PASTOR M.

ENDENCIA AND FERNANDO JUGO, PLAINTIFFS AND

APPELLEES, VS. SATURNINO DAVID, AS COLLECTOR OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. DECISION
MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional,
and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as collector of Internal
Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45
representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of
P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,
1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and
from October 20, 1950 to December 31, 1950, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify
and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers. 
RULLING:
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the
proposition and the arguments pro and con involved in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented hers. In that
case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal
Supreme Court in the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing
the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and
so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine ourselves to a discussion and
determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590,
particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salary of judicial officers.
"SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall
receive such compensation as may fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos."
The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution,
particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are
exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the
collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically
prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13,
Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public
officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said
income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the
Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the
collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a
judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has
found and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go
back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
"Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the
courts by the constitution." (Brandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N. W. 2nd 341,
342.)

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case

of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income
tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so
violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional
prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided
in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by
the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]

Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this
Supreme Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending
that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution
thereof?

Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that
salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the
Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the
Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial
officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing
official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been
transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of
the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax
on judicial salaries really impairs them.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay
taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay
the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes
thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments
are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect
of the tax is to diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted
as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they

did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in
whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is
not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a
basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest
(Evans vs. Gore).
Statutory Construction vs Judicial Legislation

When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?

To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare

what the law is or has been, is judicial. However, the court “do and
must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law. The Court decided to go
beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing law and jurisprudence. (Floresca
v. Philex Mining; Republic v. CA and Molina)

Floresca v. Philex Mining

FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,1967, died as a result of the cave-in that
buried them in the tunnels... of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that
Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground.
They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for
additional damages, pointing out in the complaint 'gross and brazen
negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security
for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground'.
Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners
have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection
between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the
employers by virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or
whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions. 
RULLING:
workmens compensation(Act No. 3428, December 10, 1927 ]
AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE COMPENSATION TO BE RECEIVED BY EMPLOYEES FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES, DEATH OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES.)

refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,

disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or
disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the employer,
while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioner
pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for
reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the
employees. ART.20
There was no judicial legislation when the Supreme Court held that
petitioners can still claim damages in civil courts even if the Workmen’s
Compensation Act expressed that its Commission shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction. It just merely gives life to the law.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION v JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
*The Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts
or doctrines. The power to issue guidelines is not judicial legislation, the Court merely defines
what the law is.
Statutory construction- is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not
explicitly provided for in the law.

Juridicial legislation- Judicial legislation means new legal rules made by judges. However the
Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
(LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE)

-Court cannot modify the said range of penalties, it can only report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice.
Limitations on power to construe
1. Courts may not, under the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include
therein situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers
2. Neither should courts construe statutes which are perfectly vague for it is repugnant to the
Constitution (see test of Constitutionality)
3. Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. For any
shortcoming of a statute is for the legislative alone to correct by appropriate enactment.
AIDS TO CONSTUCTION *Where the meaning of the statute is ambiguous, the courts may
avail of itself all legitimate aids to construction to ascertain the true intent of the legislature
Intrinsic- found in the printed page of the statute.
Extrinsic- extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page
Intrinsic Aids 1. Title 2. Preamble 3. Context of the whole text 4. Punctuation marks 5.
Capitalization of letters 6. Headnotes or epigraphs 7. Language/ lingual text
Extrinsic aids 1. Intent or spirit of law 2. Policy of law similar 3. Purpose of law 4. Dictionaries
5. Consequences of various constructions 6. Presumptions 7. Legislative history 8.
Contemporaneous construction
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity.  The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom
he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and
assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances.  In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result
their relationship was estranged.  Roridel quit her work and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
her and their child.  Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. 
What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and confliction personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must
exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites
and duties due to some psychological illness.  Reynaldo’s action at the time of
the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise
grounds for psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel
merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each
other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert testimony by Dr
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological
incapacity laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with
the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act
on behalf of the state.

LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE

FACTS:

complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral

Royale Casino
complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces
of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him and offered to sell
the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the
sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period
of 60 days
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of
the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. 
an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa,
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa 
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM
ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed were excessive
RULLING:
 
The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property
in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression,
they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution.
Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the
SenatePresident, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were
later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista
appearing as counselde oficio of the petitioner. After a thorough consideration of the
arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the following:There seems to be
a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that thecourts continue
to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said
crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would beencroaching
upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5,which
reads

Wherefore petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED.

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

RELATION TO TOPIC:
DURA LEX SED LEX – the law is harsh but it is the law

judicial legislation- Judicial legislation means new legal rules made by judges. However the
Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court
should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
(LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE)
 Aisporna v CA
FACTS:
Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as
agent to Perla Compania de Seguros.

 Thru Rodolfo, Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla.

The insured suddenly died by during lifetime of policy.

The wife of the agent (petitioner) was charged because the policy was issued with her active
participation, which is not allowed.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the
policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called
by telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section
189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

RULLING:
The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused
is acquitted of the crime charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a
person from acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance
doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word
or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company
in which it is found or with which it is associated. 
to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the
first paragraph of the aforesaid section.
The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
SECTION 189. No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor
any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for
services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from
the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such
company hereinafter provided. 
No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the
Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority
so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the
first day of January, or within six months thereafter.

REALATION TO TOPIC:
Extrinsic- extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page

Extrinsic aids 1. Intent or spirit of law 2. Policy of law similar 3. Purpose of law 4. Dictionaries
5. Consequences of various constructions 6. Presumptions 7. Legislative history 8.
Contemporaneous construction
 SARMIENTO V. MISON, G. R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987 (CASE DIGEST)
POLITICAL LAW
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
FACTS:
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the President is being
questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers,
members of the bar, and both Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is
not valid since the appointment was not submitted to the Commission On Appointment
(COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau"
requires the confirmation from COA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the appointment made by the President without the confirmation from
COA is valid.
RULLING:
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from the list of officers
that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It enumerated the four
(4) groups whom the President shall appoint:
 Heads of the Executive Departments, Ambassadors, other public minister or consuls,
Officers of the Armed Forces from the rank of Colonel or Naval Captain, and Other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in him in this Constitution;
The above-mentioned circumstance is the only instance where the appointment made by the
President that requires approval from the COA and the following instances are those which does
not require approval from COA:

 All other Officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
 Nitafan vs. Commissioner
GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
Resolution

FACTS:

Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would tantamount to
a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the Court en
banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of
income tax.

RULLING:

NO, What is provided for by the article 8, section 10 of 1987 constitution is that “The
salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and
of judges of lower courts, shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be decreased.” They have a fix salary which may not be subject to
the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the
general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

“ The 1935 Constitution provided: (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges
of inferior courts) shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”

Changed to, it is clear that the intent of the framers is to imposed income tax.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David  14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

 Article 2 Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines clearly states that
“The separation of Church & State shall be INVIOLABLE”

The Philippine Organic Act of 1902

ORGANIC ACT
Philippine organic act 1902 AN ACT TEMPORARILY TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
AFFAIRS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

-No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ

FACTS:

The government had authorized a special stamp issue on the occasion of the observance in Manila of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church. The
petitioner, as head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the measure, contending that it
violated the Constitution because it benefited a particular religion; thus he sought to prohibit the
issuance and selling of the stamps commemorative of the event.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authorized stamp issue be declared invalid for violating the principle
of separation of Church and State.
RULLING:

 the stamp issue was held to be not invalid.

The issuance of the postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The only purpose was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to
this country.” The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance
“to give publicity to the Philippines and its people”.