Chapter 2

BANGLADESH ARMY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

2.1 Introduction

Army as an organisation for defence and aggression was in existence from ancient
times, but forms of the military in terms of weapons, modes of war, vehicles,
hardware and civil supply, recruitment and training, etc. have been an ever-changing
affair. The size and complexity of the military was contingent on the size of the state.
The socio-political landscape of the state would be a decisive factor in determining
the nature of the armed forces. In most post-colonial states, military’s decisive role in
the independence struggle may induce them to claim for a fare share in the post-
independence nation-building process. As far as Bangladesh is concerned, closeness
to the history and glorification of its combatant spirit made the armed forces
exceedingly popular among the masses of the country. Sometimes, the masses had
found analogy between war heroes and warriors in their folklore narratives. The
situation has provided a windfall of opportunity for the army to interfere in the
civilian affairs of the state in the post-independence period. On the other hand, the
army has successfully used its wisdom and experience of being a central figure in the
war of independence. Therefore, after forty years of the liberation war, it is essential
to re-examine the root causes of the Bangladesh Army’s affinity towards the civilian
affairs of the state. The subject may be discussed—for the sake of convenience—
under the following sub-headings: ancient, medieval, colonial, Pakistani and
Bangladesh periods.

2.2 Ancient Period

History of the Bangladesh Army could be traced back to the Gupta Empire (AD 320-
550). Though the armed forces played a major role in the kingdoms before the Gupta
Empire, it had become an organised force during this time. The pre-Gupta period of
Bengal is shrouded with obscurity. Before the conquest of Samudragupta (AD 335 –
375), Bengal was divided into two kingdoms: Pushkarna and Samatata. According to
the available inscriptions, Chandragupta II (375-415) had defeated a league of Vanga

34
kings resulting in Bengal becoming part of the Gupta Empire (Broom, 1850:8). The
prosperity and happiness Chandra Gupta’s empire is attached by the foreign traveller
Fa-Hien, a Chinese Budhist monk who travelled to India in order to obtain authentic
copies of the scriptures. He noted the peacefulness prevailing in India, the rarity of
serious crimes and the mildness of the administration (Basham,1954:65). During
Gupta period, Senapati, or Mahasenapati, was the Commander-in-Chief of the King's
army—the highest military officer of the state. Separate officers under the supervision
of Mahasenapati managed the various divisions of the army viz., infantry, cavalry,
elephants and boats. Horses had to be procured from distant lands in the north-west
and north-east. The phrase Gauda-Malava-Khasha-Huna-Kulika-Karnata-Lata,
which occurs in most of the inscriptions of the Palas, could be interpreted to refer to
the fact that different tribal people and people from different areas of India were
absorbed in the service of the state. Also, there are references in the inscriptions to
some special officers such as Kottapala, in charge of forts, and Prantapala, the
Warden of the Marches (Broom, 1850:11). The list of officials available in the Pala
records, however, shows many other names as well. However, in view of the absence
of sufficient clarity regarding their meaning, their functions cannot be properly
ascertained. The Gupta Empire collapsed in the sixth century AD under the impact of
continues attack by the Hunas and also weakened. This led to another phase of
political disintegration in north India. Bengal also must have taken advantages of the
collapse of the Gupta empire to wrest sovereign power and so it came across two
powerful kingdoms, Gaur and Banga in sixth century AD (Sengupta, 2011:32). As
mentioned earlier, Chinese traveller Fa-Hien travelogue contains descriptions gives a
graphic picture of the imperial Guptas in Bengal.

2.3 Medieval Period

Medieval period witnessed the Mugal invasion in Indian subcontinent. The Mugal
invasion and the rule in Bengal, as in elsewhere in India, depended heavily on the
military strength. The Mugals had a well-organised army. The establishment of
authority over the subjugated but not too submissive population, and the threat of
expansionist policy of the Delhi sultans necessitated the maintenance of strong armed
forces composed of cavalry, artillery, infantry, elephants and navy, of which the
sultan himself was the chief. At the same time, geo-physical climatic conditions

35
prevented the use of cavalry throughout the year in Bengal (Bourchier, 1850:18). The
cavalry was probably the weakest component of the Bengal army. Good quality
horses were not available in this part and the sultans had to depend on the supply of
horses from foreign countries were the chief of the cavalry. The artillery was an
important section and the Mughal ruler Babar characterised it as a very effective part
of the Bengal army.

Mugals utilised military supremacy of the Bengal army over that of Arakan 1 and
Tippera 2 was largely due to the efficiency of the artillery. The artillery used cannons
and guns of various sizes. The paiks formed the vital part of the Bengal infantry
during this period. There were occasions when the paiks also tackled political
situations. The special battle array of the foot-soldiers who used bows, arrows and
guns, attracted the attention of Babar. The navy had played a significant role in
riparian Bengal during this period. In fact, the cavalry could ensure the hold over this
country for a period of six months whereas the boats backed by the army could
command supremacy over the other half of the year (Majumdar, 1954:17). These facts
somehow substantiate the historical roots of Bengal knighthood and negating the
British and Pakistani martial race theory in Indian subcontinent.

Ikhtiyar Uddin Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, one of the Qutb-ud-din-Aybak’s

(AD, 1206) associates and a reckless adventurer, was responsible for bringing Islam
and Turkish rule to Bengal. His men overran vulnerable Buddhist monasteries in
neighbouring Bihar before turning their attention to the northwest part of the Ganges
delta, then ruled by a generous Hindu monarch. Disguising themselves as horse
dealers, Bakhtiyar and his men slipped into the royal city of Nudiya. Once inside, they
rode straight to the king’s palace, where they confronted the guards with brandished
weapons. Utterly overwhelmed, for he had just sat down to dine, the Hindu monarch
hastily departed through a back door and fled with many of his retainers to the
forested hinterland of eastern Bengal, abandoning his kingdom altogether (Eaton,
1993:4). Bakhtiar’s invasions were strongly motivated by the Islamic fervour to

1
Akaran has been an independent kingdom for over four millennium and its relations with Bengal was
very intimate, specially Chittagong, the south-eastern part of Bangladesh, which derived its name in
consequence of the victory over the local chieftain by King Chula Taing Chandra of Akran in 953 AD.
2
Tippera is the anglicized name of Tripura. It was one of the largest ancient kingdoms of the Bodo-
Kachari ethnicity in the north-eastern part of South Asia.

36
spread the new religion. Indeed, Bengal, along with the whole of north India, had
become, in the twelfth centaury, a playground for the Turkish-Afghan adventures. It
was in the year 1201 that Bakhtiar made his famous and well-described raid into the
heart of Bengal, then ruled by the aged Lakshmansen. But, he withdrew to reverine
East Bengal, which was beyond the reach of the Turks. Lakshmansen died around AD
1206. His two sons, Bishwarup Sen and Keshav Sen, ruled East Bengal with the usual
imperial titles. Thereafter, no reference to them, although, in general, eastern Bengal
stayed outside Delhi’s rule for nearly half a century (Sengupta, 2011:59). Mughal
invasion in the eastern region often received financial and logistical help from the
predominant trading community in the region called Marwaris. Their economic
interests in the region induced the Marwaris to go along with the invading force.
During this period, East Bengal was another important region for a wide variety of
textiles. In fact, the Marwaris and Mughals collaborated in the conquest of Bengal.
Where the Mughals provided the Marwaris with the political security essential for
business transactions, the latter provided the Mughals with financial capital obtained
through their networks of fellow caste-members residing all over northern India In
theory, imperial officeholders spent only the cash raised from their assigned jāgīrs, or
territorially defined revenue units, to finance their military operations. In fact, though,
officers often needed more money than could be derived from their revenue
assignments, and in such cases turned to moneylenders. (Eaton,1993:87). Such an
economic relation has wide range ramification in the post and pre-colonial Bengal’s,
especially in the east, land and economic relations. That may be discussed in the
forthcoming chapters.

Since the time of Iwaz Khalji, who first organised a naval force in Bengal, the war
boats had been playing an important role in the political affairs of the country. Despite
being an indispensable part of the military department, the efficiency of navy eroded
towards the end of the Hussain Shahi dynasty that ruled during 1494-1538. Apart
from the maintenance of well-trained armed forces, the sultans depended heavily for
their defence on the forts. The soldiers were paid salary, and meals provided. The
paymaster was called ariz-i-laskar (Majumdar, 1954:19).

2.3.1 Battle of Plassey

The Battle of Plassey was a decisive war in which British East India Company

37
defeated the Nawab of Bengal and his French allies and resulted in Company’s rule in
Indian sub-continent for the next 190 years. In the battle, a contingent of 800
European regular soldiers faced an army of nearly 50,000 troops from the Nawab of
Banglal’s standing forces. Not only was there numerical superiority on the Bengali
side, but in this instance artillery and the technical supremacy were against the
European force. Nevertheless, ‘in the most miserable skirmish ever to be called a
decisive battle’, the Europeans walked off with a victory which would change the
South Asian history (Woodruff, 1964:100). Literally, the British army was very weak
as an opponent to Nawab’s well-equipped and disciplined army. There never was a
military defeat of the Nawab of the Bengal army. Therefore, the British had to resort
other tactics to subjugate the Nawab. A covert operation carried out by the British
intelligence community toppled the military strength of Bengali forces. The British,
before the Battle of Plassey, had secretly bought off the commander of Nawab’s
armed forces.

Therefore, the history of Bengali armed forces also describes the history of shifting
loyalties of those who deal with their own ambitions for power. The small British
expeditionary force under Robert Clive secured its military triumph by a neat gamble
on prior political arrangement. From the incident at Plassey onwards, the British
waged more or less continues warfare against the Indian people by consolidating their
‘power in India and the conquest of other region, breaking up the old system of self -
sufficient and self-perpetuating villages, and supporting an elite whose self-interest
would harmonise with British rule. This much-discussed story reveals the character of
Bengali armed forces. This story has been time and again repeating the political
spectrum of Bangladesh even today to describe the character of the army. The
shadow/memory of General Mir Jafar’s, the General who betrayed Nawab, has played
a major role in the character formation of the Bengali armed forces. Later, both
Bengali politicians and military echelons were witnessed the betrayal of their fellow
comrades.

2.4 British Period

The organisation of the military during the British period was basically designed to
promote and perpetuate the colonial interests in India. Like many other colonial
empires, the number of metropolitan soldiers was less in British Indian armed forces

38
rather its internal defence and security rested upon the locally recruited forces. For
reasons of cost, and because of the difficulties employing European soldiers in
tropical campaigns Britain sought to recruit from the natives. 3 Therefore, Europeans
employed more natives in the armed forces who were both cheaper and healthier. For
instance, during that time, each soldier in Indian army cost approximately one-quarter
that of his British counterpart (Vandervort, 1998:43). The nationalist sentiments
among the armed forces in the colonies began to emerge in 1820s. In Indian scenario,
a widespread disillusionment was obvious within official circle of the Bengal army—
the other two presidency armies were Madras and Bombay. This disillusionment
encouraged a general resentment of the troops which composed this army. This
questioning was based on their actual experiences, namely a war with Burma (1824-
26) and a mutiny amongst Indian troops at Barrackpore in 1824 (Majumdar, 1971:37-
38). Subsequently, a debate which followed the Barrackpore mutiny encapsulated the
three conceptual frameworks which the British devised in order to comprehend their
hybrid military culture, namely, class, race and the European officer.

Of greater importance, and more far-reaching consequences, this sense of

disillusionment in the 1820s reflected a transitory phase in how British observers
chose to interpret indigenous military culture. A language of race partly replaced a
language of class as attentions shifted away from modeling an army on caste to
forming one that rested upon discrete racial characteristics. In reality, the Bengal army
was consciously recruited on caste basis in the initial stage. For many early
nineteenth-century observers the similarities between the two, especially when
considering their functions of social organization, were sufficient to allow them to be
used interchangeably (Robertson, 1858:44). By the 1820s, the army of Bengal had
taken on several characteristics which distinguished it from the armies of Bombay and
Madras. Most obvious of these was its homogeneity for recruitment in Bengal was
almost exclusively from the higher castes. This exclusivity was further refined by the
narrow regional focus of the Company's recruiting efforts. Brahmins and Rajputs
from Awadh and neighbouring areas of Bihar and Rohilkhand made up most of the
Bengal army. Bengal, especially the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta region, was
deliberately excluded.

3
British troops suffered heavy losses from decease in the Asante campaigns, as did French
metropolitan troops in the Madagascar Campaign of 1895-96 and Spanish and US troops in Philippines
and Cuba.

39
In 1825, it was estimated that recruits from these higher castes accounted for 80 per
cent of the army. Another 10 per cent was composed of Muslims, once again largely
recruited from Awadh-Bihar. Muslims were keenly sought after for their cavalry skills
but the British enthusiasm was tempered by suspicions of their alleged cliquishness
and religious fanaticism. The remainder was drawn from an assortment of middle-
ranking and lower castes." In Bombay, British authorities went even further and
deliberately encouraged the recruiting of marginal castes and cultures to create what
one Bombay officer described as a 'most salutary mixture of castes' (Peers, 1991:547).

Bengal sepoys were drawn from the agrarian society and were to English eyes a
sturdy independent peasantry—roughly equivalent to the idealised Scottish
highlander. (Singh, 1976:251) 4. Soldiers from Awadh and neighbouring areas were
taller and more masculine than those from Bengal, the Deccan or further south. One
officer complained that the Bengalis were too feminine while those from further west
than Awadh were considered too 'apelike'. It is obvious that the Bengal recruits fitted
neatly into all the categories of soldierly-like appearance that had been devised in
Britain.

After the ‘Sepoy’ mutiny of 1857, the colonial administration devised the notion of
the “martial race” and began to recruit from only those ethnic and caste groups, which
they identified as inherently martial and more war-mongers than others (Cohen,
1990:140-43). The rebellious attitude of Bengali soldiers influenced the British policy
makers to reduce the strength of these groups in their armed forces. The process of
Indianisation of the army was very slow throughout the British rule. The recruitment
of natives was gradually increased in the colonial army to meet the troop scarcity in
the World War II. Among the natives, the number of Bengalis had always been low
and their recruitment was more or less restricted to the technical services. 5 By going
through these facts we can assume that the reduction of Bengali citizens in the
colonial forces immediately after the 1857 uprising was not a sudden decision.

It seems to be the culmination of colonial pre-occupation and communal hatred

4
In Bengal, the minimum standards for recruits were 5'8" versus 5'6" in Madras and Bombay. Bengal
recruits were also required to weigh twenty pounds heavier than those in Madras.
5
During the World War II, these were about 60,000 Bengalis in various construction units of British
Indian army.

40
towards a particular group. At the same time, the reality is that the approximately 35
per cent of the Bengal army in 1830 was composed of men with between 10 to 17
years' service (Spiers, 1980:48-49). Therefore, after the 1857 uprising, the British
Indian Army underwent a few structural changes. The Bengal Army was disbanded
and reorganised in 1861. The Royal Commission of 1858 recommended that the army
be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, be mixed
promiscuously through each regiment.

The Indian regiments were thus constituted under four different systems, ie, general
mixture, class company mixture, regimental mixture, and the village system. Before
the revolt, there had been two descriptions of Indian soldiers - the regular and the
irregular. Under the former system, a regiment of Indian Cavalry had 23 European
officers and 13 Indian commissioned officers. The Indian infantry in Bengal consisted
of 26 European officers and 20 Indian commissioned officers. The number of other
ranks varied in the three Presidencies. Under the irregular system, a regiment had but
three to five European officers, generally a Commandant, a Second in Command, and
an Adjutant (Chaudhuri, 1967:47). Authors like J.W Fortesque argue that the British
were pre-occupied with martial race even before the 1857 uprising. They consider
martial race as a determining factor in the Indian military capabilities. He says, the
colonial administrators, both military and civilian, were equally prone to the use of
stereotypes in determining the recruitment base of the armed forces (Fortesque,
1899:122, Mason, 1974:23). One such change was related to the ratio between the
British and Indian elements in the army, and was designed to strengthen surveillance
of the ‘native’ troops by the British soldiers’.

According to Dr. Mahbub Ullah, ‘the British mainly recruited the armed forces from
the martial races such as Pathans and Punjabis in the subcontinent. Bengalis were
rarely considered recruited into the armed forces. The same situation continued even
after independence.”(Mehbubullah,2011) Subsequently, the Bengali representation
has been drastically reduced in the British armed forces. Therefore, at the time of
Indian-Pakistan partition; the representation of East Pakistan was extremely poor in
all three services of the Pakistan armed forces. This is because, in the pre-
independence period, there was neither a single Bengali regiment nor a cantonment in
the eastern half of Pakistan as no troop was permanently stationed there by the

41
British.

During the British rule, unlike the other part of India, Bengal witnessed a series of
rebellions against the British Raj specially among working class and indigenous
people. The most notable rebellions are shown in the following Table.
Table: 2:1- Anti-Colonial Rebellions and Uprisings in Bengal
Sl.No. Name Year
1 The Dhalbhum Uprisings 1769-74
2 The Rangpur Rebellion 1783
3 The Bishnupur Rebellion 1789
4 The Chuar Rebellion 1799
5 The Sylhet Insurgency 1799
6 The Movement of Titu Mir at Barasat 1831
7 The Kol Rebellion 1831-32
8 The Bhumij Revolt led by Ganga Narayan 1832
in Manbhum
9 The Pagalpanthi Uprising in Mymensingh 1833
10 The Ferazi Insurgency 1838-47
11 The Santhal Revolt 1855-56
Source:Sengupta, Nitish (2011), The Land of Two Rivers: A History
Of Bengal From the Mahabharata to Mujib, New Delhi: Penguin.p.223.

The number and nature of these movements depicts the rebellious character of rural
and urban Bengal, especially the working class. It seems these movements were
actuated by the highest motive of freeing the subaltern people from the exploitative
and capitalist colonial government.

The partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of India and Pakistan further
reduced the number of Bangles in the army as non-Muslim Bengali officers and
soldiers opted for India. Therefore, in 1947, the Bengalis constituted only one per cent
of the armed forces in Pakistan (Cohen, 1990:43). The facts on British attitude
towards Bengali armed forces reveal the imperial racist underpinnings coupled with
its predatory instincts. Remarks made by Lord Canning had proved the imperial
attitude in this regard. He says, ‘the people of Bengal are for the most part, less
warlike and turbulent than those of upper India”(Lawrence,1932:36). But later his
observation proved wrong during the 1857 upraise when the Bengal army rose to the

42
occasion acting unitedly against political and economic injustices of the British Raj.6
Because of this, Bengali armed forces treated as ‘downgraded’ and ‘incapable of
being a warrior’. After the formation of Pakistan—dominated by the so called
‘warrior classes’—both population and the armed forces of its eastern province were
treated as second class citizens by following these colonial parameters. On the other
hand, Pakistan had failed to overcome the racist notions and prejudices, which was
imposed by the colonial administration against its own people.

2.5 Post 1947 Scenario: Pakistan Phase

Partition of British India also witnessed the partition of armed forces. The partition
had a subsequent affect on the infrastructure and logistical facilities of Pakistan army.
Because of the disparity in size between India and Pakistan, the later naturally
received fewer stores, supplies and facilities. Author Stephen P Cohen says,

“The two domination-shared assets in the proportion of 64:36, which is roughly,

paralleled the communal balance. Pakistan received six armoured regiments (to India’s
fourteen), eight artillery regiments (to India’s forty) and eight infantry regiments (to
India’s twenty one) of the fixed installations. It also received the staff college situated in
Quetta; the royal Indian Academy Service Corps School (at Kakul); and a few other
miscellaneous facilities, as well as several regimental training centres, important naval
facilities at Karachi and Chittagong, and the obsolete defensive infrastructure of the
Northwest Frontier” (Cohen, 1990:7).

Cohen’s analysis reveals that, in short, Pakistan had to begin with limited
infrastructure and resources during the partition.

2.5.1 Bengali Representation in Pakistan Army

However, Pakistan further raised two battalions of East Bengal regiment in 1948.
Even after the formation of the first exclusive Bengali infantry regiment,
representation of Bengalis remained low in the Pakistan armed forces. This is because
of the Pakistani ruling class continued with the British concept of ‘martial race’ and
most of the commanding posts were held by the west Pakistanis. Bengalis were

6
People{soldiers}who triggered the 1857 mutiny were Bengalis{two}. It lifted Bengalis’ image in the
eye of the general public. However, it is interesting to note that those Indian troops which mutinied in
1857 were mostly from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

43
considered physically unfit for the military service. From the very beginning, there
was a clear dominance of a particular region within the military or any other
important national institutions. These groups were from the western Pakistan. Bengali
representation in the national bureaucracy remained extremely weak. Nine years after
the creation of Bangladesh, only 51 top level policy-making positions were occupied
by the Bengalis in the Bengal Secretariat out of a total of 741 such position. Bengali
representation of the army was minimal, 98 per cent of the officer corps of the army,
navy and air force was composed of West Pakistanis (Islam, 1981:63).

2.5.2 Beginning of Pakistan Army Rule

Bangladesh, as an eastern province of Pakistan first experienced the army rule in

1958. This intervention was a pre-emptive action that was designed to foil the
Parliament election scheduled to be held in 1959 in order to prevent the autonomist
Bengali middle/lower middle classes from gaining control over the decision making
process by getting elected to the parliament. ‘The dominant sectors of West
Pakistan—the landless elites, the entrepreneurs and the civil military bureaucracy—
viewed the demand for East Bengal’s autonomy as detrimental to their interests and
were not willing to allow them to come to power’ (Maniruzzaman, 1980:10). From
the 1958 coup to 1962, General Ayub Khan ruled Pakistan through a totally closed
system ran directly by the military in collaboration with the civilian bureaucracy.
With the drafting of a new constitution in 1962 he established a “Constitutional
Autocracy”.

Ayub Khan made himself leader of the Convention Muslim League (CML), a faction
of the former ruling party. Meanwhile, the Muslim League which lost its credibility in
East Bengal rapidly after 1947 and was routed in the 1954 provincial elections. The
new constitution of 1962 introduced a controlled political system known as “Basic
Democracy” where power to elect both the president and parliament was vested in an
Electoral College of 80,000 basic Democrats. By providing various kinds of
patronage to the democrats it was easy for Ayub Khan and his hand-picked CML to
‘win’ in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1964 and 1965 respectively
(Jahan, 1980:32). Through this process, the civil military bureaucratic regime tried to
legitimize itself and strengthened its non-military support base. The policy making
apparatus were controlled by the members of the top echelons of the civil and military

44
bureaucrats where the Bengalis were virtually left out. In 1963 Bengali presence in
the officer ranks of the Pakistani army was only two per cent and most of who were in
the ranks of Colonel or bellow. In the central secretariat, in 1966, only 20.1 per cent
officers were from East Bengal. Again most of them were in the lower ranks and none
of the secretaries from East Bengal (Sobhan, 2007:143). As far as economy is
concerned, the Ayub regime followed a policy of growth without equitable
distribution. Both Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) and infrastructural
investment were given to the West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. The policies
virtually turned East Bengal into an internal colony of West Pakistan. East Bengal
was used as a market for and supplier of raw materials for those industries. Author
Noman says that, by 1968, 22 families, all of whom were West Pakistanis, were the
owners of 66 per cent of the Banks and 97 per cent of the insurance funds in Pakistan.
In contrast, in 1970, the maximum amount of capital owned by any particular Bengali
house was Taka 75 million (Noman, 1988:41).

Such an exclusionary politico economic fiscal situation seriously affected the politico-
military system of Pakistan. The control over the policy making bodies by the top
west-Pakistani civil military bureaucrats and the chronic poverty in the eastern side
gave an opportunity for East Pakistan to brush-up their aspiration for regional
autonomy. For Bengalis this was the high time that they could achieve control over
the decision making process in Pakistan. Military regime’s denial of these demands
radicalised Bengali politics that ultimately culminated into a mass upheaval in 1968-
69 which finally overthrew Ayub’s civil-military regime.

Collapse of the Ayub-system, however, did not bring any civilian government to
power. Instead, an arbiter-type military government led by General Yahya Khan took
charge in Pakistan. The new government agreed to hold parliamentary elections and
transfer power to the elected representatives. The election results, however, made it
impossible for Yahya Khan, the military and the West Pakistani properties section and
the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Zulfikkar Ali Bhutto( which won majority in
Pakistan) to transfer power to the Awami League (AL). Belligerent nature of the
political class and radical forces made a sharp politico-ideological polarisation among
the East Pakistanis.

To protect the interests of the dominant sectors of West Pakistan, the arbiter type

45
military government opted for a military solution to the problem of power transfer or
transition to the civilian system and cracked down on East Bengal in late March 1971.
The number of Bengalis was slowly increased in the Pakistan military only after they
performed well in the 1965 war with India. However, there was a strong resistance
within the Pakistan army even to the gradual expansion of East Pakistan’s
representation in the military service. In 1968, East Pakistan had four battalions. Six
more Bengali battalions were also raised in 1968-69. In spite of all these efforts, East
Pakistan had hardly any representation in the higher echelons of the army. In 1970,
there was only one lieutenant general from East Pakistan (Ahmed, 1988:34). In 1971,
the Bengalis constituted five per cent of the total strength of the Pakistan Army. Navy
and air force were 9 and 11 per cent respectively (Bangladesh Documents, Vol.I,
1971:20). The under-representation and ethnic segregation made the Bengali army
personnel more conscious about the regional imbalance in the Pakistan armed forces.
The Bengali military personals also felt that they were discriminated in terms of pay,
promotion and other privileges.

These corporate grievances made the Bengali officers vocal against the West
Pakistani ruling elites. Furthermore, while the civil-military bureaucracy complex was
well entrenched into the power structure in Pakistan, the participation of Bengalis in
the political decision making process was meagre. Under such circumstances, the
Bengali army officers not only agitated for the protection of their corporate interests,
but also sympathised with East Pakistan’s struggle for greater economic and political
share. Meanwhile, many prominent Bengalis implicated in the infamous Agartala
Conspiracy Case of 1968 for their alleged involvement in trying to separate from
Pakistan with the help of India. Apart from civil servants and politicians, a number of
serving and retired army officers were also involved in this case (Bangladesh
Documents, Vol.I, 1971:20). Agartala conspiracy case has played a major role in
igniting the national sentiments of East Bengal.

Moreover, by late 1960s, several Bengali officers developed close contact with the
Awami League—a political party that advocates for free Bangladesh—leadership. All
these developments indicate that the officers from the East Bengal Regiment
maintained a strong sub-national Bengali identity during the Pakistan period. Author
Palit D.K says that, in early 1971, the total number of Bengali armed forces personnel

46
stationed in East Pakistan was about 70,000 composed of approximately 6,000 regular
in the East Bengal regiment’s 6 battalions and 15,000 members of East Pakistan
Rifles— a paramilitary force who defends the borders. The rest were lightly armed
civilian forces like the police and the national guards such as Mujahids and Ansars
(Palit, 1972:52).

2.6 Bangladesh Liberation War

When Pakistan's army begins military crackdown against the self-determination

movement in its eastern province in 25 March 1971, the Bengali armed forces'
personnel provided the initial resistance to the Pakistan Army. This political
motivation of the East Bengal regiment personnel had been built during the critical
days of February and March 1971, which eventually prompted them to join the
liberation struggle of Bangladesh. When Mujibur Rahman gave the call for
emancipation from Pakistani rule in East Pakistan on March 7, 1971, the Bengali
population responded overwhelmingly. ‘It was also noticed that the men and officers
of the East Bengal regiment in different cantonment were in a rebellious mood’
(Safiullah, 1989:19-20). According to a former Bangladesh Army officer, “the notion
of ‘self-prevention’ forced the army cadre to transfer their loyalty from Pakistani state
to non-existent Bangladesh. The revolt demands not just the rejection of all beliefs,
but their replacement with nearly opposite ones. Extreme trauma, compressed with
the last week of March 1971, catalysed the transformation of loyal Pakistanis into
rebellious Bengali nationalists” (Ali, 1944:10-11). The Bengali army officers fighting
for the liberation of Bangladesh in different parts of the country strongly felt the need
of co-operating among themselves. Therefore, on 4 April 1971, some of them met in a
conference and formally organised the Mukti Bahini or the liberation force.

Turbulent political scenario and regional compulsions had prevented the East-Bengali
political leadership from effectively coordinating the armed forces during the
liberation war. The leadership crisis had profoundly vitiated the ground realities,
especially among the newly emerged armed groups of having different political
ambitions and loyalties. Therefore, a provisional government of Bangladesh was
formed at Mujibnagar in the Indian state of West Bengal on 17 April 1971 and
Tajuddin Ahmed was appointed as the prime minister. The government was supposed
to liberate Bangladesh from the Pakistani occupation and it immediately devoted itself

47
to organising Mukti Bahini. In order to coordinate the military operations,
Bangladesh was divided into 11 operational sectors and a regular military headquarter
was set up in Calcutta.

Participation of different armed forces was visible during the war of independence.
Though many of these armed militia groups were under different command and
control and shared different loyalties, it shared the common notion that stands for the
independence of East Bengal. However, there are many armed militia groups were
supported the Pakistan army for a unified Pakistan. The role indigenous people, the
Jummas—the term of collective self identification used by the Chittagong Hill Tracts
(CHT) people in recent years—were vital in the freedom struggle. Indigenous people
in the CHT had joined the liberation forces and played an active role in the liberation
of Bangladesh. However, Chakma Raja (King) Tridiv Roy—a member of the national
parliament—had sided with Pakistan, as he thought that this would better serve his
people's interests. This led to a general suspicion of Bengalis toward the indigenous
people in the CHT who were, unjustly, regarded as traitors (Arens and Kirti Nishan
Chakma,2002). Therefore, participation of Chakmas in the national freedom struggle
did not get proper honour and respect by both democratic and military regimes that
came into power in Bangladesh after 1971.

The Bangladesh liberation war was a politico-military struggle against the Pakistani
Army that lasted only nine months. Although the regulars constituted only a quarter of
the total strength of the Mukti Bahini, they in fact formed the core of the armed
resistance against the Pakistan Army. During the Liberation War, the regular forces
took the responsibility of leading most of the military operations, the political leaders
and other freedom fighters tried to motivate the people to lend support and participate
in the liberation war. The provisional government of Bangladesh had attached a
political wing to each army command to coordinate the activities of the regular
numbers of the armed forces and other civilian groups (Safiullah, 1989:255).
According to Ghopal Das, a veteran freedom fighter in the 1971 Bangladesh
Liberation war, says,

“It was a liberation war that we (the people of Bangladesh) fought against the invaders
with the help of Indian army and a number of East Bengali politico-military movements.
We were students when the war broke out. Initially, we joined with the Special Guerrilla

48
 Forces (SPF) led by the Communist Party of Bangladesh. Later we merged with
National Awami Party, Bangladesh Students Union and finally with Mukti Bahini. Then
we jointly launched guerrilla operations against Pakistan's army and caused heavy
damage to the enemy. It is important to note that people from different classes of the
society actively participated in this war. Such an experience—working with the armed
forces to achieve a common cause—largely changed the popular perception about the
native armed forces among the masses from an oppressor to a saviour” (Das, 2011).

Considering people’s participation in the war, many of the rural population were
supported the Pakistan army during the initial stage of war. Contemporary
Bangladeshi cinema clearly points out the rural population’s attitude towards West
Pakistan army. 7 For them the uprising in Dhaka and other part of East Pakistan was an
‘attempt’ at to ‘destabilise the idea of Pakistan’. They thought the entire
pandemonium regarding the regional autonomy was a fabricated one. However, this
perception did not had any communal or anti-Indian facets. The peaceful nature of
East Bangalis towards the Pakkistani forces has been lavishly discussed in the
memoirs written by many Pakistani military personnel after the liberation war. After
the war, sadly, many of these people were indicted with the charges of ‘collaboration
with Pakistani army’.

Because of its active participation in the liberation war, the armed forces were
exposed to various political groups and ideas. The war was fought without no strict
control and direction of a central command. The regular forces fought with the
different political groups in fragments under the command of army officers and met
the leaders of various political parties and factions. The military training and logistical
help, which was extended by India to Mukti Bahini also played major role in the
liberation war. Some argue that the militarisation of the refugee camps, irredentist
tendencies of West Bengal government, shared Bengali identity, lack of international
involvement and electoral concern over mandate were heavily politicised the newly
formed armed forces (Murshid, 2011:53). The result was that many army personnel
began to affiliate itself with different political parties. The strategy of guerrilla

7
Contemporary Bangladeshi cinema depicts an altogether different picture about the freedom struggle.
For instance, Motir Moina (The Clay Bird), a critically acclaimed 2002 Bangladeshi film, shows the
responses of rural population on the liberation war. In the movie, Kazi Saheb—father of the central
character Anu, a young protagonist—thinks that the West Pakistan army is the savior of the East
Pakistani people. But his perception got changed after the Pakistani forces began their mass murder
campaign against Eastern Bengal. For details See, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0319836/.

49
warfare also radicalised a section of the army (Hossain, 1985:41-42). Participation of
different armed group in the liberation war is shown in the following chart.
Figure:2:1: Participation of Different Armed Groups in the Liberation War

*, East Bengal Rifles(EBR)

Source: Based on the facts obtained from, A Regime of Thugs and Bigots: An Investigative Report
by Murray Sayle, Sunday Times, London-July 11, 1971, Bangladesh Genocide Archive,
http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/ , Sharmila Bose (2011), Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971
Bangladesh War , Columbia University Press and Tom Cooper and Syed Shaiz Ali Khan (2003), India
- Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction on Indian-Subcontinent Data Base,
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_326.shtml

50
Another significant development in the liberation war was the participation of college
students in the movement. Large number of them joined the Mukti Bahini. Among
them, 58 were selected for officers training and subsequently commissioned in the
Bangladesh Army in October, 1971. A second batch of 65 cadets was in training.
They were commissioned in the army immediately after the liberation of Bangladesh.
All these newly commissioned officers were more influenced by the war than by the
regimental traditions of peacetime soldiering brought to the army a high degree of
politicisation (Jahan, 1986:61). Therefore, the armed forces converted into a
nationalist army during the liberation war.

The 1971 war put an end to the so-called isolation between the army and civilians that
had existed during the British and Pakistan period. The army officers while working
in close-cooperation with the civilians during the liberation war became aware of the
prevailing state of the weak political leadership and fragile political institutions. These
factors made them very conscious of political power. This led to emergence of a
highly pollicised army in Bangladesh after the Liberation War

Thus, the Liberation War of 1971 put the final addition on the politicisation of armed
forces in Bangladesh and radicalised a section of the freedom fighters so much, so
that they became revolutionary in their ideas. The attitude of the “repatriates” from
West Pakistan (about 28,000 in number (including 1000 officers) were followed a
conservative approach in case of nation building. Comparing with the freedom
fighters, the conservatives did not had any experience of participating in the
Liberation war. These groups were largely a conglomeration youth that politicised
with minimum knowledge about the reality that exists in the country after
independence.

2.7 Post Liberation Scenario (1971-1975)

The armed forces in Bangladesh were not in a completely organised manner during
the liberation movement and aftermath. It consisted of deserters from Pakistan army
and loosely organised freedom fighters. Therefore, the most serious and immediate
issue was how to co-opt several thousand freedom fighters in the various branches of
the armed forces, para-military and police (Jahan, 1986:61). Within a week of its
return to Dhaka the Bangladesh government in exile announced the scheme for
51
forming a ‘national militia’ comprising of all freedom fighters. 8 On 2 January 1972,
an eleven member Central Board of National Militia was constituted under the
chairmanship of the prime minister. This scheme was designed to recognise all the
members of the Mukti Bahini so that the unprecedented zeal displayed by the youth
during the liberation struggle could be utilised in the national reconstruction
programme.

On January 10, 1972, Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh and assumed the
leadership of the country. At the same time, Tajuddin’s idea of an integrated ‘national
militia’ began to receive less attention. Muja did not reject the idea of ‘national
militia’, but he emphasised more on disarming the Mukti Bahini members. However,
his call for the surrender of arms did not evoke much response from the freedom
fighters. A chaotic situation has been developed in Bangladesh following to the
surrender of Pakistan army. In the absence of effective administrative mechanism,
several sector commanders possessing vast quantities of arms were running almost
parallel administration. They also went on exerting political influence in every sphere
of administration. This was perceived by Mujib as a direct threat to his regime.
Having failed to deal the freedom fighters, the government had banned Mukti Bahini
on February 24 and all other guerrilla forces on February 27, 1972 (Ahmed, 1983:43).
Nevertheless, unrest soon gripped the army by this time as the military became clearly
divided into two groups; “Freedom Fighters” and “Returnees”.

2.7.1 Freedom Fighters and Returnees 9

The rift between Freedom Fighters and Returnees became explicit during the first half
of Mujib’s regime. The division between these two groups became evident from
publication of opinions in an English weekly Holiday, which began a series of articles
in 1972 on problems facing the Bangladesh Army in a newly independent state. 10 The
articles revealed the belligerent nature of both groups. It is interesting to note that one
8
The Bangladesh government-in-exile headed by Tajuddin Ahmed returned to Dhaka on December
22, 1971 after the Pakistan army had surrendered to the Allied Forces on December 16, 1971.
9
‘Freedom Fighters’, who had taken part in the war of independence and the ‘Returnees’ who had been
stationed in the West Pakistan in the time of independence and not been repatriated until 1973.
10
The articles appeared under a column named ‘view point’. The regular accompanying note of the
‘’editor stated that “every week in this column VIEW POINT, we print opinions of our readers on
subjects we feel are popular interest and concern. The opinions, however, do not always coincide with
those of Holiday".

52
of the article stated that, “the biggest of all the asylums which are sheltering Razakras
(Bengali name of collaborators) is the Bangladesh Army headquarters where
shockingly enough, almost all the officers sitting on the revolving chairs are
collaborators” (Holyday, 16 July 1972). The writer also accused the government for
crating frustration among the freedom fighters and warned that freedom fighters “are
only looking for a chance to strike back”.
Nevertheless, the ruling elite did not heed to these looming discontents within the
armed forces. Rather, Mujib’s attitude towards the armed forces was ambivalent to a
certain extent. His bitter experience as a prisoner of war with the Pakistan army
during the war of independence made him tactlessly harsh towards the armed forces.

A Bangladeshi political analyst says that, “on the one hand, he was proud of its
(army) contribution in resisting the aggressors and fighting for its motherland. On the
other hand, his natural suspicion of things military did not allow him to fully trust
them (Choudhuri, 1990:76). According to him, the proposed scheme of forming
‘national militia’ could not be implemented because the regular forces, who
participated in the liberation war, refused to join it. Therefore, the government
decided to raise a regular army, navy and air force; a para-military force—
Bangladeshi Rifles for defending the border; and a national police force for ensuring
law and order in the country. Later, the government announced that a selection board
would be formed for recruiting commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The
government also decided to setup a military academy to train the new officers for the
nation’s defence forces. Meanwhile, ideologically, Mujib government clearly sided
with the ‘freedom fighters’ group. Senior officials, those who upheld the ethos of
Pakistan, dismissed from the army. Instead of following the path of conciliation with
the belligerent groups in the army, Mujib followed a policy of punishing the group,
which had kept allegiance to Pakistan. As a result, a major portion of the armed forces
appeared to be the enemy of his regime.

In short, though the armed forces were marginally small in number it played a vital
role in the independent struggle. The struggle of Bengali armed forces against
Pakistan’s full-fledged army and its subsequent victory had categorically proved the
colonial categorisation of martial race was wrong.

53
2.7.2 Bangladesh Army: In Search of Political Role (1971-1975)

Differences were pertinent among armed forces during the early stages of liberation
war over the military strategy had to be adopted during the war. Both the army high
command and the Bangladesh government–in-exile initially tried to follow
conventional military tactics and formations (Khan, 1986: 269-75). However, the
Bengali armed personnel suffered heavy casualties when they decided to confront
Pakistanis in an open conventional warfare. During the course of the war, many times,
the liberation forces defeated by the Pakistan army many times due to the lack of
training, experience and superior firepower. All these factors were necessitated a
change in the operational strategy. Author Maniruzzaman says,

In order to ensure more effective resistance to the occupational army and to mobilise
political support for it, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, Colonel (rtd) M.A.G. Osmani,
the commander-in-chief of the liberation forces and other army officers met in a
conference from July 11-17, 1971 at Teliapara in Sylhet district. The military strategy
prepared at this conference popularly known as Teliapara Strategy. The strategy was
with the completion of guerrilla operation, a full-scale military offensive would be
undertaken with the help of best materials available among the units and guerrilla forces
(Maniruzzaman, 1980:108-11).

Closeness with the political class, both in exile and domestic, made the cadre of
armed forces aware of the strength and weakness of the political parties and
institutions in pre and post-independent Bangladesh.

2.7.3 Factionalism in the Army

Bangladesh government in exile decided to raise the strength of the liberation forces
after July 1971, an extensive programme of recruitment of freedom fighters was
undertaken. The political leadership tried to ensure that only those freedom fighters
that were ideologically loyal to the Awami League would be recruited. Young men
affiliated to other political parties, particularly radical groups, prevented from
infiltrating into the armed forces (Maniruzzaman, 1980:112-13). However, yet
another military strategy initiated by sector commanders like Colonel Abu Taher and
Lt.Colonel M.Ziauddin during this time. They argued that instead of forming regular
battalions, all the experienced armed forces personnel should be dispersed in different

54
parts of the country to raise and train a “people militia” drawn from the peasantry. For
logistics, emphasised capturing enemy’s equipments rather than relying on foreign
help.

Moreover, they insisted that the military head quarters and the sector headquarters
should be shifted inside the Bangladesh territory. It was argued that the Pakistani
forces only be defeated through a form of people’s war based on national mobilisation
and overwhelming support of the Bengali population (Lifschuitz, 1979: 105-106).
Taher’s idea could not be worked out because of the opposition from a section of the
Bangladesh military command. Osmani and Major Safiullah opposed him and Khaled
Mosharraf when he recommended this strategy in a sector commanders’ conference
held at Calcutta in October 1971. The only two-army officers who supported Taher
were Major Ziaur Rahman and Lt. Colonel Ziauddin.

Literally, the political objective of Osmani and some of his military colleagues was to
put Awami League into power in an Independent Bangladesh in the shortest possible
time and with all available means. On the other hand, Colonel Taher’s group devised
a strategy, which was not only aimed at the attainment of independence but also the
socio-economic transformation of Bangladesh in the process of the struggle (Abrar,
1991:182-183). Therefore, the difference, which was existed, previously over the
question of war strategy for the Liberation War took a new form in post independence
period. The freedom fighters held two impeccable views with regard to the future
institutional framework of the Bangladesh armed forces. One groups opted for
continuing the traditional concepts and practices of a conventional military similar to
the pattern followed in the western liberal democracies while the other group
demanded a complete restructuring of the Bangladesh Army. The latter group
proposed that the army should convert into a ‘productive army’ based on Chinese
People’s Army. Both Colonel Abu Taher and Lt. Colonel Ziauddin were the
champions of this idea. They argued that in a poor and underdeveloped country like
Bangladesh, conventional army would only mean a greater economic burden on the
people or dependence on foreign military assistance.

In his testimony, Taher clearly stated that ‘during my career as a soldier, I realised
that a standing army was a burden on the national economies of developing and
underdeveloped countries. This form of an army is an obstacle to the social progress.

55
Such an army will make zero contribution to the national productivity (Lifschultz,
1979:85). The prevalence of antagonistic views regarding the role of the armed forces
in a newly independent country and the inculcation of revolutionary ideas like
Marxism among a section of the army personnel clearly demonstrated a high level of
politicisation of the Bangladeshi armed forces.

2.7.4 Rivalry between Freedom Fighters and Repatriates

After the independence, the newly constituted Bangladesh armed forces were mainly
composed of the freedom fighters. The Bengali military personnel who had been
stationed in West Pakistan and could not participate in the liberation war were
repatriated in 1973. The inclusion of, the repatriated added a new twist to the internal
schism in the Bangladesh armed forces. Three full battalion of the east Bengal
regiment returned from Pakistan with all their men, but were deliberately split up and
dispersed throughout the army. The choice of who was to be incorporated into the
army and in, which rank was decided based on loyalty and closeness to Sheikh Mujib
and the Awami League (Kegan, 1983:38).

In the early seventies, the freedom fighters used to dominate the military decision
making because of their close proximity with the Mujib’s regime. For their role in the
Liberation War, the freedom fighters standing in the society was much higher than
that of the repatriates. After the independence, they were given two years of seniority
in the service by the Awami League government as a gesture of appreciation. The
repatriates, on the other hand, treated as ‘collaborators’ and ‘potential traitors’ (Khan,
1986: 98). They were either retired prematurely or posted to insignificant commands.
Several senior repatriated officers bitterly resented in this regard.

Rivalry between these two groups had an ideological dimension too. The repatriated
armed personnel were already been indoctrinated with anti-Indian and radical Islamic
ideologies from Pakistan military academies. They retained much of the conservative
outlook since they did not undergo the experience of fighting a guerrilla war. The
repatriates remained as professional committed loyal soldiers. They were less
ideologically motivated and were opposed to the establishment of a people’s army and
a socialist state (Jahangir, 1980:16-18). Freedom fighters, on the other hand, were
highly nationalistic because of their active participation in the liberation struggle and

56
a section of them heavily indoctrinated with radical revolutionary ideas.

During the post liberation period, the ruling Awami League regime failed to evolve a
common ideological framework for the armed forces. The political leadership
surprisingly ignored to build a new army as a constructive force, which could have
become a crucial partner in the reconstruction of the state. Instead, the Awami League
regime encouraged internal cleavages by political patronage and sitting one faction
against the other that finally resulted in sharpening the cleavages and further
politicising the armed forces of Bangladesh (Mascarenhas, 1986:36).

2.7.5 Rivalry between Army and Mujibur Rahman

Barring all internal and ideological rivalries, the armed forces personnel had one thing
in common—they were not satisfied with the mode of the civilian regimes of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, particularly its handling of the defence establishment. The creation
of a parallel armed force—the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini (JRB)—owing exclusive
allegiance to Sheikh Mujib and his government annoyed the regular members of the
armed forces. The JRB was supposed to reduce the influence of the Pakistan trained
Bengali military personnel and counter balance those section of the freedom fighters
within the Bangladesh armed forces which affiliated themselves to ideological camps
other than the Awami League. What antagonised the military personnel was Sheikh
Mujib’s preferential treatment of this well-equipped elite para-military force as
compared to the meagre facilities provided to the regular armed forces.

During the post independence Awami League regime, under the leadership of Mujibur
Rahman, Bangladesh had witnessed a systematic weakness and performance failure of
the government. The economic crises had widened, social and political instability
increased in the countryside the influence of radical groups also increased. Therefore,
in 1973-74 Mujib asked the army to control the insurgency in the countryside and
monitor the smuggling and arms transfer. They did fairly well in this regard, but the
government called off the mission half way.

During the operation, the army arrested many Awami League cadres and its affiliated
organisations for their alleged involvement in many heinous crimes. But Mujib’s
regime stood by his followers. Therefore, the army has started to question the Awami
Leagues’ commitment to social justice. Through their active participation in the

57
civilian affairs of the state, the armed forces became aware of the basic weakness of
the Awami League regime, particularly about the people’s lack of faith in the
regime’s ability to govern. Thus, the army that lost its espit de corps in the early years
regained confidence and began to nurse a feeling that the military alone could save the
nation.

Resentments among the army became prevalent when Mujibur Rahman introduced
single party system, BAKSAL ( Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League). Like
many other social groups and institutions, the military was also opposed to the idea of
one party totalitarian BAKSAL. According to the new system, the units of
Bangladesh Army, BDR, JRB and police stationed in the districts would be under the
control of the governor. Therefore, army echelons were began to think that Mujib was
trying to bring the armed forces completely under the control of the one party
government.

2.7.6 Weakening Economy

During the early phase of democratisation both macro and micro economic situation
in Bangladesh was quite volatile and dysfunctional. The economic situation worsened
more in 1973. The democratic regime failed to tackle the economic crises, its
mismanagement of the economy and the continuing high prices of essential
commodities resulted in tremendous economic hardships for the masses of the people.
But when the masses felt the economic meltdown, a small minority gained benefit
from this. 11 Unequal distribution of the resources coupled with the alligations of
widespread corruption in the regime, led to popular disenchantment with the
government. The year 1973 proved to be a bad year for Bangladesh economy. The re-
construction works lagged behind the schedule, production in both agriculture and
industry failed to reach the level before liberation, there were shortfalls in imports and
export. According the then Bangladesh Planning commission, the prices and the cost
of living index soared. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1972-1973 was estimated to
be 12-14% lower in the real terms than the GDP in 1969-70 and GDP per-capita was
estimated to be one fifth lower than the GDP per capita of pre-liberation days
(Planning Commission, Annual Plan, 1973:1).
11
In 1973 Bangladesh saw the emergence of a small group of new–rich usually Awami League
supporters—who emerged as a new elite as recipients of the regime’

58
Agriculture production has also witnessed a marginal slow down during this period.
Rice production in 1972-73 was about 15% lower than that the normal output of
1969-70. The jute industry’s output was 28% less than the 1969-70 production. As far
as exports are concerned, in 1972-73 was estimated to be 30% lower than the level
achieved in 1979-70 and the import of non-food items was about 30% less than
normal requirement (Planning Commission Annual Plan, 1973:1). The economic
meltdown fuelled the declining of production and led to the price rise. According to a
study, from the base of hundred in 1969-70, the cost of living index of an industrial
worker rose to 200.31 at the end of the 1972 (Bose, 1973:244). Such a volatile
situation has provided a chance for army to intervene in the civilian affairs of the
country.

‘Factionalism, rivalry and hatred’ are the suitable words to describe the history
Bangladesh Army during the initial phase of the state formation. As an active player
in the Liberation War, the army had expected a better treatment from the political
class that took over leadership of the country. Moreover, the belligerent nature of the
different factions within the armed forces had prevented the leadership to maintain the
power and command in a highly concentrated and hierarchical manner. Many of the
factions in the armed forces were not ready to accept the leadership. This has resulted
in a bloody coup that finally toppled the country’s first democratic government and
the army became the custodian of political power.

2.8 Assassination of Mujibur Rahman

The mounting discontents among the army cadre against the democratic regime came
into an abrupt end with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August
1975. Disgruntled and hostile political groups carefully exploited resentment against
the regime. This was the first military coup in Bangladesh. A group of army officers
assassinated Mujibur Rahman. This incident brought to a premature end of the
political regime in Bangladesh before its proposed reforms under the BAKSAL
scheme could be implemented (Khan, 1976:123) 12 Immediately after the coup, they
made a new government that headed by Khondker Mushtaque Ahmed, the foreign

12
The coup was masterminded by 25 army officers, namely: Lt.Colonels Farooq Rahman,Abdur
Rashid, Shariful Huq, Abdul Aziz Pasha, Majors Shariful Hossain, Shashiyar, Bazlul Huda, Rashid
Choudhuri, Captain Khairuzzaman, Abdul Majed, Lieutenants Musleuddin,Kishmet Hashem and
Nazmul Anwar.

59
trade minister of Mujib’s Cabinet.

The August 15 coup had created a highly volatile situation within the Bangladesh
Army. The incident severely undermined the unified structure of the army. The army,
as a whole, did not involve in the coup and consequent development. The coup was
planned and executed by a small group of junior officers in the army. The senior
officers, those who maintained their control over the troops, wanted the junior officers
to return their barrack and accept the command. The coup leaders, however, refused
to do that and fearing that they would be disarmed and court marshalled.
For two months, an uneasy power struggle continued between the junior officers and
the army high command. The highhandedness of the August coup leaders created a
serious dissatisfaction among a section of the army officers resulting in another coup
on 3 November 1975, led by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf, the Chief of General Staff,
and President Khondker Mushthaq Ahemed was forced to resign. Major General
Ziaur Rahman was succeeded Major General K.M Safiullah as the chief of army staff
after the coup. Brigadier Khaled appointed himself as chief of staff in Zia’s place and
the chief justice of the Supreme Court A.S.M Sayem was sworn in as president on 6
November.

In spite of all his efforts, Brigadier Khaled failed to consolidate his position within the
army and to gain the confidence among the political elites. From the very beginning,
he and his supporters showed themselves to be indecisive and politically inept. From
November 3 to 5, Bangladesh practically did not have a government. The coup
leaders did not form a government immediately after seizing power, which could have
strengthened their base. This created a political vacuum.

Meanwhile, the underground Gono Bahini (people’s army) 13 emerged on the scene
and started mobilising the lower ranks of the army. Gono Bahini cadres distributed
thousand of leaflets on November 5 and 6, urging the soldiers to attack their officers
and overthrow the ‘intriguers’, who had seized the power. On November 7, only four
days after capturing power, Brigadier Khaled and his supporters were overwhelmed
by a soldiers uprising. While attempting to escape from the cantonment, Khaled and

13
. The irregular forces in the war of independence, generally called Gono Bahini (people's army), were
those who were trained more in guerrilla warfare than the conventional one. They were largely left
wing militant organization, which clandestinely worked among the army cadre.

60
some of his supporters were killed by the mutinous soldiers. Major General Ziaur
Rahman was reinstated as the Chief of Army Staff. This second mutiny had two major
objectives. First was to remove Brigadier Khaled, free Major Zia from detention and
restore him as chief of army staff. The second and more significant objective was to
establish a revolutionary army—people’s army in the country which would stand as
the armed forces of the ‘poorer class’ against and over the bourgeois echelons of the
officer corps and the bourgeois itself.

Therefore, the revolutionary soldiers put forwarded a ‘Twelve Point’ demand, which
advocated for the establishment of a people’s army and total abolition of British
military rules and regulations that still dominated the military procedures in
Bangladesh. The Twelve Point Demand also argued for the formation of a ‘classless
army’ as the first step towards the establishment of a ‘classless society in
Bangladesh’.

The other demands were equally radical. That included; complete equality between
soldiers and officers in the place of existing system of the recruitment from the elite
groups through the cadet collages and public schools and higher pay for soldiers.
Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) leaders and Colonel Taher, the Commander of the
Gono Bahini (people’s army) tried to capitalise the prevailing class contradictions
within the armed forces. This mutiny brought about far-reaching consequence in the
Bangladesh Army. The animosity between ideologically committed Geno Bahini and
its sympathisers and to a ‘people’s army’ and a Marxist state and the status quoits
eventually took the form of open confrontation between soldiers and officers. The
radical soldier’s revolutionary theory state that the class struggle should first begin
within the armed forces pushed them directly against the officer corps. The mutinous
soldiers killed at least 34 officers in Dhaka cantonment alone and nearly 100 soldiers
lost their lives in another cantonment.

It was reported that Bangladesh remained in a state of virtual anarchy for about three
weeks of the soldiers uprising in November 7, which had spread to the garrisons of
Rangpur in the north, Comilla in the east and Chittagong in the south (Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives, 1976: 27522-23). During this critical situation, Zia took a
determined stand and re-established the chain of command within the shattered army.
Finally, on July 17 Colonel Taher was sentenced to death and Ziaur Rahman become

61
an unquestionable authority in Bangladesh. Zia’s ascendency in power led the country
into a different direction, especially in governance. Before going through the nuances
of military is essential to have a look into the structure of Bangladesh military.

2.9 Structure of Bangladesh Military

The newly formed government led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had an extremely
difficult task in delivering the prosperity that people expected after decades of apathy
and bloodshed. As a new beginning, Mujib pushed through a constitution that was
modelled on the Indian constitution. The constitution enumerates a number of
principles on which the country is to be governed, which include the four pillars of
nationalism, socialism, secularism and democracy. Nevertheless, in the following
years Mujib discarded everything Bangladesh theoretically represented; that is
constitutionalism, freedom of speech, rule of law, the right to decent and equal
opportunity for employment. The situation had largely discoloured his political
charisma among large number of people and armed forces those who actively
participated in the nine-month long war against Pakistan. At the same time, in months
after the war the newly elected government had planned to constitute the armed forces
anew. The new Bangladesh armed forces rose from the former Bengali members of
the Pakistan army, navy and air force who took part in the liberation war. General
M.A.G. Osmani, who was the commander in chief of the combined liberation forces
resigned on 7 April 1972. With his resignation, the post was abolished. Instead,
separate headquarters were established for the three services of the military— army,
navy and air force. The hierarchy of Bangladesh military follows.

62
 Figure.2.2- Hierarchy of Bangaldesh Military

Source: Bangladesh Military’s Official website: http://www.bdmilitary.com/

2.9.1 Bangladesh Army

The army is the strongest and most important among three services of the military.
But at the time of independence, the army was in a state of disarray. The Bangladesh
Army inherited only a few war-ravaged cantonments from the Pakistan army. The
army lacked heavy weapons, transport and communication facilities. Besides, most of
the officers had no previous experience of running of an army headquarter. The
Bengali officers who took part in the war were either junior or middle ranking officers
who had commanded troops just up to the brigade level. 14 Moreover, the liberation
war was fought in the most difficult circumstances in which the army officers had to
take the responsibility of recruiting, organising, training and equipping guerrillas.

14
During the liberation war, the regular forces of the East Bengal Regiment and East Pakistan Rifles
were reorganized into three independent brigades under the commands of Major Ziaur Rahman (Z
Force) Major K M Safiullah (S Force) and Major Khalid Mosharraf (K Force).

63
Despite lack of experience of working in the higher command and staff position, an
army headquarter with divisional command structure soon began to function.

The strength of the army in 1972-73 was only 17,000 (Military Balance, 1973-74:49).
About 2000 surviving members of the East Bengal Regiment and some new recruits
from among the irregulars of the Mukti Bahini constituted the nucleus of the
Bangladesh Army for the first one and half years. These were added 20,000 Bengali
army personal, including 400 officers repatriated from Pakistan in 1973. These
repatriates had been stationed in West Pakistan since 1969 and could not join the
liberation war. Most of them were gradually absorbed in to the Bangladesh Army.
Thus the strength of the army rose to 30,000 in 1975(Military Balance, 1975-76:53).
There were about 1200 officers in the army in 1975. But the number of senior officers
above the ranks of captain and major was not more than 250 (Ahmed, 1982:150).

Following the August 15, 1975 coup, Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini, an elite para-military
force, was integrated with the army. This had resulted in a sharp increase in the size of
the army. In 1976, the total strength of the army was reported to be 59,000 (Military
Balance, 1976-77: 53-54). During the military rule, Bangladesh Army’s strength
increased three fold—from 30,000 in 1975 to 90,000 in 1990. This trend has been
continued even after the democracy reinstated. The present strength of the army is
estimated to be over 250,000 personnel with 50,000 retired reserve personnel
(Military Balance, 1990-2010:157). A steady increase of the armed forces strength
reveals the level of support and patronage given by the state government to military
even after democracy came into power.

Since last 38 years, Bangladesh military has undergone major transformation in its
organisational level. Since most of the coups during the Ziaur Rahman period plotted
by highly politicised freedom fighters, their ranks steadily decline with each purge
that followed an unsuccessful coup. Thus, by 1981, only 15 per cent of the
Bangladesh armed forces were freedom fighters., 25 per cent were repatriates and the
rest 60 per cent had been recruited since 1975 (Kochanek, 1993:61). Presently, the
size and per centage of the three sections of the armed forces clearly indicate the
overwhelming size of the army among the armed forces of Bangladesh.

64
 Figure: 2.3- Percentage of Bangladesh Armed Forces

In Numbers: Army:200,000, Air Force-17,000, Navy-24,000

Source:Bangladesh Army’s official website: http://www.army.mil.bd, Bangladesh
Military’s official website; http://www.bdmilitary.com/, Ministry of Defence,
Bangladesh; http://www.mod.gov.bd/. and facts derived from The Military
Balance,2010.

Apart from these three wings of armed forces, Bangladesh has diverse security,
intelligence and paramilitary forces to look after both internal and external security.
The following figure describes the various security agencies that are parallaly
functioning with the conventional armed forces.

65
 Figure: 2.4- Intelligence, Security and Special Forces in Bangladesh

Source: facts obtained from http://www.bdmilitary.com.

The number of repatriate personnel has also reduced to large extent as most of them
retired in the 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, the cadre those who recruited after
1975 constitute the majority of the army ranks today. The erstwhile army chief Moeen
U Ahmed, who turned around the political landscape of Bangladesh during the
political mayhem that crippled the country since 2007, was a post-1975 product. Since
1990s, these new generation officers were occupied the middle and lower strata in the
army. “The total strength if the officer corps in 1989 was almost 4,000. At the top
ranks it had one lieutenant general, 20 major generals, 80 brigadiers, 100 colonels,
200 lieutenant colonels. The rest of the officer corps consisted of major and lower
ranks”(Hussain, 1991:52). In short, the Pakistani trained and influenced sections in
the armed forces slowly began to retire during the 1990. This generation shift, from
Pakistani to Bangladeshi, has played a major role in the history of Bangladesh
military’s after 1990. That may be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.

Despite several resource constrains, the successive military regimes in Bangladesh

attempted to expand and modernise the army, during the Mujub period, the army had
only five divisions, but after the establishment of military rule two more divisions

66
were raised. At present seven infantry divisions of the 101,000 infantry is located in
Dhaka, Comila, Bogra, Chittagong, Rangpur, Mymensingh and Jessore. The army is
organised into 17 infantry brigades (26 Infantry battalions), 1 armed brigade (2
armoured regiments), one artillery division (6 artillery regiments), one engineering
brigade and one air defence brigade (Hussain, 1991:52). When it is comparing with
other south asian counterparts the strength of Bangladesh Army is seems to be above
Sri Lanka, which is a country that has been waging a protracted war against its rebels
over last thirty years. See the following table.
Table:2.1-Army Man Power in South Asia 2010

India Pakistan Burma Bangladesh Sri Lanka

Active 1129.9 550 375 126.153 117.9
Reserve 960 NA NA NA 1.1
Source: Asian Military Balance, 1990-2010 (In 1,000s)

The above-mentioned table shows Bangladesh has comparatively better infrastructure

in defence. It is interesting to understand that how Bangladesh Army’s direct rule
since 1975 to 1990 have expanded its reach to the nook and corner of the country. The
army, paramilitary and other security agencies are having almost 21 cantonments
across the country. Interestingly, maximum numbers of cantonements are situated in
the Chittagong and Rajashahi region. See the following figure.

67
 Fig:2:5: BANGLADESH: ARMY CANTONMENTS

Rangpur*

Syedpur*

*Mymensingh * Jalalabad
Jahangirbad*
*Mujhira
Rajashahi* *Quadirabad *Shahid Salahuddin
Rajendrapur* *Dayarmpur

* Mirpur
*Sever
* Dhaka

Moynamoti*

*Jessore *Khagrachari

*Jahanabad
*Rangamathi

*Chittagong

Bandarban*

* Army Cantonments

Source: Bangladesh Military’s official portal: http://www.army.mil.bd/ and other defence forces
websites.

The above-mentioned figure indicates army’s real role in the militarisation of the state
by establishing maximum number of military cantonment across the country. It also
reveals the high profile status, which the army is enjoying in present Bangladesh even
after twenty years of democratisation. Such grassroots expansion of the army will
have serious implication in the social life of Bangladesh. That will be discussed in the

68
forthcoming sixth chapter.
2.9.2 Bangladesh Navy

The Bangladesh Navy was formed in November 1971. It included 860 naval
commandos raised mainly from the Bengali naval personal that had defected from the
Pakistan navy and newly recruited freedom fighters. The navy played a heroic role
during the liberation war in the port areas of Chittagong, Mongla,
Chalna,Narayanganj and Chandpur by organising commando attacks (Hussain,
1991:58). In the post 1971 scenario, the Awami League leadership rebuilded the navy.
The navy headquarters was set up in Dhaka. By the end of 1974, Chittagong emerged
as the country’s first fully fledged naval Base.

However, the Bangladesh Navy remained very weak in the early seventies due to
resource crunch. The navy was poorly equipped and could not perform even the
routine petrol of the Bangladesh coastline. In 1973, the strength of the navy was only
500(Military Balance, 1976-77:54). The Bangladesh Navy has retained the basic
structure and disciplinary code of the Pakistan navy. Its rank pattern is derived from
Royal Indian Navy (Goldric, 1993:68). Bangladesh has four naval bases— Dhaka,
Chittagong, Khula and Kaptai. During the military rule, the human resources of the
navy increased from a meagre 500 in 1975 to 4,000 in 1980 (Military Balance,
1980:66). The absorption of about 2,700 repatriate naval personnel including 30
officers into the Bangladesh Navy largely contributed to this increase. Since 1975, the
Bangladesh Navy has also recruited several thousands of new officers, sailors and its
current strength is 28,000. 15

The navy’s principle duties are, a general police function for customs, fishery
protection, search and rescue and a military transport function to assist the military
with internal security and disaster relief. Besides, it is the responsibility of the
Bangladesh Navy to ensure proper exploration, preservation and utilisation of the
potential maritime resources in the 40,000 square nautical mile of the exclusive
economic zone in the Bay of Bengal. However, in the absence of adequate maritime
vassals, the Bangladesh Navy’s low enforcement surveillance in the last 25 years has
been less effective (Bangladesh Observer, 13 January, 1996).

15
Bangladesh Navy, http://www.bangladeshnavy.org/

69
2.9.3 Bangladesh Air Force

The Bangladesh Air Force was established in 28 September 1971 with a few armed
helicopters and light aircraft. About 45 Bengali officers and 673 airmen who had
escaped from the Pakistan air force contributed significantly to the liberation struggle
(Bashar, 1990:55-57). Since immediate acquisition of aircraft was difficult, its officers
and men fought on the land together with the members of the Mukti Bahini. It was
only in December 1971, when a full-scale war broke out the Bangladesh Air Force
launched its first serial attack on Pakistani positions.

After the liberation, Bangladesh faced enormous difficulties in reorganising the air
force. According to a freedom fighter “Bangladesh Air Force, inherited from the
enemy nothing but shambles, destroyed aircrafts, damaged runways, looted stores,
neutralised maintenance facilities—in short, a disorganised mess (Bashar, 1990:57).
Following the induction of repatriate personal in 1975, the navy’s strength increased
to 5,000 (Military Balance, 1990:68). During this time, all that Bangladesh Air Force
had very few Soviet-supplied MIGs, helicopters and operational bases only in Dhaka,
Chittagong and Jessore.

On October 2, 1977, a series of mutiny had taken place in the Bangladesh Air Force.
The revolt originated in a conflict between the air force rank and the senior officers
over the pay and service conditions (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives,
February,1978). The revolt was immediately crushed by the troops loyal to Ziaur
Rahman. The trials of the mutineers began before military tribunals On October 7,
1977. It was officially announced on October 18 that 460 air force personal had been
tried of whom 37 were executed, 20 sentenced to life imprisonment and 60 acquitted,
the remaining 340 had been sentenced to shorter terms of imprisonment (Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives, February,1978).

This abortive coup had a catastrophic effect on the Bangladesh Air Force. In
December 1977, 11 air force officers resigned when the then Air vice-Marshal A.G.
Mohmud was superseded as Chief of Air Staff by group captain Saruddin, who was
promoted to Air Commodore. As a result, there were 11 officers left in the entire
service, of which only three were capable of piloting an aircraft. In 1979, the total
strength of the air force was reduced to 3,000. However, several new officers were

70
recruited since 1980s. At present, the total strength of the Bangladesh Air Force is
11,000 personnel plus 200 more aircrafts (Military Balance, 2009:47).

Despite the resource constrains, the Bangladesh Air Force has made considerable
progress over these years. Some new air force bases have been constructed in Ishurdi,
Saidpur, Sylhet and Cox Bazar. The air force has also procured advanced fighters and
helicopters. The air force academy was established in 1982. The primary
responsibility of the air force is to defend country’s air space. In addition to this, it has
been actively engaged in containing insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and
relief and rescue operations for the past three decades.
Table: 2:2: Bangladesh Military: Fact Sheet
Army No Navy No Air Force No
Air Defence Aircraft NA Aircraft
[Guns&Surface to- [Air defence, 74
184
air- Missile] Aircraft Carrier NA surface-to-air
missile]
Amphibious NA 8
Aircraft 6
Aircraft Fighter
[Reconnaissance,
Destroyers NA
Transport and Utility]
59
Aircraft Fighter,
Anti-Tank 1060 Frigates 5 Ground Attack
[Guns, Missiles, Anti-
tank and Ramped 7
craft Logistics] 4 Aircraft,
Landing Craft Transport
30
238
Artillery[Multiple Mine Warfare, 5
Rocket Launcher, Counter Helicopter
Self-propelled, [Mine Hunter [Attack, Support
Towed and Mortar] Coastal, Mine and Utility]
226
Sweeper Ocean &
Personnel carrier Inshore] 39
[Armed Infantry
Fighting Vehicle,
240
Armed personnel Patrol and Coastal
Carrier] Combatants
[Fast Petrol Craft,
Tank [Light and Coastal]
Main Battle]

Source: The Military Balance 2010 , International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: Routledge,
2010.

71
Overwhelming size and the capacity to wage full-scale war—even if it is relatively
smaller in the region—make the Bangladesh Army as an elite force in the country. Its
premier role in the freedom struggle made them as most reputed and popular state
machinery after the state formation.

2.10 Socio-economic Composition of Bangladesh Army

As stated in the Figure 2:3, The Bangladesh Army’s current strength is estimated to
be over 200,000 personnel with 50,000 retired reserve personnel (Military Balance,
2009:47). There were only five battalion of the east-Bengal regiment, with about
6,000 soldiers and 100 officers, which were stationed in east-Pakistan. From these
forces, about 4,000-4,500 are believed have survived the initial resistance against the
Pakistan army’s brutal crackdown on Bengalis. More than half of the total Bengali
soldiers in the Pakistan army, about 28,000, were stranded in west-Pakistan and,
therefore, could not participate in the war. Most of them later joined the services after
returning home from Pakistan camps, so that the repatriates outnumbered the freedom
fighters.

In the initial phase, Pakistan era, the class combination of Bangladesh Army was not
equal. During this period, 1947-71, few Bengali officers were recruited into the army.
This small group represented the relatively small ranks of the upper middle class
strata of the Bengali Muslim society. The situation was changed after the 1975 coup.
The post-1975 situation showed a striking decline in the relatively high social origins
of the army.

During the early years of independence, although there were different groups of
factions in the Bangladesh armed force, the officer corps generally came from
somewhat similar socio-economic backgrounds. Those who entered the official
positions and the highest levels in the years before and after the war of liberation were
a cross-section of a middle and lower-middle classes. There are similar socio-
economic backgrounds of the officer corps in neighbouring India, Pakistan, Myanmar
and Thailand, although the social context of each country would be different (Grover,
2000:23).

As far as the term ‘middle class’ in Bangladesh is concerned, it is a social group,

72
which “somewhere in the middle between the tiny upper class of wealthy
entrepreneurs, large land owners and highly successful professionals on the one hand,
and the huge lower class of employed and unemployed workers, small land holding
peasants, tenants farmers and landless agricultural labourers on the
other”(Nordinger,1997:32) The middle class is thus rather diverse, including teachers,
civil servants, lawyers, technicians’, shop-owners, traders, small and medium
entrepreneurs and landowners along with military officers

In the initial phase, the three-quarters of the officers of the Bangladesh armed forces
were from the middle class, about 15-20 per cent in the upper class and about 10-15
per cent in the lower classes. These 100 students who were recruited as officers
during the liberation war and preferred to stay in military service are a cross section of
the middle class and the lower middle class and lower middle class groups with
origins in small towns and rural areas. The leaders of the coup in August 1975 were
sons of government officials, affluent farmers and other professionals of the mid-
income group. These 32 military officers, who served as ministers during the military
regimes of General Ziaur Rahman and Ershad, were sons of landed class and
government officials (Grover, 2000:24).

When we look into the third world scenario, Brazil shows the cadets who entered the
military academy between 1941 and 1943, 20 per cent came from traditional upper
class families, 75 per cent from middle class families and four per cent from lower-
class families. In the 1960s, upper class recruits had dropped to 6 percent, lower class
recruits had risen slightly to nine per cent, while the middle class continued to
predominant with 78 per cent of the new officer recruits (Stepan, 1971:30-33). In
case of Pakistan, though there were a significant number of officers recruited from
aristocratic or landed gentry groups at the time of independence, the internal politics
and pressure towards professional recruitment have largely eliminated or diluted these
upper-class elements (Janowitz, 1977:126:27). The military officers in Pakistan
represent ‘middle class’ groups in the society. The majority of the officers in the
Indian armed force also came from middle class backgrounds (Bukri, 1980:202).
The leaders of the Egyptian coup in 1952 were also from the middle class. They were
largely sons of civil servants, soldiers and grandsons of peasants. Turkey is a striking

73
example of a traditionally independent nation whose military is more socially
representative than other professional groups.

The liberation struggle of Bangladesh also attracted the upcoming business class,
bureaucrats and other professional groups. However, after independence, military
service did not appeal much to the upper strata of the society. About 125 students,
those who recruited as officers during the Liberation War finally opted for military
service and they came from middle and lower-middle class families. For the last two
decades, it had observed that the wards of top military officials, high-ranking
bureaucrats and big businesspersons have developed a negative attitude towards the
army. They rather prefer to go abroad for higher studies or to seek employment
either in corporate houses or in civil services. One study shows that 75 per cent of the
officers commissioned in the Bangladesh military after 1975 were born in middle
class families, about 15-20 per cent in the upper classes and about 10.15 per cent in
lower class (Hossain, 1985:56). Thus, presently, the representation of the upper class
in the Bangladesh armed forces is considerably low.

Like the upper class, the representation of lower class in the officer corps is also
limited, but for different reasons. Most of the poor families in Bangladesh cannot
meet the educational expenditure of their children. Besides, the labour of young
members is very essential for an average lower class family. Therefore, they do not
get quality education, which could have enabled them for getting entry to the branches
of any armed forces. Under such circumstances, the participation of officers of lower
class origin has always been modest (Hossain, 1985:56).

Since Bangladesh is predominantly rural, the officers and other ranks generally
recruited from countryside. Only a small section of officer corps comes from big
cities like Dhaka and Chittagong. The majority of the officers recruited into the
Bangladesh Army after 1975 are rural or small town origin. Officers coming from
rural areas belong to the land owing class. The privates on the other hand, are either
landless or marginal farmers. Unlike the army, navy and air force personnel drawn
from mostly urban areas. Both the services accept only fully literate personnel and
almost everyone in the ranks will be a secondary school graduate.

The occupational background of parents is also an important factor in this regard. A

74
vast majority of them are middle ranking officers in various ministries, government
undertaking and private sectors, urban professionals like doctors, lowers, teachers,
petty businessman, small and medium entrepreneurs, land owners and retired military
officers (Hossain, 1985:56). Given the fact, suggest that the social base of officer
recruitment has broadened in Bangladesh after 1975. Young Bangladeshis from urban
professional groups and rural affluent families have shown a keen interest in joining
the military services, which provide good salary and social status. Moreover, an army
career offers excellent opportunities for higher studies, particularly in the medical and
engineering corps. Presently, Bangladesh is the only country who sends maximum
number of troops to UN peace-keeping operations across the world. Therefore, for
Bangladeshis, especially the middle and lower middle class origin, the military
profession has become an avenue for upward social mobility.

Like the army officers, the political elites in Bangladesh are coming from more or less
similar socio-economic background— the middle and upper- middle class composed
of civil servants, affluent farmers, urban professionals, emerging business, and
industrial groups. Many army officers have family ties with these groups and as in the
most of the traditional societies, primordial loyalties are very strong in Bangladesh.
This situation often promotes the merger of political and economic interests between
military and other dominant socio-economic forces. In Bangladesh, nearly 75 per cent
of the army officers came from middle class families while this class makes up only
12-13 per cent of the total population. As members of this tiny middle class by birth,
the Bangladeshi officer corps has always tried to protect and promote its interests.
Successive military regime’s economic policies—favouring the rich peasantry and
upper strata of the urban middle class—largely approved by the officer corps. During
Zia regime, the idea of restoration of Islam, in place of secularism was also fully
accepted by the Bangladesh Army (Franda, 1981:365).

Class and social composition of the modern armed forces in Bangladesh considerably
changed during the second phase of democratisation. The army became more
professional than the erstwhile one by following general recruitments into its cadres,
in which all qualified/eligible candidates can participate in the recruitment process. As
per the new system, every male citizen, irrespective of caste, class or religion is

75
eligible for recruitment in the armed forces. 16 Though some recent report (Wazed,
Sajeeb and Carl Ciovacco, 2008), points out thriving nature of the Islamic
fundamentalism and the growing number of Islamists in the army will have an impact
on the social structure of the armed forces. However, infiltrating into the highest level
of the armed forces are still a herculean task for the fundamentalists.

2.11 Arms Procurements

The Bangladesh military has been largely depending on import in arms. Bangladesh’s
arms import seems to have remained more or less constant from 1995 to 2005 as a
percentage of all imports. 17 But the rapidly changing regional power balance has
pushed Bangladesh into the fiefdom of China for defence procurement after 1990s.
India had championed as a major arms supplier to Bangladesh in the initial phase of
Bangladesh, China has emerged as the largest source of import for Bangladesh
replacing India for the first time in 2005. According to the statistics of Chief
Controller of Import and Export (CCIF), Bangladeshi import from China amounted to
32.14 billion taka ( $494.5 million) during the July-September period of the July 2005
to June 2006 against 27.08 billion taka ($416.6 million) import from India during the
same period of 2004 (Kumar, 2006). China is also the largest supplier of military
hardware to Bangladesh. Bangladesh's air force has 65 fighter planes and 39
helicopters, mostly a mix of Soviet-era and Chinese aircraft. To modernise this air
force, Bangladesh has decided to purchase 16 fighter aircraft from China for $94
million. Hafizuddin Ahmed, the country's water resources minister in 2006, who was
also the acting minister of defence, told the national parliament as reported by The
Daily Star on 24 February 2006: “Each fighter plane will cost $5.85 million and (an)
agreement to this effect was signed last year. Lieutenant-Colonel Nazrul Islam, a
spokesman for the country's armed forces, identified the planes to be bought as F-7
fighter jets.”

16
For more details see, the Official Website of Bangladesh Army, http://www.army.mil.bd/.The army
recruitement is carried out on quareterrly basis by Headquarters Recruitment Unit/Branch Recruitment
Unit/Area Recruitment Team and training Centres.
17
For details see, Table-II, Arms Transfer Deliveries and total Trade, 1995-2005,by Region,
Organisation and Country in World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 2005. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm.

76
2.12 Conclusion

Politicisation of the armed forces began in the British period as the armed forces
began to split in accordance with the different loyalties and power structures.
Colonisation has a legacy in asserting the army’s role in the newly-independent third
world countries. In most of the post-colonial countries, the concept of nation state was
‘air-lifted” by the colonial powers to uphold the western liberal values within the
hierarchically divided and socially plural societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
All these nations were actually the conglomeration of various sub-nationalities
temporarily brought together by the colonial powers for administration. According to
author Kalim Bahadur, “under the long history of colonial rule and oppression most of
the new nations were left with a heritage full of well-entrenched feudal classes, an
under developed capitalist class with close links with the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
The imperialist rule had also promoted national strife, caste conflicts, linguistic,
religious clashes, and economic disparities between classes and regions. The uneven
economic development led to social, political and economic tensions and conflicts
(Bahadur and Chopra, 1986:7). The politicisation of the armed forces and weaknesses
of the democratic institutions made the army more aware about the political system
and such situation induced the army to interfere in the civilian affairs of the state.

Evolution of the Bangladesh Army from the Chera Empire to 1975—the first military
takeover—indicate the role of armed forces in the creation of a new nation and how
that experience made them to interfere in the civilian affairs of the state. The political
class in Bangladesh confused in its own goal by asserting how and by whom it wants
to be led and how to develop a war-ravaged country and its economy. The misgivings
created by the political class have induced the army to intervene in the civilian affairs
of the state in the early stages of democratisation. The army’s transformation form
“an active contributor for the freedom struggle” to “a complete political actor” seems
to be its response to the dysfunctional political system—run by the political elite—
that had prevented the interests of the armed forces after the state formation.
Therefore, the army had dictated the course of politics, redefined the character of
democracy and repeatedly sought to destabilise the democratic movements and
aspirations since the end of Mujib Rahaman’s reign in 1975.

77