En Banc: Lou Tirol, Isagani Fuentes & Nelson Loyola For Petitioner. Merle Fernandez For Private Respondent
En Banc: Lou Tirol, Isagani Fuentes & Nelson Loyola For Petitioner. Merle Fernandez For Private Respondent
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J : p
After the issues were joined with the filing of the comments on the petition, we
resolved to decide this case on the merits in view of the novel issue presented,
namely, whether the public respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in dismissing the petitioner's petition for review and in upholding (a) the order of the
4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macato-Tangalan, Aklan, of 30 May
1994 denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss Election Protest Case No. 94-02 based
on a claim that it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping
required in Administrative Circular No. 04-09 of this Court, and (b) the decision of
Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan, of 13 June 1994,
denying the petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the order of
the MCTC.
It appears that in the barangay election of 9 May 1994, the petitioner was
proclaimed on 10 May 1994 by the Barangay Board of Canvassers as the duly elected
Punong Barangay of barangay Poblacion of the Municipality of Tangalan, Aklan.
On 18 May 1994, private respondent Aniceto Fernandez III, the defeated
candidate for Punong Barangay, filed with the 4th MCTC of Macato-Tangalan an
election protest against the petitioner which was docketed as Election Protest Case
No. 94-02. On the same date, respondent Judge Eduardo R. Avelino of the said court
issued an order directing the issuance of summons to the petitioner, directing the latter
to answer the petition within five days from receipt thereof, and setting the hearings
of the case for 25 May to 31 May 1994. The protest was not accompanied by a
certification of non-forum shopping required under Administrative Circular No. 04-94
of this Court which took effect on 1 April 1994. However, the following day or on 19
May 1994, in compliance with the said circular, the private respondent submitted to
the MCTC his certification of non-forum shopping.
On 25 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the protest for the
private respondent's failure to strictly comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
He claims that the filing of the certification on 19 May 1994 was merely the private
respondents desperate attempt to cure the jurisdictional flaw of his petition.
On 30 May 1994, the MCTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss
and, in support of the denial, it reasoned thus:
nature of the action where the type of action is reposed by law in certain other courts.
2
Substantial compliance with the Circular is sufficient. This Circular expanded
or broadened the applicability of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. In Gabionza vs.
3
Court of Appeals, 4 this Court held that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient
for:
It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so
interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme
Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to
serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert
its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure —
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
In this case, it is a fact that the certification of non-forum shopping was filed
by the private respondent on 19 May 1994, a day after he filed his election protest.
Since the proclamation of the results of the election was made by the barangay board
of canvassers on 10 May 1994, the private respondent, pursuant to Section 9 of R.A.
6679, 5 had ten days therefrom until 20 May 1994 within which to file an election
protest. The filing of the certification was therefore still within the period for filing an
election protest. Accordingly, although the certification was not filed simultaneously
with the initiatory pleading, its filing within the reglementary period was a substantial
compliance with Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely
underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its
requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial
compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
II.
We do not agree with the MCTC that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is not
applicable to election cases because it is merely amendatory of the Rules of Court and
the latter, pursuant to Rule 143 thereof, is not applicable to election cases. There is
nothing in the Circular that indicates that it does not apply to election cases. On the
contrary, it expressly provides that the requirements therein, which are in addition to
those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, "shall be
strictly complied with in the filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other
initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distingure debemus.
Nor are we persuaded by its ruling that considering that the MCTC has after all
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the election protest, the certification was
unnecessary since the private respondent could not have filed the case anywhere else.
The argument fails to consider the possibility of a party availing, rightly or wrongly,
of other legal remedies; or of filing the same election protest in more than one MTC,
despite the erroneous venues; or of even being unaware of the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC over such protests and filing one of the protests in the RTC
by mistake.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Macato-Tangalan, Aklan, is directed to proceed with dispatch in the hearing
and resolution of Election Protest Case No. 94-02. This decision is immediately
executory.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.