National Security Outlook

August 2014

Japanese Hard Power: Rising to the Challenge

By Toshi Yoshihara
The following National Security Outlook by Toshi Yoshihara is the 14th in AEI’s Hard Power series. The
Outlook is a timely analysis of the Japanese government’s changing security posture and the resulting changes in its
defense policies and programs under the premiership of Shinzō Abe. Over the past two decades, Japan has increas-
ingly viewed its security as tied to developments outside its surrounding waters. However, Japan’s long-standing
interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution prohibited the nation from any military activity that was not directly
tied to its self-defense. This interpretation included Japan denying itself the UN-sanctioned right to engage in collec-
tive self-defense—something the United States did not even ask Germany or Italy to forgo after World War II—
and meant Japan was not a “normal” country. It was stuck in an anomalous position in which it could not exercise
collective self-defense but relied, through the US-Japan Security Treaty, on collective self-defense for its national
security. With a desire to play a more significant regional role and under the pressure of a rising and aggressive
China, the Abe government has begun to shake off these self-imposed restrictions—a turn for which many in the
United States had been hoping for some time.
—Gary Schmitt, Director, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at AEI

No longer is Japan the political shrinking violet of security establishment and the deteriorating
the immediate postwar years. Historians will look regional environment, 2) evaluate Japan’s defense
back on the first decades of the 21st century as a posture and military modernization efforts, and 3)
turning point for Japanese strategy, both in East identify the various financial and demographic
Asia and beyond. From major national security constraints that could limit the material dimen-
decisions—including the recent move to assume a sions of Japanese strategy.
limited right of collective self-defense—to a shift in
military posture to counter a rising China, Japan is
steadily loosening the constraints on its security
Key points in this Outlook:
policy. Japanese hard power, which includes Japan’s
first-rate but constitutionally handicapped military, • Japan’s ambition to play a larger role on the
world stage and address the security problems
will correspondingly play a more prominent role in
posed by a rising China have led Tokyo to
Tokyo’s strategic calculus. undertake institutional, policy, and defense
Understanding how Japanese policymakers reforms.
will wield that hard power as an instrument of
• Japan’s military reforms are intended to move
statecraft is thus crucial to Asian and global secu- its defense force from a posture of passive
rity. To explore how Japan’s newfound assertiveness deterrence to one that is agile and forward
will shape Japanese hard power, this Outlook will 1) leaning.
assess recent developments in Japan’s national
• Given Japan’s budgetary restraints, however,
it is unclear whether its resources can match
Toshi Yoshihara ([email protected]) is the its strategic ambitions.
John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at
the US Naval War College.

1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202 .862.5800 www.aei.org
 -2-

A “Normal” Japan at Last? and prosperity of the international community while

achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, who returned to power in the Asia-Pacific region.”5 Indeed, Prime Minister Abe
late 2012 following the Liberal Democratic Party’s land- can look to Japanese contributions to international peace
slide victory in the Diet’s lower-house elections, has and security since the end of the Cold War as the basis
pushed aggressively to realize his ambitious agenda. for his foreign policy vision.
Within a year of being elected, Abe instituted sweeping
reforms to the national security apparatus. In December
2013, Japan announced the formation of a National For the first time in Japan’s post–
Security Council (NSC) modeled after that of the World War II history, Tokyo has
United States. The council streamlines the prime minis-
produced policy documents that
ter’s decision-making process while breaking down the
various bureaucratic barriers that have impeded effective systematically align Japanese policy,
crisis management. Tokyo also enacted a controversial strategy, and capabilities.
state-secrets law that tightened the government’s control
over sensitive and classified information, enabling the
NSC to centralize the handling of intelligence. In a concrete manifestation of this proactive stance,
Concurrent with the NSC’s creation, Tokyo issued the Abe administration relaxed Japan’s arms-exports ban,
three defense policy documents that furnish the roadmap which had been in place for nearly five decades. Issued in
for developing and sustaining Japanese hard power. The April 2014, the new guidelines for transferring defense
National Security Strategy (NSS), the first of its kind, sets equipment intend to enhance technological cooperation
forth “Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national with partners and friends, raising Japan’s profile in
security.”1 The document is a welcome expression of regional and global arms markets. The move quickly
Japan’s long-term vision for securing the nation’s regional bore fruit. A week after the new policy was announced,
and global security objectives. The fifth National Defense Australia and Japan agreed to a joint research project on
Program Guidelines (NDPG) establishes Japan’s longer- marine hydrodynamics for constructing new submarines.
term defense policy and force structure.2 The Medium In July 2014, the newly established NSC approved
Term Defense Program (MTDP) is a programmatic Japan’s research with Britain on the Meteor air-to-air
statement of defense requirements and acquisition plans missile and approved exporting a sensor component for
over a five-year period.3 For the first time in Japan’s the Patriot Advanced Capability–2 air defense system to
post–World War II history, Tokyo has produced policy the United States. A network of defense collaboration
documents that systematically align Japanese policy, centered on developing hard power among like-minded
strategy, and capabilities. nations could well emerge from these joint ventures. A
Notably, the NSS promotes the concept of “proactive proactive contribution to peace is thus as much about
contribution to peace” that commits Japan to an even empowering other defenders of the status quo as it is
more forward-leaning posture in world affairs. Describing about strengthening one’s own capabilities.
the concept as a “fundamental principle of [Japan’s] In an even more consequential move, Abe partially
national security,” the NSS argues that the security of lifted Japan’s self-imposed ban on the right of collective
Japan and of the wider international community have self-defense, the hallmark of the nation’s post–World War
become indivisible: “Japan cannot secure its own peace II foreign policy. For decades, successive Japanese govern-
and security by itself, and the international community ments strictly followed the constitutional interpretation
expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and that permitted Japan to exercise the right of individual
stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its self-defense, which forbids Japan’s Self-Defense Forces
national capabilities.”4 In other words, Japan advances (SDF) from aiding friendly or allied military units that
global security by safeguarding its own neighborhood, have come under enemy assault.
while Japanese defense of the international order benefits This self-denial of a universal right, a right recognized
Asian regional stability. under the UN charter, has long imposed a highly asym-
As such, the NDPG contends that Japan must “con- metric and awkward arrangement on the US-Japanese
tribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability alliance. Washington would be obliged by treaty to
 -3-

defend Japan should it be attacked, while Tokyo could not Abe’s cabinet further acknowledged that “prior
reciprocate without violating its constitution. To Abe and approval of the Diet is in principle required upon
his followers, such a legal constraint has become unten- issuing orders” to the SDF for collective self-defense
able in an increasingly dangerous security environment. missions.8 By no means has Japan been unshackled
Among the scenarios used to advance Abe’s initiative, from its constitutional restraints or from its exclusively
two relating to the US-Japan alliance stand out. Imagine defensive orientation.
that a Japanese warship were in the vicinity of an Ameri-
can naval unit under attack and the warship took no
Limited collective self-defense will
action because of constitutional constraints. Imagine, too,
that a Japanese destroyer equipped with the Aegis ballistic open the door for Japanese hard
missile defense system were in a position to intercept a
power to play a more effective and
long-range missile headed for the United States, but the
destroyer failed to do so owing to Japan’s ban on collective meaningful role in maintaining
self-defense. To Abe and his lieutenants, if either of these regional and global security.
crises occurred and Japan did nothing, then the alliance
might not survive the subsequent political blowback in
Washington. Thus, adopting the right to collective self- The cabinet decision represents just the first step
defense would signal Japan’s determination to act along- in what will likely be a deliberate political process to
side the US military, sustaining the alliance’s integrity operationalize this broader constitutional interpretation.
while enhancing allied deterrence. The Abe administration will need to submit a legislative
In July 2014, after intense negotiations with the New package to the Diet that would provide the proper legal
Komeito—the Japanese government’s ambivalent junior framework for the SDF to help assist or defend allies and
coalition partner—Abe’s cabinet approved the reinterpre- friends should they come under attack. At least 10 exist-
tation of the constitution, allowing Japan to nominally ing laws would be reviewed, updated, and revised in this
exercise its right of collective self-defense. Under the new process. Opposition parties will have another chance to
understanding, use of force would be permitted “not only litigate the issue.
when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when In the meantime, changes in popular opinion or other
an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close domestic political developments, such as local election
relationship with Japan occurs.”6 However, in a compro- outcomes, could influence the momentum behind
mise acknowledging the New Komeito’s concerns, the Abe’s initiative. Public debate and legislative scrutiny—
Japanese government attached three key conditions nec- integral to Japan’s open democratic system—will
essary to invoke the right: inevitably accompany this important shift in defense
policy. Change will come incrementally through careful
1. Only an attack or an impending attack that and transparent negotiations.
“threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear It is still unclear how the concept of limited collec-
danger to fundamentally overthrow people’s tive self-defense will translate into operational practice
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness” for the US-Japan alliance. Planned revisions to the
would meet the constitutional standards for US-Japan defense guidelines, which spell out the allied
engaging in collective self-defense. division of labor, will reportedly incorporate an
expanded defensive and logistical role for the SDF.
2. Moreover, policymakers must determine that Due for completion at the end of 2014, the guidelines
“no other appropriate means” were available could call on the SDF to provide maintenance, supplies,
to counter the threat to Japan. and fuel to American military units heading into a
combat zone—all rear-area activities that were previ-
3. Even then, the SDF must limit its use of force ously prohibited.
to “the minimum extent necessary” to repel or In addition to improving allied cooperation, the cabi-
defeat the threat.7 net decision could broaden the scope of the SDF’s out-of-
area operations. For example, the Abe administration has
identified minesweeping as a potentially permissible
 -4-

action under UN Security Council authorization. Given and circled back to port by way of the international strait
Japan’s dependence on energy from the Persian Gulf between Okinawa and Miyako Islands. Reflecting Tokyo’s
region, the mining of the Strait of Hormuz could consti- growing concerns about China’s naval activism, Japan’s
tute a clear threat to the nation’s survival and well-being. annual defense white papers meticulously report the
This and other scenarios will likely be the subject of fur- courses taken by Chinese naval task forces.
ther debate when the government submits its legislative
package to the Diet.
Japanese officials must strike a balance between adher- Tokyo clearly recognizes that
ing to the constraints of the cabinet decision and ensuring China’s aggression is not a passing
sufficient flexibility to account for the uncertainties of
real-world military contingencies. Limited collective phenomenon; rather, it will likely
self-defense will open the door for Japanese hard power to intensify in the coming years.
play a more effective and meaningful role in maintaining
regional and global security.
Chinese military aircraft, including fighter jets, have
Japan’s Neighborhood Gets Rougher also ramped up flight operations over the East China
Sea. In July, September, and October 2013, Y-8 airborne
Mounting pressures close to home, including China’s early-warning aircraft and H-6 medium-range bombers
rise and North Korea’s unpredictability, largely explain conducted long-range flight operations over the Pacific
the quickening pace of Japan’s normalization. China’s Ocean, passing between Miyako and Okinawa to reach
assertiveness in the East China Sea over the past five the open sea.9 Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
years has been most troubling to Japan. In September launched a record number of intercepts against Chinese
2010, China reacted vociferously after Japanese law aircraft in fiscal year 2013, surpassing the number of
enforcement arrested a Chinese fishing-boat skipper who scrambles in fiscal year 2012 by more than 30 percent.10
was filmed ramming Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the In November 2013, Beijing unilaterally declared an
waters off the Senkaku Islands. Beijing used economic Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East
coercion, cutting off Japan’s only supply of rare-earth China Sea that requires all foreign aircraft entering
minerals critical to electronic manufactures. the zone to submit flight plans to Chinese aviation
After Tokyo nationalized the Senkakus in September authorities. The Chinese ADIZ pointedly overlaps with
2012, Chinese maritime law-enforcement flotillas began Japan’s, extending to the Senkakus. Given that China
making the rounds in the disputed waters near the islands, is committed to making these increased naval and air
and China has insisted that the regular patrols are routine. activities the new status quo, frequent run-ins between
In response, Japanese Coast Guard vessels have been Chinese and Japanese forces within the relatively con-
working overtime to monitor and trail every Chinese fined spaces of East Asian seas will likely be the norm
“intrusion,” lest Tokyo concede Beijing’s jurisdictional in the coming years.
claims. Japan and China have been staring each other Japanese policy documents routinely express Tokyo’s
down in the East China Sea ever since. misgivings about China’s maritime rise. The NSS asserts,
Beyond the Senkakus dispute, Japan and China “China has taken actions that can be regarded as
are locked in a budding naval rivalry. As China’s attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on
rapidly modernizing navy extends its reach, it has their own assertions . . . in the maritime and aerial
become commonplace for Chinese naval flotillas to domains, including the East China Sea and the South
sail through Japanese-held narrow seas. Beginning in China Sea.”11 The NDPG further observes, “China has
2008 as sporadic forays into the Pacific, these expedi- taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts
tions now take place regularly year round. Moreover, of interests in the maritime domain. . . . As for the seas
the Chinese navy has steadily expanded the scope and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into
of its peacetime operations. Japanese territorial waters, frequently violated Japan’s
Notably, in July 2013, a surface action group steamed airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that
through the Sōya Strait (the first time Chinese units could cause unexpected situations.” The report singles
had conducted such a transit), circumnavigated Japan, out China’s newly established ADIZ over the East China
 -5-

Sea as destabilizing, concluding, “As Japan has great Japan in March 2014. With an estimated range of at
concern about these Chinese activities it will need to least 1,000 kilometers, the Nodong can reach large
pay utmost attention to them.”12 parts of Japan. As the NDPG asserts, “North Korea’s
nuclear and missile development, coupled with its
provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting
Given defense spending trends, Japan a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent
may have trouble keeping up with threat to Japan’s security.”15
the Chinese military.
The Dynamic Joint Defense Force

Successive editions of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s Chinese naval and air activities in and around the East
annual defense white papers have devoted more attention China Sea and the employment of paramilitary maritime
to China’s maritime activism. In response to recent Chi- units near the Senkakus pose particularly taxing chal-
nese provocations at sea, the 2013 edition uses unusually lenges for Japan. These peacetime tactics have enabled
blunt language to admonish Beijing: “Some of these activ- Beijing to apply constant pressure on Tokyo. China has
ities of China involve its intrusion into Japan’s territorial thus far kept its frequent encounters with the SDF and
waters, its violation of Japan’s airspace and even danger- Japanese Coast Guard at a low simmer, avoiding escala-
ous actions that could cause a contingency situation, tion yet ensuring that the standoff remains in play.
which are extremely regrettable. China should accept and Short of capitulation, Japan has had no choice but to
stick to the international norms.”13 oblige in the cat-and-mouse game, lest it concede to Chi-
Since 2011, the defense ministry’s internal think tank, na’s jurisdictional claims or to its larger strategic aims in
the National Institute for Defense Studies, has published maritime Asia. And because Beijing has carefully cali-
annual reports on China’s security policy, offering a valu- brated its displays of force, Tokyo must respond judiciously
able regional perspective and a second opinion to the to Chinese provocations. As China grows more powerful,
Pentagon’s assessment of Chinese military power. Notably, this twilight phenomenon—featuring nervy close encoun-
the institute devoted the entire 2012 issue to Chinese ters falling well short of armed conflict—is likely to
maritime strategy and activities.14 become a new “normal.” Japan thus finds itself in a pro-
In the meantime, North Korea refuses to fade into tracted contest of wills with no end in sight.
the background. In a series of provocations in 2010, As the NSS observes, “The Asia-Pacific region has
North Korea sank the South Korean corvette Cheonan, become more prone to so-called ‘gray zone’ situations,
revealed a new uranium-enrichment facility, and shelled situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingen-
an island along the inter-Korean frontier. Pyongyang’s cies over territorial sovereignty and interests. There is a
ongoing development of its nuclear weapons and missile risk that these ‘gray zone’ situations could further develop
programs continues to pose a major security threat into grave situations.”16 An incident at sea or a midair
to Tokyo. North Korea has thus far conducted a collision could trigger Sino-Japanese interactions that
nuclear test in 2006, 2009, and 2013. A fourth test quickly spin out of control. In January 2013, a Chinese
will reportedly provide the reclusive regime sufficient frigate locked its fire-control radar on a Japanese destroyer,
data to design a nuclear warhead small enough to fit a threatening gesture that typically precedes weapons
atop a ballistic missile. release. Chinese fighters’ dangerously close intercepts of
Since the 1990s, North Korea has test-launched a Japanese surveillance aircraft in May and June 2014 lend
series of ballistic missiles, with varying degrees of success. credibility to fears that frequent military encounters could
In December 2012, Pyongyang placed a satellite into lead to accidents and even spiraling escalation.
orbit following a failed bid eight months earlier. Widely The NDPG further notes, “Amid the increasingly
seen as a disguise for a missile test, the successful space severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF,
launch demonstrated North Korea’s advances in long- in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to
range rocketry and its potential ability to develop inter- various situations, including ‘gray zone’ situations which
continental ballistic missiles. After a nearly five-year require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situa-
hiatus, the country resumed testing of its medium-range tions and the duration of responses are both increasing.”17
Nodong ballistic missile, splashing two into the Sea of Tokyo clearly recognizes that China’s aggression is not a
 -6-

passing phenomenon; rather, it will likely intensify in the the SDF has embarked on a series of military moderniza-
coming years. As such, the NDPG asserts, “Japan will tion programs.
swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray
zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to Force Modernization Trends
continuously address a protracted situation.”18
To cope with the ambiguities and complex demands of Japan boasts one of the most modern and professional mil-
gray-zone contingencies, the NDPG pledges to “build a itaries in the world. During the Cold War, the SDF com-
Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft plemented—and filled the gaps of—the US military
and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and presence in the Western Pacific. Japan’s armed forces
connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and shielded the home islands while the major forward bases
capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide along the Japanese archipelago allowed the United States
range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.”19 to project power across Asia and beyond. The Japanese
Such a force, according to the MTDP, “will provide an Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF’s) surface, undersea,
effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a and air units bottled up Soviet naval forces in the Sea of
diverse range of activities based on joint operations Japan. The maritime service also kept open the sea lanes
seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they and secured the maritime approaches to Japan, which
demand, while prioritizing particularly important func- were critical to the nation’s economic well-being.
tions and capabilities through optimal resource alloca- The ASDF’s modern fighters ensured that Japan could
tion.”20 Despite the impenetrable jargon typical of defense defend the airspace over and near the country. The
reports, these stated objectives provide a roadmap to the nation’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) bristled with
SDF’s modernization programs and future force structure. tanks and artillery to defend against a full-scale Soviet
The Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept is the invasion of the homeland, particularly against Hokkaido
product of a steady evolution in Japanese strategic Island. The SDF was—and remains—largely a defensive
thought. Notably, the 2010 NDPG formally jettisoned force designed to maintain the nation’s territorial
the Basic Defense Force Concept, a Cold War legacy integrity, possessing limited offensive power projection
premised on strong yet relatively immobile defenses capabilities. Japan’s current force structure and posture are
designed to repel assault and predicated on a largely thus legacies of this superpower rivalry.
passive deterrence posture. Instead, according to the As a quintessential maritime nation, it is not surprising
2010 NDPG, a dynamic defense force would take the that Japan counts the MSDF as its leading service. Over
place of static defense, and agility would be the watch- the past decade, Japanese naval power has evolved in
word of the new force. Such forces could swiftly deploy both quantitative and qualitative terms. In 2010,
to remote islands for a variety of contingencies, meeting Tokyo announced its plan to increase its world-class
challenges as they arose. To develop a dynamic defense submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats, representing a nearly
force, the SDF would concurrently rejuvenate aerial, 40 percent jump in size. The decision was all the more
surface, and underwater surveillance operations. remarkable because the number of boats had stayed fixed

Leading this growth is the cutting-edge Sōryū-class

The dynamic joint defense force thus carries forward at 16 since 1976.
many of the key tenets developed in 2010. In addition to

world, the Sōryū is superior to its predecessor by virtually

mobility and readiness, the 2013 NDPG emphasizes the diesel-electric submarine. The largest of its kind in the
close coordination among naval, air, and ground forces.
The inherently amphibious character of the Japanese- every index of performance. It is the first Japanese boat
held islands in the East China Sea demands such integra- fitted with air-independent propulsion, a fuel-cell technol-
tion of capabilities. At the same time, the 2013 NDPG ogy that permits submarines to operate underwater for
calls on the SDF to establish an effective intelligence, sur- extended periods while quieting their noise signature. In
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) architecture that short, the MSDF leads the region in conventional subma-
would blanket the East China Sea with a variety of sen- rine warfare, constituting the benchmark against which
sors to better monitor China’s naval and air activities. other Asian navies will be compared over the next decade.
All three services would benefit enormously from such an Notably, Japan has been able to invest in its undersea
enhanced ability to keep track of Chinese forces. To meet prowess without imposing undue burdens on its fiscal
the ambitions of the dynamic joint defense force concept, position. The MSDF has traditionally decommissioned its
 -7-

submarines unusually early, introducing more advanced TABLE 1

boats to replace older ones that could have stayed in NDPG COMPARISON: PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
active service for at least another decade. To support the
1995 2013
current buildup, the maritime service began keeping its NDPG NDPG Future
existing boats at sea longer, allowing for a steady growth SDF
in fleet size without substantially increasing acquisition Active-Duty Personnel 145,000 151000* 151,000
costs. Japan will likely meet its 22-boat target before the GSDF
end of the decade. Tanks 900* 700* 300*
The MSDF’s surface fleet, comprised of nearly 50 Artillery 900* 600* 300*
major surface combatants, has also undergone a makeover. MSDF

two Hyūga-class helicopter carriers with a full load dis-

In 2009, the maritime service commissioned the first of Destroyers 50* 47 54
(Aegis-equipped destroyers) — 6 8
placement of 19,000 tons. Capable of embarking as many Combat aircraft 170* 170* 170*
as 11 helicopters, the carrier is a powerful antisubmarine Submarines 16 16 22
warfare (ASW) platform. ASDF
In 2013, Japan launched the first of two Izumo-class Combat aircraft 400* 340* 360*
ASW helicopter carriers that displace 27,000 tons at full Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2014,” figures II-
load and carry up to 14 helicopters. Measuring nearly 4-3-2 and II-4-3-3, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014
_Figure_1st_0730.pdf.
250 meters in length, the Izumo will enter service in Notes: An asterisk denotes approximate figures. The “Future” column
2015 as the largest warship the Japanese have built since derives from the 2013 NDPG’s discussion of a future defense posture that
will probably be achieved within a 10-year period.
World War II. It promises to substantially boost Japan’s

the Hyūga-class carriers.

ability to conduct and sustain ASW operations alongside
Japan is also developing its own stealth fighter, the
Additionally, two more Aegis-equipped surface com- Advanced Technology Demonstrator–X, to replace
batants will join the four Kongō-class and two Atago- the F-2s. The C-2 transport, the successor to the C-1,
class guided missile destroyers to enhance Japan’s missile promises to substantially improve the range and capacity
defense capabilities at sea. In 2012, the first of four of the ASDF’s lift. Japan’s air service will acquire new
Akizuki-class guided missile destroyers was commissioned airborne early-warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers,
to provide antiair, antisurface, and antisubmarine cover and transports to augment the ASDF’s ability to patrol
for the helicopter carriers and Aegis-equipped destroyers. the airspace around the Japanese islands. Japan will also
For the MSDF’s air fleet, the P-1s—the next-generation invest in UAVs—a joint asset available to the three
maritime patrol aircraft—will eventually replace the services—to enhance its ISR capabilities. The leading
aging P-3Cs as Japan’s main shored-based, fixed-wing contender to enter service with the ASDF is the high-
ASW unit. altitude, long-endurance Global Hawk.
The ASDF fields a mix of fourth- and third-generation The GSDF is undergoing the most dramatic restructur-
fighters, including nearly 200 F-15s, 90 F-2s (a variant ing and reorganization of recent years. Reflecting Tokyo’s
of the American F-16), and 60 F-4s. A modest number judgment that the risk of a homeland invasion is negligi-
of KC-767 aerial refueling tankers, E-767 Airborne ble, about 700 main battle tanks and 600 artillery pieces
Warning and Control System aircraft, and E-2C airborne will be reduced to 300 and 300, respectively, over a
early-warning aircraft provide support to Japan’s air 10-year period. Tank and artillery units will also be
superiority and multirole combat aircraft. A fleet of removed from Honshu Island and consolidated on
C-130 and C-1 transports furnishes limited strategic lift Hokkaido and Kyushu Islands. (See table 1.)
to Japanese forces. To enhance responsiveness and mobility, the GSDF
The most prominent and expensive modernization will form two rapid-deployment divisions and two rapid-
program for the air service is that of the fifth-generation deployment brigades. Most notably, the ground service
F-35 fighters. Because of the prohibitive per-unit cost of will create a new marine brigade capable of conducting
the aircraft, which has risen further with Japan’s participa- amphibious operations to retake remote islands seized by
tion in the local production of the fighters’ parts, the enemy forces. Japan will procure the AAV-7 amphibious
ASDF currently plans to acquire only 42 F-35s. assault vehicles and V-22 tiltrotor aircraft that would
 -8-

provide Japanese marines with organic lift capability to squadron to Naha Airbase in Okinawa, reinforcing the

three Ōsumi-class tank-landing ships to accommodate

project forces ashore. squadrons already there. And the MSDF will refit its
It is worth noting that these modernization efforts will
likely strengthen the SDF’s capacity to project only lim- the planned purchases of the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft and
ited power in the coming years. Notwithstanding breath- the AAV-7 amphibious assault vehicle. In June 2013, in

MV-22 landed on the Hyūga helicopter carrier during an

less commentary surrounding the unveiling of the an early sign of Japanese intentions, a US Marine Corps
Izumo-class helicopter carrier, the MSDF is many steps
and years away from acquiring a fixed-wing carrier-strike allied exercise.
force. Long-range bombers or intercontinental ballistic Japan is also applying lessons learned from its Cold
missiles are conspicuously missing from the ASDF’s inven- War experiences. In anticipation of a massive Soviet
tory, and the GSDF can only conduct limited expedi- amphibious assault on Hokkaido Island, the Japanese
tionary operations for territorial defense. developed an anti-invasion strategy that employed shore-
The SDF is still very much the shield that counts on based missile units to strike approaching enemy transports.
the American spear to fulfill the full range of missions in Tokyo is now replicating this asymmetric tactic in the
Japan’s defense. This is consistent with Tokyo’s current south. The 2013 NDPG calls on the GSDF to “maintain
constitutional interpretation prohibiting the possession of surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent
weaponry capable of prosecuting offensive operations. invasion of Japan’s remote islands while [invading forces
Any attempt to depart from this defensive orientation will are] still at sea.”23
not escape Japan’s democratic processes, involving Two years earlier, the GSDF deployed several units

Amami Ōshima, which is near the northern end of the

painstaking negotiations and debates. Fears of creeping armed with Type 88 antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) to

Ryūkyūs. In November 2013, the GSDF put ashore Type

Japanese militarism are thus unwarranted.

Defending the Southwest Islands 88 missiles on Miyako Island as a part of a larger military
exercise. These unprecedented shows of force were no

strengthen its defense posture along the Ryūkyū Islands

As successive policy documents make clear, Tokyo will doubt directed at Beijing, as Chinese naval flotillas fre-
quently transit the strait between Miyako and Okinawa
in the southwest, the geographic epicenter of the Islands. The message was not lost on the Chinese.

Ryūkyūs, Japan might be able to exploit a permanent

Sino-Japanese rivalry. By beefing up defenses along the The GSDF’s truck-launched Type 88 ASCM makes for
an ideal weapon on the Southwest Islands. With a range
geographic advantage. The island chain gives the SDF of 110 miles, Type 88s can strike warships at sea from sites

Ryūkyū narrow seas while converting the eastern edge of

the option of closing off Chinese access to the high far inland. Well-placed ASCM batteries could cover all
seas—much as Japan’s Home Islands formed a physical
barrier that kept the Soviet Navy bottled up in the Sea the East China Sea into a no-go area for Chinese surface
of Japan—and provide a form of strategic leverage. forces. The GSDF has begun acquiring the Type 12
Indeed, given Beijing’s deeply embedded fears of being ASCM, the successor to the Type 88.24 Boasting greater
denied access to the global commons, a powerful blocking reach, precision, and survivability, these new missile units
force along the Southwest Islands could bolster Japan’s promise to render transiting straits or nearby waters even
deterrence posture.21 more perilous for Chinese mariners.

trates, an effective defense of the Ryūkyūs would require

The MTDP directs the GSDF to establish a new As the Dynamic Joint Defense Force concept illus-

island of the Ryūkyū archipelago, strategically located

coastal reconnaissance unit on Yonaguni, the westernmost
unprecedented coordination among the three services.
about 70 miles east of Taiwan and about 100 miles south- The GSDF’s amphibious forces and shore-based antiship
west of the Senkakus.22 A garrison on Yonaguni would missile units would rely on the lift capabilities of the
extend Japan’s situational awareness to its largely unde- ASDF’s air transports and the MSDF’s vessels to rapidly
fended and potentially vulnerable southern flank. In a reach islands stretching over 1,000 kilometers between
cross–Taiwan Strait war, for example, Chinese forces Kyushu Island and Taiwan. The coastal reconnaissance
would likely transit the seas and airspace near Yonaguni to garrison on Yonaguni would provide early warning to air
attack Taiwan’s less-defended east coast. The ASDF will and naval units. The Type 88 and Type 12 ASCM
redeploy an airborne early-warning squadron and a fighter launchers would require the cuing and targeting data from
 -9-

the MSDF’s airborne early-warning aircraft to conduct debate. In reference to the North Korean missile threat,
over-the-horizon strikes against enemy surface forces. The the latest NDPG and the MTDP obliquely hint at revisit-
ASDF’s UAVs, when they enter service, would enhance ing a counterstrike capability. The NDPG states:
the situational awareness of all units operating around the
Southwest Islands. Above all, Japanese warships, sub- Based on appropriate role and mission sharing
marines, and fighters must ensure sea control and air supe- between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen
riority, without which amphibious operations and island the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a whole
defense would founder. Mutual support among the three through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and
services in a complex operational environment is thus response capability, Japan will study a potential
essential to success. form of response capability to address the means of
ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and
A Conventional Counterstrike Option? take means as necessary.27

If the military balance continues to tilt in Beijing’s favor, In other words, all options are back on the table. What
Tokyo could feel compelled to deter by punishment, would a conventional missile option look like? Tokyo
which could entail inflicting unacceptable levels of pain would almost certainly limit itself to counterforce strikes
on China should the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aimed exclusively at enemy military units. This would
ever attack Japan and Japanese forces. To retaliate directly require Japan to plan for counteroffensive operations
against China with such force, Japan would have to against Chinese military forces, including those deployed
develop offensive strike capabilities designed to hold at on the mainland.
risk a range of assets, especially those on the mainland Equipping Japanese forces with conventional long-
that Beijing highly values. In theory, Tokyo’s ability to range precision-strike weapons, such as the venerable
impose prohibitive costs on China would deter the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, would not only be
Chinese military from acting in the first place. Japanese relatively affordable but also technically feasible. In partic-
debates about the constitutionality of attacking enemy ular, Japanese destroyers, submarines, and aircraft armed
territory, dating back to the 1950s, suggest that a decision with Tomahawks or their equivalents could strike large
to pursue deterrence by punishment is not farfetched. fixed targets, such as the over-the-horizon radars, essential
While an offensive posture would no doubt stoke for conducting Chinese antiaccess operations. As Chinese
political controversy, serious debates about acquiring dependence on land-based sensors to effectively employ
land-attack cruise missiles have surfaced in Japan from its theater-strike systems increases, Japan may find the
time to time since at least 2005.25 The discourse has cen- strategic dividends of a counterstrike capability opera-
tered primarily on the legalities of Tokyo’s hypothetical tionally attractive and, thus, politically persuasive.
decision to attack North Korean missile bases in the event
of a crisis. But it can be assumed that Japan would not Defense Budget Woes
limit the missile’s use to Pyongyang if Japan ever acquired
such a weapon system. While Tokyo’s modernization plans are well tailored to
In 2009, the subcommittee of the defense policymak- address China’s growing challenge, Japan may have trou-
ing council of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sub- ble sustaining or expanding them to keep up with the
mitted a proposal endorsing the acquisition of offensive Chinese military. On paper, Japan’s annual defense
missiles. The committee called on Japan to “maintain the budget, at nearly $48.6 billion in 2013, is impressive.28
capability to attack enemy missile sites” and recom- Indeed, Japan is ranked fifth in the world in military
mended developing cruise and ballistic missiles and the expenditures, following the United States, China, Russia,
space-based systems to support missile operations.26 The and France. But such a high figure paints a superficial
LDP’s electoral defeat in September 2009 ended further picture at best. For decades, Japan capped its defense bud-
discussions on this issue. get at 1 percent of GDP—far below figures expected of
Nevertheless, the report represented a significant mile- great powers—as an expression of its pacifist orientation.
stone in postwar Japanese thinking about defense and Although Tokyo is not legally committed to such fiscal
helped legitimize the notion of going on the offense. constraint, longstanding practice has formed a powerful
Prime Minister Abe’s electoral victory has resurrected the normative prohibition against shattering this ceiling.
 - 10 -

Consequently, the fixed defense budget FIGURE 1

has plateaued alongside anemic eco- JAPANESE VERSUS CHINESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
nomic growth since the early 1990s.
Moreover, Japanese government debt is 180
Japan
nearly 250 percent of GDP, and soaring

Constant 2011 US $ (Billions)

160
China
social security expenditures owing to 140

Japan’s rapidly aging society have 120

intensified competition over ever- 100

scarcer financial resources. Such fiscal 80

60
burdens could prove crippling in the
40
years ahead, draining the political will
20
to spend substantially more on defense.
0
The past decade’s budgetary trends

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13
20
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20
reflect Japan’s monetary predicament.
Year
The defense budget suffered cuts for 11
consecutive years, dropping from ¥4.94 Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
trillion in 2002 to ¥4.64 trillion in www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database.
29 Note: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s total military expenditures for China
2012. In 2013, Prime Minister Abe’s are estimates.
government announced a very modest
0.8 percent budgetary increase over the previous year, $112 billion, more than doubling Japan’s $51 billion
reversing the steady decline. The cabinet then approved a defense budget.32 (See figure 1.) Such an extraordinary
2.8 percent boost to its defense budget for fiscal year 2014, reversal in fortunes between two rival regional powers is
the largest year-on-year increase since the mid-1990s. rare by historical standards. Ominously, Japan’s persis-
In light of the deteriorating security environment, the tently low economic growth rates will likely permit
decision to reverse the steady decline was long overdue. China to further widen the spending gap.
While the spending hikes are welcome news, they are
unlikely to provide sufficient relief. Military moderniza- Strategy-Resource Mismatch?
tion programs will compete with other priorities. For
example, compensation for government pay cuts following Beyond budgetary constraints, Japan’s longstanding
the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disas- ambitions to fulfill wider international responsibilities
ters could largely nullify the growth in outlays. It thus befitting a major power—captured by Abe’s concept
remains unclear how much more capability these modest of “proactive contribution to peace”—could spread the
increases will buy. SDF too thin. Since Japan’s dispatch of minesweepers
Japan’s budgetary woes are even more alarming in to the Persian Gulf after the First Gulf War in 1991,
comparative terms. China has dramatically surpassed successive Japanese administrations have deployed
Japan in defense spending over the past decade. The ground, air, and naval forces far beyond Japan’s
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute esti- own neighborhood to conduct “international peace
mates that the Chinese defense budget, measured in con- cooperation operations.”
stant 2011 dollars, grew from $52.8 billion in 2002 to The 2013 MTDP defines such operations as “activities
$159.5 billion in 2012. Japan, by contrast, virtually stood cooperatively carried out by the international society to
still, with its budget declining slightly from $60.7 billion improve the international security environment such as
to $59.5 billion over the same period. 30 UN Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assis-
The Japanese Ministry of Defense reckons that China’s tance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields
defense spending grew by 350 percent from 2003 to 2012, of non-traditional security.”33 Since Japan’s first peace-
while Japan’s budget shrank slightly during that decade.31 keeping mission in Cambodia in 1992, Japan has sent
The International Institute for Strategic Studies paints a peacekeepers around the world, including to the Golan
similarly stark picture. In 1990, Japan spent, in nominal Heights in the Levant, to South Sudan, to East Timor,
terms, nearly $29 billion on defense compared to China’s and to Haiti. Japanese forces distinguished themselves in
$6 billion. By 2013, Chinese expenditures soared to rendering assistance to stricken nations following the
 - 11 -

2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and to the Philippines in the possible that Japanese political ends will outstrip ways
aftermath of the 2013 Haiyan typhoon. and means.
In a post-9/11 show of solidarity with the United
States, Tokyo committed MSDF vessels to the coalition Japan’s Looming Demographic Crisis
naval contingent supporting combat operations in
Afghanistan. MSDF tankers resupplied coalition Over the long term, Tokyo will confront a structural and
warships, and Aegis destroyers guarded against air and virtually irreversible challenge to its hard power. Japan’s
surface threats in the Arabian Sea. MSDF vessels supplied rapidly aging society is pushing the nation toward an
fuel oil and water to customers from about a dozen unprecedented demographic crisis that could have dire
countries—including the United States, Pakistan, France, implications for its defense posture in the coming decades.
Britain, and Germany—until the mission lapsed in Owing to low fertility, high life expectancy, and trifling
January 2010. immigration, Japan will be significantly older and smaller
Over the past decade, Japan has participated in in 2030 than it is today. The population will likely decline
various global efforts to secure peace. The country from 128 million in 2010 to 116 million 20 years hence,
was a founding participant in the Proliferation Security averaging a loss of more than 660,000 Japanese citizens
Initiative in 2003 and has remained one of the initiative’s per year.
foremost proponents. Moreover, a modest-sized GSDF During this same period, Japan’s working-age popula-
contingent deployed to Iraq in January 2004 for tion (ages 15 to 64) will shrink by 17 percent, from 81
noncombat duty. And Tokyo joined the fight against million to 67 million. The median age of the population
Indian Ocean piracy in July 2009, committing to an will rise from 45 to 50, and about a third of the popula-
open-ended, out-of-area deployment. Finally, Japanese tion will be over 65 years old by 2030. Some forecasts esti-
mariners continue to ply the anarchic Gulf of Aden mate that Japan’s population may shrink to 90 million by
and Arabian Sea alongside a multinational contingent midcentury, representing an astounding 30 percent
of naval forces. Tokyo subsequently established a decrease from its peak years in the late 2000s.34
military base at Djibouti to support forward-deployed Population decline inevitably reduces the pool of man-
MSDF units, Japan’s first overseas base since World power available for military service. The figures are sober-
War II. ing. The male population eligible to join the SDF (ages 18
While these praiseworthy activities have set a power- to 26) peaked at 9 million in 1994. In just over 15 years,
ful precedent for fulfilling Prime Minister Abe’s wider this age group recorded 30 percent drop, plummeting to
agenda, competing imperatives will likely force Japan around 6 million.
to prioritize narrower national interests above global By 2030, SDF-eligible males will fall to less than
security. As the security environment deteriorates 5 million. By contrast, the United States will likely
closer to home, Japan’s willingness to spend political experience a 16 percent increase for the same cohort
and military capital on extraregional missions will between 2010 and 2030. The cost of fielding troops for
diminish commensurately. combat will rise as manpower availability dwindles. In
Moreover, the Japanese government will place greater the coming years, maintaining satisfactory levels of
weight on managing direct threats to sovereignty and recruitment and retention will likely tax Tokyo’s
material prosperity than on meeting abstract, diffuse resources. Indeed, the 2013 NDPG specifically cites
challenges in regions where Japan remains a marginal the declining birthrate as a factor in pressurizing the
player. As an economically dynamic, militarily strong recruiting environment.35
China eyes the Senkakus and the wider East China Recent defense policy documents have held out
Sea, Japan’s SDF, which is already inferior in numbers hope that technology will potentially lessen the effect
to the PLA, is losing its edge in its main East Asian of personnel shortages. But most military operations—
theater, even as threats to Japanese interests in other ranging from high-end conventional wars to post-
parts of the world remain remote, ill-defined, and of conflict reconstruction—soak up manpower. Gee-whiz
indefinite duration. Whether the Japanese government technologies, such as unmanned systems, only go so
can allocate resources deftly enough to balance traditional far. War fighters in the field and support crews in the
against nontraditional military functions remains rear must still do much of the heavy lifting. Japan’s
uncertain. If Tokyo fails to prioritize, then it is entirely response to the March 2011 tsunami was the starkest
 - 12 -

reminder of this reality: Tokyo called up more than Notes

100,000 military personnel—about 40 percent of the
active-duty force—for relief operations, the largest 1. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
deployment of troops in Japan’s postwar history. In National Security Strategy (December 17, 2013), www.cas.go.jp/jp
short, boots on the ground still count as much in peace- /siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, 1.
time as they do in war. 2. The NDPG was previously published in 1976, 1995, 2004, and
Unless Japan is prepared for a major military buildup, 2010.
which appears politically doubtful and fiscally unsus- 3. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
tainable, the country’s shrinking pool of manpower Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014–FY2018) (December 17,
will weigh heavily on Japanese decision makers. It 2013), www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014
remains to be seen whether such socioeconomic /pdf/Defense_Program.pdf.
pressures will increase temptations to turn inward, 4. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
even as Japan’s external security environment grows National Security Strategy, 3–4.
more contentious. 5. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond (Decem-
Will Japan Rise to the Challenge? ber 17, 2013), www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014
/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf, 5.
China’s rapid ascent has spurred Japanese policymakers to 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Cabinet Decision on Devel-
reallocate considerable material resources and to expend opment of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and
intellectual energy on hard power during an era of fiscal Protect Its People (July 1, 2014), www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page23e
austerity. Chinese behavior in recent years suggests that _000273.html, 8.
the stakes now involve nothing less than Japan’s and 7. Ibid., 8.
China’s future places in maritime Asia. At the very 8. Ibid.

China Sea and through the Ryūkyū Islands, see Japanese Ministry
least, Tokyo’s choices have narrowed: it can either 9. For detailed flight paths of Chinese aircraft over the East
accommodate Beijing in the near future, or it can act
now to preserve the freedom of action it has enjoyed of Defense, “China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace,”
for decades. Not since the 1969 Nixon Doctrine—a www.mod.go.jp /e/d_act/ryouku/index.html.
presidential call to America’s Asian allies to protect 10. Kosuke Takahashi and James Hardy, “Japan Sees Big Rise in
themselves against external threats, even as the United Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft,” HIS Jane’s 360, April 9, 2014,
States retrenched—has Japan confronted such strategic www.janes.com/article/36580/japan-sees-big-rise-in-scrambles-
danger and stark options. against-chinese-.
Only sound strategy will help Tokyo navigate the 11. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
uncertainties of living in an unstable security environ- National Security Strategy, 12.
ment. And the extent to which Japan can shape its 12. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
hard power to serve an effective strategy will depend on National Defense Program Guidelines, 3–4.
meaningful progress along multiple fronts. Tokyo must 13. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013 (July
pivot even more decisively away from its northward 2013), www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2013.html, 39.
orientation toward Russia—an anachronistic Cold 14. National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China

Ryūkyūs. Japan must stubbornly hold the line there,

War legacy—and toward its southern flank along the Security Report 2011 (February 2012), www.nids.go.jp/english
/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2011_A01.
maintaining high levels of alertness even while keeping pdf, 4.
its cool in the face of persistent Chinese probes and 15. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
provocations. To do so, the SDF must develop unprece- National Defense Program Guidelines, 3.
dented levels of cooperation and trust among its services 16. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
to secure an extended front far from the Home Islands. National Security Strategy, 11.
Above all, Tokyo must sustain the political will and invest 17. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
in the capabilities necessary to take up the Chinese chal- National Defense Program Guidelines, 7.
lenge. Only thus can Japan hope to stay in a competition 18. Ibid. 13.
that promises to be a long one. 19. Ibid. 8.
 - 13 -

20. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 27. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
Medium Term Defense Program, 1. National Defense Program Guidelines, 20.
21. See Michael Pillsbury, “The Sixteen Fears: China’s 28. The defense budget is given in 2013 dollars. For more
Strategic Psychology,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 5 information, see Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
(October–November 2012), 152–54. tute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, www.sipri.org/research
22. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, /armaments/milex/milex_database.
Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014–FY2018), 7. 29. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, 119.
23. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council, 30. Data drawn from Stockholm International Peace Research
National Defense Program Guidelines, 22. Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (2014), http://milex-
24. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget of data.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-
Japan: Overview of FY 2014 Budget (March 20, 2014), www.mod.go.jp 2013.xlsx.
/e/d_budget/pdf/251009.pdf , 8. 31. Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2013, 122.
25. See, for example, Sugio Takahashi, “Strike Capability against 32. I thank Bradford Lee for this insight. See International Insti-
Enemy Territory under Exclusive Defense Policy: One Option for tute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991, 150; 165; and
Coping with Enemy Missile Threats,” NIDS Security Studies 8, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
no. 1 (October 2005): 105–21; and Hideaki Kaneda, “Is It Possible 2014, 230; 250.
for the SDF to Attack Enemy Missile Bases?” Sekai No Kansen 33. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
(February 2007). Medium Term Defense Program, 1–2.
26. National Defense Division of the Liberal Democratic Party, 34. United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision
Subcommittee of the Defense Policymaking Council, A Proposal 1 (New York: Population Division, 2008), 292–93.
Regarding the New National Defense Program Guidelines (June 6, 2009), 35. Prime Minister’s Cabinet and National Security Council,
11–12. National Defense Program Guidelines, 26.