Endencia Vs David G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
Endencia Vs David G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
Endencia Vs David G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of
income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured
by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and
preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited
membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice
and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late
in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming
that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the
benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give
more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive,
they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income
tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is
based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when
charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives
except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their
attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for
any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or
contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators
and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and
exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural
and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when
used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec.
22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or
interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines
under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration
are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men
of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned
by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are
exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of
officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted
from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public
interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for
the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and
necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their
compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the
effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the
hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a
case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
no pronouncement as to costs.
Separate Opinions
Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I
wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall
be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law",
constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the
opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle
underlying the separation of powers.
I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto
vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no
legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.