CAN TRADITIONAL SEMIOTICS ACCOUNT FOR TRANSLATION THEORY?

– AN ESSAY ON STRUCTGURAL HERMENEUTICS

Robert N. St. Clair,

University of Louisville

Abstract

Translation can only take place from one community to another when their
horizons can be fused. If the disparity is too great, then one horizon is distorted
in order to fit into that of the target language and culture. In substantiating this
claim, several concepts are discussed. First, translation theory is predicated on
the assumption that signs are translated from one community to another through
language. This involves the use of signs, but traditional semiotics has conflated
meaning and form into a sign function that make translation more difficult.
Hence, the concept of traditional semiotics needs to be rehabilitated. Second, a
model of language is presented that separates signs into epistemological and
ontological realms. This implies a Cartesian model of translation in which
thoughts and ideas are separated from their objects. This emphasis on
consciousness is balanced with a rehabilitated model of consciousness proposed
by Gadamer. This means that translation not only involves consciousness but
also epistemological distance. Third, a practical philosophy of hermeneutics is
employed in the translation of the traditional culture of Hawai’i. Translation
assumes that horizons are fused, but when disparate cultures are brought
together, this is not the usual outcome.
.

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Hans-Geog Gadamer (1989) argued that translation involves interpretation. This
is because each community has a horizon and people come from different backgrounds
and it is not possible to totally remove oneself from one’s background, history, culture,
education, and language. Each community, in other words has an entirely different
system of attitudes, beliefs, and ways of thinking. A horizon designates everything from a
particular position or point of view. Each horizon is situated. Understanding occurs
when one tries to stand within the horizon of another community. Gadamer (1889: 304)
treats understanding as a conversation or dialogue in which translators from different
communities attempt to interpret texts or stories that are based on their past experiences
and value-laden traditions (Vorurteil). The problem is that people have a “historically
effected consciousness” (wirkunggeschiches Bewußtsein) and this means that they are
embedded in the particular culture that shaped them. Hence, interpreting a text involves a
fusion of horizons where translators find a way to articulate the text of the other through
their own background. The success of this task is the focus of this essay.
It is argued that in order to translate from one language to another, one needs a

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workable model of semiotics. Unfortunately, traditional semiotics hinders translation
rather than enhance it. For this reason, traditional semiotics is rehabilitated so that it can
provide a better access to other sign system and cognitive frames across languages. This
is the focus of the first part of this essay.
The second part has to do with the philosophy of language and the role that
language plays in thinking. Gadamer argues that language is the medium of human
experience. One exists within a language. Language is the fundamental way in which one
exists in the world. Hence, one is situated in language and understanding takes place in
that situation of linguisticality (Sprachlichkeit). He is not saying that language is an
instrument of thought but has a more Heideggerian view of language in that language
serves the object in that it lets it come into being (Erscheinung). For Gadamer,
experience is not wordless. It becomes an object by being named. One seeks the right
word that belongs to the thing. Hence, for Gadamer, the word belongs to the thing. In
this section of the essay, the dialogue between Gadamer and Habermas will be revisited
as this divergence of thought plays a major role in translating scientific concepts.
In part three, a practical philosophy of hermeneutics is employed in the translation
of the traditional culture of Hawai’i into American culture. The focus of this application
has to do with the Hawaiian Wedding Song. It is argued that the disparity between these
two horizons is significant and what purports to be a translation amounts from one culture
into another is more of a distortion of the source towards the target language and culture.
The author assumes that most translations are of this nature.

2.1 THE REHABILITATION OF SEMIOTICS

As noted by Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) inherent in the concept of the sign is
the linkage between meaning and form. He referred to his system of signs as semiology.
What is important in this model is that both meaning
and form need to co-occur. . A meaning without a form
is not expressible and a form without a meaning is
ineffable Charles Saunders Peirce (1955) presented his
own model of sign theory which he called semiotics.
One of the major differences between these two
theories of the sign is Peirce included the concept of the
interpretant within the context of meanings and forms.
Both of these theoretical models of the sign need to be
revised. Although they provide clear statements about
how meaning (content) and form (expression) are related, they also obscure many of the
underlying assumptions associated with these models.

2.2 THE SEMIOLOGICAL PLANES OF MEANING AND FORM

The first major problem with the concept of the sign is that it is located within the
same mental space. Louis Hjelmslev (1969) was well aware of this problem and he
argued that they should be relegated to different planes. He argued that the signified
(meaning) was located on the content plane and the signified (form) was found on the
expression plane. Such a dyadic definition of the sign places it totally within the realms
of meaning (epistemology) and form (ontology). Ferdinand de Saussure, it should be
noted, treated the sign as a mental object. He allowed forms to exist within the mind but

2
not as physical objects. In this regard, he has omitted the realm of ontology from his
model. His forms were mental objects. Such a model of semiotics limits sign systems
only to epistemology and does not account for ontological signs. In such a model,
symbols are grounded as mental objects and not as physical objects. These assumptions
merit re-investigation. The meaning, it is argued in this reanalysis, should belong to the
realm of epistemology and the form should belong to the realm of ontology. This was the
rationale behind glossematics (Hjelmslev, 1969).

The relationship between epistemology and ontology can also be found in a reformulation
in the triadic concept of the sign proposed by Peirce (1992). More will be said about this
later. What was implicit in the writings of Hjelmslev was the claim that the concept of the
sign needed to be reformulated. This shift involves moving from Hjelmslev’s
semiological planes to philosophical realms.

2.3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REALMS OF MEANING AND FORM

By moving away from the sign as a semiological unit, one moves into the sign as
a philosophical concept. Content is no longer situated in the plane of content, but it is
now part of an epistemological system. Form is no longer located on the semiological
plane but is now part of the study of all human forms (ontology). Hence, the sign needs to
be reformulated with in this new context. If one were to leave the reformulation of the
sign as merely the connection of form and meaning, it would not explain other aspects of
semiotics that needs to be discussed, viz., the concept of the interpretant (Peirce, 1955).
The best way of introducing this is by considering a far more interesting model of social
semiotics, the model of Berger and Luckmann on their theory of the social construction
of reality.

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2.4 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY
The social construction of reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966)
characterizes a sociological concept that was slowly emerging among European scholars.
However, it was Berger and Luckmann who not only articulated the new paradigm but
coined the terms that are characteristically associated with this movement. One of the
major premises of this new school of thought is that knowledge is socially constructed.
They argued, for example, that what one considers to be real in one culture may not be so
in another. What is real to an American businessman may not be seen as real, for
example, to a Buddhist monk. Each of these individuals has constructed different social
realities. They went on to demonstrate that these social values were constructed through
several concomitant sociological processes (externalization, reification, and
internalization). They noted that ideas, thoughts, and feelings cannot be shared with
others unless they are first externalized through language.

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A thought without a form is ineffable. Meanings must have a form or pattern of existence
in order to be shared with others. Once ideas, thoughts, and feelings are encoded into a
language, they become objectified or reified. They exist as objects or things outside of the
speakers who produced them. It is interesting to note that most linguists only study this
aspect of language, viz., dictionary meanings and grammatical rules. Finally, linguistic
codes exist in a social context among members of a speech community and these coded
forms influence them. Once this happens, the social and cultural language patterns are
internalized. Berger and Luckmann created this model of simultaneous processes because
they noted that the leading linguistic models only focused on linguistic codes. What is
important about their model is that it establishes a relationship between meaning and
form and it implies a resolution of the dichotomy between epistemology (knowledge
structures) and ontology (world of things). This model also accounts for the triadic sign
proposed by Peirce (1955) in which an the content of a sign is split into two parts: one is
connected to an object in the real world (ontology) and the other is connect to the effect
of the sign in the mind of a potential interpreter (Noth, 1995). The dynamic interaction
between the externalizing of epistemological markers of feeling, ideas, and concepts and
the internalization of ontological markers (indices, icons, symbols and cultural artifacts)
emerge as socio-cultural practices. They constitute reality-loops in that they form bonds
between epistemic signs that are externalized as ontological forms and vice versa.
Something that is socially constructed and participates in reality-loops is considered to be
real and meaningful. In the philosophy of structural communication, meanings are
externalized and expressed as ontological forms. These same forms are also interpreted
and internalized as epistemic signs. What is important about these reality-loops is that
they involve both form and
content. One cannot exist
without the other.
Ontological signs are created
during the process of
semiosis (sign making) and
during the process of
structural hermeneutics (sign-
interpretation). The former is
characteristically associated
with the creation of
ontological signs and the
latter with epistemological
signs. Hence, there are two
kinds of social and cultural
relations associated with
signs. Hence, there are two
kinds of culture: one is
associated with the structure
of meaning (epistemology) and is called culture in the mind (Shore, 1996) and the other
can be found as the expression or the externalization of ideas (ontology) and is called
cultural materialism (Harris, 2001).

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The process of taking meanings and making them into tangible and visible forms
(language, art, architecture, music, dance, and social behavior) is called Structural
Semiosis. Once a form has been externalized, it exists as an ontological marker (index,
icon, or symbol), At this stage, it is objectified and is treated as an object. The reverse pr
ocess of taking objects and assigning meaning to them is known as structural
hermeneutics. These patterns of externalization and internalization form reality-loops.
Together, they constitute the social construction of reality (St. Clair, 2006). There are a
myriad of such reality-loops that make up the culture of the mind (epistemology) and the
culture of material form (ontology). It is this dynamic interaction between the two realms
(epistemology and ontology) that was the focus of activity theory (Leontiev, 1979). It
was the connection of the ego pole of the self to the object pole of reality that was the
focus of the phenomenology of Husserl (1980). Reality-loops affirm cognitive interaction
with the human environment.They create ontological markers through the externalization
of concepts and develop knowledge frameworks in the process of internalizing them.
This activity creates a bond between the subjective realm of epistemology and the
objective realm of ontology. However, the interpretant in this model differs from that of
Peirce in that an interpretant is required in structural semiosis (from meanings to objects)
and another interpretant is involved in the process of structural hermeneutics (from object
to meaning).

2.5 THE DUALITY OF SIGN FUNCTIONS

As noted above, there are two functions associated with signs that have been
overlooked in sign theory. One has to do with the creation of signs from meanings
(Structural Semiosis). The other has to do with the assignment of meanings to forms
(Structural Hermeneutics). Both of these are signs. They are not structurally the same.
They do not have the same properties nor do they have the same function.

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 Structural Semiosis Structural Hermeneutics
This is the process of taking an
This is the process of taking a ontological form and providing
Function meaning and providing it with an it with meaning (placing it
ontological form. within a system of meaningful
forms)
Property semiosis interpretation
Transition from meaning to form from form to meaning
from the epistemological realm to from the ontological realm to
Mapping
the ontological realm the epistemological realm
Symbolic Interactionism Ethnomethodology
Realm Epistemological Ontological
Social Practices are tied to
System Meaning are tied to reality-loops
ontological markers
How practices within the
How meanings function within an sociology of everyday life
Function
epistemological system function within an ontological
system

One can best understand how these systems operate by considering the difference
between two sociological theories: symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Adler and
Adler, 1980) and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; Mehan and Wood, 1975). When
Blumer (1969) coined the term "symbolic interactionism" he used it to demonstrate how
people act toward things based on the meaning those things have for them. He also noted
that these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through
interpretation. What is important about this concept is for the purpose of renovating sign
theory is that it is housed within the realm of epistemology. Symbolic interactionism has
to do with meanings and meaning systems. Whether one is creating forms from meaning
or interpreting forms in order to assign them meaning, the focus is, nevertheless, on
meaning. Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, is concerned with the procedures by
which that social order is produced, and shared. It has to do with the meaningful,
patterned, and orderly character of everyday life. Itis is something that one must work to
achieve and this means that one has a method for doing so. Hence, ethnomethodology
belongs to the realm of ontology. Symbolic Interactionism Ethnomethodology Realm
Epistemological Ontological System Meaning are tied to reality-loops Social Practices
are tied to ontological markers Function How meanings function within an
epistemological system How practices within the sociology of everyday life function
within an ontological system What is important about this dichotomy between meaning
systems and social practices is that the study of culture exists within and across these two
realms. One cannot describe a culture only from an epistemological perspective. It must
include the objects, things, behaviors, and social patterns created by that culture. A
system of meanings based on signs is the original meaning of the dyadic sign of Saussure
(1974). With the addition of the ontological realm, one can map an epistemological
system into objects in the ontological realm. This is the rationale behind material

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cultures. Hence, one can describe a culture in terms of its system of meanings as well of
its system of social practices, cultural artifacts, and social scripts. The problem with such
a systemic analysis, however, takes on a very different concept of system when signs
function not as exosemiotic processes but as endosemiotic processes (Gudwin, 1996).
What one finds in endosemiotic processes are closed systems in which communication
takes place between the compontents of the system through a system of signs. This
system could be a mathematical system (Gudwin, 2002), a computational system
(Gudwin, 1996), an organizational system (Van Heusen and Jorna, 2002), or a
biosemiological system (Barbieri, 2003). Endosemiotic systems differ substantially from
exosemiotic systems in their mapping functions. It is now time to consider how the
concept of self form reality-loops. It is by means of reality-loops that the two realms are
integrated as sign systems.

2.6 REALITY-LOOPS
As noted earlier, the concept of reality-loops is characteristically associated with a
structural philosophy of communication. The processes of Externalization and
Internalization espoused by Berger and Luckmann (1966) have been revised and
recodified. The process of taking meanings and externalizing them into tangible and
visible forms (language, art, architecture, music, dance, and social behavior) begins with
Structural Semiosis. Once a form has been externalized, it exists as an ontological sign. It
is objectified and becomes associated with ontology as an entity within a system of
entities. The reverse process of taking objects and internalizing them by assigning
meaning to them begins as structural hermeneutics. Hence, both structural semiosis and
structural hermeneutics are part of an internal system of signs referred to as the structural
philosophy of communication. These patterns of externalization and internalization are
stablished as bonds of practical consciousness, they form reality-loops. Together, they
constitute the social construction of reality. What is socially or culturally real is that
which has been socially constructed to interface with the ontological realm and the
navigation and the negotiation of meanings in that realm is profoundly related to the
epistemological realm. There are a myriad of such reality-loops that make up the culture
of the mind (epistemology) and culture expressed in material form (ontology).

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2.7 PHEMONENOLOGY OF REALITY-LOOPS
Peirce (1955) argued that one of the divisions within philosophy consists of the
study of phenomena (the world of appearances). This follows the Kantian distinction
between Noumena (things that cannot be known of the real world) and Phenomena
(things that can be known of the real world (Kant, 2000). Why is this important? It is
significant because Peirce argued that all that one can know of the real world is its
appearances, its qualities. He placed a high value on the role of qualities in his model of
semiotics. Out of the nine categories that Kant developed in his philosophy of pure
reason, Peirce only kept three of them and the most important of these was that of quality
which he referred to as Firstness (the domain of thought that governs qualities). Another
reason why Peirce places a high premium on qualities can be found in his definition of
reality. It is a term, he argues (House and Kloesel, 1998), that was invented in the
thirteenth century to signify having properties. Hence, he argued that “real” is a way to
say that a thing is real if its predicates are true. Although he makes a distinction between
existence and reality,

Peirce avoids dualistic or subjective interpretations of being. He makes no distinction

between epistemology and ontology. For him, they are the same thing (Deledalle, 2009:
70). Hence, it is not surprising that his second domain of thought (Secondness) is
existential, a physical force, a reaction to nature. This approach will not be followed in
this reanalysis of the concept of the sign. The model espoused in this essay assumes that
reality is socially constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). In this model, reality is a
special mode of being that differs from existence. In such a model the subjective
interpretation of being is important. Hence, the role that phenomenology plays
in reality-construction is provided below: There are several differences between this
semiotic model of reality construction and that of Peirce. Sign theory belongs to the
philosophical realm of phenomenology. It is a realm of appearances, but those
appearances are made up on ontological markers. This is why it was referred earlier in
this essay as the realm of ontology. It has physical features (noumena) that cannot be
truly known. What are known are those various morphological forms and these forms can

9
be found in human languages. Its qualities can be described as adjectives’ the things that
are occur in the ontological realm are designated as nouns or substantives; nd its actions
are best described in terms of verbs. Unfortunately, Peirce limited his ontological markers
to qualities. He should have included nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, aspect markers,
and other basic grammatical forms into his theory of categories. Another difference
between Peirce and the philosophy of structural communication has to do with the
concept of the interpretant. It is a vague term created by Peirce that needs to be further
articulated. There is agency involved in the creation of ontological markers (structural
poesis) and there is agency involved in the interpretation of previously formed
ontological markers (structural hermeneutics). They are not the same. The first is
associated with the human ego and the latter with the social self. They do different things
and perform different functions. The human ego is associated with creativity. It is
associated with feelings, moods, thoughts, and ideas. When one attempts to externalize
these epistemological markers, they are limited by linguistic codes. The richness that
exists within the system is difficult to articulate due to the given limitations of language
codes (grammar, morphology, syntax, semantics). The social self, on the other hand, is
connected with adjusting to the social environment. It must deal with social roles, social
scripts, and other forms of practical knowledge. There is a disparity between these two
forms of self and the ego must learn to adjust to the social self. Society functions as a
parent and the ego as a child (parent-child relationship). The concept of the individual
presented in this essay involves three main components: the ego, the biographical self,
and the social self. The ego contains the id. This inclusion of the id within the ego is
necessary as it plays an important role in works of Jacques Lacan (Mcgowan, Restuccia,
and Kunkle, 2004). The role of the social self is well known as it plays a central role in
symbolic interactionism (Hewitt, 1976). What is different in this model of the self can be
found in the placement of the biographical self interacting between the ego and the social
self. The biographical self provides an individual with a sense of his own personal
history. It forms the basis for the construction of the social self and it is the source of
most of human agency. It provides the individual with the self as a psychological object.
Another difference between Peirce and the current model has to do with ontology.It is
treated as an endosystem much in the way that it is done within the philosophy of the
embodied mind (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, 1945, 1964; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999;
Rodriguez, St. Clair, and Joshua, 2005). There are biological transducers that connect
human beings to their environments. These transducers create special epistemological
markers within the human being. These markers are further organized by modules
(Fodor, 1983). Hence, there are no simple isomorphic mappings between the endosystem
and the morphological markers. In this model, the concept of recursive signs as proposed
by Peirce will not work.

3.0 PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS

Modern philosophy began with the Cartesian concept of consciousness
(Descartes, 1999). Gadamer and other postmodern philosophers felt a need to move
away from this Cartesian emphasis on consciousness. Much of the discussions among
these postmodern philosophers had to do with the process of understanding. Friderich
Schleiermacher (1998) developed a model of hermeneutics that was concerned with the
interpretation of various types of religious and historical texts. He reasoned that the art of

10
understanding played a major role in his model of interpreting texts. He noted that
people interpret texts in two ways: one is grammatical and the other is psychological.
With a focus on the latter process, he defined hermeneutics as the art of moving inside
the thought of another person and understanding their thought from that perspective.
Gadamer (1989: 197) found this approach to hermeneutics to be rather limiting because it
only focused on the historical worldview of these texts. Consequently, he was not able to
transcend the interpretation of these texts. He was limited by his focus on psychology.
Wilhelm Dilthey (1966, 1970) saw in hermeneutics the possibility of establishing a
framework for the human sciences (die Geisteswissenschaften). Disciplines, he argued,
are created by human beings. They have an espistemology. Dilthey made a distinction
between explanations (Erklärung) and understanding (Verstehen). The process, he
reasoned, takes place from the inner life of understanding to the outer life of forms that
are used as explanations. The natural sciences are content with explanations but the
human sciences require understanding. In addition, the human sciences are temporal.
They understand themselves in what they create historically. They create things as
expressions of life. For Dilthey, language provides the fullest expression of human life.
Although Dilthey made an imporovement to the study of hermeneutics, Gadamer felt that
he was still concerned with deciphering the historical past and not involved in
understanding the human experience. He placed too heavy an emphasis on historicality.
Gadamer’s ideas on hermeneutics are close to those of Martin Heidegger (1927)
in that he sees understanding as the way in which human beings exist in the world and
not as a method for grasping psychological or historical meaning. Every act of
interpretation, Gadamer argues, is based on human understanding. Furthermore,
understanding is ontological. It is an integral part of being.

3.2 OVERCOMING ALIENATION

Both Heidegger and Gadamer see alienation as an inheritance from the
Englightenment, a period that emphasized reason and self-consciousness. Gadamer
argued that the Enlightenment distanced human beings from experience. It did not enable
them to understand their human existence. He wanted to overcome the dichotomous
thinking because it set up a distance between what it means to be human and the
experiences that one encounters in being human. When one emphasizes self-
consciousness, he argues, one distances the subject from the object and this means that
one distances a subject from his experiences. Hence, this detachment restricts one’s
understanding of life to conceptual knowledge.

3.3 AESTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS

One example of how people area alienated from their experiences can be seen in
Gadamer’s discussion of aesthetic consciousness. He contends that people approach art
as a form of perceptual enjoyment. This approach to art does not constitute knowledge
(Gadamer, 1989: 87). People go to museums to experience the art but this art is placed in
a separate space from everyday life. Its function is simply to elicit feeling. Art, Gadamer
argues, should be an encounter with the world. It should be an experience of that
encounter. Art is something that one belongs to (Gadamer, 1989: 101). One should be
transformed by this experience.

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3.5 HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
One’s knowledge of a historical event is characterized by distance. The past is
objectified and task of historical consciousness is to reconstruct the world of the
historical object in order to grasp its meaning. This is what Schleiermacher did with his
method of hermeneutics. He wanted to return to the original circumstances in order to
grasp its meaning. Because human beings are finite and historical beings, they can never
return to such original circumstances. Hence, Gadamer (1989: 168-169) says that one
must inegrate these past events into contemporary life. He accomplishes this through
what Heidegger halls fore-having (Vorhabe). In order to understand a thing, one must
have the thing in advance. Every interpretation involves a fore-concept (Vorgriff). Every
understanding must already be a part of a decision on how to perceive that thing
(Gadamer, 1989: 269). Everything, he claims, has this fore-sight (Vorsicht) and this is
what makes understanding possible (Gadamer, 1988: 276). This assemblage of ideas is
similar in many ways to the concept of conceptual frames used in cognitive linguistics
(Lakoff, 2004). A frame is a mental construct that influence thinking. It sets up a
situation and then provides scenarios that operate within that configuration. Certain
words invoke that frame. If one denies a frame, the frame continues to exist. Hence, the
frame is a structure that the concept carries with it to provide content to that frame.
Cognitive linguistics, however, goes beyond frames and includes metaphors that are used
through analogical reasoning to create concepts and the frames that contain them. It
should be noted that the avatar of frame analysis is Erving Goffman (1986).

3.5 TRADITION
Gadamer states that tradition is really a part of being human. He expresses this
concept of tradition as the handing over of the past (überlieferung) because the past is
always present within a tradition. Hence, people should be addressed within their
tradition. Historical consciousness recognizes that it is part of a living tradition and that
it was formed by that tradition. What this means for Gadamer that the subject as a
knower does not act in the Cartesian sense, but only participates in an event within a
tradition. If one is to fully understand the language of a community, then one must come
from the tradition in which that language was spoken. However, a tradition is also alien
and strange and hermeneutic consciousness requires a play (Spiel) between familiarity
and strangeness. In other words, it requires interpretive distance that facilitates the
filtering out of understanding across disparate horizons. It requires a fusion of these
horizons (Horzontverschmetzung). . It should be noted that play for Gadamer is a mode
of being-in-the-world. One loses himself in play; he does not objectify it and hold it at a
distance. When one is absorbed in play, he is no longer a subject. He acts the play. He
enjoys a sense of freedom associated with being-in-the-world even though plays have
rules because play is a form of self-representation. One represents himself for someone.
In play, one is transformed. He becomes a different person. Each celebration in art,
music, or drama is a repetition in which the past is brought into the present and made
contemporary. The original essence is always something different (Gadamer, 1989: 123).

3.6 LANGUAGE AS EXPERIENCE

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 When one interprets another culture, one does so through language. All
interpretation presupposes language. This is because the medium of human experience is
language. One is situataed within language and a translator is a person who is
comfortable in the laguages being translated. He makes what is spoken in one language
intelligible in another. He finds the best way to make the subject that he is translating
intelligible in the second language. For Gadamer (1989: 388), language is not a tool. For
an example of how language is used as a tool, one should look at the work of Serge
Vygotsky (1963; 1978)

Instruments used by Human Beings according to Vygotsky

Symbolic Instrument Language is a symbolic Language belongs to the
instrument Realm of Epistemology
Instruments of Technology Technology is an ontological Technology belongs to the
instrument Realm of Ontology

For Vygotsky, intelligence had to do with the capacity to learn from instruction with
tools. Hence, the teacher plays a central role in this context. The teacher is there to help
the student go beyond his current level of competence. Hence, intelligence is an index of
what a student can do and is capable of doing while interacting with adults. The move
from the present level of development to the new potential level of development is called
the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD). This zone is too difficult for a child to
manage alone and for this reason it is done with a mentor, a teacher, helping adult. The
use of apprenticeship in education is called scaffolding. The teacher helps the student to
move to the next rung on the ladder of ZPD.

Child’s Understanding of Zone of Proximal Adult’s Understanding of the

the world Development (ZPD) world

X Transitional Stage, Y
Old Configuration Guided by Instruments of New Configuration
Knowledge

One moves from position X to position Y with the help of a mentor or teacher. The task is
determined by the teacher as a ZPD. One the task is accomplished, a new task is
arranged. This series of tasks is called “scaffolding.”

Gadamer argues that language goes beyond being an instrument of thought, it is the
medium of thought. Just as the air that one breathes is a medium in which one lives, so
too is language a medium in which ones thinks and lives. Humans exist in the medium of
language. It is the preferred object of interpretation (Gadamer, 1989: 389). Objects have
a being in language. The process of understanding is fundamentally one of
linguisticality. Hence, when one enters into a language one is bound by its horizons.

3.7 FACTUALNESS

13
 The object of understating has its life within language. Gadamer reduces all
understanding to language. It is the real medium of human beings. Language is a mirror
of culture. It constitutes a Zeitgeist. If something is factual, it is because it is recognized
and deemed to be a significant by humans. The world that comes into language is a
world that is significant to humans (Gadamer, 1988: 456). Factualness shows that human
beings do not control the world of their experience. Humans facilitate the development
and the growth of the world by things. Things and people are able to enter into language
and so become a part of the human world. It is in language that the human world is
disclosed. Linguisticality constitutes human communication. Language is the horizon of
all experience. One belongs to language. It is the space of human belonging
(Zugehörigkeit). Through language, one is taken into a common world that is shared with
others. It is a space in which people belong together. It is a wold in which subjects are
not isolated. It is a non-Cartesian world.

4.0 THE HAWAIIAN WEDDING SONG

The Hawaiian Wedding Song provides an informative example of translating
from one cultural horizon to another. This song was written by Charles King in 1926 for
his operetta, "Prince of Hawaii." It's Hawaiian name is Ke Kali Nei Au (Waiting Here
for You). The English words were written by Al Hoffman and Dick Manning in 1958.
Although they were not intended to be a formal translation of the Hawaiian lyrics, they
nevertheless do function as an information translation of that song. Hence, they are
discussed in this section of the essay.

4.1 TRADITIONAL HAWAIIAN ETHNOMUSICOLOGY

What are some of the horizons that need to be fused or merged in order to
translate this song into English? The most obvious problem has to do with the Hawaiian
musicology. Before the arrival of the missionaries, the Hawaiians did not know about
tonal music. Their music did not involve the use of melody. There were two types of
vocal traditions: mele oli and mele hula. The former are performed as solo chants
without accompaniment. The oli are chanted on special occasions such as rituals and
ceremonies. The mele oli use only a few notes in a simple melody. The mele hula are
chants accompanied by dance (hula) and often by musical instruments such as the drum
(pahu), the gourd (ipu heke), the gourd rattle (uliuli), and the slapping of the hands on the
chest (pai umauma).. This music has a regular metrical rhythm. These Hawaiian chants
(mele) were sonorous and repetitive and the emphasis was on maintaining a Polynesian
tradition rather than on making music. A few years after the arrival of the missionaries,
however, they acquired a new musical tradition of singing Christian hymns (himeni).
Another hybrid form of music soon developed when the members of the monarchy who
were musically gifted composed songs that were combined with the melodic tunes of
Europe. King Kalakaua and his brother along with their sisters Likelike and Liliuokalani
wrote many songs that have become a part of Hawaiian musical culture. Queen
Liliuokalani, for example composed more than 100 songs including the famous Aloha
Oe. In 1836 King Kamehameha III founded the Royal Hawaiian Band. The band was
led by Heinrich Berger who was brought over from Germany by King Kamehameha V
and he wrote many new Hawaiian songs including the Hawaiian national anthem. He was
also the original conductor of the Honolulu Symphony. With the arrival of the

14
Portuguese immigrants from the Azores in the 19th century, Hawaiian music took on a
new style with the arrival of the braga from Portugal and the cavaquinho from Brazil.
These were the prototype for the Hawaiian instrument known as the ukulele. Finally, the
slack-key guitar became an integral part of Hawaiian music. By the time that Charles
King wrote the Hawaiian Wedding Song, tonal music was already a part of Hawaiian
music culture. Hence, the Wedding Song is written from the perspective of Western
culture. It is written as tonal music. Obviously, the two horizons can be merged because
they were already similar to each other. If this song were to be done as a mele hula, for
example, the disparity between their ethnomusicology would make translation rather
difficult.

4.1 THE HAWAIIAN SONG AND ITS TRANSLATION

The other horizon that needs to be addressed has to do with translating Hawaiian
into English. Some of these problems ascertained from a comparison from the Hawaii
language and its rough translations into English (King 1926, 1943).

Ke Kali Nei Au (Waiting For You) -

Eia au ke kali nei Here I am waiting

Aia la i hea ku'u aloha Where is my beloved

Eia au ke huli nei I've searched for you

A loa`a `oe e ka ipo Now that I've found you
Maha ka `i`ini a ka pu`uwai Calm the desire of my heart

Ua sila pa`a `ia me `oe Sealed forever to you

Ko aloha makamae e ipo Sweetheart you are so precious
Ka`u ia e lei a`e nei la I pledge my love to you alone

Nou no ka `i`ini (nou ka `i`ini) I desire you (desire)

A nou wale no (wale no) True to you alone (alone)
A o ko aloha ka`u e hi`ipoi mau With you joy will ever be mine
Na'u `oe (na'u `oe) You're mine (you're mine)
E lei (e lei) Oh, my lei (Oh, lei)
Na'u `oe e lei You`re mine, my lei
A he hali`a kai hiki mai
Fond remembrance of the one who came
No ku`u lei onaona
My fragrant lei
Pulupe i ka ua
Drenched in the rain
Auhea `oe ka `i`ini a loko
Listen you, my heart's desire
Na loko a`e ka mana`o
To the thought within me
Hu`e lani ana i ku`u kino
Open the heaven within my body
Ku`u pua ku`u lei onaona
My flower, my fragrant lei
A`u i kui a lawa ia nei

15
 I will string and bind
Me ke ala pua pikake
Like the fragrant jasmine flower
A o `oe ku`u pua (`O `oe ku`u pua)
You are my blossom (you, my blossom)
Ku`u pua lei lehua (lehua)
My lei of lehua (lehua)
A`u e li`a mau nei ho`opa`a
My desire is always to be with and close
Ia iho k ealoha
To my love
He lei (he lei)
My lei (my lei)
`Oe na`u (`oe na`u)
You're mine
He lei `oe na`u
My lei, you're mine

4.2 WORD ORDER

Hawaiian differs from English with regard to word order. It would appear that this is a
problem, but it is not. Hawaiian is a verb initial language (VSO) in which the subject (S)
occurs before the object (O). English is a verb initial language (VSO) in its deep
structure but a verb medial language (SVO) in its service structure. Hence, the
placements of elements within a sentence differ in a predictable manner. Both, for
example place their question markers (QM) at the beginning of the sentence.

Hawaiian English
Word Order [Ua ‘ike] [ke kanaka] [‘i ke ali’i’] [The man] [saw] [the chief]
Saw the man OM the chief S V O
V S O

Question Pehea ‘oe? How are you? Who saw John?

Markers He aha kela? What of it? What did he do?
Aia i hea ku’u aloha? Where is my Where did he go?
beloved?

What is different between these languages, however, is their patterns of stress. Hawaiian
is a syllable-timed language. It has a staccato rhythm. English, on the other hand, is a
stress-timed language and is places a heavy emphasis on certain positions within word
phrases. This problem was overcome by the composer of the song by diminishing the
chanting rhythm of the Hawaiian language and replacing it with more melodic tones.
Once again a translation has taken place but at the expense of the source language.

4.3 ASPECT MARKERS

English grammatical terminology is based on Latin which marks events as either being
completed or not-completed. A completed event is marked by the Latin perfective and a
non-completed event is marked by the imperfect. In the Romance languages derived
from Latin, one finds the same grammatical terminology and it is concomitant with the

16
Latin concept of the perfect and the imperfect aspect markers.

Perfective Imperfective
Latin The action was carried out The action was not carried
out
Spanish Cantó (he sang) Cantaba (he was singing)

English, however, has a different kind of aspect system. It is essentially a German

language that was influenced by Normandy French. The aspect markers in English have
to do with punctuals (one time actions), durations, and iteratives.

English form Commentary

Punctuals He dropped the ball This is a one time action
Duratives He has eaten The action begins in the past and lasts into the
present
have V en He had eaten The action began early in the past and ends later in
the past
He will have eaten The action begins early in the present and ends in
the future
He would have The action begins early in the future and ends later
eaten in the future
Iteratives He is eating The action is iterative and began in the past and lasts
into the present
be V ing He was eating The action is iterative and began early in the past
and ended later in the past
He will be eating The action is iterative and begins in the present and
ends in the future
He would be eating The action is iterative and begins in the early future
and ends later in the future

Because the nomenclature characteristically associated with Latin grammatical

terminology is misleading when used in English, the aspect markers of punctuality,
duration, and iterative will be used to explain how these markers function in English.
Hawaiian also has its own aspect markers and the problem here is that tense and
aspect markers have been conflated so that a translation into English from Hawaiian may
be semantically ambiguous.

Hawaiian English
e + Verb + nei
Present Tense ke hana nei au I work
Present Iterative ke hana nei au I am working
e + Verb + ana
Past Iterative e hana ana au I was working
ua + Verb
Past Tense ua hana au I worked
Present Durative ua hana au I have worked

17
 ua + Verb + e
Past Durative ua hana e au I had worked
i + Verb
Past Tense i hana au I worked
(used in negative
constructions)
Nominative i hana Having worked
e +Verb
Future Tense e hana au I will work
e + Verb
Imperative e hana au You work!

The aforementioned chart on Hawaiian verbs and aspect markers is confusing because
Hawaiian is a language that is not overly concerned with durative and iteratives.
However, it turns out to be just the opposite. In Hawaii, one is concerned with whether an
action is completed or not completed but it is not overly concerned with tense. That is,
aspect markers show whether the verb is completed or incomplete. Hence, aspect markers
do not indicate tense outright; they are used to create equivalent structures to
tenses. Obviously, the Latin terminology of perfect and imperfect aspect makes more
sense for Hawaiian than it does for English.

Hawaiian Aspect
E +verb + ana + Subject Incomplete action, state not achieved
Verb + Subject Completed action, achieved state
No aspect marker + Verb + Subject Simple present tense, generic and timeless
i + Verb + Subject Completed action, achieved state

Another more functional kind of aspect has to do with the proximity that one has from the
speaker. These are used with present tense markers.

Hawaiian English
Close to the Speaker ke + Verb + nei Speaking to the person here
Distant from the Speaker ke + Verb + ala Speaking to the person there
More distant from the Speaker ke + Verb + la Speaking to the person over there

This distinction is also used for determinatives.

Hawaiian English Commentary

Ke puke The book
Ke puke ia This book The demonstrative is composed of the article plus the
Keia puke locative marker. Dialects of English also make this
distinction: This book and this-here book .
Ke puke la That book Dialectal variants: That-there book, that book there
Kela puke

The following difficulty in translating aspect from Hawaiian to English is indicative of

18
this conflation of tense and aspect.

Hawaiian Grammatical Explication Translation

Eia au ke huli nei Eia is a locative (here is) + au (I or me) I've searched for
Huli is a verb (to search or to look for you
Here am I searching someone) Literally: Here I
ke …. nei is a progressive aspect marker am searching
Commentary: The English present progressive shows that an action began in the past and
continues into the present. The English durative has to do with an action that begins in
the past and lasts until the present. The Hawaiian sentence was in the present progressive
but the translation into English in this case is presented as a present durative. Hence,
there is a problem with this translation.

4.4 SEMANTIC DOMAINS

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in the fusion of horizons between Hawaiian and
English can be found in the semantic domains The following sentence from the
Hawaiian Wedding Song demonstrates that these languages and cultures differ in how
they view the center of emotions in their respective cultures.

Maha ka `i`ini a ka Maha is a verb (rest) Calm the desire of

pu`uwai ‘i’ini is a verb (crave, desire). The definite my heart
article ka nominalizes it (the desire)
a is inalienable possessive marker (of)
Ka pu’uwai is a noun phrase (the heart)
Pu’uwai is used as the center of emotions. This is a Western concept. Emotions in
Hawaiian are felt in the Na’au (intestines), ôpû (stomach), or loko (entrails). For
example, Na’au pôkole means short tempered. It is literally short intestines. Ôpû nini
means jealous. Literally stomach ointment. Loko ino means heartless. Literally it means
wicked or evil entrails.

These examples are indicative of the problems associated with the translation from a
polynesian language into a Germanic Creole (English).

5.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The proposed rehabilitation of semiotics opens up the way for a more integrated
model that can map elements from the epistemological domain such as cognitive frames
with the expressions in the realm of ontology. An important part of this model includes
the discussion of human agency.

19
Agency in this rehabilitated model of semiotics includes the Id, the Ego, and the
Superego. The Id plays a minor role in this model, but the Ego functions as the Self and
the Superego functions as the Social Self. The socially constructed self is an expansion of
the Mirror Self in Lacan (1999). What began as the mirror image model of the self is
transformed over time into a socially constructed model of the self. In the aforementioned
figure, it portrays the self as an artist who is part of an intellectual community. He models
himself for that community. It is his cognitive frame. His social scenarios are addressed
to that community. His works of art (structural semiosis) is addressed to that group. His
interpretations of art (structural hermeneutics) are based on that audience. Since there are
many frames in ones social life, the interaction of the self is best expressed in terms of
graph theory in which there are vertices and edges associated with aristocratic circles of
contacts and plebian contacts in small world theory (Chartrand, 1985; Watts and Duncan,
1998).

The vertices, in this case, do not represent people, but cognitive frames. The activities

20
within those frames are articulated social scripts. Traditional semiotics cannot handle
this kind of complexity in dealing with the interface between meaning systems and
ontological forms or expressions.

5.1 THE ALIENATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Gadamer contends that the task of philosophy is to overcome the alienation of
consciousness from the experiences of life. He directs his attack on the natural sciences
and feels that the natural sciences have distanced people from the lived experiences of the
world. This alienation occurs, he claims, because the prevailing attitude in these sciences
is to dominate and control nature. Habermas (1985) countered this attack on the natural
sciences. These sciences, he argued, can arrive at truth and moreover it can provide
important information to the world of human experience. In other words, he claimed that
philosophical hermeneutics is incomplete. It depends on the medium of language in
order to arrive at truth, but the natural sciences can operate without language. Habermas
went on to write about how difficult it is to transcend one’s own zeitgeist within
philosophical hermeneutics. He brought into play the case of psychoanalysis where one
is convinced of his own distorted view of communication and where an outsider, a
therapist, must be brought into the situation in order to rectify the situation. When people
are in a situation, he explains, they do not have the ability to see things beyond their own
horizon. The analyst functions as an external standard against which a hidden pathology
can be revealed. Furthermore, hermeneutic consciousness must reach beyond language.
Habermas believes that a distinction needs to be made within Truth and Method
(Gadamer, 1989) between authority and reason. Gadamer, he notes, is deluded into
accepting authority as a positive presupposition for understanding. As a matter of fact, he
adds, authority is legitimated force and not legitimated knowledge. Hence, reason is a
standard that stands against authority. For example, in Thomas S. Kuhn’s Theory of
Scientific Revolutions, normal science represents authority, in the period of crisis, the
reactions against authority was based on reason, and the establishment of a new
revolutionary science was also based on reason (Kuhn, 1964).
One of the differences between Habermas and Gadamer has to do with their own
theoretical constructs. Habermas (1981) is a neo-Hegelian. He has built into his model
of communicative action (Theorie des kommunikativen Handels) the concept of social
evolution based on the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel, 1977). Hegel, it has been argued
(St. Clair, 2002) has blended two metaphors from Plato and Aristotle. From the latter, he
took the idea of growth (Greek: physis) as a change from material form through the final
cause and from the former he took the concept of the world of ideal forms. His book on
the Phenomenology of Spirit is based on Aristotle’s motor cause, the energy that takes a
form from its beginning into its final form. Hegel called this motor force spirit (Geist).
History, for Hegel, was a continuous growth in the Aristotelian sense in which the final
form was the world of ideal forms. Nevertheless, history for Hegel is never complete
because it continues to grow. Habermas sees society in this way. It is continuously
evolving. From his point of view, the model proposed by Gadamer appears to be rather
static and incapable of growth.

5.2 LANGUAGE AS BOTH AGENCY AND EXPERIENCE

21
 Rene Descartes (1999) placed too strong an emphasis on self-consciousness. This
led Edmund Husserl (1965) to attempt to transcend the ego and account for the existence
of the world. He argued that ideas are real (Husserl, (1962) because they involve
intention. Heidegger (1927) redefined the experience of being human away from man as
a rational being into one who is a being-in-the-world. He did not want to accept human
beings as agents in the world and focused his attention on the experiences of being.
Gadamer (1989) had a philosopher that was similar to Heidegger but his concern was
with using hermeneutics as a method to arrive at his truth of the world. What has
happened in this transition from Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, to Gadamer,
a postmodern philosopher, is a denial of the significance of self-consciousness and
agency in language. He argued that language is not a tool. Tools require human agents.
Instead, he placed great emphasis on language being a medium of human experience.
The model of structural philosophy proposed by St. Clair (2010) argues that agency has a
role in human experience. Postmodernism cannot divorce itself from modernism.
Human beings are agents in the world as well as beings-in-the-world. The limitations of
philosophical hermeneutics are most evident in the debate between Habermas (1985) and
Gadamer. Science and technology are part of being human. There are more avenues to
knowledge than those provided only by language. However, language is a primary
instrument of thought as well as a medium of thought. This is why the concept of reality-
loops go well beyond the linking of thought and experience. They constitute the social
construction of reality.
This essay began with the realization that traditional semiotics could not
adequately be used as an instrument of translation and interpretation across linguistic
communities. The work of Gadamer on philosophical hermeneutics was used to
investigate how language and experience are involved in the experience of being human.
Although Gadamer did not see language as an instrument of thought, it is. It is also a
medium of human experience. Both are required in translation. The social self plays a
strong role in the social construction of self. Agency may be human, but it is also social.
People act in the presence of others. They exist for others. Intentionality is connected
both to agency and to the experience of being-in-the-world. Language, it has been argued
(Rodrigues, St. Clair, and Joshua, 2005)) is provides human beings with schemas, frames,
and the modern equivalent of the Kantian categories.

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