CHAPTER VIII

UNDERSTANDING HERMENEUTICS IN NATURAL SCIENCE

In inquiry into what constitutes interpretation in natural science

will have to reflect on the constitutive elements of interpretation and three

approaches to hermeneutics. It is observed that the classical hermeneutics

was essentially objectivist. Notwithstanding the individual thinkers'

inclination away from the natural sciences, and their denial of 'unity of

method' between natural and social sciences, hermeneutics retained the

autonomy of the object and the interpreter and the possibility of historical

objectivity in making valid interpretations.

CI
With Schleipacher, hermeneutics was no longer restricted to

textual analysis but became general hermeneutics. He defined his aim as

the framing of a general hermeneutics as the art of understanding. And

understanding for him involves experiencing of the author's mental

process. Even explanation falls outside the domain of hermeneutics. To

understand what is spoken is different from formulating something and

bringing it to speech. This difference between speaking and understanding

paved the way to a systematic basis for hermeneutics in the theory of

understanding.

The distinction between grammatical and psychological interpreta-

tr
tion is of great significance in SchltiAnacher' s works. He points out that

since all texts are in language, grammar can be used to know the

meaning of a sentence. The meaning that we seek is the result of the

interaction between the grammatical structure and the general idea. The

grammatical interpretation, for him, proceeds by locating the assertion

according to objective and general laws. It is this commitment that makes

.er
Schleimacher's 'hermeneutics' objectivist.
 Cl A r:
'1 1/4.)

Dilthey , though influenced by Schleirmacher, extended his scope

of hermeneutics . His aim was to gain objectively-valid knowledge.

Though Dilthey opposed the tendency of the Social sciences to borrow

norms and ways of thinking from natural sciences, the objective

influences of natural sciences can be seen in his ideas . While criticizing

the tendency of the social or human sciences to use the natural science

methodology , he engages himself in the task of having a methodology for

gaining objectively valid interpretations of human life . The relatively

unchanging nature of object enhanced the possibility of objectively valid

knowledge. Dilthey was unable to rise above the objectivity and

scienticism and falls into the familiar subject-object distinction of natural

sciences . His goal of gaining objectively valid knowledge itself reflects ,

the scientific ideals totally opposed to the historicality of our self-

understanding .

Emilio Betti aimed at defending objectivity in social sciences,

when he tried to formulate a general theory of how ' objectivations ' of

human experience could be interpreted. He argued that one can gain

objectivity of interpretation by separating the meaning of the phenomenon

from its significance to the interpreter . Betti' s insistence on objectivity

in historical interpretation does not mean that he neglected the subject

of interpretation, but he merely brought to our notice that inspite of

the subjective element in interpretation, the object still remains an

object and can be interpreted objectively .

This obsession of hermeneutical theory in keeping away the

subjective element from interpretation stressed the idea of return to

objectivity . A historian, in studying history should leave behind his

own present standpoint. Hermeneutics , according to hermeneutical theory

 '

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should supply the principles of objective knowledge. This hope of

hermeneutical theory to find a basis for the scientific investigation of

meaning is what hermeneutical philosophy rejects as objectivism.

Hermeneutic philosophy expressed the other extreme view point

from that of hermeneutic theory. It did not aim at objectivity but

instead asserted that the subject has a preunderstanding of the object

to be interpreted. This makes it important to start with a mental frame-

work of the subject's mind. Hermeneutic philosophy concerned itself

with the interpretation of Dasein. They wanted to remove objectifying

procedures from hermeneutic. The attempt of the hermeneutic theory to

give objectively valid interpretation is naive.

The concern of the hermeneutic philosophy with the interpretation

of Dasein brought about the transition from objective interpretation to

subjective interpretation. Bultmann, Heidegger, Gadamer fall under this

category.

Following Heidegger, Bultmann tried to carry out a deepening of

Dasein's methodological analysis. He concerned himself with the dialectic

problem between the existential understanding of the interpreter and the

mythological language in which the Kerygma found expression in the New

Testament. What the holy texts want to convey lies hidden in its

existential appeal. This existential core of the text needs to be explicated.

The mahner in which we interpret the text depends on our interest

and our preunderstanding. The idea of objective meaning which plagued

hermeneutic theory is an impossibility because meaning can arise only in

the interpreter's relationship to the future and also because history can

be known through the historian's subjectivity.

 2, A 7

Gadamer, in an allempl lo eliminate objectifying procedures from

hermeneutics stressed the impossibility of objectively-valid interpretations.

For, to have objectively-valid interpretation it would mean that one can

understand history from some standpoint outside history. This, according

to Gadamer is an impossibility since we always exist within traditions and

this is no objectifying process. The, tradition here is not viewed as

something other but as a part of us. Gadamer argues that the Historical,

attitude therefore, is not restoration of the past but 'thoughtful mediation'

with contemporary life. This mediation is brought about by 'fusion of

horizons' . Hermeneutics in Gadamer, takes a language philosophical

turn. Understanding in the end, rests on language itself. Language

brings about a fusion of horizons of the interpreter and the historical

object, which characterizes the act of understanding. Gadamer argues

for the universality of hermeneutic experience which helped him to over-

come dogmatic metaphysics and scientistic restriction on knowledge. These

exponents of hermeneutical philosophies lacked the 'completeness' as they

failed to answer many questions about the existential, historical and

cultural embedding of their language and communication. Critical

hermeneutics of Apel and Habermas had to retrieve something of this

classical hermeneutics and combine the methodical and objective approach

to arrive at practically relevant knowledge.

They challenged the idealist assumption of hermeneutic philosophy

and theory and the unjustifiable claim to universality put forward by the

hermeneutic philosophy. While hermeneutic philosophy and hermeneutic

theory placed conflicting emphasis on the role of the interpreter, they

joined hands on one dimension, namely the questioning of the content of

the object of interpretation. Any reflection on. the truth of the text was
 (.1 b

excluded as falling outside the concerns of an epistemology and methodology

of the understanding process. This brought about incomplete understanding

of understanding.

Apel and Habermas as the exponents of critical hermeneutics aimed

to arrive at practically relevant knowledge. ' Apel acts as a synthesizer

of the two earlier positions. While accepting a common ground for natural

and human sciences, he refused to reduce it to the idea of unified science.

While recognizing the autonomous and nonreductive character of social

sciences he did not neglect the scientific attitude of the natural sciences.

These two attitudes according to him are complementary to one another.

Interpretation in human sciences is not to be restricted to a mere mediation

between past and present, but is a process which produces knowledge.

Natural as well as social sciences according to Apel have their

roots in the inter-subjective sphere of a given speech-community as their

.
common apiori. Better understanding of these sciences can be achieved in
—tr---

free society which permits open discussion. Our understanding of the

texts allows us to critically evaluate them and transcend the truths

contained in them because we are in possession of the idea of a more

truthful way of life.

Habermas, like Apel, aims at relating the interpretative and

explanatory approaches. The positivists reduce history to a static

present and to mere empirical facts. He, therefore, tried to mediate the

objectivity of historical process with the motives of those acting within it.

In order to get rid of the objectivism in scientistic approaches to the

social world, he introduced hermeneutical thought into the methodology of

the social sciences. Through a synthesis of hermeneutic philosophy and

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p!.-,ychoanalysis, Ilabermas arrives aL an outline of a dialectical-hermeneu-

tical theory of action. Psychoanalysis provides a model which allows us

to transcend the communicative consensus metahermeneutically.

The critical philosophy of Apel and Habermas thus attempts an

appraisal of "existing states of affairs that derive from the knowledge

of something better than already exists as a potential or a tendency in

the present; it is guided by the principle of reason as the demand for

1
unrestricted communication and self-determination".

In tracing the contemporary hermeneutics, three different, mutually

incompatible strands rose to the surface, namely hermeneutical theory,

. •-
which tried to solve the problem of objectively understood meaning; •

hermeneutic philosophy which tried to get rid of objective elements in

social sciences; and critical philosophy which seeks out the causes of

distorted understanding and communication which operate underneath

normal interaction. They tried to combine the objective and methodical

approaches to arrive at practically relevant knowledge.

Paul Ricoeurs' work, vvhile not representing a clearly separate

idea, brings into sharp relief the three strands, and attempts to integrate

them into a larger framework. While acting as a mediator, he outlines

the role of the structuralist analysis of a system of signs in relation to

the hermeneutical interpretation of a text.

While pointing out the divergent approaches to interpretation of

symbols, Ricoeur felt the impossibility of forming universal canons of

interpretation. We can have, according to Ricoeur therefore only separate

theories regarding the rules of interpretations. His theory of interpre-

tation does not restrict itself to text but is also applicable to actions,
which helped him to overcome the 'understanding-explanation' dichotomy .

An inquiry into the possibility of hermeneutical interpretation in

the natural sciences was taken seriously after Kuhn's analysis of history

of science. Kuhn's notion of 'paradigm' became central to the interpre-

tative analysis of philosophers of science to such an extent that 'laissez-

faire' interpretations became the order of the day . Science lost its

'preciseness' , 'objectivity' , 'neutrality' , 'progress' , 'continuity' , etc.

The excessive historicist conception of science formualted by Kuhn is

based upon his notion of 'paradigm' , which, paradoxically lacked precise

2
conceptual articulation. Margaret Masterman observed the term 'paradigm'

being used in 21 different senses. These senses ranged from paradigm

being a 'myth' to 'a universally recognized scientific achievement' .

Masterman recognized three different sets of 'paradigm' uses: the meta-

physical, the sociological and the artifact or construct paradigm. William

3
J. Gavin notices certain relations between the three sets or clusters and

these relations can be best understood from phenomenological rather than

analytic perspective. Gavin quotes Kuhn to show that he unconsciously

practiced hermeneutics: "What I, as a physicist had to discover for myself ,

most historians learn by example in the course of professional training.

Consciously, or not, they are all practitioners of the hermeneutic method.

In my case, however, the discovery of hermeneutics did more than make

history seem consequential. Its most immediate and decisive effect was,
4
instead, on my views of science".

What type of hermeneutics Kuhn practiced is as unclear as his

notion of paradigm. However much he tried to be historicist and conse-

quently anti-positivist, Kuhn could not account. for the growth of

scientific knowledge. In other words, Kuhn was caught "in the idio m of
 5
positivism and logical empiricism that he sought to criticize and replace".

If one wants to appreciate the ' hermeneutical dimension' of natural

science, one has to reflect on the fact that the contents of perception and

scientific observation are never unique, final, and absolute, and apart

from the history and particular social and cultural milieu. Again',

different models or paradigms of methods result in distinguishably different

interpretations of the same physical phenomena. For example, light at one

instance is interpreted as wave motion and at another instance as constitu-

ting of particles. Hermeneutics, therefore enters natural science through

perception (observation) and through the study of literary, graphic and

mathematical materials - which is the corpus of science. Patrick Heelan

puts this idea more lucidly when he says that "visual perception - and bY

analogy, all perception - is hermeneutical as well as causal: it responds

to structures in the flow of optical energy but the character of its response

is hermeneutical, that it has the capacity to 'read' the appropriate optical

structure in the World ( ' texts' ), and to form perceptual judgements of the
6
World about which these 'speak' " .

Two points need consideration at this stage. One, if hermeneutics

enters into all perception, how are we to avoid the cross subjectivism and

'laissez-faire' interpretation that follows from it? Secondly, how do we

retrieve the objectivist hermeneutics useful for the scientific community as

a whole? It may be noted that Patrick Heelan and other philosophers of

science adopt a Kantian framework in accepting perceptual judgements as

both hermeneutical and causal. Secondly, they argue for the thesis that

hermeneutical interpretation (i.e. 'reading' , 'writing' , 'speaking' ) of

texts "by nature share a common hermeneutical structure with reading and

interpreting the linguistic artifacts of human authors; that to use such

 rj
v..,

expressions about perception and scientific observation is not to indulge

in a mere metaphor but to probe into the common primordial hermeneutical

structure of all human understanding, an understanding which subtends

7
both linguistic, perceptual, and scientific activity".

Traditionally, natural sciences were viewed as non-hermeneutical.

This was deemed to be the distinguishing mark between natural and

social sciences. That natural sciences are also hermeneutical is of recent

origin, partly due to Kuhn's historicist concerns and partly due to the

fact that considerably different accounts of nature have arisen at diverse

times, places and circumstances. A scientific realism, a la Popper, is

seen as too difficult to sustain and defend. Different types of realist

theories (as seen in Chapter VI and VII) have been proposed. Patrick

Heelan, however, attempts to retrieve the realist elements of scientific

enterprise within the context of hermeneutics in a form of hermeneutical

or horizonal realism.

Patrick Heelan' s 'horizonal realism' consists in showing that

'things in themselves' "come to be understood, recognized and named, not

just through a hermeneutic of the literary, graphic and mathematical

materials of a scientific theory ... but through 'reading' of text-like

8 9
materials", ( ' text' which is The Book of Nature ) ... "the pages on which

Nature 'writes' its 'text' ", according to Heelan "is a scientific-instrument

10
used as a readable technology".

Our concern in this Chapter is not to analyse the varied herme-

neutical interpretations of science. What we have argued here is that

hermeneutics enters science in a very crucial manner. But the existence

of alternate and valid ways of interpteting the natural world does not
diminish or compromise the results of scientific research. As J.A. Mazzeo

puts it: "The quantum physicist may use matrix algebra and wave

mechanical formulations with relative indifference, since both formulations

are isomorphic and both permit him to interpret physical data. The fact

that an electron may be viewed as a charged particle, or a charged

cloud, or even as the area under a curve, that it may be imagined as

"solid" point or a "disturbance" spreading out in a region of space,

simply means that the scientist has moved a little closer to the exegete
11
confronted with a plurality of valid interpretations of his text".

The Book of Nature requires interpretation because its functions

are hidden, and what we 'see' is not necessarily 'what is going on' .

NOTF,S

1. Joseph Bleicher, 'Contemporary Hermeneutics' (London: Routledge

and Kegan paul, 1980), p.4.

2. Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of Paradigm" Criticism and the

growth of knowledge; ed. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrane,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 61.

3. William J. Gavin, "Science As Interpretation: The Hermeneutic

Inter-Relationship of Masterman's 'Paradigm Clusters",
Contemporary Philosophy, XI, 3, 1986, p.2.

4. Ibid,

5. R. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory,

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976), p. 52.

6. Patrick Heelan, "Natural Science As A Hermeneutic Of Instrumen-

tation", Philosophy of Science, 50, 2, '1983, pp. 181-182.
 r

7. Ibid, . 182.

8. Ibid, . 188.

9. 'Science as the reading of "The Book of Nature" ' is an old

concept which Patrick Heelan revives but with a difference. For
Augustine, Galileo and Spinoza 'The Book of Nature' is written
in final and complete form by God. For P. Heelan, "The 'text'
which science 'reads' iS an artifact of scientific culture, caused
to be 'written' by Nature on human instruments within the
controlled context of a scientific environment". (Ibid. p. 188).

10. Ibid.

11. Jos,Dh Anthony Mazzeo, 'Varieties of Interpretation' (NotreDame:

University of NotreDame Press, 1978); p. 2.