Some Remarks on the Question of the Originality of the Renaissance

Author(s): Ernst Cassirer, Francis R. Johnson, Paul Oskar Kristeller, Dean P. Lockwood and
Lynn Thorndike
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan., 1943), pp. 49-74
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 ON THE ORIGINALITY OF THE RENAISSANCE 49

If, on the other hand, we are today more aware than Burek-
hardt of the immense importance of the continuitybinding the
ideas and institutionsof the modern world to the medieval past,
this insight neither needs nor has the power to undo the lesson
learned froma centuryof studies of the Italian Renaissance. The
task before us is increasingly to integrate the two great vistas
opened up by medieval and Renaissance research,neitherof which
gains by theirmutual disparagement.
Great Neck, N. Y.

DISCUSSION

SOME REMARKS ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINALITY

OF THE RENAISSANCE
BY ERNST CASSIRER

I am veryglad to accept thekind invitationof the editorsof the Journal

of the Historyof Ideas to take part in the discussionof "the originalityof
the Renaissance." But I should prefer not to limit myselfto repeating
heremyown viewson thistheme,whichI have treatedin several works,and
to justifyingthemwithnew arguments. If the questionseemsto have been
so little clarifiedas yet,and if we are still receivingdiametricallyopposed
answersto it, the responsibilitylies, in my judgment,less with any differ-
ence of opinion concerningthe historicalmaterialsthemselvesthan with a
lack of clarityas to the problemand the methodof investigationin the his-
mentof realismin the serviceof new ideas of thenatureand dignityof man and as a
help for the discoveryof objective natural laws. It is particularlya study by J.
Huizinga, "Renaissance und Realismus" (in his Wege der Kulturgeschichte[1930],
140-164), thathas impressedstudentsof theRenaissance withthe necessityof these
discriminations.(See this writer'snote in the AmericanHistor. Review,46 [1941],
621 ff.). As to the elementof "individualism,"the discussionof this otherBurek-
hardtian earmark of the Renaissance has passed throughsimilar phases. When
many cases of "individualism"were discoveredall over the Middle Ages, and in
practicallyeveryhistoricalperiod, one group of scholars began to reject the idea
that the Renaissance was more "individualistic"than the medieval centuries. But
otherstudents,while acknowledgingthat "individualism"withoutfurtherspecifica-
tion is not a label distinguishingany one particular epoch, have been increasingly
at pains to differentiate the "individualismof the Renaissance" from the indi-
vidualismobservedin otherperiods. For a study of this latter type, and also an
able summaryof the recent discussionsof Renaissance individualism,see Norman
Nelson, "Individualismas a Criterionof the Renaissance," The Journal of English
and GermanicPhilology,,32 (1933), 316-334.

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50 ERNST CASSIRER

toryof ideas. This point is very clearlybroughtout in the presentpapers

of Durand and Baron. The followingremarks are merely intended to
amplifythe expositionsof bothwritersin thisone particular.
Every philologistis acquainted with the phenomenonwe call "semantic
change." For linguistics the phenomena of phonetic change, analogic
change, and semanticchange constitutethe only possibilityof explaining
the facts of language.1 In semanticchange the old formsof speech may
indeed be long preserved,but their meaning shifts,and is at times even
transformedinto its very opposite. This holds also of "semantic change"
in history. But the historical"meaning" of a given "idea" is not so easy
to ascertainas the linguisticmeaningof a word. It always requiresa diffi-
cult and painstakinganalysis. I mustrefuseto go into thisimportantques-
tionhere in detail; but I shouldlike to attemptto illustrateit in a few cases
which have been much discussed in the recent literaturedealing with the
Renaissance,and whichit seemsare at presentin the focus of attention.
I. The antecedentsof Galileo's science are now much more precisely
knownthan they were a few decades back. When I began my studies in
Galileo fortyyears ago, this fieldwas largelya terraincognita. A turning-
pointhere came withthe investigationsof Duhem.2 It became clear thatby
the sixteenthcenturyAristotle's theoryof motionno longer enjoyed the
undisputedauthoritywhichhad oftenbeen ascribed to it. We now know
thatlong beforeGalileo therewas a new theoryof "impetus" whichin many
ways prepared the ground for Galileo's dynamics. The antecedentsof
Galileo's theoryof methodhave also been thoroughlyand intensivelyex-
amined.3 I clearlyrememberhow surprisedI was when in studyingZaba-
rella's works I came upon an explicit statementof the differencebetween
the "compositive" and the "resolutive method" which seemed to show a
very marked analogy to Galileo's conception. In my examinationof the
problem of knowledgeI laid great emphasis on this circumstance,which
seemed to me very significanthistorically.4 That Zabarella was here only
one link in a great chain,that he was followinga century-oldtraditionthat
extendsthroughthe wholehistoryof the School of Padua, I have recently
learned fromProfessorRandall's study.
But can all this historicalevidenceseriouslyshake our convictionof the
incomparablescientificoriginalityof Galileo? I believe that it can only
serve to strengthenthis convictionand to support it with new arguments.
Galileo was completelyrightwhen in his Discorsi e Demonstrazionihe ex-
plained that he was presenting"a very new science about a very old sub-
'
Cf. Leonard Bloomfield,Language, 2nd ed., chapters20-24.
2 Cf. supra, p. 6.
3 J. H. Randall, Jr., "The Developmentof ScientificMethod in the School of
Padua," this Journal,I, 2, 177-206; Philip P. Wiener,"The TraditionbehindGali-
leo's Methodology,"Osiris,I (1936), 733-46.
4Erkenntnisproblem, I (2nd edition,1911), 136 f.

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 ON THE ORIGINALITY OF THE RENAISSANCE 51
ject." A worklike the dynamicsof Galileo could not come to birthall at
once, like Athene fromthe head of Zeus. It needed a slow preparation,
empiricallyas well as logicallyand methodologically. But to all thesegiven
elementsGalileo added somethingcompletelynew. No one beforehim had
been able to makethekind of use ofthe "resolutiveand compositivemethod"
that Galileo made in his demonstration of thelaws of fallingbodies or in his
discoveryof the parabolic formof the trajectory. All this is whollynew
and unique-and unique not only as a particular discovery,but as the ex-
pressionof a scientificattitudeand temper. For it is the significanceand
value attachedto the mathematicalmethod,not its mere content,that intro-
duee a clear changeover the fifteenth century.
That mathematics,to use Kant's expression,is the "pride of human
reason," had never been seriouslydisputed since Plato's time. Augustine
likewisespeakswiththe greatestenthusiasmof mathematicsand its "eternal
truths,"whichopen to us an immediateentranceinto the intelligibleworld.
And even the idea of a mathematicalscience of nature by no means first
originated in the fifteenthand sixteenthcenturies. The necessityof a
strictlymathematicaltreatmentof optics was recognized,for instance,by
Roger Bacon: "Virtus efficientis et mcateriaesciri non potest sine magna
mathematicce potestatesicut nec ipsi effectusproducti."5 And we seem to
findan anticipationof Galileo's conceptionof causation when William of
Ockhamexplainsthatno eventcan be regardedas the eause of another"nisi
per experientiacm possit convinciita sctlicetquod ipso posito alio destructo
sequitur effectus,vel quod ipso non posito quocumque alio posito non
sequitureffectus."6
But all these analogies, to which mightbe added many others,prove
nothing. Mathematicshad been an elementin culturelong beforethe Re-
naissance; but in the Renaissance,with thinkerslike Leonardo or Galileo,
it becamea new culturalforce. It is the intensitywithwhichthisnew force
fillsthe wholeintellectuallife and transformsit fromwithinthat we should
regard as what is significantly new. "He who scorns the very great cer-
taintyof mathematics, " says Leonardo, "is feedinghis mind on confusion,
and will never be able to silence the sophisticalteachingsthat lead only to
an eternalbattle of words."7 This is the convictionof Galileo also. For
him mathematicsis not one fieldof knowledge,but the only valid criterion
of knowledge-the normby whichall else that is called knowledgeis to be
measuredand beforewhichit mustpass its tests.
This new estimationof thevalue of mathematicalphysicsrestson another
5 Opus Majus, IV, II, i (ed. F. H. Bridges [Oxford,19001 I, 110).
6
Cf. Galileo's Saggiatore, Opere (ed. Alberi), IV, 216: "Quella e non altra si
debbe propriamentestimareausa la qual posta segue sempre l'effetto,e rimossa si
rimuove."
7 Leonardo da Vinci, Scrittiletterari(ed. J. P. Richter),No. 1157, II, 289.

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52 ERNST CASSIRER

underlyingidea. In medievalphilosophywe finda bifurcationof knowledge,

which we meet firstin Augustine and which then runs like a red thread
through the entire historyof scholasticism. It is the divorce between
"scientia" and "sapientia." "Scientia" is the knowledgeof "natural"
things,"sapientia" the knowledgeof "supernatural" things. Scientia is
concernedwith the "regnum naturae," sapientia with the "regnum gra-
tiae." The unquestionedpre-eminence,the "primacy" of sapientia over
mere scientia,is establishedfor all medieval thinkers. "Si ergo haec est
sapientiae et scientiaerecta distinctio,"says Augustine,"ut ad sapientiam
pertineataeternarumrerumcognitiointellectualis:ad scientiamvero tern-
poraliumrerumcognitiorationalis,quid cui praeponendumsive postponen-
dum sit, non est difficilejudicare."8 According to this distinctionany
mathematicalscienceof nature-if thereis such a science-is a scienceof the
createdworld; it can hencenever claim a positionequal to metaphysicsand
theology,thesciencesof theeternal. e" Cognitiocertitudinalisesse non potest
nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitaset infallibilitasex parte scientiae.
Veritas autem creata non est immutabilissimpliciter,sed ex suppositione,
similiternec lux creaturae est omninoinfallibilisex propria virtute,cum
utraque sit creata et prodieritde non esse in esse."9
All this is completelychanged in Galileo. Mathematicalphysicsis for
him not merelya special branch of "science," it has become the tool, the
necessaryconditionand instrumentfor any knowledgeof truth. Without
it therewould be no truthfor men. All "supernatural" truthwhichcon-
tradictsthe conclusionsof natural science or attemptsto set limitsto them
is mereappearance. This was the new ideal for whichGalileo fought-and
it was thisfightthat led to his condemnation. For him mathematicalphys-
ics had becomea necessaryelementin his conceptionof life and of the world,
in his interpretationof the universe.
What Galileo introducedand establishedis a new hermeneutics. The
theologicalhermeneutiesof the Middle Ages was in possessionof the truth
in the Holy Scripturesand in the interpretationof the Scripturesgiven by
the ChurchFathers. The humanistichermeneuties knewand recognizedno
higherauthoritythan that of the classical writers:the comparisonof texts
gave truth and "was" truth. All this Galileo dismissedwith a few epi-
grams. "This kind of men believe," he wroteto Kepler, "that philosophy
is a booklike theAeneid or theOdyssey,and thatthetruthis not to be found
in the universeor in nature,but (and these are their own words) in the
comparisonof texts."10
8 Augustine,De trinitate,XII, 15.
9 Bonaventura, Itinerarium mentis in deum, Opera omnia (1882-1902), V,
293-316.
10See furtherdetails in my paper, "Wahrheitsbegriff
und Wahrheitsproblem
bei Galilei," Scientia (1937), 121-30, 185-93.

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 ON THE ORIGINALITY OF THE RENAISSANCE 53

II. The like holds for Kepler's AstronomiaNova. It too is completely

justifiedin its title-not only its contentsbut also its methodologyis new.
The firstpointis undisputed: withoutKepler's laws Newtonwould not have
been able to constructhis systemof theworldor to writehis Principia. But
neither can the universal philosophical significanceof Kepler's work be
broughtinto question. In the recentliteratureon Kepler there seems to
be a strongtendencyto emphasizethe "mystical" elementsin his thought.
That there are such elements,and that Kepler is much closer than Galileo
to the Neoplatonicand Neopythagoreantraditions,is unmistakable. But
it is not onlyan exaggeration,it is absurd,whenmenlike DietrichMahnke1l
try to derive his entire science from these ideas. "Mystical" ideas may
well have had great influenceon Kepler's personal attitude. We findclear
traces of them in the MysteriumCosmographicumand in the Harmonia
Mundi. Even the beliefin astrologyKepler seems never to have overcome
fully-though he speaks withincreasingdetachmentand oftenwith a clear
ironyabout his own astrologicalideas.
But none of this is really significant. The real emancipationis accom-
plishedin Kepler's work. And it could be accomplishedthereonly because
Kepler stood for a new and stricterideal of truth. Kepler himselftells us
that in his firststudiesof planetarymotionhe had arrived at an hypothesis
which formulatedall his observationswith sufficientaccuracy: the error
amounted to only eight minutes,and in accordance with the prevailing
opinionof the timecould be neglected. But he was not satisfied,and went
further: "These eight minutes," he himselfsays, "became the beginning
of the wholenew astronomy." It was thus a new demand for "precision"
whichgave birthto Kepler's laws. And so theregrewup a new and stricter
scientificcritique of all pictorial and symbolicideas, a clearer recognition
of what symbols can and cannot do. "Ludo quippe et ego symbolis,"
Kepler says in a letter,"sed ita ludo, ut me ludere non obliviscar. Nihil
enim probatursymbolis;nihil abstrusi eruiturin naturali philosophiaper
symbolageometrica,tantumante nota accommodantur, nisi certisrationibus
evincatur,non tantum esse symbolica,sed esse descriptosconnexionisrei
utriusquemodoset causas.''12
III. In conclusion,I should like to touchbrieflyon anotherproblemthat
has for some time been at the center of the "Renaissance controversy."
Ever since Burckhardtset forth"the discoveryof Nature and of Man" in
" DietrichMahnke,UnendlicheSphdre und Allmittelpunkt:Beitrdgezur Gene-
alogie der mathematischen
Mystik (Halle, 1937). For criticismof this book cf. my
article, "MathematischeMystik und mathematischeNaturwissenschaft,"Lychnos
(Annual of the Swedish History of Science Society,Uppsala, 1940), II, 248-65.
12 Kepler, Opera Omnia (ed. Frisch), I, 378.

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54 ERNST CASSIRER

the Renaissance-ever since he explained that the Italian Renaissance was

the age "in which Man became an intellectualIndividual and recognized
himselfas such" -this thesishas been repeated countlesstimes. Oftenthe
so-called"individualism" of the Renaissance has been used as a merecatch-
word. That this should have called forththe sharpestcriticismis easy to
understand. Huizinga once said thatit is impossibleto confine" individual-
ism" to the Renaissance,since figureslike Abailard, Johnof Salisbury,and
Wolframof Eschenbachremainoutsideits boundaries.
But it is clear that Burckhardtdid not intend his thesis in this sense.
What he was tryingto say was thatin theAge of theRenaissancethe relative
emphasisplaced on the "universal" and on the "particular" began to shift.
In the scale of values the individual was now assuming anotherplace and
anotherstation. I am contentto make this clear in a single case, that of
Montaigne. Montaigne's Essais created a new "philosophy" of the indi-
vidual. That the portrayalof a particularman as a particularman-with
all his peculiarities,accidents,and idiosyncrasies-could have a theoretical
interest,was recognizedby no philosophybefore the Renaissance. The
portrayalof men gave rise ratherto types or "characters"-like the Char-
acters of Theophrastus. Montaigneis the firstthinkerwho dares to break
withthistraditionand who completesthe breakwithfull awarenessof what
he is doing. Augustinewas able to set down his private confessions-but
a portraitof himselfin Montaigne's sense would have seemed to him pure
blasphemy. "Les aultres formentl'homme," says Montaigne,"je le recite
et en representeun particulier,bien mal forme . . . Je ne puis asseurermon
object; il va troubleet chancelant,d'une yvressenaturelle: je le prends en
ce poinct,commeil est en l'instant que je m'amuse a luy: je ne peinds pas
1'etre,je peinds le passage, non un passage d'aage en aultre,ou, commedict
le peuple,de sept en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de minuteen minute
Chasque hommeportela formeentierede l'humnaine condition. Les aucteurs
se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque speciale et etrangiere;moy,
le premier,par monestreuniversel,commeMichelde Montaigne,non comme
grammairien,ou poete, ou jurisconsulte . . . Au moins j'ay cecy selon la
discipline,Que jamais hommene traicta subjet qu'il entendist,ne cogneust
mieulxque je fois celuy que j'ay entreprins;et qu'en celuy la je suis le plus
sgavanthomme qui viVe."13 Thatan authorshoulddareto portrayhimself
in all his peculiarities,particulars,accidents and idiosyncrasies-and that
he should neverthelessclaim for this portraita universal significance:this
is indeed somethingnew withthe Renaissance. The considerationof indi-
vidualitythus acquires an entirelynew value. It is no accident that Mon-
taigne's Essais was one of Shakespeare's favoritebooks.
Our controversyas to the orginalityof the Renaissance and as to the
dividing-linebetweenthe "Renaissance" and the "Middle Ages" seems to
me in many ways rathera "logical" dispute than one about the historical
13 Montaigne,"Du repentir,"Essais, Livre III, chap. 2.

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 ON THE ORIGINALITY OF THE RENAISSANCE 55
facts. Ideas like " Gothic," "Renaissance," or "Baroque" are ideas of
historical"style." As to the meaningof these ideas of "style" there still
prevails a great lack of clarityin many respects.14 They can be used to
characterizeand interpretintellectualmovements, but theyexpressno actual
historicalfacts that ever existed at any given time. "Renaissance" and
"Middle Ages" are, strictlyspeaking,not names for historicalperiods at
all, but theyare conceptsof "ideal types," in Max Weber's sense. We can-
not thereforeuse themas instrumentsfor any strictdivisionof periods; we
cannot inquire at what temporalpoint the Middle Ages "stopped" or the
Renaissance "began." The actual historicalfacts cut across and extend
over each otherin the most complicatedmanner.
Neverthelessthe distinctionitself has a real meaning. What we can
expressby it,and whatalone we intendto express,is thatfromthebeginning
of the fifteenth centuryonwardthe balance betweenthe particularforces-
society,state, religion,church,art, science-begins to shift slowly. New
forcespress up out of the depthsand alter the previous equilibrium. And
the characterof every culture rests on the equilibriumbetweenthe forces
that give it form. Wheneverthereforewe make any comparisonbetween
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,it is never enough to single out par-
ticular ideas or concepts. What we want to knowis not the particularidea
as such, but the importanceit possesses,and the strengthwith which it is
acting in the wholestructure. "Middle Ages" and "Renaissance" are two
great and mightystreamsof ideas. When we single out fromthema par-
ticular idea, we are doing what a chemistdoes in analyzing the water of a
streamor what a geographerdoes in tryingto trace it to its source. No one
denies that these are interestingand importantquestions. But they are
neitherthe onlynor the mostimportantconcernof the historianof ideas.
The historianof ideas knowsthat the water whichthe river carrieswith
it changes only very slowly. The same ideas are always appearing again
and again, and are maintainedforcenturies. The forceand the tenacityof
traditioncan hardly be over-estimated. From this point of view we must
acknowledgeover and over again that thereis nothingnew under the sun.
But the historianof ideas is not asking primarilywhat the substanceis of
particularideas. He is askingwhattheirfunctionis. What he is studying
-or should be studying-is less the contentof ideas than their dynamics.
To continuethefigure,we could say thathe is not tryingto analyzethe drops
of water in the river,but that he is seekingto nmeasure
its widthand depth
and to ascertaintheforceand velocityof the current. It is all thesefactors
that are fundamentallyaltered in the Renaissance: the dynamicsof ideas
has changed.
14I have tried to analyze and clarify this characterin a book that has just
appeared, "Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften," Schriftender UniversitdtGothen-
burg (Gothenburg,1942). A copy of the book is available in the Yale University
Library.

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56 FRANCIS R. JOHNSON

Considera case like that of Pico della Mirandola. In a study recently

published in thesepages'5 I tried to show that the problemof freedomlies
at the centerof Pico's thought. This is certainlyno "new" idea. It be-
longswiththe eternalquestionsof philosophy,whichno philosophicthinker
and no theologiancan fail to reckonwith. But what Pico makes out of this
problem-the way in whichhe sets it in the focus of philosophicand relig-
ious concernand followsit as it radiates outwardfromthis focus in every
direction-all this was new and profoundlysignificant. Only this kind of
originality,it seems to me, can be claimed for the Renaissance. Its great
achievementslay muchless in the new contentit created-although that too
rich-than in the new energiesit awakened and in the intensity
is infinitely
withwhichtheseenergiesacted.
Yale University.

PREPARATION AND INNOVATION IN THE PROGRESS

OF SCIENCE
BY FRANCIS R. JOHNSON

A questionnot directlytouchedupon by eitherDr. Durand or Dr. Baron

suggestsitselfin consideringthe relativeimportanceof traditionand inno-
vation in the historyof Italian scienceof the fifteenthcentury-or for that
matter,in the historyof science of any period. It has to do with how far
we are justifiedin denying originalityand primarysignificanceto those
periodsduringwhichlittleapparent advance is made in scientificdiscovery,
but which,upon moresearchingstudy,reveal themselvesas periodsof eager
assimilation,dissemination,and elaborationof the body of scientificknowl-
edge inheritedfromthe distantand recentpast, oftenwith concurrentout-
side forces spurringmen to re-examinethe traditionalmaterial in a new
light. Such periods of apparent quiescence seem to be customarypre-
liminariesto thoseperiodswe regard as markedby spectacularinnovations.
An apt analogy is the alternation,in a militarycampaign,of the rapid
conquestof vast areas by spectacularadvances in the field,with the no less
necessary phase during which these advances are consolidated,old units
regrouped,new forcesbroughtup, and the ground prepared for the next
forwardlunge. The militarystrategistwill usually rate this second, less
spectacular,phase of a campaignas the moreimportant,demandinggreater
skill. Unless it is successfullyexecuted, seemingvictory is transformed
into stalemateor defeat.
Fifteenth-century Italy presentsjust such a period of consolidationand
preparationin the historyof science. Both Dr. Durand's and Dr. Baron's
papers, emphasizingcomplementary aspects of recentscholarship,illustrate
15 This Journal,III, 2 and 3 (April-June,1942).

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 INNOVATION IN THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE 57
that our increased knowledgeof the Quattrocentopoints to this sort of
evaluationof its contributionto scientificthought. Dr. Durand, weighing
its claimsfor innovation,rightlyfindsthat its innovations,accordingto his
helpfuland lucid classification, consistedprimarilyin the internalelabora-
tion of traditionalsubstanceratherthan full mutations. Dr. Baron, on the
otherhand, justly assertingthat the isolated study of the historyof science
frequentlyleads us astray,maintainsthatthe Quattrocento's importancefor
sciencelies in its transformation of the cultural atmospherein whichscien-
tistsworked,and in the emergenceof new ways of thoughtwhichpromoted
the mutationalchangesthat were to come later. Thus, whetherwe fixour
attentionupon definiteincrementsof scientific knowledgeor considerscience
in relation to other material and intellectual activities,fifteenth-century
Italy standsforthneitheras a period of spectacularachievementin scientific
discoverynor as one in whichsciencewas stagnantand neglected. Rather it
is an era in which,at universitiessuch as Padua, old materialwas being sub-
jected to re-examinationand elaboration,in which a closer co-operation
between the scholar-scientist and the artist-craftsman was being evolved,
and in which new political, economic,and social conditionswere placing
theirimpressupon scientificthought.
In theserespectsthe conditionsin fifteenth-century Italy were in many
ways analogous to thosein sixteenth-century England. Under the Tudors
no great contributions, cited as landmarksin the progressof science,were
made before Gilbert's De Magnete in 1600. But the entire centurywas
one of alert and growingscientificactivity,in which ancient science,as it
becameavailable in bettertexts,was criticallyre-examined;the manuscripts
of medieval scientistslike Bacon, Bradwardine,and Grosseteste-to name
only English authors-were studiedwithfreshinsight; and the new contri-
butions of Vesalius, Copernicus, and others assimilated soon after they
appeared.' A closerliaison betweenthe systematizedlearningof the schol-
arly scientistand the technologicalskill of the artisan was fosteredby men
like Recorde,Digges, Dee, and Gilbert. The merchantcompanies,such as
the MuscovyCompany,became patronsand promotersof practical science,
and employedsome of the ablest scientistsas expert advisers. Before the
end of the centuryThomas Hood, and later the GreshamCollege professors,
were deliveringpublic lectureson science,in English, to the tradesmenand
artisans of London. Moreover,just as the fifteenthcenturyin Italy pre-
pared the way forthe moreobviousachievementsof the next centuryand a
half,so in England the sixteenthwas the forerunnerof Britain's greatness
1 For studies of scientificactivityin Tudor England see especially Sanford V.
Larkey,"The Vesalian Compendiumof Geminusand Nicholas Udall's Translation,"
The Library, 4th Ser., XIII (1933), 367-94; Francis R. Johnson,Astronomical
Thoughtin Renaissance England (Baltimore,1937); and E. G. 1R.Taylor, Tudor
Geography,1485-1583 (Lortdon,1930).

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58 FRANCIS R. JOHNSON

in the seventeenth,the century of Napier, Briggs, Harvey, Boyle, and

Newton.
Unless we revive the mysticalconceptof scientificprogress,long since
discarded by most historians,which views it whollyin termsof the "un-
analyzed creative intuitions" of individual geniuses,innovationwill con-
tinueto appear, upon fullerinvestigation, less and less as a sharp breakwith
the past. As our studies proceed,we are impressedwith the numberand
complexityof the factorsthat must be already present,and in the right
state of preparation,beforesome individual scientist,acting as a catalyst,
producesthe synthesisthat we hail as a spectacularinnovation. Galileo is
a case in point. The studies of Duhem, Thorndike,and Randall, as Dr.
Durand indicates,have minimizedthe absolute originalityof Galileo by
emphasizinghis indebtednessto his predecessors. Leonardo Olschki,how-
ever,in a recentarticle,insistsupon Galileo's originalityand independence.2
His case restsupon the claimthat Galileo's transforming idea was a dynamic
conceptionof all physical phenomena,opposed to the older conceptionof
rest as the natural state of all bodies. But this transformingidea would,
accordingto Dr. Baron's analysis,be merelyGalileo's intellectualheritage
fromthe Quattrocento,applied to scientificphenomena.
The Quattrocento,therefore,shouldbe assigneda significanceof its own
in the completehistoryof science. We fail to do it full justice if, with
Thorndike,we compare it adversely with the centurythat preceded it.
Neithershouldwe,because of its fewerpositivecontributions, rate it inferior
to the age that followed. As transmitterand transmuterits role was just
as indispensableas thoseof its predecessorand its successor. Its claims for
primacyin thehistoryof scientific thought,however,evenwhenshiftedfrom
theno longertenablegroundof a sudden breakwiththemiddleages, remain
highly doubtful in the light of our present inadequate knowledge. The
factorsoutside the immediatedomain of science which Dr. Baron empha-
sizes so stronglyin his reaffirmationof Italian primacywere equally opera-
tive in othercountriessuch as England at a slightlylater period and with
similarresults. Like factorsmay have had an importantrole as precursors
of the scientificachievementsof the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturiesin
other countriesof Europe. Our presentinformationconcerningmedieval
technology,forexample,is so slightthatit would be hazardous to assertthat
the architectsand buildersof the medieval cathedralsleft an impressupon
scientificthoughtless importantthanthatproducedby theartistsand crafts-
men of the Italian citiesof the fifteenthcentury.3 As we move forwardin
2"The ScientificPersonalityof Galileo," Bulletin of the History of Medicine,
XII (July,1942), 248-73. Olschki'sthesisis a restatement, for a moregeneralaudi-
ence,of that developedby A. Koyre in Etudes Galile'enes,Paris, 1939).
3 On medieval technologysee the surveyby Lynn T. White, Jr., "Technology

and Inventionin the Middle Ages," Speculum, XV (1940), 141-59; also his forth-
comingarticleon "Natural Science and NaturalisticArt in the Middle Ages."

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 CLASSICAL HUMANISM IN RENAISSANCE THOUGHT 59

our studiesof thehistoryof sciencein relationto otheraspectsof civilization,

the Quattrocento,as a period of consolidationof past scientificprogressand
preparationfor the future will most likely be revealed as one of several
similarperiods in Westernthought. As such it should be assigned no less
importance,because no longerinterpretedas unique.
StanfordUniversity.

THE PLACE OF CLASSICAL HUMANISM IN RENAISSANCE

THOUGHT
BY PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

The " problemof the Renaissance," as it has been widely discussed in

the last few decades, is largely a pseudo-problem. A complex historical
period with a great variety of cross-currents, in which each European
countryand each fieldof interestunderwentits own particulardevelopment,
can hardlybe interpretedin termsof a briefdefinitionwhichwould at the
same timedistinguishit fromall otherperiods of history. Such definitions
are apt to be too narrow or too broad. The discussion has been further
complicatedby the tendencyof many scholarsto take the Renaissance as an
imaginarybattle-groundon whichto fightout contemporary political,social
or as a testcase forthesolutionof such meta-histori-
and ideologicalconflicts,
cal questionsas the possibilityand the causes of historicalchange. On the
otherhand, thereseemsno doubt about the distinctivephysiognomyof the
Renaissance, and the claim that the very existenceof "the Renaissance"
has to be proved by a satisfactorydefinitionof it, must be rejected. With
the same right,we mightas well concludethattherewas no " eighteenthcen-
tury," sincewe are unable to describeits distinctivecharacteristicsin a brief
definition. The best procedure would be rather to start with a tentative
conceptionof the Renaissance,and to take this idea as a guiding principle
when investigatingthe actual facts and sources of the period under con-
sideration.
The questionwhichProfessorDurand sets out to answer is much more
specific:what is the contributionof fifteenth-century Italy to the progress
of natural science? I thinkt-hequestion is worthasking,and we must be
gratefulfor the judicious way in whichhe has presentedand evaluated the
factsdiscoveredthroughrecentstudiesin thehistoryof science. He rightly
emphasizesthe continuityof the universitytradition,and at the same time
recognizesthe importanceof the new translationsfromthe Greek,as in the
case of Ptolemy's Geography. Many otherscientifictranslations,commen-
taries,and treatisesofthefifteenth centuryare still awaitinga moredetailed
investigation,and many other branches of science and learningwill have to
be examined. But most probably ProfessorDurand's conclusionwill be

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60 PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

confirmed,that fifteenth-century Italy brought no basic change in the

methodsand results of natural science,althoughit contributednumerous
observationsand theoriesin thevarious fields.
I disagree,however,withthe conclusionsfor the general interpretation
of theRenaissanceProfessorDurand seemsto draw fromthisresult. I fully
agree withProfessorBaron's excellentdefinitionof the relationbetweenthe
historyof scienceand intellectualhistoryin general,and his emphasison the
powerfulinfluencewhichimportantchangesin otherfieldseventuallyexer-
cised on the developmentof natural science. The questionof traditionand
innovationin Renaissancesciencecannotbe definitely settledwithouttaking
into considerationthe non-professionalwriterson science, the non-Italian
scientists,many of whom were more or less indebted to the Italians, and
possiblyeventhescientistsof thesixteenthcenturywho largelyreaped what
the fifteenth centuryhad sown. Moreover,sciencehas not always occupied
that dominatingplace among the otherfieldsof culture which it has held
during the last few centuriesof occidentalhistory. We cannot accept the
claim thathistoricalchangesare unimportantunless theyare changesin the
fieldof scienceor immediatelyaffectscience. In the case of theRenaissance,
the culturalchange did not primarilyconcernscience. Since Burckhardt's
conceptionof the Renaissance is not based on any claim for a basic change
in natural science,I do not see how it can be disprovedby showingthat
actually no such basic change in science took place. On the otherhand, I
agree withProfessorBaron that a change did take place in fieldsotherthan
science,and thatthischangedid influencethedevelopmentof science,though
indirectlyand in a later period.
But whenI tryto answerthe question,what kind of change was charac-
teristicof the Renaissance,and especially of fifteenth-century Italy, I find
myselfless in agreementwithProfessorBaron than withProfessorDurand.
I do believe that classical humanismwas, if not the only,certainlythe most
characteristicand pervasive intellectualcurrentof that period. With its
meritsand withits limitations,humanismpervaded moreor less all achieve-
mentsand expressionsof thefifteenth century. When its influencedeclined
in the sixteenthcentury,its workhad been already done. The influenceof
humanismon science as well as on philosophywas indirect,but powerful.
The actual performanceof the humanistsin these fieldswas rather poor.
But theypopularized the entirebody of ancient Greeklearning and litera-
tureand thusmade available new source materialsof whichthe professional
scientistsand philosopherscould not fail to take advantage. This was im-
portant,because at that time occidental science and thoughthad not yet
reached or surpassed the results of classical antiquity,and hence had still
somethingto learn fromthe ancients. Moreover,medieval science had de-
veloped in definitepatterns, and the introductionof new sources and
"authorities" eventuallyprepared the way for new methodsand theories.

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 CLASSICAL HUMANISM IN RENAISSANCE THOUGHT 61

Those who claim that ancient science was completelyknownto the Middle
Ages are as mistakenas thosewho deny that it was knownat all. At least
someof the classical Latin authorsbecamemorewidelyknownin theRenais-
sance,Lucretius,for example. NumerousGreekmanuscriptswere brought
over fromthe East, and moremen were able to read themin the original.
Moreover,practicallyall the Greektextswere translatedinto Latin by the
humanists,manyfor the firsttime. The questionof how manywere trans-
lated forthefirsttimeand whetherthe new translationswerebetteror more
influentialthan the extantearliertranslations,cannotbe settledby dispute,
but onlyby a carefulbibliographyof the Latin translationsfromthe Greek,
whichshould include the manuscriptmaterials. In the fieldof philosophy,
humanism introduced most of the works of Plato, Plotinus, Epictetus,
Diogenes Laertius,Plutarch,Lucian, as well as manyworksof the commen-
tatorson Aristotleand of the GreekFathers,not to speak of the Greekpoets,
historians,and orators. In sciencethe contributionmay be less impressive,
but it has still to be investigated. Archimedesand Hero came at least to be
morewidelyknown,and manyof the minormathematicianswere translated
for the firsttime. The Latin translationswere followedby extensivecom-
mentaries,and by translationsinto the various vernacularlanguages which
reachedan even widerpublic.
The humanistswere certainlynot the onlyrepresentativesof scienceand
learningin thefifteenth century. On the one hand, therewerethefollowers
of the medieval traditionswho carried on the work of their predecessors,
especially at the various universities. On the other hand, there were the
artistsand engineerswhothroughtheirpracticalworkcame face to face with
mathematicaland scientificproblemsand sometimesmade importantcontri-
butions,as has been recentlyemphasized. But in the fifteenth centuryboth
of these latter groups were influencedby humanism,as was the general
public. If the humanistsfailed to make substantial contributionsto the
various fieldsof traditionallearning,they did introducesource materials
and problemswhich could be applied to those fields. By the end of the
fifteenth century,humanismhad not indeed replaced the traditionallearn-
ing,but therepresentatives of traditionallearninghad absorbedthe achieve-
mentsof humanism. This accountsforthe changesand progresswhichtook
place in the sixteenthcentury-just as the achievementsof the artistsand
engineerswere taken over by the professionalscientistsafterthe middle of
that century. On the otherhand, even the artistsand engineerswere sub-
ject to the influenceof humanism,as ProfessorBaron rightlyemphasizes.
The personal relationsbetweenthe humanistsand the artistsneed further
investigation,especially as they appear fromnumerouslettersand poems
of the humanistswhich have not yet been utilized for this purpose. The
numberof artistsand engineerswho made active contributionsto science
was still comparativelysmall in the fifteenth centuryas comparedwiththe

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62 PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

sixteenth. But the case of Leon Battista Alberti shows that this scientific
activityof theartistscannotbe separatedfrom,or opposed to, contemporary
humanism.
I cannot agree with those who identifythese artists with the general
public of the unlearned or who make a sharp contrastbetweenthe "Aca-
demic" humanistswho wrotein Latin, and the "popular" writerswho used
the vernacular language. Those artists who also wrote scientifictreatises
certainlyhad some learning beyond that of the general public, and drew
somethingfromtheprofessionallearningof theirtime,whetherit was in the
medievalor in the humanistictradition. The humaniststhemselves,no less
than theseartists,impressedthe popular imaginationof theirtime,as many
anecdotesshow. Since this was a matterof fashion,no real understanding
on the part of the public was required. If todaymany admire the achieve-
mentsof modernscience withoutunderstandingits methods,we may well
grant that in the early renaissance many admired the humanistswithout
understandingtheirLatin. Moreover,the question of language is less im-
portantfor our problemthan mightbe supposed. In the fifteenth century
thereis abundantevidencefor the mutual influencebetweenvernacularand
Neo-latinliterature,and when the vernaculardefinitelywon out in the six-
teenthcentury,it had already absorbed the characteristicachievementsof
humanism,in style,terminology, literaryform,and subject matter. Other-
wise,it could not have replaced Latin.
To conclude,I should like to add to the statementsof ProfessorsDurand
and Baron thatby popularizingin the fifteenth centurythe worksof classi-
cal antiquity,the humanistsmade an important,thoughindirectcontribu-
tionto thedevelopmentof scienceand philosophy,and that this contribution
bore fruitnot onlyin the workof the humaniststhemselves,but also in that
of the professionalscientistsand artistsof theirtime and of the following
century. All thesestatements, however,are tentativeratherthan final,and
subject to furtherrevision. The only thing that really counts in Renais-
sance studies is the actual investigationof the extensivesource materials
whichhave not yet been included in any extant synthesis. This investiga-
tion must proceed with the cooperationof all scholars interestedin the
period, regardlessof their point of view. In this study we should try to
eliminateso far as possible our personal preferencefor or against this or
that nation,language, class, current,or field,and to arrive at a fair evalu-
ation of the contributioneach of themhas made to the whole of occidental
civilization. Such an evaluation will not depend wholly on the influence,
direct or distant,which each phenomenonhas exercised on later develop-
ments,but will also acknowledgethe inherent,"absolute" significanceof
manyideas and achievementswhichfor somereason or otherfailed to have
any visible influence. It is this significance,rather than any incidental

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 IT IS TIME TO RECOGNIZE A NEW "MODERN AGE" 63
sequence of changes or influences,which in my opinion should be the ulti-
mate purpose of the historyof ideas, if not of all history.
Columbia University.

IT IS TIME TO RECOGNIZE A NEW "MODERN AGE"

BY DEAN P. LoCKWOOD

Prof. Durand arguesthat" scienceis fundamentalto themodernworld,"

and thatinasmuchas QuattrocentoItaly made littleor no advance in science,
the ModernWorld owes less to the "Italian Renaissance" than is ordinarily
supposed. Dr. Baron, commentingon thisthesis,has shown,in my opinion,
a far broader grasp of the period, and has demonstratedthat some of the
intangibles,some of the indirectresultsof intellectualforces,are far more
importantthanProf.Durand realized. All veryinteresting! But themost
serious defect in Prof. Durand's reasoning is that he fails to definethe
"modern world." He does nottake intoaccountthefact thata new Modern
Age is well under way.
We are at the beginning,I say, of a new era-the era of the annihilation
of global space. It is an era so differentfromall previoushumanexperience
that it will be markedby the mostimportantcleavage in recordedhistory.
It is in this new era, beginningapproximatelywith the twentiethcentury,
that "science is fundamental." To call the Renaissance a prelude to this
age is absurd,and to re-define the Renaissancein termsof twentieth-century
values is beside the point. The Renaissance was prelude,in mostways that
were then consideredimportant,to the ex-ModernAge, the now nameless
age, the period of the XIV-XIX centuries. We now need a handy desig-
nationforthisrecently-deceased era of westerncivilization.
Obviouslythe period since the Renaissance (the period commonlycalled
the "Modern Age") could not have gone on being called the modernage
forever. That termis, in the nature of the case, temporary. The Greco-
Roman Era was once "the moderna";the Middle Ages wereonce "modern";
and now the period of the XIV-XIX centurieshas receded into the past.
It must be ticketedand laid on the shelf. (By the same token,the term
"Middle Ages" is now automaticallyoutmoded.) It is thereforetime to
recognizea new ModernAge.
Future historiansmaybattleover the positionof the nineteenthcentury.
Should it be regardedas thelast of the old era or the beginningof the new?
From my preoccupationduringthe last few years withthe historyof medi-
cine-and fromthe evidenceof the "age of inventions'-I am inclinedto
speculate that the latter half of the nineteenthcenturywill come to be
regarded as of the New Era. But I am strayingtoo far fromthe Renais-
sance.

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64 DEAN P. LOCKWOOD

The historyof medicine-of whichProf. Durand has littleto say-hardly

supportsthenow popular theoryof the superiorityof the thirteenthcentury
over the Renaissance. The evolutionof the Science of Medicine is distinct
fromthat of any otherfieldof knowledgeand has a simplicityand clarity
all its own. Medicine,as we conceiveit today-playing, as it does,a supreme
rWlein modernlife-begins in the nineteenthcentury. From the time of
Vesalius there had, of course, been stirrings,and new forces were slowly
gatheringheadway. But assuredlythe medicineof all recordedtimebefore
the mid-nineteenth century (i.e., before the advent of antiseptic surgery,
anaesthesia,physiologicalchemistry,et al.) falls into one major era.
The Italian Renaissance contributednothingworthmentioningto the
scienceof medicine. How could it? Renaissancemeansrevival. From the
point of view of modernmedicinethere was nothingin the Greco-Roman
world worthreviving. And actually, in the fifteenthand sixteenthcen-
turies,the Greekand Latin medicalauthorsthatwererecoveredand revived
wereno improvement on Avicenna. If Hippocraticor Galenic medicinehad
been fully revived in all its purity and perfection,there mighthave been
a slightgain (counterbalancedby the loss of Arabic embellishments);but
at best therewould have been a difference of degree,not of kind.
The Italian physiciansof thefifteenthcentury(and after) weremedieval
in theirspeculationsand primitivein theirpractice. The utter abyss,the
seeming lack of all connectionbetween their complicated physical and
methodologicalspeculations on the one hand, and their pigeon-dungand
scorpion-powder therapyfor hot and cold, dry and moist,melancholicand
phlegmatic"malcomplexions" on the other,is to the modernmind amazing
and inconceivable. On the whole the Renaissance contributednothingto
modernmedicine;neitherdid the Middle Ages; neitherdid the Greeks.
Thereinlies just the difference betweenthe attitudeof the scientistand
that of the humanisttowardthe Renaissance-or towardthe whole past, for
that matter! In the humanities-in art, in literature,in philosophy-we
still go back to the Greco-Romanworld,and to the Renaissanceof the Greco-
Roman world (and to theMiddle Ages as well), forinspirationand even for
guidance in the great problemsof human life-moral, spiritual, and aes-
thetic; and we always will. But modernsciencelooks to the past no more.
It had its rootsin the past, of course; but to trace themis merelyto satisfy
a curiosity,to pursue an intellectualhobby. The era in which "science is
fundamental"has nothingto learn-in science-from the past.
I note an increasing tendencyin the scientistsof today to scorn the
humanities,and to projecttheirscornof thehumanitiesintothe past. Thus
past eras are re-evaluatedwith a new bias. If the classics, these scientists
seemto say, are of no value today,how could theyhave been of value in the
past? It is a dangerous argument. In the fifteenthcentury,when the

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 RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE ? 65
revival of classical attitudeswas fresh,the classics were a potentforce. If
the resultswere indirect,theywere none the less real; and Dr. Baron has
made a masterlypresentationof thesubtlerinfluences.
I believe that a more static interpretationof the past, by means of an
effortto re-createthe atmosphereof the past itself,is a sounderprocedure
than endeavoringconstantlyto re-interpretthe past in accordance with
everyvariationof contemporary thought.
HaverfordCollege.

RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE?
BY LYNN THORNDIKE

Professor Dana B. Durand has accused me of harboring a personal

antipathyto the Renaissance. Whethermy motiveis personal or rational,
objectiveor subjective,consciousor sub-conscious,it mustbe confessedthat
my aversion to the term in question is even more sweeping than Durand
perhaps thinksand extendsto such catchwordsas the Carolingian Renais-
sance and the twelfth-centuryrenaissance,as well as to the moreoftenmen-
tioned Italian Renaissance of the fifteenthcentury or somewherethere-
abouts. Religion may have its resurrectionsand revivals,but I have even
less faith than Nicodemus in rebirthsor restorationsof whole periods of
human history. I take my stand withthe blind writerof Christianhymns,
Fanny Crosby,who sang,
But thebirdwiththebrokenpinionneversoaredso highagain;
withWilliam Muldoon who said of formerheavy-weightchampions,
Theynevercomeback;
with Omar Khayyamwho mused,
The movingfinger writesand havingwrit
Moveson; norall yourpietynorwit
May lureit backto cancelhalfa line
Norall yourtearswipeoutonewordof it;
and witha versefromthe lightopera, Tom Jones,
Timeis nota necromancer;
Time'sa thiefand nothingmore.
Legacies fromthe past? Yes. Inheritancesfromprevious periods? Yes.
Survivals? Yes. Resemblances to our forebears? Yes. Reformations?
Perhaps. Reactions? Unfortunately.But no rebirthsand no restorations!
Books and worksof art are about all that remainsto us of the past. The
latter are all too soon sadly altered,and theirrestoration,whetherby some
Germanprofessoror by a Thorwaldsenor Viollet-le-Due,only makes them
less like what theyoriginallywere. Books remainless changedby the lapse

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66 LYNN THORNDIKE

of time,but even theirtextmay becomecorrupt,or the meaningof the very

wordstheyuse alter in the interim. The humanistsof the so-calledItalian
Renaissance had only a bookishknowledgeof antiquity; theyfailed almost
as dismallyas have Mussoliniand his Fascists to make the realityof ancient
Rome live again. If, even in our own day, all the resourcesof the art of
historyaided by archaeologycan give us only a faint and imperfectidea of
the past, how can we expect actual renaissancesof it or recognizethemas
such, if they were to occur? At the age of sixty I am perhaps more like
myselfat the age of twentythan I am like anyone else. But I couldn't
possiblyput myselfback into the frameof mind that I had then. I have a
dim recollectionof it; my presentstate of mind is an outgrowthof it; that
is all. A girl of eighteen,dressedup in the clotheswhichher grandmother
worewhena girl of eighteen,may look morelike her grandmotheras she was
then than her grandmotherherselfdoes now. But she will not feel or act
as her grandmotherfeltand acted half a centuryor moreago. Much more
tenuousis the connectionbetweendistanthistoricalperiods,and much less
likelyis it thathistorianscan successfullyventureupon glitteringgenerali-
ties about them. Who can evoke from the past more than a wraith, a
phantasy,a specter,whichmurmurs,like the ghostin Hamlet, "Historian,
rememberme! "
It is truethathistoryoffersexamplesof human customswhichsomewhat
resemblethe conceptionof a renaissance. For instance,at Tonalamatl in
ancientMexico the recurrenceof the year date 2. acatl every52 years was
considereda criticaloccasion,it being feared that the sun mightfail to rise
next day and that the evil spirits mightdestroythe world and mankind.
Accordingly,a festivalof ceremonialfire-making was held. All the old fires
were carefullyextinguished and at midnight on the mountaintop the high-
priest by rubbing sticks together kindled a new fire on the breast of a
prisoner who was forthwith sacrificed. The new firewas then distributed
to the templesof the surroundingcitiesand thence to the adjacent peoples.
Old garmentswere thrownaway and household dishes and utensils were
brokenor freshlypainted overin tokenof the new lease of life givento man-
kind.' But thisrekindlingand renewalwas immediate,continuous,and per-
functory. Only a part of one nightintervenedbetweenthe two periods,not
centuriesof dark ages. There was no intellectualor spiritualrebirth.
We mightalso adduce the influenceupon our notionsof revolutionsand
periodsin historyof the astrologicaltheoryof conjunctionsand revolutions
of the planets.
But let us turn to the developmentof the conceptof an Italian Renais-
sance and begin with the translationinto Latin of Ptolemy's Geographyin
the firstdecade of the fifteenthcentury. Durand is inclinedto censurethe
previousmedievaltranslatorsfor neglectingthis work. If theydid-for a
1 Joyce,Mexican Archaeology(1914), 74.

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 RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE ? 67
previous translationmay have escaped our notice-it is to be remembered
that afterall the text in question consistslargely of lists of ancient place-
names,many of whichcannotbe identifiedand located with any assurance
and are of purelyhistoricaland linguisticinterest. Moreover,Ptolemyhad
made theMediterraneanSea too shortby one-third,whereasone of the medi-
eval portolani is more accurate than any othermap of the Mediterranean
until the eighteenthcentury. Concerningthe Far East, too, and islands in
the Atlantic the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturieswere much betterin-
formedthanPtolemy. The translationand subsequentvogue of his Geogra-
phy were thereforein some ways regrettable. Be that as it may, in the
dedication of his translationto pope Alexander V, Jacobus Angelus, who
was a boosterof his native townof Florence,says:
Thisveryage of ours,especiallyin ourcityofFlorence,has sparkledwithhow
manywits,whototheirgreatgloryhaveresuscitated liberalstudieswhichhadgrown
almosttorpid.
In the fifthvolume of A History of Magic and Experimental Science I
have givenvariousexamplesof thisnotionof a resuscitationof liberal studies
becomingstereotypedand being extendedto mostinappropriatefields,such
as astronomyby Moravus and Santritter,chiromancyand physiognomyby
Cocles, anatomyby Vesalius, and magic in the case of AntiochusTibertus.
Abstemiusdepictedpope Paul III as restoringastrologyafterit had lain in
darkness,disrepute,barbarismand sordid squalor for many centuriespast;
Pena praised Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, for having resuscitatedthe
prostratemathematicalsciences.2 Just as the humanistswho found manu-
scripts of the Latin classics in monasteriesrepresentedthemselvesas dis-
coveringtheworkin questionand rescuingit fromneglectand decay,saying
nothingof the fact that the monkshad copied it in Carolingian timesand
preservedit ever since,but leaving their own manuscriptswhen they died
to some monasteryas the safest place in whichto keep them,so publishers
who printeda text for the firsttime,even if it was a typical product of
medieval scholasticism,representedthemselvesas snatchingit fromGothic
filthand dust and mildewand cobwebsand bringingit to the lightof fairest
impressionswiththe textcarefullyrestoredto its pristinepurityand freed
frombarbarisms,whenin realitytheywereverylikelyusing a singleinferior
manuscriptand neglectinga dozen older and superiorversions.
When was the word, Renaissance,firstused? Nicolaus Prucknerusor
Prugner approachedsuch usage when,in the prefaceto his re-editionof the
ancientRoman astrologer,Julius FirmicusMaternus,addressedfromStras-
bourg on January28, 1551,to youngking Edward VI of England, he spoke
of religion reviving in that realm (una cum renascente religione istius
regni). But evidentlyhe was speaking of the Protestant Reformation.
2A History of Magic and ExperimentalScience, V, 334-5, 52-3, 524 and 530,
55, 265, 304.

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68 LYNN THORNDIKE

Two years later,however,the French naturalist,Pierre Belon, in the dedi-

catory epistle of his Les observations. . . de plusieurs singularitez to
Frangois cardinal Tournon,assured him that,as a resultof his patronageof
learning and education of promisingyoung scholars,it had followedthat
the mindsof men,whichwere formerlyas it were asleep and sunk in a pro-
found slumber of long-standingignorance,had begun to awake, to come
forthfromthe shadowswheretheyhad so long dwelt,and to develop in all
sortsof good disciplinesa happy and desirableRenaissance,like plants that,
afterthe rigorsof winter,regain theirstrengthwith the sun and sweetness
of springtime.3
Peter Ramus, in an orationdeliveredin 1546, made the followingvivid
contrastbetweenhis own and the precedingcentury. Suppose, he said, a
masterof a centuryago should returnto life now, what progresshe would
discover,how astoundedhe would be! He would be as surprisedas one who,
risenfromdepthsof earth,should see forthe firsttimesun, moonand stars
shiningbright. For thenhe heard no one speak except in a barbarousand
ineptmanner,whilenow he would hear countlesspersonsof everyage speak-
ing and writingLatin correctlyand ornately. Then no one could read
Greek,now mennot onlyread it but understandit thoroughly. He used to
hear as grammarians,poets and orators,Alexander of Villa-Dei, Facetus,
the Graecismus;in philosophy,Scotistsand followersof Petrus Hispanus;
in medicine,the Arabs; in theology,I know not what upstarts. Now he
would hear Terence,Caesar, Virgil, Cicero,Aristotle,Plato, Galen, Hippoc-
rates, Moses and the prophets,the Apostles and other true and genuine
messengersof the Gospel,and indeed voices in all languages.4
Except for the closing allusions to vernaculartranslationsof the Bible,
thispassage well expressesthe originalrestrictedsignificanceof the Renais-
sance as a purificationof Latin diction and grammar,a revival of Greek,
and a returnfrommedievalcompilers,commentators and originatorsto the
old classical texts. This was all that the revival of learning meant to the
Italian humanistsof the quattrocentoand to theirfellowsbeyond the Alps,
and for themit was enough. The mere thoughtof it aroused in Ramus a
3Edition of Paris, 1553, printedby Benoist Prevost,rue Prementel: "De la est
ensuivy que les esprits des hommesqui auparavant estoyentcomme endormiset
detenuz assopiz en un profond sommeil d'ancienne ignorance ont commence'a
s'esveilleret sortirdes tenebresou si long temps estoyentdemeurezensueliz et en
sortantont iecte hors et tireen evidencetoutesespeces de bonnesdisciplineslesquel-
les a luer tant eureuse et desirablerenaissance,tout ainsi que les nouvelles plantes
apres saison de l'hyverreprennentleur vigeur a la chaleur du Soleil et sont con-
solees de la doulceurdu printemps."
4 For the Latin of the passage, whichI have renderedfreely,see K. Wadding-

ton,Ramus,sa vie,ses 'erits (1858), 304-5. For a verysimilarattitudeby Giovanni

Ferrerio,in an academic dissertationpublishedat Paris in 1539, see Magic and Ex-
perimentalScience,V, 295.

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 RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE? 69
grand and gloriousfeelingof enthusiasmtemperedwith complacency. He
neither sensed any change in the political and economicset-up nor was
aware of any alterationin social and moralvalues.
As the studyand readingof Latin and Greekwaned,however-and this
was partlybecause the humanistsand classicistshad substituteda dead for
a living language-fewer and fewer persons could sincerelyshare in this
thrillor impartit to others. Such fervoras the conceptof the Renaissance
still invokedwas largely in the realm of the finearts, where the termhad
been applied to thepost-Gothicperiod. It was at thisjuncturethatMichelet
called the Renaissance "the discoveryof the world and of man," and was
followedin this lead by the very influentialbook of Burckhardt,in which,
on what seem too oftento be dogmaticor imaginarygroundswithoutsuffi-
cient presentationof facts as evidence,the Renaissance was no longer re-
garded as primarilya rebirthof classical learningand culturebut ratheras
a pre-birthor precursorof presentsocietyand of moderncivilization-"a
period," to quote the Boston Transcript (February 27, 1926) concerning
Elizabethan England, "that witnessedthe birthpangs of mostthat is worth
while in moderncivilizationand government."
This made a well-calculatedappeal to the average reader who is little
interestedto be told that Erasmus was a great Greek scholar or that Leo-
nardo da Vinci copied fromAlbert of Saxony,but whose ego is titillatedto
be told thatLeonardo was an individuallike himselfor that Erasmus's chief
claim to fameis thathe was the firstmodernman-the firstone like you and
me. All thiswas quite soothingand flatteringand did muchto compensate
for one's inabilityto read Horace or to quote Euripides. It even had its
appeal for professorsof modernEuropean historyand for teachersof the
modernlanguages. It appears to be the conceptof the Renaissanee which
such recentadvocatesthereofor apologiststhereforas Wallace K. Ferguson
and Hans Baron are concernedto defend,retreatingto new standingground
of plausiblehypothesisand ingeniousconjecture,whensomeof Burckhardt's
old bulwarksare proved to be untenableby new masses of facts concerning
eitheror boththemiddleages and the quattrocento. But would it not make
thingsclearer,if theyceased to employthe old name, since the old concept
has been abandoned,and, instead of talkingof the Renaissance,spoke of the
period or movementor whateverit is theyhave in mindas the Prenaissance?
With regard to the work of BurckhardtI may perhaps be permitteda
few furthercomments. Of its six parts, the third on the Revival of An-
tiquityseemsto me scholarlyand just, recognizingthe defectsas well as the
meritsof the Italian humanistsand containingmany bits of illuminating
detail. But most of the political, social, moral and religious phenomena
whichhe picturesas Renaissance seemalmostequally characteristicof Italy
at any timefromthetwelfthto the eighteenthcenturyinclusive. The fourth
part on the discoveryof the world and man uses only popular,not scientific
literature,nor may this be dismissedas merelya sin of omission,since else-

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70 LYNN THORNDIKE

wherein the volume are such atrociousmisstatements as that few worksof

Aristotlehad been translated into Latin by the fourteenthcentury. By
includingsuch personalitiesas Frederick II and such authors and literary
compositionsas Dante and the Carmina burana within the Renaissance,
Burckhardtfreed the movementfromthe embarrassmentof chronological
limits and made any differentiation betweenit and medieval culture well-
nigh impossible. At bottomthis was a wholesometendency,equivalent to
recognitionthat thereis no dividingline between"medieval" and "renais-
sance" culture,just as mosthistoricalmuseumshave a single sectionlabeled
"Middle Ages and Renaissance." In general,Burckhardtdevotedso much
of his pages and energyto the attemptto trace intangibles,such as person-
ality, imagination,passion, spirit, the popular mind, the feeling for this
and that, such and such a sentiment,that his book hardly touches the
domainof intellectualhistoryand seemsto possess a will-o'-the-wispsort of
character.
The attractionwhich this kind of writinghas for many has been well
expressedby ProfessorSchevill in reviewinganotherbook:
If themodernscientific method, a well co-ordinatedplan,and theview-point
regardingthe characterof the social processwhichobtainsamongpresent-day
scholarsare theindispensablerequirements of a goodhistory, it wouldhave to be
concededthatMrs.Taylor'sbookstandsself-condemned. But if thereis salvation
outsidetherulingformulas, if a workmaystillbe history, and goodhistory, when,
insteadofbuildingup a solidedifice
offacts,it occupiesitselfwiththespiritbehind
thefactsin thehopeofcommunicating thecolorandperfume ofa segment ofhuman
experience,thisbookcan be confidently recommended not onlyto thenotoriously
unscientific
loversof theRenaissancebut to thosegraveand reverend signors,the
professionalhistoriansthemselves.5
The troubleis that this kind of writingis almostinvariablybased upon an
insufficientacquaintancewiththe facts and misinterpretation of them. Of
the same genus is anotherbete-noireof mine, those writerswho proclaim
that this or that personwas far in advance of his time,like Roger Bacon or
Leonardo da Vinci.6 But should you ask them to name a few contempo-
raries of the person in questionwho were typical of that time,they would
hardlybe able to do so.
Was the individual freed and personalityenhancedby the Renaissance
or Prenaissance? Burckhardtaffirmed thatwithit "man became a spiritual
individual and recognizedhimselfas such," whereas "in the middle ages
both sides of human consciousness-that which was turned within as that
whichwas turnedwithout-lay dreamingor half awake beneath a common
veil." 7 It mightbe remarkedthat individualismmay be a markof decline
5Review of Rachel Annand Taylor,Aspects of the Italian Renaissance: Amer-
ican Historical Review, XXIX (October,1923), 122.
6Durand has recognizedthis antipathy,too, in reviewingmy fifthand sixth
volumesin Isis, XXXIII (June, 1942), 691-712, especially 702-3, 704-6.

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 RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE ? 71
ratherthan progress. The self-centredsage of the Stoics and Epicureans
rang the knell of the Greekcity-state. Basil, on the verge of the barbarian
invasions,complainedthat men "for the greaterpart preferindividual and
privatelife to the union of commonlife."8 Carl Neumannheld that "true
modernindividualismhas its rootsin the strengthof the barbarians,in the
realism of the barbarians,and in the Christianmiddle ages." 9 Cunning-
ham believed that the Roman Empire "left little scope for individual aims
and tended to checkthe energyof capitalistsand laborers alike," whereas
Christianitytaught the supremedignityof man and encouragedthe indi-
vidual and personal responsibility. Moreover,in the thirteenthcentury
there were "fewer barriersto social intercoursethan now. ' 10 According
to Schaifer,"So far as public life in the broadestsense,in churchand state,
cityand country,law and society,is concerned,the middle ages are the time
of most distinctiveindividualityand independentpersonalityin volition
and action. " We may no longerthinkof the Gothicarchitectsas anony-
mous,and de Mely discoveredhundredsof signaturesof miniaturistshidden
in the initials and illuminationsof medieval manuscripts.12No period in
the historyof philosophyhas discussedindividualityand its problemsmore
oftenor moresubtlythan did the medievalschoolmen. Vittorinoda Feltre
and otherhumanisteducatorsmay have suited their teaching to the indi-
vidual pupil; at the medievaluniversitythe individual scholar suited him-
self. The humanistswere imitativein their writing,not original. Vitru-
vius was the Bible of Renaissance architectswho came to follow authority
far more than their creative Gothic predecessors. For the middle ages
loved variety; the Renaissance,uniformity.
Not only has it been demonstratedthat the thirteenthand fourteenth
centurieswere moreactive and penetratingin natural science than was the
quattrocento,13 but the notion that "appreciation of natural beauty" was
"introduced into modernEurope by the Italian Renaissance'14 must also
be abandoned. Burckhardt admitted that medieval literature displayed
sympathywithnature,but neverthelessregardedPetrarch's ascentof Mount
7English translation(1890), 129.
8[exaemeron, Viii, 7.
9 "Byzant. Kultur u. Renais. Kultur," HIistorischeZeitschrift,XCI (1903),
215-32; translatedin Munro and Sellery,Medieval Civilization,524-46.
10 WesternCivilizationin Its Economic Aspects, II (1910), 8 et seq., 2.
11"Zur Beurtheilungdes Wormser Concordats,"Philos. u. Hist. Abhandl. d.
kgl. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. (1905), 94.
12 F. de Mely,Les primitifset leurs signatures: les miniaturistes(1913).
13 In addition to the bibliographygiven by Durand may be noted "Science in
the Renaissance," by George Sarton, in The Civilizationof the Renaissance (Chi-
eago, 1929), 75-95. As Dr. Sarton remarks,"From the scientificpoint of view the
Renaissance was not a renaissance."
14 J. E. Spingarn,A History of Literary Criticismin the Renaissance (1899),
226.

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72 LYNN THORNDIKE

Ventoux (whichis only 6260 feethigh) in 1336 as epoch-making. Petrarch

representedan old herdsmanwho had tried in vain to climb it fiftyyears
beforeas beseechinghim to turn back on the ground that he had received
only torn clothesand brokenbones for his pains and that no one had at-
temptedthe ascent since. As a matterof fact,Jean Buridan, the Parisian
schoolman,had visitedit between1316 and 1334, had given details as to its
altitude,and had waxed enthusiasticas to the Cevennes. So that all Pe-
trarch's account proves is his capacity for story-tellingand sentimental
abilityto make a mountainout of a molehill. Miss Stockmayer,in a book
on feelingfor nature in Germanyin the tenthand eleventhcenturies,has
noted various ascents and descriptionsof mountainsfromthat period. In
the closingyears of his life archbishopAnno of Cologneclimbedhis beloved
mountainoftenerthanusual.'5
As for the feelingfornature in medieval art, let me repeat what I have
writtenelsewhereanent the interestdisplayed by the studentsof Albertus
Magnus in particularherbsand trees.16
This healthyinterestin nature and commendablecuriosityconcerning
real things was not confinedto Albert's students nor to "rustic intelli-
gences." One has only to examine the sculpture of the great thirteenth-
centurycathedralsto see thatthecraftsmenof the townswereclose observers
of the world of nature,and that everyartistwas a :naturalisttoo. In the
foliage that twiniesabout the capitals of the columnsin the French Gothic
cathedralsit is easy to recognize,says M. Male, a large numberof plants:
"the plantain,arum,ranunculus,fern,clover,coladine,hepatica,columbine,
cress,parsley,strawberry-plant, ivy, snap-dragon,the flowerof the broom
and the leaf of the oak, a typicallyFrench collectionof flowersloved from
childhood. ' 17 Mutatis mutandis,the same statementcould be made con-
cerningthe carved vegetationthat runs riot in Lincoln cathedral. "The
thirteenth-century sculptorssang their chant de mai. All the spring de-
lightsof the Middle Ages live again in theirwork-the exhilarationof Palm
Sunday, the garlands of flowers,the bouquets fastenedon the doors, the
strewingof freshherbs in the chapels, the magical flowersof the feast of
Saint John-all the fleetingcharmof those old-timespringsand summers.
The Middle Ages, so oftensaid to have littlelove fornature,in point of fact
gazed at everyblade of grass withreverence.2218
15 GertrudStockmayer, Ober Naturgefiihlin Deutschlandim 10. und 11. Jahr-
hundert(1910), 38 et seq. For furtherbibliographyon feeling for nature in the
middleages consultPaetow, Guide to theStudy of MedievalHistory (revisededition,
1931), 463, which,however,does not mentionB. Q. Morgan,Nature in Middle High
GermanLyrics (1912).
16 Magic and ExperimentalScience, II, 536-37.

17 tmile Male, Religious Art in France in the ThirteenthCentury,translated

fromthe thirdeditionby Dora Nussey (1913), 52.
18 Ibid., 53.

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 RENAISSANCE OR PRENAISSANCE T 73
It is not merelylove of nature but scientificinterestand accuracy that
we see revealedin thesculpturesof thecathedralsand in thenote-bookof the
thirteenth-century architect,Villard de Honnecourt,19 with its sketchesof
insect as well as animal life, of a lobster,two parroquets on a perch, the
spirals of a snail's shell,a fly,a dragonfly,and a grasshopper,as well as a
bear and a lion fromlife, and more familiar animals such as the cat and
swan. The sculptorsof gargoylesand chimeraswere not contentto repro-
duce existing animals but showed their command of animal anatomy by
creating strange compound and hybrid monsters-one might almost say,
evolving new species-which neverthelesshave all the verisimilitudeof
copies fromlivingforms. It was thesebreedersin stone,theseBurbanksof
the pencil,theseDarwins withthe chisel,who knewnature and had studied
botanyand zoologyin a way superiorto the scholarwho simplypored over
the worksof Aristotleand Pliny. No wonderthat Albert's studentswere
curiousabout particularthings.
Finally, can we accept the alteredconceptof a Prenaissance as the vesti-
bule to moderntimesand seed-bedof the modernspirit? Chronologically,
perhaps. But, aside fromthe circumstancethat moderntimes and spirit
seem at presentto be swiftlyshifting,are not our political,economic,chari-
table, educationaland ecclesiasticalinstitutionsquite as muchan outgrowth
frommedievallife? Withoutattemptinghereto argue this larger question,
I would merelyrecall thatmedievalmencoinedthe word,modern,and regu-
larly spoke of themselvesor the last generationsof themselvesas such.
"Maurus, Matthew,Solomon, Peter, Urso are modern physiciansthrough
whomreigns the medicineof Salerno." 20 About 1050 Berengar of Tours
was accused of "introducing ancient heresies in modern times" ;20a about
1108 Hugh of Fleury wrote his Historitamoderna,. "On all sides they
clamor," wroteJohnof Salisbury in the twelfthcentury,"what do we care
for the sayings or deeds of the ancients? . . . The golden sayings of the
ancientspleased theirtimes; now onlynew ones please our times." 221 When
in thenextcenturyRobertusAnglicuscomposedhis treatiseon thequadrant,
it was called Tractatusquadrantissecundummodernos. But thenimprove-
ments were made in the quadrant and Robert's work became Tractatus
quadrantis veteris.2 Even scholastic philosophyhad its via moderniaas
well as via antiqua.3
19Publishedin facsimileat London (1859), and Paris (1908).
20
Epilogue to a RegimenSalernitanumin Sloane MS. 554, f. 155, at the British
Museum; S. de Renzi, Collectio Salernitana, V, 139.
20a Soc. Bist. Franc., 50 (1884), 75.
21
Haureau, Notices et Extraits, III, 216, quoting the Entheticus.
22 Duhem,Le du monde,III, 306.
syterme
23
The ancientswere the thirteenth-century thinkersbeforeWilliam of Ockham,
the modernshis followers. See "modern"in the indices of Magic and Experimental
Science, vols. II-IV, for otherexamples of medieval use of the word.

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74 LYNN THORNDIKE

The conceptof theItalian Renaissanceor Prenaissancehas in myopinion

done a great deal of harm in the past and may continueto do harm in the
future. It is too suggestiveof a sensational,miraculous, extraordinary,
magical,human and intellectualdevelopment,like unto the phoenix rising
from its ashes after five hundred years. It is contraryto the fact that
human nature tends to remainmuch the same in all times. It has led to a
chorus of rhapsodistsas to freedom,breadth,soaring ideas, horizons,per-
spectives,out of fettersand swaddling clothes,and so on. It long dis-
couragedthestudyof centuriesof humandevelopmentthat precededit, and
blinded the French philosophesand revolutioniststo the value of medieval
political and economicinstitutions. It has kept men in generalfromrecog-
nizing that our life and thoughtis based more nearly and actually on the
middle ages than on distant Greece and Rome, fromwhom our heritageis
more indirect,bookishand sentimental,less institutional,social, religious,
even less economicand experimental.
But what is the use of questioningthe Renaissance? No one has ever
proved its existence;no one has really tried to. So oftenas one phase of it
or conceptionof it is disproved,or is shownto be equally characteristicof the
precedingperiod,its defenderstakeup a new positionand are just as happy,
just as enthusiastic,just as complacentas ever.
You maybreak,you mayshatterthevase, if you will,
But thescentof theroseswillhangroundit still.
Still lingersthe sweetperfumeof the Renaissance; still hoversabout us the
blithespiritof the Prenaissance.
ColumbiaUniversity.

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