Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda

Articles
Informal Institutions and Comparative

Politics: A Research Agenda
Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky
Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal insti-
tutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political
behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important
incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions
and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formal-
informal institutional interaction: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely
ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature
of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification,
measurement, and comparison.
O
ver the last two decades, institutional analysis has that many “rules of the game” that structure political life
become a central focus in comparative politics. are informal—created, communicated, and enforced out-
Fueled by a wave of institutional change in the side of officially sanctioned channels.6 Examples abound.
developing and postcommunist worlds, scholars from diverse For decades, Mexican presidents were selected not accord-
research traditions have studied how constitutional design, ing to rules in the Constitution, the electoral law, or party
electoral systems, and other formal institutional arrange- statutes, but rather via the dedazo (“big finger”)—an unwrit-
ments affect political and economic outcomes.1 These stud- ten code that gave the sitting president the right to choose
ies have produced important theoretical advances. his successor, specified the candidate pool, and prohibited
Nevertheless, a growing body of research on Latin Amer- potential candidates from openly seeking the job.7 In Japan,
ica,2 postcommunist Eurasia,3 Africa,4 and Asia 5 suggests the “strict but unwritten rules” of Amakudari (“descent from
heaven”), through which retiring state bureaucrats are
awarded top positions in private corporations, have sur-
Gretchen Helmke is assistant professor of political science at vived decades of administrative reform.8 In Central Asia,
the University of Rochester ([email protected]). Her clan-based norms have “become the rules of the game,”
book Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and while the constitutional structures created after the collapse
Presidents in Argentina, will be published by Cambridge Uni- of the Soviet Union are “increasingly . . . inconsequen-
versity Press. Steven Levitsky is associate professor of govern- tial.” 9 And in much of the developing and postcommunist
ment at Harvard University ([email protected]). world, patterns of clientelism, corruption, and patrimoni-
He is the author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties alism coexist with (and often subvert) new democratic, mar-
in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative ket, and state institutions.10
Perspective and is currently writing a book on competitive Attention to informal institutions is by no means new
authoritarian regimes in the post–Cold War era. The to political science. Earlier studies of “prismatic soci-
authors thank the Weatherhead Center for International eties,” 11 “moral economies,” 12 “economies of affection,” 13
Affairs at Harvard University and the Kellogg Institute for legal pluralism,14 clientelism,15 corruption,16 and consoci-
International Studies at the University of Notre Dame for ationalism,17 as well as on government-business relations
generously sponsoring conferences on informal institutions. The in Japan,18 blat in the Soviet Union,19 and the “folkways”
authors also gratefully acknowledge comments from Jorge of the U.S. Senate 20 highlighted the importance of unwrit-
Domínguez, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran ten rules. Nevertheless, informal rules have remained at
Hyden, Jack Knight, Lisa Martin, Hillel Soifer, Benjamin the margins of the institutionalist turn in comparative pol-
Smith, Susan Stokes, María Victoria Murillo, and Kurt itics. Indeed, much current literature assumes that actors’
Weyland, as well as three anonymous reviewers and the incentives and expectations are shaped primarily, if not
editors of Perspectives on Politics. exclusively, by formal rules. Such a narrow focus can be
December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 725

Articles | Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics
problematic, for it risks missing much of what drives polit- to vote by local brokers, such elections are won not by
ical behavior and can hinder efforts to explain important ideological candidates but by those with the largest political
political phenomena.21 machine.32
This article broadens the scope of comparative research Informal institutions also shape formal institutional out-
on political institutions by laying the foundation for a sys- comes in a less visible way: by creating or strengthening
tematic analysis of informal rules. Our motivation is sim- incentives to comply with formal rules. In other words,
ple: good institutional analysis requires rigorous attention they may do the enabling and constraining that is widely
to both formal and informal rules. Careful attention to attributed to formal institutions.33 Since the Federalist Papers,
informal institutions is critical to understanding the incen- scholars have recognized that the norms underlying formal
tives that enable and constrain political behavior. Political institutions matter. The stability of the United States’ pres-
actors respond to a mix of formal and informal incen- idential democracy is not only a product of the rules laid
tives,22 and in some instances, informal incentives trump out in the Constitution, but is also rooted in informal rules
the formal ones. In postwar Italy, for example, norms of (such as gracious losing, the underuse of certain formal
corruption were “more powerful than the laws of the state: prerogatives, and bipartisan consensus on critical issues) that
the latter could be violated with impunity, while anyone prevent formal checks and balances from deteriorating into
who challenged the conventions of the illicit market would severe conflict among the branches of government.
meet with certain punishment.” 23 To take a different exam- These are hardly isolated examples. Informal rules shape
ple, although Brazilian state law prohibits extra-judicial formal institutional outcomes in areas such as legislative
executions, informal rules and procedures within the public politics,34 judicial politics,35 party organization,36 cam-
security apparatus enable and even encourage police officers paign finance,37 regime change,38 federalism,39 public admin-
to engage in such killing.24 Thus officers who kill suspected istration,40 and state building.41
violent criminals know they will be protected from pros- Bringing together a large but disparate body of scholar-
ecution and possibly rewarded with a promotion or bonus.25 ship, we develop a research agenda aimed at incorporating
In such cases, a strict analysis of the formal rules would be informal institutions into the theoretical toolkits used by stu-
woefully insufficient to understand the incentives driving dents of comparative politics.42 In the first section we clarify
behavior. the concept of informal institution, distinguishing it not only
Consideration of informal rules is also often critical to from that of formal institution, but also from other informal
explaining institutional outcomes. Informal structures shape phenomena, including weak institutions, informal behav-
the performance of formal institutions in important and ioral regularities, informal organizations, and culture. In the
often unexpected ways. For example, executive-legislative second section we examine how formal and informal rules
relations cannot always be explained strictly in terms of interact. Expanding on the work of Hans-Joachim Lauth,43
constitutional design. Neopatrimonial norms permitting we distinguish among four types of informal institution: com-
unregulated presidential control over state institutions in plementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive.
Africa and Latin America often yield a degree of executive The third and fourth sections are devoted to issues of infor-
dominance that far exceeds a presidents’ constitutional mal institutional emergence and change—questions largely
authority.26 Informal institutions may also limit presiden- ignored in recent comparative research. Finally, we discuss
tial power. In constitutional terms, Chile possesses “one of specific challenges related to research on informal institu-
the most powerful presidencies in the world.” 27 Yet, due to tions, such as issues of identification, measurement, and
a set of informal institutions that encouraged executive con- comparison.
sultation and power sharing, Chilean presidents systemati- A few caveats are in order. Although the term informal
cally underused their constitutional prerogatives during the institution encompasses a wide range of social (e.g., the
1990s; 28 consequently, Chile was cited as an exception in a handshake, or the rules of dating) and economic (e.g., black
region characterized by presidential dominance.29 markets) institutions, we are concerned only with political
Informal institutions also mediate the effects of electoral rules of the game. We restrict our analysis to the modern
rules. For example, Costa Rica’s proportional representa- period, when codification of law is nearly universal. Before
tion system and ban on congressional reelection offer no this period, our distinction between formal and informal
formal incentive for legislators to perform constituency ser- rules is less meaningful. Finally, although we draw on a
vice. Yet Costa Rican legislators routinely engage in such broad range of cases, the examples we cite are illustrative
activities in response to informal, party-sponsored “dis- only, not comprehensive.
tricts” and blacklisting.30 In the area of candidate selection,
studies in the United States suggest that because committed
voters are more likely to participate in primaries, primary What Informal Institutions Are
systems encourage the election of ideologically polarizing (and Are Not)
candidates.31 Yet in a context of pervasive clientelism, where The term informal institution has been applied to a dizzy-
primary participation is limited largely to people induced ing array of phenomena, including personal networks,44
726 Perspectives on Politics

clientelism,45 corruption,46 clans and mafias,47 civil soci- paper are widely circumvented or ignored. Yet formal insti-
ety,48 traditional culture,49 and a variety of legislative, judi- tutional weakness does not necessarily imply the presence
cial, and bureaucratic norms. We propose a more precise— of informal institutions. It may be that no stable or binding
and analytically useful—definition of informal institution. rules—formal or informal—exist. For example, in his sem-
It should capture as much of the universe of informal rules inal article on delegative democracy, Guillermo O’Donnell
as possible, but it must be narrow enough to distinguish argued that in much of Latin America, the formal rules of
informal rules from other, noninstitutional, informal representative democracy are weakly institutionalized.58 In
phenomena. the absence of institutionalized checks on executive power,
We begin with a standard definition of institutions as the scope of permissible presidential behavior widened con-
rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that struc- siderably, which resulted in substantial abuse of executive
ture social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ authority. In subsequent work, O’Donnell highlighted how
behavior.50 How to distinguish between formal and infor- particularistic informal institutions, such as clientelism,
mal institutions is, however, less clear. Some scholars equate undermined the effectiveness of representative institu-
informal institutions with cultural traditions.51 Others tions.59 O’Donnell’s work points to two distinct patterns of
employ a state-societal distinction, treating state agencies formal institutional weakness that should not be conflated.
and state-enforced rules as formal, and the rules and orga- Clientelism and abuses of executive authority both depart
nizations within civil society as informal.52 Still others dis- from formal rules, but whereas the former is an informal
tinguish between informal norms, which are self-enforcing, institution, the latter is best understood as noninstitutional
and formal rules, which are enforced by a third party, often behavior.
the state.53 Second, informal institutions must be distinguished from
Each conceptualization fails to capture important infor- other informal behavioral regularities. Not all patterned
mal institutions. For example, although some informal insti- behavior is rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations
tutions are undoubtedly rooted in cultural traditions, about others’ behavior.60 Behavioral regularities may be a
many—from legislative norms to illicit patterns of party product of a variety of incentives. To cite an example offered
finance—have little to do with culture. With respect to by Daniel Brinks,61 removing one’s hat in church is an
the state-societal distinction, many institutions within the informal institution, whereas removing one’s coat in a res-
state (from bureaucratic norms to corruption) are also infor- taurant is simply a behavioral regularity. In the latter case,
mal,54 while the rules governing many nonstate organiza- leaving one’s coat on may bring physical discomfort, but it
tions (such as corporations and political parties and is not expected to trigger social disapproval or sanction. To
corporations) are widely considered to be formal. Finally, be considered an informal institution, a behavioral regular-
although the self-enforcing definition is analytically useful, ity must respond to an established rule or guideline, the
it fails to account for the fact that informal rules may be violation of which generates some kind of external sanc-
externally enforced (for example, by clan and mafia bosses), tion. To take another example, public graft is clearly infor-
even by the state itself (i.e., organized state corruption).55 mal behavior, but only some patterns of graft should be
We employ a fourth approach. We define informal insti- considered institutional. Where graft is enforced from
tutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are above,62 or where it is rooted in widely shared expectations
created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanc- among citizens and public officials (and a refusal to go along
tioned channels.56 By contrast, formal institutions are rules risks incurring important costs),63 corruption may indeed
and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced be an institution. By contrast, where graft is neither exter-
through channels widely accepted as official. This includes nally sanctioned nor rooted in shared expectations, but is
state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and rather a response to low public sector salaries and ineffec-
state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), but tive enforcement, it may be best characterized as a behavior
also what Robert C. Ellickson calls “organization rules,” or pattern.
the official rules that govern organizations such as corpora- Third, informal institutions should be distinguished from
tions, political parties, and interest groups.57 informal organizations. Although scholars often incorpo-
Distinguishing between formal and informal institu- rate organizations into their definition of institution,64 it
tions, however, is only half the conceptual task. “Informal is useful, following Douglass North, to separate the polit-
institution” is often treated as a residual category, in the ical actors (or “players”) from the rules they follow.65
sense that it can be applied to virtually any behavior that Just as formal organizations (such as political parties or
departs from, or is not accounted for by, the written-down unions) may be distinguished from formal rules, informal
rules. To avoid this pitfall, we must say more about what an organizations (clans, mafias) should be distinguished
informal institution is not. from informal institutions. Nevertheless, informal rules may
Four distinctions are worth noting. First, informal insti- be embedded within these organizations, and just as for-
tutions should be distinguished from weak institutions. Many mal political organizations are studied under the rubric
formal institutions are ineffective, in that rules that exist on of “institutionalism,” clans, mafias, and other informal

structures may be usefully Figure 1

incorporated into informal A typology of informal institutions
institutional analysis.
Finally, we return to the dis- Effective formal Ineffective formal
tinction between informal insti- Outcomes institutions institutions
tutions and the broader concept Convergent Complementary Substitutive
of culture. Culture may help to
shape informal institutions, and Divergent Accommodating Competing
the frontier between the two is
a critical area for research.66 In
our view, however, the best way
to pursue this agenda is to cast informal institutions in tion noncompliance. Where formal rules and procedures
relatively narrow terms by defining informal institution in are ineffective, actors believe the probability of enforcement
terms of shared expectations rather than shared values. Shared (and hence the expected cost of violation) will be low.
expectations may or may not be rooted in broader societal These two dimensions produce the fourfold typology
values.67 Distinguishing between shared values and shared shown in figure 1. The types located in the upper left (com-
expectations allows future scholars to analyze potential causal plementary) and lower right (competing) cells correspond
relationships between culture and informal institutions, such to the “functional” and “dysfunctional” types that predom-
as whether societal values reinforce or undermine particular inate in much of the literature. The typology also yields two
informal institutions. novel types (accommodating and substitutive) that allow us
to make sense of other, less familiar institutional patterns.
Four Types of Informal Institution

Formal and informal institutions interact in a variety of Complementary informal institutions
ways. In this section, we develop a typology aimed at cap- The left side of the figure corresponds to informal institu-
turing these relationships.68 Characterizations of formal- tions that coexist with effective formal institutions, such
informal institutional relationships tend to fall into one of that actors expect that the rules that exist on paper will be
two sharply contrasting categories. One camp treats infor- enforced. The upper left corner combines effective formal
mal institutions as functional, or problem solving, in that rules and convergent outcomes, producing what Lauth calls
they provide solutions to problems of social interaction and complementary informal institutions.73 Such institutions “fill
coordination,69 which enhance the efficiency or perfor- in gaps” either by addressing contingencies not dealt with
mance of formal institutions.70 A second camp treats infor- in the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individ-
mal institutions as dysfunctional, or problem creating. ual goals within the formal institutional framework. These
Clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism are said to informal institutions often enhance efficiency. Examples
undermine the performance of formal democratic, market, include the myriad norms, routines, and operating proce-
and state institutions.71 However, recent studies suggest a dures that ease decision making and coordination within
more complex picture than envisioned by either camp, in bureaucracies,74 and judicial norms (such as the opinion
which informal institutions at times reinforce or substitute assignment procedures and the “Rule of Four”) that facili-
for the formal institutions they appear to undermine. tate the work of the U.S. Supreme Court.75
To capture these differences, our typology is based on Complementary informal institutions may also serve as a
two dimensions. The first is the degree to which formal and foundation for formal institutions, creating or strengthen-
informal institutional outcomes converge. The distinction ing incentives to comply with formal rules that might other-
here is whether following informal rules produces a substan- wise exist merely on paper.76 Thus scholars have linked the
tively similar or different result from that expected from a effectiveness of the U.S. Constitution to a complementary
strict and exclusive adherence to formal rules. Where fol- set of shared beliefs and expectations among citizens.77 Like-
lowing the informal rule leads to a substantively different wise, the efficiency of Singapore’s postcolonial bureaucracy
outcome, formal and informal institutions diverge. Where (the formal organization of which resembled those of Indo-
the two outcomes are not substantively different, formal nesia and the Philippines) has been attributed to underly-
and informal institutions converge. ing norms of meritocracy and discipline.78 Rural Chinese
The second dimension is the effectiveness of the relevant village governments are more likely to provide public goods
formal institutions, that is, the extent to which rules and where there exist informal norms of social obligation gen-
procedures that exist on paper are enforced and complied erated by membership in local temple associations.79 In
with in practice.72 Effective formal institutions actually con- each case, informal institutions do not merely exist along-
strain or enable political actors’ choices. Actors believe that side effective formal ones, but rather play a key role in
there is a high probability that official authorities will sanc- making effective the formal rules of the game.

Accommodating informal institutions enforced, which enables actors to ignore or violate them.
The lower left corner of figure 1, which combines effective The cell in the lower right corner combines ineffective for-
formal institutions and divergent outcomes, corresponds to mal rules and divergent outcomes, producing competing
accommodating informal institutions. These informal insti- informal institutions. These informal institutions structure
tutions create incentives to behave in ways that alter the incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal
substantive effects of formal rules, but without directly vio- rules: to follow one rule, actors must violate another. Par-
lating them; they contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of ticularistic informal institutions such as clientelism, patri-
the formal rules. Accommodating informal institutions are monialism, clan politics, and corruption are among the most
often created by actors who dislike outcomes generated by familiar examples.87 Thus postwar Italian corruption was
the formal rules but are unable to change or openly violate embedded in “alternative norms” under which actors could
those rules. As such, they often help to reconcile these actors’ violate certain state laws “with impunity,” 88 whereas those
interests with the existing formal institutional arrange- who adhered to the law “met with certain punishment.” 89
ments. Hence, although accommodating informal institu- Competing informal institutions are often found in post-
tions may not be efficiency enhancing, they may enhance colonial contexts in which formal institutions were imposed
the stability of formal institutions by dampening demands on indigenous rules and authority structures. In postcolo-
for change. nial Ghana, civil servants were officially instructed to follow
Chile’s executive-legislative power-sharing mechanisms are the rules of the public bureaucracy, but as Robert Price found,
a clear example. Leaders of the Democratic Concertation most believed they would pay a significant social cost (such
inherited an “exaggeratedly strong presidential system” and a as a loss of standing in the community) if they ignored kin-
majoritarian electoral system that ran counter to their goal of ship group norms that obliged them to provide jobs and other
maintaining a broad multiparty coalition.80 Lacking the leg- favors to their families and villages.90 Similarly, scholars of
islative strength to amend the 1980 Constitution, Concer- legal pluralism have argued that the imposition of European
tación elites created informal mechanisms of interparty and legal systems created “multiple systems of legal obligation.” 91
executive-legislative consultation aimed at counteracting its Because these systems “embodied very different principles and
effects. These power-sharing arrangements “enhanced coali- procedures,” 92 adherence to custom law at times required a
tional trust” in a formal constitutional setting that otherwise violation of state law (and vice versa).
“provided very few incentives for cooperation.” 81
Dutch consociational practices may also be characterized
as accommodating. The Netherlands’ post-1917 democ- Substitutive informal institutions
racy was based on a set of “informal, unwritten rules” of Finally, the upper right corner, which combines ineffective
elite accommodation and power sharing, including exten- formal institutions and compatible outcomes, corresponds
sive consultation in policy making, mutual veto power, and to substitutive informal institutions.93 Like complementary
the proportional allocation of government jobs among polit- institutions, substitutive informal institutions are employed
ical parties.82 Although these cartel-like arrangements vio- by actors who seek outcomes compatible with formal rules
lated the democratic spirit of the Dutch constitution (by and procedures. Like competing institutions, however, they
limiting the power of the vote), they reduced class and reli- exist in environments where formal rules are not routinely
gious conflict, thereby enhancing democratic stability.83 enforced. Hence, substitutive informal institutions achieve
Accommodating informal rules also emerged within state what formal institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve.
socialist institutions in the Soviet Union. Because strict adher- Substitutive institutions tend to emerge where state struc-
ence to the formal rules governing Soviet political and eco- tures are weak or lack authority. During Mexico’s pro-
nomic life did not allow enterprises to fulfill state targets or tracted democratic transition, formal institutions of electoral
permit individuals to meet basic needs, a set of informal dispute resolution (such as the electoral courts) lacked cred-
norms—commonly known as blat—emerged in which indi- ibility and were frequently bypassed. In this context, offi-
viduals met these goals through personal networks.84 Not cials of the national government and the opposition National
strictly illegal, blat enabled factory managers, workers, and Action Party resolved postelection disputes through infor-
bureaucrats to “find a way around formal procedures.” 85 mal concertacesiones, or “gentleman’s agreements.” 94 Con-
By helping enterprises to fulfill state targets and individuals certacesiones thus served as a “way station” for government
to obtain essential goods and services, this informal system and opposition elites until formal institutions of electoral
of exchange was critical to the survival of the Soviet system.86 dispute resolution became credible.95 In rural northern Peru,
where state weakness resulted in inadequate police protec-
tion and ineffective courts during the late 1970s, citizens
Competing informal institutions created informal rondas campesinas (self-defense patrols) to
On the right side of figure 1 we find informal institutions defend their communities and ronda assemblies (informal
that coexist with ineffective formal institutions. In such courts) to resolve local disputes.96 In rural China, some
cases, formal rules and procedures are not systematically local officials compensate for the state’s incapacity to raise

revenue and provide public goods by mobilizing resources words, why, given the existence of a set of formal rules and
through temple and lineage associations, thereby “substitut- rule-making mechanisms, do actors choose to create infor-
ing the use of these informal institutions for . . . formal mal rules? Building on the previous section, we see three
political institutional channels of public goods provisions.” 97 general motivations.
Taken together, these four types suggest that informal First, actors create informal rules because formal institu-
institutions cannot be classified in simple dichotomous (functions are incomplete.104 Formal rules set general parameters
tional versus dysfunctional) terms. Although substitutive for behavior, but they cannot cover all contingencies. Con-
informal institutions such as concertacesiones and rondas sequently, actors operating within a particular formal insti-
campesinas subvert formal rules and procedures, they may tutional context, such as bureaucracies and legislatures,
help achieve results (resolution of postelectoral conflict, pub- develop norms and procedures that expedite their work or
lic security) that the formal rules failed to achieve. And address problems not anticipated by formal rules.105
although accommodating informal institutions such as con- Second, informal institutions may be a “second best” strat-
sociationalism violate the spirit of the formal rules, they egy for actors who prefer, but cannot achieve, a formal insti-
may generate outcomes (democratic stability) that are viewed tutional solution.106 In some cases, actors simply lack the
as broadly beneficial. It remains an open question, however, power to change the formal rules. Thus post-Pinochet elites
whether accommodating and substitutive institutions can in Chile created informal power-sharing arrangements because
contribute to the development of more effective formal struc- they lacked the political strength to rewrite the 1980 Con-
tures, or whether they “crowd out” such development (by stitution.107 Similarly, Soviet workers and managers opted
quelling demands for formal institutional change or creat- for the informality of blat in part because they were unable to
ing new actors, skills, and interests linked to the preserva- reform or do away with state socialist institutions.
tion of the informal rules).98 The following two sections lay A broader statement of this motivation, elaborated by
a foundation for addressing such questions. Carol Mershon, is that actors create informal institutions
when they deem it less costly than creating formal institu-
Origins of Informal Institutions tions to their liking.108 In postwar Italy, Christian Demo-
cratic leaders who sought to keep the communist and
To date, much empirical literature on informal institutions
neofascist parties out of power found it easier to develop an
has neglected questions of why and how such institutions
informal “formula” to exclude those parties from governing
emerge.99 Analyses of entrenched competing informal insti-
coalitions than to push through parliament a majoritarian
tutions such as custom law, clientelism, and patrimonialism
electoral system aimed at strengthening large moderate par-
frequently take them as historical givens, or part of a static
ties.109 Similarly, Costa Rican party leaders’ use of informal
cultural landscape, rarely asking why they emerged in the
devices to induce legislators to engage in constituency ser-
first place. As a result, they often understate the degree to
vice may have been easier than overturning the ban on
which informal institutions are modified, adapted, or even
legislative reelection.110
reinvented over time.100 Meanwhile, many existing expla-
Inventing informal institutions may also be a second-
nations (particularly studies of complementary institu-
best strategy where formal institutions exist on paper but
tions) confront a major pitfall of early functionalist accounts
are ineffective in practice. In the case of substitutive infor-
of formal institutions: they explain the emergence of infor-
mal institutions, for example, actors create informal struc-
mal institutions primarily in terms of their purported effects
tures not because they dislike the formal rules, but because
(e.g., the efficiency gains they yield), without identifying
the existing rules—and rule-making processes—lack credi-
the mechanisms by which they are created.101 For example,
bility. Thus Mexican opposition leaders engaged in concert-
many early rational-choice analyses treated informal norms
acesiones during the 1990s because they did not view the
as efficient solutions to problems of cycling, information,
formal electoral courts as credible, and Peruvian villagers
or collective action.102 Although such explanations may par-
created rondas campesinas because the state judicial system
tially explain the persistence of informal institutions once
failed to enforce the rule of law.
established, they are insufficient, if not misleading, for gen-
A third motivation for creating informal institutions is
erating theories about institutional emergence. In this sec-
the pursuit of goals not considered publicly acceptable.
tion we seek to move beyond static and functionalist
Because they are relatively inconspicuous,111 informal insti-
accounts, arguing that compelling explanations of informal
tutions allow actors to pursue activities—ranging from the
institutions must not only ask why actors create informal
unpopular to the illegal—that are unlikely to stand the
rules, but also examine how actors create and communicate
test of public scrutiny. Even where bribery, patrimonial-
those rules.
ism, and vote-buying are widely accepted, prevailing norms
of universalism prevent their legalization. Norms of lax
Why Informal Institutions? enforcement—what the Dutch call gedogen—provide
We focus our discussion here on informal institutions that another example.112 Prostitution, soft drug use, and eutha-
are endogenous to formal institutional structures.103 In other nasia (or abortion in predominantly Catholic countries)

are legally proscribed but widely tolerated. The informal out of elite-level strategic interaction (Mexico’s concertace-
procedures enabling extrajudicial executions in Brazil may siones). In other instances (corruption, clientelism, blat)
also be explained in these terms.113 informal rules emerge out of a decentralized process involv-
Informal institutions may also be created in pursuit of ing a much larger number of actors. In either process, we
goals that are not internationally acceptable. For example, may understand mechanisms of emergence in terms of focal
the geopolitical changes produced by the end of the Cold points,118 repeated interaction,119 or bargaining.120 Alter-
War raised the external cost of maintaining openly (e.g., natively, informal institutional creation may be a histori-
military or Leninist one party) authoritarian regimes dur- cally contingent process in which informal structures are an
ing the 1990s, which led many autocratic elites to adopt unintended product of particular conflicts and compro-
formal democratic institutions. To maintain power in this mises. For example, Amakudari originated as a makeshift
new international context, autocrats in countries like Bela- strategy by Japanese ministry officials seeking to reconcile
rus, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Peru, Russia, Ukraine, and Zim- prewar norms of lifetime employment with postwar reali-
babwe resorted to informal mechanisms of coercion and ties of resource scarcity and strict seniority systems.121
control, ranging from use of paramilitary thugs to elaborate Although such informal institutions may ultimately take
systems of vote buying, fraud, co-optation, espionage, and on functions that are perceived as efficient or beneficial,
blackmail.114 these functions often have little to do with their origins.
Understanding why actors create informal institutions is Analyses of the origins of informal institutions must also
not, however, sufficient to explain how they are established. account for how they are communicated and learned in the
Incompleteness does not by itself explain how the need for absence of written down rules and public enforcement. In
additional rules translates into their creation (or, for that some cases, informal institutionalization appears to be a
matter, why informal, rather than formal, rules are adopted). process of social learning through widely observed instances
Where informal institutions are a second-best strategy, why of trial and error. The Mexican dedazo was institutionalized
are actors who lack the capacity to change the formal rules through a “process of learning by example,” as PRI leaders
nevertheless able to establish and enforce informal ones? who broke the informal rules during the 1940s and 1950s
And where actors share certain illicit goals, how are they suffered political defeat and marginalization, while those
able to establish mechanisms that effectively circumvent who played by the rules “were rewarded with better posts.”122
the formal rules? In short, to avoid the functionalist trap, it Similarly, postwar Italian prime ministers who broke the
is essential to examine the mechanisms by which informal informal rule that gave parties the right to name govern-
institutions are established. ment ministers “saw their governments meet rapid ends.”
Their successors quickly “learned the lesson,” and by the
mid-1950s, “the rule of negotiated decisions by party and
How Informal Institutions are Created faction leaders had been hammered out.” 123
and Communicated Social networks and political organizations may also trans-
The construction of informal institutions differs markedly mit informal rules. Thus the norms of Amakudari were
from formal rule-making processes. Whereas formal rules diffused through social networks that linked universities,
are created through official channels (such as executives state bureaucracies, and private corporations,124 and infor-
and legislatures) and communicated and enforced by state mal networks within the Peruvian and Ukrainian states com-
agencies (such as the police and courts), informal rules are municated the rules of corruption and blackmail that
created, communicated, and enforced outside of public sustained autocratic regimes during the 1990s.125 Political
channels, and usually outside of the public eye. The actors parties also carry informal rules. Parties communicated
who create and enforce them may deny having done so. power-sharing arrangements in Chile, the Netherlands, and
Hence, their origins are often unclear.115 postwar Italy; 126 party organizations enforced the system of
Precisely because of these differences, scholars should take kickbacks and bribery in Italy; 127 and competing local party
the process of informal rule-making seriously by identify- leaders spread rondas campesinas across northern Peru.128
ing the actors, coalitions, and interests behind the creation In sum, moving beyond functionalist accounts entails
of informal rules. To the extent that these rules are created identifying the relevant actors and interests behind infor-
in a context in which power and resources are unevenly mal institutions, specifying the process by which informal
distributed, they can be expected to produce winners and rules are created, and showing how those rules are commu-
losers.116 Thus, following Jack Knight,117 scholars should nicated to other actors in such a manner that they evolve
be sensitive to underlying processes of conflict and coer- into sets of shared expectations.
cion, rather than assume pure coordination.
Processes of informal institutional emergence vary. In
some cases, the process is “top down”; informal institutions Informal Institutional Change
may be a product of elite design and imposition (the Mex- Informal institutions are often characterized as highly resis-
ican dedazo, Dutch consociationalism), or they may emerge tant to change, possessing a “tenacious survival ability.” 129

When change occurs, it is expected to be slow and incre- electoral courts over the course of the 1990s reduced the
mental.130 Lauth, for example, argues that because infor- incentive of opposition leaders to work through informal
mal rules “do not possess a center which directs and concertacesiones, 138 and the increased effectiveness of Peru’s
co-ordinates their actions,” informal institutional change is public security and judicial systems led to the collapse of
likely to be an “extremely lengthy” process.131 Yet informal many rondas campesinas and ronda assemblies.139
institutions do change—and often quite quickly. The Other sources of informal institutional change lie out-
centuries-old Chinese practice of foot-binding disappeared side the formal institutional context. For scholars who view
within a generation,132 and many of the informal rules that informal institutions primarily as a product of culture, infor-
structured Mexican elite politics for much of the twentieth mal institutional change is rooted primarily in the evolu-
century (including the dedazo) collapsed quickly during the tion of societal values.140 Because such shifts tend to be
late 1990s.133 glacial in pace, this pattern of informal institutional change
Several sources may generate the impetus for informal will be slow and incremental. We might understand the
institutional change. One important source is formal insti- erosion of traditional or kinship-based patterns of authority
tutional change. The impact of formal rule changes should in Europe in these terms.
not, of course, be overstated; many informal institutions Informal institutions may also change as the status quo
have proved resilient even in the face of large-scale legal or conditions that sustain them change.141 Developments in
administrative reform.134 Nevertheless, to the extent that the external environment may change the distribution of
formal institutional change alters the costs and benefits of power and resources within a community, weakening those
adhering to particular informal rules, it can serve as an actors who benefit from a particular informal institution
important catalyst for informal institutional change. and strengthening those who seek to change it. Thus Mexico’s
Two types of formal institutional change are relevant here. increasingly competitive electoral environment during the
The first is change in formal institutional design. Particu- 1990s strengthened local PRI leaders and activists vis-à-vis
larly for informal institutions that are endogenous to for- the national leadership, which allowed them to contest and
mal structures, a change in the design of the formal rules eventually dismantle the dedazo system.142 In the Nether-
may affect the costs and benefits of adhering to related infor- lands, a long-term decline in class and religious identities
mal rules, which can produce rapid informal institutional strengthened new parties that challenged the consocia-
change. In the case of complementary informal institutional rules of the game and induced established parties to
tions, for example, modifying the relevant formal rules may abandon them.143 The growth of middle-class electorates
change the nature of the gaps that the informal institution erodes the bases of clientelism by reducing voters’ depen-
had been designed to address, which may create incentives dence on the distribution of selective material goods.144 In
for actors to modify or abandon the informal rule. The these cases, informal institutional change tends to be incre-
1974 Bill of Rights of Subcommittees in the House of Rep- mental, as actors gradually reorient their expectations to
resentatives “produced a sharp change in formal rules that reflect underlying changes in their and others’ bargaining
overrode previous informal committee structures.” 135 power.
Informal institutional change may also be a product of Other analytic tools may be needed to explain some rapid
changes in formal institutional strength or effectiveness. In informal institutional change or collapse. Tipping models
such cases, changes in the level of enforcement of formal offer one such tool.145 These models suggest that if a suffi-
rules alter the costs and benefits adhering to informal insti- ciently large enough number of actors become convinced
tutions that compete with or substitute for those rules. For that a new and better alternative exists, and if a mechanism
example, compliance with competing informal institutions exists through which to coordinate actors’ expectations, a
becomes more costly with increased enforcement of the shift from one set of norms to another may occur quite
formal rules, and at some point, these costs will induce rapidly. Gerry Mackie argues that the move to end foot
actors to abandon the informal institution. Thus the binding in China hinged on creating an alternative mar-
increased judicial enforcement triggered by the Mani Pulite riage market that allowed sons to marry daughters who had
investigations weakened corruption networks in Italy; 136 natural feet, thereby escaping conventional inferiority.146
the tight controls imposed by the postrevolutionary state Figure 2 summarizes these sources of informal institu-
weakened traditional gift-giving norms in Maoist China; 137 tional change. As the figure suggests, informal institutions
and federal enforcement of civil rights legislation weakened vary considerably with respect to both the source and the
Jim Crow practices in the South. pace of change. Whereas some (complementary, accommo-
Increased formal institutional effectiveness may also dating) are highly susceptible to changes in formal institu-
weaken substitutive informal institutions. When the credi- tional design, others (substitutive, competing) are more
bility of previously ineffective formal structures is enhanced, likely to be affected by changes in formal institutional
the benefits associated with the use of substitutive institu- strength. With respect to the pace of change, cultural evo-
tions may diminish, potentially to the point of their dispens- lution is likely to produce incremental change, but formal
ability. For example, the increased credibility of Mexico’s institutional change or coordination around an alternative

equilibrium may trigger the rapid collapse of informal
Erosion of traditional kinship-based norms

Collapse of Mexican concertacesiones as
institutions.
1974 change in committee rules in U.S.
Erosion of clientelism through growth of

courts gain credibility; Mani Pulite and
Research Challenges: Identification,
Measurement, and Comparison
End of foot-binding in China

Examples
Bringing informal institutions into mainstream compara-

tive institutional analysis poses a new set of research chal-
lenges. A major issue is identifying and measuring informal
institutions. In formal institutional analysis, this task is
Italian corruption relatively straightforward. Because formal institutions are
middle class
usually written down and officially communicated and sanc-
Congress
tioned, their identification and measurement often requires

little knowledge of particular cases, which facilitates large-n
comparison. Identifying informal institutions is more chal-
lenging. A country’s constitution can tell us whether it has
a presidential or parliamentary system of government, but
it cannot tell us about the pervasiveness of clientelism or
Often slow, incremental
kinship networks.
Often relatively rapid
Pace of change
One way of identifying informal institutions is to look

for instances in which similar formal rules produce differ-
ent outcomes and then attribute the difference to informal
institutions.147 Although the logic of this approach is clear,
Very slow
Variable
it reduces informal institutions to a residual category and

Rapid
risks conflating informal institutions and weak institutions.

An alternative strategy is to identify stable patterns of behav-
ior that do not correspond to formal rules. However, this
approach runs the risk of treating all behavioral regularities
Change in design of formal institution
as informal institutions.
At a minimum, efforts to identify informal institutions
Change in effectiveness of formal
should answer three basic questions.148 First, what are the

Mechanism of change
actors’ shared expectations about the actual constraints they

Change in societal values
New rounds of bargaining
face? Only by examining actors’ mutual understanding of the

rules can one distinguish between informal behavior pat-
terns and informal institutions. Second, what is the commu-
nity to which the informal rules apply? Whereas the domain
of a formal institution is often delineated by laws or other
statutes, the domain of informal rules is often more difficult
institution
to discern.The relevant community may be a village, a nation,

Tipping
an ethnic or religious group, or an organization such as a polit-

ical party, legislature, or state bureaucracy. In some cases, the
Sources of informal institutional change
relevant community is a political elite, the boundaries of which

are often blurry. Third, how are informal rules enforced? If
informal behavior is rule-bound, then violations must trig-
Change in distribution of power,
Updating of beliefs/mechanism
ger external sanction. Unlike formal enforcement mecha-

Formal institutional Change
Formal institutional Change
nisms (police, courts), informal sanctioning mechanisms are

often subtle, hidden, and even illegal. They may range from
hostile remarks, gossip, ostracism, and other displays of social
Source of change
disapproval to extrajudicial violence.149

Cultural evolution
for coordination
Identifying the shared expectations and enforcement

mechanisms that sustain informal institutions is a challeng-
resources
ing task, requiring in most cases substantial knowledge of

Figure 2
the community within which the informal institutions are

embedded. Hence there is probably no substitute for inten-
sive fieldwork in informal institutional analysis. Indeed most

studies of informal institutions take the form of either islative rules? 156 In comparative politics, the issue of how
abstract theory (N50) or inductive case studies (N51).150 informal institutions sustain or reinforce—as opposed to
Case studies provide essential building blocks for compari- undermine or distort—formal ones has not been well
son and theory building. However, a more general body of researched. When institutions function effectively, we often
theory will require scholars to incorporate other methods as assume that the formal rules are driving actors’ behavior.
well. Yet in some cases, underlying informal norms do much of
One such method is rigorous small-n comparison. With- the enabling and constraining that we attribute to the for-
out losing the sensitivity to context that characterizes case mal rules.
studies, small-n analyses can begin to identify patterns of Second, we need to theorize more rigorously about the
informal institutional effects, formal-informal institutional emergence of informal institutions and particularly about
interaction, and informal institutional change. For exam- the mechanisms through which informal rules are created,
ple, Kathleen Collins’s comparative study of three Central communicated, and learned. Some seemingly age-old infor-
Asian states enabled her to examine the interaction between mal institutions are in reality relatively recent reconfigura-
clan networks and different formal regime types.151 Simi- tions (or reinventions); this fact makes the issues of origins
larly, Scott Desposato’s analysis of legislative behavior in all the more compelling.157
five Brazilian states with varying degrees of clientelism Third, we need to better understand the sources of infor-
allowed him to consider how clientelism affects the func- mal institutional stability and change. One question not
tioning of legislatures with similar formal structures.152 addressed in this article is that of codification of informal
Large-n surveys may also prove useful in research on infor- rules. In some instances, state actors opt to legalize informal
mal institutions. Survey research may capture actors’ expec- institutions that are perceived to compete with or under-
tations and beliefs about the “actual” rules of the game. mine formal rules. Several Latin American governments “con-
Here it is important to distinguish between conventional stitutionalized” aspects of indigenous law (granting them
surveys that capture values or attitudes toward particular constitutional status) during the 1990s in an effort to
institutions (e.g., the World Values Survey) and those enhance compliance with state law.158 Similarly, in Argen-
designed to capture socially shared beliefs about constraints tina, in an effort to regulate President Carlos Menem’s use
that individuals face. An example of the latter is Susan Stokes’s of extraconstitutional decree authority, legislators included
analysis of informal institutions of accountability in Argen- a provision for executive decrees in the 1994 Constitu-
tina, which uses survey data to demonstrate the existence in tion.159 We need to know more about what induces state
some parts of the country of shared citizen expectations actors to formalize rather than oppose informal institutions.
that voters will punish politicians who behave dishonest- Comparative politics research on informal institutions is
ly.153 Although expectations-based surveys may initially be still at an incipient stage. Advances are likely on several
limited to identifying of informal institutions, they might fronts, ranging from abstract formal modeling to ethno-
eventually be used to generate and test causal claims. graphic studies to survey research. New insights will come
from a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, eco-
nomics, law, sociology, and political psychology. Hence, it
Conclusion is essential to promote a broad and pluralistic research agenda
Since James March and Johan P. Olsen declared that “a new that encourages fertilization across disciplines, methods, and
institutionalism has appeared in political science,” 154 research regions. Given the range of areas in which informal rules
on political institutions has advanced considerably. Yet and organizations matter politically, it is essential that polit-
because the comparative politics literature has focused pri- ical scientists take the real rules of the game seriously—
marily on formal institutions, it risks missing many of the whether they are written into parchment or not.
“real” incentives and constraints that underlie political behav-
ior. Indeed, rational-choice analyses of institutions have been Notes
criticized for an “excessive attention to formal rules” and 1 For an excellent survey of this literature, see Carey
“insufficient attention to firmly established informal prac- 2000.
tices and ‘institutions.’” 155 2 Taylor 1992; Hartlyn 1994; O’Donnell 1996; Siave-
We have sought to provide a framework for incorporat- lis 1997; Starn 1999; Van Cott 2000; Levitsky 2001;
ing informal rules into mainstream institutional analysis. Levitsky 2003; Helmke 2002; Brinks 2003a; Eisen-
Far from rejecting the literature on institutions, we seek to stadt 2003.
broaden and extend it, with the goal of refining, and ulti- 3 Clarke 1995; Ledeneva 1998; Böröcz 2000; Easter
mately strengthening, its theoretical framework. We see sev- 2000; Sil 2001; Collins 2002a, 2003; Grzymala-
eral areas for future research. First, we must posit and test Busse and Jones Luong 2002; Way 2002; Gel’man
hypotheses about how informal rules shape formal institu- 2003.
tional outcomes. For example, how do clientelism and 4 Dia 1996; Sandbrook and Oelbaum 1999; Hyden
patronage networks mediate the effects of electoral and leg- 2002; Lindberg 2003; Galvan 2004.

5 Yang 1994; Hamilton-Hart 2000; Wang 2000; 50 See North 1990; Knight 1992; Carey 2000.
Göbel 2001; Tsai 2001, 2004; Colignon and Usui 51 Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. Pejovich defines informal
2003. institutions as “traditions, customs, moral values, reli-
6 For general analyses of informal institutions, see gious beliefs, and all other norms of behavior that
North 1990; Knight 1992; O’Donnell 1996; Lauth have passed the test of time. . . . Thus, informal insti-
2000. tutions are the part of a community’s heritage that
7 Langston 2003. we call culture” (p. 166).
8 Colignon and Usui 2003. 52 Boussard 2000; Manor 2001; Tsai 2002.
9 Collins 2002b, 23, 30. 53 Knight 1992; Calvert 1995.
10 O’Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000; Böröcz 2000; Göbel 54 Hamilton-Hart 2000; Grzymala-Busse and Jones-
2001; Lindberg 2003. Luong 2002; Colignon and Usui 2003.
11 Riggs 1964. 55 Waterbury 1973; Darden 2002; Langston 2003.
12 Scott 1976. 56 This definition borrows from Brinks 2003a and is con-
13 Hyden 1980. sistent with North 1990; O’Donnell 1996; Carey
14 Hooker 1975; Griffiths 1986. 2000; and Lauth 2000. We treat informal institu-
15 Scott 1972; Lemarchand 1972; tions and norms synonymously. However, norms
16 Scott 1969; Waterbury 1973; Rose-Ackerman 1978. have been defined in a variety of ways, and some con-
17 Lijphart 1975. ceptualizations do not include external enforce-
18 Johnson 1974, 1982. ment. See Elster 1989.
19 Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn 1956; Berliner 1957. 57 Ellickson 1991, 31.
20 Matthews 1959. 58 O’Donnell 1994.
21 O’Donnell 1996; Weyland 2002. 59 O’Donnell 1996.
22 North 1990. 60 See Hart 1961; Knight 1992.
23 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, 15. 61 Brinks 2003a.
24 Brinks 2003a, 2003b. 62 Waterbury 1973; Darden 2002.
25 Brinks 2003b. 63 Manion 1996; Della Porta and Vannucci 1999.
26 O’Donnell 1994; Hartlyn 1994; Sandbrook and Oel- 64 See Huntington 1968.
baum 1999. 65 North 1990.
27 Siavelis 2002a, 81. 66 North 1990; Galvan 2004.
28 Siavelis 2002b. 67 For example, some indigenous institutions in Latin
29 O’Donnell 1994. America draw on cultural traditions but others do
30 Taylor 1992. not. See Yrigoyen Fajardo 2000; Van Cott 2003.
31 Wright and Berkman 1986. 68 Lauth 2000 distinguishes among three types of formal-
32 Levitsky 2001; 2003. informal institutional relationships: complementary,
33 Stokes 2003. substitutive, and conflicting. He does not elabo-
34 Mershon 1994; Desposato 2003. rate on these types, however.
35 Helmke 2002; Van Cott 2003; Bill Chavez 2004. 69 Ullman-Margalit 1978; Axelrod 1986.
36 Freidenberg and Levitsky 2002; Langston 2003; Lev- 70 Weingast 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988; March
itsky 2003. and Olsen 1989.
37 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Samuels 2003. 71 O’Donnell 1996; Böröcz 2000; Lauth 2000; Collins
38 Collins 2002a, 2002b; Ottaway 2003. 2002a.
39 Way 2002. 72 By effectiveness, we do not mean efficiency. History
40 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Hamilton-Hart is littered with examples of inefficient institutions
2000; Colignon and Usui 2003. that nevertheless effectively shaped actors’ expecta-
41 Darden 2002; Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong tions (North 1990).
2002; Tsai 2004. 73 Lauth 2000.
42 For other efforts in this direction, see Lauth 2000 74 March and Olsen 1989.
and Pasotti and Rothstein 2002. 75 Maltzman and Wahlbeck 1996; Epstein and Knight
43 Lauth 2000. 1997.
44 Wang 2000. 76 Stokes 2003.
45 O’Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000. 77 North, Summerhill, and Weingast, 2000.
46 Böröcz 2000; Darden 2002. 78 Hamilton-Hart 2000.
47 Lauth 2000; Collins 2002a; Collins 2003. 79 Tsai 2004.
48 Boussard 2000; Manor 2001. 80 Siavelis 2002b, 10–11.
49 Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. 81 Ibid., 21.

82 Lijphart 1975, 122–38. ones), or they may be created without taking pre-
83 Ibid. existing informal structures into account (as occurred
84 Bauer, Inkeles, and Kluckhohn 1956; Berliner 1957; with many colonial institutions).
Ledeneva 1998. 104 Johnson 2002.
85 Ledeneva 1998, 43, 1. 105 March and Olsen 1989; Nelson and Winter 1982;
86 Berliner 1957; Ledeneva 1998. Guanxi, or personal rela- Weingast 1979; Weingast and Marshall 1988.
tionships maintained by gift giving and reciprocal 106 We thank Susan Stokes for suggesting this point.
favors, played a similar role in post-Maoist China. See 107 Siavelis 2002b.
Yang 1994. 108 Mershon 1994.
87 O’Donnell 1996; Böröcz 2000; Lauth 2000; Collins 109 Ibid.
2002a, 2003; Lindberg 2003. According to O’Donnell 110 Taylor 1992.
(1996, 40), particularistic norms are “antagonistic 111 Mershon 1994, 50.
to one of the main aspects of the full institutional pack- 112 Van Oenen 2001.
age of polyarchy. . . . Individuals performing roles 113 Brinks 2003a.
in political and state institutions are supposed to be 114 Darden 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler
guided not by particularistic motives but by uni- 2002; Ottaway 2003.
versalistic orientations to some version of the public 115 See, for example, Starn’s account of the disputed ori-
good. . . . Where particularism is pervasive, this gins of the ronda campesinas in Peru (1999, 36–69)
notion is weaker, less widely held, and seldom and Ledeneva’s (1998) analysis of the origins of
enforced.” blat in the Soviet Union.
88 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, 146, 15. 116 Knight 1992.
89 Ibid., 15, 122. 117 Ibid.
90 Price 1975. 118 Schelling 1960.
91 Hooker 1975, 2; also Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988. 119 Sugden 1986; Schotter 1981; and Calvert 1995.
92 Merry 1988, 869. 120 Knight 1992
93 Lauth 2000. 121 Johnson 1974; Colignon and Usui 2003. Similarly,
94 Eisenstadt 2002; Eisenstadt 2003. norms of restraint and flexibility within Japan’s secu-
95 Eisenstadt 2002. rity forces have been traced to the intense socio-
96 Starn 1999. political conflicts in the aftermath of World War II
97 Tsai 2001, 16. (Katzenstein 1996).
98 Wang 2000; Tsai 2001. 122 Langston 2003, 14–16.
99 The question of informal institutional emergence 123 Mershon 1994, 67–68.
has been the subject of a large literature within for- 124 Colignon and Usui 2003.
mal political theory. See Schotter 1981; Knight 125 Darden 2002; Moreno Ocampo 2002.
1992; Calvert 1995. 126 Siavelis 2002b; Lijphart 1975; Mershon 1994.
100 For example, some indigenous institutions widely 127 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, 93–124.
viewed as “traditional” are in fact recent creations 128 Starn 1999.
that merely draw on earlier traditions. See Starn 1999; 129 North 1990, 45; See also Dia 1996; O’Donnell
Van Cott 2000, 2003; Galvan 2004. 1996; Pejovich 1999; Collins 2002b.
101 For a critique, see Knight 1992. 130 North 1990; Lauth 2000.
102 See, for example, early work on legislative norms by 131 Lauth 2000, 24–25.
Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Wein- 132 Mackie 1996.
gast and Marshall 1988. 133 Langston 2003.
103 Many informal institutions emerge endogenously 134 Dia 1996; O’Donnell 1996; Pejovich 1999. For exam-
from formal institutional arrangements. Actors cre- ple, Amakudari persisted for decades despite multi-
ate them in an effort to subvert, mitigate the ple legislative reforms aimed at its eradication (Colignon
effects of, substitute for, or enhance the efficiency of for- and Usui 2003, 43–49); clan politics in Central
mal institutions. However, other informal institu- Asia survived the rise and fall of the Soviet Union (Col-
tions develop independently of formal institutional lins 2002a, 2002b); and many Soviet-era norms sur-
structures, in response to conditions that are vived Russia’s transition from state socialism to a
unrelated to (and frequently pre-date) the formal insti- market economy (Clarke 1995; Sil 2001).
tutional context. Formal institutions may then be 135 North 1990, 88.
built on the foundation of these informal institu- 136 Della Porta and Vannucci 1999.
tions (actors may formalize pre-existing informal 137 Yang 1994.
rules or use them as the bases for designing formal 138 Eisenstadt 2002.

139 Starn 1999. Boussard, Caroline. 2000. Democratic consolidation: The
140 North 1990; Dia 1996; Pejovich 1999. role of informal institutions. Illustrations from Central
141 Knight 1992. America. Paper presented at the 22nd International
142 Langston 2003. Congress of the Latin American Studies Association,
143 Lijphart 1975. Miami, FL, March 16–18.
144 Kitschelt 2000. Brinks, Daniel. 2003a. Informal institutions and the rule
145 Schelling 1960, 1978. of law: The judicial response to state killings in Bue-
146 Mackie 1996. nos Aires and São Paulo in the 1990s. Comparative Pol-
147 See, for example, North 1990. itics 36 (1): 1–19.
148 For a more elaborate discussion of how to identify _. 2003b. Courts, norms, and laws: Competing rules
and measure informal institutions, see Brinks 2003b. and legal rights in Salvador, São Paulo, and Buenos
149 An additional problem, identified by Brinks (2003b), Aires. Paper presented at the conference Informal Insti-
is that some informal rules permit, but do not require, tutions and Politics in Latin America, Kellogg Insti-
certain behavior. Under rules of this type, actors tute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame,
who refrain from the permitted behavior (e.g., govern- April 24–25.
ment officials who choose not to collect bribes) do Calvert, Randall. 1995. The rational choice theory of
not break the informal rule and thus will not be sanc- social institutions: Cooperation, coordination, and
tioned. In such cases, sanctions are likely to be communication.” In Modern political economy: Old
applied only to actors who seek to formally sanction topics, new directions, ed. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A.
behavior permitted by the informal rules—i.e., whis- Hanushek, 216–67. New York: Cambridge Univer-
tle blowers. sity Press.
150 Within the case study tradition, a more microlevel Carey, John M. 2000. Parchment, equilibria, and institu-
approach is to construct analytic narratives that tions. Comparative Political Studies 33 (6): 735–61.
blend elements of deductive and inductive reason- Clarke, Simon, ed. 1995. Management and industry in Rus-
ing. See Bates et al. 1998. sia: Formal and informal relations in the period of transi-
151 Collins 2002a. tion. Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar.
152 Desposato 2003. Colignon, Richard A, and Chikako Usui. 2003. Amaku-
153 Stokes 2003. dari: The hidden fabric of Japan’s economy. Ithaca: Cor-
154 March and Olsen 1984, 734. nell University Press.
155 Weyland 2002, 67. Collins, Kathleen. 2002a. Clans, pacts and politics in Cen-
156 On these questions, see Kitschelt 2000; Desposato tral Asia.” Journal of Democracy 13 (3): 137–52.
2003 and Taylor-Robinson 2003. _. 2002b. Clans, pacts, and regime transitions in
157 Van Cott 2000, 2003; Galvan 2004. Central Asia. Paper presented at the conference Infor-
158 Yrigoyen Fajardo 2000; Van Cott 2000, 2003. mal Institutions and Politics in the Developing World,
159 Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998, 56–57. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Har-
vard University, April 5–6.
_. 2003. The political role of clans in Central Asia. Com-
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Informal Institutions and Comparative

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726 Perspectives on Politics

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structures may be usefully Figure 1

Four Types of Informal Institution

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Erosion of traditional kinship-based norms

1974 change in committee rules in U.S.

Erosion of clientelism through growth of

End of foot-binding in China

Bringing informal institutions into mainstream compara-

tioned, their identification and measurement often requires

One way of identifying informal institutions is to look

it reduces informal institutions to a residual category and

risks conflating informal institutions and weak institutions.

should answer three basic questions.148 First, what are the

actors’ shared expectations about the actual constraints they

New rounds of bargaining

face? Only by examining actors’ mutual understanding of the

to discern.The relevant community may be a village, a nation,

an ethnic or religious group, or an organization such as a polit-

relevant community is a political elite, the boundaries of which

ger external sanction. Unlike formal enforcement mecha-

Formal institutional Change

nisms (police, courts), informal sanctioning mechanisms are

disapproval to extrajudicial violence.149

Identifying the shared expectations and enforcement

ing task, requiring in most cases substantial knowledge of

the community within which the informal institutions are

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