Courtney Freer 1

RENTIER
ISLAMISM
THE ROLE OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD IN THE GULF

Courtney Freer

LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series | 09

2 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

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RENTIER ISLAMISM: THE ROLE OF THE
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE GULF

Courtney Freer

LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series | 09

November 2015
4 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

About the Author

Courtney Freer is Research Officer at the LSE Kuwait Programme, Middle East Centre.
Having received a BA from Princeton University in Near East Studies and an MA from
The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, she has
recently completed her PhD in Politics at the University of Oxford. Courtney’s thesis
focused on revising rentier state theory by examining the socio-political role played by
Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in the so-called ‘super-rentiers’ of Kuwait, Qatar, and
the UAE. Courtney previously worked as Research Assistant at the Brookings Doha
Center and as a researcher at the US-Saudi Arabian Business Council. Her research
interests include the political and social role of Islam in the Gulf; the history and cur-
rent role of Islamist organisations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, in the GCC;
and political reform in the Gulf states.

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
represent those of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) or the Middle East
Centre. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s) and the
LSE Middle East Centre should be credited, with the date of the publication. While every effort has
been made to ensure the accuracy of the material in this paper, the author(s) and/or the LSE Middle
East Centre will not be liable for any loss or damages incurred through the use of this paper.

The London School of Economics and Political Science holds the dual status of an exempt charity
under Section 2 of the Charities Act 1993 (as a constituent part of the University of London), and a
company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 1985 (Registration no. 70527).
Courtney Freer 5

Executive Summary
Too often political discussion of oil-wealthy states like Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) becomes centred on the means in which their economic largesse facilitates
political quiescence. While rulers of these states, which I dub ‘super-rentiers’ due to their
massive oil and gas wealth, have at times used their riches as a means of buying good
will from their citizenries, they cannot and have not completely deterred independent
political actors. Of these, ideological agents are, logically, the least likely to be ‘bought
off’ and therefore the most viable independent political forces. Nonetheless, political
Islam is rarely discussed in the context of the Gulf states which provide few institu-
tionalised opportunities for political participation and do not require welfare services
often provided by Islamist groups. In this paper, I discuss the degree to which Muslim
Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE influence political decision-mak-
ing and how those governments have chosen to handle the Ikhwan.1 Given my analysis,
I provide the following policy recommendations to both regional and Western actors.

1
The terms ‘Ikhwan’ (the Arabic term for Brotherhood) and ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ are used here
interchangeably.
6 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

Policy Recommendations

Policy Recommendations for Gulf Governments

• Look beyond economic considerations. A variety of political outcomes is observed
in states with similar GDPs, thereby eliminating economic wellbeing as an explan-
atory factor for political outcomes. Considering citizens’ political demands as pri-
marily pecuniary is short sighted and simplistic. Not only is paying off unhappy
citizens unsustainable, it also fails to address the root of most viable political com-
plaint in the Gulf, which is Islamist-driven.
• Do not underestimate the power of informal Islamist networks. Simply because an
Islamist strand is not institutionalised does not mean it is politically unimportant;
the super-rentiers are under-institutionalised, rather than under-politicised.
• Recognise the political importance of social policies. The social and the political
spheres become less distinct in states which allow limited space for independent
political action. Part of the Brotherhood’s appeal remains its ability to provide so-
cial networks, as well as a broader ideology that informs political action.
• Consider co-optation, rather than crackdown, a more sustainable policy towards
Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf. These groups will not disappear, but rather will
go further underground. Because it appeals to local populations, Ikhwan ideology
will remain in the region, despite government crackdowns. Rather than working
against Brotherhood groups and attempting to dismantle them, regimes should
endeavour to co-opt them.

Policy Recommendations for Western Governments

• Pay close attention to the politics of cultural and national identity in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC). Because socio-economic issues are less important for Is-
lamists in such states, these matters take on primary significance. As the number of
Western expatriates increases in these states, Islamists will probably continue to po-
sition themselves as preservers of local identity and culture, as well as Islamic values.
• Do not simplify the role of Brotherhood organisations as solely political, as their so-
cial role is influential. Such a social presence is particularly important in states which
provide limited means of institutionalised political participation, as in the Gulf.
• Discourage the use of monetary disbursements as a means of addressing Islamist
complaint. Because such movements do not provide material support or seek to
gain it, they cannot be ‘bought off’ and indeed have not been in the past, even in
states where they needed fiscal assistance.
• Do not treat all Muslim Brotherhood affiliates as part of the same group. Even in
the small states of the Gulf, which have striking economic and political similarities,
the Brotherhood functions differently. It is not possible, then, to have a blanket
policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood; its international cohesion is limited in the
present day.
Courtney Freer 7

Introduction
Muslim Brotherhood movements in the wealthiest rentier states of Kuwait, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are often overlooked as domestic political actors, due
to the relatively placid environments of such states and comparatively few means of
institutionalised political participation (outside of Kuwait). In reality, grassroots social
outreach programmes in the Gulf help Brotherhood members spread their ideology
and garner support. Although they are not needed on the material level in the Gulf
(aside from Iraqi-occupied Kuwait), such programmes have become popular in their
provision of ideological guidance and social activities in societies that are often criticised
for lacking indigenous intellectual or cultural vibrancy. They also link the Brotherhood
to political life; ‘by engaging in hands-on activist work in popular neighbourhoods,
they [Islamists] have learned the informal language of politics spoken by the people’.2
Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE thus exercise political influence
primarily due to their ideological appeal. In Kuwait, the Brotherhood influences politi-
cal outcomes in a straightforward way through its participation in electoral politics and
its grassroots outreach, particularly in the youth and education sector, which helps to
influence new generations of voters. In Qatar, the Brotherhood maintains social influ-
ence, which is communicated to the political leadership largely through the informal
sector of the majlis.3 The Emirati Brotherhood, though outlawed today, operated in
the social sphere primarily, yet also came to join forces with other political opposition
movements in the efforts to expand popular participation in government.

Persistence of Brotherhood Ideology in the Super-Rentiers

Kuwait
The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1951, is the most organised and
influential branch in the Gulf. In its first decades, through Jamʿiat al-Irshad (1951-59)
and Jamʿiat al-Islah al-Ijtimaʿi (hereafter Islah, 1963 to present), it enjoyed cordial
ties with the regime, and, beginning in the 1960s, had some limited political success,
especially with social policies like the banning of alcohol (1965) and the restriction of
nationality to Muslims (1982). Through to the 1980s, Brotherhood members were par-
ticularly powerful in the ministries of education and Islamic Affairs, and this influence
lasted for generations through the curricula they approved.

From 1981, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood contested parliamentary elections as an organisa-

tion, and a decade later it created a dedicated political bloc, the Islamic Constitutional
Movement (ICM or Hadas), alongside Islah, its social arm. The Ikhwan in Kuwait is

2
Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006),
p. 176.
3
The majlis (plural majalis), similar to Kuwait’s diwaniyya, is a crucial element of civil society. Such
meetings are hosted by rulers, as well as by private citizens.
8 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

distinct in the Gulf not only because it contests legislative elections, but also because
it is the only branch that has been forced to provide services in the state’s absence – a
task common among Brotherhood affiliates outside of the Gulf. The Kuwaiti branch
undertook this during the Iraqi occupation from August 1990 to March 1991.

Today, the ICM forms a critical part of the broader Kuwaiti opposition movement that
includes secular, left-leaning political groupings. Its agenda remains exclusively domes-
tic. Former ICM MP Nasser al-Sane explains, ‘of course we want Islam to be our social
norm and the government to respect Islam’.4 Nonetheless, the bloc’s primary goals
have changed from a focus on enshrining shariʿa as the source of legislation in Kuwait
to promoting a pro-democracy agenda. The organisation pushes for reforms such as an
elected prime minister, a single electoral district to reduce gerrymandering, the legal-
isation of political parties, and, eventually, the creation of a constitutional monarchy.

Reflecting their commitment to domestic politics, ‘the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood

are Kuwaiti first and Muslim Brotherhood second’.5 Indeed, it formally broke ties with
its mother organisation following the failure of the latter to support the US-led liber-
ation of Kuwait in 1991. While its members remain outspoken in their disapproval of
the Egyptian Sisi regime, with the organisation condemning his takeover as a coup
three days after it took place,6 the issue has not remained central to its platform7 –
despite the government investing US$4 billion in Sisi’s regime.

The organisation’s agenda is marked by gradualism. Until recently it has sought to make
incremental changes through the existing system and with the ruling family. Despite
its boycott of elections since 2012, former ICM MP Usama al-Shahin insisted, ‘we are
100 percent loyal to [the ruling family].
We want reform, repair, not change’.8 ‘The Kuwaiti Muslim
In fact, the amir meets with members of
the Brotherhood and attends their diwan- Brotherhood are Kuwaiti first
iyyat,9 demonstrating that the Kuwaiti and Muslim Brotherhood second’
government, unlike others in the Gulf, - Mohammad al-Rumaihi
‘isn’t in panic mode’.10

4
Interview with Nasser al-Sane, 21 November 2013.
5
Interview with Mohammad al-Rumaihi, 25 November 2013.
6
Lori Plotkin Boghardt, ‘Kuwait’s Elections: It’s Not What Happens Now, but What Happens Next’,
The Washington Institute Policy Analysis, 26 July 2013. Available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/view/kuwaits-elections-its-not-what-happens-now-but-what-happens-next
7
Heba Saleh, ‘Gulf states put their money on Sisi’s Egypt with pledges worth $12bn’, Financial Times,
13 March 2015. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/85c2b3cc-c9a0-11e4-a2d9-00144feab7de.
html#axzz3nP85255k.
8
Interview with Usama al-Shahin, 24 November 2013.
9
A diwaniyya (plural diwaniyyat) is an informal meeting, which has long been a part of Kuwaiti political
life. Such gatherings, hosted by members of the ruling family, politicians, and private individuals, are
most often convened in homes and cover topics ranging from social life to religious ideology to politics.
10
Interview with Abdullah al-Shayeji, 27 November 2013.
Courtney Freer 9

Like the other political blocks that compete for seats in the Kuwaiti parliament, the Broth-
erhood does not enjoy legal recognition in Kuwait. But only limited actions have targeted
the Brotherhood specifically: a lawsuit calling for the closure of Islah in March 2014,
an MP trying to outlaw the Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation in July 2014, and
rumours circulating about purges of Brotherhood supporters from government in 2013.
The lack of large-scale government action against the Ikhwan is in part due to the larger
role that it plays in the opposition movement. Because ‘Kuwaiti Islamists are liberal
politically but conservative socially’,11 they are able to work with secular liberal members
of the opposition. Indeed, the Brotherhood has never run for a plurality of seats in par-
liament, instead allying with other blocs to enhance its influence in the legislature while
also gaining political cover from secular groups. Determining the ICM’s popularity,
then, is difficult, especially since it generally does not give estimates of its member-
ship numbers. As of 1989,
however, the number of
‘Kuwaiti Islamists are liberal politically officially registered mem-
but conservative socially.’ - Abdulla al-Nibari bers of the movement
reached 1,170.12

Qatar
Qatar, like the UAE, no longer houses an organised Muslim Brotherhood affiliate.
Although the Qatari Brotherhood completed its voluntary disbandment by 2003,
claims remain about its ongoing political influence. One Qatari explained, ‘Muslim
Brotherhood influence is informal, not institutionalised’,13 making it difficult to trace.

In an institutionalised form, the Qatari Brotherhood was founded in 1974, after an

influx of Qatari students returned to the country, having studied in places like Egypt
and Kuwait with active Ikhwan movements. Eager to replicate such movements at
home, these students created the organisation described by former Supreme Leader
Jassim Sultan as ‘just collaboration, a simple thing’.14 Before this, Brotherhood ideology
had become popular through the prominent positions of sympathetic expatriates in the
education system. For a brief period in the 1980s, under the influence of newly emi-
grated members of the Syrian Brotherhood, the Qatari Ikhwan published a magazine,
al-umma al-Qatariyya (The Qatari Umma), under the leadership of Amr Abid Husna.15

11
Interview with Abdulla al-Nibari, 2 February 2014.
12
Falah Abdullah al-Mdaires, Jamaʿat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi al-Kuwait (The Muslim Brotherhood
Group in Kuwait), (Kuwait: Huquq al-Taba’ va-l-Nashar Mahfuza, 1994), p. 22.
13
Interview with Hassan al-Ibrahim, 2 October 2013.
14
Interview with Jassim Sultan, 4 November 2013.
15
Mustafa Ashur, ‘Tajribat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Qatar’ (The Experience of the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Qatar), in Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Salafiyyun fi al-Khalij (The Muslim Brotherhood and
Salafis in the Gulf), ed. by Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, pp. 187-204. (Dubai: Al-Mesbar
Studies and Research Centre, 2011), p.192.
10 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

By the end of the 1980s, a generational split emerged. Younger members hoped to
ramp up political activities and older ones were cautious.16 Division led to the creation
of an extensive two-part study – ‘an intellectual and organisational dissection of the
Brotherhood’ in terms of its structure, communication, leadership, prevailing culture,
and goals, as well as feasibility of the goals and risks associated with them.17 Import-
ant questions included: Is there a real plan for the organisation? How much has been
achieved, and what remains to be accomplished?18 The study ‘finished with one of the
problems that pushed the re-evaluation to begin: that the Muslim Brotherhood’s plans
generally lacked clarity – what did it want exactly? And how would it get there?’19

Members considered the Qatari Brotherhood to have ‘been frozen by dogma, lost
direction, and failed to adapt’.20 They questioned the need for a Brotherhood organ-
isation in Qatar, a state with few major
economic, social, or political problems
‘[In Qatar] Muslim Brotherhood or openings, whose oil wealth obviated
influence is informal, not the need for non-state social welfare, and
which was naturally conservative and reli-
institutionalised’. gious due to its Wahhabi roots.21 As the
- Hassan al-Ibrahim Qatari Ikhwan’s former Supreme Guide
Jassim Sultan put it, ‘[b]y study and
research, the pitfalls were obvious. The program doesn’t fit Qatar. There is a major
defect in the theory’.22

In sum, today, ‘there is interest ideologically, but the Brotherhood’s social struc-
ture is not as helpful in Qatar. It is perhaps least helpful here than in any other Gulf
state’.23 As a result, the Brotherhood exists in Qatar solely at the ideological level and
organisationally only on a very limited scale – with small Qurʾanic recitation circles.
Determining what it means to be a Brotherhood member or supporter in a state lack-
ing formal organisation is challenging. Few Qataris identify themselves as members of
the Brotherhood even if they agree with its ideology, making it difficult to determine
the organisation’s domestic popularity and strength. A difference in labelling comes
into play; ‘[i]t is very complicated because lots of Qataris agree with the Muslim Broth-
erhood but don’t even realise it’.24

16
Abdulaziz Al-Mahmoud, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Qatar…Man hum?’ (The Muslim Brotherhood
in Qatar…Who are They?), Al-Arab, 1 August 2012. Available at http://www.alarab.qa/story/-‫اإلخوان‬
‫هم‬-‫من‬-‫قطر‬-‫في‬-‫المسلمون‬.
17
Ashur, p.197.
18
Abdullah Al-Nafisi, ‘Al-Hala al-Islamiyya fi Qatar’ (The Islamic Situation in Qatar), IslamToday, 12
March 2007. Available at http://www.islamtoday.net/bohooth/artshow-19-8828.htm.
19
Amr al-Turabi and Tarek al-Mubarak, ‘Qatar’s Introspective Islamists’, Asharq al-Awsat, 18 June
2013. Available at http://www.aawsat.net/2013/06/article55306189.
20
Marc Lynch, ‘Muslim Brotherhood Debates’, Abu Aardvark (blog), 28 February 2007. Available at
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/02/muslim_brotherh.html.
21
Ibid.
22
Interview with Jassim Sultan, 9 October 2013.
23
Interview with Shadi Hamid, 5 November 2013.
24
Interview with Michael Stephens, 1 November 2013.
Courtney Freer 11

Conflation between support for the Brotherhood and allegiance to conservative Islam
further complicates the study of the organisation in isolation in Qatar. ‘Lots of Qataris
agree with what al-Qaradawi is saying but they see this as being religious, not being
Muslim Brotherhood’.25 The government, recognising the appeal of conservative Isla-
mist doctrine in a Wahhabi country, has largely endeavoured to appease, rather than
silence, such elements, having accepted them as a part of Qatar’s ideological landscape.

The United Arab Emirates

The Emirati Muslim Brotherhood differs from other branches due to the state’s unique
federal character. First founded in Dubai in 1974, that branch received support from
that emirate’s leader and Vice President Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al-Maktoum, signal-
ling the government’s willingness to patronise an Islamist group as a bulwark against
Arab nationalism. Sheikh Rashid contributed to the establishment of branches in Ras
al Khaimah and Fujairah, and Emirati President and Abu Dhabi ruler Sheikh Zayed
bin Sultan al-Nahyan provided land for an Abu Dhabi branch at the end of the 1970s,
yet it ultimately never gained permission to form there. Sharjah also lacked a branch, a
reflection of the prevalence of Arabism and nationalism – rather than Islamism – there
at that time, and also of its close ties to Saudi Arabia. In Ajman, ‘the Brotherhood set-
tled for subordination to the Association of Guidance and Social Counselling [Irshad]’.26

Like Brotherhood affiliates elsewhere in the region, the Emirati Ikhwan was involved
in social and cultural activities. Examination of the group’s magazine al-Islah demon-
strates that the most commonly discussed topics concerned the development of Islamic
education,27 censorship of Western materials such as magazines and television pro-
grammes,28 restriction of the sale of alcohol,29 corruption in government spending,30
and the encroachment of foreign (particularly Western) businesses and culture in
Emirati society.31 First and foremost, ‘Islah tapped into issues of Emiratis drinking,
social issues’.32 The organisation also developed a political reform agenda alongside

25
Ibid.
26
Mansur al-Noqaidan, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imarat: Al-Tamaddad wa-l-Inhisar’ (The
Muslim Brotherhood in the Emirates: Expansion and Decline), in Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al Khalij
(The Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf), ed. by Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, (Dubai:
Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre, 2012), p. 61.
27
‘Readings into Some Curricula of Private Schools in the Emirates’, al-Islah 57 (1982), in Ali Salem
Humaid (ed), The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 2, (Dubai: Al Mezmaah Studies and Research
Centre, 2013), pp. 180-188.
28
‘Our Children and the Lovely Pig’, al-Islah 34/49 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against
the UAE 1, p. 48.
29
‘We Are Waiting for Final Ban’, al-Islah 7/50 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the
UAE 1, p. 69.
30
‘Frugality and Extravagance’, al-Islah 50/51 (1982), in Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the
UAE 1, pp.98-99.
31
Omar Abdul Rahman, ‘The Devil Kai and the English Language’, al-Islah 26-27/49 (1982), in
Humaid, The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 1, p.40.
32
Interview with Dubai-based Gulf correspondent, 6 March 2014.
12 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

its social programme, pressing for more representative government and more equal
distribution of wealth.33 As early as March 1979, Islah’s UAE management council
wrote a letter to the local rulers ahead of a meeting of the Supreme Council of Rulers,
supporting the government’s attempts to diminish corruption and to spend oil money
in a ‘pious’ way.34 In 1982, al-Islah magazine was more explicit about the organisation’s
potential role as political opposition in the context of government bans on Islamic
magazines: ‘With Islam we liberate lands of Islam, we stop injustice to Islam. Tyrants
are afraid of us because of Islam’.35

Because its members had come to exert considerable influence on Emirati society
through positions in the educational and judicial sectors, the Emirati Muslim Broth-
erhood provoked government suspicion in the 1990s. At that time, ‘the UAE’s judicial
and education sector was effectively a state within a state’,36 and student councils as
well as teachers’ and judges’ professional associations became ‘outposts dedicated to
advancing their [Brotherhood] interests’.37 Perhaps fearing that the Emirati Brother-
hood could gain a broader following as a political bloc, as in Kuwait, the government
resolved to squash it before it could influence politics on an institutionalised level.

In the early 1990s, investigations by Egyptian security services allegedly proved that
individuals involved in Egyptian Islamic Jihad had received monetary donations from
Islah’s Committee for Relief and Outside Activities,38 arguing that the Brotherhood is,
at its core, an international organisation, ‘imported by Egyptians’, with the goal of a
single Islamic state.39 The government began investigating the influence of Brother-
hood members within the education sector when promising scholarship applications
were rejected, and found that the Brotherhood members managed the distribution
of educational awards.40 Hoping to regain control, the government dissolved the
Brotherhood’s previously elected boards of directors in 1994,41 placing them under
supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs.42 External activities were also frozen,43 and
members were banned from holding public office.44 This decision affected the branches

33
Pekka Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, Directorate-General for External Policies,
Policy Department, European Parliament, 15 November 2012, 2. Available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=78691.
34
Al-Noqaidan, pp. 65-66.
35
Abdullah Abu al-Hadi, ‘Why Ban Islamic Magazines?’, al-Islah 30/50 (1982), quoted in Humaid,
The Roots of Conspiracy Against the UAE 2, p. 172.
36
Sultan Sooud al-Qassemi, ‘The Brothers and the Gulf’, Foreign Policy, 14 December 2012. Available
at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/14/Muslim_Brotherhood_Gulf_UAE_Qassemi.
37
Ibid.
38
‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imirat…Al-Qisat al-Kamila’ (The Muslim Brotherhood in the Emir-
ates…The Whole Story), Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 1 February 2013. Available at http://classic.aawsat.com/
details.asp?article=715512&issueno=12484&section=4#.VGtRRofBZKp.
39
Interview with Ebtesam al-Ketbi, 24 February 2014.
40
Marta Saldana, ‘Rentierism and Political Culture in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of UAEU
Students’, PhD diss., (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2014), p. 139.
41
Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, p. 2.
42
Al-Sharq al-Awsat, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imirat…Al-Qisat al-Kamila’.
43
Ibid.
44
Hakala, ‘Opposition in the United Arab Emirates’, p. 2.
Courtney Freer 13

of Islah in Dubai and Fujairah, in addition to the more loosely affiliated Guidance
Group in Ajman. Notably, the Ras al-Khaimah branch of Islah was exempted from
ministerial control, though it did have to curtail its external activities.45 Until the most
recent crackdown, it remained independent under the protection of its sympathetic
ruler Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi, who ‘rejected the dissolution of al-Islah because he felt it
played a role in preserving the youth’.46

The tense relationship between the Emirati government and the Muslim Brother-
hood became more confrontational following the attacks of 11 September 2001. The
State Security Directorate arrested over 250 individuals accused of terrorism, mainly
harbouring Islamist sympathies in 2002, yet most had been released by 2004. The
government attempted to persuade Islah to disband following September 11, but the
organisation refused.47 Emirati officials requested that Islah follow Qatar’s example
because, in their view, if it were not a politically subversive group, it would not require
independent organisational capacity.48 After months of talks, Islah rejected the govern-
ment’s invitation to continue engaging in daʿwa without an organisational structure.
Large numbers of Islamist supporters were purged from the educational system.

Despite this setback, the remaining branches of Islah (Dubai, Fujairah, and Ras
al-Khaimah) and the Guidance Society in Ajman continued with their activities of
hosting discussions, lectures, and Qurʾan recitation competitions, in addition to the
publication of al-Islah.49 By the mid-2000s, it had become clear that ‘[t]he regime in
the UAE is not friendly towards Islamists, and prominent Islamists have been arrested,
barred from teaching at university, and otherwise harassed by the government’.50 In
such an environment, it became increasingly difficult for members of Islah to pursue
their social or political aims. In 2012, as the broader political opposition gained
momentum after the issuing of a petition a year earlier, all branches of the Brother-
hood were effectively closed down within the UAE.

45
Al-Noqaidan, p. 69.
46
Mohammed al-Roken, quoted in Yara Bayoumy, ‘UAE Islamist Group Had No Desire to Topple
Government: Families’, Reuters, 3 July 2013. Available at http://reut.rs/12jlUg8.
47
Saldana, ‘Rentierism and Political Culture in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of UAEU Stu-
dents’, p. 140.
48
Interview with Jamal Khashoggi, 23 October 2013.
49
Al-Noqaidan, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi al-Imarat: Al-Tamaddad wa-l-Inhisar’, p. 74.
50
Herb, ‘Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates’, p. 359.
14 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

From Co-optation to Crackdown: Government Policies

towards the Brotherhood

Kuwait
In large measure, due to the fact that the Brotherhood has existed inside Kuwait for
decades and is the most organised political bloc in the country, that government has
allowed the Ikhwan to operate relatively openly. It seems to have accepted the Broth-
erhood as part of the political landscape and thus has allowed it to continue its work
within parameters, placing on it largely the same limits faced by secular political blocs
in Kuwait.

Facilitating peaceful relations with the government, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood has
embraced gradualism in achieving its goals, at least as far as the Islamisation of society
is concerned. It has instead become a more outspoken member of the broader political
opposition, privileging limited systemic changes over more limited Islamic social policies.
Furthermore, because the most elected seats it has ever won was six out of fifty in 2006,
the Brotherhood does not challenge government authority by contesting a plurality
of seats. It instead prefers to form coalitions with other political blocs that grant it a
degree of political cover.51 Most recently, the organisation signed on to a document
drafted alongside members of the secular Civil Democratic Movement and Musallam
al-Barrak, who agree about the need for ‘a full parliamentary system, with a stronger
legislature, independent judiciary and revised criminal code’.52

The government has reacted harshly against recently forged opposition unity, yet has
not targeted the Brotherhood specifically. Instead, it revoked the citizenship of five
opposition members in July 2014, a step that Joe Stork, Deputy Director for Middle
East and North Africa at Human Rights Watch, dubbed ‘yet another downward step
in Kuwait’s assault on the right to free speech’.53 Those stripped of citizenship did
not include members of the ICM,54 yet the organisation released a statement call-
ing the situation a ‘regretful example of utilizing the state’s capabilities in fighting
reformists instead of supporting the process of reform’.55 In January 2015, former
ICM MP Mubarak al-Duwailah was arrested on charges of endangering ties with
an ally and insulting leaders of an allied state following his statements, on Kuwait’s

51
Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 51.
52
E.A.D., ‘Kuwait’s Opposition: A Reawakening’, The Economist, 17 April 2014. Available at http://
www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/04/kuwaits-opposition.
53
Joe Stork, quoted in ‘Kuwait: 5 Critics Stripped of Citizenship’, Human Rights Watch, 10 August
2014. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/10/kuwait-5-critics-stripped-citizenship.
54
Former Salafi MP Abdullah al-Bargash, two of his brothers and his sister were arrested, along with
Ahmad Jabir al-Shammari, owner of al-Yawm satellite television and Al-ʿAlam al-Yawm newspaper,
which are said to have ties with the liberal Popular Bloc.
55
A. Saleh, ‘ICM accuses government of ‘using’ citizenship file’, Kuwait Times, 2 August 2014. Avail-
able at http://news.kuwaittimes.net/icm-accuses-government-using-citizenship-file/.
Courtney Freer 15

parliamentary television channel, about Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Moham-
med bin Zayed al-Nahyan being ‘against Sunni Islam’.56 Though al-Duwailah was not
charged in Kuwait, his case was referred to the UAE’s Federal Supreme Court, which
will try him in absentia.57

In the face of limited government suppression, the ICM is likely to continue to priv-
ilege political reform over social policies, as opposition groups focus increasingly on
pursuing common goals of political reform.58 In fact, al-Duwailah explicitly called on
political blocs to overcome their traditional differences in a January statement shortly
after his arrest, and such opposition unification appears to be taking place.59 The
ICM, along with al-Barrak’s Popular Labour Movement and the Salafi al-Umma Party
have led the charge in continued protests in 2015 against judicial corruption and the
government’s policy of stripping citizenship,60 while calling for new parliamentary
elections and the release of political prisoners.61 Al-Barrak’s sentencing to two years in
prison in February 2015 spurred a renewed call to protests.62 The most recent oppo-
sition rally, held in March in response to al-Barrak’s arrest, was broken up by security
forces and resulted in the jailing of dozens of opposition leaders and alleged assault
of participants.63 The more the government excludes opposition political blocs from
power, the more likely they are to privilege a pro-democracy agenda over ideological
differences. In this way, government crackdown has encouraged the moderation of
traditional Islamist social aims as the Brotherhood and some Salafi strands promote
broad-ranging reform, rather than Islamisation.

By tempering its demands for laws to Islamise society and for the implementation
of shariʿa, the ICM has come to hold a more powerful political position as a lead-
ing opposition bloc. Its political capital, though, is not expressed solely through its
representation in parliament, as its social organisation (Islah) forms a major part of

56
‘UAE to Try Kuwaiti Ex-MP over Remarks on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince’, Middle East Eye, 9 March
2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-try-kuwaiti-ex-mp-over-remarks-abu-dha-
bi-crown-prince-1546132555.
57
Ibid.
58
Hamid, Temptations of Power, pp. 54-55.
59
‘Al-Duwailah: ‘Ala al-Quwwa al-Siyasiyya an Tafham Hassasiyyat al-Marhala Tatatalab al-Taʿali ʿan
al-Khilafat al-Taqlidiyya’ (Al-Duwailah: The Political Forces Must Understand that the Sensitivity of
the Stage Requires the Transcendence of Traditional Differences), Al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Dusturi-
yya, 11 January 2015. Available at http://tinyurl.com/nnbqezm.
60
Dahlia Kholaif, ‘Kuwait’s Opposition Movements Feel the Squeeze on Freedoms’, Middle East
Eye, 30 March 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kuwaits-opposition-move-
ments-feel-squeeze-freedoms-1703345061.
61
‘Kuwait: Opposition Protest Broken Up’, Human Rights Watch, 29 March 2015. Available at http://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/29/kuwait-opposition-protest-broken.
62
‘Kuwait Sentences Opposition Politician Mussallam Al Barrak to Two Years in Jail for ‘Insulting
Ruler’’, Global Voices, 22 February 2015. Available at http://globalvoicesonline.org/2015/02/22/kuwait-
sentences-opposition-politician-mussallam-al-barrak-to-two-years-in-jail-for-insulting-ruler/.
63
Linah Alsaafin, ‘Kuwait Security Forces Violently Disperse Anti-Government Protest’, Middle East
Eye, 23 March 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kuwaiti-security-forces-violent-
ly-disperse-anti-government-protest-1878869579.
16 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

outreach to the general Kuwaiti population and has become particularly influential as
the ICM has boycotted the last two parliamentary elections.

The popular perception in Kuwait remains that ‘you can speak reason with the Ikhwan.
They’re part of the system of elites, so they would never dream of overturning [the sys-
tem]’.64 Ismail al-Shatti, for his part, has called for the implementation of all parts of
shariʿa over time, considering that ‘[t]he Qurʾan came in stages’.65 This more moderate
stance prevails today, as issues of government reform appear more urgent.

While the Kuwaiti government has never legally recognised the ICM,66 its approach in
dealing with the bloc, and with the Brotherhood in general, is far more moderate than
the repressive security-led approach seen in the UAE in part because the group’s status
as a primarily local political bloc has been established and accepted.

Unlike other Brotherhood affiliates in the Gulf, the Kuwaiti branch has also benefit-
ted from years of experience in government.67 Perhaps because of its involvement in
public office, the Kuwaiti Brotherhood has learned to balance its conservative social
goals with its pro-democracy agenda into a politically influential platform.

Qatar
Unlike its neighbours, the Qatari government has taken steps towards the soft co-opta-
tion of the Muslim Brotherhood, considering the organisation a potential ally rather
than major threat. Ira William Zartman, taking the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and Tuni-
sia, points out that opposition movements can in fact amplify support of the state.
‘Neither uses the other, but each serves the other’s interests in performing its own
role. Thus, stability in the contemporary Arab state can be explained not only by the
government’s handling of opposition but also by the opposition’s handling of itself
and the government’.68 This symbiotic relationship may best describe the ties between
the Qatari government and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari government has
historically granted a public voice to Islamists, in addition to conceding to a number
of Islamist-supported social policies, and the Brotherhood has in turn praised the
government for its Islamist-aligned policies, thereby cementing al-Thani power and
domestic political stability – a testament to the system’s strength. Simply put, the
Qatari regime does not place restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood because it does
not need to do so.

64
Interview with Ibrahim al-Hadban, 14 November 2013.
65
Shafeeq Ghabra, ‘Balancing State and Society: The Islamic Movement in Kuwait’, Middle East Policy
5/2 (1997), p. 69.
66
Nathan J. Brown, ‘Pushing Toward Party Politics?: Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement’,
Carnegie Papers 79, (January 2007), p. 15. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp79_
brown_kuwait_final.pdf.
67
Interview with Sami al-Faraj, 13 November 2013.
68
Ira William Zartman, ‘Opposition as Support of the State’, in Adeed I. Dawisha and Ira William
Zartman (eds.), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 62.
Courtney Freer 17

As one former advisor to the Amiri Diwan put it, ‘why should the government put
pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood when they don’t challenge them? The two are
interdependent’.69 In its current form, the Qatari Brotherhood exists as ‘a tendency’ or
‘a current’, conceived of as an ideology or set of beliefs, rather than a political bloc.70 In
such a loosely organised form, members are able to meet without fearing consequences
of a crackdown from authorities. Furthermore, their goals of daʿwa and Islamic educa-
tion are achievable without the implementation of a structure that the state may find
objectionable. By remaining amorphous, the Brotherhood can continue to enjoy state
backing while maintaining its independent activities.

Muslim Brotherhood influence in Qatar’s religious and education sectors is palpable,

yet like much else in the country, uninstitutionalised and largely informal. ‘There is
influence of Muslim Brotherhood in justice, education awqaf – not in terms of policies
– but in terms of influencing people who do make policy; this influence is not institu-
tionalised’.71 As a result, studying the Brotherhood as a movement in Qatar is difficult,
especially because its ideology shares many common points with conservative Islam
commonly found in the Gulf and highly influential inside the country. As explained
by one Qatari, ‘it’s not that these ties don’t exist but that they are more benign than
people realise’.72

Islamist sentiment has, how-

ever, affected social policies ‘Why should the government put pressure
inside Qatar. Determining on the Muslim Brotherhood when they
whether this feeling reflects
backing of the Muslim Broth-
don’t challenge them? The two are
erhood or of conservative interdependent.’ - Ibrahim Arafat
Wahhabi Islam is difficult.
Since 2011, for example,
the government has banned the sale of alcohol from the Pearl-Qatar development,
has removed statues considered religiously offensive from public spaces, has placed
further restrictions on when alcohol can be consumed in hotels, and has backed and
funded increasingly public campaigns for moderate dress. Such campaigns would be
the purview of Brotherhood organisations elsewhere in the Middle East yet in Qatar
appear to have formed almost spontaneously.

The ad hoc and informal nature of the organisation inside Qatar suits the state’s polit-
ical character as the least institutionalised and most personalistic of the three systems
under consideration.

69
Interview with Ibrahim Arafat, 4 December 2014.
70
Al-Nafisi.
71
Interview with Hassan al-Ibrahim.
72
Interview with Michael Stephens.
18 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

The United Arab Emirates

In contrast to its Kuwaiti and Qatari counterparts, the Emirati government considers
the Muslim Brotherhood to be an existential threat, as an organisation promoting a for-
eign ideology. As such, its response has been security-focused, yet has differed slightly
among emirates. Abu Dhabi has taken the strongest stance, reflecting the belief of that
emirate’s Crown Prince Sheikh Muhammad bin Zayed that ‘if there were an election [in
the UAE] tomorrow, the Muslim Brotherhood would take over’.73 Abu Dhabi has always
been cautious about the Muslim Brotherhood, having denied the organisation permis-
sion to operate in the emirate as early as the 1990s. The government has responded
with efforts to promote what it considered to be the appropriate brand of ‘moderate’
Islam. In fact, restrictions exist about the length of beard that members of the armed
forces can grow, for fear that they may be mistaken for conservative Muslims who tra-
ditionally favour long beards.74 Aware of the Brotherhood’s eagerness to participate
in political debate, that emirate’s government also promoted the emergence of other,
more politically quietist. Further cementing the Emirati government’s stance against
the Brotherhood, a new anti-terrorism law passed in August 2014 updated the 2004
legislation, allowing for expanded use of the death penalty and other severe punish-
ments.75 The legislation, though cracking down on violent extremist groups at a time
of regional fear about an resurgence of violent jihadist activity, also ‘has the potential
to be used against peaceful activists and government critics due to the broad ambit of
its provisions, their vague definition, and the range of actions that may be considered
under the law to amount to terrorism’.76 As Sarah Leah Whitson of Human Rights
Watch put it, ‘[i]n the UAE it’s now a case of ‘you’re with us or you’re a terrorist’’.77 In
November 2014, the UAE released a list of 82 organisations that it considers terrorist
groups. Although this record includes violent groups such as al-Qaʿida and IS, it also
comprises nonviolent groups like Islah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, in addi-
tion to advocacy organisations like the Council on American-Islamic Relations.78

Dubai’s government, on the other hand, has traditionally focused primarily on ‘‘track-
ing’ individuals known to be sympathetic to the Islamist agenda’.79 In an effort to
dissuade Dubai citizens from Islamism, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum,

73
Mohammed bin Zayed, quoted in Christopher M. Davidson, After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse
of the Gulf Monarchies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 14.
74
‘UAE Minimizing Influence of Islamic Extremists’, Embassy of the United States Abu Dhabi,
WikiLeaks, 10 November 2004. Available at http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04ABUD-
HABI4061_a.html.
75
‘‘There Is No Freedom Here’: Silencing Dissent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, Amnesty
International, November 2014, p. 10. Available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/there-
is-no-freedom-here-silencing-dissent-in-the-united-arab-emirates
76
Ibid.
77
‘UAE: Terrorism Law Threatens Lives, Liberty’, Human Rights Watch, 4 December 2014. Available
at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/03/uae-terrorism-law-threatens-lives-liberty.
78
‘UAE Blacklists 82 Groups as ‘Terrorist’’, Al Arabiya, 15 November 2014. Available at http://english.
alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/15/UAE-formally-blacklists-82-groups-as-terrorist-.html.
79
‘UAE Minimizing Influence of Islamic Extremists’.
Courtney Freer 19

until the recent crackdown, met with them ‘to explain to them the error of their ways,
and to tell them that if they are looking for a job, or land, or any other assistance, they
should not hesitate to ask’. Apparently, this approach (direct appeal from the ruler)
is often effective, especially for younger devotees. Those who are resistant to change,
however, are locked up, sometimes repeatedly, for months at a time in hopes that this
will dissuade them from acting on their Islamist tendencies.80 In contrast, rulers in
Ras al-Khaimah have traditionally allowed more freedom to the Brotherhood, yet a
member of that ruling family was jailed in the recent crackdown.

It remains to be seen whether a large-scale Abu Dhabi-led crackdown on the Emirati

Ikhwan was necessary due to the group’s widespread appeal. In the words of Abdulkha-
leq Abdulla, ‘one-third of the population probably thinks this way, that the state could
be more Islamic’, but not necessarly Muslim Brotherhood.81 The Emirati government
has understood the influence of Brotherhood organisations to be primarily political
and thus threatening to their ruling system. In the face of such ideological competi-
tion, they hope to promote secular nationalism and institutionalised Islam that will
harbour loyalty to the regime.

April 2012 marked the beginning of arrests targeting the Muslim Brotherhood, which
the government considered to be the primary political threat. In the words of liberal
activist Ahmed Mansoor, the Ikhwan ‘was more popular and well-known [than the
liberal movement] due to its social activities. Many of its members were seen as the
cream of society […] with good repu-
tations and important positions’.82 In
‘In the UAE it’s now a case of
April 2012, seven Islah members (the
‘you’re with us or you’re a terrorist’’ so-called UAE7),83 who were signato-
- Sarah Leah Whitson ries to the March 2011 petition and
whose citizenship had been stripped
in December 2011, were jailed after they did not leave the country as the government
requested.84 They contended that they had been ‘unjustly targeted for their political
views’ since they had signed the petition on behalf of Islah.85 These arrests marked
only the beginning of the crackdown on Islah. By the end of 2012, 94 alleged members
of Islah had been imprisoned.

The Emirati government has been surprisingly outspoken in its recent criticism of the
Muslim Brotherhood, dismissing the organisation’s calls for reform as attempts to dis-
mantle the regime. Although the government’s actions against the Ikhwan only made
headlines during the Arab Spring, members of the government had expressed concerns

80
Ibid.
81
Interview with Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, 10 February 2014.
82
Interview with Ahmed Mansoor, 26 March 2014.
83
The seven included Sheikh Mohammad Abdul Razzaq al-Siddiq, Ahmed Ghaith al-Suwaidi,
Ali Hussain al-Hammadi, Shaheen Abdullah al-Hosani, Hussain Munif Abdullah al-Jabri, Hassan
al-Jabri, and Ibrahim Hassan al-Marzouqi.
84
‘‘There Is No Freedom Here’: Silencing Dissent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’, p. 7.
85
Davidson, After the Sheikhs, p. 225.
20 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

about the organisation in conversations with American officials as early as 2007.

At that time, they used ‘‘quiet marginalization’ and support for reintegrating MB
[Muslim Brotherhood] members back into mainstream society. Members of the ruling
families often got personally involved in this process’.86 The UAE ruling families
long feared Brotherhood influence, despite their massive wealth, demonstrating the
salience of ideological politics in a super-rentier. Having failed to ‘buy off’ such move-
ments, the government resolved to squash it.

During the January 2012 GCC National and Regional Security Conference sponsored
by the Bahrain Centre for Strategic, International and Energy Studies, Dhahi Khalfan
went so far as to state: ‘The Muslim Brotherhood is a security threat to the Gulf, and
is no less dangerous than Iran’.87 Emirati Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed
al-Nahyan similarly denounced the Brotherhood as ‘an organization which encroaches
upon the sovereignty and integrity of nations’ and called on Gulf governments to work
against its expanding influence.88 Such language illustrates government attempts to
use fears about emerging Islamist political parties in the region as an excuse to dismiss
such groups’ demands for political reform within the UAE.

Conclusions
As expatriate populations increase, Islamist groups like the Brotherhood will retain a
powerful voice against increasing Westernisation. Super-rentier governments endeav-
our to balance their desires to modernise and to accommodate their overwhelming
non-national populations with the need to address grievances of national populations
that remain, for the most part, conservative and religious.

Due to strict laws concerning civil society in Qatar and the UAE, Muslim Brotherhood
affiliates there are relegated to the social realm, and non-Islamist political blocs often
have little space in which to operate. Kuwait affords the Brotherhood an institution-
alised place in political life, however. These different forms highlight the fact that
Islamists adapt their activities to operate within the restrictive system; their ideology
cannot be ‘bought off’ simply through government disbursements. By creating ideo-
logical links at the grassroots, they amass long-term popular support.89

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE began with the goal of Isla-
mising society in the face of Western encroachment. Since their establishment, these

86
Ingo Forstenlechner, Emilie Rutledge, and Rashed Salem al-Nuaimi, ‘The UAE, the ‘Arab Spring’
and Different Types of Dissent’, Middle East Policy 19/4 (2012), p. 55.
87
Abdullah al-Rashid, ‘The Brothers and the Emirates’, The Majalla, 14 February 2013. Available at
http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/02/article55238281.
88
Ian Black, ‘Emirati Nerves Rattled by Islamists’ Rise’, The Guardian, 12 October 2012. Available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/on-the-middle-east/2012/oct/12/uae-muslimbrotherhood-egypt-ar-
abspring.
89
Larry Diamond, ‘Why Are There No Arab Democracies?’ Journal of Democracy 21/1 (2010), pp.
100-01.
Courtney Freer 21

groups have altered their priorities to varying degrees. The Kuwaiti Brotherhood
has come to privilege electoral success and political influence more broadly through
wide-ranging reform over the initial social agenda that it pushed in the 1980s. The
Qatari Brotherhood, on the other hand, has favoured the ideological and social ele-
ments of its platform over structural or institutionalised influence. Even what appears
to be social power, as in the Qatari case, is hardly politically neutral, particularly in a
super-rentier that allows few outlets for political debate. Finally, the Emirati Brother-
hood, before the most recent crackdown began in 2012, operated in a space between
the purely political (inhabited by the Kuwaiti Brotherhood) and the amorphous (rep-
resented by the Qatari Ikhwan). While it advocated for social reforms, the Emirati
Brotherhood came to voice concerns about political freedoms more broadly, thereby
leading to restrictions from the regime. The government thus made it unlikely for
the Emirati Brotherhood to evolve to the state of its Kuwaiti counterpart, which has
developed a clearly defined political platform and popularity. Despite the different
trajectories they eventually took, each of the Gulf Brotherhood movements began with
the platform of countering Western encroachment into their societies.

The presence of oil rents thus does not mitigate Islamist complaint, nor does it make
such voices politically irrelevant. Emirati rulers were particularly attuned to the polit-
ical capital held by their domestic Brotherhood movements and even considered the
Ikhwan an existential threat. Kuwait and Qatar, on the other hand, have granted the
Ikhwan more freedom, reflecting those leaders’ beliefs that co-optation and contain-
ment are more effective than crackdown.

Rulers in the Gulf seem to be coming to terms with the fact that Islamist complaint
will always form a part of political discourse in that region. Signalling modification of
its previous hardline stance, Saudi Arabia hosted the International Union for Muslim
Scholars, headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and dubbed a terrorist organisation by
the UAE, for the Islamic Conference convened in February 2015 by King Salman.90 Ear-
lier that month, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal stated that his government has
‘no problem with the Muslim Brotherhood’.91 While Qatar’s support of Brotherhood
regimes in Egypt and Tunisia has been heavily criticised, its moderate approach towards
the Ikhwan inside its borders may be inspiring a change in the Saudi stance. With the
Brotherhood unlikely to disappear from the political or social scene, as it can maintain
its position in the social sphere, a strategy of co-optation or cooperation is more sustain-
able than one of crackdown. Even in cases, as in the UAE, where the government has
urged the closing of the Brotherhood affiliate, it has been pushed farther underground
and has become increasingly informal, rather than having become radicalised.

90
‘Saudi King Hosts Muslim Scholars Close to Brotherhood’, Middle East Monitor, 24 February 2015.
Available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/17159-saudi-king-hosts-muslim-
scholars-close-to-brotherhood.
91
Saud bin Faysal, quoted in Mary Atkins, ‘Saudi Arabia Has ‘No Problem’ with Muslim Brother-
hood: Foreign Minister’, Middle East Eye, 11 February 2015. Available at http://www.middleeasteye.
net/news/saudi-foreign-minister-no-problem-muslim-brotherhood-230201904.
22 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

Perhaps due to the union of unequal emirates in the UAE, the state has been more
concerned about the emergence of ideological politics. States that seem similar from
the outside, then, have very different considerations when formulating policy towards
the Muslim Brotherhood.

Because they gain appeal primarily through an ideology unaffected by the presence of
wealth, Islamist organisations, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, will not become
any less influential in the Gulf in the coming years, despite campaigns against them.
Rather, they will take on different forms, depending on the political freedom afforded
them. Further, because Ikhwan groups in the super-rentiers do not need to provide
goods and services, as they do in poorer states like Egypt and Jordan, they have been
allowed more freedom in terms of structural appearance.

Rentier Islamists will continue to hold sway primarily through the informal sector. The
means through which such Islamists gain support is not threatened by changes to the
Ikhwan’s strength elsewhere in the Middle East due to the power of their ideological
message. As long as the state continues to politicise Islam, which seems likely as a legit-
imation strategy, political Islam will remain relevant.
Courtney Freer 23

Cover Photo: © Hamed Masoumi, July 2008. Source: flickr.com.

24 Rentier Islamism: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf

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