12 de La Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., Et Al. 95 Phil. 739, August 31, 1954

[No. L7089.
August 31, 1954]
DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES INC.,, ET AL,
defendants and appellees,
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; DAMAGES CAUSED TO

EMPLOYEE BY A STRANGER CAN NOT BE
RECOVERED FROM EMPLOYER GIVING LEGAL
ASSISTANCE TO EMPLOYEE is NOT A LEGAL BUT A
MORAL OBLIGATION.—A claim of an employee against
his employer for damages caused to the former by a
stranger or outsider while said employee was in the
performance of his duties, presents a novel question which
under present legislation can not be decided in favor of the
employee. While it is to the interest of the
740
740 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
De la Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., et al.
employer to give legal help to, and defend, its employees

charged criminally in court, in order to show that he was
,not guilty of any crime either deliberately or through
negligence, because should the employee be finally held
criminally liable and he is found to be insolvent, the
employer would be subsidiarily liable, such legal
assistance might be regarded as a moral obligation but it
does not at present count with the sanction of manmade
laws. If the employer is not legally obliged to give legal
assistance to its employee and provide him with a lawyer,
naturally said employee may not recover from his
employer the amount he may have paid a lawyer hired by
him.
2. ID.; ID.; PARTIES WHO MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE

FOR DAMAGES.— If despite the absence of any criminal
responsibility on the part of the employee he was accused
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016112b071cde687223d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/6
of homicide, the responsibility for the improper accusation
may be laid at the door of the heirs of the deceased at
whose instance the action was filed by the State through
the Fiscal. This responsibility can not be transferred to his
employer, who in no way intervened, much less initiated
the criminal proceedings and whose only connection or
relation to the whole affair was that it employed plaintiff
to perform a specific duty or task, which was performed
lawfully and without negligence.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Ilocos Norte. Belmonte, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Conrado Rubio for appellant.
Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, Ruiz, and Benjamin Guerrero for
appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts

are simple. In the year 1941 the Northern Theatrical
Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation operated a movie
house in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and among the persons
employed by it was the plaintiff DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ,
hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the
main entrance of the cine, to maintain peace and order and
to report the commission of disorders within the premises.
As such guard he carried a revolver. In the afternoon of
July 4, 1941, one Benjamin Martin wanted to crash
741
VOL. 95, AUGUST 31, 1954 741

the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the

refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first
providing himself with a ticket, Martin attacked him with a
bolo. De la Cruz defended himself as best he could until he
was cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the
gate crasher, resulting in the latter's death.
For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide in
Criminal Case No. 8449 of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte. After a reinvestigation conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal the latter filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which was granted by the court in January
1943. On July 8, 1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the
same crime of homicide, in Criminal Case No. 431 of the
same Court. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the
charge on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases De la
Cruz employed a lawyer to defend him. He demanded from
his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but
was refused, after which he filed the present action against
the movie corporation and the three members of its board
of directors, to recover not only the amounts he had paid
his lawyers but also moral damages said to have been
suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and
his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his
land, a total of P1 5,000. On the basis of the complaint and
the answer filed by defendants wherein they asked for the
dismissal of the complaint, as well as the agreed statement
of facts, the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte after
rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of
the defendants and that as such agent he was entitled to
reimbursement of the expenses incurred by him in
connection with the agency (Arts. 17091729 of the old Civil
Code), found that plaintiff had no cause of action and
dismissed the complaint without costs. De la Cruz appealed
directly to this Tribunal for the reason that only questions
of law are involved in the appeal.
We agree with the trial court that the relationship
between the movie corporation and the plaintiff was not
that
742

of principal and agent because the principle of

representation was in no way involved. Plaintiff was not
employed to represent the defendant corporation in its
dealings with third parties. He was a mere employee hired
to perform a certain specific duty or task, that of acting as
special guard and staying at the main entrance of the
movie house to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace
and order within the premises. The question posed by this
appeal is whether an employee or servant who in line of
duty and while in the performance of the task assigned to
him, performs an act which eventually results in his
incurring in expenses, caused not directly by his master or
employer or his fellow servants or by reason of his
performance of his duty, but rather by a third party or
stranger not in the employ of his employer, may recover
said damages against his employer,
The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its
decision dismissing the complaint said that "after studying
many laws or provisions of law to find out what law is
applicable to the facts submitted and admitted by the
parties, has found none and it has no other alternative
than to dismiss the complaint." The trial court is right. We
confess that we are not aware of any law or judicial
authority that is directly applicable to the present case,
and realizing the importance and farreaching effect of a
ruling on the subjectmatter we have searched, though
vainly, for judicial authorities and enlightenment. All the
laws and principles of law we have found, as regards
master and servants, or employer and employee, refer to
cases of physical injuries, light or serious, resulting in loss
of a member of the body or of any one of the senses, or
permanent physical disability or even dealth, suffered in
line of duty and in the course of the performance of the
duties assigned to the servant or employee, and these cases
are mainly governed by the Employer's Liability Act and
the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a case involving
damages caused to an employee by a stranger or
743
VOL. 95, AUGUST 81, 1954 743

outsider while said employee was in the perf ormance of his

duties, presents a novel question which under present
legislation we are neither able nor prepared to decide in
favor of the employee.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a
driver employed by a transportation company, who while in
the course of employment runs over and inflicts physical
injuries on or causes the death of a pedestrian; and such
employer will help in the defense
driver is later charged criminally in court, one can imagine because if employee is eventually
that it would be to the interest of the employer to give legal adjudged guilty and he becomes
help to and defend its employee in order to show that the insolvent, the employer will be
subsidiarily liable to the offended
latter was not guilty of any crime either deliberately or party.
through negligence, because should the employee be finally
held criminally liable and he is found to be insolvent, the BUT THIS IS NOT A LEGAL
OBLIGATION
employer would be subsidiarily liable. That is why, we —employee cannot seek to
repeat, it is to the interest of the employer to render legal recover judicial expenses from
the employer
assistance to its employee. But we are not prepared to say
and to hold that the giving of said legal assistance to its
employees is a legal obligation. While it might yet and
possibly be regarded as a moral obligation, it does not at
present count with the sanction of manmade laws.
If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal
assistance to its employee and provide him with a lawyer,
naturally said employee may not recover the amount he
may have paid a lawyer hired by him.
Viewed from another angle it may be said that the
damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the expenses
incurred by him in remunerating his lawyer, is not caused
by his act of shooting to death the gate crasher but rather
by the filing of the charge of homicide which made it
necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of counsel.
Had no criminal charge been filed against him, there would
have been no expenses incurred or damage suffered. So the
damage suffered by plaintiff was caused rather by the
improper filing of the criminal charge, possibly at the
instance of the heirs of the deceased gate crasher and by
the State through the Fiscal. We say improper filing,
744

Transport Contractors, Inc. vs. Public Service Commission,
et al.
judging by the results of the court proceedings, namely,

acquittal. In other words, the plaintiff was innocent and
blameless. If despite his innocence and despite the absence
of any criminal responsibility on his part he was accused of
homicide, then the responsibility for the improper
accusation may be laid at the door of the heirs of the
deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they are the
parties that may be held responsible civilly ex or damages
and if this is so, we fail to see how this responsibility can be
transferred to the employer who in no way intervened,
much less initiated the criminal proceedings and whose
only connection or relation to the whole affairs was that he
employed plaintiff to perform a specific duty or task, which
task or duty was performed lawfully and without
negligence.
Still another point of view is that the damages incurred
here consisting of the payment of the lawyer's fee did not
flow directly from the performance of his duties but only
indirectly because there was an efficient, intervening
cause, namely, the filing of the criminal charges. In other
words, the shooting to death of the deceased by the plaintiff
was not the proximate cause of the damages suffered but
may be regarded as only a remote cause, because from the
shooting to the damages suff ered there was not that
natural and continuous sequence required to fix civil
responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court
is affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
——o0o——
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12 de La Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., Et Al. 95 Phil. 739, August 31, 1954

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[No. L­7089.

August 31, 1954]

DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; DAMAGES CAUSED TO

740 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

De la Cruz vs. Northern Theatrical Enterprises, Inc., et al.

employer to give legal help to, and defend, its employees

2. ID.; ID.; PARTIES WHO MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts

VOL. 95, AUGUST 31, 1954 741

the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the

742 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

of principal and agent because the principle of

VOL. 95, AUGUST 81, 1954 743

outsider while said employee was in the perf ormance of his

744 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

judging by the results of the court proceedings, namely,

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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[No. L7089.