Stanis³aw Matsumoto

University of Warsaw

Japan's Role in Security of The Asia-Pacific Region

Abstract
This paper examines Japan's present and future
international security role in the light of changes affecting
the Asia-Pacific Region. Japan always had a major impact
on this region despite of its post-World War II
uncomfortable geopolitical position. In this paper the
author concludes that Japan is now more favorably
disposed to play a “comprehensive international role” in
the field of regional security. Tokyo seems to be eager to go
on with security co-operation with Washington D.C.,
however at the same time gradually increasing self-
responsibility for its defense and the security of its
surrounding environment. Although Japan with no doubt
has its strategic interests in Asia-Pacific, nowadays it is
likely to play more than only a supportive role in this
region. From the political point of view, the author tries to
prove, that Japan is well prepared to play a role of regional
stabilizer, but to do this Japan requires to choose carefully
its independent path without undermining strategic
relations with the United States.
Keywords: Japan, United States, defense, security,
international relations.
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Introduction

Japan's international position in geopolitical world had been always

attracting attention since its great victories over Qing's China (1894-1895) and
Tsar's Russia (1904-1905). After its “national seclusion” period in Tokugawa Era
(1603-1868) the Japanese made such fast progress in every field, that nobody
has expected during first decades of re-opening its borders to the outside
world, especially for the occidental powers. Before and after World War I
Japan had already confirmed its position as a regional power with more
ambitious plans... After surrounding to the Allies in 1945 Japan has become an
occupied state with newly introduced constitution, in which it is forbidden to
maintain the army and thus, practically, not to play any significant role in even
regional security system. It was obvious, that Japan will not participate in
shaping military security even on its own territory. But soon when the Cold
War broke down, it became natural that country with such industrial and
economic potential should play more comprehensive role in the regional
security system.

However, the details of Japan's post-war security role in the said region
still remains the subject of intense debate among the international community
and of course in Japan itself. Although Japan is now politically and
economically independent state with its top scientific and technological
potential, the burden of lost Pacific War (1937-1945) is still, for some states,
overshadowing its non-aggressive image. After the fall of the Berlin Wall
(1990), which symbolized the end of the Cold War, an increasing number of
Japanese top politicians seems to adopt very quickly to new conditions. On the
other hand, Japanese society expresses great uncertainty to new geopolitical
situation.

In 1992, it was great responsibility for all Japanese cabinets facing both,
internal and external, critical reactions on dispatching Japanese Self Defense
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Forces (JSDF) abroad for the first time after World War Two. As Muthiah
Algappa mentioned: “Post-World War II Japan's international orientation has
been governed by three main factors: impressive economic growth (...); the U.S.
connection; and a pacifist tendency with an apolitical orientation arising from
the negative reaction in Japan to its experiences in the Pacific war.”

Despite on above, it seems that Japanese government plays with the

diversity of many opinions using the lack of consensus as an excuse to
maintain its military profile for self-defense. The limitations of using troops
included in Article 9 of post-war Constitution of Japan still determines the
politicians to deal with tight security collaboration with the United States as the
only way to survive in not friendly entourage. Paradoxically, it gives Japan
green light for focusing on other measures (mainly economic) to maintain the
stability in Asia-Pacific Region.

Breaking up with pacifism?

Until the end of 20th century Japan's security policy can be described as
rather passive. Still relying on U.S. security alliance Japan could concentrate
on soft-power measures, such as development assistance, direct and indirect
foreign investments, cultural promotion. Taking into consideration significant
changes in the Asia-Pacific Region, which took place after Cold War, Japan
has undertaken steps to redefine its security policy. In new reality, aspiring to
take over the role of regional leader, Japanese authorities are exposed to new
type of threats – growing economic and military power of China, nuclear threat
of North Korea and nowadays even “active” foreign policy of Russia.

December 2013 marked an important turning point in Japan’s evolving

security and defense policies. While the debate about Japan’s so-called
security ‘normalisation’ has been going on now for more than a decade, by
releasing three national security-related documents the conservative
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government led by Shinzo Abe since 2012 has dissipated any doubts that may
still linger regarding the ‘why, what and how’ of Japan’s national security. The
Abe administration adopted the first ever National Security Strategy (NSS) of
Japan – together with the country’s new national security doctrine, namely the
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), as well as the Mid-Term
Defense Program for 2014-2019. The last two documents replace the 2010
NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program adopted by the previous, centre-
left government of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Centred on a policy of
‘proactive contribution to peace’, the NSS sets out the main guidelines for
Japan’s national security for the next decade, including for the areas of sea,
outer space and energy. It also seeks to promote, both domestically and
internationally, a better understanding of the country’s strategic objectives and
responses.

Japan’s national security policy is driven, first of all, by a strong

perception of a shifting balance of power at the global level since the start of
the twenty-first century. In this regard, the documents make reference to the
emerging countries, especially to China’s increasing international presence, as
well as to the changing relative influence of the US. Specific threats to Japan’s
security at the global level include international terrorism as well as the threats
stemming from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and
their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles (BM). The Abe administration
further underscores the problems related to maintaining ‘open and stable seas’,
which include piracy, maritime disasters and, generally, the safety of sea lanes
of communication (SLOCs). What stands out here, in particular, is the
reference to the growing risk of incidents at sea, not least as a result of
competition between states over natural resources and unresolved sovereignty
issues. Specifically, the South China Sea disputes are provided as an example
in the NSS.

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At regional level, in the Asia-Pacific, the shifting balance of power is said

to give rise to regional tensions. Northeast Asia is singled out as an Asian
subregion with a large concentration of military power and where countries
have diverse security views (as well as different political systems). There is
also an explicit concern about escalation of the so-called ‘grey zone’ disputes
over territorial sovereignty and interests – which, in Japan’s view, further
complicates the Asia-Pacific strategic environment.

Shinzo Abe as a participant of 13th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapour,

describing changes in security environment in 21st Century, stated that the Asia
Pacific Region has experienced huge development changes merely in one
generation. Unfortunately, significant part of this growth is spent for military
purposes and arms' dealing. However, the ASEAN members are increasing
their defense budgets and modernizing their armed forces as a challenge for
rising regional power – Peoples' Republic of China. Also the US allies in the Far
East – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, do not remain calm and are adjusting
their budgets to new challenges in the field of national security.

Specific regional security challenges to Japan’s national security

discussed in the NSS and the NDPG are not new, and include North Korea’s
Ballistic Missile (BM) and nuclear developments as well as China’s military
modernisation and its intensified activities in the seas and airspace around
Japan. However, it is the increasing concern about maintaining the rule of law
at sea that appears to be of primary importance for the Abe administration.
The perception that Beijing is attempting to unilaterally change the status quo
‘by coercion’, disregarding international law and infringing upon the freedom
of navigation, refers to Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku (Diayou)
Islands in the East China Sea. The Abe government sees China’s overall
behaviour as an ‘issue of concern for the international community, including

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Japan’45. The overall conclusion, therefore, is that the security environment

surrounding Japan ‘is becoming increasingly tense’.

The core principles of Japan’s national security, as introduced in the

post-war years, are said to remain unchanged. These include maintaining an
exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses
a threat to other countries, and adhering to the three non-nuclear principles of
not possessing, not producing and not introducing nuclear weapons in the
country. The main message that the Abe administration seeks to send is one of
continuity: Japan remains ‘a peace-loving nation’46.

Based on this new national security principle and in line with its long-
standing policy of international cooperation, Japan is expected to become a
‘proactive contributor to peace’. The country’s contribution to international
security has been made primarily in the framework of the UN, including in
humanitarian relief missions and peacekeeping operations. Japan has a self-
imposed ban on exercising its right to collective self-defense based on the
interpretation of Article 9 (also known as the ‘peace clause’) of its 1947 post-
war Constitution.

As Abe has prioritised constitutional revision in order to allow Japan to

enter into collective self-defense arrangements, the shift in the NSS towards
proactive pacifism seeks to open up the way for Abe to move forward on this
policy initiative. This shift has alarmed some of Japan’s neighbours, notably
China and South Korea. As both countries suffered under Japan’s imperial rule
in Asia in the first half of the twentieth century, they now warily watch Abe’s
every step aimed at expanding Japan’s security role. The justification for
Tokyo’s move towards security activism, as discussed in the NSS, includes the

45
E. Atassanova-Cornelis, Japan's New Approach to National Security, in: Brief Issue of EU Institute of Security
Studies, January 2014
46
Precisely, it is the content – namely the shift in the NSS from the ‘one-country pacifism’ to ‘proactive
pacifism’ – that suggests new security aspirations. In: Mid-term National Defense Program for 2014-2019

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‘severe’ security environment that Japan faces and the Abe administration’s
belief that the international community expects the country to become an
active contributor to international peace. Furthermore, the successful pursuit of
Tokyo’s national interests – such as maintaining sovereignty and achieving
prosperity – is seen to be directly linked to the country’s efforts in the area of
international cooperation. In line with this thinking, Abe’s national security
objectives stress – in addition to deterring threats from reaching Japan
(national level) and improving the regional security situation in the Asia-Pacific
(regional level) – Tokyo’s role in global security and in building a stable
international community (global level).47

Japan’s capabilities and roles

Although the NSS mentions the strengthening of Japan’s diplomatic

creativity and its ‘soft’ (or non-military) power as well as its role in
international organisations, the weight of this strategic approach appears to be
placed on enhancing the country’s military capabilities, namely its ‘hard’
power. The document introduces the ‘highly effective and joint defense force’
concept, which emphasises collaborative operations among the three branches
of the Self-defense Forces (SDF), i.e. Ground, Maritime and Air SDF. This new
‘dynamic joint defense force’ will be equipped with advanced technology and
able to deter diverse threats, as well as respond in a swift and integrated
manner to various contingencies. These can include, for example, a potential
occupation by enemy forces of a remote island. Such a scenario has arguably
been considered by the Abe government: in April 2013 it adopted a five-year
blueprint for protecting the nation’s maritime interests, partly as a response to
Chinese claims in the East China Sea. In this regard, the NSS mentions that

47
Japan’s strategic approaches to national security may be divided into three major groups: strengthening
Japan’s own capabilities and roles; enhancing the US-Japan alliance; and cooperating for global peace and
stability. The strategic thinking of the Abe administration reveals a comprehensive picture of diplomatic and
defense policies as well as the utilisation of diverse resources designed to address challenges at the three levels
mentioned above – the national, the regional and the global.

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Japan will protect and develop remote islands near national borders as well as
examine ‘the situation of land ownership’ in such areas.

The maritime dimension of Japan’s national interests is underscored and

well reflected in the nature of the capabilities to be enhanced and the specific
contingencies to be tackled. The former include, for example, capabilities for
maritime surveillance and law enforcement as well as the SDF development of
‘full amphibious’ capability that would be necessary – in the Abe
administration’s view – for the potential recapturing of an occupied island.
Primary contingencies include ensuring the safety of sea and airspace
surrounding Japan and responding to offshore island invasion, along with
responses to BM attacks and threats in cyberspace. The NSS and the NDPG
express Japan’s determination to ‘fully protect its territories’ and ‘not to
tolerate any change in the status quo by coercion’, thereby sending a quite
unequivocal signal to China. The defense of the Nansei islands in
Southwestern Japan, in particular, will be strengthened. To this end, 52
amphibious vehicles and 17 Osprey transport aircraft will be introduced, which
will seek to provide the SDF with landing capabilities comparable to those of
the US Marine Corps. Furthermore, the NSS calls on Tokyo to play a leading
role in maintaining and developing ‘open and stable seas’, especially by
seeking to ensure the safety of SLOCs.

Other capabilities that are to be strengthened include, among others,

information-gathering and intelligence analysis as well as satellite
manufacturing and dual-use technologies. The NSS further underscores Japan’s
participation in joint development and production of defense-related
equipment, as well as its exports of weapons and military technology. By lifting
restrictions on weapons exports and engaging in joint manufacturing of arms, it
is hoped that Tokyo will enhance the international competitiveness of its
defense industry.

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The strengthening of Japan’s defense capabilities goes hand in

hand with changes in military spending. The current fiscal year, which started
in April 2013, has marked an increase of 0.8 % from 2012 and the first increase
in defense spending after 10 consecutive years of decline. Military spending is
projected to rise by more than 2.5% (to ¥4.81 trillion) in FY 2014. In 2010, the
DPJ-led administration earmarked ¥23.5 trillion (US$227 billion) for the 2011-
2016 five-year defense program. For its part, the Abe administration’s Mid-term
Defense Program for 2014-2019 projects a five-year defense spending of ¥24.7
trillion (US$240 billion). This will constitute a 5% increase to the military
budget over five years.

The US-Japan Alliance

In line with previous policies, the Abe administration sees the alliance
with the US – based on common strategic interests and universal values – as
‘the cornerstone of Japan’s security’, also playing an indispensable role in
fostering peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The NSS calls for enhancing
the effectiveness of the bilateral security arrangements, for instance by revising
the Guidelines for Japan-US defense Cooperation and strengthening bilateral
ties in the areas of Ballistic Missile defense and maritime affairs. However, the
‘hidden’ message that the NSS seems to send is one of strategic uncertainty.
This concerns the sustainability of the US commitments to Asian-Pacific
security against the background of America’s tight fiscal and economic
situation and, especially, China’s rise. Japan, therefore, appears to emphasise
the strengthening of its own defense and deterrence capabilities as the best
way of responding to a ‘severe’ regional environment while maintaining its
alliance with the US.

Security Cooperation with ASEAN

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Special attention in the NSS is also given to Tokyo’s role in promoting

multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, including in the framework of
ASEAN+3, as well as trilateral dialogues, such as the Japan-China-Korea
grouping. Concerning China, Abe’s thinking is dominated by the long-standing
Japanese objectives of encouraging Beijing to ‘adhere to international norms of
behaviour’ and enhance its ‘transparency’ in military affairs. While
constructing a ‘mutually beneficial relationship’ with China is the long-term
goal, urging the PRC ‘to exercise self-restraint’ appears to be an urgent priority
for Abe, indeed, reflecting Japan’s concern about Chinese behavior in
territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific.

Other initiatives that Japan is expected to pursue largely represent

continuity of previous policies. These range from contributing to UN
peacekeeping operations and the international disarmament efforts, to
promoting the rule of law and the free trade system, as well as the strategic
use of foreign aid. Abe’s policy approaches at the global level thus appear to
emphasise Japan’s ‘soft’ power, which stands in contrast with the focus on
‘hard’ power envisaged for Japan to deal with regional challenges in Asia.

In fact, the path that Japan has followed over the last 70 years is nothing
short of extraordinary. After the war, Japan reinvented itself as a peaceful
nation by going through a remarkable democratization and by promulgating a
new constitution that included the famous Article 9 “peace clause.” Japan built
an egalitarian society, achieved rapid economic recovery to become the second
largest economy in the world in less than 25 years, utilized its wealth to
establish itself as a leader in technological innovation, and became one of the
world’s leading providers of official development assistance—all the while
never firing a single bullet. Japan’s peaceful identity and its contributions to
global public goods have been recognized around the world, as evinced by its
positive image in global opinion polls.

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Abe’s NSS is significant not because of the shifts it appears to introduce,

but because it provides a clarification regarding Japan’s path towards
‘proactive pacifism’ – a tangible trend in Japan’s security policy since the start
of the century. It now seems quite clear that, for Japan, there is no turning
back...

Looking forward, Japan must make clear to the world that it is

continuing to face up to its wartime conduct; that it recognizes the pivotal role
of US support, which enabled Japan to reinvent itself; and that, based on its
proud record over the past 70 years, it will continue to work for the peace and
prosperity of the region in the future.

The Issue of Article 9

The domestic debate on Article 9 revision and the need for more
international contributions, too, has been a major characteristic of the security
debate in Japan in the past decade. What seems to be new is the (implicit)
emphasis placed on Japan’s own efforts, rather than on its alliance with the
US, for responding to the changing security environment.

To best position itself for future regional cooperation, the Japanese

government must pay more attention to how its foreign policy is perceived
among its neighbors. Most critically, it must clarify where it is moving with the
reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution, which it is undertaking in order
to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to engage in collective self-
defense. While the contemporary security environment makes it important to
move forward with a common-sense reinterpretation of Article 9 that will allow
limited forms of collective self-defense, more rigorous explanation is required

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to demonstrate that the reinterpretation set out in the cabinet’s July 2014
decision will maintain the constitution’s original spirit.

The Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation names three new conditions for the
use of force beyond cases where the Japanese homeland is under attack:
“When an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship
with Japan . . . threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to
fundamentally overturn the [Japanese] people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness”; when there are “no other means to repel the attack”; and when
the use of force is limited “to the minimum extent necessary.”

These conditions appear restrictive, but since they do not come with any
geographical limits, there is significant potential to push the envelope toward a
more expansive interpretation. For instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) could theoretically be interpreted as posing a threat to the
Japanese people’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Some may argue that this would open the door for the SDF to
participate in coalition air strikes against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, a scenario that
goes well beyond the spirit of the constitution.

Thus, conservatives argue that Japan cannot isolate itself from the global
phenomenon of terrorism and must be prepared to use the SDF to safeguard
Japanese interests. While there are merits to both arguments, Japan’s national
security policy must be determined in a calm and rational manner. The danger
now is that Japan’s security policy and postwar identity may be shifted by a
wave of emotional nationalism following these tragic deaths. In shaping new
policy, a careful balance must be maintained between clarifying the legitimate
roles of the SDF and maintaining Japan’s identity as a pacifist nation.

Building Long-Term Cooperation with China

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China is a rising star on the global stage, having achieved

unprecedentedly rapid economic growth, hosting key international events such
as the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2014 APEC Summit. From Japan’s
perspective, there is a risk that Chinese leaders might, for the sake of short-
term domestic political gains, choose to escalate anti-Japan rhetoric, further
politicize history, move unilaterally in the East and South China Seas, and
pursue their version of a “new model of great power relations” with the US in
a way that marginalizes Japan.

The meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Chinese President Xi

Jinping at the APEC Summit was an important first step in repairing Japan-
China relations, but further follow-through is needed. To this end, both
countries need long-term, win-win strategies to deepen regional cooperation.
China’s continued portrayals of Japan as a present-day adversary undermine
the long-term peace and prosperity of both China and the region by damaging
not only Japan-China trade and investment relations but also, and more
critically, the requisite regional stability needed for high-level regional
cooperation aimed at managing the shifting balance of power and deepening
regional economic integration.

Indeed, the need for investment in infrastructure in emerging and

developing economies across the region is huge. But the manner in which
China announced the establishment of the bank without prior consultations
with other countries leaves uncertainty as to whether it will uphold
international labor, environmental, and good governance standards, as well as
concerns about equitable representation for all member nations. Japan, South
Korea, the United States, the EU.48

48
H. Tanaka, Bolstering East Asian Cooperation 70 Years On, in: East Asia Insights, Feb. 2015

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Repairing Japan–South Korea Relations

Japan-ROK relations have been frosty over the last few years, and Prime
Minister Abe and President Park Geun-hye have yet to meet bilaterally despite
both being in office for two years. The primary issue that is blocking not only
a leaders’ meeting but also bilateral cooperation on other fronts is the 'comfort
women issue'. It is right for Japan to express its sincere apologies and remorse
for the treatment of the comfort women, such as through the 1993 Kono
Statement and the efforts of the Asian Women’s Fund. But Seoul’s
preconditions, which essentially assume that Japan should do more unilaterally
to resolve the issue despite the need for strong leadership from both sides,
have been disappointing. In order to realize a mutually acceptable resolution,
Japan and South Korea must enhance bilateral communication channels at all
levels of government and find a way to work together.

As the two most economically advanced East Asian democracies, Japan

and South Korea share overlapping strategic interests. They both have a stake
in coordinating joint contingency planning vis-à-vis North Korea, promoting a
regional order based on liberal free market principles and open regionalism,
and negotiating free trade pacts such as the China-Japan-ROK Free Trade
Agreement and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the
ASEAN+6 countries. There is no time to waste in resolving the comfort women
issue, but at the same time, discussions on critical shared interests cannot be
postponed as a diplomatic bargaining chip. It is time for Japan and South
Korea to reestablish a mindset of being regional partners with shared
democratic values and an atmosphere that encourages collaborative work.

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Solidifying US Engagement in Asia

While the US-Japan alliance remains strong 70 years after the war, a
number of thorny issues must be tackled to ensure it remains a bedrock for
regional stability. Two issues in particular that have the potential to damage
alliance confidence if not properly managed are the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) negotiations and the Okinawa military base issue. With regard to the
first issue, early agreement on the TPP is imperative not only for the further
liberalization of markets but also because the TPP has the potential to be
utilized as a vehicle to deepen cross-Pacific economic integration and establish
rules needed for 21st-century economic relations.

However, the bigger issue at hand is the broader strategic context of

how the US forward deployment can meet US objectives and the needs of the
US-Japan alliance. The question of whether the concentration of bases in
Okinawa might be gradually reduced needs to be periodically reviewed within
the context of the overall American forward deployment throughout the region,
advances in military technologies, the evolving roles and functions of the SDF,
and the expanding military cooperation between the United States and other
regional partners such as Australia, India, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

The United States has repeatedly insisted that it is committed to

remaining deeply engaged in Asia, but doubts still persist around the region
among those who have seen Washington’s involvement ebb and flow over the
years. Given the growing importance of the region, what is needed is a shift in
the United States toward a mindset in which it feels comfortable viewing itself
as a “resident political power” in East Asia. One way in which the United
States could move toward that goal is by spearheading the establishment of a
four-party China-Japan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism. The US
alliances with Japan and South Korea and the growing strategic weight of the
US-China relationship place the United States in the best position to take the

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lead in creating such a mechanism. It is an urgent task, given the need to

manage the shifting balance of power in the region, not to mention the serious
risk of accidental conflict if US-Japan and US-ROK joint military exercises are
misinterpreted by China’s increasingly active navy. A good first step would be
to establish standardized protocols and permanent emergency hotlines to deal
with any potential crises in the most efficient manner.

A Systematic Approach towards Security Policy

The Abe administration initiated a systematic approach towards national

security policy, creating a mechanism to plan and execute it and developing a
comprehensive strategy for it. The administration established the National
Security Council (NSC) and its staff, National Security Secretariat, located at
the Prime Minister’s Office in December 2013. The core of the NSC is the four
ministers meeting consisting of the prime minister, the foreign and defense
ministers, and the chief cabinet secretary, who meet regularly. The four
ministers meeting is expected to serve as a control tower for foreign and
defense policy related to national security, while larger meetings conduct
discussions in a wider context.

The Abe administration announced the first NSS in Japanese history on

December 17, 2013. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG 2013) for
fiscal year 2014 and beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (MTDP) for
fiscal years 2014-2018 were released on the same day based on the NSS,
covering a broader context encompassing the defense strategy. A defense
strategy and policies to implement it fit into the wider NSS context. In the case
of the United States, a national security strategy is issued at the presidential
level, which leads to a national defense strategy at the level of the secretary of
defense, following which the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops a
national military strategy. This, in turn, sets the strategic context for

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subordinate strategies such as those of service chiefs (army, navy, air force,
marines) and unified commanders (Pacific Command, etc.). This change in the
process of developing defense strategy and policy will ensure that they are
consonant with all other aspects of Japan’s security strategy such as those on
diplomacy, commerce, and trade, while fitting precisely into a broader picture
of NSS. The establishment of the NSC and a permanent staff for it reinforces
the planning and execution of strategy in a comprehensive manner.

When Japan moves in the direction dictated by the new NSS as a

“proactive contributor to peace,” deliberations on constitutional restraints
become more important. As the Cold War East-West confrontation
disappeared, a cooperative approach towards international security became
much more feasible. International peace activities, as UN PKO, have become
more frequent—more common than traditional peacekeeping following the
termination of armed conflict that includes “peace-building” operations.

Since 1992 when Japan sent its first peacekeepers to Cambodia, it has
actively participated in international peace operations. The JSDF contingents in
Cambodia in 1992 worked together with Korean peacekeepers in Timor le Este
in 2002-2004 for reconstruction of the two countries. During the PKO in
Cambodia in 1992-1993, in which Chinese and Japanese peacekeepers worked
together, the Chinese contingents suffered from a mortar attack resulting in two
fatalities and some dozen wounded. In the South Sudan there have been
fatalities, including Indian peacekeepers, while Japanese have been safe. While
UN PKOs are not intended for combat, they are not conducted under perfectly
safe conditions. There may be cases where the Japanese contingent needs the
assistance of the armed forces of other countries as well as where it is needed
to assist units from other countries. In the worst case scenario, the Japanese
contingent would be asked to protect other peacekeepers and not be able to do
so due to constitutional restraints. If this meant intentional failure to save
fellow peacekeepers from Asian countries such as Korea and China, it could

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result in another history issue lasting for a number of decades ahead.

Restraining from exercising the right of collective defense is obviously not
sufficient to show Japan’s determination to be a peace-loving nation.

Which Way Now? - Conclusion

Japan’s choices are: to strengthen the alliance with the United States in
order to assure its commitment to the region; and to build constructive
relations with China through engagement while hedging to avoid a situation
where Japan has to consider China as a hostile entity. For the alliance, it is
important to revise the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.” The
first guidelines, adopted in 1978, described operational cooperation between US
forces and the SDF and were revised in 1997 to adapt the alliance to the post-
Cold War environment. The ongoing efforts to revise the guidelines should be
extended to include the bilateral response to “gray-zone” situations as well as
bilateral cooperation for other peacetime activities such as counter-piracy,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations, and to deal with issues
related to new domains such as the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace. 49

Japan’s own defense buildup is also important in the context of the

Japan-US alliance because it shows the determination to take responsibility as
an ally. In parallel to this effort, Japan must be keen about taking measures to
reconstruct the legal basis for security that will strengthen the alliance, such as
those for the protection of US naval vessels on the open seas and the
interception of ballistic missiles that might be on their way to the United States.
The two governments are currently working on the new “Guidelines for
Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” which will provide the two with a golden
opportunity to coordinate their respective security policies and to share threat
perceptions and security priorities.

49
N. Yamaguchi, Evolution of Japan’s National Security Policy under the Abe Administration, in: The Asian
Forum, Jan.-Feb. 2015

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Aware of the importance of building and maintaining good relations with

Japan’s neighbors, the Abe administration has been active diplomatically and
successful in improving ties with many countries, notably the members of
ASEAN. It remains an urgent task to rebuild constructive relations with Korea
and China. For this reason, Japan will construct future-oriented and
multilayered relations and strengthen the foundation for security cooperation –
a key framework in realizing peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region.

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References
1. E. Atassanova-Cornelis, Japan's New Approach to National Security,
in: Brief Issue of EU Institute of Security Studies, January 2014
2. Mid-term National Defense Program for 2014-2019
3. H. Tanaka, Bolstering East Asian Cooperation 70 Years On, in: East
Asia Insights, Feb. 2015
4. N. Yamaguchi, Evolution of Japan’s National Security Policy
under the Abe Administration, in: The Asian Forum, Jan.-Feb. 2015

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