatically review the
decision of the COMELEC Division without the requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in denying or
cancelling the registration/accreditation of the petitioners, mainly
relying on the eight point guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang
Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT OF THE PETITIONS

II. A. On reliance on Ang Bagong Bayani
and its Guidelines.
Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC’s1
intrinsically flawed interpretation of the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions is the main source
of the present controversy. Its constricted interpretation of
the statutory phrase “marginalized and underrepresented”
has invited more questions than answers that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution in fact sought to avoid.
II. A.1. Points of Disagreement with Ang Bagong

Bayani.
I take the position that it is time to revisit this

oftcited ruling before the partylist system is
further led astray.
_______________
1 412 Phil. 308, 342; 359 SCRA 698 (2001).
609
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 609

First, the partylist system came into being, principally

driven by the constitutional framers’ intent to reform the
then prevailing electoral system by giving marginal and
underrepresented parties (i.e., those who cannot win in the
legislative district elections and in this sense are
marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect
themselves there, but who—nationally—may generate votes
equivalent to what a winner in the legislative district
election would garner) the chance to participate in the
electoral exercise and to elect themselves to the House of
Representatives through a system other than the
legislative district elections.
Ang Bagong Bayani glossed over the constitutional text
and made a slanted reading of the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. By these means, it erroneously
concluded that the partylist system is primarily intended
as a social justice tool, and was not principally driven by
intent to reform electoral system. Thus, under its First
Guideline, Ang Bagong Bayani solely viewed the
partylist system from the prism of social justice, and
not from the prism of electoral reform as the framers
of the Constitution originally intended.
Second. In the constitutional deliberations, the
proponents of the electoral reform concept were opposed by
those who wanted a partylist system open only to sectoral
representation, particularly to sectoral groups with social
justice orientation.
The oppositors were defeated, but the proponents

nevertheless opened the system to sectoral representation
and in fact gave the social justice groups a headstart by
providing for their representation through selection in the
first three elections.
In the resulting approved wording, the Constitution
made a textual commitment to open the partylist system
to registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations. The Article on the Commission on
Elections also
610

pointedly provided that there shall be a “free and open

party system,” and votes for parties, organizations or
coalitions shall only be recognized in the partylist
system.
II.A.2. Effects on the Components of the Party
list System
Ang Bagong Bayani admits that even political parties
may run in the partylist elections but maintains under its
Second Guideline that they must qualify as marginal
and underrepresented as this phrase is understood
in the social justice context. This is totally incorrect.
Based on the reasons discussed above and further
expounded below, even major political parties can
participate in partylist elections because the partylist
system is open to all registered political, national, regional,
sectoral organizations and parties, subject only to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution and bylaw.
Further, both political and sectoral parties have equal roles
and participation in the partylist system; again, they are
subject to the same limitations imposed by law (the
Constitution and RA No. 7941) and are separately
burdened only by the limitations intrinsic to their
respective natures. To summarize:
a) For political parties (whether national or
regional): to be classified as political parties, they
must advocate an ideology or platform, principles and
policies, for the general conduct of government. The
application of the further requirement under RA No.

7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing
the adoption of their principles of governance, they
must regularly nominate and support their leaders
and members as candidates for public office) shall
depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
The marginal and underrepresentation in the
electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district elec
611
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 611

tions) and lack of constituency requirements fully

apply, but there is no reason not to presume
compliance with these requirements if political
parties are not participants in any legislative district
elections.
Major political parties, if they participate in the
legislative district elections, cannot participate in the
partylist elections, nor can they form a coalition with
partylist parties and run as a coalition in the party
list elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the
partylist system; what the partylist system forbids
directly (i.e., participation in both electoral arenas),
the major political parties cannot do indirectly
through a coalition. No prohibition, however, exists
against informal alliances that they can form with
partylist parties, organizations or groups running for
the partylist elections. The partylist component of
these informal alliances is not prohibited from
running in the partylist elections.
b) For sectoral parties and organizations, they
must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5
of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice
characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or
characteristics specific to their sectors although they
do not require or need to identify with any social
justice characteristic. In either case, they are subject
to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and the
“constituency” requirements of the law through a

showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a
sector that is actually characterized as marginal and
underrepresented.
These parties and organizations are additionally
subject to the general overriding requirement of
electoral marginalization and under
representation and the constituency
requirements of the law, but
612

there is no reason why compliance with these

requirements cannot be presumed if they are not
participants in any legislative district elections.
c) Compliance with COMELEC Rules. To justify their
existence, all partylist groups must comply with the
requirements of law, their own internal rules on
membership, and with the COMELEC’s Rules of
Procedure. They must submit to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) their constitution, bylaws,
platform or program of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement and other relevant information as
the COMELEC may require.2
To sum up these Ang Bagong Bayani objections, the
partylist system—as principally espoused by
Commissioner Christian Monsod and duly approved by
the Commission’s vote—maintained its electoral reform
objectives while significantly contributing to the social
justice thrust of the Constitution.
It is not correct to say, as the Chief Justice did in
her Reflections, that this Separate Opinion is not
“appropriately sensitive to the context from which it [the
1987 Constitution] arose.” I recognize the social justice
content of the partylist provisions in the Constitution and
the law; I simply cannot give these provisions the primacy
that both the framers of the Constitution and Congress did
not see fit to accord.
B. On Nominees
Third. Considering the Constitution’s solicitous concern

for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors as
understood in the social justice context, and RA 7941’s
requirement of mere bona fide membership of a nominee in
the partylist group, a nominee who does not actually
possess the marginalized and underrepresented
status represented by
_______________
2 RA No. 7941, Section 5.
613
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 613

the partylist group but proves to be a genuine

advocate of the interest and concern of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector
represented is still qualified to be a nominee.
This classification of nominees, however, is relevant only
to sectoral parties and organizations which are
marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice
sense or in terms of their special interests, concerns or
characteristics. To be consistent with the sectoral
representation envisioned by the framers, a majority of
the members of the party must actually belong to the
sector represented, while nominees must be a member of
the sectoral party or organization.
Since political parties are identified by their ideology
or platform of government, bona fide membership, in
accordance with the political party’s constitution and by
laws, would suffice.
In both political or sectoral party or group, party
membership is the most tangible link of the nominees to
their respective parties and to the partylist system.
Subject to the above, the disqualification of the
nominee does not necessarily mean the disqualification of
the party since all the grounds for cancellation or refusal of
registration pertain to the party itself.
I make the qualification that the law’s3 requirement of
the submission of a list containing at least five
(qualified) nominees is mandatory, and a party’s
inexcusable failure to comply with this requirement

warrants the refusal or cancellation of its registration
under Section 6 of RA 7941.
C. On the Observations of the Chief Justice
As my fourth and final point, the “textualist”
approach that the Chief Justice objects to, has been driven,
and is fully
_______________
614

justified, by the above reading of the Constitution and

the law.
As a basic constitutional point, the business and
principal function of this Court (and of the whole Judiciary)
is not to create policy or to supplant what the Constitution
and the law expressly provide. The framers of the
Constitution and Congress (through RA No. 7941 in this
case) provided the policy expressed through the words of
the Constitution and the law, and through the intents the
framers; both were considered and cited to ensure that the
constitutional policy is properly read and understood. The
whole Judiciary, including this Court, can only apply these
policies in the course of their assigned task of adjudication
without adding anything of our own; we can interpret the
words only in case of ambiguity.
This Court and its Members cannot likewise act as
advocates, even for social justice or for any ideology
for that matter, as advocacy is not the task assigned
to us by the Constitution. To play the role of advocates, or
to formulate policies that fall within the role of the
Legislative Branch of government, would be a violation of
our sworn duty.
D. Grave Abuse of Discretion and Conclusion
As agreed upon by the Majority during the deliberations
of this case, the Court suspended the Rules of Court in
considering the Rule 64 petitions before us in light of the
clear and patent violation of the Constitution that the

Majority unanimously found.
Thus, without an explicit ruling on the grave abuse of
discretion in this case, I vote to VACATE the ruling of the
COMELEC pursuant to the suspended rules in light of our
finding of patent violation of the Constitution after
revisiting and overturning the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
Having said these, however, I reflect for the record my
view that a grave abuse of discretion exists.
615
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 615

Undeniably, all the parties to these consolidated cases—

namely, the petitioners and the COMELEC—relied upon
and were all guided by the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling.
However, my reexamination of Ang Bagong Bayani and its
standards, in light of what the text and intents of the
Constitution and RA No. 7491 provide, yield a result
different from what Ang Bagong Bayani reached.
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate
Opinion, wrong considerations were used in ruling on
the consolidated petitions, resulting in gross
misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Constitution. This is grave abuse of discretion that
taints a decision maker’s action,4 infinitely made worse in
this case because the Constitution itself is involved.
An added basis for a finding of grave abuse of discretion
pertains specifically to the COMELEC’s refusal or
cancellation of registration of the partylist group based,
solely or partly, on the disqualification of the nominee. As
discussed below, this action and any refusal or
cancellation of registration is completely devoid of
basis in fact and in law and in this sense constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
In these lights, I vote for the REMAND of ALL the
petitions to the COMELEC in accordance with the terms
of this Separate Opinion.
III. PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A. The existence of jurisdictional error that
warrants reviewing COMELEC’s action
Whether acting in the exercise of its purely

administrative power, on one hand, or quasijudicial
powers, on the other
_______________
4 Varias v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189078, Feb. 11, 2010,
612 SCRA 386.
616

hand, the judicial remedy available to an aggrieved

party is the remedy of certiorari under Rule 64, in relation
with Rule 65. Court action under this rule is rendered
necessary by the reality that, by law, the COMELEC en
banc decision is final and executory and should stand
unless nullified by this Court through a writ of certiorari.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the Rules of Court
expressly require that the tribunal must have acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The requisite grave abuse of discretion is in keeping with
the office of the writ of certiorari; its function is to keep the
tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction under the
Constitution and law.
The term grave abuse of discretion, while it defies exact
definition, generally refers to capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.5
Arguably under the above standards, it may be claimed
that since the COMELEC merely complied with the
prevailing jurisprudence (in particular with the Court’s
pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC and
Banat v. COMELEC), then it could not have acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, much less with grave abuse
of discretion. Besides, the writ of certiorari only lies when
the respondent is exercising judicial or quasijudicial

functions, which is not so in the present case.
This rationalization, however, is only superficially sound
as the gross misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Constitution cannot be allowed by this Court in its role and
duty as
_______________
5 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622
SCRA 744.
617
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 617

guardian of the Constitution. Where a misinterpretation or

misapplication of the Constitution occurs, the result is a
constitutional violation that this Court cannot be prevented
from addressing through the exercise of its powers through
the available medium of review under the Rules of Court.
To hold otherwise is to countenance a violation of the
Constitution—a lapse that cannot and should not happen
under our legal system.
Otherwise stated, if the Court were to sustain the view
that the mere application of a prevailing rule or doctrine
negates a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in spite of a
glaring error in the doctrine’s interpretation of the
Constitution, then the Court would have no chance to
correct the error, except by laying down a new doctrine that
would operate prospectively but at the same time
dismissing the petition for failure to show grave abuse of
discretion. To be sure, this is a course of action the Court
cannot take if it were to faithfully discharge its solemn
duty to hold the Constitution inviolate. For the Court,
action under these circumstances is a must; no ifs or buts
can be allowed to be heard about its right and duty to act.
It should be considered, too, that in the adjudication of a
case with constitutional dimensions, it is the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution itself that reign supreme. The
Court’s previous ruling on a matter serves as a guide in the
resolution of a similar matter in the future, but this prior
ruling cannot inflexibly bind the Court in its future actions.
As the highest Court in our judicial hierarchy, the Court

cannot tie its hands through its past actions, particularly
when the Constitution is involved; it is invested with the
innate authority to rule according to what it sees best in its
role as guardian of the Constitution.6
_______________
6 See: De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March
17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
618

Additionally, be it remembered that the rulings of this

Court are not written in stone and do not remain unerased
and applicable for all times under all circumstances. The
Supreme Court’s review of its rulings is in a sense a
continuing one as these are made and refined in the cases
before the Court, taking into account what it has said on
the similar points in the past. This is the principle of stare
decisis that fosters the stability of rulings and decisions.
This principle, however, is not an absolute one that applies
even if an incisive examination shows that a past ruling is
inaccurate and is far from a faithful interpretation of the
Constitution, or in fact involves a constitutional violation.
In this excluded circumstance, both the rule of reason and
the commands of the Constitution itself require that the
past ruling be modified and, if need be, overturned.7
Indeed, if the act done is contrary
_______________
7 See: Justice Arturo Brion’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council. See also Justice Reynato Puno’s
Dissenting Opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
174153, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160 where he stated:
“…Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal
scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to
cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal
stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare
decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare

decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a
command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in
stone in our Constitution.”
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal
stare decisis—constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis
involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for
courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in
constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis’ view on the binding
effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: “Stare decisis is not . . . a
univer
619
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 619

to the Constitution, then the existence of grave abuse of

discretion cannot be doubted.8
As will be discussed extensively in this Separate
Opinion, the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling does not rest on
firm constitutional and legal grounds; its slanted reading of
the text of the constitution and its myopic view of
constitutional intent led it to a grave error never
envisioned by the framers of our constitution.
By ordering the remand of all the petitions to the
COMELEC and for the latter to act in accordance with the
new ruling laid down by the Court—i.e., allowing political
parties to participate in the partylist elections without
need of proving that they are “marginalized and
underrepresented” (as this term is understood in Ang
Bagong Bayani), and in recognizing that a genuine
advocate of a sectoral party or organization may be validly
included in the list of nominees—the Court would not be
violating the principle of prospectivity.9
_______________
sal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again
called upon to consider a question once decided.” In the same vein,

the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: “the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it.” In contrast, the application of stare
decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: “after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be
as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress
itself.” This stance reflects both respect for Congress’ role and the
need to preserve the courts’ limited resources.
8 Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 159139, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 141.
9 Articles 4 and 8 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
620

The rationale behind the principle of prospectivity—both

in the application of law and of judicial decisions
enunciating new doctrines—is the protection of vested
rights and the obligation of contracts. When a new ruling
overrules a prior ruling, the prospective application of the
new ruling is made in favor of parties who have relied in
good faith on the prior ruling under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
Obviously, the force of this rationale finds no application
in this case, for, a ruling overturning Ang Bagong
Bayani broadens the base of participation in the
partylist system of election based on the text and intent
of the Constitution. Thus, no one can claim that the
application of this ruling in the upcoming 2013 election
would operate to the prejudice of parties who relied on the
Ang Bagong Bayani ruling; the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors (as the term in understood in Ang
Bagong Bayani) continue to be eligible to participate in the
partylist elections, subject to the determination of parties’
individual circumstances by the COMELEC.
B. COMELEC power to register

and to cancel registration of a
partylist group is an exercise of
its administrative powers
The COMELEC En Banc’s authority under COMELEC
Resolution No. 9513—i.e., to conduct summary hearings for
the purpose of determining the registered parties’
continuing compliance with the law and the regulations
and to review the COMELEC Division’s ruling granting a
petition for registration—is appropriately an exercise of the
COMELEC’s administrative power rather than its
quasijudicial power. In the exercise of this authority, the
COMELEC may automatically review the decision of its
Divisions, without need for a
_______________
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
621
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 621

motion to reconsider the grant of a petition for registration;

it may also conduct summary hearings when previously
registered partylist groups file their manifestation of
intent to participate in the coming elections.
The case of Santiago, Jr., etc. v. Bautista, et al.10 already
provides us ample guidance and insights into what
distinguishes administrative and quasijudicial powers
from one another. On the issue of whether the remedy of
certiorari (which can only be invoked when the respondent
exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions) would lie
against a public school committee whose function was to
determine the ranking of selected honor students for its
graduating class, the Court gave a negative answer and
said:
From the [foregoing], it will be gleaned that before a tribunal,

board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasijudicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is

brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record
about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down
to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination
of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically
vested with judicial or quasijudicial functions.11 (citation omitted;
emphases ours)
In the present case, no pretense at all is claimed or

made that a petition for registration or the determination
of a registered party’s continuing compliance with existing
laws, rules and jurisprudence entails the assertion of a
right or the presence of a conflict of rights. In a registration
or compliance proceeding, an applicant simply attempts to
prove its posses
_______________
10 143 Phil. 209; 32 SCRA 188 (1970).
11 Id., at p. 219; pp. 198199.
622

sion or continued possession of the requisite qualifications

for the purpose of availing the privilege of participating in
an electoral exercise. Thus, no real adjudication entailing
the exercise of quasijudicial powers actually takes place.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the principle of res
judicata in these registration proceedings necessarily
weakens any claim that adjudication, done in the exercise
of quasijudicial functions, is involved. Each election period
is sui generis—a class in itself, and any registration or
accreditation by a partylist group is only for the purpose of
the coming election; it does not grant any registered party
list group any mantle of immunity from the COMELEC’s
power of review as an incident of its power to register. To
hold otherwise would emasculate the COMELEC as an
independent constitutional commission, and weaken the

crucial role it plays in our republican democracy.
IV. DISCUSSION: MERITS OF THE PETITIONS
I take the firm position that this Court should now

revisit its ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani before our
partylist system drifts any farther from the text and spirit
of the constitutional and statutory commands.
These Discussions shall dwell on the reasons supporting
this approach and my conclusions.
A. The Constitutional Provisions on the Partylist
System
a. The Constitutional Text.
The only constitutional provisions directly dealing with
the partylist system of election are Section 5(1) and (2)
of Article VI, and Sections 2, 6 and 7, Article IXC of
the 1987 Constitution.
The cited Article VI section reads:
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 623

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a partylist system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
under the partylist. For three consecutive terms after the
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
[emphasis, underscores and italics ours]
Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand,

is the article on the COMELEC, and the cited sections
quoted below are its provisions related to the partylist
system.
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions:
x x x x
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the
Commission on Elections. x x x
x x x x
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to
evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.
Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the partylist system as provided in this
Constitution. [emphases and italics ours]
624

These provisions are specifically mentioned and shall be

cited throughout this Separate Opinion as they are the
essential takeoff points in considering, appreciating and
implementing the partylist system.
b. The Constitutional Text Summarized
Paraphrased and summarized, the terms of the
Constitution relating to the partylist system essentially
provide that:
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of
members elected from legislative districts, and
those who are elected through a partylist
system.
2. The members of the House of Representatives
under the partylist system are those who are
elected, as provided by law, thus, plainly leaving
the mechanics of the system to future legislation.
3. The members under the system shall be elected

through registered national, regional, sectoral
parties and organizations, thus, textually
identifying the recognized component groupings in
the partylist system; they must all register with the
COMELEC to be able to participate.
4. To be voted under the partylist system are the
component political parties, organizations and
coalitions, in contrast with the individual candidates
voted upon in legislative district elections.
5. The partylist representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives, including those in the partylist.
6. For three consecutive terms after the ratification
of the Constitution, onehalf of the seats allocated to
partylist representatives shall be filled as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities,
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 625

women, youth, and such other sectors as may be

provided by law, except the religious sector.
7. The Constitution allows a free and open party
system that shall evolve according to the free choice
of the people, within the limits of the Constitution.
c. Purpose Behind the Partylist Innovation
Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both
terse and general in their terms. However, they are not, in
fact, as bare as they would seem, as the words used carry
meanings and intents12 expressed during the
deliberations and the voting that took place to determine
what the Constitution would exactly provide.13
Basic in understanding the constitutional text is
the intent that led to the modification of the system of
legislative district elections that the country has used even
before the 1935 Constitution.
The traditional system, incidentally, is the legislative
district system that remains described in the Constitution
as
_______________
12 In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (460 Phil. 830, 885
886; 415 SCRA 44 [2003]), the Court held: “where there is ambiguity, ratio
legis est anima. x x x
x x x x
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers. [italics, emphasis and
underscore supplied]
13 The deliberations, together with voting on the various issues raised
and the wording of the constitutional text of the partylist provision, took
place on July 22, 1986, July 25, 1986 and August 1, 1986.
626

election by district “apportioned among the provinces, cities

and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.”14
The proponent, Commissioner Christian Monsod,
described the new partylist system in terms of its
purpose, as follows:15
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past

elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or
1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth
place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the
Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially
the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the partylist
system. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
These same purpose and objective were reiterated in the

Commissioner’s subsequent statement when he said—
The whole purpose of the system is precisely to give room for

those who have a national constituency who may never be able to
win a seat on a legislative district basis. But they must have a
constituency of at least 400,000 in order to claim a voice in the
National Assembly.16
thus, leaving no doubt on what the partylist system

conceptually is and why it was established.
B. RA No. 7941, the PartyList System Act
Following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
President Corazon Aquino appointed representatives of the
sectors
_______________
14 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5(1).
15 II RECORD OF THE CONTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, p. 86.
16 Id., at p. 259.
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 627

mentioned in the Constitution, namely: labor, peasant,

urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and
youth, who acted as the partylist representatives for the
first three (3) elections under this Constitution.
In March 1995, Congress enacted RA No. 7941, the
PartyList System Act, as the law that would implement
the partylist election scheduled for May 1998. The law at
the same time fleshed out the mechanics for partylist
elections, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution.
The law specifically provided for:
a. a declaration of the policy behind the law;
b. a definition of terms, specifically defining the terms national,
political, regional, and sectoral parties, and their coalitions;
c. the requisites and terms for registration; the grounds for refusal
and cancellation of registration; and the certified list of
registered parties;
d. the nomination and qualification for partylist representatives;
e. the manner of voting;
f. the number and procedure for the allocation of partylist

representatives; and
g. the proclamation of the winning partylist representatives,
their term of office; the limitation on their change of affiliation;
their rights; and the provisions in case of vacancy.
Reflecting the constitutional intents, the law defined the

partylist system as:
a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate
628

independently provided the coalition of which they form part does

not participate in the partylist system.17 (emphases and italics
ours)
and clarified the State’s policy, objectives and means,

as follows:
a. the promotion of proportional representation in the

election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a partylist system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof;
b. with the aim of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack welldefined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives; and
c. for the development and guarantee of a full, free and
open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature under the simplest scheme possible.18
RA No. 7941 likewise succinctly defined the

component groupings recognized by law in the party
list system, as follows:
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party

or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
_______________
17 RA No. 7941, Section 3(a).
629
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 629

means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and

supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated [labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals] whose principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered
national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.19 (emphases and italics ours)
Notably, the definitions carried no significant

qualifications, preferences, exclusions or limitations by law
on what the recognized partylist groupings should be,
although Section 6 of RA No. 7941 specified and defined the

grounds for disqualification.
C. Jurisprudential Developments
a. The Ang Bagong Bayani Case
In 2001, the first judicial test in the implementation of
the partylist system came through the Ang Bagong Bayani
case where the petitioners sought the disqualification of
the private respondents, among whom were major political
parties. The Court resolved, among others, the following
issues:
_______________
19 RA No. 7941, Section 3(b) to (f).
630

1. whether political parties may participate in party

list elections; and
2. whether the partylist system is exclusive to
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors and
organizations.
The majority ruling held that political parties may
participate in partylist elections, provided that the
requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the Constitution and RA No. 7941. The
partylist organization or party must factually and
truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies, identifying them, non
exclusively, as the labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. The partylist nominees, as well, must be
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Based on its conclusions, the majority provided the
guidelines for the partylist system, summarized below:
First, the political party, sector, organization or

coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.
In other words, it must show—through its constitution, articles of

incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track
record—that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, how
631
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 631

ever, that they represent the interests of the marginalized

and underrepresented. x x x
x x x x
Third, [by an] express constitutional provision[,] the religious
sector may not be represented in the partylist system. x x x
x x x x
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification[.]
x x x x
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct
of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by,
the government. By the very nature of the partylist system, the
party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by
citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so.
Section 9 of RA 7941 [contains the qualifications of partylist
nominees, with special agerelated terms for youth sector
candidates].
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
so also must its nominees. x x x [U]nder Section 2 of RA 7941,

the nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties.” x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole.20 (italics and emphases ours)
b. BANAT Case
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections21 is
essen
_______________
20 Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4,
at pp. 342345; pp. 727731.
21 G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
632

tially a case on the computation of the allocation of seats

based on the partylist votes. Despite the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling, the question of whether the Constitution
prohibits political parties from participating in the
partylist elections remained a live issue in this case.
By a vote of 87, the Court decided to disallow major
political parties from participating in the partylist
elections, directly or indirectly; thus, effectively
reversing the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani that major
political parties may participate in the partylist system,
provided they represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
cited two reasons for disallowing the participation of major
political parties:
1. Limiting the partylist system to the marginalized
and excluding the major political parties from participating
in the election of their representatives are aligned with the
constitutional mandate to reduce social, economic and
political inequalities and remove cultural inequalities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the

common good.
2. Allowing major political parties to participate in the
partylist system electoral process will suffocate the voice of
the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty, and betray
the democratic spirit of the Constitution.
The minority view22 took the position that neither the
Constitution nor RA No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the partylist system. It
maintained that, on the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in partylist elections through their sectoral
wings, and this Court cannot engage in sociopolitical
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from partylist elections, in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.
_______________
22 See ponencia of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 633

Moreover, the minority maintained that the PartyList

System Act and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed
to coalesce with sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. The other major political parties can
thus organize or affiliate with their chosen sector or
sectors, provided that their nominees belong to their
respective sectors. Nor is it necessary that the partylist
organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution, and
infirmity,” as there is no financial status or educational
requirement in the law. It is enough that the nominee of
the sectoral party belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; that is, if the nominee represents
the fisherfolk, he must be a fisherfolk, if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he must be a senior citizen.
D. The Partylist System of elections under the
constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang
Bagong Bayani and its errors
I opened these Discussions by quoting the plain terms of

the Constitution and of the law to stress these terms for
later comparison with Ang Bagong Bayani. In this
manner, Ang Bagong Bayani’s slanted reading of the
Constitution and the laws can be seen in bold relief. Its
main mistake is its erroneous reading of the
constitutional intent, based on the statements of a
constitutional commissioner that were quoted out of
context, to justify its reading of the constitutional
intent.23 Specifically, it relied on the state
_______________
23 II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, p. 561. Stated by
Commissioner Villacorta prior to the approval of the amendment that
became Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Mr. Villacorta. I would like to report that the proponents of
sectoral representation and of the party list system met to
thoroughly discuss the issues and have arrived at a compromise
formula.
On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully,
usher in a new chapter in our national history by giving
634

ments of Commissioner Villacorta, an advocate of sectoral

representation, and glossed over those of Commissioner
Monsod and the results of the deliberations, as reflected in
the resulting words of the Constitution.24 Thus, its
conclusion is not truly reflective of the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. This error is fatal as its conclusion was
then used to justify his interpretation of the statute,
leading to a bias for the social justice view.
a. The Aim or Objective of the PartyList System
a.1. From the Constitutional Perspective.
The aim of the partylist provision, Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, is principally to reform the then
existing electoral system by adding a new system of
electing the members of the House of Representatives. The
innovation is a partylist system that would expand
opportunities for electoral participation to allow those who
could not win in the legislative district elections a fair

chance to enter the House of Representatives other than
through the district election system.
Otherwise stated, the aim is primarily electoral
reform—not to provide a social justice mechanism
that would guarantee that sectors (described in social
justice context by its constitutional deliberation proponents
as “marginalized”) would exclusively occupy, or have
reserved, seats in
_______________
genuine power to our people in the legislature.
Commissioner Monsod will present to the Committee on the
Legislative the amendment to Section 5 which we have agreed
upon. [emphasis and underscore ours]
The underlined and boldfaced portion was lifted out of context in Ang
Bagong Bayani.
24 See Dissent of J. Vicente V. Mendoza which discussed the Villacorta
and Monsod positions, as well as the statements of Commissioners Jaime
Tadeo and Blas Ople, based on the record of the Constitutional
Commission.
635
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 635

the House of Representatives under the partylist

system. This is one glaring error that is evident right from
the opening statement of Ang Bagong Bayani when it
described the partylist system as “a social justice tool.”
While the partylist system can indeed serve the ends of
social justice by providing the opportunity—through an
open, multiparty system—for the social justice sector
groups that have no chance to win in legislative district
elections, the partylist system was not established
primarily for this purpose.
The best proof of this characteristic comes from the
words of the Constitution itself which do not provide for
exclusive or guaranteed representation for sectoral groups
in the partylist system. If at all, the constitutional text
only provided a guarantee of 50% participation for specified
sectoral groups, but the guarantee was only for the first
three (3) elections after the ratification of the

Constitution.25
The deliberations where the words of the Constitution
were framed and adopted confirm the primacy of electoral
reform as against social justice objectives. The electoral
reform view was espoused by the author of the provision,
Commissioner Monsod, and his proposed amendment26 met
vigorous objections from Commissioner Eulogio Lerum and
Commissioner Jaime Tadeo, who then sought to have
guaranteed or reserved seats for the “marginalized” sectors
in order to prevent their “political massacre” should the
Monsod amendment be allowed.27
When voting took place, those against reserved seats
for the marginalized sector won. Eventually, what was
conceded to the latter was what the Constitution, as
worded now, pro
_______________
25 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 5(2).
26 On July 25, 1986.
27 II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 255, 561562. See
also the Dissents of Justice Jose C. Vitug and Justice Vicente Mendoza in
Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4.
636

vides—i.e., “For three consecutive terms after the

ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats
allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from” the
enumerated sectors.
Indeed, if the concept of “marginalized” would be applied
to the partylist system, the term should apply to the
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations that cannot win in the traditional
legislative district elections (following the explanation
of Commissioner Monsod), not necessarily to those claiming
marginalization in the social justice context or because of
their special interests or characteristics. The term, of
course, can very well be applicable to the latter if they
indeed cannot win on their own in the traditional

legislative district elections. These aspects of the case are
further discussed and explained below.
a.2. From the Statutory Perspective.
Even from the perspective of RA No. 7941, the policy
behind the partylist system innovation does not vary or
depart from the basic constitutional intents. The objective
continues to be electoral reform, expressed as the
promotion of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a partylist system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions, under a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.28
It should be noted that it was under RA No. 7941 that
the words “marginalized and underrepresented” made their
formal appearance in the partylist system. It was used in
the context of defining one of the aims of the system, i.e.,
to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and
_______________
28 See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.
637
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 637

underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,

and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
This entry and use of the term is admittedly an effective
and formal statutory recognition that accommodates the
sectoral (in the special interest or concern or social justice
senses) character into the partylist system (i.e., in addition
to the primary electoral reform purpose contemplated in
the Constitution), but nevertheless does not render sectoral
groups the exclusive participants in partylist elections. As

already mentioned, this conclusion is not justified by the
wording, aims and intents of the partylist system as
established by the Constitution and under RA No. 9741.
Nor does the use of the term “marginalized and
underrepresented” (understood in the narrow sectoral
context) render it an absolute requirement to qualify a
party, group or organization for participation in the party
list election, except for those in the sectoral groups or
parties who by the nature of their parties or organizations
necessarily are subject to this requirement. For all parties,
sectors, organizations or coalition, however, the absolute
overriding requirement—as justified by the principal aim
of the system—remains to be a party, group or
organization’s inability to participate in the legislative
district elections with a fair chance of winning. To
clearly express the logical implication of this statement, a
party, group or organization already participating in the
legislative district elections is presumed to have assessed
for itself a fair chance of winning and should no longer
qualify to be a participant in the partylist elections.
b. Party Participation under the Partylist System
The members of the House of Representatives under
the partylist system are those who would be elected, as
638

provided by law, thus, plainly leaving the mechanics of

the system to future legislation. They are likewise
constitutionally identified as the registered national,
regional, sectoral parties and organizations, and are
the partylist groupings to be voted under the partylist
system under a free and open party system that should
be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the
people within the limits of the Constitution.29
From the perspective of the law, this party structure and
system would hopefully foster proportional representation
that would lead to the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens: (1) who belong to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties; and (2) who lack welldefined constituencies;

but (3) who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. The key words in this policy are
“proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack of welldefined
constituencies.”
The term “marginalized and underrepresented” has been
partly discussed above and would merit further discussion
below. Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC,30 on the other hand, defined the term
“proportional representation” in this manner:
[I]t refers to the representation of the “marginalized and

underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5
of the law; namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural, communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.31
As well, the case defined the phrase “who lack well

defined political constituency” to mean:
_______________
29 Pages 1923 of this Separate Opinion.
30 Supra note 4.
31 Id., at p. 333.
639
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 639

refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group,

like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the “marginalized or underrepresented.32
Thus, in both instances, Ang Bagong Bayani harked

back to the term “marginalized and underrepresented,”
clearly showing how, in its view, the partylist system is
bound to this descriptive term. As discussed above, Ang
Bagong Bayani’s use of the term is not exactly correct on
the basis of the primary aim of the partylist system. This
error becomes more glaring as the case applies it to the
phrases “proportional representation” and “lack of political

constituency.”
For clarity, Section 2—the only provision where the
term “marginalized and underrepresented” appears—reads
in full:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy.—The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives
to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a
full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall
provide the simplest scheme possible.
As defined in the law, a party refers to any of the three:

a political party, a sectoral party, or a coalition of parties
(Section 3[b] of RA No. 7941). As distinguished from
sectoral parties or organizations—which generally advocate
“interests or
_______________
32 Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4,
at p. 334; p. 719.
640

concerns”—a political party is one which advocates “an

ideology or platform, principles and policies” of the
government. In short, its identification is with or through
its program of governance.
Under the verba legis or plain terms rule of statutory

interpretation33 and the maxim ut magis valeat quam
pereat,34 a combined reading of Section 2 and Section 3
shows
_______________
33 Per Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives (supra note 7, at
pp. 884885): verba legis signifies that “wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. x x x We look to the language of the
document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should
ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as
possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.
What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.”
(emphasis, underscore and italics ours)
34 Id., at p. 887, “ut magis valeat quam pereat”—the Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole. “It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated
from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections
bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.” (Citing Civil
Liberties Union v.
541
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 541

that the status of being “marginalized and

underrepresented” is not limited merely to sectors,
particularly to those enumerated in Section 5 of the law.

The law itself recognizes that the same status can apply as
well to “political parties.”
Again, the explanation of Commissioner Monsod on the
principal objective of the partylist system comes to mind
as it provides a ready and very useful answer dealing with
the relationship and interaction between sectoral
representation and the partylist system as a whole:
We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party

list system. Under the partylist system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can
form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then
register and present candidates of their party. How do the
mechanics go? Essentially, under the partylist system, every
voter has two votes, so
_______________
Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA
317.)
In other words, the Court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one
which may make the words idle and nugatory.
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available.
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and
purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value
as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave
that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers’ understanding thereof. (Id.)
642

there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the

representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that
same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or
coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here
will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions
that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to
be put in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral
party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he
wants the farmers’ party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the
COMELEC will then tabulate the votes that had been garnered
by each party or each organization—one does not have to be a
political party and register in order to participate as a party—and
count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes
that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
x x x x
It means that any group or party who has a constituency
of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we
allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any
district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no
reason why a group that has a national constituency, even
if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have
a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us
say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a
party or as a group. If each of them gets only one percent or five of
them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative.
So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly.
Those are the dynamics of a partylist system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those
who really have a national constituency or sectoral constituency
will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These
sectors or these groups may not have the constituency to win a
seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a
seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a
nationwide basis.
x x x x
643
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 643

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting

that when we speak now of partylist system though we refer to
sectors, we would be referring to sectoral partylist rather than
sectors and partylist?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the
partylist system, we do not even have to mention sectors
because the sectors would be included in the partylist
system. They can be sectoral parties within the partylist
system.
BISHOP BACANI: Thank you very much.35 (emphases and
underscores supplied)
These exchanges took place on July 22, 1986. When the

discussion on the partylist system of election resumed on
July 25, 1986, Commissioner Monsod proposed an
amendment36 (that substantially became Section 5[1],
Article VI of 1987 Constitution) that further clarified what
this innovative system is.
Thus, the words “marginalized” and “underrepresented”
should be understood in the electoral sense,37 i.e., those
who cannot win in the traditional district elections and
who, while they may have a national presence, lacked
“welldefined political constituency” within a district
sufficient for them to win. For emphasis, sectoral
representation of those perceived in the narrow sectoral
(including social justice) sense as “marginalized” in society
is encapsulated within the broader multiparty (partylist
system) envisioned by the framers.
This broader multiparty (partylist system) seeks to
address not only the concerns of the marginalized sector (in
the narrow sectoral sense) but also the concerns of those
“underrepresented” (in the legislative district) as a result of
the
_______________
35 II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, pp. 8586.
36 Id., at p. 252.
37 See Justice Vicente Mendoza’s Dissent in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at pp. 369370; pp. 758759.
644

winnertakeall system prevailing in district elections—a

system that ineluctably “disenfranchises” those groups or
mass of people who voted for the second, third or fourth
placer in the district elections and even those who are
passive holders of Filipino citizenship.
RA No. 7941 itself amply supports this idea of
“underrepresented” when it used a broad qualitative
requirement in defining “political parties” as ideology or
policybased groups and, “sectoral parties” as those whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of identified sectors.
Based on these considerations, it becomes vividly clear
that—contrary once again to what Ang Bagong Bayani
holds—proportional representation refers to the
representation of different political parties, sectoral
parties and organizations in the House of
Representatives in proportion to the number of their
national constituency or voters, consistent with the
constitutional policy to allow an “open and free
party system” to evolve.
In this regard, the second sentence of Section 2 of RA
No. 7941 is itself notably anchored on the “open and free
party system” mandated by Article IXC of the
Constitution. For some reason, Ang Bagong Bayani never
noted this part of Section 2 and its significance, and is
utterly silent as well on the constitutional anchor provided
by Section 6, Article IXC of the Constitution. It appears
to have simply and conveniently focused on the first
sentence of the Section and its constricted view of the term
“marginalized and underrepresented,” while wholly fixated
on a social justice orientation. Thus, it opened its ruling, as
follows:
The partylist system is a social justice tool designed not only

to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less
in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and
645
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 645

the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the State’s

benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of
representative democracy.38 (emphasis supplied)
Reliance on the concept of social justice, to be sure,

involves a motherhood statement that offers little
opportunity for error, yet relying on the concept solely and
exclusively can be misleading. To begin with, the
creation of an avenue by which “sectoral parties or
organizations” can meaningfully join an electoral exercise
is, in and by itself, a social justice mechanism but it served
other purposes that the framers of the Constitution were
addressing. Looking back, the appeal to the social justice
concept to make the partylist elections an exclusive affair
of the “marginalized and underrepresented sector” (as
defined in Ang Bagong Bayani) proceeds from the premise
that a multipartysystem is antithetical to sectoral
representation. This was effectively the argument of the
proponents of the exclusive sectoral representation view in
the constitutional partylist debates; to allow political
parties to join a multiparty election is a predetermination
of the sectors’ political massacre. This issue, however, has
been laid to rest in the constitutional debates and should
not now be revived and resurrected by coursing it through
the Judiciary.
As the constitutional debates and voting show, what the
framers envisioned was a multiparty system that already
includes sectoral representation. Both sectoral
representation and multipartysystem under our partylist
system are concepts that comfortably fall within this vision
of a Filipinostyle partylist system. Thus, both the text and
spirit of the Constitution do not support an interpretation
of exclusive sectoral representation under the partylist
system; what was provided was an avenue for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate
in the electoral system—it is an invitation for these sectors
to join and take a chance on what democracy and
republicanism can offer.
_______________
38 412 Phil. 322; 359 SCRA 698 (2001).
646

Indeed, our democracy becomes more vibrant when we

allow the interaction and exchange of ideas, philosophies
and interests within a broader context. By allowing the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors who have the
numbers, to participate together with other political parties
and interest groups that we have characterized, under the
simple and relatively inexpensive mechanism of partylist
we have today, the framers clearly aimed to enrich
principled discourse among the greater portion of the
society and hoped to create a better citizenry and nation.
b.1. Impact on Political Parties
To summarize the above discussions and to put them in
operation, political parties are not only “not excluded” from
the partylist system; they are, in fact, expressly allowed by
law to participate. This participation is not impaired by
any “marginalized and underrepresented” limitation
understood in the Ang Bagong Bayani sense.
As applied to political parties, this limitation must be
understood in the electoral sense, i.e., they are parties
espousing their unique and “marginalized” principles of
governance and who must operate in the partylist system
because they only have a “marginal” chance of winning in
the legislative district elections. This definition assumes
that the political party is not also a participant in the
legislative district elections as the basic concept and
purpose of the partylist innovation negate the
possibility of playing in both legislative district and
partylist arenas.
Thus, parties—whether national, regional or sectoral—
with legislative district election presence anywhere in the
country can no longer participate as the partylist system is
national in scope and no overlap between the two electoral
systems can be allowed anywhere.
647
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 647
c. The Parties and Their Nominees

c.1. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Party
Registration Due to Nominee Problems
The COMELEC’s refusal and cancellation of registration
or accreditation of parties based on Section 6 of RA No.
7941 is a sore point when applied to parties based on the
defects or deficiencies attributable to the nominees. On this
point, I maintain the view that essential distinctions
exist between the parties and their nominees that
cannot be disregarded. As quoted in the Summary of
Positions, however, the need to make a distinction between
the two types of nominees is relevant only to sectoral
parties and organizations.
The cancellation of registration or the refusal to register
some of the petitioners on the ground that their nominees
are not qualified implies that the COMELEC viewed the
nominees and their partylist groups as one and the
same entity; hence, the disqualification of the nominee
necessarily results in the disqualification of his/her party.
Sadly, this interpretation ignores the factual and legal
reality that the partylist group, not the nominee, is the
candidate in the partylist election, and at the same time
blurs the distinction between a partylist representative
and a district representative.
c.2. The PartyNominee Relationship
That the partylist group, rather than the nominee, is
voted for in the elections is not a disputed point. Our
essential holding, however, is that a partylist group, in
order to be entitled to participate in the elections, must
satisfy the following express statutory requirements:
1. must be composed of Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties;
648

2. has no welldefined political constituencies; and
3. must be capable of contributing to the formulation

and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
The Constitution requires, too, that the members of the
House of Representatives are those who are elected from
legislative districts, and those who are elected through a
partylist system (Section 5[1], Article VI) where the votes
are in favor of a political party, organization or coalition
(Section 6, Article IXC).
These requirements embody the concept behind the
partylist system and demonstrate that it is a system
completely different from the legislative district
representation. From the point of view of the nominee,
he or she is not the candidate, the party is the entity
voted for. This is in far contrast from the legislative
district system where the candidate is directly voted for in
a personal electoral struggle among candidates in a
district. Thus, the nominee in the partylist system is
effectively merely an agent of the party.39 It is the
partylist group for whom the right of suffrage40 is
exercised by the national electorate with the divined
_______________
39 Separate Dissenting Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong
BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, supra note 4, at p.
354; p. 738.
40 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article V. In AkbayanYouth v. COMELEC (407
Phil. 618, 636; 355 SCRA 318, 333 [2001]), the Court characterized the
requirement of registration as an “indispensable precondition” to the
exercise of the right of suffrage. The Court said: “Proceeding from the
significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote,
the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may
then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration
for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities
in a realistic and orderly manner—one which is not indifferent and so far
removed
649
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 649

intent of casting a vote for a partylist group in order that

the particular ideology, advocacy and concern represented
by the group may be heard and given attention in the halls
of the legislature.
This concept and its purpose negate the idea that the
infirmities of the nominee that do not go into the
qualifications of the party itself should prejudice the party.
In fact, the law does not expressly provide that the
disqualification of the nominee results in the
disqualification of a partylist group from participating in
the elections. In this regard, Section 6 of RA No. 7941
reads:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The

COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the partylist system in the two (2) pre
_______________
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of
the times.”
650

ceding elections for the constituency in which it has

registered. [italics supplied]
Notably, all these grounds pertain to the party itself.

Thus, if the law were to be correctly applied, the law, rules
and regulations that the party violated under Section 6(5)
of RA No. 7941 must affect the party itself to warrant
refusal or cancellation of registration.
To take one of the presented issues as an example, it is
only after a party’s failure to submit its list of five qualified
candidates, after being notified of its nominees’
disqualification, that refusal or cancellation of registration
may be warranted. Indeed, if the partylist group
inexcusably fails to comply with this simple requirement of
the law (Section 8 of RA No. 7941), then its registration
deserves to be denied or an existing one cancelled as this
omission, by itself, demonstrates that it cannot then be
expected to “contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation.”41
The nominee is supposed to carry out the ideals and
concerns of the partylist group to which he/she belongs; to
the electorate, he/she embodies the causes and ideals of the
partylist group. However, unlike the political parties’
official candidates—who can, for whatever reason,
disaffiliate from his party and run as an independent
candidate—the linkage between a nominee and his party
list group is actually a oneway mirror relationship. The
nominee can only see (and therefore run) through the
partylist group42 but the partylist group can see beyond
the nomineemember.
_______________
41 See Section 2 of RA No. 7941.
42 In fact, a nominee’s change of party affiliation during his term
results in the forfeiture of his seat in Congress (see Section 15 of RA No.
7941). If the partylist group fails to obtain a seat in Congress, the law
nevertheless requires a nominee to be a bona fide member of the partylist
group.
651
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 651

While the nominee is the entity “elected” to Congress, a

companion idea that cannot be glossed over is that he only
carried this out because of the nomination made by the
party to which he belongs and only through the unique
partylist system. Note in this regard that the registration
with the COMELEC confers personality (for purposes of
election) on the partylist group itself—and to no other.
Note, too, that what the Constitution and the law envision
is proportional representation through the group and the
latter, not the nominee, is the one voted for in the elections.
Even the manner of his nomination and the duties his
official relation to his party entails are matters that are
primarily determined by the party’s governing constitution
and bylaws. To be sure, political dynamics take place
within the party itself prior to or after the period of
registration that transcend the nominee’s status as a
representative. These realities render indisputable that a
party has the right (in fact, the duty) to replace a nominee
who fails to keep his bona fide membership in the party—
i.e., keeping true to the causes of the party—even while the
nominee is serving in Congress.
The preceding discussions show that the COMELEC’s
action of apparently treating the nominee and his party as
one and the same is clearly and plainly unwarranted and
could only proceed from its commission of grave abuse of
discretion, correctible under Rule 65.
These distinctions do not discount at all the position or
the role of the partylist nominee; it is from the list of
nominees submitted by the party that partylist
representatives are chosen should the party obtain the
required number of votes. In fact, once the partylist group
submits the list of its nominees, the law provides specific
grounds for the change of nominees or for the alteration of
their order of nomination. While the nominee may
withdraw his nomination, we ruled it invalid to allow the
party to withdraw the nomination it
652

43
made in order “to save the nominee from falling under the
whim of the partylist organization once his name has been
submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate
from the capriciousness of the partylist organizations.”44
We also recognize the importance of informing the public
who the nominees of the partylist groups are as these
nominees may eventually be in Congress.45 For the
nominees themselves, the law requires that:
1. he has given his written consent to be a nominee;
2. he must be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines;
3. he must be a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election;
4. he must be able to read and to write;
5. he must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election; and
6. he must be at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
From this list, what clearly serves as the legal link

between the party and its nominee is only the latter’s
bona fide membership in the party that wishes to
participate in the partylist system of election.
Because of this relationship, membership is a fact
that the COMELEC must be able to confirm as it is
the link between the party the electorate votes for
and the representation that the nominee
subsequently undertakes in the House of
Representatives. To illustrate, if a sectoral party’s
nominee, who does not “actually share the attribute or
_______________
43 Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 17943132 and
180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385, 412.
44 Ibid.
45 Bantay Republic Act or BARA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. Nos. 177271 and 177314, May 4, 2007, 523 SCRA 1, 1617.
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characteristic” of the sector he seeks to represent, fails to

prove that he is a genuine advocate of this sector, then the
presence of bona fide membership cannot be maintained.
To automatically disqualify a party without affording it
opportunity to meet the challenge on the eligibility of its
nominee or to undertake rectifications deprives the party
itself of the legal recognition of its own personality that
registration actually seeks.
The qualifications of a nominee at the same time that it
determines whether registration shall be granted.46 When
under the COMELEC’s lights, the shadow cast by the
partylist nominee is not truly reflective of the group he/she
is supposed to represent, what the COMELEC must do is to
give the party the opportunity to field in the five qualified
candidates. The COMELEC acts with grave abuse of
discretion when it immediately cancels or refuses the
registration of a party without affording it the opportunity
to comply.
In line with the idea of proportional and sectoral
representation, the law provides that a nominee
representative who changes his affiliation during his term
forfeits his seat. Likewise, in providing for the rule in case
of vacancy for seats reserved for partylist representatives,
the reason for the vacancy is broad enough to include not
only the valid causes provided for in the party’s
constitution and bylaws (such as the nonpossession of the
necessary qualifications), but likewise includes the
situation where the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal finds that the nomineerepresentative unqualified
for failure to measure up to the necessary statutory and
other legal requirements.47 If these can be remedied
without affecting the status of the party
_______________
46 For partylist groups already previously registered, the COMELEC
can determine the qualifications of their nominees once they file a
Manifestation of Intent to participate.
47 See Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, supra
note 42; and Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 43.
654

itself, no reason exists why the registration of a partylist

group should automatically be cancelled or refused by
reason of individual failures imputable and affecting only
the nominee.
Based on these considerations and premises, the party
list group and its nominees cannot be wholly considered as
one identifiable entity, with the fault attributable and
affecting only the nominee, producing disastrous effects on
the otherwise qualified collective merit of the party. If their
identification with one another can be considered at all, it
is in the ideal constitutional sense that one ought to be a
reflection of the other—i.e., the partylist group acts in
Congress through its nominee/s and the nominee in so
acting represents the causes of the party in whose behalf it
is there for.
E. Observations on Chief Justice Sereno’s
Reflections.
Essentially, the Reflections defend the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling and do not need to be further discussed at
this point lest this Opinion be unduly repetitious. One
point, however, that needs to be answered squarely is the
statement that this Separate Opinion is not “appropriately
sensitive to the context from which it [the 1987 Constitution]
arose.” The Reflections asserted that the heart of the 1987
Constitution is the Article on Social Justice,” citing, in
justification, the statements endorsing the approval of the
1987 Constitution, particularly those of Commissioner
Cecilia Muñoz Palma, the President of the 1986
Constitutional Commission; President Muñoz Palma
described the Constitution as reaching out to the social
justice sectors.
These cited statements, however, were endorsements of
the Constitution as a whole and did not focus solely on the
electoral reform provisions. As must be evident in the
discussions above, I have no problem in accepting
the social justice thrust of the 1987 Constitution as it
indeed, on the whole, shows special concern for
social justice
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compared with the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution.

The Reflections, however, apparently misunderstood
the thrust of my Separate Opinion as already fully
explained above.
This Separate Opinion simply explains that the
provisions under consideration in the present case are the
Constitution’s electoral provisions, specifically the elections
for the House of Representatives and the nation’s basic
electoral policies (expressed in the Article on the
Commission on Elections) that the constitutional framers
wanted to reform.
What the 1987 constitutional framers simply wanted, by
way of electoral reform, was to “open up” the electoral
system by giving more participation to those who could not
otherwise participate under the then existing system—
those who were marginalized in the legislative district
elections because they could not be elected in the past for
lack of the required votes and specific constituency in the
winnertakeall legislative district contest, and who, by the
number of votes they garnered as 3rd or 4th placer in the
district elections, showed that nationally, they had the
equivalent of what the winner in the legislative district
would garner. This was the concept of “marginalized and
underrepresented” and the “lack of political constituency”
that came out in the constitutional deliberations and led to
the present wordings of the Constitution. RA No. 7941
subsequently faithfully reflected these intents.
Despite this overriding intent, the framers recognized as
well that those belonging to specificallynamed sectors (i.e.,
the marginalized and underrepresented in the social justice
sense) should be given a headstart—a “push” so to speak—
in the first three (3) elections so that their representatives
were simply to be selected as partylist representatives in
these initial elections.
Read in this manner, the partylist system as defined in
the Constitution cannot but be one that is “primarily”
grounded on electoral reform and one that was principally
driven by electoral objectives. As written, it admits of
national
656

and regional political parties (which may be based on

ideology, e.g. the Socialist Party of the Philippines), with or
without social justice orientation. At the same time, the
system shows its open embrace of social justice through the
preference it gave to the social justice sectors (labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector) in the first three elections
after ratification of the Constitution, and to the labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals, in the RA No. 7941
definition of sectoral party.
The objection regarding the “textualist” approach has
been fully discussed in the Summary of Positions and need
not be repeated here.
F. The ElevenPoint Parameters for the
COMELEC
I close this Opinion by outlining the elevenpoint
parameters that should guide the COMELEC in the
exercise of its power to register parties under the partylist
system of elections. For ease of application, these
parameters refer back to the Ang Bagong Bayani
guidelines, particularly on what points in these guidelines
should be discarded and what remains intact and effective.
In view of our prior ruling in BANAT v. Commission on
Elections (disqualifying political parties from participating
in the partylist elections), the petitioners understandably
attempted to demonstrate, in one way or another, that they
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
as the term is understood in Bagong Bayani. As discussed
in this Separate Opinion, however, the requirement of
being marginalized and underrepresented should be
understood, not only in the narrow sectoral sense, but also
in the broader electoral sense.
We likewise take note of the fact that this is the first
time that the Court ever attempted to make a categorical
definition
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 657

and characterization of the term “marginalized and

underrepresented,” a phrase that, correctly understood,
must primarily be interpreted in the electoral sense and, in
case of sectoral parties and organizations, also partly in the
special interests and social justice contexts. The
COMELEC understandably has not been given parameters
under the present pronouncements either in evaluating the
petitions for registration filed before it, on one hand, or in
determining whether existing partylist groups should be
allowed to participate in the partylist elections. Hence, the
need for the following parameters as we order a remand of
all these consolidated petitions to the COMELEC.
1. Purpose and Objective of Partylist System.
The primary objective and purpose of the partylist
system (established under the Constitution and RA
7941 is electoral reform by giving marginalized and
underrepresented parties (i.e., those who cannot win
in the legislative district elections and in this sense are
marginalized and may lack the constituency to elect
themselves there, but who—nationally—may generate
the following and votes equivalent to what a winner in
the legislative district election would garner), the
chance to participate in the electoral exercise and to
elect themselves to the House of Representatives
through a system other than the legislative district
elections.
At the same time, the partylist system recognizes
sectoral representation through sectoral organizations
(that, as defined did not require or identify any social
justice characteristic but were still subject to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and the
“constituency” requirements of the law), and through
sectors identified by their common “social justice”
characteristics (but which must likewise comply with
the “marginalized and underrepresented” and
“constituency” requirements of the law).
658

2. For political parties (whether national or

regional): a) to be classified as political parties, they
must advocate an ideology or platform, principles and
policies, for the general conduct of government. The
application of the further requirement under RA No.
7941 (that as the most immediate means of securing
the adoption of their principles of governance, they
must regularly nominate and support their leaders
and members as candidates for public office) shall
depend on the particular circumstances of the party.
b) The marginal and underrepresentation in
the electoral sense (i.e., in the legislative district
elections) and the lack of constituency requirements
fully apply to political parties, but there is no reason
not to presume compliance with these requirements if
political parties are not participants in any legislative
district elections.
c) Role of Major Political Parties in Party
list Elections. Major political parties, if they
participate in the legislative district elections, cannot
participate in the partylist elections, nor can they
form a coalition with partylist parties and run as a
coalition in the partylist elections.
A coalition is a formal party participant in the
partylist system; what the partylist system forbids
directly (i.e., participation in both electoral arenas),
the major political parties cannot do indirectly
through a coalition.
No prohibition, however, exists against informal
alliances that they can form with partylist parties,
organizations or groups running for the partylist
elections. The partylist component of these informal
alliances is not prohibited from running in the party
list elections.
The plain requirements intrinsic to the nature of
the political party evidently render the first and
659
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 659

second Ang Bagong Bayani guideline invalid,

and significantly affects the fourth guideline. To
stress, political parties are not only “not excluded”
from the partylist system; they are, in fact, expressly
allowed by law to participate without being limited by
the “marginalized and underrepresented”
requirement, as narrowly understood in Ang Bagong
Bayani.
3. Sectoral parties, groups and organizations
must belong to the sectors enumerated in Section
5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 5
of RA No. 7941 that are mainly based on social justice
characteristics; or must have interests, concerns or
characteristics specific to their sectors although they
do not require or need to identify with any social
justice characteristic.
In either case, they are subject to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and the
“constituency” requirements of the law through a
showing, supported by evidence, that they belong to a
sector that is actually characterized as marginal and
underrepresented.
Sectoral parties, groups and organizations are
additionally subject to the general overriding
requirement of electoral marginalization and
underrepresentation and the constituency
requirements of the law, but there is no reason why
compliance with these requirements cannot be
presumed if they are not participants in any
legislative district elections.
4. Registration with the COMELEC.
Political parties (whether national or regional,
already registered with the COMELEC as regular
political parties but not under the partylist system)
must register under the partylist system to
participate in the partylist elections. For partylist
registration purposes, they must submit to the
COMELEC their constitution, bylaws, platform or
program of
660

government, list of officers, coalition agreement and

other relevant information that the COMELEC may
require.48
Similarly, sectoral parties, groups or
organizations already registered under the general
COMELEC rules for registration of political parties
(but not under the partylist system), must register
under the partylist system to be eligible to
participate in the partylist elections, and must
likewise submit relevant documentation that the
COMELEC shall require.
Political and sectoral parties, groups or
organizations already previously registered
and/or accredited under the partylist system,
shall maintain their previous registration and/or
accreditation and shall be allowed to participate in
the partylist elections unless there are grounds for
cancellation of their registration and/or accreditation
under Section 6, RA 7941.
5. Submission of Relevant Documents. The
statutory requirement on the submission of relevant
documentary evidence to the COMELEC is not an
empty and formal ceremony. The eighth (8th) Ang
Bagong Bayani guideline relating to the ability of
the partylist group (not just the nominee but directly
through the nominee or indirectly through the group)
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
remains wholly relevant and should be complied with
through the required submissions the COMELEC
shall require.
The platform or program of government, among
others, is very important considering the significant
role the partylist group itself, as a collective
_______________
661
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body, plays in the partylist system dynamics even as

its nominee or nominees is the one who is considered
“Member” of the House of Representatives. The
statutory recognition of an “appropriate legislation”
beneficial to the nation injects the meaningful
democracy that the partylist system seeks to add
stimulus into.
6. Party Disqualification. Political parties and
sectoral parties and organizations alike must not
possess any of the disqualifying grounds under
Section 6, RA 7941 to be able to participate in the
partylist elections.
Insofar as the third Ang Bagong Bayani
guideline merely reiterates the first ground for
cancellation or refusal of registration under Section 6,
RA 7941—that the partylist group is a religious sect
or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purpose—and the same ground
is retained under these parameters.
7. Compliance with Substantive Requirements.
To justify their existence, all partylist groups must
comply with the substantive requirements of the law
specific to their own group, their own internal rules
on membership, and with the COMELEC’s Rules of
Procedure.
8. Prohibited Assistance from Government. The
party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by
the government. It must be independent of the
government. This is the fifth Ang Bagong Bayani
guideline. While this requirement only contemplated
of the marginalized and underrepresented sector in
the narrow sense in Ang Bagong Bayani, no reason
exists not to extend this requirement even to political
parties participating in the partylist elections.
To emphasize, the general overriding requirement
in the partylist elections is inability to par
662

ticipate in the legislative district elections with

a fair chance of winning. If a political party at the
very least obtains the assistance of the government,
whether financially or otherwise, then its
participation in the partylist system defeats the
broad electoral sense in which the term
“marginalized” and “underrepresented” is understood
as applied to political parties.
9. Qualification of Partylist Nominee. The sixth
Ang Bagong Bayani guideline, being a mere
faithful reiteration of Section 9 of RA 7941
(qualification of a partylist nomine), should remain.
In addition, the partylist nominee must comply with
the proviso in Section 15 of RA 7941.
10. Party and Nominee Membership. For sectoral
parties and organizations, the seventh Ang Bagong
Bayani guideline—i.e., that the nominees must also
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors—refers not only to the actual possession of the
marginalized and underrepresented status
represented by the sectoral party or organization but
also to one who genuinely advocates the interest or
concern of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector represented by the sectoral party or
organization.
To be consistent with the sectoral representation
envisioned by the framers, majority of the members
of the sectoral party or organization must actually
belong to the sector represented.
For political parties, it is enough that their
nominees are bona fide member of the group they
represent.
11. Effects of Disqualification of Nominee. The
disqualification of a nominee (on the ground that he is
not a bona fide member of the political party; or that
he does not possess the actual status or characteristic
or that he is not a genuine advocate of the sector rep
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 663

resented) does not automatically result in the

disqualification of the party since all the grounds for
cancellation or refusal of registration pertain to the
party itself.
The partylist group should be given opportunity
either to refute the finding of disqualification of its
nominee or to fill in a qualified nominee before
cancellation or refusal of registration is ordered.
Consistent with Section 6 (5) and Section 8 of RA
7941, the partylist group must submit a list
containing at least five nominees to the COMELEC. If
a partylist group endeavors to participate in the
partylist elections on the theoretical assumption that
it has a national constituency (as against district
constituency), then compliance with the clear
requirement of the law on the number of nominees
must all the more be strictly complied with by the
partylist group.
Considering that the thirteen petitioners, who are new
applicants, only secured a Status Quo Ante Order (instead
of mandatory injunction that would secure their inclusion
in the ballots now being printed by the COMELEC), the
remand of their petitions is only for the academic purpose
of determining their entitlement to registration under the
partylist system but not anymore for the purpose of
participating in the 2013 elections.
Any of the remaining partylist groups involved in the
remaining 40 petitions49 that obtain the number of votes
required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives
would still be subject to the determination by the
COMELEC of their qualifications based on the parameters
and rationale expressed in this Separate Opinion.
_______________
49 The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 204421 and 204425 refer to one and the
same partylist group, only that they are represented by different
personalities, claiming to be the legitimate officers of the party.
664

REYES, J.:
In its noblest sense, the partylist system truly empowers the

masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it
invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past—the
farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement—to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections.
The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling
and desecrating this social justice vehicle.1
The Court is tasked to resolve the fiftythree (53)

consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for
Certiorari and Prohibition filed under Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court by various partylist
groups and organizations. The petitions assail the
resolutions issued by the respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) that either cancelled their existing
registration and accreditation, or denied their new
petitions for registration under the partylist system.2
Of the fiftythree (53) petitions, thirteen (13) are
instituted by new applicants to the partylist system,
whose respective applications for registration and/or
accreditation filed under Republic Act No. 79413 (RA 7941)
and COMELEC Resolution No. 93664 dated February 21,
2012 were denied by the
_______________
1 Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party vs. Commission on Elections,
412 Phil. 308; 359 SCRA 698 (2001).
2 Resolutions dated November 13, 2012, November 20, 2012, December
4, 2012, December 11, 2012 and February 19, 2013.
3 “An Act Providing for the Election of PartyList Representatives
Through the PartyList System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor”
4Rules and Regulations Governing The: 1) Filing of Petitions for
Registration; 2) Filing of Manifestations of Intent to Participate; 3)
Submission of Names of Nominees; and 4) Filing of Disqualification Cases
Against Nominees or PartyList Groups of Organizations
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 665

COMELEC En Banc upon its review of the resolutions of a

division of the Commission.
The forty (40) other petitions are instituted by partylist
groups or organizations that have been previously
registered and accredited by the COMELEC, with most of
them having been allowed to participate under the party
list system in the past elections. These 40 petitions involve
the COMELEC’s recent cancellation of their groups’
registration and accreditation, which effectively denied
them of the chance to participate under the partylist
system in the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The Antecedents
All petitions stem from the petitioners’ desire and intent
to participate as candidates in the partylist system of
representation, which takes its core from Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Article VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 5. 1. The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of
organizations.
2. The partylist representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the partylist. For three consecutive
_______________
Participating Under the PartyList System of Representation in Connection
with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections
Thereafter.
666

terms after the ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of

the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
In 1995, RA 7941 was enacted to provide for the matters

that shall govern the partylist system, including the
registration of partylist groups, the qualifications of party
list nominees, and the election of partylist representatives.
In 1998, the country’s first partylist election was held.
Since then, the Court has been called upon on several
instances to resolve controversies on the system, oftentimes
on questions involving the qualifications of partylist
groups and their nominees. Among the landmark cases on
these issues is Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC5 decided by the Court in 2001, wherein the
Court laid down the eightpoint guidelines6 in the
determination of the qualifications of partylist
participants.
_______________
5 Supra note 1.
6 First, the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show—through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record—that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. x x
x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the partylist system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling “Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to
be elected to the House of Representatives.” In other words, while they are
not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they
must show, however, that they
667
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Pursuant to its specific mandate under Section 18 of RA

7941 to “promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act,”
the COMELEC issued on February 21, 2012 Resolution No.
9366. About 2807 groups, comprised of new applicants and
previouslyregistered partylist groups, formally signified
their intent to join the partylist system in the May 13,
2013 elections.
As required in Rule 1, Resolution No. 9366 on the
registration of organized groups that are not yet registered
under the partylist system, among the groups that filed
with the COMELEC their respective petitions for
registration were: (1) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204139; (2) Akbay Kalusugan
(AKIN), petitioner in G.R. No. 204367; (3) Ako An Bisaya
(AAB), petitioner in G.R. No.
_______________
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. x x x
x x x x
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the partylist
system.
x x x x
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under
Section 6 of RA 7941 x x x
x x x x
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law;
its nominees must likewise do so.
x x x x
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominess.
x x x
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the

formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. x x x
7 Consolidated Comment dated December 26, 2012, p. 54.
668

204370; (4) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN), petitioner in G.R.

No. 204379; (5) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent and Nanny
of the Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204394; (6) Kalikasan PartyList (KALIKASAN),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204402; (7) Association of Local
Athletics Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALAEH),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204426; (8) 1 Alliance Advocating
Autonomy Party (1AAAP), herein petitioner in G.R. No.
204435; (9) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204455; (10) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204485; and (11) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204490. The political parties Abyan
Ilonggo Party (AI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204436, and
Partido ng Bida (PBB), petitioner in G.R. No. 204484, also
sought to participate for the first time in the partylist
elections, although their petitions for registration were not
filed under Rule 1 of Resolution No. 9366.
Partylist groups that were previously registered and
accredited merely filed their Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the PartyList System of Representation in
the May 13, 2013 Elections, as provided in Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366. Among these parties were: (1) Atong
Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum), petitioner in G.R. No.
203766; (2) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB), petitioner in
G.R. Nos. 20381819; (3) Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), petitioner in G.R. No. 203922; (4)
Aksyon MagsasakaPartido Tinig ng Masa (AKMAPTM),
petitioner in G.R. No. 203936; (5) Kapatiran ng mga
Nakulong na Walang Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA), petitioner in
G.R. No. 203958; (6) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural
Energy, Inc. (1CARE), petitioner in G.R. No. 203960; (7)

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.
(ARARO), petitioner in G.R. No. 203976; (8) Association
for Righteousness Advocacy on Leadership (ARAL),
petitioner in G.R. No. 203981; (9) Alliance for Rural Con
669
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 669

cerns (ARC), petitioner in G.R. No. 204002; (10) Alliance

for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204094; (11) 1Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BROPGBI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204100; (12) 1
Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner in G.R. No. 204122;
(13) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance, Inc. (A
IPRA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204125; (14) Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204126; (15) The True Marcos
Loyalist (for God, Country, and People) Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY), petitioner in G.R. No.
204141; (16) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG
MASDA), petitioner in G.R. No. 204153; (17) Action
Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc. (ABROAD),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204158; (18) Aangat Tayo PartyList
Party (AT), petitioner in G.R. No. 204174; (19) Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc (COCOFED), petitioner
in G.R. No. 204216; (20) Abang Lingkod PartyList
(ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204220; (21)
Firm 24K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24K), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204236; (22) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204238; (23) Green Force for the
Environment Sons and Daughters of Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE), petitioner in G.R. No. 204239; (24)
AgriAgra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng Pilipinas
Movement (AGRI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204240; (25)
Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen
International, Inc. (A BLESSED PartyList), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204263; (26) United Movement Against Drugs
Foundation (UNIMAD), petitioner in G.R. No. 204318;
(27) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204321; (28) Bayani Partylist (BAYANI),

petitioner in G.R. No. 204323; (29) Action League of
Indigenous Masses (ALIM), petitioner in G.R. No. 204341;
(30) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL), petitioner in G.R. No.
204356; (31) Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
for National Progress (AAMA), petitioner in G.R. No.
204358; (32) Social Move
670

ment for Active Reform and Transparency (SMART),

petitioner in G.R. No. 204359; (33) Adhikain at Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong Tao Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran (AKOBAHAY), petitioner in G.R. No. 204364;
(34) Binhi – Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
Magsasaka (BINHI), petitioner in G.R. No. 204374; (35)
Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor Youth
Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), petitioner in G.R.
No. 204408; (36) 1United Transport Koalisyon (1UTAK),
petitioner in G.R. No. 204410; (37) Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR CITIZENS), petitioner in G.R. No. 204421 and
G.R. No. 204425; (38) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204428; and (39) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan
Ginhawang Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS), petitioner in
G.R. No. 204486.
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 9513, which provides for additional rules on the
Commission’s disposition of the new petitions and
manifestations of intent that were filed with it under
Resolution No. 9366. Resolution No. 9513, entitled In the
Matter of: (1) The Automatic Review by the Commission En
Banc of Pending Petitions for Registration of PartyList
Groups; and (2) Setting for Hearing the Accredited Party
List Groups or Organizations which are Existing and which
have Filed Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the
2013 National Elections, reads in part:
WHEREAS, it is necessary and indispensable for the Commission En

Banc to review and affirm the grant of registration and accreditation to
partylist groups and organizations in view of its role in ensuring that

only those parties, groups, or organizations with the requisite character
consistent with the purpose of the partylist system is registered and
accredited to participate in the partylist system of representation;
WHEREAS, Section 4, Rule 1 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure
authorize[s] the suspension of the Rules or any portion thereof in the
interest of justice and in order to obtain the speedy disposition of all
matters pending before it; and
671
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 671

WHEREAS, Section 19 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure on

Motions for Reconsideration should be suspended in order for the
Commission En Banc to fulfill its role as stated in the Ang Bagong
Bayani case.
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission on
Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, and Republic Act No. 7941 or the “PartyList
System Act”, hereby RESOLVES to promulgate the following:
1. In all pending cases where a Division grants the Petition for
Registration of a partylist group or organization, the records shall
be forwarded to the Commission En Banc for automatic review
within five (5) days from the promulgation of the Resolution
without need of a motion for reconsideration. It shall be
understood that a partylist group shall not be deemed accredited
without affirmation from the Commission En Banc of the
Division’s ruling. For this purpose, the provisions of Rule 19 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be suspended.
2. To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission
En Banc, for purposes of determining their continuing compliance
with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines in the
Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if noncompliant, cancel the
registration of the following:
(a) Partylist groups or organizations which are already
registered and accredited and will participate in the May
13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En Banc
has not passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions
for Registration; and
(b) Partylist groups or organizations which are existing and
retained in the list of Registered PartyList Parties per
Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April 2012, and

which have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the PartyList System of Representation in the
May 13, 2013 Elections.
672

With the provision in Resolution No. 9513 on the

COMELEC’S determination of the continuing compliance
of registered/accredited parties that have filed their
manifestations of intent, the Commission En Banc
scheduled summary hearings on various dates, and allowed
the partylist groups to present their witnesses and submit
their evidence.8 After due proceedings, the COMELEC En
Banc issued the following resolutions:
1. Resolution9 dated October 10, 2012 in SPP No. 12
154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12177 (PLM)
The COMELEC retained the registration and
accreditation of AKB10 as a political party, but denied
its participation in the May 2013 partylist elections.
The COMELEC’s ruling is founded on several
grounds. First, the party does not represent or seek to
uplift any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
From its constitution and bylaws, the party seeks to
represent and uplift the lives of Bicolanos, who, for
the COMELEC, cannot be considered or even
associated with persons who are marginalized and
underrepresented. Second, the provinces in the Bicol
Region already have their respective representatives
in Congress. To allow more representatives for the
Bicolanos and the Bicol Region would violate the rule
on proportional representation of “provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the
number of their inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.”11 Third, AKB’s nomi
_______________
8 Order dated August 9, 2012; Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 1619.
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 203818), pp. 8387; Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim;

Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
10 SPP No. 12154 (PLM) and SPP No. 12177 (PLM).
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 203818), p. 86.
673
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 673

nees, a businessman, three lawyers and an

ophthalmologist, are not marginalized and
underrepresented; thus, they fail to satisfy the
seventh guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution12 dated October 11, 2012,
which covers SPP No. 12161 (PLM), SPP No. 12187
(PLM), SPP No. 12188 (PLM) and SPP No. 12220
(PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration and
accreditation of Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC and
UNIMAD.
The COMELEC held that Atong Paglaum’s13
nominees do not belong to the sectors which the party
represents, i.e., the urban poor, consumer, women and
youth. While these include the women and youth
sectors, five of the party’s six nominees are all male,
and all of its nominees are above 30 years14 of age.
Further, the COMELEC ruled that the personal
circumstances of the nominees belie the claim that
they belong to the urban poor sector: (1) its first
nominee15 served as vicepresident in a multinational
corporation; (2) its second nominee16 is the owner of a
corporation engaged in the business of pineapple
contract growing with Del Monte
_______________
Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim. Commissioner
Rene V. Sarmiento also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
13 SPP No. 12161 (PLM).
14 Section 9 of RA 7941 x x x x In case of a nominee of the youth

sector, he must be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of
age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
in office until the expiration of his term.
15 Rodolfo P. Pancrudo, Jr.
16 Pablo Lorenzo III.
674

Philippines; (3) its third nominee17 is the owner

and manager of two business establishments; and (4)
its sixth nominee18 is an electrical engineer and three
term member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Finally, the COMELEC
cited the party’s failure to file its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures when it participated
in the 2010 Elections, despite having been ordered to
do so during the summary evidentiary hearing.
In ruling against ARAL,19 the COMELEC cited
the party’s “failure to comply, and for violation of
election laws, rules and regulations pursuant to
Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, in connection with the
fourth, sixth, and seventh guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani.”20 The Commission explained that while the
party seeks to represent the women and youth
sectors, only the first of its seven nominees is a
woman, and only its second nominee is below 30 years
of age. The Commission further took note that: first,
some of its activities were jointly conducted with
religious organizations, and second, its fifth nominee
is a pastor. “Although these circumstances are not
sufficient proof that the organization is itself a
religious sect, denomination or association and/or is
organized for religious purposes, one nevertheless
cannot but hold doubt.”21
The registration of ARC22 was cancelled for the
failure of its nominees to qualify. The party claims to
represent landless farmers, agrarian reform
beneficiaries, fisherfolk, upland dwellers, indigenous

people and Bangsa
_______________
17 Victor G. Noval.
18 Melchor P. Maramara.
19 SPP No. 12187 (PLM).
20 Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 59.
21 Id., at p. 60.
22 SPP No. 12188 (PLM).
675
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 675

Moro people.23 However, none of its nominees belongs

to any of these sectors. In addition, the party failed to
prove that a majority of its members belong to the
sectors that it seeks to represent. The party’s
advocacy for the “development of the rural sectors” is
also not limited to the cited sectors, as it may even
include sectors that are not marginalized and
underrepresented.
UNIMAD24 claims to represent “the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors which include young
professionals like drug counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, among others.”25 For the
COMELEC, however, such sectors are not
marginalized and underrepresented. The fight
against illegal drugs is an issue that interests the
general public, and not just particular sectors of the
society. There are also existing laws, such as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and various specialized
government agencies, such as the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and the Dangerous
Drugs Board (DDB), that already address the problem
of illegal drugs. In cancelling UNIMAD’s registration,
the COMELEC also cited the party’s failure to
establish its track record as an organization.
Furthermore, while the party claims to represent the
youth and young professionals, none of its nominees is
aged below thirty years.

(PLM) and SPP No. 12257 (PLM)
_______________
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 61.
24 SPP No. 12220 (PLM).
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 203981), p. 66.
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christina Robert S. Lim;
676

The main reason for the cancellation of 1BRO

PGBI’s27 registration was its failure to define the
sector that it seeks to represent. An affidavit executed
by its second nominee indicates that the party
represents professionals, while its Manifestation of
Intent indicates that it is multisectoral. For the
COMELEC, such differing statements from the party
reveal that 1BROPGBI does not really intend to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector. Instead, it only seeks to represent its
members, and that it is more of a
“fraternity/brotherhood composed mostly of military
men with esoteric learnings.”28 The party’s nominees
also did not appear to belong to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, being a barangay captain,
consultant, guidance counselor, lawyer and retired
captain/security consultant.
The registration of 1GANAP/GUARDIANS29 was
also cancelled, following the COMELEC’s finding that
it is a military fraternity. The Commission also cited
the following grounds: first, there is a “glaring
similarity between 1GANAP/GUARDIANS and
1BROPGBI”;30 second, “it wishes to protect the
interests of its members; however, it failed to
establish x x x the group’s service outside the walls of
its ‘brotherhood’;”31 third, the “community volunteer

workers” sector which it seeks to represent is too
broad to allow for meaningful representation; and
fourth, its nominees do not appear to belong to the
said sector.
_______________
27 SPP No. 12196 (PLM).
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 60.
29 SPP No. 12223 (PLM).
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 62.
31 Id.
677
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 677

A BLESSED PartyList32 claims to represent

farmers and fishermen in Region XI. The COMELEC
resolved to cancel its registration after finding that
three of its seven nominees are “not themselves
farmers and fishermen, [and] none of its nominees are
registered voters of Region XI, the particular region
which they seek to represent.”33
4. Resolution34 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP No.
12260
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of 1
CARE35 on the following grounds: (1) rural energy
consumers, the sector which 1CARE intends to
represent, is not marginalized and underrepresented;
(2) the party’s track record and activities are almost
exclusively related to electric cooperatives and not to
rural energy consumers; and (3) its nominees, all of
whom are/were highlevel officials of various electric
cooperatives in the country, do not belong to the
sector of rural energy consumers.
5. Resolution36 dated October 16, 2012 in SPP Case
No. 12201 (PLM)
accreditation of APEC37 on the following grounds: (1)
a re
_______________
32 SPP No. 12257 (PLM).
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 204100), p. 65.
Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioners
Rene V. Sarmiento and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
35 SPP No. 12260.
37 SPP No. 12201 (PLM).
678

view of its constitution and bylaws shows that it

does not represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as it is merely an economic
lobby group for the electric power industry; and (2) all
of its nominees, being an employee, electrical
engineer, sugar planter and retired government
employee, do not appear to belong to the sector that
the party claims to represent.
6. Resolution38 dated October 23, 2012 in SPP No.
12232 (PLM)
In cancelling AT’s39 registration and accreditation,
the COMELEC ruled that: first, the party, which
represents the sectors of women, elderly, youth, labor
and urban poor, does not appear to have a bona fide
intention to represent all these sectors, as it has, in
fact, failed to uplift the welfare of all these sectors
through the authorship or sponsorship by its
incumbent representative in Congress of house bills
that are beneficial to the elderly, youth and urban
poor; and second, its nominees, being all
professionals, do not belong to any of the
marginalized sectors that the party seeks to
represent.

which covers SPP Case No. 12288 (PLM)
_______________
Armando C. Velasco; Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim concurred;
39 SPP No. 12232 (PLM).
Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph, also voted in favor. Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
no part.
679
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 679

The COMELEC’s resolution to cancel ARARO’s41

registration and accreditation was founded on the
following: (1) the separate interests of the peasant
and urban poor sectors, which the party both
represents, differ and even oftentimes conflict; (2)
most of its nominees cannot be considered members of
any of these sectors, as they reside “in the gated
subdivisions of Metro Manila”42; hence, such
nominees can be considered more as landowners, and
not farmers as they claim themselves to be; (3) the
party failed to show that three of its nominees43 are
among its bona fide members; (4) Its nominee Quirino
De La Torre (De La Torre) appeared to be a farmland
owner, rather than an actual farmer; and (5) It failed
to present any document to show that its Board had
resolved to participate in the May 2013 elections, and
that De La Torre was authorized to sign and file with
the COMELEC the documents that are required for
the said purpose.
which covers SPP Case No. 12279 (PLM), SPP No. 12
248 (PLM), SPP No. 12263 (PLM), SPP No. 12180
(PLM), SPP No. 12229 (PLM), SPP No. 12217 (PLM),

SPP No. 12277 (PLM) and SPP No. 12015 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of
AGRI, AKMAPTM, KAP, AKO BAHAY, BANTAY,
PACYAW, PASANG MASDA and KAKUSA.
_______________
41 SPP No. 12288 (PLM).
42 Id., at p. 28.
43 Joel C. Obar, Jose F. Gamos and Alan G. Gonzales.
Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph, also voted in favor; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
no part.
680

In AGRI’s45 case, the COMELEC ruled that: (1) for

more than a year immediately after the May 2010
elections, AGRI stopped existing as an organization,
and this constitutes as a ground to cancel registration
under Section 6 of RA 7941; (2) its nominees did not
appear to actually belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of peasants and farmers,
which the party seeks to represent; (3) it submitted a
list of only four nominees, instead of five as mandated
by Section 8 of RA 7941; and (4) there is no showing
that it undertook meaningful activities for the
upliftment of its constituency.
AKMAPTM’s46 registration as a party to
represent the farmers sector was cancelled for its
failure to show that majority of its members and
officers belonged to the marginalized and
underrepresented. There was also no proof that its
first to fourth nominees,47 who were an educator and
persons engaged in business, actually belonged to a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Its fifth to
ninth nominees, although all farmers, had not been
shown to work on uplifting the lives of the members of

their sector.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of KAP48
(formerly Ako Agila ng Nagkakaisang Magsasaka,
Inc.—Ako Agila) on the following grounds: (1) its
Manifestation of Intent and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an appropriate officer of the party,
as required by Section 3, Rule 2 of Resolution No.
9366; (2) it failed to show that it has continued to
work for the betterment of the lives of the members of
the sectors it represents,
_______________
45 SPP No. 12279 (PLM).
46 SPP No. 12248 (PLM).
47 Margarita Delos Reyes Cojuangco, Datu Michael Abas Kida,
Catherine Domingo Trinidad, Saidamen Odin Limgas.
48 SPP No. 12263 (PLM).
681
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 681

i.e., farmers and peasants; and (3) it failed to show

that its nominees actually belong to the sectors which
the party represents, or that they have undertaken
meaningful activities which address the concerns of
said sectors.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of AKO
BAHAY49 for its failure to prove that its nominees
actually belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector that the party seeks to
represent, i.e., the urban poor, or to have engaged in
meaningful activities that tend to uplift and enrich
the lives of the members of said sector.
BANTAY50 claims to represent the “peasants,
urban poor, workers and nationalistic individuals who
have stakes in promoting security of the country
against insurgency, criminality and their roots in
economic poverty.”51 The COMELEC held that the
party failed to prove that the majority of its members
belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented.
In addition, there was no proof that its first and third

nominees, a dentist and private sector
employee/businesswoman, respectively, actually
belonged to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors which BANTAY seeks to represent.
The registration of PACYAW52 was cancelled on
the following grounds: first, since the party desired to
change the sector to represent, i.e., from the “urban
poor youth” sector to the “urban poor” sector, it
needed to file a new application for registration;
second, it failed to show a credible track record of
working for the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented; third, it failed to prove that
majority of its officers and members
_______________
49 SPP No. 12180 (PLM).
50 SPP No. 12229 (PLM).
51 Rollo (G.R. No. 203958), p. 39.
52 SPP No. 12217 (PLM).
682

were from the urban poor sector; and fourth, its

nominees are also not members of the urban poor
sector.
PASANG MASDA’s53 registration was cancelled
on two grounds. First, it represents both drivers and
operators, who may have conflicting interests that
may adversely affect the party’s mandate to represent
both sectors. Second, its nominees are all operators or
former operators, making the COMELEC question
the party’s capacity to represent the interests of
drivers.
The registration of KAKUSA,54 a party “organized
to represent persons imprisoned without proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt,”55 was cancelled by the
COMELEC for lack of proof that majority of its
officers and members belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. The Commission also took note of
its failure to show that its incumbent representative

has been working on any legislation in Congress to
uplift the lives of those whom the group allegedly
represents. The party showed no credible track
record, and its nominees, being persons engaged in
business, did not appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
9. Resolution56 dated October 30, 2012 in SPP Case
No. 12256 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled AG’s57 registration and
accreditation on three grounds. First, the party failed
to appear during the summary hearing scheduled by
the
_______________
53 SPP No. 12277 (PLM).
54 SPP No. 12015 (PLM).
55 Rollo (G.R. No. 203958), p. 44.
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle and
Armando C. Velasco; Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim concurred; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca,
took no part.
57 SPP No. 12256 (PLM).
683
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 683

COMELEC. For the Commission, such failure

shows the party’s “wanton disregard for the rules and
regulations of [the] Commission”58 and constitutes a
sufficient ground to cancel its registration under Rule
2, Section 2 (f)59 of Resolution No. 9366. Second, the
party does not intend to represent any marginalized
and underrepresented sector, as evidenced by its lack
of track record. In addition, nowhere in its
constitution, bylaws and platform of government
does it state the marginalized and underrepresented
sector that it seeks to represent. It is only in its
Memorandum later submitted to the COMELEC that
it mentions aiding the marginalized sectors of
security guards, drivers, vendors, tanods, smallscale

businesses and the jobless. Third, its nominees do not
belong to any of the mentioned sectors.
10. Resolution60 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP
Case No. 12185 (PLM)
ANAD’s61 registration and accreditation were
cancelled by the COMELEC on several grounds. First,
it does not represent an identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector, judging from the party’s
declared “advocacies to publicly oppose, denounce and
counter, communism in all its form in the Filipino
society, in industries, in the academe and in the labor
sector; to pub
_______________
58 Rollo (G.R. No. 204428), p. 36.
59 Sec. 2. Grounds for opposition to a petition for registration. The
Commission may deny due course to the petition motu proprio or upon
verified opposition of any interested party, after due notice and hearing,
on any of the following grounds: x x x f. It violates or fails to comply with
laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; x x x.
Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
61 SPP No. 12185 (PLM).
684

licly oppose, denounce and counter all acts of

terrorism and insurgency; to preserve, protect and
promote the democratic principles of good government
and governance by peaceful and democratic means
under a regime of law and order; to generate and
provide avenues for the development of skills of its
members as aide in providing income opportunities;
develop and implement livelihood programs for its
members.”62 Second, the party submitted a list of only
three nominees, in violation of Section 4, Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366 that requires the submission of a
list of at least five nominees. Third, its nominees do

not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Fourth, it failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
National and Local Elections.
11. Omnibus Resolution63 dated November 7, 2012,
(PLM) and SPP 12269 (PLM)
accreditation of GREENFORCE, FIRM 24K and
ALIM.
The ruling against GREENFORCE64 was based
on the following grounds: (1) the party is only an
advocacy group composed of environmental
enthusiasts intending to take care of, protect and save
Mother Earth and the country’s natural reserves from
destruction or degradation; (2) even if a liberal stance
is adopted on the meaning of sectoral representation,
the accreditation of GREENFORCE still merits
cancellation for the party’s failure to prove its
continuing compliance with the track
_______________
62 Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), p. 34.
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia
64 SPP No. 12060 (PLM).
685
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 685

record requirement; (3) based on their certificates

of acceptance, the personal circumstances of
GREENFORCE’s nominees demonstrate that they
cannot be classified as marginalized citizens. The first
and second nominees are businessmen, the third and
fourth nominees are lawyers, leaving only the fifth
nominee, a fish farmer, as the only marginalized
citizen among the nominees.
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of FIRM

24K65 after finding that its nominees do not belong to
the sectors which the party represents. It pointed out
that while FIRM 24K supposedly represents the
urban poor and peasants in the National Capital
Region, only two of its nominees actually reside
therein. Also, the COMELEC held that FIRM 24K
failed to prove its track record as an organization;
that the photographs it submitted, showing its
treeplanting activities, are selfserving and incapable
of exhibiting an organized program for the urban
poor.
ALIM’s66 registration was cancelled for its failure
to establish that its nominees, or at least a majority of
them, are members of the indigenous people sector
which the party seeks to represent. Only its first
nominee submitted a certificate from the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), which
confirmed his membership with the Itawes
Indigenous Cultural Communities. In addition, the
COMELEC explained that while ALIM’s president,
Fatani Abdul Malik, testified that their party
specifically represents the indigenous masses from
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, only two of the party’s
five nominees hailed from those areas. Finally, the
party had nominees who did not appear to be
_______________
65 SPP No. 12254 (PLM).
66 SPP No. 12269 (PLM).
686

long to a “marginalized class,” being a businessman,

lawyer and real estate developer.
12. Resolution67 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP No.
12204 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of AAMA,68 the
COMELEC held that the sectors it represents,
namely, employees, either skilled or ordinary labor,
professionals directly engaged in mining activities or

occupation incidental thereto and nongovernment
groups advocating advancement of responsible mining
for national progress, is a specifically defined group
which may not be allowed registration under the
partylist system. In addition, AAMA failed to
establish that its nominees actually represent and
belong to said sectors, that they have actively
participated in the activities of AAMA, that they
truly adhere to its advocacies, and are bona fide
members of the party.
12272 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled the registration of
SMART70 after finding that its nominees are
disqualified from representing the sectors which the
party represents, i.e., workers, peasants, youth,
students, women, professionals and those belonging to
sectors such as do
_______________
Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca; Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento on official business.
68 SPP No. 12204 (PLM).
70 SPP No. 12272 (PLM).
687
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 687

mestic helpers, vendors, drivers and construction

workers, since: first, the party claims to represent the
youth sector, yet four of its five nominees are more
than 30 years of age while its fifth nominee would be
more than 30 years of age on May 13, 2013; second,
the party claims to represent the women sector, yet
four out of its five nominees are male; and third, its
nominees are composed of businessmen, a doctor, an
executive chef and a computer programmer, who are
thus not marginalized. Also, the COMELEC observed
that the party’s activities do not specifically cater to
the interest and needs of the sectors which it
represents. Lastly, the lack of restrictions in the class
of persons who may join SMART casts doubt as to
whether a majority its members are indeed
marginalized and underrepresented.
12173 (PLM)
The COMELEC held that the registration and
accreditation in 2010 of ABP72 as a partylist group
was defective. The party was initially accredited by
the COMELEC in 2009 as a regional political party.
In November 2009, it only filed a Manifestation of
Intent to participate in the May 2010 elections,
instead of a petition for registration under Section 5
of RA 7941. Acting on the recommendation of its Law
Department, the COMELEC accredited ABP as a
partylist group on January 15, 2010. The COMELEC
then ruled that ABP could not be accredited for the
May 2013 Elections as a partylist group sans the
filing of a petition for registra
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioners Armando C.
Velasco and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca on official business.
72 SPP No. 12173 (PLM).
688

tion. Also, the COMELEC held that ABP does not

represent any sector. While it claimed during the
summary evidentiary hearing that it represents
construction workers and professionals, its
constitution and bylaws indicate that its membership
is composed of men and women in Region V. Lastly,

none of ABP’s nominees are employed in the
construction industry.
BAYANI74 claims to represent “the marginalized
and underrepresented professional sector [comprised]
of millions of jobless and underemployed professionals
such as the registered nurses, midwives, engineers,
lawyers, [certified public accountants], among
others.”75 Its registration and accreditation were
cancelled by the COMELEC on the ground of its
failure to prove a track record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and underrepresented sector of
professionals. In addition, the party’s second
nominee,76 being a businessman, was declared
unqualified to represent the sector of professionals.
_______________
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca.
74 SPP No. 12210 (PLM).
75 Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 4445.
76 Alvin V. Abejuela.
Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca.
689
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 689

The registration and accreditation of AANI78 were

cancelled on several grounds. First, the party has
failed to establish a track record of enhancing the
lives of the marginalized and underrepresented
farmers which it claims to represent. Its activities
that include relief operations and consultative

meetings did not appear to primarily benefit the said
sector. Second, more than majority of the party’s
nominees are not farmers, contrary to the seventh
guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani that a party’s
nominees must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector to be represented.
The registration and accreditation of AIPRA,80
which claims to represent and advance the interests
of indigenous peoples, were cancelled on the ground of
its failure to prove that its five nominees are “indeed
indigenous people; have actively participated in the
undertakings of AIPRA; truly adhere to its
advocacies; and most of all, that the said nominees
are its bona fide members.”81
accreditation of COCOFED83 on several grounds.
First, the
_______________
78 SPP No. 12252 (PLM).
Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria Gracia
80 SPP No. 12292 (PLM).
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 204125), p. 47.
Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph,
Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
83 SPP No. 12202 (PLM).
690

party is already affiliated with a number of coconut

agencies, both private and government. COCOFED
admits that it sits in the board of the United Coconut

Association of the Philippines (UCAP), the Philippine
Coconut Research and Development Foundation
(PCRDF), Coconut Investment Co. (CIC), Cocofed
Marketing Corporation (CMC) and the Quezon
Coconut Planters Savings and Loan Bank (QCPSLB).
Such circumstance negates the claim that it is still
marginalized. Second, a partylist group must not be
an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded by the government. Contrary to this guideline,
COCOFED openly admits that it is assisted by the
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) in various
farmeroriented projects. Third, COCOFED’s
nominees are not members of the marginalized sector
of coconut farmers and producers, which the party
claims to represent.
12238 (PLM)
ABANG LINGKOD’s85 registration was cancelled
for its failure to establish a track record of
continuously representing marginalized and
underrepresented peasantfarmers. Further, the party
failed to show that its members actually belong to the
sector which it claims to represent. As regards the
qualification of ABANG LINGKOD’s nominees, there
was a failure to show that they are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented, that they have
actively participated in programs for the
advancement of peasant farmers, and that they truly
adhere to the advocacies of ABANG LINGKOD.
_______________
Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and
Christian Robert S. Lim.
85 SPP No. 12238 (PLM).
691
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 691


The registration and accreditation of ABROAD87
were cancelled on several grounds. First, the party
was accredited as a regional multisectoral party to
represent the sectors of labor, overseas workers,
professionals, urban poor and peasants. However, the
documents submitted by the party indicate that it
only advances the welfare of the labor, overseas
workers and professionals sectors, and fails to
champion the causes of the urban poor and peasants
sectors. In addition, while the party was registered
way back in September 2009, the documents
presented to prove its track record only show its
activities beginning January 15, 2011. The
COMELEC held, “(w)hat transpired from September
4, 2009 to December 2010 is a puzzle to us. ABROAD
could have already carried out its purposes and
platform of government in this period of time to
promote the interests of its members, but it did not.”88
Third, ABROAD’s nominees do not fall under any of
the sectors which the party seeks to represent.
accreditation of BINHI90 on the following grounds: (1)
the
_______________
86Rollo (G.R. No. 204158), pp. 5964; Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C.
Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
87 SPP No. 12158 (PLM).
88 Rollo (G.R. No. 204158), p. 62.
89Rollo (G.R. No. 204374), pp. 3641; Signed by Chairman Sixto S.
692
party’s component organization, the Cabanatuan City

Seed Growers MultiPurpose Cooperative
(CCSGMPC), being a cooperative duly registered with
the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA),
cannot be considered as a marginalized or
underrepresented sectoral organization as it already
receives ample assistance, attention and protection
from the State through the CDA; (2) being a
cooperative, the party receives assistance from the
government through the Department of Agriculture,
in violation of the fifth guideline in Ang Bagong
Bayani; and (3) while it may appear from the
documents submitted during the summary
evidentiary hearing that BINHI/CCSGMPC indeed
promotes the interests and concerns of peasants,
farmers and farm tillers, there is no proof, however,
that the group, as a whole, is marginalized and
underrepresented.
The registration and accreditation of BUTIL92
were cancelled on two grounds. First, in the Judicial
Affidavit submitted by its Secretary General to the
Comelec, it is stated that the party represents
“members of the agriculture and cooperative sector.”
For the COMELEC, BUTIL failed to establish that
the “agricultural and cooperative sectors” are
marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the
party’s nominees neither appear to belong to the
sectors which they seek to represent, nor to have
actively participated in the undertakings of the party.
_______________
90 SPP No. 12238 (PLM).
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim, with
MariaGracia Cielo M. Padaca taking no part.
92 SPP No. 12136 (PLM).
693
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 693

23. Resolution93 dated December 3, 2012 in SPP No.

12194 (PLM)
1st KABAGIS94 was found by the COMELEC to
have ceased to exist after the 2010 elections. The
documents which it submitted to prove its continued
existence were substantially the same as those it
presented to support its petition for registration in
2009. Furthermore, 1st KABAGIS appeared to have
“recycled the documentation of its activities in 2009 to
deliberately mislead the Commission to believe that it
has existed continuously.”95 For the COMELEC, these
circumstances constitute sufficient grounds for the
cancellation of the party’s registration, as provided in
Section 6 (6) and (7) of RA 7941 on a party’s
declaration of untruthful statements in the petition
and failure to exist for at least one year. Finally, the
COMELEC took note that while 1st KABAGIS
intends to represent the labor, fisherfolks and the
urban poor indigenous cultural communities sectors,
none of its five nominees belong to any of these
sectors.
12198 (PLM)
The COMELEC cancelled 1UTAK’s97
accreditation, holding that: First, the party does not
factually and truly
93 Rollo (G.R. No. 204486), pp. 4247; Signed by
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R, Yusoph
and Christian Robert S. Lim; Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, no part.
_______________
94 SPP No. 12194 (PLM).
95 Rollo (G.R. 204486), p. 46.
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Armando C. Velasco
and Christian Robert S. Lim, with Commisioners Lucenito N. Tagle and
Elias R. Yusoph dissenting, and Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca taking no part.
97 SPP No. 12198 (PLM).
694

represent a marginalized sector considering that

drivers and operators, which 1UTAK seeks to both
represent, have diametrically opposing interests. The
advocacy of drivers pertains to wages and benefits
while operators are mainly concerned with their
profits. Second, the party’s nominees do not belong to
any marginalized and underrepresented sector. The
party did not even include among its nominees a
representative from the drivers’ sector.
12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM)
In cancelling the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS,99 the COMELEC explained that, first, its
nominees during the May 2010 elections had agreed
on a termsharing agreement, which circumvented
Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that
mandates a threeyear term for members of the House
of Representatives. The termsharing agreement was
also declared contrary to public policy since a given
term of public office cannot be made subject to any
agreement of the parties; it is not a commodity that
can be shared, apportioned or be made subject of any
private agreement. The Commission further cited
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
and emphasized that a violation or failure to comply
with laws, rules and regulations relating to elections
is, pursuant to Section 6 (5) of RA 7941, a ground for
the cancellation of a party’s registration.
_______________

Brillantes, Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Christian Robert S. Lim
and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commisioners Lucenito N. Tagle,
Armando C. Velasco, and Elias R. Yusoph dissenting.
99 SPP No. 12157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM).
695
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 695


11002
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s resolution to grant the registration
and accreditation of PBB101 as an NCR Political
Party, but prohibited it from participating in the 2013
partylist elections based on the following grounds: (1)
the party does not represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as it is composed of
businessmen, civil society groups, politicians and
ordinary citizens advocating genuine people
empowerment, social justice, and environmental
protection and utilization for sustainable
development; (2) it failed to apply for registration as a
partylist group; and (3) it failed to establish its track
record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives
of the marginalized and underrepresented.
The COMELEC En Banc’s authority under Resolution
No. 9513 to conduct an automatic review of the
COMELEC divisions’ resolutions favoring new registrants
also resulted in the COMELEC En Banc’s issuance of
several resolutions. It reversed the rulings of the
Commission’s divisions through the issuance of the
following:
12099 (PLM)
_______________
Armando c. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. lim and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca.
101 SPP No. 11002.
Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with
Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting.
696

ASIN’s103 petition for registration was denied by

the COMELEC En Banc on the following grounds:
first, the “artists” sector, which is among the sectors
which ASIN seeks to represent, is not considered
marginalized and underrepresented under RA 7941
and relevant jurisprudence; second, ASIN failed to
prove its track record as an organization, there being
no sufficient evidence to show that it had performed
acts that tend to advance the interest of the sectors
which it seeks to represent; and third, ASIN failed to
show that its nominees are qualified under the
provisions of RA 7941 and the guidelines laid down in
Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. Omnibus Resolution104 dated November 27, 2012,
which covers SPP No. 12041 (PLM) and SPP No. 12
011 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied the registration of
Manila Teachers and ALAEH.
In denying Manila Teachers’105 petition, the
COMELEC En Banc reasoned that a nonstock
savings and loan association cannot be considered a
marginalized and underrepresented sector under the
partylist system of representation, for being neither
a part of the “working class,” “service class,”
“economically deprived,” “social outcasts,”
106
“vulnerable” and “work impaired.” Furthermore,
the COMELEC held that a nonstock savings and
loan association is mandated to engage, exclusively,
_______________
103 SPP No. 12099 (PLM).
Velasco (concurred except for SPP No. 12011 ALAEH), Christian Robert
S. Lim (concurred with reservation on issue of jurisdiction) and Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias
R. Yusoph, dissenting.
105 SPP No. 12238 (PLM).

106 Rollo (G.R. No. 204426), p. 143.
697
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 697

in the legitimate business of a nonstock savings and

loan association; thus, the very foundation of its
organization would be forfeited should it pursue its
partylist campaign.107 Even granting that Manila
Teachers may seek registration under the partylist
system as a group representing public school
teachers, the fact that its first and second nominees
are not teachers by profession adversely affects the
party’s application.
The denial of ALAEH’s108 petition was based on
its failure to show that its members, particularly
businessmen, sports enthusiasts, donors and
hobbyists, belong to an identifiable group of persons
which the law considers as marginalized. Further, the
COMELEC En Banc ruled that the group’s nominees
did not appear to be qualified, as they were
individuals doing financially well in their respective
businesses that do not contribute to the welfare of
Filipino athletes and sports enthusiasts.109
12057 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc denied 1AAAP’s111
petition on the ground of the failure of the party’s
nominees to qualify. While the group seeks
registration as a regional political party under Region
XI, its third and fourth nominees112 are not residents
of the said region. For the COMELEC En Banc, such
circumstance disqualifies
_______________
107 Id., at p. 133.
108 SPP No. 12011 (PLM).
109 Rollo (G.R. No. 204426), pp. 134135.
111 SPP No. 12057 (PLM).
112 Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong and Herculano C. Co, Jr.
698

them as nominees, for “it would be difficult for the

said nominees to represent the interest of 1AAAP’s
supposed constituency who are residents and voters of
Region XI.”113 In addition, the group failed to satisfy
the second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani, with the
Comelec En Banc taking note that four114 of its five
nominees do not belong to any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
12104 (PL)
AKIN116 claims to be an organization of health
workers and social workers from urban poor
communities. The denial of its petition is founded on
the group’s failure to show that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector. Its first and second
nominees117 are lawyers, its second nominee118 is a
retired government employee, its fourth nominee119 is
an accountant/social volunteer worker, and its fifth
nominee120 is a secretary.
113 Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), p. 53.
114 1st Nominee, Atty. Pantaleon D. Alvarez, is a
lawyer, business, former DOTC Secretary and
Congressman; 2nd Nominee, Emmanuel D. Cifra, is a
general manager/president; 3rd Nominee, Atty. Eddie U.
Tamondong, is a lawyer; 4th Nominee, Herculano C. Co.,
Jr., is a businessman.
_______________
116 SPP No. 12104 (PL).
117 Camelita P. Crisologo and Benjamin A. Moraleda, Jr.

118 Corazon Alma G. De Leon.
119 Imelda S. Quirante.
120 Flordeliza P. Penalosa.
699
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 699


12011 (PP)
AAB122 applied for registration as a regional political
party in Region VIII, allegedly with “constituencies
[composed of] the men and women (registered voters) of
Region VIII, its provinces, cities, municipalities and all
other Bisayans from the other parts of the Philippines
whose roots can be traced to the Bisayan Regions of Region
VIII x x x.”123 In denying AAB’s petition, the COMELEC
En Banc cited the following grounds: first, the records do
not show that the group represents a marginalized sector of
the society, other than by its claim to have formed a
sectoral wing, the Association of Bisayan FarmersR8
(ABFR8), registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on May 4, 2012 and aiming to pursue
legislation and programs for the benefit of the Bisayan
farmers in Region VIII; second, AAB’s alleged
constituencies in Region VIII are not underrepresented
because they already have their district representatives in
Congress; third, granting that ABFR8 is a legitimate
sectoral group of AAB, it has been in existence only since
May 4, 2012, putting into question its track record of
representing peasants and farmers; and fourth, its
nominees are neither farmers nor peasants—three are
lawyers, and the two others are company employees.
6. Resolution124 dated December 4, 2012 in SPP
Case Nos. 12009 (PP) and 12165 (PLM)
_______________
122 SPP No. 12011 (PLM).

123 Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), p. 44, citing AAB’s Petition dated
February 8, 2012.
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Ar
700

Although the COMELEC En Banc affirmed AI’s125

registration as a regional political party in Region VI, it
denied the party’s registration under the partylist system
on several grounds. First, the party failed to show that it
represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector,
considering that the Province of Iloilo already has “no less
than five (5) incumbent district representatives in
Congress.”126 Second, the party made untruthful
statements in the Memorandum it filed with the
COMELEC, when it claimed that some of its nominees are
members of its sectoral wings PatladCayos Farmers’
Association (PatladCayos) and Alyansa ng Industriya ng
Bigas (ANIB), composed of farmers and NFAaccredited
retailers, respectively. The COMELEC En Banc took note
that none of its nominees are farmers and food retailers,
judging from their occupations or professions as declared in
the certificates of acceptance to their nominations. Third,
AI’s fourth nominee127 has withdrawn his acceptance to his
nomination, while its first128 and fifth129 nominees have
filed their certificates of candidacy for local elective
positions in Iloilo.
12175 (PL)
_______________
mando C. Velasco, Christian Robert S. Lim and Maria Gracia Cielo M.
Padaca, with Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph,
dissenting.
125 SPP No. 12009 (PP).
126 Rollo (G.R. No. 204379), p. 53.
127 Lyndeen John D. Deloria.
128 Rolex T. Suplico.
129 Francis G. Lavilla.

Velasco, and Christian Robert S. Lim; with Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, dissenting; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo
M. Padaca, no part.
701
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 701

ALONA131 claims to be an aggrupation of citizen

groups composed of homeowners’ associations, urban
poor, elderly organizations, young professionals,
overseas Filipino workers, women, entrepreneurs,
cooperatives, fisherfolk, farmers, labor, transport,
vendors and youth groups. In ruling against the
party’s petition, the COMELEC En Banc cited: first,
the group’s failure to establish how it can represent
all these fourteen (14) sectors which have different,
even conflicting, causes and needs; second, the sectors
of homeowners associations, entrepreneurs and
cooperatives are not marginalized and
underrepresented; and third, three of the party’s
nominees, a businessman and two lawyers, do not
belong to any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
Among the petitioners, only the petitions for
registration of ALAM, KALIKASAN, PPP and
GUARDJAN were denied by a division of the COMELEC
in the first instance. The divisions’ rulings were elevated to
the COMELEC En Banc by virtue of motions for
reconsideration, which were resolved via the following
Resolutions:
1. Resolution132 dated November 7, 2012 in SPP 12
127 (PL)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s finding that ALAM133 failed to
sufficiently prove its track record as an organization,
and to show that it actually represents and seeks to
uplift the marginalized and the underrepresented.
Further, the
_______________
131 SPP No. 12175 (PL).
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle
and Armando C. Velasco; Commissioners Elias R. Yusoph and Christian
Robert S. Lim voted in favor, but were on official business at the time of
signing; Commissioner Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
133 SPP No. 12127 (PL).
702

COMELEC En Banc ruled that the myriad of

sectors which ALAM seeks to represent, i.e.,
community print journalists, news dealers, news
sellers, newsboys, tribesmen who learned to love the
liberty of the press, B’laan tribesmen who cry for
ancestral lands, urban poor or informal settlers,
drivers and smalltime operators of transport units,
poor residents in urban barangays, and labor and jury
system advocates, is too broad and unrelated to one
another. Although there is no prohibition against
multisectoral representation in the partylist system,
a party, organization or coalition which seeks
registration must be capable of serving fully all the
sectors which it seeks to represent.
Case No. 12061 (PP)
KALIKASAN,135 a group which claims to be a
proenvironment political party representing the
sectors of workers, informal settlers, women, youth,
elderly, fisherfolks, handicapped, overseas workers
and ordinary professionals who are most vulnerable
to the effects of climate change and environmental
degradation,136 was denied registration, on the
following grounds: (1) the principles and objectives
stated in its constitution and bylaws reflect an
advocacy for the protection of the environment rather
than for the causes of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent; (2)
there is no proof that majority of its membership
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented; (3)

it seeks to represent sectors with conflicting interests;
and (4) its nominees do not belong to any of the
sectors which the party claims to represent.
_______________
Brillantes, Jr., Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and
Christian Robert S. Lim.
135 SPP No. 12061 (PP).
136 Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), p. 35.
703
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 703


12145 (PL)
GUARDJAN’s138 petition for registration was
denied on the ground of its failure to prove its
membership base and solid track record. The group
failed to present the activities that sufficiently
benefited its intended constituency of guards, utility
helpers, aiders, riders, drivers, domestic helpers,
janitors, agents and nannies. Its nominees were also
found to be unqualified, as they do not belong to any
of the sectors which GUARDJAN seeks to represent;
rather, they are the owner, consultant or manager of
agencies which employ security guards. For the
COMELEC En Banc, such circumstance will only
result in a conflict of interest between the owners or
managers of security agencies on one hand, and the
security guards on the other.
12073 (PLM)
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings of
the COMELEC First Division, which cited in its
Resolution140 the failure of PPP141 to show a
constituency of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. The group claims to represent the entire four
provinces and five cities of Region XII, all already
belonging to eight congres
_______________
137 Rollo (G.R. No. 204394); Signed by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr. and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando
C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Commissioner
Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
138 SPP No. 12145 (PL).
Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph and Christian Robert S. Lim; Maria
Gracia Cielo M. Padaca, no part.
140 Id., at pp. 6170.
141 SPP No. 12073 (PLM).
704

sional districts, and already represented by eight

district congressmen. Furthermore, the group has
failed to show a track record of undertaking programs
that are aimed at promoting the welfare of the group
or any sector that it claims to represent.
The issuance by the COMELEC En Banc of the
foregoing resolutions prompted the filing of the present
petitions, which delve primarily on the following
contentions:
First, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing Resolution No. 9513. The petitioners challenge the
COMELEC En Banc’s authority under the Resolution to
conduct an automatic review of its division’s resolutions
notwithstanding the absence of a motion for
reconsideration. For the petitioners, the COMELEC En
Banc cannot dismiss with the procedural requirement on
the filing of motions for reconsideration under Rule 19 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure before it can
review a decision or resolution rendered by any of its
divisions in quasijudicial proceedings.
As regards the COMELEC’s resolve to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, the continuing compliance
of previouslyregistered and accredited partylist groups,
the COMELEC En Banc denied the parties of their right to
due process and has violated the principle of res judicata

that should have otherwise worked in the petitioners’ favor.
Further, the COMELEC’s exercise of its quasijudicial
powers, which they claim to include the cancellation of
existing registration and accreditation, could not have been
exercised at the first instance by the COMELEC En Banc,
but should have been first decided by a division of the
Commission.
Second, the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
refusing or cancelling the petitioners’ registration and
accreditation under the partylist system. The petitioners
assail the COMELEC En Banc’s appreciation of facts and
application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence, especially
the eightpoint
705
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 705

guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani, in determining their

sectors’, groups’ and nominees’ respective qualifications.
Given the common questions and the similarity in the
issues that are raised in the 53 subject petitions, the Court
has resolved, through its Resolutions of November 13,
2012, November 20, 2012, November 27, 2012, December 4,
2012, December 11, 2012 and February 19, 2013 to
consolidate the petitions, and require the COMELEC to
comment thereon.
With the petitioners’ inclusion in their respective
petitions of prayers for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the
Court also ordered, via the aforementioned resolutions,
the issuance of Status Quo Ante Orders (SQAOs) in all the
petitions.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for
the respondent COMELEC, filed its Consolidated
Comments on the petitions. In refuting the petitioners’
claim of grave abuse of discretion against the COMELEC,
the OSG submitted the following arguments:142
First, the COMELEC has the power to review existing
partylist groups’ or organizations’ compliance with the
requirements provided by law and the guidelines set by

jurisprudence on the partylist system. The OSG cites
Section 2, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution which
enumerates the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
giving emphasis on paragraph 1 thereof that gives the
Commission the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, and
paragraph 5 that cites the Commission’s power to register
political parties, organizations or coalitions.
Second, the COMELEC’s review of the parties’
qualifications was a valid exercise by the COMELEC of its
administrative powers; hence, the COMELEC En Banc
could have, even at the first instance, ruled on it.
_______________
142 Comment dated December 26, 2012, pp. 3536.
706

Third, the requirements of due process were satisfied

because the petitioners were given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC’s resolve to
suspend its own rules was sanctioned by law, as it was
aimed for a speedy disposition of matters before the
Commission. Furthermore, no petitioner had previously
questioned the procedure that was adopted by the
COMELEC on the review of the parties’ registration;
instead, the groups voluntarily submitted to the
Commission’s jurisdiction and actively participated in its
proceedings.
Fourth, the COMELEC faithfully applied the grounds
for denial and cancellation of a group’s registration, as
provided by statute and prevailing jurisprudence. The OSG
specifically cites Sections 5 to 9 of RA 7941 and the eight
point guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
Fifth, the COMELEC’s findings of fact in each
petitioner’s case are supported by substantial evidence;
thus, are final and nonreviewable as provided in Section 5,
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In précis, the fiftythree (53) consolidated petitions

concern two main issues: the procedural issue as to the
COMELEC En Banc’s power to automatically review a
decision of its division without the requisite filing of a
motion for reconsideration, and the substantive issue as to
the COMELEC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in
denying or cancelling the registration and/or accreditation
under the partylist system of the petitioners.
I signify my assent to the ponencia’s rulings on the
procedural issue; however, consistent with aforequoted
pronouncement of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani,143 I
signify my strong dissent on major points in the ponencia’s
resolution of the substantive issue, including its
discussions on the nature of the partylist system and its
disposition on the qualifi
_______________
143 Supra note 1.
707
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 707

cations of political parties which seek to participate under

the partylist system of representation. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the new standards that the ponencia now
provides for partylist groups, the remand of all 53
petitions to the COMELEC is unnecessary.
Procedural Aspect
The Powers and Functions of the COMELEC
Under the present Constitution, the COMELEC is
recognized as the sole authority in the enforcement and
administration of election laws. This grant of power
retraces its history in the 1935 Constitution. From then,
the powers and functions of the COMELEC had
continuously been expounded to respond to the call of
contemporary times. In Mendoza v. Commission on
Elections,144 the Court briefly noted:
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an

administrative agency whose powers have been increased from
the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country’s
awareness of the need to provide greater regulation and

protection to our electoral processes to ensure their integrity. In
the 1935 Constitution, the powers and functions of the
COMELEC were defined as follows:
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise
all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law.
It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all
administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials. All law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by
the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of
insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions,
orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to
review by the Supreme Court. x x x
_______________
144 G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692.
708

These evolved into the following powers and functions under

the 1973 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the
National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote,
administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number and location of polling places,
the appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the
registration of voters.
These powers have been enhanced in scope and details under
the 1987 Constitution, x x x145
Under the 1987 Constitution, the intent to reinforce the

authority of the COMELEC is evident in the grant of
several other powers upon the Commission, specifically

under Section 2, Article IXC thereof which reads:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
_______________
145 Id., at pp. 709710.
709
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 709

3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all

questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission
on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere
to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign

government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.
6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending, including limitation of places
where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent
and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer
or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
710

9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a

comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Essentially, the COMELEC has general and specific

powers. Section 2(1) of Article IXC partakes of the general
grant of the power to the COMELEC to “enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.”
The authority given to the COMELEC under this provision
encapsulates all the other powers granted to it under the
Constitution. The intention in providing this general grant
of power is to give the COMELEC a wide latitude in
dealing with matters under its jurisdiction so as not to
unduly delimit the performance of its functions.
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this constitutional

provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.146 The
rest of the enumeration in the mentioned provision
constitutes the COMELEC’s specific powers.
As to the nature of the power exercised, the COMELEC’s
powers can further be classified into administrative, quasi
legislative, quasijudicial, and, in limited instances,
judicial. The quasijudicial power of the Commission
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising in the
enforcement of election laws and to be the sole judge of all
preproclamation controversies and of all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi
legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and
regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise
such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to
it by Congress. Its administrative
_______________
146 Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 297, 312; 319
SCRA 283, 299 (1999).
711
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 711

function refers to the enforcement and administration of

election laws.147
In Baytan v. COMELEC,148 the Court had the occasion to pass

upon the classification of the powers being exercised by the
COMELEC, thus:
The COMELEC’s administrative powers are found in
Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IXC. The
1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should
exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division.
The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC’s administrative
powers in the “Commission on Elections,” while providing that the
COMELEC “may sit en banc or in two divisions.” Clearly, the
COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its
administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the

COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC’s quasijudicial powers
are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IXC, to wit:
“Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.149 (Emphasis
supplied)
_______________
147 Dissenting Opinion of J. Pardo, AkbayanYouth v. Commission on
Elections, 407 Phil. 618, 669; 355 SCRA 318, 364, citing Digman v.
Commission on Elections, 120 SCRA 650 (1983).
148444 Phil. 812; 396 SCRA 703 (2003).
149 Id., at pp. 824825; pp. 714716, citing Commission on Elections v.
Silva, Jr., 286 SCRA 177 (1998); Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections,
289 SCRA 586 (1998); Commission on Elections vs. Noynay, 292 SCRA 254
(1998); Domalanta vs. Commission on Elections, 334 SCRA 555 (2000).
712

The distinction on the nature of the power being

exercised by the COMELEC is crucial to the procedure
which has to be observed so as to stamp an official action
with validity. In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi
judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC
to hear and decide cases first by division and upon motion
for reconsideration, by the COMELEC En Banc.150 Section
3 of Article IXC states:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in

two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard

and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
On the other hand, matters within the administrative

jurisdiction of the COMELEC may be acted upon directly
by the COMELEC En Banc without having to pass through
any of its divisions.151
The Issuance of Resolution No.
9513 as an Implement of the Power
to Register Political Parties, Or
ganizations and Coalitions
One of the specific powers granted to the COMELEC is
the power to register political parties, organizations and
coalitions articulated in Section 2(5) of Article IXC of the
Constitution, thus:
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,

organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit
_______________
150 Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 460 Phil. 459, 476; 414 SCRA 299,
311 (2003), citing Canicosa v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 189; 282 SCRA
512 (1997).
151 Canicosa v. Commission on Elections, 347 Phil. 189, 201; 282 SCRA 512,
523 (1997).
713
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 713

citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious

denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.
x x x x
The essence of registration cannot be overemphasized.

Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies
it are required because of the Constitution’s concern about

the character of the organizations officially participating in
the elections.152 Specifically, the process of registration
serves to filter the applicants for electoral seats and
segregate the qualified from the ineligible. The purity of
this exercise is crucial to the achievement of orderly,
honest and peaceful elections which the Constitution
envisions.
The power to register political parties, however, is not a
mere clerical exercise. The COMELEC does not simply
register every party, organization or coalition that comes to
its office and manifests its intent to participate in the
elections. Registration entails the possession of
qualifications. The party seeking registration must first
present its qualifications before registration will follow as a
matter of course.
Similar with all the specific powers of the COMELEC,
the power to register political parties, organizations and
coalitions must be understood as an implement by which
its general power to enforce and administer election laws is
being realized. The exercise of this power must thus be
construed in a manner that will aid the COMELEC in
fulfilling its duty of ensuring that the electoral exercise is
held exclusive to those who possess the qualifications set by
the law.
It is pursuant to this duty that the COMELEC found it
imperative to promulgate Resolution No. 9513. The said
Reso
_______________
152 Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections, 620 SCRA 393, 431
(2010).
714

lution seeks to manage the registration of partylist groups,

organizations and coalitions that are aspiring to participate
in the 2013 National and Local Elections, with the objective
of ensuring that only those parties, groups or organizations
with the requisite character consistent with the purpose of
the partylist system are registered and accredited to

participate in the partylist system of representation.
Plainly, the resolution authorized the COMELEC En
Banc to automatically review all pending registration of
partylist groups, organizations and coalitions and to set
for summary evidentiary hearings all those that were
previously registered to determine continuing compliance.
To effectively carry out the purpose of the Resolution, the
COMELEC suspended Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, specifically the requirement for a
motion for reconsideration.
In the implementation of Resolution No. 9513, a number
of applicants for registration as partylist group,
organization or coalition were denied registration by the
COMELEC En Banc, while several others that were
previously registered and/or accredited were stripped of
their status as registered and/or accredited partylist
groups, organizations or coalitions.
Given the circumstances, I agree with the majority that
the action of the COMELEC En Banc was wellwithin its
authority.
The arguments of the petitioners proceed from a feeble
understanding of the nature of the powers being exercised
by the COMELEC in which the procedure to be observed
depends. Indeed, in a quasijudicial proceeding, the
COMELEC En Banc does not have the authority to assume
jurisdiction without the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
presupposes that the case had been heard, passed upon and
disposed by the COMELEC Division before the same is
subjected to review of the COMELEC En Banc.
715
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 715

In Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva,153the Court defined

quasijudicial power, to wit:
Quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the

other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is

to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The administrative body exercises its quasijudicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it. In carrying out their quasijudicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence,
and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper
exercise of quasijudicial power due process must be observed in
the conduct of the proceedings.154
To be clear, the COMELEC exercises quasijudicial

powers in deciding election contests where, in the course of
the exercise of its jurisdiction, it holds hearings and
exercises discretion of a judicial nature; it receives
evidence, ascertains the facts from the parties’
submissions, determines the law and the legal rights of the
parties, and on the basis of all these, decides on the merits
of the case and renders judgment.155
_______________
153 G.R. No. 161115, No
vember 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 332.
154 Id., at pp. 369370.
155 Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188308, October 15,
2009, 603 SCRA 692, 710, citing Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task
Force v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83578, March 16, 1989, 171 SCRA 348;
Midland Insurance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L
71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA 458; Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, on the activities
encompassed by the exercise of quasijudicial power.
716

However, the registration of political parties,

organizations and coalitions stated in Section 2(5) of Article
IXC of the Constitution involves the exercise of
administrative power. The Court has earlier declared in
Baytan that Sections 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) of
Article IXC pertain to the administrative powers of the
COMELEC.156 It reiterated this pronouncement in
Bautista v. COMELEC157 where it further deliberated on
the distinctions between the administrative and quasi
judicial powers of the COMELEC. And recently, in
Magdalo v. COMELEC,158 it made a categorical
pronouncement that the power of the COMELEC to
register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of
groups to participate in the elections is purely
administrative in character.159
Distinguishing the nature of the power being exercised
by the COMELEC is relevant because of the different set of
rules that applies to each. For instance, in Canicosa v.
COMELEC,160 the Court stressed that matters falling
under the administrative jurisdiction of the COMELEC
may be acted upon directly by the COMELEC En Banc. On
the other hand, Section 3, Article IXC of the Constitution
underscores the requirement for a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take
action in quasijudicial proceedings.
The COMELEC’s determination as to whether a party is
a political party entitled to registration is an exercise of its
constitutional power of administering the laws relative to
the conduct of elections.161 The same principle applies in
the registration of partylist groups, organizations and
coalitions. In
_______________
156 Supra note 155, at p. 824.
157 Supra note 157.
158 G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, 673 SCRA 651.
159 Id., citing Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677; 436
SCRA 45 (2004).
160 347 Phil. 189; 282 SCRA 512 (1997).
161 Santos v. Commission on Elections, 191 Phil. 212, 219; 103 SCRA
641 (1981).
717
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 717

the process of registration, the COMELEC determines

whether the applicant possesses all the qualifications
required under the law. There are no contending parties or
actual controversy. It is merely the applicant proving his
qualifications to participate in the elections.
The foregoing ratiocination, however, does not suggest
that the COMELEC En Banc can forthwith act on pending
petitions for registration and subject previouslyregistered
partylist groups, organizations and coalitions to summary
evidentiary hearings to determine continuing compliance
simply because it is administrative in nature. Indeed, it
may do so, but only with respect to the latter group.
I distinguish between (1) new or pending petitions for
registration (referred to as the first group), and; (2)
previously registered and/or accredited partylist groups,
organizations and coalitions (referred to as the second
group).
As regards the first group, the COMELEC En Banc
cannot directly act on new petitions for registration as
there is a specific procedure governing the performance of
this function. It bears noting that pursuant to the authority
vested in the COMELEC to promulgate rules of procedure
in order to expedite the disposition of cases,162 it drafted
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure which will govern
pleadings, practice and procedure before the Commission.
Under Section 32 of the said Rules, the registration of
political parties or organizations is classified under Special
Proceedings, together with annulment of permanent list of
voters and accreditation of citizen’s arms of the
Commission. In relation to this, Section 3 of Rule 3 states:
Section 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions—The

Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide
protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special
cases, provi
_______________
162 Section 3, Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution.
718

sional remedies, contempt, and special proceedings except in

accreditation of citizens’ arm of the Commission. (Emphasis ours)
The same rule applies to the registration of partylist

groups, organizations or coalitions. Thus, petitions for
registration of partylist groups, organizations and
coalitions are first heard by the COMELEC Division before
they are elevated to the En Banc on motion for
reconsideration. It is this requirement for a motion for
reconsideration of the resolutions of the COMELEC
Division granting new petitions for registration that the
COMELEC suspended in Resolution No. 9513. In doing so,
the COMELEC resorted to Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
Section 4. Suspension of the Rules.—In the interest of justice

and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
suspended by the Commission.
Surely, the suspension of the rule will serve the greater

interest of justice and public good since the objective is to
purge the list of registrants of those who are not qualified
to participate in the elections of partylist representatives
in Congress. Ultimately, it will help secure the electoral
seats to the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941 and, at the
same time, guard against flybynight groups and
organizations that are seeking for the opportune time to
snatch a chance. By virtue of the suspension of the
requirement for motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC
En Banc may then automatically review pending petitions
for registration and determine if the qualifications under
the law are truly met. It is a measure that was pursued in
order that the COMELEC may fulfill its duty to ensure the
purity of elections. And, as the rules of procedure are
designed to facilitate the COMELEC’s performance of its
duties, it must never be a stumbling block in achieving the
very purpose of its creation.
With respect to the second group, the COMELEC En
Banc may directly order the conduct of summary
evidentiary hear
719
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 719

ings to determine continuing compliance considering that

there is no specific procedure on this matter. The
petitioners cannot invoke Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure since this provision relates
only to new petitions for registration. Absent a special rule
or procedure, the COMELEC En Banc may directly act or
perform an otherwise administrative function, consistent
with our pronouncement in Canicosa.
The authority of the COMELEC En Banc to subject
previouslyregistered and/or accredited partylist groups,
organizations and coalitions to summary evidentiary
hearing emanates from its general power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election163 and duty to ensure “free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.”164 Part and parcel of this
duty is the maintenance of a list of qualified candidates.
Correlative to this duty of the COMELEC is the duty of the
candidate or, in this case, the registered partylist groups,
organizations or coalitions to maintain their qualifications.
Consistent with the principle that the right to hold
public office is a privilege, it is incumbent upon aspiring
participants in the partylist system of representation to
satisfactorily show that they have the required
qualifications stated in the law and prevailing
jurisprudence. Specifically, a partylist group or
organization applying for registration in the first instance
must present sufficient evidence to establish its
qualifications. It is only upon proof of possession of
qualifications that registration follows.
The process, however, does not end with registration.
Partylist groups and organizations that are previously
allowed registration and/or accreditation are dutybound to
maintain their qualifications.
_______________
163 Section 2(1), Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution.
164 Section 2(3), Article IXC of the 1987 Constitution.
720

In Amores v. House of Representatives Electoral

Tribunal,165 the Court emphasized:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and

must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election
or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged.166
It can be gathered from the foregoing that the fact that a

candidate who was allowed to participate in the elections
and hold office does not give him a vested right to retain
his position notwithstanding loss of qualification. The
elective official must maintain his qualifications lest he
loses the right to the office he is holding.
Further, the fact that a candidate was previously
allowed to run or hold public office does not exempt him
from establishing his qualifications once again in case he
bids for reelection. He must maintain and attest to his
qualifications every time he is minded to join the electoral
race. Thus, he is required to file a certificate of candidacy
even if he is an incumbent elective official or previously a
candidate in the immediately preceding elections.
Similar to individual candidates, registered partylist
groups, organizations and coalitions must also establish
their continuing compliance with the requirements of the
law which are specific to those running under the partylist
system of representation. Registration does not vest them
the perpetual right to participate in the election. The basis
of the right to participate in the elections remains to be the
possession of qualifications. Resolution No. 9513 is a formal
recognition of the COMELEC’s duty to ensure that only
those who
_______________
165 G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 593.
166 Id., citing Frivaldo v. Commision on Elections, G.R. No. 87193,
June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245, 255.
721
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 721

are qualified must be allowed to run as partylist

representative. It cannot be defeated by a claim of previous
registration.
Therefore, it is my view that the COMELEC cannot be
estopped from cancelling existing registration and/or
accreditation in case the concerned partylist group or
organization failed to maintain its qualifications. Being the
authority which permits registration and/or accreditation,
it also has the power to cancel the same in the event that
the basis of the grant no longer exists.
Inapplicability of the Doctrine
of Res Judicata
Similarly, the COMELEC cannot be precluded from
reviewing pending registration and existing registration
and/or accreditation of partylist groups, organizations and
coalitions on the ground of res judicata. It has been
repeatedly cited in a long line of jurisprudence that the
doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi
judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
powers.167
Moreover, the application of the doctrine of res judicata
requires the concurrence of four (4) elements, viz.: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered
after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties during the trial of the case; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.168
_______________
167 Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158, 169; 405 SCRA 264, 272
(2003), citing Dinsay vs. Cioco, 264 SCRA 703 (1996).
168 Baricuatro v. Caballero, G.R. No. 158643, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA
70, 76.
722

Here, the resolutions of the COMELEC Division,

allowing the registration of the applicant partylist groups
and organizations do not partake of a final judgment or
order. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which,
on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is right. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned.169
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot be
considered an adjudication on the merits since they do not
involve a determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the ultimate facts disclosed in the
pleadings or in the issues presented during the trial.170
They are simply recognition by the COMELEC that the
applicant partylist or organization possesses the
qualifications for registration. They do not involve the
settlement of conflicting claims; it is merely an initiatory
procedure for the conduct of elections. On the other hand,
previous registration and/or accreditation only attests to
the fact that the concerned partylist group, organization or
coalition satisfactorily proved its qualifications to run as
partylist representative in the immediately preceding
elections. It does not, however, create a vested right in
favor of the registered partylist group, organization or
coalition to participate in the succeeding elections.
The resolutions of the COMELEC Division cannot also
become final as to exempt the partylist group or
organization from proving his qualifications in the
succeeding elections. As in individual candidate, a party
list group, organization or
_______________
169 Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15,
2010, 634 SCRA 635, 648, citing Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75000, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 280.
170 Supra note 175.
723
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 723

coalition desiring to participate in the elections must

possess the required qualifications every time it manifests
its intent to participate in the elections. It must prove and
attest to its possession of the required qualifications every
time it bids for election.
The inapplicability of the doctrine of res judicata is even
made more apparent by the fact that the group,
organization or coalition which was denied registration
may still apply for registration in succeeding elections and
even be allowed registration provided that the
qualifications are met. The same holds true with previously
registered and/or accredited partylist group, organization
or coalition which was stripped of its registration and/or
accreditation.
Procedural due process was
properly observed.
There is even no merit in the petitioners’ claim that
their right to procedural due process was violated by the
COMELEC’s automatic review and conduct of summary
evidentiary hearings under Resolution No. 9513.
As regards the first group, I have explained why I deem
the COMELEC’s suspension of its own rules on motions for
reconsideration justified, given its duty to ensure that votes
cast by the electorate in the partylist elections will only
count for qualified partylist groups, in the end that the
system’s ideals will be realized.
Equally important, the settled rule in administrative
proceedings is that a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain one’s side satisfies the requirements of due process.
Its essence is embodied in the basic requirements of notice
and the real opportunity to be heard.171
_______________
171 See Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, 619 SCRA 585.
724

Consistent with the foregoing, Section 6 of RA 7941 only

commands the minimum requirements of due notice and
hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the refusal
and/or cancellation of a party, organization or coalition’s
registration under the partylist system. It reads:

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The

COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The petitioners then cannot validly claim that they were

denied of their right to procedural process. We shall not
disregard the proceedings that ensued before the
COMELEC’s divisions, before whom the groups were given
due notice and the ample opportunity to present and
substantiate their plea for registration. The COMELEC En
Banc’s resolution to later review the resolutions of its
divisions did not render insignificant such due process
already accorded to the groups, especially as we consider
that the En Banc decided on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the groups before the divisions, only that it
arrived at factual findings and conclusions that differed
from those of the latter.
The second group’s right to procedural process was also
unimpaired, notwithstanding the COMELEC’s conduct of
the summary evidentiary hearings for the purpose of
determining the parties’ continuing compliance with rules
on partylist groups. The notice requirement was satisfied
by the COMELEC through its issuance of the Order dated
August 2, 2012,172 which notified the partylist groups of
the Commission’s resolve to conduct summary evidentiary
hearings, the dates thereof, and the purpose for which the
hearings shall be conducted. The specific matters that are
expected from them
_______________
172 Rollo (G.R. No. 204323), pp. 1619.
725
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 725

by the Commission are also identified in the Order, as it

provides:
To simplify the proceedings[,] the partylist groups or

organizations thru counsel/s shall submit the following:
1. The names of witness/es who shall be the Chairperson,
President or Secretary General of the partylist groups,
organization or coalition;
2. Judicial Affidavit/s of the witness/es to be submitted at
prior to the scheduled hearing; and
3. Other documents to prove their continuing
compliance with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941
and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case.173
(Emphasis supplied)
There is then no merit in most petitioners’ claim that

they were not informed of the grounds for which their
existing registration and/or accreditation shall be tested,
considering that the parameters by which the parties’
qualifications were to be assessed by the COMELEC were
explained in the Order.
That the parties were duly notified is further supported
by their actual participation in the scheduled hearings and
their submission of evidence they deemed sufficient which,
in turn, satisfied the requirement on the opportunity to be
heard.
Substantive Aspect
The common contention raised in the consolidated
petitions is that the COMELEC erred in assessing their
qualifications which eventually led to the denial of their
petitions for registration and cancellation of their
registration and/or accreditation.
A deliberation on the purpose and contemplation of the
relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence is imperative.
_______________
173 Id., at p. 19.
726

The PartyList System of

Representation
Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my staunch
position that the partylist system, being a complement of
the social justice provisions in the Constitution, is
primarily intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; the ideals of social justice permeates
every provision in the Constitution, including Section 5(2),
Article VI on the partylist system.
The partylist system is a social justice tool designed not
only to give more law to the great masses of our people who
have less in life, but also to enable them to become
veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate
directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit
them.174 It is not simply a mechanism for electoral
reform. To simply regard it as a mere procedure for
reforming the already working and existing electoral
system is a superficial reading of RA 7941 and the
Constitution, from which the law breathed life. The idea is
that by promoting the advancement of the underprivileged
and allowing them an opportunity to grow, they can rise to
become partners of the State in pursuing greater causes.
The ideals of social justice cannot be more emphatically
underscored in the 1987 Constitution. The strong desire to
incorporate and utilize social justice as one of the pillars of
the present Constitution was brought forth by the intent to
perpetually safeguard democracy against social injustices,
desecration of human rights and disrespect of the laws
which characterized the dark pages of our history. It is
reminiscent of the unified and selfless movement of the
people in EDSA who, minuscule in power and resources,
braved the streets and reclaimed their freedom from the
leash of dictatorship.
_______________
174 Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,

supra note 1.
727
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 727

The gallantry and patriotism of the masses and their

nonnegotiable demand to reclaim democracy are the
inspirations in the drafting of our Constitution.
The ambition of the framers of the Constitution for a
state which recognizes social justice at the forefront of its
policies brought them to propose a separate article on social
justice and human rights. Initially, the proposed provision
defined social justice as follows:
SOCIAL JUSTICE
SECTION 1. Social Justice, as a social, economic,
political, moral imperative, shall be the primary
consideration of the State in the pursuit of national
development. To this end, Congress shall give the highest
priority to the formulation and implementation of
measures designed to reduce economic and political
inequalities found among citizens, and to promote the
material structural conditions which promote and enhance
human dignity, protect the inalienable rights of persons and
sectors to health, welfare and security, and put the material
wealth and power of the community at the disposal of the common
good.
SECTION 2. Towards these ends, the State shall regulate
the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its
fruits, promote the establishment of selfreliant, sociopolitical
and economic structures determined by the people themselves,
protect labor, rationalize the use and disposition of land, and
ensure the satisfaction of the basic material needs of all.175
(Emphasis supplied)
In her sponsorship speech, Commissioner Nieva delved

into the primacy of the promotion of social justice in the
ideals that the Constitution will carry. She explained:
Our Committee hopes that social justice will be the centerpiece

of the 1986 Constitution. The rationale for this is that social
justice provides the material and social infrastructure for the

realization of basic human rights the enhancement of human
dignity and effective
_______________
175 Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
728

participation in democratic processes. Rights, dignity and

participation remain illusory without social justice.
Our February 1986 Revolution was not merely against the
dictatorship nor was it merely a fight for the restoration of human
rights; rather, this popular revolution was also a clamor for a
more equitable share of the nation’s resources and power, a
clamor which reverberated in the many public hearings which the
Constitutional Commission conducted throughout the country.
If our 1986 Constitution would enshrine the people’s
aspirations as dramatically expressed in the revolution and
ensure the stability, peace and progress of our nation, it must
provide for social justice in a stronger and more comprehensive
manner than did the previous Constitutions.
x x x x
In Sections 1 and 2, the provisions mandate the State to give
social justice the highest priority to promote equality in the social,
economic and political life of the nation through the redistribution
of our resources, wealth and power for the greater good.176
Further in the deliberations, Commissioner Bennagen

remarked on the aspects of social justice, viz.:
MR. BENNAGEN: x x x x

We did not fail to incorporate aspects of attitudinal change, as
well as structural change, and these are fairly evident in the first
two sections. As indicated in Section 1, we did emphasize
that social justice should be a social, economic, political
and moral imperative. The moral component is important
because we feel that a justice provision should be on the
side of the poor, the disadvantaged, the socalled deprived
and the oppressed. This is a point that has been raised a
number of times especially by social scientists. Specifically, I
would like to mention Dr. Mahar Mangahas who, in his

extensive studies on social justice, feels that the State
itself has been a major source of injustice and that,
therefore, the State should be able to correct that and
must assume a moral stance in rela
_______________
176 Record of the Constitutional Commission No. 46, August 2, 1986.
729
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 729

tion to the poor, the deprived and the oppressed, a moral

stance that we feel should also permeate the bureaucracy,
the technocracy and eventually, with the changes in
structures, also the whole of our Philippine society.177
(Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the ends discussed by the framers of the

Constitution, they came up with Article XIII which
specifically deals with Social Justice and Human Rights.
Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution carries the
positive command to the Congress to uphold social justice.
It reads:
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the

enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
x x x x
One of the modes by which the Constitution seeks to

achieve social justice is through the introduction of the
partylist system. Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI thereof
provide:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be

elected through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
selection or election
_______________
177 Ibid.
730

from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural

communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that the provisions on partylist system of

representation are not selfexecuting, the Congress enacted
RA 7941. The said law defined the parameters of the party
list system, the procedural guidelines and the
qualifications of those intending to participate in the
exercise. In enacting RA 7941, the legislature did not mean
to depart from the impetus which impelled the members of
the Constitutional Commission to provide for this scheme
of representation—social justice. The underlying principle
remains to be the reduction of political inequality by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power. Certainly,
there could be no other intended beneficiaries for this
provision than the powerless and underprivileged. It could
not have been intended for those who already have the
power and resources who may be lesser in number but are
in command of the machinery of the government.
As so fervently declared in the case of Ang Bagong
Bayani, the partylist system of is a social justice
mechanism, designed to distribute political power. In the
said case, the Court held:
The partylist system is a social justice tool designed not only to

give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in
life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive
recipients of the State’s benevolence, but active participants in
the mainstream of representative democracy.178
The objective to hold the partylist system for the

benefit of the marginalized and underrepresented is
expressed in clear language of Section 2 of RA 7941. It
reads:
_______________
178 Supra note 1 at p. 322.
731
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 731

Section 2. Declaration of policy.—The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a partylist system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and
shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Emphasis ours)
A reading of Section 2 shows that the participation of

registered national, regional and sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions in the partylist elections are
qualified by three (3) limiting characteristics: (1) they must
consist of Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized

and underrepresented sectors, organizations or coalitions;
(2) who lack welldefined political constituencies, (3) but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
whole. The term “marginalized and
underrepresented” effectively limits the partylist
system to sectors which directly need support and
representation. The law could not have deemed to benefit
even those who are already represented in the House of
Representatives lest it results to a wider gap between the
powerful and the underprivileged. In empowering the
powerless, the law must necessarily tilt its partiality in
favor of the marginalized and underrepresented if genuine
social justice must be achieved.
The favor of the law towards the marginalized and
underrepresented, which was first articulated by former
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Ang Bagong Bayani,
was later
732

affirmed and reiterated by no less than another former

Chief Justice of this Court, Reynato S. Puno, in his erudite
separate opinion in BANAT v. COMELEC.179 He forcefully
articulated:
History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless

masses to find their voice, even as they are relegated to the
sidelines as genuine functional representation systemically
evades them. It is by reason of this underlying premise that
the partylist system was espoused and embedded in the
Constitution, and it is within this context that I register my
dissent to the entry of major political parties to the partylist
system.
x x x x
x x x With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We
stand on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution
to give utmost deference to the democratic sympathies,
ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are

expressed in the text of the Constitution which the people
ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people
that matters in interpreting the Constitution. x x x
x x x x
Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the
Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its every
section and clause. We should strive to make every word of the
fundamental law operative and avoid rendering some words idle
and nugatory. The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5
with related constitutional provisions will better reveal
the intent of the people as regards the partylist system.
Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory Provisions, the President
was permitted to fill by appointment the seats reserved for
sectoral representation under the partylist system from a list of
nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result
of historical precedents that saw how the elected Members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular Batasang Pambansa
tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of
sectoral representatives on the ground that they could not rise to
the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by the people.
To avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the
_______________
179 586 SCRA 210 (2009).
733
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 733

President was given all the leeway to “break new ground and
precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the
sectoral representatives will take roots and be part and parcel
exactly of the process of drafting the law which will stipulate and
provide for the concept of sectoral representation.” Similarly,
limiting the partylist system to the marginalized and
excluding the major political parties from participating in
the election of their representatives is aligned with the
constitutional mandate to “reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good”; the right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decisionmaking; the right of women to

opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation; the right of
labor to participate in policy and decisionmaking processes
affecting their rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional
advancement; the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
the consideration of their cultures, traditions and institutions in
the formulation of national plans and policies, and the
indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.
x x x x
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and
underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the
1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the
partylist system that the Constitution sought to address
this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people
recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral
groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who
have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political
institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in
the partylist system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the
voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray
the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve
as the graveyard of the partylist system.
The intent of the Constitution to keep the partylist

system exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is then crystal clear. To hold otherwise is to
frustrate the
734

spirit of the law and the sacred intention to hold

inviolable the safeguards of social justice embedded
in the Constitution.
In the same line, RA 7941 must not be interpreted as
merely a mode for electoral reform. It could not have
been that too simplistic. Far from being merely an
electoral reform, the partylist system is one concrete
expression of the primacy of social justice in the
Constitution. It is well to remember that RA 7941 was only

implementing the specific mandate of the Constitution in
Section 5, Article VI. It should not be disengaged from the
purpose of its enactment. The purpose of the mentioned
provision was not simply to reform the electoral system but
to initiate the equitable distribution of political power. It
aims to empower the larger portion of the populace who
sulk in poverty and injustice by giving them a chance to
participate in legislation and advance their causes.
The parameters under RA 7941 were also further
elaborated by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani, which
outlined the eightpoint guidelines for screening partylist
participants. Succinctly, the guidelines pertain to the
qualifications of the (1) sector, (2) partylist group,
organization or coalition, and (3) nominee. These key
considerations determine the eligibility of the partylist
group, organization or coalition to participate in the party
list system of representation. Thus, for purposes of
registration and continuing compliance, three (3) basic
questions must be addressed:
(1) Is the sector sought to be represented marginalized
and underrepresented?
(2) Is the party, organization or coalition qualified to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
sector?
(3) Are the nominees qualified to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented party,
organization or coalition?
735
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 735

In seriatim, I shall expound on what I deem should be

the key considerations for qualifying as a partylist group,
organization or coalition.
The sector must be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Section 2 of RA 7941 underscored the policy of the State
in enacting the law. Tersely, the state aims to promote
proportional representation by means of a Filipinostyle
partylist system, which will enable the election to the

House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1) who belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2) who lack welldefined constituencies; but
3) who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole.180
RA 7941 gives emphasis on the requirement that the
party, organization or coalition must represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. A marginalized
and underrepresented sector is a group of individuals who,
by reason of status or condition, are drawn towards the
bottom of the social strata. Remote from the core of
institutional power, their necessities are often neglected
and relegated to the least of the government’s priorities.
They endure inadequacies in provisions and social services
and are oftentimes victims of economic, social and political
inequalities.
Section 5 of RA 7941 enumerates the sectors that are
subsumed under the term “marginalized and
underrepresented” and may register as a partylist group,
organization or coalition. It states:
_______________
180 Id., at p. 333; p. 261.
736

SEC. 5. Registration.—Any organized group of persons may

register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
partylist system by filing with the COMELEC not later than
ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
partylist system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations,
attaching thereto its constitution, bylaws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided,
That the sectors shall include labor peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,

handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals. (Emphasis ours)
Based on the provision, there are at least twelve (12)

sectors that are considered marginalized and
underrepresented: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. The enumeration is, however, not exclusive.
During the drafting of our Constitution, the members of the
Commission expressed reluctance to provide an
enumeration of the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors because of their apprehension that the longer the
enumeration, the more limiting the law becomes.181 Instead
of an enumeration, then Commissioner Jaime Tadeo
suggested the criteria by which the determination of which
sectors are marginalized can be based, viz.:
1. The number of people belonging to the sector;
2. The extent of marginalization, exploitation and
deprivation of social and economic rights suffered by
the sector;
3. The absence of representation in the government,
particularly in the legislature, through the years;
_______________
181 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 22,
1986, RCC No. 36, p. 85.
737
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 737

4. The sector’s decisive role in production and in

bringing about the basic social services needed by the
people.182
The Constitutional Commission saw it fit to provide a
set of standards which will approximate the sectors that
the Constitution regards as marginalized and
underrepresented and evaded a definite enumeration. The
reason is that a specific enumeration is antithetical to the
purpose of the partylist system. The partylist system of
representation endeavors to empower the underprivileged

sectors, tap their innate potentials and hone them to
become productive and selfsustaining segments of the
society. Sooner, they are expected to graduate from their
status as marginalized and underrepresented. During the
process, some formerly selfsufficient sectors may drift to
the bottom and regress to become the new marginalized
sectors. The resilience in the enumeration of the sectors
accommodates this eventuality.
Qualifications of the PartyList Group,
Organization or Coalition
Among the eight (8) points mentioned in the guidelines
for screening partylist participants in Ang Bagong Bayani,
five (5) pertain to the qualifications of the partylist group,
organization or coalition. The first point in the
enumeration reads:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must

represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show—
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history,
platform of government and track record—that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily,
majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepre
_______________
182 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, July 25, 1986, RCC
No. 39, p. 255.
738

sented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it

has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.183
Certainly, it takes more than a mere claim or desire to

represent the marginalized and underrepresented to
qualify as a partylist group. There must be proof, credible
and convincing, to demonstrate the group’s advocacy to
alleviate the condition of the sector.
The rigid requirement for the presentation of evidence

showing the party’s relation to the causes of the sector goes
to the uniqueness of the partylist system of
representation. In the partylist system of representation,
the candidates are parties, organizations and coalitions and
not individuals. And while an individual candidate seeks to
represent a district or particular constituency, a partylist
group vying for seats in the House of Representatives must
aim to represent a sector. It is thus important to ascertain
that the partylist group, organization or coalition reflects
the ideals of the sector in its constitution and bylaws. It
must have an outline of concrete measures it wishes to
undertake in its platform of government. Moreover, its
track record must speak of its firm advocacy towards
uplifting the marginalized and underrepresented by
undertaking activities or projects directly addressing the
concerns of the sector.
It is likewise imperative for the partylist group to show
that it effectively represents the marginalized and
underrepresented. While a partylist group is allowed to
represent various sectors, it must prove, however, that it is
able to address the multifarious interests and concerns of
all the sectors it represents. That a multisectoral partylist
group undertakes projects and activities that only address
the interests of some of the sectors, neglecting the concerns
of the other marginalized and underrepresented sectors it
supposedly represents, is nugatory to the objective of giving
a meaningful and
_______________
supra note 1 at p. 342; p. 727.
739
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 739

effective representation to the marginalized and

underrepresented.
Equally important is that the majority of the
membership of the partylist group, organization or
coalition belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector. This means that a majority of the members of the

sector must actually possess the attribute which makes the
sector marginalized. This is so because the primary reason
why partylist groups are even allowed to participate in the
elections of the members of the House of Representatives,
who are normally elected by district, is to give a collective
voice to the members of the sectors who are oftentimes
unheard or neglected. This intention is put to naught if at
least the majority of the members of the partylist do not
belong to the same class or sector. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the partylist applicant to present all the evidence
necessary to establish this fact. Without a convincing proof
of legitimate membership of a majority of the marginalized,
the COMELEC has no reason to believe otherwise and may
thus deny a petition for registration or cancel an existing
registration.
The second guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani
underscores the policy of the state to hold the partylist
system of representation exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented, a distinguishing feature which sets our
system apart from systems of partylist representation in
other jurisdictions. The guideline states:

underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives.” x x x184
_______________
184 Ibid.
740

The second guideline was an offshoot of the declaration

of policy in RA 7941. Specifically, Section 2 of the statute
emphasized the state’s policy of promoting proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a partylist system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or

organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x
to become members of the House of Representatives. As it
is exclusively for the marginalized and underrepresented,
it is an inflexible requirement that the group applying for
registration must represent a sector. The rationale behind
this qualification was highlighted in Ang Bagong Bayani,
thus:
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and

underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party
list system was enacted—to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply
to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the partylist system truly
empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the
past—the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those
in the underground movement—to come out and participate, as
indeed many of them came out and participated during the last
elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by
disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.185
RA 7941 also provides that a party desiring to register

and participate in the partylist elections must represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. While the law
did not restrict the sectors that may be subsumed under
the term “marginalized and underrepresented”, it must be
construed in relation to the sectors enumerated in RA
7941, the enabling
_______________
185 Id., at pp. 336337; p. 722.
741
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 741

law of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. Based on
the foregoing, a mere association of individuals
espousing shared “beliefs” and “advocacies” cannot
qualify as a marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
The term “marginalized and underrepresented” is
descriptive of the sector that may join the partylist
elections. A sector pertains to a “sociological, economic or
political subdivision of the society”186 which consists of
individuals identified by the activity, status or condition, or
attribute that specifically pertains to them. It is identified
by a common characteristic pertaining to the individuals
composing the same.
On the other hand, an association of individuals
espousing a common belief or advocacy is aptly called a
group, not a sector. Specifically, advocacy groups consist of
individuals engaged in the “act of pleading for, supporting,
or recommending active espousal”187 of a cause. Contrary to
a sector which is identified by a common characteristic of
the members, advocacy groups are identified by the causes
that they promote. The members coalesced to pursue
causes or fulfil patriotic ends that do not specifically
pertain to them, but even to those who are not part of their
circle.
Certainly, it takes far more than beliefs and advocacies
before a group of individuals can constitute a sector. There
are underlying sociological and economic considerations in
the enumeration of the sectors in the Constitution and RA
7941. These considerations must be strictly observed lest
we deviate from the objectives of RA 7941 of providing a
meaningful and effective representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented. To relegate the
contemplation of the law of what is a
_______________
186 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986),
p. 2053.
187 Words and Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 2A, p. 294.
742

“marginalized and underrepresented sector” to a mere

association of individuals espousing a shared belief or
advocacy, is to disregard the essence of the partylist
system of representation and the intent of the law to hold
the system exclusive for the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, political parties
may apply for registration and/or accreditation as a party
list provided that they are organized along sectoral lines.188
This pronouncement in Ang Bagong Bayani was expounded
in BANAT by referring to the exchange between the
members of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we

suggested or proposed the partylist system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the partylist system.
x x x.
x x x
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198
seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we
going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the partylist
concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these
parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise,
they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we
are allocating under the partylist system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can
field district candidates and can also participate in the partylist
system?
_______________
188 Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Volume 2, 7251986, RCC

No. 39, p. 257.
743
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 743

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the

partylist system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the partylist system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under
BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the
partylist system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang
linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the partylist
election if they can prove that they are also organized
along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all
political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base
of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang
UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the partylist at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang partylist system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors.
Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run
there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the partylist system?
744

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral

candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the partylist system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he
shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa
sectoral lines.189 (Emphasis supplied)
In his erudite separate opinion in BANAT, former Chief

Justice Reynato S. Puno expressed his approval of keeping
the partylist system of representation exclusive to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To further
safeguard the sanctity of the purpose of the law, he
conveyed his vehement objection to the participation of
major political parties in the partylist system of
representation because of the likelihood that they will
easily trump the organizations of the marginalized. He
opined:
Similarly, limiting the partylist system to the marginalized

and excluding the major political parties from participating in the
election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional
mandate to “reduce social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good”; the right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation
at all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking; the
right of women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare
and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the
nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision
making processes affecting their rights and benefits in keeping
with its role as a primary social economic force; the right of
teachers to professional advancement; the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures,
traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans
and policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the
national economy.
_______________
189 Id., at pp. 247248.
745
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 745

x x x x
There is no gainsaying the fact that the partylist parties are
no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena.
This is borne out in the partylist elections held in 2001 where
major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be
voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution
of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major
political parties made it to the top 50.190 (Citations omitted)
By a vote of 87, the Court decided in BANAT to revert

to its ruling in the 2000 case Veterans Federation Party v.
Comelec191 that major political parties are barred from
participating in the partylist elections, directly or
indirectly.
Consistent with our pronouncement in BANAT, I
maintain that major political parties have advantages over
minority political parties and sectoral parties in the party
list elections. By their broad constituency and full
resources, it is easier for these major political parties to
obtain the required percentage of votes for partylist seats,
a circumstance which, in turn, only weakens the minority
parties’ chance to be elected.
I, however, agree with the view of the majority that it is
unjustified to absolutely disqualify from the partylist
system the major political parties solely by reason of their
classification as such. Nonetheless, the privilege to be
accorded to them shall not be without reasonable
restrictions. Political parties shall only be allowed to
participate in the partylist system if they do not field
candidates in the election of legislative district
representatives. The justification therefor is reasonable.
The partylist system was adopted by the state purposely to
enable parties which, by their limited resources and
citizens
_______________
190 Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Puno, BANAT v. Comelec,
supra note 186 at pp. 258259.
191 396 Phil. 419; 342 SCRA 244 (2000).
746

base per district, find difficulty in placing representatives

in Congress. Major political parties that field candidates for
district representatives can do so with ease, given that they
satisfy the standards set by Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, for their classification,
to wit: (a) the established record of the said parties,
coalition of groups that now compose them, taking into
account, among other things, their showing in past
elections; (b) the number of incumbent elective officials
belonging to them ninety (90) days before the election; (c)
their identifiable political organizations and strengths as
evidenced by their organized chapters; (d) the ability to fill
a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to
the position of the President; and (e) other analogous
circumstances that may determine their relative
organizations and strengths. As the Court explained in Ang
Bagong Bayani:
(T)he purpose of the partylist provision is to open up the system,

in order to enhance chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the
simplest scheme possible. Logic shows that the system has been
opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it – those
who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore
need the “simplest scheme possible” to do so. Conversely, it would
be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within
it – those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open partylist system may be more vividly
understood when compared to a student dormitory “open house,”
which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities.
Obviously, the “open house” is for the benefit of outsiders only, not
the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party
list system is only for the “outsiders” who cannot get elected
through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non
marginalized or overrepresented who already fill the ranks of
Congress.192
_______________
192 Supra note 1 at pp. 337338; pp. 722723.
747
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 747

The contemplated limitation against the major political

parties who wish to participate may then allay the fear
contemplated by the justification given in BANAT for the
disqualification.
Nonetheless, a guiding principle remains the same: the
partylist system must be held exclusive for the
marginalized and underrepresented. Regardless of the
structure or organization of the group, it is imperative that
it represents a marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Thus, it is my submission that political parties which seek
to participate in the partylist system must observe two
rules: (1) they must be organized along sectoral lines;
and (2) they must not field in candidates for district
representatives.
The importance of the requirement for representation of
marginalized and underrepresented sector cannot be
overemphasized. The very essence of the partylist system
of representation is to give representation to the voiceless
sectors of the society. It is the characteristic which
distinguishes partylist representatives from the regular
district representatives in Congress.
That a partylist group must represent a
marginalized and underrepresented sector is the
only hurdle which keeps all other organizations
from joining the partylist elections. If this lone filter
we have against flybynight organizations will be junked,
then the COMELEC will be flocked with petitions for
registration from organizations created to pursue selfish
ends and not to the benefit of the voiceless and neglected

sectors of the society.
The move to open the partylist system freeforall
will create a dangerous precedent as it will open the
doors even to illegitimate organizations.
Organizations aspiring to join the partylist election can
simply skirt the law and organize themselves as a political
party to take advantage of the more lenient entrance. The
organization need only to register as a political party to
dispense with the stringent requirement of representing a
sector. It will automatically be
748

off the hook from the danger of being disqualified on the

ground that it is not representing a marginalized and
underrepresented sector. Other organizations, even those
organized as sectoral parties, may follow through and may
even disrobe themselves as sectoral parties and opt to
become political parties instead because it is the easier way
to be allowed participation in the partylist elections. Thus,
once again, the causes of the marginalized and
underrepresented are lagged behind.
The second requirement for political parties is that they
must not field in candidates for district representatives.
The reason is that the partylist system is solely for the
marginalized and underrepresented. Certainly, political
parties which are able to field in candidates for the regular
seats in the House of Representatives cannot be classified
as such.
The third guideline in Ang Bagong Bayani expresses the
proscription against the registration of religious groups as
partylist groups. The idea is that the government acts for
secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects.193 Despite the prohibition, members of a religious
group may be nominated as representative of a
marginalized and underrepresented sector. The prohibition
is directed only against religious sectors registering as a
political party194 because the government cannot have a
partner in legislation who may be driven by the dictates of

faith which may not be capable of rational evaluation.
The fourth and fifth guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani
pertain to disqualifying circumstances which can justify
the denial of the petition for registration of party,
organization or coalition, thus:
_______________
193 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32, 59.
supra note 1 at p. 343; p. 729.
749
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 749

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified

under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
“(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the partylist system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.”
x x x x
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a
project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the partylist system, the party

or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens
and operated by citizens. x x x195
To be eligible for registration, the party, organization or

coalition must prove that it possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications stated in the law. The
grounds for disqualification stated in Section 6 of RA 7941
pertain to acts, status or conditions which render the
applicant group an unsuitable partner of the state in
alleviating the conditions of the marginalized and
underrepresented. These disqualifying circumstances are
drawn to further im
_______________
195 Id., at pp. 343344; pp. 729730.
750

plement the state policy of preserving the partylist system

exclusively for the intended beneficiaries of RA 7941.
On the other hand, the disqualification mentioned in the
fifth guideline connotes that the partylist group must
maintain its independence from the government so that it
may be able to pursue its causes without undue
interference or any other extraneous considerations. Verily,
the group is expected to organize and operate on its own. It
must derive its life from its own resources and must not
owe any part of its creation to the government or any of its
instrumentalities. By maintaining its independence, the
group creates a shield that no influence or semblance of
influence can penetrate and obstruct the group from
achieving its purposes. In the end, the partylist group is
able to effectively represent the causes of the marginalized
and underrepresented, particularly in the formulation of
legislation intended for the benefit of the sectors.
Qualifications of the Nominees
The sixth, seventh and eighth guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani bear on the qualifications of the nominees, viz.:
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements
of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of PartyList Nominees.—No
person shall be nominated as partylist representative
unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who
751
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 751

attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be

allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.”
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens “who belong to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.” Surely,
the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an
industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to
give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a welldefined
political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. x x x196
Except for a few, the basic qualifications of the nominee

are practically the same as those required of individual
candidates for election to the House of Representatives. He
must be: (a) a naturalborn citizen; (b) a registered voter;

(c) a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
(d) able to read and write; (e) bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days before the day of election; (f) at least
twenty five (25) years of age on the day of election; (g) in
case of a nominee for the youth sector, he must at least be
on the day of election. Owing to the peculiarity of the party
list system of representation, it is not required that the
nominee be a resident or a registered voter of a particular
district since it is the partylist group that is voted for and
not the appointed nominees. He must, however, be a bona
fide member of the partylist group at least ninety (90)
days before the elections.
_______________
196 Id., at p. 345; pp. 730731.
752

The nominee must be a bona fide

member of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector
In some of the petitions, the COMELEC denied
registration to the party, organization or coalition on the
ground that the nominee does not belong to the sector he
wishes to represent. The quandary stems from the
interpretation of who are considered as one “belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented.” The COMELEC
supposed that before a person may be considered as one
“belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector,” he must actually share with the rest of the
membership that common characteristic or attribute which
makes the sector marginalized and underrepresented.
The construction seemed logical but to be consistent
with the letter of the law, it must be harmonized with
Section 9 of RA 7941, the specific provision dealing with
the qualifications of the nominee. In the mentioned
provision, aside from the qualifications similarly required

of candidates seeking to represent their respective districts,
the nominee is required to be a bona fide member of the
party, a status he acquires when he enters into the
membership of the organization for at least ninety (90)
days before the election. From the point in time when the
person acquires the status of being a bona fide member, he
becomes one “belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector.”
It is my view that the foregoing interpretation
accommodates two (2) types of nominees:
1. One who actually shares the attribute or
characteristic which makes the sector marginalized or
underrepresented (the first type);
2. An advocate or one who is genuinely and actively
promoting the causes of the sector he wishes to
represent (the second type).
753
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 753

The first type of nominee is one who shares a common

physical attribute or status with the rest of the
membership. That he possesses this common characteristic
of marginalization is what entitles him to nomination as
representative of the group. This is because of the
reasonable presumption that those who have experienced
the inadequacies in the sector are the ones who can truly
represent the same. However, there are instances when
this strict construction becomes impracticable, if not
altogether impossible. For instance, a representation from
the organization of skilled workers working abroad is
difficult to comply with without the nominee being
excluded from the literal definition of who belongs to the
sector. The strict interpretation also discourages growth, as
in the nominee from the urban sector, since the moment he
rises from his status as such, he becomes disqualified to
represent the party.
The second type of nominee addresses the gap. An
advocate or one who is publicly known to be pursuing the
causes of the sector is equally capable of fulfilling the
objective of providing a genuine and effective

representation for the marginalized and underrepresented.
He is one who, notwithstanding social status, has always
shown genuine concern for those who have less in life.
Unlike the first type of nominee who shares a common
characteristic with the members of the group, the advocate
shares with them a common aspiration and leads them
towards achieving that end. He serves as a catalyst that
stirs movement so that the members of the sector may be
encouraged to pursue their welfare. And though not bound
with the group by something physical, he is one with them
in spirit and heart. He is known for his genuine
commitment and selfless dedication to the causes of the
sector and his track record boldly speaks of his advocacy.
At the outset, it may seem that the foregoing
ratiocination translates to a more lenient entry for those
aspiring to become a nominee. However, the standard of
scrutiny should not change and nominees shall still be
subject to the evaluation by the COMELEC of their
qualifications. They bear the bur
754

den of proof to establish by concrete and credible evidence

that they are truly representative of the causes of the
sector. They must present proof of the history of their
advocacy and the activities they undertook for the
promotion of the welfare of the sector. They must be able to
demonstrate, through their track record, their vigorous
involvement to the causes of the sector.
The law puts a heavy burden on the nominee to prove
his advocacy through his track record. To be clear, the
track record is not a mere recital of his visions for the
organization and the trivial activities he conducted under
the guise of promoting the causes of the sector. He must
actually and actively be espousing the interests of the
sector by undertaking activities directly addressing its
concerns.
In Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC,197 the Court enumerated the
list of evidence which the partylist group and its nominees
may present to establish their qualifications, to wit:
The partylist group and the nominees must submit

documentary evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A.
7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the partylist group/organization
showing active participation of the nominee/s in the
undertakings of the partylist group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the
advocacies of the partylist group/organizations (prior
declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/s showing
his/her adherence to the advocacies of the partylist
group/organizations);
_______________
197 G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 538.
755
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 755

c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide

member of the partylist group/organization for at least
ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a partylist group/organization seeking
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented
sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of
the partylist/organization but is/are also a bona fide
member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented
sector.198
Regardless of whether the nominee falls under the first

or second type, proof of his track record is required. The
requirement is even more stringent for the second type of
nominee as he must convincingly show, through past
activities and undertakings, his sincere regard for the
causes of the sector. The history of his advocacy and the

reputation he earned for the same will be considered in the
determination of his qualification.
Admittedly, the foregoing clarification partakes of a new
guideline which the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration when it conducted automatic review of the
petitions for registration and summary evidentiary
hearings pursuant to Resolution No. 9513.
Disqualification of the nominee
and its effects
In a number of resolutions, the COMELEC disqualified
some partylist groups on the ground that one or some of its
nominees are disqualified. Apparently, the COMELEC is of
the impression that the group, upon filing their petition for
registration, must submit names of at least five (5)
nominees who must all be qualified. In the instances when
some of the nominees were found to be suffering from any
disqualification, the COMELEC deemed the party to have
committed a
_______________
198 Ibid.
756

violation of election laws, rules and regulations and denied

its petition for registration.
I agree with the majority that the construction made by
the COMELEC is misplaced.
It is the COMELEC’s supposition that when the party
list group included a disqualified nominee in the list of
names submitted to the COMELEC, it is deemed to have
committed the violation stated in Section 6 (5)199 of RA
7941. This feeble deduction, however, is not within the
contemplation of the law. The mentioned provision does not
suggest that all kinds of violations can be subsumed under
Section 6 (5) and justify the disqualification of the group.
To warrant such a serious penalty, the violation must be
demonstrative of gross and willful disregard of the laws or
public policy. It must be taken to refer to election offenses
enumerated under Sections 261 and 262, Article XXII of

the Omnibus Election Code or any other acts or omissions
that are inconsistent with the ideals of fair and orderly
elections. It does not intend to cover even innocuous
mistakes or incomplete compliance with procedural
requirements.
Accordingly, it is a mistake on the part of the
COMELEC to suppose that failure to comply with Section 8
of RA 7941 is within the contemplation of Section 6 (5)
thereof. Section 8 reads:
Section 8. Nomination of PartyList Representatives.—Each

registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
_______________
199 Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.—The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules and regulations relating to
elections;
x x x x
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VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 757

COMELEC not later than fortyfive (45) days before the election a
list of names, not less than five (5), from which partylist
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
x x x x
The language of the law is clear and unambiguous; it

must be given its plain and literal meaning. A reading of
the provision will show that it is simply a procedural
requirement relating to the registration of groups,
organizations and coalitions under the partylist system of
representation. Plainly, it requires the applicant under the
partylist system to submit a list of nominees, not less than
five, at least fortyfive (45) days before the election. The
group’s compliance with this requirement is determinative
of the action of the COMELEC. In case of failure to comply,

the COMELEC may refuse to act on the petition for
registration. If the applicant, on the other hand, tendered
an incomplete compliance, as in submitting a list of less
than five (5) nominees, the COMELEC may ask it to
comply or simply regard the same as a waiver. In no way
can the mere submission of the list be construed as a
guarantee or attestation on the part of the group that all of
the nominees shall be qualified especially that the
assessment of qualifications is a duty pertaining solely to
the COMELEC. In the same way, the provision did not
intend to hold the group liable for violation of election laws
for such a shortcoming and to mete out the same with the
penalty of disqualification. Such an absurd conclusion
could not have been the intention of the law.
Indeed, there are instances when one or some of the
nominees are disqualified to represent the group but this
should not automatically result to the disqualification of
the latter. To hold otherwise is to accord the nominees the
same significance which the law holds for the partylist
groups of the marginalized and underrepresented. It is
worthy to emphasize that the formation of partylist groups
organized by the marginalized and underrepresented and
their participation in the process of legislation is the
essence of the partylist sys
758

tem of representation. Consistent with the purpose of the

law, it is still the fact that the partylist group satisfied the
qualifications of the law that is material to consider. That
one or some of its chosen agents failed to satisfy the
qualifications for the position should not unreasonably
upset the existence of an otherwise legitimate partylist
group. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be
regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It
should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the
partylist group itself with defect.
The point is that the partylist group must thus be
treated separate and distinct from its nominees such that
qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and

parcel of the qualifications of the former. The features of
the partylist system of representation are reflective of the
intention of the law to treat them severally.
To begin with, the electorate votes for the partylist
group or organization itself, not for the individual
nominees.200 The nominees do not file a certificate of
candidacy nor do they launch a personal campaign for
themselves.201 It is the partylist group that runs as
candidate and it is the name of the group that is indicated
in the ballot. The list of nominees submitted to the
COMELEC becomes relevant only when the partylist
group garners the required percentage of votes that will
entitle it to a seat in Congress. At any rate, the partylist
group does not cease in existence even when it loses the
electoral race. And, should it decide to make another
electoral bid, it is not required to keep its previous list of
nominees and can submit an entirely new set of names.
Further, there are separate principles and provisions of
law pertaining to the qualifications and disqualifications of
the
_______________
200 Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 17943132 and
180443, June 22, 2010, 621 SCRA 385, 409.
201 Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to
December 5, 1994, Volume II, Nos. 2345, p. 143.
759
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partylist group and the nominees. The qualifications of the

partylist group are outlined in Ang Bagong Bayani while
the grounds for the removal/cancellation of registration are
enumerated in Section 6 of RA 7941.
On the other hand, Section 9 of the law governs the
qualifications of the nominees. As to their disqualification,
it can be premised on the ground that they are not
considered as one “belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector” or that they lack one or some of
the qualifications. They may also be disqualified under
202
Section 15 and Section 8203 of RA 7941, particularly
under the second paragraph thereof. Even after the
COMELEC’s determination, interested parties may still
question the qualifications of the nominees through a
petition to cancel or deny due course to the nomination or
petition for disqualification under Sections 1204 and 2,205
Rule 5 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9366,
respectively.
_______________
202 Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect.—Any elected partylist
representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; Provided, that if he changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as partylist
representative under his new party or organization.
203 Section 8. Nomination of Partylist Representatives.—x x x x
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have
given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his
bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. x x x x
204 SEC. 1. Petition to deny due course and/or cancellation; Grounds.
—A verified petition seeking to deny due course the nomination of
nominees of partylist groups may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that a material misrepresentation has been committed in the
qualification of the nominees.
205 SEC. 2. Petition for disqualification, Ground.—A verified petition
seeking the disqualification of nominees of partylist groups may be filed
by any person when the nominee has been declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
760

It is worth emphasizing that the selection of nominees

depends upon the choice of the members of the partylist
group. It is a matter which cannot be legislated and is
solely dependent upon the will of the party.206 More often
than not, the choice of nominees is grounded on trust and
confidence, not on the vague or abstract concepts of
qualifications under the law. The method or process by
which the members of the partylist group choose their

nominees is a matter internal to them. No set of rules or
guidelines can be imposed upon them by the Court or the
COMELEC in selecting their representatives lest we be
charged of unnecessarily disrupting a democratic process.
Regrettably, the COMELEC did intrude in the partylist
groups’ freedom to choose their nominees when it
disqualified some of them on the ground that their
nominees are disqualified. While the COMELEC has the
authority to determine the qualifications of the nominees,
the disqualification of the group itself due to the failure to
qualify of one or some of the nominees is too harsh a
penalty. The nexus between the COMELEC’s outright
disqualification of the group due to the disqualification of
the nominees and the avowed objective of RA 7941 of
encouraging the development of a “full, free and open
partylist system” is extremely hard to decipher.
_______________
a. Given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
b. Committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
c. Spent in the campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law;
d. Solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Section 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code; or
e. Violated any of Sections 83, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.
206 Record of the Senate, Third Regular Session, October 3, 1994 to
December 5, 1994, Volume II, Nos. 2345, p. 157.
761
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 761

In other words, the Court cannot countenance the action

of the COMELEC in disqualifying the partylist group due
to the disqualification of one or some of the nominees.
There is simply no justifiable ground to support this action.
It is unthinkable how the COMELEC could have conceived
the thought that the fate of the partylist group depends on
the qualifications of the nominees, who are mere agents of
the group, especially that the agency between them is still
subject to the condition that the group obtains the required

percentage of votes to be entitled to a seat in the House of
Representatives. Until this condition is realized, what the
nominees have is a mere expectancy.
It may also be helpful to mention that in Veterans
Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,207 the Court
emphasized the threeseat limit rule, which holds that each
qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled only to a maximum of three
(3) seats.208 The rule is a reiteration of Section 11(b)209 of
RA 7941. Relating the principle to Section 8, it becomes
more apparent that the action of the COMELEC was made
with grave abuse of discretion. It bears noting that while
Section 8 requires the submission of the names of at least
five (5) nominees, Section 11 states that only three (3) of
them can actually occupy seats in the House of
Representatives should the votes they gather suffice to
meet the required percentage. The two (2) other nominees
in
_______________
207 396 Phil. 419; 342 SCRA 244 (2000).
208 Id., at p. 424; p. 273.
209 Section 11. Number of PartyList Representatives.
a. x x x x
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party list system shall be
entitled to one set each: Provided, That those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
762

the list are not really expecting to get a seat in Congress

even when the partylist group of which they are members
prevailed in the elections. If at all, they can only substitute
incumbent representatives, if for any reason, they vacate
the office. Therefore, if the right to office of three (3) of the
nominees is based on a mere expectancy while with the
other two (2) the nomination is dependent on the

occurrence of at least two (2) future and uncertain events,
it is with more reason that the disqualification of one or
some of the nominees should not affect the qualifications of
the partylist group.
I have also observed that in some of the consolidated
petitions, the partylist group submitted a list of nominees,
with less than five (5) names stated in Section 8 of RA
7941. In some other petitions, only some out of the number
of nominees submitted by the partylist group qualified.
Again, Section 8 must be construed as a procedural
requirement relative to registration of groups aspiring to
participate in the partylist system of representation. In
case of failure to comply, as in nonsubmission of a list of
nominees, the COMELEC may deny due course to the
petition. In case of incomplete compliance, as when the
partylist group submitted less than 5 names, it is my view
that the COMELEC must ask the group to comply with the
admonition that failure to do so will amount to the waiver
to submit 5 names. The implication is that if the partylist
group submitted only one qualified nominee and it garners
a number of votes sufficient to give it two (2) seats, it
forfeits the right to have a second representative in
Congress. Therefore, for as long as the partylist group has
one (1) qualified nominee, it must be allowed registration
and participation in the election. The situation is different
when the partylist group submitted a list of nominees but
none qualified and, upon being asked to submit a new list
of names, still failed to appoint at least one (1) qualified
nominee. In this case, the party can now reasonably be
denied registration as it cannot, without at least one
qualified nominee, fulfill the objective of the law for
genuine and effective representation for the marginalized
and underrepresented, a
763
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 763

task which the law imposes on the qualified nominee by

participating in the “formulation and enactment of
210
whole.” More importantly, the partylist group’s inability
to field in qualified nominees casts doubt on whether the
group is truly representative of the marginalized and
underrepresented. Considering that the majority of the
group must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented, it should not have any trouble
appointing a qualified nominee.
Ruling on each of the petitions
As opposed to the vote of the majority, I deem it
unnecessary to remand ALL the petitions to the
COMELEC, completely disregarding the ground/s for the
cancellation or denial of the partylist groups’ registration,
and even on the supposition that the ponencia had
substantially modified the guidelines that are set forth in
the Ang Bagong Bayani.
I vote, instead, to REMAND only the petitions of
the partylist groups whose remaining ground for
denial or cancellation of registration involves the
new guideline on the qualifications of a party’s
nominees. While I agree on modifying the qualifications of
major political parties, no remand is justified on this
ground since none of the 52211 petitioners is a major
political party. On all other issues, the standard of grave
abuse of discretion shall already be applied by the Court.
For an extraordinary writ of certiorari to be justified, the
tribunal or administrative body must have issued the
assailed decision, order or resolution with grave abuse of
discretion.212
_______________
210 Section 2, RA 7941.
211 The 53 consolidated petitions include 2 petitions filed by SENIOR
CITIZENS.
212 Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319; 390 SCRA 480
(2002).
764

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,213 the Court

recognized that along with the limited focus that attends
petitions for certiorari is the condition, under Section 5,

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the
COMELEC, when supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and nonreviewable. Substantial evidence is that
degree of evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
sufficient to support a conclusion.214
Guided by the foregoing principles, I vote to DISMISS
the petitions for failure to substantiate grave abuse of
discretion, and to AFFIRM THE COMELEC’s DENIAL
OR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION, of the
following partylist groups: GREENFORCE,
KALIKASAN, UNIMAD, AAMA, APEC, 1CARE, ALA
EH, 1BROPGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, ASIN,
Manila Teachers, KAKUSA, BANTAY, GUARDJAN,
PACYAW, ARC, SMART, ALAM, ABANG LINGKOD,
AKMAPTM, BAYANI, FIRM 24K, KAP, COCOFED,
AANI, ABROAD, AG, ALONA, AGRI, 1ST KABAGIS,
ARAL, BINHI, SENIOR CITIZENS, Atong Paglaum,
ANAD, PBB, PPP, 1AAAP, ABP, AAB, AKB and AI.
The COMELEC’s conclusion on the said groups’ failure
to qualify, insofar as the grounds pertained to the sectors
which they seek to represent and/or their capacity to
represent their intended sector finds support in established
facts, law and jurisprudence.
ON THE OTHER HAND, I find grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC in ruling on the
disqualification of 1UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL,
AT and ARARO on the supposed failure of these parties to
substantiate their eligibility as a group, specifically on
questions pertaining to their track record and the sectors
which they seek to represent.
_______________
213 G.R. No. 191938, June 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
214 Id., at pp. 766767.
765
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 765

Although as a general rule, the Court does not review in

a certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence presented to it, in exceptional cases,

as when the COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and
evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of discretion to
the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not
only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene.
When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors
arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgment to one of jurisdiction.215 To this exception falls
the COMELEC’s disqualification of 1UTAK, PASANG
MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO.
1UTAK and PASANG MASDA
1UTAK is a sectoral organization composed of various
transport drivers and operators associations nationwide
with a common goal of promoting the interest and welfare
of public utility drivers and operators.216 On the other
hand, PASANG MASDA is a sectoral political party that
mainly represents the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of jeepney and tricycle drivers and operators across
the National Capital Region.217 Contrary to the conclusion
that was inferred by the COMELEC from the common
circumstance that 1UTAK and PASANG MASDA
represent the sectors of both public utility drivers and
operators, it is not a sufficient ground to cancel their
respective registration as partylist group.
To a great extent, the supposed conflict in the respective
interests of public utility drivers and operators is more
apparent than real. It is true that there is a variance in the
economic interests of public utility drivers and operators;
the former is concerned with wages while the latter is
concerned with profits. However, what the COMELEC
failed to consider
_______________
215 Id., at p. 767.
216 Rollo (G.R. No. 204410), p. 79.
217 Rollo (G.R. No. 204153), p. 5.
766

is that the two sectors have substantial congruent concerns

and interests.
To my mind, the interests of public utility drivers and
operators are aligned with each other in several instances.
To name a few: first, the effects of fluctuation in the prices
of petroleum products; second, their benefit from petitions
for fare increase/reduction; and third, the implications of
government policies affecting the transportation sector
such as traffic rules and public transport regulation. In
these instances, it is mutually beneficial for drivers and
operators of public utility vehicles to work together in order
to effectively lobby their interests. Certainly, the
interrelated concerns and interests of public utility drivers
and operators far outweigh the supposed variance in their
respective economic interests.
Accordingly, my view is that the COMELEC En Banc
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration
of 1UTAK and PASANG MASDA as partylist groups on
the ground of the sectors which they aim to represent.
BUTIL
Similarly, the COMELEC gravely abused its discetion
when it cancelled the registration of BUTIL on the alleged
ground that the party failed to prove that the “agriculture
and cooperative sectors,” which the party represents, are
marginalized and underrepresented.218
In arriving at the said conclusion, the COMELEC noted
that the SecretaryGeneral of BUTIL, Wilfredo A.
Antimano affirmed in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL is
an organization “representing members of the agriculture
and cooperative sectors.” From this declaration, the
COMELEC ruled that since the agriculture and cooperative
sectors are not enumerated in RA 7941, it is incumbent
upon BUTIL to establish the fact that the sectors it is
representing are marginalized and
_______________
218 Rollo (G.R. No. 204356), p. 61.
767
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 767

underrepresented. Since the party failed to discharge this

burden, the COMELEC cancelled the party’s registration.
I stress, however, that in determining whether the
group represents a marginalized and underrepresented
sector, all of the evidence submitted by the party should be
duly considered by the Commission. Thus, Antimano’s
statement in his judicial affidavit that BUTIL represents
the “agriculture and cooperative sectors” should be read in
conjunction with the other documents submitted by the
party, including the oral testimony that was given by the
party’s witness. Significantly, during the clarificatory
hearing conducted by the Commission En Banc on August
23, 2012, Antimano explained:
CHAIRMAN BRILLANTES:
Isa lang. Gusto ko lang malaman, sino ho ang mga myembro nyo?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Ang myembro po ng aming partido ay mga magsasaka, maliliit
na magsasaka at maliliit na mangignigsda sa kanayunan.
x x x x
Ang tanong ko ho eh, gusto ko lang malaman, small farmers ang
inyong nirerepresent?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
Small fishermen, kasama ho ba yun?
MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo.
Pati maliliit na mangingisda?
768

MR. ANTIMANO:
Opo, sa kanayunan. Meron po kasing maliliit na mangingisda sa
karagatan pero yung sa amin, yun pong maliliit na mangingisda
na nagaalaga ng maliliit na…219
It can be reasonably gathered from the foregoing that

Antimano’s reference to the “agriculture and cooperative
sector” pertains to small farmers and fishermen. Likewise,
on the basis of the evidence on record, the term
“cooperative” in Antimano’s affidavit should be taken to
refer to agricultural cooperatives which, by their nature,
are still comprised of agricultural workers.
Time and again, the Court has recognized small
agricultural workers as marginalized and
underrepresented. Based on the records, BUTIL appears to
fully adhere to and work towards their cause. I also give
due consideration to the fact that since the partylist
system was first implemented in 1998, the party had been
able to obtain the necessary votes for at least one seat in
the House of Representatives. This affirms the party’s
constituency that may deserve a continued representation
in Congress.
AT
AT is an incumbent partylist group that claims to
represent six (6) marginalized sectors—labor, urban poor,
elderly, women, youth and overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs).220 In disqualifying AT, the COMELEC found that
its incumbent representative, Congresswoman Daryl Grace
J. Abayon, failed to author house measures that will uplift
the welfare of all the sectors it claims to represent.221
In so ruling, however, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in failing to appreciate that effective
representation
_______________
219 Id., at pp. 7779.
220 Rollo (G.R. No. 204174), p. 173.
221 Id., at p. 160.
769
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 769

of sectors is not confined to the passage of bills that directly

identify or name all of the sectors it seeks to represent. In
the case of AT, there is evidence that it adopted and co
sponsored House Bills that advanced the interests, not only
of the sectors it represents, but even other marginalized

and underrepresented sectors.222 AT also established with
sufficiency an exceptional track record that demonstrates
its genuine desire to uplift the welfare of all of the sectors it
represents.223 It is broad enough to cover legislation which,
while directly identifying only some of the sectors as main
beneficiaries, also benefits the rest of the sectors it seeks to
represent.
ARARO
ARARO is a partylist group that seeks to represent
peasants and the urban poor. It was disqualified by the
COMELEC on the ground that these two sectors involve
conflicting interests, for instance, in the matter of land use.
However, I do not see, and the COMELEC failed to
show, how the issue of land use can be conflicting between
these sectors. Peasants generally belong to the class of
marginal farmers, fisherfolk and laborers in the rural
areas. On the other hand, the urban poor, as the term
connotes, are those in the urban areas. While they may
have different interests and concerns, these are not
necessarily divergent.
I also do not adhere to the COMELEC’s conclusion that
ARARO’s alliances with other sectoral organizations
“muddle” the sectors it represents.224 These are mere
alliances, i.e., ties. It does not necessarily follow that
ARARO, because of these ties, will also represent the
interests of these sectors. As long as ARARO’s platform
continually focuses on the enhancement of the welfare of
the peasants and the urban poor, there can be an effective
representation in their behalf.
_______________
222 Id., at pp. 544613.
223 Id., at pp. 8391494.
224 Rollo (G.R. No. 203976), p. 28.
770

On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, I then vote to

nullify the COMELEC’s cancellation of the registration of
1UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO on

the ground of these parties’ supposed failure to prove their
eligibility to represent their intended sectors.
The COMELEC also committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling on the outright cancellation of the five
parties’ registration on the ground of the supposed failure
of their nominees to qualify. I have fully explained that the
qualification of a partylist group shall be treated separate
and distinct, and shall not necessarily result from the
qualification of its nominees.
In any case, my vote to nullify the aforementioned
actions of the COMELEC shall not be construed to
automatically restore the five parties’ registration and
accreditation, which would otherwise allow their
participation in the May 2013 elections. As has been
discussed, each party must still be able to field in qualified
nominees, as it is only through them that the party may
perform its legislative function in the event that it garners
the required percentage of votes for a seat in the House of
Representatives. With this circumstance, and considering a
new guideline on nominees’ qualifications, I then find the
necessity of remanding their petitions to the COMELEC.
ALIM, AIPRA, AKIN, A BLESSED
PartyList and AKOBAHAY
The denial of the registration of AKIN, and the
cancellation of the registration of ALIM, AIPRA, A
BLESSED PartyList and AKOBAHAY were based
solely on the alleged failure of their respective nominees to
prove that they factually belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector that their parties seek to
represent. I reiterate that a partylist group must be
treated separate and distinct from its nominees; the
outright disqualification of the groups on the
771
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 771

said ground is not warranted. The COMELEC’s ruling to

the contrary is an act exhibitive of grave abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly, I deem it appropriate to nullify the

COMELEC’s resolve to deny AKIN’s registration and
cancel the registration of ALIM, AIPRA, A BLESSED
PartyList and AKOBAHAY. Nonetheless, as in the case
of 1UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT and ARARO,
this does not necessarily restore or grant their registration
under the partylist system.
I submit that in view of my stand regarding the
qualifications of nominees, specifically on the two types of
qualified nominees, it is only proper that the petitions that
involve the ground of disqualification of the nominees be
remanded to the COMELEC to afford it the opportunity to
revisit its rulings. In so doing, the COMELEC may be able
to assess the facts and the records, while being guided by
the clarification on the matter. It must be emphasized,
however, that not all of the petitions necessitates a remand
considering that from the records, only ten (10) out of the
fiftythree (53) consolidated petitions solely involved the
disqualification of the party’s nominees. The bulk of the
petitions consist of cancellation or denial of registration on
the ground (1) that the partylist group does not represent
a marginalized and underrepresented sector, or; (2) that
the group itself, on the basis of the pertinent guidelines
enumerated in Ang Bagong Bayani, failed to qualify. If the
ground for the denial or cancellation of registration is
disqualification on the basis of sector or group, it is a futile
exercise to delve into the qualifications of the nominees
since notwithstanding the outcome therein, the partylist
group remains disqualified. It is well to remember that the
law provides for different sets of qualifications for the
partylist group and the nominees. The law, while
requiring that the partylist group must have qualified
nominees to represent it, treats the former as separate and
distinct from the latter, not to treat them as equals but to
give a higher regard to the partylist group itself. Thus, in
the event that
772

the nominees of the partylist group fail to qualify, the

partylist group may still be afforded the chance to fill in
qualified nominees to represent it. The reverse, however, is
not true. The lack of qualifications, or the possession of
disqualifying circumstances by the group, impinges on the
legitimacy or the existence of the partylist group itself.
Absent a qualified partylist group, the fact that the
nominees that are supposed to represent it are qualified
does not hold any significance.
Even though the ponencia modifies the qualifications for
all national or regional parties/organizations, IT STILL IS
NOT NECESSARY TO REMAND ALL THE
PETITIONS. It bears stressing that of the 52 petitioners,
only eleven are national or regional parties/organizations.
The rest of the petitioners, as indicated in their respective
Manifestations of Intent and/or petitions, are organized as
sectoral parties or organizations.
The partylist groups that are organized as national
parties/organizations are:
1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD)225
2. Bantay PartyList (BANTAY)226
3. Allance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)227
On the other hand, the following are regional parties/

organizations:
1. Ako Bicol Political Party (AKB)228
2. Aksyon Magsasaka – Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMAPTM)229
3. Ako an Bisaya (AAB)230
_______________
225 Rollo (G.R. No. 204094), p. 146.
226 Rollo (G.R. No. 204141), p. 74.
227 Rollo (G.R. No. 204238), p. 170.
228 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 20381819), p. 119.
229 Rollo (G.R. No. 203936), p. 73.
230 Rollo (G.R. No. 204370), p. 92.
773
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 773

4. Kalikasan PartyList (KALIKASAN)231

5. 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party (1AAAP)232
6. Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)234
7. Partido ng Bayan and Bida (PBB)235
8. Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)236
Accordingly, even granting credence to the ponencia’s

ratiocination, it does not follow that a remand of all the
cases is justified; as we have pointed out the ponencia has
been able to explain the necessity of a remand of only
eleven petitions for further proceedings in the COMELEC,
in addition to the ten petitions that I have recommended
for remand.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, I
vote to:
1. PARTLY GRANT the petitions in G.R. No. 204410,
G.R. No. 204153, G.R. No. 204356, G.R. No. 204174, G.R.
No. 204367, G.R. No. 204341, G.R. No. 204125, G.R. No.
203976, G.R. No. 204263 and G.R. No. 204364. The assailed
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in SPP No. 12198 (PLM), SPP No. 12 277 (PLM),
SPP No. 12136 (PLM), SPP No. 12232 (PLM), SPP No. 12
104 (PL), SPP No. 12269 (PLM), SPP No. 12292 (PLM),
SPP No. 12288 (PLM), SPP No. 12257 (PLM) and SPP No.
12180 (PLM) shall be NULLIFIED insofar as these
declared the outright disqualification of the parties 1
UTAK, PASANG MASDA, BUTIL, AT, AKIN, ALIM,
AIPRA, ARARO, A Blessed PartyList and AKOBAHAY,
respectively, and their cases shall be REMANDED to the
COMELEC, which shall be DIRECTED to: (a) allow the
partylist groups to present further proof that their
nominees are actually qualified in light of the new
_______________
231 Rollo (G.R. No. 204402), p. 72.
232 Rollo (G.R. No. 204435), p. 91.
233 Rollo (G.R. No. 204436), p. 186.
234 Rollo (G.R. No. 204484), p. 60.
235 Rollo (G.R. No. 204490), p. 79.
774
guideline on the qualification of nominees, (b) evaluate

whether the nominees are qualified to represent the group,
and (c) grant or deny registration depending on its
determination;
2. DISMISS the petitions in G.R. No. 204139, G.R. No.
204370, G.R. No. 204379, G.R. No. 204394, G.R. No.
204402, G.R. No. 204426, G.R. No. 204435, G.R. No.
204455, G.R. No. 204485, G.R. No. 204490, G.R. No.
204436, G.R. No. 204484, G.R. No. 203766, G.R. Nos.
20381819, G.R. No. 203922, G.R. No. 203936, G.R. No.
203958, G.R. No. 203960, G.R. No. 203981, G.R. No.
204002, G.R. No. 204094, G.R. No. 204100, G.R. No.
204122, G.R. No. 204126, G.R. No. 204141, G.R. No.
204158, G.R. No. 204216, G.R. No. 204220, G.R. No.
204236, G.R. No. 204238, G.R. No. 204239, G.R. No.
204240, G.R. No. 204318, G.R. No. 204321, G.R. No.
204323, G.R. No. 204358, G.R. No. 204359, G.R. No.
204374, G.R. No. 204408, G.R. No. 204421, G.R. No.
204425, G.R. No. 204428 and G.R. No. 204486.
LEONEN, J.:
I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in so
far as there is no finding of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC.
National political parties may participate in partylist
elections, provided that they have no candidate for
legislative districts. The constitution disqualifies political
parties, which have candidates for legislative districts,
from the partylist system.1 I also agree that they need not
be organized sectorally and/or represent the “marginalized
and underrepresented.”
_______________
1 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. (1).
775
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 775

We take this opportunity to take a harder look at article

VI section 5(1) and (2) in the light of article II section 1 of
the Constitution. We now benefit from hindsight as we are
all witness to the aftermath of the doctrines enunciated in
Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. COMELEC2 as
qualified by Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC3 and
Transparency v. COMELEC.4
In my view, the Constitutional provisions have always
created space for “national, regional and sectoral parties
and organizations” to join the partylist system. It is
textually clear that national political parties or regional
organizations do not need to be organized on sectoral lines.
Sectoral parties or organizations belong to a different
category of participants in the partylist system.
Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that all
those who participate in the partylist system “must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups”
as mentioned in Republic Act No. 7941.5 This law is
unconstitutional in so far as it makes a requirement that is
not supported by the plain text of the Constitution.
There is also a constitutional difference between the
political parties that support those who are candidates for
legislative districts and those that participate in the party
list system. It is inconsistent for national political parties
who have candidates for legislative districts to also run for
partylist. This, too, is the clear implication from the text of
article VI, section 5(1) of the Constitution.
_______________
2 G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
3 G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA 244.
4 G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 211. But, by a vote of 8
joining the opinion of Puno, C.J. the court upheld Veterans disallowing
political parties from participating in the party list elections.
5 Republic Act No. 7941 (1995).
776

The insistence on the criteria of “marginalized and

underrepresented”6 has caused so much chaos to the point
of absurdity in our partylist system. It is too ambiguous so
as to invite invidious intervention on the part of
COMELEC, endangering the fundamental rights to
suffrage of our people. Hewing more closely with the text of
the Constitution makes more sense under the present
circumstances.
Besides, there was no clear majority in support of the
ratio decidendi relevant to our present cases in the case of
Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC7 and BANAT v.
COMELEC.8
_______________
6 Supra note 2, see first, second and sixth and seventh requirements:
“First, the political party, sector, organization or coalitions must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its
constitution, articles of incorporation, by laws, history, platform of
government and track recordthat it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented ...
“Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors...to be
elected to the House of Representatives.’ In other words, while they are
not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they
must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized
and underrepresented...”
xxx
“Sixth, the party or organization must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so...”
“Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees...”
7 Supra note 2.
8 Supra note 4; Infra note 29.
777
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 777

I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the nullification

of COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, s. August 2, 2012. This
will have the effect of reinstating the registration of thirty
nine (39) existing partylist groups that have already
registered for the 2010 elections especially those that have
won seats in the current Congress. This will also
automatically remand the thirteen (13) cases of new party
list registrants for proper processing and evaluation by the
Commission on Elections.
Textual analysis
of the relevant provisions
Different kind of political party in the
partylist system
The core principle that defines the relationship between
our government and those that it governs is captured in the
constitutional phrase that ours is a “democratic and
republican state”.9 A democratic and republican state is
founded on effective representation. It is also founded on
the idea that it is the electorate’s choices that must be
given full consideration.10 We must always be sensitive in
our crafting of doctrines lest the guardians of our electoral
system be empowered to silence those who wish to offer
their representation. We cannot replace the needed
experience of our people to mature as citizens in our
electorate.
We should read article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) in the
light of these overarching consideration.
Article VI, section 5(1) provides:
“(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance
_______________
9 CONSTITUTION, Art. II, Sec. 1.
10 See Moya v. Del Fiero, G.R. No. L46863, November 18, 1939.
778

with the number of their respective inhabitants, and those who,

as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations.” (emphasis provided)
There are two types of representatives in the House of

Representatives. Those in the first group are “elected from
legislative districts”. Those in the second group are “elected
through a partylist system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties and organizations.”
The differences in terms of representation are clear.
Those who are elected from legislative districts will have
their name in the ballot. They present their persons as the
potential agent of their electorate. It is their individual
qualifications that will be assessed by COMELEC on the
basis of the Constitution and relevant statutes. Should
there be disqualification it would be their personal
circumstances, which will be reviewed, in the proper case,
by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). The individual representative can lose subsequent
elections for various reasons, including dissatisfaction from
those that initially elected him/her into office.
Incidentally, those who present themselves for election
by legislative districts may or may not be supported by a
registered political party. This may give them added
political advantages in the electoral exercise, which
includes the goodwill, reputation and resources of the
major political party they affiliate with. However, it is not
the nature of the political party that endorses them that is
critical in assessing the qualifications or disqualifications
of the candidate.
The elected district representative in the House of
Representative is directly accountable to his/her electorate.
The political party she affiliates with only shares that
political accountability; but, only to a certain extent. Good
performance is usually rewarded with subsequent election
to another term. It is the elected representative, not the
political party that will get reelected. We can even take
judicial notice that party
779
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 779

affiliation may change in subsequent elections for various

reasons, without any effect on the qualification of the
elected representative.
The political party that affiliates those who participate
in elections in legislative districts organize primarily to
have their candidates win. These political parties have
avowed principles and platforms of government.11 But, they
will be known more through the personalities and
popularity of their candidates.12 Often, compromises occur
in the political party’s philosophies in order to
accommodate a viable candidate.
This has been the usual role of political parties even
before the 1987 Constitution.
The partylist system is an attempt to introduce a new
system of politics in our country, one where voters choose
platforms and principles primarily and candidatenominees
secondarily. As provided in the Constitution, the partylist
system’s intentions are broader than simply to “ensure that
those who are marginalized and represented become
lawmakers themselves.”13
Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the
popular and, perhaps, pedigreed individual candidate over
platforms and political programs.14 Political parties were
convenient amalgamation of electoral candidates from the
national to the local level that gravitated towards a few of
its leaders who
_______________
11 See for instance, Lande, Carl H., Parties and Politics in the
Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 9 (Sep. 1968) pp. 725747 or
Teehankee, Julio, Electoral Politics in the Philippines, in Electoral Politics
in Southeast Asia, Aurel Croissant, ed., Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002.
12 Id.; Lo, Barnaby, Fame, Family Dominate Key Philippines Election,
CBS News, May 10, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301503543_162
20004523503543.html> (visited March 7, 2013).
13 See CONSTITUTION, Art. IX(C), Sec. 6.
14 Supra note 11.
780

could marshall the resources to supplement the electoral

campaigns of their members.15 Most elections were choices
between competing personalities often with very little
discernible differences in their interpretation and solutions
for contemporary issues.16 The electorate chose on the
bases of personality and popularity; only after the
candidates were elected to public offices will they later find
out the concrete political programs that the candidate will
execute. Our history is replete with instances where the
programs that were executed lacked cohesion on the basis
of principle.17 In a sense, our electoral politics alienated
and marginalized large parts of our population.
The partylist system was introduced to challenge the
status quo. It could not have been intended to enhance and
further entrench the same system. It is the party or the
organization that is elected. It is the partylist group that
authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a
priority list of its nominees. It is also the partylist group
that can delist or remove their nominees, and hence replace
him or her, should he or she act inconsistently with the
avowed principles and platforms of governance of their
organization. In short, the partylist system assists genuine
political parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable
true representation, and hence, provide the potential for us
to realize a “democratic and republican state.”
Today, we are witness to the possibility of some party
list groups that have maintained organizational integrity
to pose candidates for higher offices, i.e., the Senate. We
can take judicial notice that two of the candidates for the
2013 senatorial elections—who used to represent partylist
groups in the House of Representatives—do not have the
resources nor the pedigree and, therefore, are not of the
same mould as many of
_______________
15 Id.
16 Supra note 12.
17 Supra note 11.
781
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 781
the usual politicians who view for that position. It is no

accident that the partylist system is only confined to the
House of Representatives. It is the nurturing ground to
mature genuine political parties and give them the
experience and the ability to build constituencies for other
elective public offices.
In a sense, challenging the politics of personality by
constitutionally entrenching the ability of political parties
and organizations to instill party discipline can redound to
the benefit of those who have been marginalized and
underrepresented in the past. It makes it possible for
nominees to be chosen on the basis of their loyalty to
principle and platform rather than their family affiliation.
It encourages more collective action by the membership of
the party and hence will reduce the possibility that the
party be controlled only by a select few.
Thus, it is not only “for the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst… who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity”18 that the partylist system was
enacted. Rather, it was for everyone in so far as attempting
a reform in our politics.
But, based on our recent experiences, requiring
“national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations”
that participate in the partylist system to be
representatives of the “marginalized and underrepresented
sector” and be “marginalized and underrepresented
themselves” is to engage in an ambiguous and dangerous
fiction that undermines the possibility for vibrant party
politics in our country. This requirement, in fact, was the
very requirement that “gut the substance of the partylist
system”.19
_______________
18Supra note 2.
19 See supra note 2. (This was the ostensible justification for not
allowing all “national, regional and sectoral parties and organizations” as
provided in the Constitution to participate).
782

Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to

appreciate the true context of the partylist system.
No requirement that the party or organization
be “marginalized and underrepresented”
The disqualification of two “green” or ecological parties20
and two “right wing” ideological groups21 (currently part of
the partylist sector in the present Congress) is based on
the assessment of the COMELEC en banc that they do not
represent a “marginalized” sector and that the nominee
themselves do not appear to be marginalized.
It is inconceivable that the partylist system framed in
our Constitution make it impossible to accommodate green
or ecological parties of various political persuasions.
Environmental causes do not have as their constituency
only those who are marginalized or underrepresented.
Neither do they only have for their constituency those “who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity”.22 In truth, all
of us, regardless of economic class, are constituents of
ecological advocacies.
Also, political parties organized along ideological lines
the socialist or even right wing political partiesare groups
motivated by a their own narratives of our history, a vision
of what society can be and how it can get there. There is no
limit to the economic class that can be gripped by the
cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political
platforms. Allowing them space in the House of
Representatives if they have the constituency that can win
them a seat will enrich the deliberations in that legislative
chamber. Having them voice out opinions—whether true or
false—should make the choices
_______________
20GREENFORCE in G.R. No. 204239 and KALIKASAN in G.R. No.
204402.
21 ANAD in G.R. No. 204094 and BANTAY in G.R. No. 204141.
22 Supra notes 2 & 4.
783
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 783

of our representatives richer. It will make the choices of our

representatives more democratic.
Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of
those who are marginalized and underrepresented, but
they do not necessarily come mainly from that economic
class. Just a glance at the history of strong political parties
in different jurisdictions will show that it will be the public
intellectuals within these parties who will provide their
rationale and continually guide their membership in the
interpretation of events and, thus, inform their movement
forward.
Political ideologies have people with kindred ideas as
their constituents. They may care for the marginalized and
underrepresented, but they are not themselves—nor for
their effectivity in the House of Representatives should we
require that they can only come from that class.
Highlighting these groups in this opinion should not be
mistaken as an endorsement of their platforms. Rather, it
should be seen as clear examples where interests and
advocacies, which may not be within the main focus of
those who represent legislative districts, cry out for
representation. Surely, it should be the electorate, not the
COMELEC, which should decide whether their groups
should participate in our legislative deliberations. That
these groups could be excluded even before the vote is not
what the partylist system is all about.
These two instances arising from the consolidated
petitions we are considering clearly show why the text of
article VI, section 5 (2) provides:
“(2) The partylist representative shall constitute twenty per

ratification of this Constitution, onehalf of the seats
allocated to partylist shall be filled, as provided by law, by
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such
other sectors as may be
784

provided by law, except the religious sectors.” (emphasis

provided)
What is plain from a reading of the text is that the

qualification as to reserved seats is applicable only for the
“three consecutive terms after the ratification” of the
Constitution. Only onehalf of the seats within that period
is reserved to the “sectors” that were enumerated, clearly
implying that there are other kinds of partylist
groups other than those who are sectoral.
To require that all the seats for partylist
representatives remain sectoral in one form or the other is
clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not supported
by the text. Its rationale and its actual effect is not in
accord with the spirit of these provisions.
Revisiting Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v. COMELEC
We are aware of the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v
Comelec.23 In that case, the Court en banc declared that
political parties may participate in the partylist system
but that these political parties must be organized sectorally
to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”.
The reasoning of the ponencia of that case derived from
his fundamental principle that:
“...The requisite character of these parties or organizations must

be consistent with the purpose of the partylist system, as laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941.”24
The ponencia then proceeded to put the interpretation

of a statute at par with the text of article VI, section 5
(1) and (2) the Constitution, thus:
_______________
23 Supra note 2.
24 Id., 359 SCRA 698, 717 (2001).
785
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 785

“The foregoing provision on the partylist system is not self

executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like ‘in
accordance with law’ or ‘as may be provided by law’; it was thus
up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the

Constitution.”25
The 1987 Constitution is a complete document. Every

provision should be read in the context of all the other
provisions so that contours of constitutional policy are
made clear.26 To claim that the framers of the Constitution
left it to Congress to complete the very framework of the
partylist system is to question the fundamental character
of our constitution. The phrases “in accordance with law”
and “as may be provided by law” is not an invitation to the
members of Congress to continue the work of the
constituent assembly that crafted the Constitution.
Constitutional policy is to be derived from the text of the
constitution in the light of its context in the document and
considering the contemporary impact of relevant
precedents.
From constitutional policy, Congress then details the
workings of the policy through law. The Constitution
remains the fundamental and basic law with a more
dominant interpretative position visavis statute. It has no
equal within our normative system.
Article VI, section 5 (1) and (2) already imply a complete
Constitutional framework for the partylist system.
Congress cannot add the concept of “proportional
representation.” Congress cannot pass a law so that we
read in the text of the Constitution the requirement that
even national and regional parties or organizations
should likewise be sectoral. Certainly Congress
cannot pass a law so that even the onehalf that was
not reserved for sectoral representatives even during
the first three consecutive
_______________
25 Id., 359 SCRA 698, 718 (2001).
26 Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579.
786

terms after the ratification of the Constitution should

now only be composed of sectoral representatives.
There were strong cogent dissenting opinions coming
from Justices Mendoza and Vitug when Ang Bagong
Bayani v. COMELEC was decided in 2001.27 Only six (6)
justices concurred with the reasoning of the ponencia. Two
justices voted only in the result. Five (5) justices dissented.
Four (4) of them joining the dissenting opinion of Justice
Vicente Mendoza. There was no majority therefore in
upholding the reasoning and ratio decidendi proposed by
the ponencia in that case. It was a divided court, one where
there was a majority to sustain the result but not enough to
establish doctrine.
It was even a more divided court when the same issues
were tackled in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC in 2009.28
Ostensibly, the rationale of the majority in BANAT was
to prevent major political parties from dominating
organizations of the marginalized. Citing the concurring
and dissenting opinion of then Chief Justice Puno:
“....There is no gainsaying the fact that the partylist parties are

no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena.
This is borne out in the partylist elections held in 2001 where
major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be
voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some
commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major
political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution
of votes: of the 162 parties
_______________
27 See supra note 2 at pp. 733761.
28 See supra note 4. (Voting to disallow major political parties from
participating directly or indirectly in the party list system were eight justices,
namely: Puno, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Austria Martinez, Corona, Chico
Nazario, Velasco and Leonardode Castro. Voting to allow major political parties in
the party list system were seven justices, namely: Carpio, CarpioMorales, Tinga,
Nachura, Brion, Peralta and Bersamin).
787
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 787

which participated, the seven major political parties made it to

the top 50.”29
The premise of course was the argument that major

political parties that support candidates for legislative
districts were to be allowed to participate in the partylist
system. This is not the reading proposed today of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the opinion failed to foresee
that even parties and organizations that claim to represent
the “marginalized” could crowd out each other further
weakening the system.
Not only do we vote today without a precedent having a
clear vote, we also do so with the benefit of hindsight.
“Marginalized and underrepresented” is ambiguous
There is another reason why we cannot fully subscribe
to the concept of “marginalized and underrepresented”. It is
too ambiguous. There can be no consistent judicially
discernible standard for the COMELEC to apply. It thus
invites invidious intervention from COMELEC to
undermine the right of suffrage of the groups that want to
vie for representation. Indirectly, it also violates the right
of suffrage of the electorate. COMELEC substituted its
judgment for that of the electorate. It thus acted arbitrarily
and beyond its jurisdiction.
In none of the Orders of the COMELEC in question was
there a definition of what it is to be socially marginalized.
No empirical studies have informed COMELEC’s
determination as to which groups are “underrepresented”
in government. In fact, there is no indication as to what the
characteristics of an individual’s or group’s identity would
lead the COMELEC en banc to consider that they were a
“sector”.
To the COMELEC en banc, for instance, the following
are not marginalized or underrepresented sectors:
“Bicolanos”,30
_______________
29 Id., per Puno Concurring and Dissenting opinion at pp. 258259.
788

“young professionals like drug counselors and lecturers”,31

rural energy consumers,32 “peasants, urban poor, workers
and nationalistic individuals who have stakes in promoting
security of the country against insurgency criminality and
their roots in economic poverty”,33 “persons imprisoned
without proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt”,34 those
who advocate “to publicly oppose, denounce and counter,
communism in all its form in the Filipino society”;35
“environmental enthusiasts intending to take are of,
protect and save Mother Earth”,36 “agricultural and
cooperative sectors”;37 “businessmen, civil society groups,
politicians and ordinary citizens advocating genuine people
empowerment, social justice, and environmental protection
and utilization for sustainable development”;38 “artists”;39
“Bisayans”;40
_______________
30 COMELEC Resolution dated October 20, 2012, SPP No. 12154
(PLM) and SPP No. 12177 (PLM), G.R. No. 203818 (Ako Bikol Political
Party, AKB).
31 COMELEC Omnibus Resolution dated October 11, 2012, SPP 12220
(PLM), G.R. No. 203981 (UNIMAD).
32 COMELEC Resolution dated October 16, 2012, SPP 12260 (PLM),
G.R. No. 203960 (1CARE).
G.R. No. 203958 (BANTAY).
G.R. No. 203958 (KAKUSA).
35 COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12185 (PLM),
G.R. No. 204094 (ANAD)
36 COMELEC Resolution dated November 7, 2012, SPP 12060 (PLM),
G.R. No. 204239 (GREENFORCE)
37 COMELEC Resolution dated November 28, 2012, SPP 12136
(PLM), G.R. No. 204356 (BUTIL)
38 COMELEC Resolution dated December 5, 2012, SPP 11002, G.R.
No. 204484 (PBB)
39 COMELEC Resolution dated November 23, 2012, SPP 12099, G.R.
No. 204379 (ASIN)
40 COMELEC Resolution dated November 29, 2012, SPP 12011 (PP),
G.R. No. 204370 (AAB)

789
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 789

Ilonggos.41
What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex
cathedra sans any standard what were the “marginalized
and underrepresented sectors.” This, in my opinion,
constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. We are now asked to confirm their actions. We
are asked to affirm that COMELEC knew what a
“marginalized and underrepresented sector” was when they
saw one.
COMELEC’s process was a modern day inquisition
reminiscent of the medieval hunt for heretics and witches,
a spectacle which may in a few cases weed out the sham
organization. But it was a spectacle nonetheless fraught
with too many vulnerabilities that cannot be
constitutionally valid. It constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
As guardians of the text and values congealed in our
Constitution, we should not lend our imprimatur to both
the basis and the procedure deployed by COMELEC in this
case.
After all, we have a due process clause still in place.42
Regardless of the nature of the power that COMELEC
deployed—whether it was administrative or quasijudicial
—the parties were entitled to have a standard that they
could apply in their situation so that they could properly
discern whether their factual situation deserved
registration or disqualification.
Neither was it possible for COMELEC to come up with a
standard. Even Rep. Act No. 7941 was ambiguously
worded.43 There was no workable definition of
“marginalized”, “underrepresented” and “sector.”44
_______________
41 COMELEC Resolution dated December 4, 2012, SPP 12009 (PP),
G.R. No. 204379 (AI)
42 See CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.
43 See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Secs. 23.
44 See Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), Sec. 3.
790

Neither would it have been possible for Congress to

define these concepts. In the first place, our decisions have
not given them guidance. In the second place, we could not
give guidance because it is not in the Constitution and
could not be derived from its provisions. This is also apart
from the reality that “identity”, “sector”, “marginalized”
and “underrepresented” are heavily contested concepts in
the fields of social science and philosophy.45
The fallacy of representation by “marginalized
and underrepresented” groups
It is possible under our system for a partylist group
representing indigenous peoples to be elected by peoples
who do not belong to their sector but from a voterich
legislative district. The same is true with a partylist group
allegedly of security guards.46 They, too, can get elected
without the consent of majority of all the security guards in
this country but simply from the required number allowed
by our formula in BANAT v. COMELEC.47 In practice, we
have seen the possibility for these “marginalized and
underrepresented” partylist groups being elected simply
by the required vote in some legislative districts.
This sham produces the failure in representation. It
undermines the spirit of the partylist system, violates the
principle of representation inherent in a democratic and
republican state, and weakens—rather than strengthen—
the abilities of the “marginalized and underrepresented” to
become lawmakers themselves. Constitutional construction
cannot
_______________
45 See for instance, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of
Difference, (2011).
46 ANG GALING PINOY (AG) in G.R. No. 204428.
47 Supra note 4.
791
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 791

lose sight of how doctrines can cause realities that will

undermine the very spirit of the text of our Constitution.48
Allowing the existence of strong national and regional
parties or organizations in the partylist system have
better chances of representing the voices of the
“marginalized and underrepresented. It will also allow
views, standpoints and ideologies sidelined by the
pragmatic politics required for political parties
participating in legislative districts to be represented in the
House of Representatives. It will also encourage the
concept of being multisectoral and therefore the
strengthening of political platforms.
To allow this to happen only requires that we maintain
full fealty to the textual content of our Constitution. It is “a
partylist system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.”49 Nothing more, nothing
less.
Requirements for PartyList Groups
Preferably, partylist groups should represent the
marginalized and underrepresented in our society.
Preferably, they may not be marginalized themselves but
that they may also subscribe to political platforms that
have the improvement of those who are politically
marginalized and economically destitute as their
catapulting passion. But, this cannot be the constitutional
requirements that will guide legislation and actions on the
part of the Commission on Election.
I propose instead the following benchmarks:
_______________
48 See for instance Association of Small Landowners v. DAR, G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [per Cruz J.] on allowing payment of
just compensation in cash and bonds: “...We do not mind admitting that a
certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue,
but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its
enhancement.”
49 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI, Sec. 5, par. 1.
792

First, the partylist system includes national, regional

and sectoral parties and organizations;
Second, there is no need to show that they represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented”. However, they will
have to clearly show how their plans will impact on the
“marginalized and underrepresented”. Should the partylist
group prefer to represent a sector, then our rulings in Ang
Bagong Bayani50 and BANAT51 will apply to them;
Third, the parties or organizations that participate in
the partylist system must not also be a participant in the
election of representatives for the legislative districts. In
other words, political parties that field candidates for
legislative districts cannot also participate in the partylist
system;
Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political
platforms guided by a vision of society, an understanding of
history, a statement of their philosophies and how this
translates into realistic political platforms;
Fifth, the parties or organizations—not only the
nomineesmust have concrete and verifiable track record
of political participation showing their translation of their
political platforms into action;
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for
registration must be organized solely for the purpose of
participating in electoral exercises;
Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable
period, such as three (3) years, prior to their registration.
Within that period they should be able to show concrete
activities that are in line with their political platforms;
Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual
active membership roster so as to be able to mount a
credible campaign for purpose of enticing their audience
(national, regional or sectoral) for their election;
_______________
50 Supra note 2.
51 Supra note 4.
793
VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 793

Ninth, a substantial number of these members must

have participated in the political activities of the
organization;
Tenth, the partylist group must have a governing
structure that is not only democratically elected but also
one which is not dominated by the nominees themselves;
Eleventh, the nominees of the political party must be
selected through a transparent and democratic process;
Twelfth, the source of the funding and other resources
used by the party or organization must be clear and should
not point to a few dominant contributors specifically of
individuals with families that are or have participated in
the elections for representatives of legislative districts;
Thirteenth, the political party or partylist organization
must be able to win within the two elections subsequent to
their registration;
Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and
Fifteenth, the partylist group is not a religious
organization.
Disqualification of existing registered
partylist groups Jurisdiction of the
COMELEC
With respect to existing registered partylist groups,
jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The
Constitution in article VI, section 17 clearly provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall

each have a Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members...”
A more specific provision in the Constitution with

respect to disqualifying registered political partylist
groups should
794

prevail over the more general powers of the COMELEC to

enforce and administer election laws. Besides, that the
HRET is the “sole judge” clearly shows that the

constitutional intention is to exclude all the rest.52
WHEREFORE, in View of the foregoing, I vote to:
(1) GRANT the Petitions and NULLIFY COMELEC
Resolution No. 9135 and all the COMELEC Resolutions
raised in these consolidated cases; and
(2) REMAND the cases to COMELEC for proper
proceedings in line with our decision.
Petitions granted.
Notes.—Section 6 of said PartyList System Act states

that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”
(Layug vs. Commission on Elections, 667 SCRA 135 [2012])
As one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC is
also tasked to register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or
program of government. (Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, 674 SCRA 538 [2012])
——o0o——
_______________
52 See Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L45081, July 15,
1936, 63 Phil. 139.
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2/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 694

G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.*

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President,

G.R. Nos. 203818­19. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.*

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.*

VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 479

sioner, and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,

G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.*

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.*

VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 481

G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.*

INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.*

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH,

G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.*

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,

G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.*

VOL. 694, APRIL 2, 2013 483

ties as Commissioners thereof, respondents.

G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.*

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.*

G.R. Nos. 20381819. April 2, 2013.*

Election Law; PartyList System; The partylist system is

disqualified, and the partylist group is able to join the elections

list parties and run as a coalition in the partylist elections.—

fall within this vision of a Filipinostyle partylist system. Thus,