Some Principles of Human Intelligence and Their

Application
A Monograph
by
MAJ Robert A. Sayre, Jr.
U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff
College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AY 03-04
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14. ABSTRACT
Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, has through the course of
the twentieth century, been less emphasized by the U.S. Army relative to the technical disciplines of signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). HUMINT should remain a key component of an
intelligence system, as it can cue and be cued by the other disciplines and combine with them to be more
effective than any of them would be by itself. Additionally, the Army is involved in low- and mid-intensity
campaigns around the world and Army doctrine for these types of operations identifies the importance of
HUMINT in their conduct. Army leadership has expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of Army
HUMINT and stated that it needs improvement. In order to make such an improvement, principles of
HUMINT are necessary so that the HUMINT system and its components--including the individual
HUMINT collectors--may be properly designed or trained. Such principles may be derived from writings
of theorists and practitioners of HUMINT. All of the civilizations of the ancient world practiced HUMINT
in one form or another, and many of them left behind extensive writings on the theory and practice of
HUMINT. This was particularly true of the ancient Chinese and Indians, for whom HUMINT in its various
forms was integral to their statecraft. The civilizations of the ancient Near East and classical period in the
Mediterranean also engaged in HUMINT and left behind a record of it. Governments and militaries also
employed HUMINT throughout the twentieth century, and there is an extensive body of both history and
theory from twentieth century practitioners and theorists. From all of these writings, which almost
completely agree, one can see that HUMINT collectors should be people of the best personal quality,
mature and experienced, and with good knowledge of the areas on which they are collecting. Other
writings on leadership, business, and training practice and theory can be added to demonstrate what
HUMINT organizations should be like and what ought to be expected from HUMINT leaders. Other
HUMINT organizations can serve as models for improvement of Army HUMINT, particularly the British
Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program. All of these in one way or
another ensures that their HUMINT collectors have the appropriate personal qualities, are conversant in
the subjects on which they are asked to collect, and have the leaders and organizations that they need to
succeed.
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 Abstract

SOME ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR

APPLICATION
by MAJ Robert A. Sayre, Jr., U.S. Army, 50 pages.

Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, has
through the course of the twentieth century, been less emphasized by the U.S. Army
relative to the technical disciplines of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery
intelligence (IMINT). HUMINT should remain a key component of an intelligence
system, as it can cue and be cued by the other disciplines and combine with them to be
more effective than any of them would be by itself. Additionally, the Army is involved
in low- and mid-intensity campaigns around the world and Army doctrine for these types
of operations identifies the importance of HUMINT in their conduct. Army leadership
has expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of Army HUMINT and stated that it
needs improvement. In order to make such an improvement, principles of HUMINT are
necessary so that the HUMINT system and its components--including the individual
HUMINT collectors--may be properly designed or trained.

Such principles may be derived from writings of theorists and practitioners of HUMINT.
All of the civilizations of the ancient world practiced HUMINT in one form or another,
and many of them left behind extensive writings on the theory and practice of HUMINT.
This was particularly true of the ancient Chinese and Indians, for whom HUMINT in its
various forms was integral to their statecraft. The civilizations of the ancient Near East
and classical period in the Mediterranean also engaged in HUMINT and left behind a
record of it. Governments and militaries also employed HUMINT throughout the
twentieth century, and there is an extensive body of both history and theory from
twentieth century practitioners and theorists. From all of these writings, which almost
completely agree, one can see that HUMINT collectors should be people of the best
personal quality, mature and experienced, and with good knowledge of the areas on
which they are collecting. Other writings on leadership, business, and training practice
and theory can be added to demonstrate what HUMINT organizations should be like and
what ought to be expected from HUMINT leaders.

Other HUMINT organizations can serve as models for improvement of Army HUMINT,
particularly the British Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Army Foreign Area
Officer Program. All of these in one way or another ensures that their HUMINT
collectors have the appropriate personal qualities, are conversant in the subjects on which
they are asked to collect, and have the leaders and organizations that they need to
succeed.

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ..................................................................................................................................i

Introduction ...........................................................................................................................1

The Contemporary HUMINT Environment...........................................................................1

Research Intent and Design ..................................................................................................4

The Collector .........................................................................................................................7

The Nature of the Collector .................................................................................................7

The Desired Characteristics of a Collector - The Theory from Antiquity .............................7

Personal Characteristics of the Collector - Modern Theory ...............................................12

The Nature of the HUMINT Relationship .......................................................................17

The Background of the Collector........................................................................................19

Area Knowledge ...........................................................................................................19

Professional Background ...............................................................................................26

Consistency of Ancients and Moderns on the Collector's Background ...............................28

The HUMINT Organization ..................................................................................................30

Leadership ........................................................................................................................30

Quality Control.................................................................................................................35

Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................................39

The Nature of the Problem for the U.S. Army .....................................................................39

Application of HUMINT Principles....................................................................................40

Models .............................................................................................................................45

Recommendations .............................................................................................................47

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................1

ii
 Introduction
The Contemporary HUMINT Environment

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines, and has even

been described as the second-oldest profession. Before the advent of photography and of

communications technologies such as telegraphy and radio--which led to the other disciplines of

imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT)--HUMINT was the only

intelligence discipline. Through the course of the twentieth century, and especially during and

after the Second World War, the emphasis the U.S. Army accorded HUMINT relative to the other

disciplines declined. This was due in part to the concern with mid- to high-intensity conflict, in

which HUMINT is less important, and also to the American orientation towards technological

solutions to problems, including intelligence problems. 1 During the Cold War the primary

concern of the Army was the large, conventional forces of the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact that it

faced in Central Europe. The intelligence questions posed by this situation could be largely

answered by the technical disciplines of IMINT and SIGINT; as a result those disciplines were

emphasized.

Though impressive capabilities have been fielded in the technical intelligence disciplines,

there will always be a need for the maintenance of HUMINT capabilities. Reliance on purely

technical intelligence--or on any one intelligence discipline--opens the intelligence system to

manipulation and deception. For example, physical decoys at a particular location and dummy

radio traffic associated with the decoys might fool IMINT and SIGINT sensors, but direct human

observation of the targeted site would easily expose the attempt at deception. One discipline can

direct one or both of the others; a HUMINT report, for instance, on adversary plans for a military

operation can be used to precisely direct IMINT systems. Each discipline can also facilitate the

1
James Sherr, "Cultures of Spying," The National Interest 38 (Winter 1994/1995): 57; Greg Jaffe,
"Between the Lines: Army Finds Good Information in Short Supply in Guerrilla War," Wall Street
Journal, October 6, 2003, A1.

others. The famous Polish successes against German cryptographic systems before the Second

World War were aided by HUMINT operations that obtained documents on the systems for use

by cryptanalysts; similar help from HUMINT aided some American cryptanalytic efforts against

the Japanese at around the same time.2 The three disciplines in concert complement and enhance

one another, can cue one another, and make the intelligence collection system more resilient and

harder to disrupt or deceive.3

In addition to the need for HUMINT to work alongside the other disciplines, the situation

presented the U.S. Army since the end of the Cold War also makes HUMINT capability of great

importance. The greatly increased threat from terrorism since the end of the twentieth century

and the nature of military operations conducted by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have

presented the U.S. Army with an environment and threat quite distinct from that presented by the

former Soviet Union and its allies. In this environment, commanders and intelligence officers in

the field face an intelligence problem of a fundamentally different nature than that of the Cold

War. This difference is accounted for to a large degree by Army doctrine, as the need for

increased HUMINT in lower-intensity military operations of every variety is clearly identified.4

Doctrinal and other writings discuss this need in some detail. Stability and support operations

(SASO), such as those conducted in Bosnia and Kosovo, are described as requiring detailed

intelligence on local political, economic, and cultural conditions that can only be acquired

through HUMINT.5 This also applies to the SASO and low-intensity conflicts taking place after

2
Stephen Budiansky, Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II (New
York: Touchstone Books, 2002), 83, 101.
3
Anthony H. Cordesman, Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War (Washington: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, July 16, 2003), 19; Major John A. Hurley, "HUMINT Revitalization," Military
Review 61, no. 8, August 1981: 26.
4
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3 -07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999, II-20; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM
90-8: Counterguerrilla Operations, 29 August 1986, 3-6, Appendix H; Headquarters, Department of the
Army, FM 100-23: Peace Operations, 30 December 1994, 4-12. These are only a few of the doctrinal
publications that discuss the need for HUMINT in operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
5
LTC (P) Michael W. Pick, "What the Joint Force Commander Needs to Know About CI and
HUMINT Operations," National War College Paper, 2002.

the winding-down of major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to other,

similar operations elsewhere in the world.

Operations against terrorism and terrorists also demand high-quality intelligence from

HUMINT. Terrorist organizations frequently employ low-technology means for communications

that defy collection by SIGINT assets; the nature of terrorist operations often renders IMINT

irrelevant. HUMINT is not only the best but also frequently the only means by which terrorists

may be identified and their organizations understood and located. Direct-action against terrorist

personnel or cells, in order to be effective, must be directed precisely by intelligence information;

the sort of information needed for this is best gathered by means of HUMINT.6 But though

SASO, counter-terrorist operations, and low-intensity operations in general require a more robust

HUMINT capability, even in mid-intensity combat operations such as those conducted in the

spring of 2003 by the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Iraq, HUMINT was identified as

an important contributor. 7

These factors have focused attention on the HUMINT capability of the U.S. military,

including that of the Army, and Army leadership has identified the need for improving this

capability. The former U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Lieutenant General

Robert Noonan, stated the need to improve HUMINT capability in terms of both quantity and

quality.8 Many involved in operations against terrorists and insurgents around the world have

also noted the shortfall in Army HUMINT capability. As described by one commander involved

in the struggle after the end of major combat operations associated with Operation Iraqi Freedom,

while intelligence in a high -intensity conflict is a science that the Ar my has perfected, that

6
Nathan Hodge, "Anaconda Commanders: Sensors No Substitute for HUMINT," Defense Week,
April 1, 2002, 1; Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," The Washington Quarterly 25, no 1
(Winter 2002): 79-80, 91.
7
Headquarters, Third Infantry Division, Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After-Action
Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003 [book online], accessed 4 December 2003, available from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf
8
"More SIGINT, UAVs, and HUMINT Top Army Intel Needs From Afghanistan," C4I News,
April 25, 2002, 1; Noonan remarks at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September 10,
2002.

associated with post-conflict operations is more of an art. Some Army intelligence leaders

believe that this art may have been lost. In the words of Brigadier General John Custer, the J2­

Intelligence officer for U.S. Central Command responsible for intelligence support to Army

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, "We haven't fought a war where human intelligence was the

coin of the realm for decades."9

Research Intent and Design

In order to make desired improvements in HUMINT capabilities, it is important that there

be a fundamental understanding of the principles of the HUMINT discipline; providing such an

understanding is the intent of this paper. Designers of technical intelligence systems employ their

understanding of the nature of optics or of the propagation of radio waves to construct technical

sensors and systems. The task of designing a technical collection system is relatively

straightforward insofar as elements of physical science involved are combined with the state-of-

the-art in engineering to produce a system. Only the state of scientific knowledge, the ingenuity

of engineers, and the resources available for construction of the system limit a technical system.

Similarly, designers of HUMINT systems should ideally proceed from an understanding of the

basic nature of the HUMINT problem to the design of the best possible sensors and system.

What distinguishes HUMINT from the technical disciplines is that the sensors are not

mechanical-electrical devices but people, and the systems are groups of people rather than

networks of devices. 10

The problem for improvement of U.S. Army HUMINT is that, unlike for engineering and

the physical sciences, there is not a readily available body of principles on the desired

characteristics of HUMINT sensors. The 'HUMINT sensors' are the people who work as

HUMINT collectors; the principles needed would concern what kind of people ought to be

9
Jaffe, Between the Lines.
10
Technical systems, of course, are networks not only of devices, but also of people such as
analysts and technicians. The point is that the nature and major challenges of the technical disciplines are
basically different from those of HUMINT.

collecting HUMINT and how they should be trained, prepared, and employed. This paper will

examine the nature of HUMINT to derive some of the principles of the discipline and make

recommendations on how to achieve the improvements desired. This examination will employ

two types of materials. The first will be historical examples of HUMINT drawn from a range of

eras and cultures and analyzed to determine what common themes can be seen that might point to

a principle of contemporary applicability. The second type of material will be the writings of

theorists of statecraft and intelligence that examine the conduct of HUMINT and discuss what is

necessary for its success. Theory used, like historical examples used, will be drawn from across

various eras and cultures. In some cases, related theory from the worlds of business or other

professions will also be used.

In order to discuss HUMINT, it is first necessary to provide a definition of the subject.

For the purposes of this paper, HUMINT will be the collection of intelligence by a human being

directly from another human being by means of personal interaction. In practical terms this

covers a wide range of collection activities. Those from which historical examples will be taken

in this paper will include agent operations, prisoner interrogation, attaché operations, debriefing

of friendly travelers, and overt source operations. One type of collection activity that the U.S.

Army defines as HUMINT, the collection of intelligence from open sources such as newspapers,

television, radio, and other electronic and print media (OSINT), does not involve human

interaction and will not be considered.

Each of the HUMINT collection activities mentioned is unique in the method used to

gain access to the source--to put the collector 'on target.' Agent operations require the collector to

use espionage tradecraft, interrogation of prisoners only that the collector walk into the

interrogation room. Attachés gain access to targets through a variety of means, including social

or diplomatic events, visits to military units, and the cultivation of people met on a casual basis.

Debriefers of friendly travelers make an appointment with their source and often perform their

work in the source's home or workplace. Collectors in overt source operations go into

communities in the area of operations and, not only openly but often in uniform, seek information

from the local population.

The concern of this paper, though, is not the differences between these activities, but

rather what they have in common. All of them, when successful, have a common outcome: a

HUMINT collector talking to a source. The differences between the HUMINT collection

activities correspond to the differences between mounting a SIGINT collection system in a

vehicle, an aircraft, a ship, or a fixed ground station. Though each of these will put particular

constraints on collection equipment in matters of weight, size, or power consumption, what

remain constant are the physical principles governing the propagation of radio waves and the

design of the SIGINT sensor (an antenna). Likewise, in some aspects different HUMINT

activities may require differing skills from collectors in order to get a collector to a source, but all

of them rely on a human being interacting with another human being to collect intelligence. This

sort of interaction is the central concern of this paper, and its goal is to lay out some principles

determining the ideal characteristics of the HUMINT sensor, the human collector.

In addition to discussing the individual HUMINT collector, this paper will also discuss

two aspects of the organizations in which HUMINT collectors work. The first of these will be

what abilities the leaders of HUMINT organizations in particular ought to possess as opposed to

those that leaders of all organizations should. The second organizational topic discussed will be

how to best ensure that a system is in place to prevent unreliable or deceptive information from

being disseminated from the HUMINT collector to the larger organization.

 The Collector
The Nature of the Collector

The Desired Characteristics of a Collector - The Theory from Antiquity

The history of nearly all of the ancient civilizations includes the practice of HUMINT.

The Bible records that Moses, who scholars estimate lived around 3,400 years ago, sent

HUMINT collectors into the land of Canaan under divine instructions:

And the Lord spake unto Moses saying, "Send thou men, that they may search
the land of Canaan, which I give unto the children of Israel: of every tribe of
their fathers shall ye send a man, every one a ruler among them."

When the men had been selected, Moses gave them detailed instructions as to what they

should look for in Canaan; after their mission they reported to Moses on their observations of the

land, its inhabitants, their culture, and the prospects for successful conquest. 11 Moses'

instructions specified that each of the collectors must be one of the rulers of his tribe. The Lord's

reasoning for this is not given, but what is clear is the central concern with the characteristics of

the Israelites' HUMINT collectors in Canaan.

That divine care would be taken in this instance is a reflection of the importance of the

matter. As the nature of the SIGINT problem determines the characteristics of a SIGINT sensor,

so the nature of the HUMINT problem should determine the characteristics of the HUMINT

collector. A collector, whether human or technical, whose characteristics are inappropriate will

not be successful. Some of the ancient cultures took exactly this approach and made detailed,

sophisticated studies of the HUMINT problem with a view to determining what characteristics

their collectors ought to have.

Of those cultures that studied the HUMINT problem, the Chinese made by far the

greatest and most systematic effort; they are said to have over the centuries practiced and

11
Num. 13 AV

7
theorized about HUMINT more than any other nation. 12 Good intelligence in Chinese military

practice was vital, and good intelligence in pre-industrial cultures was good HUMINT. Sun Tzu,

the most famous and influential of the Chinese military writers, advocates a brand of warfare that

emphasizes avoiding strengths and seeking out weaknesses (including those that might not be

strictly military), deception, psychological warfare, and attacks on strategy and alliances. Sun

Tzu says that success in the realm of war relies on 'foreknowledge', which in turn requires

intelligence of a very sophisticated nature, not merely information of the physical disposition and

capability of enemy forces, but understanding of personality, motives, and psychology. While

basic information on enemy forces might be gathered by a simple observer with materials to

make a sketch, the sophisticated intelligence required in the subtle military art of Sun Tzu must

often be found in the mind of an enemy leader. 13 Gaining access to the mind of an enemy leader

obviously requires a collector of a very high order, and, given the central role of foreknowledge,

Sun Tzu rates the subject of HUMINT collectors as amongst the most important, calling them 'the

treasure of the sovereign' and stating that they must be very generously rewarded.14

Chinese practice was that HUMINT sources dealt directly with a very senior officer,

often even the general or head of state. In this situation, the general was in effect his own

HUMINT collector, while his source was also a HUMINT collector when he was in the enemy's

territory. The Chinese paid great attention to what qualities and characteristics the general and

the source needed to be good collectors. Sun Tzu says that in order to conduct HUMINT, the

general needed to be "sage and wise, humane and just,…delicate and subtle…." Ancient Chinese

commentators on Sun Tzu added that he must be able to estimate the character of the source as to

his sincerity, truthfulness, and intelligence, and that in turn the general's source must be able to

communicate reports, wise, intelligent, strong of heart, vigorous, and able to endure the danger

12
Ralph Sawyer, The Tao of Spycraft (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), xiii.

13
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979),

145.
14
Ibid., 147, 145.

8
and privations of his job. He must also be able to gain access to those of the enemy who are

intimate with the leadership. Sun Tzu himself described these matters as "Delicate indeed! Truly

delicate!" 15

The Chinese practice of HUMINT as described by Sun Tzu and other ancient writers is

an extremely complex business, with various types of agents employed in collection, sowing

confusion, transmitting false information, or finding out the agents of the enemy. It seems as

though Chinese generals and leaders must have sent swarms of agents out to secure the

foreknowledge they sought (and to spoil the enemy's foreknowledge), a situation that certainly

had the potential to create confusion and opportunities for deception by way of planted or false

information, or even through simple misunderstanding. The Chinese, though, recognized this

problem, and saw the key to successfully practicing HUMINT as the ability to reliably evaluate

men. Reliable evaluation of men gives the ability to select those men best able to carry out

HUMINT missions and, just as importantly, to evaluate their truthfulness when they return with

their report. A great deal of effort was put into the study of men and their reliability. Some

Chinese writers advocated techniques of observing expression, body language, or demeanor,

others the close analysis of reports for contradictions and conformity with other information.16

The writings on this subject show great awareness of the complexity of human reliability and

motivation; the Chinese believed that the conduct of HUMINT required "sagacious wisdom", that

extreme sophistication and arduous study were necessary to master the art of evaluating men, and

that only a very few would ever do these things well. 17

Another ancient culture that studied and practiced HUMINT extensively was that of

India. The importance they gave to their intelligence system and its pervasiveness in their

political and military activities indicates that they also must have given HUMINT a great deal of

15
Ibid., 147.
16
Observation of demeanor to determine deception is still practiced today, often as a technique to
complement the polygraph. John E. Reid and Fred E. Inbau, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph ("Lie
Detector") Technique, 2d ed. (Baltimore, MD: Williams and Wilkins, 1977), 13, 17.
17
Sawyer, Tao of Spycraft, 150, 312 passim.

9
thought; however, the only work of theory on the subject translated from the original Sanskrit is

the Arthashastra. Kautilya, who is said to have been an advisor to an Indian ruler of the 4th

century B.C, composed the Arthashastra as a guide to politics and statecraft. In it, he advocated a

very high degree of state control and that this control be ensured by a robust intelligence system.

Because of the central place given to intelligence, the workings of the system advocated are laid

out in some detail.

Kautilya expressed many of the same concerns with the assessment of reliability of

HUMINT sources as the Chinese, though he did not go into the specifics of methods in this area.

What Kautilya did write on at some length was the necessity for HUMINT collectors to have the

ability to assess the personality of their sources so as to choose the approach that would most

likely induce the source to give the collector the desired information. He describes the practice of

HUMINT as the gathering of information by judging and exploiting people. 18 The Arthashastra

contains a list of personality types, such as angry, greedy, diligent, or easily insulted, matching

each with a suitable approach. For example, Kautilya recommends suborning the greedy by

telling them that their leaders only reward the unworthy and that the collector and his leaders

recognize worth and reward it accordingly.19

Like the Chinese theorists of HUMINT, Kautilya recognized that the qualities and

characteristics of the HUMINT collector are of extreme importance. He wrote that HUMINT

collectors ought to be courageous, sharp, and intelligent, and that they must above all have great

integrity. In order to carry out their duties they need knowledge of physiology and sociology and

of the arts of men and society.20 Kautilya further specifies that they must have all the same

qualifications as the king and his counselors. Though he does not charge the ruler or general with

18
Kautilya, The Arthashastra, ed. and trans. L.N. Rangarajan (New Dehli: Penguin Books India,
1992), 577-578.
19
Ibid., 519-522.
20
Ibid., 503-507.

10
the direct conduct of HUMINT as the Chinese do, like the Chinese--and the Bible--Kautilya

closely associates HUMINT with political and military decision makers. 21

Other ancient civilizations practiced HUMINT as well, and though any theoretical

writings on the subject they may have done have not survived, their practice of HUMINT shows

that they identified many of the same concerns with the nature of the collector as the Chinese and

Indian theorists. All the HUMINT disciplines were used in the ancient world, including overt

collection, interrogation of prisoners, agent operations, collection by attachés or diplomats, and

the debriefing of friendly travelers and merchants. The latter two were especially prevalent and

employed by nearly every ancient state, as were agent operations. Surviving records of the one of

the earliest intelligence services known in the ancient Near East, that associated with the

Babylonia king Hammurabi, include a discussion of personality types and the motives of sources

somewhat similar to that in the Arthashastra. This intelligence service used a wide range of

HUMINT collection techniques, exploited captured documents for intelligence purposes,

included a section dedicated to analysis, and even debriefed the queen for information of value.

The traces of this organization that survive also include the earliest known classified document. 22

Civilizations in the ancient Mediterranean also employed HUMINT. Alexander the Great

and Hannibal, who both brought large military forces into distant foreign lands, both employed

HUMINT collectors who combined knowledge of these foreign lands, their cultures, and peoples

with the ability to go among those peoples and obtain the information needed to achieve their

remarkable successes. Alexander, whose conquests encompassed a large and various range of

cultures, began his practice of HUMINT as a teenager questioning Persian visitors to his father's

court regarding the road system in their empire.23 Interrogation of prisoners in much of classical

21
Ibid., 576.
22
Rose Mary Sheldon, "Spying in Mesopotamia," Studies in Intelligence 33, no. 1, Spring 1989:
9-10.
23
Donald Engels, "Alexander's Intelligence Service," Classical Quarterly 30, 1980; Rose Mary
Sheldon, "Hannibal's Spies," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 3, Fall
1986.

11

Greece was quite organized and subtle, using some of the same techniques taught to interrogators

in the present day.24 The Byzantine Empire employed agentes in rebus (conductors of affairs),

selected for their native ability and moral behavior, trained, and then employed on a trial basis for

five years. Other civilizations that engaged in sophisticated HUMINT practice included the

Persian Empire, Mongols of Jenghiz Khan, and the Abbasid Muslim Empire; in all of these, as in

the others discussed, much thought was given to HUMINT and to the attributes of a good

HUMINT collector. 25

None of the ancients aside from the Chinese and Indians left behind their theory of the

practice of HUMINT. However, it is clear both from those theoretical writings and the record of

the practice of HUMINT in all the ancient cultures that from the very beginning there was an

awareness that successful HUMINT required HUMINT collectors with certain characteristics.

There is across the records from all of them a consistent belief that the collector should be

intelligent and wise, subtle, sophisticated, courageous, and possessed of great integrity. Above

all, the ancients agreed, the collector of HUMINT must be a good judge of character with the

capability to assess motivation, approach a potential source based on that assessment, and

evaluate the source and the information provided with regard to truthfulness and reliability.

Personal Characteristics of the Collector - Modern Theory

Intelligence practice in the twentieth century was in some ways very similar to that of the

time of the ancient empires. Military and political conflict in all ranges of intensity between large

states or blocs of states spread over enormous geographic areas had by the end of the century

24
An example of this is the use of the 'show of knowledge' technique, in which the subject of
interrogation is asked a question and then told that he could not possible know the answer, provoking him
answer to prove that he does indeed know. Frank S. Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 170.
25
Francis Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece,
Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1978). The consistent emphasis in the ancient world on intelligence in general
and HUMINT in particular is likely due in large part to the despotic nature of ancient states and the need
for good information to ensure both the survival of the regime and the personal survival of the ruler.

12

given rise to large intelligence organizations, as well as to a body of literature on the theory of

intelligence produced both by academics and practitioners. Though technical intelligence

disciplines would have been a matter of wonderment to them, the ancients would have recognized

the outlines of both the organizations and the theory as a products of the same desire for

foreknowledge expressed by Sun Tzu and of the need bureaucratic states have for intelligence. In

particular, they would have immediately recogn ized the swarms of collectors fielded against both

foreign and internal targets by totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union anxious to ensure their

own survival.

The concern shown by the ancient writers on HUMINT for the qualities and

characteristics of HUMINT collectors was also shown in the writings on the topic of the twentieth

century, which stressed the importance and difficulty of finding good people to work in the

HUMINT field. What is quite striking is the great similarity between the characteristics valued

by both the ancients and the modern writers.

Modern writers on HUMINT, like the ancients, placed great value on a group of

characteristics that can be grouped together under the general heading of 'character.' Allen

Dulles, a HUMINT officer during the Second World War and later the U.S. Director of Central

Intelligence, believed that HUMINT collectors ought to have great integrity, be receptive to and

understanding of foreign points of view, and be able to work well with people under difficult

conditions. 26 Another writer stated that "what matters in the final analysis is that an intelligence

agency has people of competence and integrity available," and added that, just as in earlier eras,

good HUMINT required collectors of discretion, patience, tact, calmness, subtlety, force of mind,

and prudence. The collector would also often be required to adapt himself to the character of his

sources, though it required he do violence to his own.27

26
Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 173-175.
27
Walter Laquer, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1993), 37, 320.

13

 The importance of issues of personality and character was recognized by the agency with

which Allen Dulles was originally employed as a HUMINT collector during the Second World

War, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor agency to the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA). The director of the OSS, William Donovan, stated that it was his highest priority

to find people of quality, and the OSS put a great deal of effort into this search.28 This was not

the case from the beginning of the OSS, however. The assessment of potential OSS officers that

began in 1941 was relatively cursory, and led to complaints from overseas OSS offices about

incompetent personnel and the operational problems they caused. This led to the development of

a formal assessment process for OSS officers, one intended to find men and women of "guts,

savoir faire, and intelligence."29

The resulting assessment process aimed for a total picture of the potential officer. To

gain the necessary insights, the OSS constructed an elaborate system of situational and written

testing combined with interviews, designed to provide the deepest possible understanding of the

recruit's personality. The system made specific evaluations of each candidate in several areas,

including intelligence, emotional stability, social skills, observation skills, communications skills,

and initiative. Additionally, the evaluators made personal judgments of sense of humor, basic

honesty, and well-rounded competence. 30

This approach was not limited to Western HUMINT practice. The Soviet military

intelligence agency, the GRU, put great emphasis on the same sort of personality assessment as

the OSS, selecting as potential officers the cream of Soviet military academies. These officers

were subjected to intensive personality evaluations, in both formal and informal settings, and

judged for their effectiveness in forming close relationships with non-Soviets. 31 The KGB, the

Soviet national intelligence agency, used a similar approach. The best graduates of the top Soviet

28
"A Good Man is Hard to Find," Fortune, March 1946, 223.
29
Ibid., 92.
30
Ibid., 218.
31
Richard Framingham, "Career Trainee Program, GRU Style," Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 3
(Fall 1966): 48, 53-54, 57.

14

institutions of higher learning were selected and put through a battery of assessments similar to

that used by the GRU.32

The modern theory and practice discussed above specifically concern the practice of

agent operations. Interestingly, writers on the practice of prisoner interrogation say that

interrogators require similar qualities. Hans Scharff, the top prisoner interrogator of the German

Air Force during the Second World War, said that the key to his method was to use the best

psychological approaches of statesmanship, combined with some of the talents of an actor. He

believed that a good interrogator needed what he summed up with the German words Ehr, Lehr,

and Wehr. Ehr meant honor in the broadest sense, a total range of moral and social values. Lehr

meant education and knowledge, the refinement of heart and mind acquired by time and learning.

And Wehr signified the mental and moral virtues. Scharff added that a "deep well of personal

resourcefulness" was needed. These qualities, he believed, along with great experience and

maturity, were especially necessary when interrogating more senior prisoners. They also proved

important in dealing with the extremely complex human and intelligence problem of prisoner of

war camps, in which resistant prisoners might develop their own intelligence and resistance

networks that interrogators might be required to penetrate and unravel. 33

William R. Johnson, an interrogator and HUMINT collector for the CIA for many years,

wrote that "only people of the cleanest character" should practice interrogation. Amongst the

talents and traits of character he held that a good interrogator must have were self -understanding

and control of the emotions, some acting ability and an actor's sense of timing, and patience.

These should be combined with a talent for empathy and for establishing rapport with others.

The talents for empathy and rapport in turn are based on a high degree of personal

32
Sherman W. Flemer, "Soviet Intelligence Training," Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Winter
1959): 46.
33
Raymond F. Tolliver, The Interrogator: The Story of Hans Scharff, Luftwaffe's Master
Interrogator (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Books, 1978), 276, 183; John Joseph Kelly, "Intelligence and Counter-
Intelligence in German Prisoner of War Camps in Canada During World War II," Dalhousie Review 48
(Summer 1978).

15

communications skills and a sensitivity for what 'makes others tick,' an appreciation of human

emotions such as pride, fear, or shame.34

Accounts of collection by attachés also show the importance of the characteristics of

character and personality. Military and naval attachés in the Orient before the Second World War

used their ability to establish personal relationships with foreign military officers to gather

valuable intelligence on Japanese military capabilities, particularly that of their naval air arm. A

U.S. Naval Attaché in China during the 1930s and early 1940s, Marine Corps Major James H.

McHugh, developed close personal relationships with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai­

shek and, through these and other relationships with Chinese and third-country nationals, had

excellent access to the inner circles of the Chinese Nationalist government and military. McHugh

and other attachés used this access to produce political, military, and technical intelligence of

great value, including detailed information on the performance of Japanese aircraft and air tactics,

and the quality of Japanese pilots. 35 In eastern Europe at around the same time, attachés using

their access to and personal relationships with Soviet and other officers provided detailed

intelligence from within the Soviet Union, including the first accurate accounts of the Soviet

purges and the development of deep battle doctrine. 36

In addition to the possessing the character to form personal relationships and develop

rapport with others from an alien culture, attachés also required the same communications skills

practitioners of the other HUMINT pursuits do. A U.S. Army G-2 explained in 1923 that reports

submitted by attachés ought to be coherent, concise, and thorough and that they should have the

"ability to paint a brief pen picture of a situation and not to clutter it up with details and data as to

34
William R. Johnson, "Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation," International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 2, Summer 1986: 104-105.
35
William Leary, "Assessing the Japanese Threat: Air Intelligence Prior to Pearl Harbor,"
Aerospace Historian 34, no. 4, Winter/December 1987: 273.
36
David M. Glantz, "Observing the Soviets: U.S. Army Attachés in Eastern Europe During the
1930s," The Journal of Military History 55 (April 1991).

16

make it unintelligible." 37 Another writer states that attachés and other diplomats must be able to

"observe sharply…and to convey their findings to their superiors in clear, objective, and succinct

reports."38

Other modern practitioners and writers on HUMINT also stress the human qualities a

HUMINT collector ought to have, stating that HUMINT requires good, smart people for complex

situations; that a HUMINT collector ought to portray confidence, persistence, and a high level of

craft; that it is better to have a few people with the right attributes than many who are unsuitable;

and that their the ability to perform sophisticated, skeptical analysis of other people is critical. 39

The modern view is notable in its close consistency with the views of the theorists of the ancient

world. The ancient idea that HUMINT collectors must be possessed of integrity, intelligence,

wisdom, subtlety, sophistication, and the ability to judge character as to motivation, truthfulness,

and reliability is completely validated in the writings of modern practitioners and theorists.

The Nature of the HUMINT Relationship

The consistency of the ancients and moderns writing and practice in HUMINT is a result

of the nature of the HUMINT problem. At its root, this is a matter of the relationship between

two human beings, one of whom wants the other to provide information when doing so might not

be in the latter's best interests. There is no reason to believe that either the basic nature of

HUMINT or of relationships between people has changed in its fundamentals from the time of

Hammurabi to the present day. These relationships, then as now, require at least a small degree

37
Scott A. Koch, "The Role o f U.S. Army Military Attachés Between the World Wars," Studies in
Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 113. This observation was made as part of a lament that many attachés did
not have this ability.
38
Laquer, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, 321. The author served as an attaché and can attest
to the absolute necessity that an attaché have the ability to form personal relationships, establish rapport
with a wide range of people, and compose concise, informative reports.
39
Stephen J. Cimbala, "Counterintelligence: The Necessary Skepticism," National Defense 69,
no. 402 (November 1984): 61; Nigel West, "The Defector Syndrome: A British Perspective," American
Intelligence Journal 8, no. 2 (May 1987): 3; Larry Pavlicek, "Developing a Counterintelligence Mindset,"
Security Management 36, no. 4 (April 1992): 55; Peter F. Kalitka, "Counterintelligence Myths
Compromised! No Surprise," American Intelligence Journal 9, no. 1 (March 1988) 27; Seymour Hersh,
"The Stovepipe," The New Yorker, October 27, 2003, .

17

of rapport between two people. In some cases--for example, when the provision of information to

the collector might endanger the source--a collector's success may require development of a

close, trusting relationship. People of low integrity and character who are not highly sensitive to

others with whom they interact are unlikely to be able to successfully cultivate sources in this

way. This applies to all varieties of HUMINT practice: as rapport is necessary in any

relationship, the agent handler, diplomat or attaché, interrogator, and overt debriefer all require

the personal ability and qualities needed to establish it.

Once the needed relationship is established, the collector must be able to control it. A

source will always have some sort of stake in the relationship reflecting his motive for entering

into it. This motive may be adventure, esteem for the collector, the desire for revenge on

someone, or almost any other human motive. The context of the source's motive will inevitably

have some influence on the information he provides since the source may be attempting to

accomplish something through the collector. For example, if the source provides information

from his workplace out of anger at a co-worker, that information may be twisted or edited to have

a particular effect on that co-worker, or may even be false. The context of the source's motive

can be particularly important when the information provided is of a political nature and the source

is involved in the political activity concerned.40 This problem inherent to HUMINT is the reason

collectors are said to need sophistication, wisdom, subtlety, and the ability to judge and assess

people as to their character, motivation, reliability, and truthfulness. These characteristics and

abilities allow the collector to properly weigh the information provided against the context of the

source and his motivation. The better the awareness of the context, the less ability the source has

to accomplish his ends through an unwitting collector, and the more control the collector has of

the relationship. Again, the common and central concern with this aspect of the HUMINT

problem shown in both ancient and contemporary times demonstrates its overriding importance.

40
Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War (New York: Madison Books, 1992), 58-60.

18
The Background of the Collector

Area Knowledge

Writers on HUMINT from both ancient and modern times, while placing great emphasis

on the personal qualities of collectors, have also always believed their professional and

educational characteristics to be very important, specifically their background, experience,

knowledge of the world, and in particular knowledge of the part of the world in which they and

their sources work, or area knowledge.41 There are two main reasons for this. The first is to aid

the collector in the establishment of rapport with sources, to supplement the personal qualities

needed with the ability to do so across a cultural divide, and to help him navigate the environment

in which sources must be sought. The second is to provide an advantage to the collector in the

effort to control the relationship with the source by ensuring that the collector knows at least the

cultural and political basics of the area in which he is working, thereby making the collector

harder for the source to deceive and aiding the collector in the assessment of both the information

and the source.42

In ancient times, one particular professional group was prized as HUMINT collectors, the

class of merchants. All ancient intelligence services seem to have employed traveling merchants

directly, or at least debriefed them upon their return home. Kautilya mentions that Indian

merchants were excellent gatherers of information.43 The ancient Greeks were very aware of the

potential of merchants as HUMINT collectors and made extensive use of them against each other

as well as against their Persian enemies, while the Persians in turn used the same methods against

41
Both the ancients and moderns also greatly valued the mastery of foreign languages for
HUMINT collectors, for obvious reasons.
42
There is a third reason, which is to enable collectors to assume a notional background or
profession. The purpose of this is to provide a pretext for the collector to be somewhere potential sources
might be found and for access to them, an idea known as cover. Cover will be discussed only in passing in
this paper. U.S. Army HUMINT collectors make very little use of this as they primarily engage in overt
collection, prisoner interrogation, or debriefing of friendly travelers, activities that do not ordinarily require
cover.
43
Kautilya, Arthashastra, 509-510.

19
the Greeks. 44 Alexander the Great questioned merchants and traveling artisans in great detail who

were familiar with areas and peoples of interest. The Roman Empire actually formalized their

employment of merchants as collectors. The Roman intelligence service recruited the merchants

who furnished supplies to their legions--called in Latin frumentarii--and employed them in an

organized network throughout the Empire as collectors of both HUMINT and taxes. 45 Jenghiz

Khan, whose fast-moving, fluid style of war and conquest required accurate intelligence

regarding both his enemies and their lands, made extensive use of merchants as both HUMINT

collectors and sources. 46

A primary reason that merchants were seen as suitable for HUMINT was that their travels

and business dealings provided them excellent cover, but this was certainly not the only reason.

Merchants were very often extremely valuable sources of area knowledge; the success of their

business enterprises often depended on their familiarity with the people, language, and culture of

an area in which they wished to do business. Jenghiz Khan, for example, sought merchants out

not only for the specifics of an area such as roads or logistics, but also because they were highly

cultivated, worldly, and able to provide advice in areas such as diplomatic or psychological

approaches. 47

Area knowledge of this kind has always been recognized as valuable, especially for those

conducting military operations in foreign lands amongst alien cultures; the campaigns of

Alexander the Great provide an excellent example of the collection of this kind of information

and its use. Alexander's operations against the Persians and others in Asia would have failed if he

had not been able to obtain information about supplies, roads, terrain, climate, and the fighting

ability of his enemies. A wrong turn by his army might have put them in country that could not

44
Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece , 92; Engels, "Alexander's Intelligence
Service," 333.
45
Rose Mary Sheldon, "The Roman Secret Service," The Intelligence Quarterly 1, no. 2 (July
1985): 1.
46
Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services, 274.
47
Ibid., 275.

20
feed them or in terrain that presented tactical problems, and thereby lead to defeat. His

accumulation of area knowledge required a sophisticated effort. Potential sources for this kind of

intelligence were not hard to find, but Alexander and his staff were faced with the problem of

evaluating sources and the information provided to guard against being deceived. The process

started with the gathering of area knowledge from merchants and others who had traveled through

Asia. Then, while on campaign in Asia, the solid base of area knowledge made it much more

difficult for local sources to provide false information and enabled the intelligent evaluation of

sources and information; this fresh information, in turn, allowed the assessment of still more

sources and information. 48

Another group capable of providing excellent area knowledge was diplomats and envoys.

Nearly all the ancient states of every culture and era exchanged envoys. While the most

prominent role of a diplomat is to represent his country in a foreign capital, diplomats have also

always served the function of information gatherers. The Mesopotamians, Chinese, Indians,

Greeks, Romans, Persians, Byzantines, and Abbasid Muslims, amongst others, all used diplomats

and envoys as important sources of area knowledge and other information. 49 The Greeks in

particular took great care in the selection of their envoys, who they selected on the basis of their

area knowledge and their ability to understand their potential targets. One famous example was

Aristotle, who while serving as a tutor to Alexander the Great, was said to have been sent to

Greece by Alexander's father Philip as an envoy and collector, based on his knowledge of his

native land.50

The employment of diplomats in this manner--including military diplomats, or attachés--

has hardly changed. A modern author has described the attaché's role as a HUMINT collector as

observing and reporting political, sociological, psychological, and economic information of

48
Engels, "Alexander's Intelligence System," 328-332.

49
Dvornik, Origins of Intelligence Services.

50
Russell, Information Gathering in Classical Greece , 65.

21

potential value in assessing military intentions as well as the military situation as a whole.51 The

importance of an attaché's ability to establish personal relationships with his potential sources has

already been noted; what is nearly as important is the area knowledge that an attaché who lives

and works in a country, speaks the language, and understands the people and culture can provide

to his government. This sort of understanding--in combination with the vital personal qualities

noted earlier--is obviously of great use in the establishment of rapport with sources. Area and

cultural knowledge also allows the collector to move more comfortably in the target society, to be

more discreet when necessary, and to more easily find those who might become sources. Further,

it enables the collector to make more intelligent and accurate observations. An important reason

for the success of American attachés in Japan and China in the period before the Second World

War was that their area and cultural knowledge enabled them to present the intelligence they

collected to their superiors free of the racial stereotypes of Orientals common amongst Americans

at that time. 52 This was true as well of their counterparts serving in the Soviet Union, Eastern

Europe, and other parts of the world; in fact, the archive of their reports shows that by both

volume and quality, attachés were the most productive U.S. collectors of intelligence during the

years before the Second World War. Their important role continues to this day.53

The importance of area knowledge can be shown by demonstrating the effect that its lack

can have. A famous example is that of the Athenian expedition to Sicily during the

Peloponnesian War. Thucydides relates that, although the Athenians knew little of basic facts

such as the size of the island or of the people who inhabited it, they committed a large part of

their power to an eventually disastrous campaign. The Athenian mistake is in great part due to

their failure to correctly assess their sources of information on the subject. The members of the

51
Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995),
246.
52
Leary, "Assessing the Japanese Threat," 277. The reports of these attachés, notwithstanding
their accuracy, were often ignored. Most in the U.S. military (though not all) thought that their reports on
the high proficiency of Japanese pilots and the quality of their aircraft were improbable based on
preconceptions of Japanese backwardness relative to the West.
53
Glantz, "Observing the Soviets," 154, 183; Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 246.

22
Athenian assembly--who had the responsibility for the decision to undertake the expedition--had

little area knowledge of Sicily upon which to base their decision. They were forced to rely on

their sources for that information; these sources were their own political leadership. In assessing

the information their political leaders provided on Sicily, they failed to remember that their

leaders had a personal political stake in the mounting of the expedition (and no more area

knowledge of Sicily than anyone else), and to assess the information they provided accordingly. 54

Another illustration of the effect of a lack of area knowledge is provided by the Battle of

the Teutoburg Forest. In A.D. 9, three Roman legions of the Emperor Augustus led by Quintilius

Varus were destroyed by rebellious Germans led by the tribal leader Arminius in a battle that

marked the final limit of the expansion of the Roman Empire in that part of Europe. This was in

large measure attributable to lack of information of two kinds. First, a lack of understanding of

the culture of the Germanic tribes--particularly that of Arminius, which had a long tradition of

resistance to Roman rule--prevented Varus, who like other ancient leaders served in part as his

own HUMINT collector, from comprehending the degree of dissatisfaction with Roman rule in

that part of Germany. Based on his personal interactions with Arminius and other Germans,

Varus, who was not knowledgeable of the culture of his enemy, believed the problem to be a

dispute between Germans that did not directly involve the Romans. This led him to

underestimate the threat and discount information that the German discontent was not with other

Germans, but with the Romans. Second, an incomplete understanding of the terrain combined

with the underestimation of the threat led the Romans to march into an ideal ambush site, in

which the Germans were able to trap and kill approximately 12,000 Roman legionaires, a defeat

amongst the worst ever suffered by the Romans. 55

54
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 1998), 233, 236-242.
55
Rose Mary Sheldon, "Slaughter in the Forest: Roman Intelligence Mistakes in Germany," Small
Wars and Insurgencies 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001).

23

 Modern writers and practitioners also recognize the importance of area knowledge. Allen

Dulles pointed out the necessity that collectors be understanding of foreign ways of thinking,

William Johnson that collectors be able to apply cultural insights to the subjects of both

interrogation and the close relative of interrogation, the polygraph examination. 56 Other writers

also describe regional and area knowledge as vital and refer to the need for knowledge of the

character of the natives and ignorance of the outside world as dangerous. 57 The intelligence

agencies of the former USSR shared this concern. One of them, the GRU, provided their

HUMINT collectors with a Western-style liberal arts education to give them a deeper

understanding of their targets. 58

Of the reasons discussed earlier for the importance of area knowledge, the provision of an

advantage to the collector in his efforts to control his relationships with his sources is vital. A

collector with attractive personal qualities and a friendly disposition may well be able to establish

the needed rapport with an individual from an entirely foreign culture, learning what he needs

about that culture along the way. The collector may even be able to turn the need to learn the

culture to advantage, cultivating talkative and proud natives by inviting them to talk about their

country, its culture and politics.

But a collector without area knowledge is vulnerable to misunderstanding what his

sources tell him, or even to deception. The state-run media of China recently furnished an

amusing, though instructive, example of how a lack of area knowledge can lead to

misunderstanding. The Beijing Evening News reported in its May 29, 2002 edit ion that the U.S.

Congress had threatened to move from Washington unless the Capitol building was upgraded to

include a retractable dome and luxury boxes. This story was picked up from the satirical U.S.

56
Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 174; William R. Johnson, "The Ambivalent Polygraph,"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 2, Summer 1986: 73; Johnson, "Tricks
of the Trade," 105.
57
BGen James D. Beans, "Marine Corps Intelligence in Low-Intensity Conflicts," Signal 43, no. 7,
March 1989: 30; Laquer, Uses and Limits of Intelligence, 320, 322.
58
Framingham, "Career Trainee Program," 53.

24
newspaper The Onion. The basis of the mistake was a lack of area knowledge, specifically that

the demands of professional sports teams for subsidized stadiums were becoming a significant

political issue in some U.S. cities. But even a basic familiarity with the U.S., its government, and

its culture would probably have prevented this gaffe. 59

While mistakes resulting from misunderstanding can cause problems, purposeful

deception can cause total failure. A collector with no area knowledge can come to consider a

source who explains the local environment as indispensable; the source in such a situation will

likely sense the collector's dependency and gain more control over the relationship from the

collector. 60 In addition, the collector will have little or no ability to assess the credibility of the

source's information. This can be especially difficult if a source provides information on an

unimportant topic that is shown to be reliable, and then offers information in an important area on

which the collector has little knowledge.61 This combination of circumstances makes the

collector and the intelligence system very vulnerable to deception, as the source has control of

both the relationship and the information and can use this to influence the collector's belief in the

credibility of source and information.

Deception, though, need not be deliberate. In 1961 the U.S. government believed reports

from Cuban exiles that said the Cuban people would rise against the Castro government if a U.S.-

sponsored invasion took place. These reports were deceptive, though not purposefully so. The

collectors involved did not have the area knowledge necessary to understand their sources' deep

emotional stake in the matter, nor that it was their fondest hope that this would be the case. They

therefore judged these reports as credible, contributing eventually to the failure of the landing at

59
Henry Chu, "Reeled In By A Spoof, Chinese Daily Shrugs Off Its Capitol Error," Los Angeles
Times, June 7 , 2002, A3.
60
Peter F. Kalitka, "Back to the Future (Note 1)," American Intelligence Journal 9, no. 1, Fall
1988: 15. This was the problem faced by the Athenian assembly described earlier.
61
Bruce L. Pechan, "The Collector's Role in Evaluation," Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 2, Summer
1961: 39. This problem can easily occur, as the most valuable information will not be common knowledge,
but, as it is not common knowledge, its credibility will be that much harder to evaluate.

25

the Bay of Pigs. 62 The important point is that the less collectors know about their target area, the

more vulnerable they and the operational elements they support are to being deceived by their

enemy, intentionally or otherwise. This can, in the worst case, lead to defeat.

Professional Background

Another area of concern in HUMINT theory and practice throughout all eras has been the

collector's profession outside of his work as an intelligence collector. The earliest writers on the

subject believed that under ideal circumstances the collector should be matched as closely as

possible to his target. The Arthashastra recommends that collectors should be of similar personal

and professional backgrounds as their potential targets, and specifies that merchants should be

employed as collectors against commercial interests, householders against small towns, and so

forth. The intent of this was that the collectors be able to bring their expertise in a given area to

the problem as an aid to intelligent collection. 63 The Chinese followed a corresponding practice

for reasons similar to those given in The Arthashastra, believing that those from related

backgrounds know each other best. 64 In the current day, this idea is a part of the rationale for

attaché collection operations, which deploy military officers as collectors primarily against other

military officers.

Properly matching a collector to a target or group of targets in this way provides two

advantages. These are somewhat similar to the advantages gained by area knowledge in

establishing rapport and evaluating sources and information. First, a collector will have a much

easier time establishing rapport with a source with whom he shares a profession. All professions

have broad elements in common throughout the world, and many have a professional jargon or

technical aspects that only a member of that profession would understand. The essentials of

being a merchant, doctor, politician, or many other occupations are largely the same everywhere,

62
Felix, The Secret War, 102-103.

63
Kautilya, Arthashastra, 468, 509-510.

64
Sawyer, TheTao of Spycraft, 324.

26

and members of the same profession will not have difficulty finding common ground or the basis

for the beginnings of a personal relationship. Conversely, sending a mechanic to establish a

relationship with and collect from a politician will usually not be productive. As one writer

stated, "Because it is…a waste of time to press people who habitually talk to farmers to talk to

scholars, and vice versa, the notion of an all-purpose intelligence collector is silly." Collectors,

he adds, should ideally be as diverse as their targets. 65

The case of attachés provides a good example of this principle. Military officers around

the world, in addition to the common technical aspects of the profession, nearly all share a slight

degree of disdain (at the very least) for civilians. An attaché who meets a foreign officer at a

social function can use this as the start of a conversation with that officer, a pretext for talking to

the officer about his government, and even a motive for the source to provide information. 66

The second advantage provided by a proper match of collector to source is in the

assessment of sources and information, thoroughness of debriefing, and speed of collection.

Where the similar advantage gained through area knowledge can aid in the evaluation of a source

and his information in relation to the general context of the situation, the specific knowledge of a

collector seeking information in an area of personal expertise will provide the ability to evaluate

the source and his information in more detail. It would be very easy, for example, for a proficient

aeronautical engineer to assess the truthfulness of a source providing information on the design of

an aircraft, or for an artilleryman serving as an attaché to evaluate the credibility of information

obtained on a fire direction system.

A collector well matched to a source will also have the ability to debrief sources more

thoroughly and efficiently, making the best use of what may be scarce opportunities to collect

from a given source and obtaining information more quickly. The aeronautical engineer or

artillery officer could, for instance, do an on-the-spot analysis of the information provided and

65
Angelo Codevilla, Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (New York: The Free
Press, 1992), 303, 441.
66
The author's personal experience as an attaché bears this out completely.

27
ask intelligent follow-up questions immediately to clarify, amplify, or expand on the material

provided. This capacity to bring expertise to bear and analyze information immediately can

eliminate the possible need for the collector to submit the information to his organization, await

feedback, and then arrange another interview to fill in gaps identified. This understanding of the

subject matter of the information, along with generic communications skills, is also needed for

the collector to be able to produce useful reports. If a collector cannot be specif ically matched to

a source in this way, the collector should at least have a respectable store of knowledge on the

subjects upon which sources provide information to allow for follow-up questions, some degree

of immediate evaluation, the composition of intelligent reports that include commentary from the

collector. 67

Consistency of Ancients and Moderns on the Collector's Background

In the question of the ideal educational, cultural, and professional background of

HUMINT collectors, as in matters of their character and personal qualities, we again find that

writers and practitioners of every era are in fairly close correspondence. All are in agreement that

HUMINT collectors need to have a good amount of area knowledge, that individual collectors

should be matched as closely as possible to their possible sources, and that every collector ought

to have a decent grounding in the subject in which information is sought. The combination of all

these can be incredibly effective. Area knowledge can help the collector move through the

society he is working in and more efficiently find those who have the information he seeks; it can

also prevent mistakes based on a poor appraisal of the social and cultural context of the source.

Collectors deployed with a view to matching up with a particular sort of source, having found and

made a general evaluation of a potential source based on their area knowledge, then have a head

start in beginning and building the relationship necessary to obtain the desired information.

Finally, the expertise of a collector properly matched to a source facilitates the best and most

67
Pechan, "The Collector's Role," 40, 44-46.

28
efficient use of the source and his information, and produces the most intelligent, useful reports

possible by the collector.

29

 The HUMINT Organization

Leadership

Where ancient HUMINT practice was usually (though not always) carried out by a few

collectors working directly for a general or king, modern HUMINT, while still used at the

national level, is also practiced at a much lower level and may support very small units,

particularly in SASO or counterinsurgency operations. 68 In the U.S. Army today collectors are

found in dedicated collection units of company or platoon size located at the corps and division

levels, as well as in the armored cavalry regiment and special forces group. 69 Other militaries

also have HUMINT capabilities that operate at similar levels. 70 The size and complexity of

modern military organizations makes it impossible in nearly all circumstances that a senior

officer would be able to directly supervise a HUMINT collector in the way that his predecessors

in the time of Sun Tzu might have. As specialist intelligence officers rather than senior

commanders now supervise collectors and, as we have seen, the practice of HUMINT is a subtle

art requiring a particular set of characteristics, the characteristics of the person who would lead

HUMINT collection units is worthy of consideration.

HUMINT leaders, like leaders of other organizations, must possess integrity, character,

and the ability to communicate with and motivate their subordinates. 71 What are of interest here,

though, are the characteristics and abilities that would be unique to a leader and supervisor of

HUMINT collectors.

68
See page 3 above. This is not completely new; the U.S. Marine Corps advocated doing
this in its small-war doctrine in 1940, which allowed for the practice of HUMINT down to the
individual patrol level. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1940), Chapter 6, 39.
69
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 22-7, Chapter 2.
70
Interview with and email from LTC J. R. Hockenhull. LTC Hockenhull is a British
exchange instructor with the U.S. Army Command and Staff College who has direct and
extensive experience of British HUMINT operations and practice.
71
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 22-100, 31 August 1999. It is interesting
that the description of desired leadership traits in this manual, as well as in civilian academic
writing on leadership, bears great similarity to the desired traits of a HUMINT collector discussed
earlier.

30

 What must make a HUMINT leader different from other leaders is the requirement that

all leaders have to be competent in the basic skills of the organization they lead. Leadership

paradigms and expectations not only across various sorts of organizations but across cultures give

an important role to competence, to the ability of the leader to not only perform basic tasks, but to

excel in them. 72

What distinguishes the leader of a HUMINT organization from a leader in another

intelligence discipline or, for that matter, from a leader in another walk of life, is skill in the

basics of the HUMINT discipline. One academic study has stated that positions of leadership in

the best organizations will be held by those who are perceived by members of the organization as

extremely proficient in the organization's basic activity. In particular, the initial impression of

members of the organizations as to the leader's expertise will have a strong influence on the

status, influence, credibility, and prestige of the leader in the organization. Leaders in these

organizations will tend not to be generalists, i.e. continue to be fully expert in performing basic

tasks in spite of their more senior position and added responsibilities. 73 The presence of an

extremely competent leader can be a huge benefit for an organization. One writer describes a

restaurant kitchen in which the "esprit de corps" of the staff "would have done credit to the

marines." This was in spite of the fact that the head chef was extremely demanding, intolerant of

mistakes, boasted that he made more money than everyone else, micromanaged to a great degree,

and seldom praised anyone for anything. Remarking that many aspects of this leader's style were

not at all what one might wish for, the writer states that the critical factor in this situation was that

the leader was by far the most proficient in the basic skill of the organization--cooking--and

72
David M. Rosen, "Leadership in World Cultures," in Leadership: Multidisciplinary
Perspectives, ed. Barbara Kellerman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1984), 47-60.
73
Peter B. Vaill, "Toward a Behavioral Description of High-Performing Systems," in Leadership:
Where Else Can We Go?, ed. Morgan W. McCall, Jr. and Michael M. Lombardo (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1978), 111.

31

everyone in the organization knew it. 74 While it seems clear that competence cannot mask

abusive or overbearing behavior forever, the special value of leader competence is also evident.

U.S. Army leadership doctrine agrees that leaders must possess a high degree of technical

skill and competence, and that in every organization there are skills in which all members,

including leaders, must be competent. 75 Direct leaders--those who are the first-line supervisors of

individual soldiers--should be the Army's technical experts. This not only engenders respect for

leaders, but enables them to serve as trainers and mentors for their subordinates, to properly

employ their organization's capabilities, and to make decisions. 76

What makes the challenge facing the leader of a HUMINT organization unique is the

nature of the work his subordinates perform. A special problem HUMINT leaders face is that of

assessing their subordinates' personal relationships with sources when quite often the leader, for

reasons of practicality or security, will never be present at a meeting with the source. Quite aside

from the necessity for a leader to establish his status by means of his competence in the basic

skills of the HUMINT discipline, the leader also needs some degree of HUMINT skill to

effectively interact with his collectors to determine the true state of their collection operations.

As the collector more than likely has at least a small personal stake in the relationship with the

source, he may shade his account of the relationship and the source's performance to his

supervisor, even if only unwittingly. To effectively supervise subordinates in their conduct of

operations, the leader must assess the reliability of the collectors' accounts of their sources in

much the same way as the collector assesses the reliability of the source's information. The

ability to do so requires the establishment of a working rapport with the collector and many of the

same skills that collectors use in the course of their work; in fact, since HUMINT collectors

exercise these skills on a routine basis, the supervisor's skills ought to be of a higher order to

74
D. Ogilvy, "The Creative Chef," in The Creative Organization, ed. G. Steiner (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 114.
75
Department of the Army, FM 22-100, 4-14.
76
Ibid., 2-25, 4-14; Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development
and Career Management, 1 October 1998, 1.

32
ensure that the supervisor-collector relationship is conducted in the best interests of the

organization.77 Without such skills, the leader will be able to neither effectively supervise his

subordinates nor make intelligent decisions on their proper employment.

An interesting and useful analogue to the situation of a leader of HUMINT collectors is

that faced by supervisors of psychoanalysts. 78 Like a HUMINT collector, an analyst must

establish a personal relationship with a source. In the case of the psychoanalyst, the source is a

patient from whom the psychoanalyst collects information; the information collected in this case

is an account of the patient's own mental state. In working with the patient, the psychoanalyst

must make an assessment of the information the patient provides with a view towards having a

therapeutic effect on the patient largely through the vehicle of their personal relationship. In the

case of both the analyst and the HUMINT collector, there is inevitably a very strong interpersonal

aspect at the core of the matter.79

The highly interpersonal nature of psychoanalysis presents the teacher or supervisor of

psychoanalysts with a problem in that the supervisor must rely on the analyst's account of the

personal interaction with the patient in order to evaluate both the subordinate psychoanalyst and

the patient. To do so, the supervisor establishes a relationship with the analyst that is quite

similar to that which the analyst establishes with the patient. The supervisor often functions as a

coach to the analyst, helping the analyst learn through overt instruction, by actually practicing the

skills of psychoanalysis with the patient, and also by way of being a participant in the relationship

with the supervisor. Analysts, as well as students in many other professions, learn best by doing,

77
This is not to say that the supervisor-subordinate relationship should or must be adversarial.
The subordinate will have an interest in presenting his work in the field in the best possible light, and the
supervisor must be aware of and account for this.
78
The description of psychoanalytic practice and the supervision of psychoanalysts that follows is
drawn from Donald A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (New York:
Basic Books, 1983), 105-127; and especially Donald A. Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner (San
Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1987), 217-254. This paper makes no claim as to the efficacy of
psychoanalysis, but is interested in the field as one in which personal relationships are central to its
practice.
79
There is a similar element in many other professions, such as teaching, management, social
work, or sales. Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner, 220.

33

and the role of coaching by a senior and expert analyst is the best way to nurture talent and create

skill. It is, in effect, a very personal form of leadership and mentoring by example. This is

especially important in professions such as psychoanalysis--or HUMINT collection--in which the

situations faced by the professional will be endlessly various and call for the exercise of informed

judgment in the face of a multitude of unique situations. 80 What is important for effective

coaching and mentoring in such an environment is that those who are learning the profession

have access to experts who are capable of filling the role of coach and mentor and whose

proficiency is such that there would be no question of their qualifications to do so.

While it is evident that any leader of any organization must be skilled in the basics of the

function of the organization, it is especially true that this be the case with the leaders of HUMINT

organizations. The leader's place at the head of the organization can be cemented by the

realization on the part of its members that the leader is amongst the best of them in their

profession. The leader will also require HUMINT proficiency in order to make decisions on the

proper employment of his collectors, to translate the information requirements of those the

organization supports, whether military or civilian, into specific instructions for the individual

collectors.

Finally, and most importantly, the leader must possess the skill to establish a relationship

with subordinate collectors similar to that which collectors establish with sources. This is

necessary to enable the leader to intelligently assess his subordinates' performance and the value

of the information they have gathered from sources who the leader will never meet, and is the

most important method by which the leader may present himself as an example and fully develop

the skills of subordinates.

80
Ibid., 6, 16-17.

34
Quality Control

The central aspect of the HUMINT problem, as we have seen, is the personal relationship

and rapport between the collector and the source. This relationship may only be of a few minutes

length, but it might also be of far longer duration. What is important is that it furnishes the

collector an opportunity to gather information from the source, and provides the source the

motivation to give the collector the information he seeks. This relationship obviously requires

some personal investment by the source, but it also requires a return on that investment by the

collector; this return can be as simple as praise or as involved and collaborative as friendship.

Whatever the duration or nature of the rapport between the collector and a source, it is vital that

the collector maintain control of the relationship and ensure that it continues to primarily serve

his purposes rather than those of the source or some third party. Failure of the collector to control

relationships with sources can result in a source using the collector to accomplish his purposes.

These purposes may be relatively innocent; for example, a source's purpose may be only to

continue to meet with the collector for the excitement. However, a source may use control of the

relationship for more malign reasons, such as using the collector as a conduit for misleading or

deceptive information. But even in the innocent seeming instance, a collector who his not in

control and does not realize that the source's main goal is to continue the relationship can have a

serious problem. The collector, not understanding that the source manipulates the information he

provides with the goal of maintaining the collector's interest, may well accept distorted

information as genuine and report it as reliable intelligence.

The problem of controlling relationships with sources can be, due to the personal stake

that both sources and collectors might have, a difficult one. The establishment of rapport with a

source requires a degree of personal commitment and engagement on the part of the collector.

This engagement can make it difficult for a collector who has cultivated a source over a period of

time to objectively and rigorously examine the relationship with the source with a view to

35

determining as best as possible who truly controls the relationship. A collector who has a strong

personal relationship with a source has, due to his personal involvement, something of a conflict

of interest in the matter.

A different variety of problem can develop for collectors with their sources who are

considered particularly good. The relationship with a source who provides good information can

also become difficult if the source is told or comes to understand that he is important. 81 The need

to praise and encourage sources to strengthen relationships must be balanced with the imperative

of retaining control over sources. Striking this balance is amongst the most difficult things for a

collector.

Theorists of HUMINT recognize this issue and the difficulties inherent in deciding which

sources are properly controlled and which are not. The solution to these problems is the

provision of good counterintelligence (CI) support to HUMINT operations. The role of CI

support is to guard the integrity of collection operations and to protect against both purposeful

manipulation and inadvertent confusion by evaluation of both the source and the information

provided. The goal of CI support to HUMINT should be to help determine who controls a

relationship with a source--the collector, the source, or someone else--and how reliable the

information a source provides is. 82 This is done through continuous evaluation of the source's

motives and general truthfulness, as well as through particular attention to the reliability and

veracity of the information provided.

Proper use of CI in support of HUMINT is vital in an environment in which an enemy

purposefully attempts to deceive by putting ostensible sources where friendly collectors might

find and begin to use them. This can be especially important in a low-intensity conflict against an

opponent who does not have the capability to deceive via technical means. During the Vietnam

War, for instance, U.S. units employed 'Chieu Hoi' scouts as guides and sources of information on

81
Kalitka, "Back to the Future," 14-15.

82
Codevilla, Informing Statecraft, 26-28.

36

the local area and personalities. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese frequently attempted to

plant people under their control with the Chieu Hoi in order to deceive, or even to lead U.S. units

into ambushes. Good CI support, particularly the detailed review of every case with a view

towards establishing truthfulness, reliability, and motivation, prevented most of these planted

Chieu Hoi from having any effect. 83

What is crucial is that CI serve as an honest evaluator of every HUMINT source, and that

it be allowed to do so independently of the HUMINT collector. As noted earlier, the HUMINT

collector has a stake in the validity of his source's information. So do the collector's superiors,

who may have some reluctance to go to the commander they support to say that intelligence

previously believed excellent was in fact bogus. CI in this role is in fact much like quality control

in an industrial organization and, like quality control, can be unpopular. 84 The practice of quality

control in the commercial world recognizes this problem and accounts for it by ensuring that the

director of production does not supervise the individual responsible for quality control. The

director of quality control instead is generally a peer of the director of production, both of whom

usually answer to a common superior. 85 CI elements supporting HUMINT collectors should

likewise be independent of those collectors and their superiors so that their objectivity is

unimpaired. In fact, this is the way that CI, so as to allow hard, independent examinations of

HUMINT operations, supports many HUMINT organizations. 86

83
Joseph C. Liberti, "Counterintelligence in Direct Support," Infantry 64, no. 2, March-April
1976: 42.
84
Codevilla, Informing Statecraft, 447.
85
Richard E. DeVor, Tsong-how Chang, and John W. Sutherland, Statistical Design and Quality
Control (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 11. In some industries the current approach is now
to spread quality control throughout an organization and its processes, including the product design
process. This is especially true in non-industrial activities like software design or service industries.
However, in many industries such as construction and heavy manufacturing, the traditional separation of
quality control from production continues as it is more suited to the nature of those industries. Email from
Mr. Ricardo R. Fernandez, November 23, 2003. Mr. Fernandez is the president of Advent Group, a quality
assurance consultancy.
86
Cimbala, "Counterintelligence," 63; Email from Mr. William M. Edwards, 10 October 2003.
Mr. Edwards is the Chief of CI Support for HUMINT Operations in the Defense Intelligence Agency.

37

 What is at stake in the HUMINT quality control effort is the control of sources and,

ultimately, the control of information. It is for this reason that Sun Tzu, for whom knowledge and

information were central, puts such emphasis on the identification of enemy HUMINT sources,

and that the Chinese theorists were so concerned with the assessment of the reliability of sources

and information.87 Likewise, The Arthashastra says that sources and the information they

provide should always be tested. 88 To fulfill this quality control function, CI should employ what

one writer describes as a 'sophisticated skepticism,' examining every HUMINT source with an

eye to what could be wrong, being especially wary of those sources who might be becoming

'important' or 'indispensable,' and not being deterred by HUMINT collectors who insist that their

sources are excellent and do not merit the attention of CI support. 89 At the same time, though,

HUMINT operations cannot be paralyzed by a excess of mistrust. The idea is to examine

operations thoroughly, employing a reasonable degree of prudence, so that an intelligent decision

on each source can be made. Failure to succeed in this may lead to a successful enemy deception

and all the consequences that implies. As a theorist of intelligence has stated, "…when one side's

intelligence loses the contest in quality control, it becomes a net liability."90

87
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 146, 148, 149. Sun Tzu also advocates giving identified enemy
HUMINT sources false information as a means to deceive.
88
Kautilya, Arthashastra, 381.
89
Kalitka, "Back to the Future," 13-14; Kalitka, "Counterintelligence Myths," 27.
90
Codevilla, Informing Statecraft, 37.

38

 Conclusions and Recommendations

The Nature of the Problem for the U.S. Army

As noted at the beginning of this paper, the intelligence leaders of the U.S. Army have

identified the need for improvement of the Army HUMINT capabilities. What is disturbing is

that the current generation of leaders is not the first to identify this need. In fact, the deficiency

and need for improvement in Army HUMINT capability has been noted in publications at least as

far back as the end of the Vietnam War, and periodically since then up to the present day. 91

While HUMINT is as old as civilization and conflict and has been practiced in every era

by virtually every variety of human group, understanding of and aptitude for HUMINT has varied

greatly. Americans would not seem to have been amongst the most effective or apt practitioners

of HUMINT. This has been variously put down to the American preference for technical

solutions, dislike for what is seen as an underhanded practice, deficiency of cross-cultural skills

and empathy, and the absence of a tradition of intelligence and intrigue. 92 This is something that

we share with our cultural predecessors, the Romans, who during the period before the Caesars

found a vigorous intelligence service to be incompatible with the principles of their republican

government. Instead, the Romans sought direct military confrontation, were generally stronger

than their opponents, and therefore preferred to employ means that made use of their strength and

demonstrated dominance.93 As we have seen, the Roman lack of sophistication in this area in one

instance cost them three legions and checked the expansion of the Roman Empire in Central

Europe.

91
Hurley, "HUMINT Revitalization;" Liberti, "Counterintelligence in Direct Support." These two
articles are only the oldest found in the course of research for this paper; there are many others. What is
interesting is that have been surges in production of papers calling for improved HUMINT at the beginning
of each decade with titles such as "HUMINT for the 80s," or whichever decade impends.
92
Sherr, "Cultures of Spying," 56-60; Robert Bryant et al., "America Needs More Spies," The
Economist 368, no. 8332, 12 July 2003: 30. HUMINT is often a tool employed by the weak or poor
against the strong or rich, and this may also be a factor in the American preference for other means. The
most famous and proudly recounted instance of American HUMINT, that of Nathan Hale, comes from the
era of the American Revolution, when American power was at its weakest and most vulnerable.
93
Sheldon, "The Roman Secret Service," 2.

39
 The result of this for the U.S. is that there is little in American writing on statecraft,

power, and the military to compare with the extensive discussions of the theory and practice of

HUMINT found in Chinese or Indian thought, and therefore little accessible work on the subject

useful for American HUMINT thinkers or practitioners. What work does exist rarely discusses

the human aspect of the problem, but more often discusses organizational or administrative

issues, or attempts at technical solutions to HUMINT inadequacies. 94 While it would seem self-

evident that the nature of the individual collector as far as his personal characteristics and

interpersonal skills would be central to HUMINT, what is striking in U.S. Army writing on the

subject, both in doctrinal publications and journal contributions, is the lack of consideration of

these topics. This is in marked contrast to much of the literature of other cultures, which often

goes into great detail on questions of personality and the suitability of individuals for HUMINT.

Application of HUMINT Principles

What has been lacking in the Army's efforts to improve HUMINT capability to date has

been the application of principles of HUMINT to the problem in the same way that principles of,

say, the propagation of radio waves are applied to the SIGINT problem. In fact, a great deal of

time and financial resources are put into the design and matching of SIGINT and other technical

sensors to their targets, while nearly no similar effort is put into a similar effort for HUMINT.

What is necessary to improve HUMINT is attention to the 'design' of the HUMINT sensor, the

individual collector, in relation to HUMINT targets, and to support HUMINT collectors with the

right leadership and organizations. Through an examination of the historical and theoretical

literature, this paper has derived some principles of the HUMINT discipline. These principles are

that collectors must have certain personal characteristics and a good degree of area knowledge;

94
David D. Perkins, "Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Operations in Bosnia," Defense
Intelligence Journal 6, no. 1, Spring 1997; Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Dillon, "A Theory for Human
Intelligence Operations," U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project Paper, 1999; LTC (P) Michael
W. Pick, "What the Joint Force Commander Needs to Know About CI and HUMINT Operations," National
War College Paper, 2002. It is interesting that in these articles, the examples given from operations are of
collectors taking photographs of or observing facilities, not of collectors interacting with sources.

40

that they ought to be as closely matched to their potential sources as possible; that they need a

decent familiarity with the subject matter upon which they are collecting; that their leaders must

be extremely skillful in the basics of HUMINT collection; and that they need independent support

from CI. These will now be compared with current Army HUMINT with a view to pointing the

way to the improved capability that has been sought for so long.

As one cannot design and build a HUMINT collector--unlike an antenna or camera--from

the ground up, one must instead put a corresponding effort into the selection of collectors.

Selection of HUMINT collectors is the counterpart of the design of technical collectors.

Practitioners and theorists throughout history are in agreement as to the criteria that should be

used to select HUMINT collectors. The first of the principles of HUMINT is that collectors must

have certain personal qualities: they must possess a high degree of integrity; they must be able to

effectively relate to people and establish rapport; they must be able to communicate effectively;

they must be sophisticated, subtle, and wise; and they must be good judges of character,

motivation, and reliability. All sources also agree that people of this quality are not common.

Current Army selection of HUMINT personnel takes none of this into account. Soldiers

enter the two HUMINT-related Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), 97B ­

Counterintelligence Agent and 97E - Human Intelligence Collector. Soldiers in the 97B MOS

"collect information from human sources to better understand the adversarial intelligence and

international terrorist threat," while 97E soldiers' mission will be to "gather information from

human sources…that address local and national intelligence requirements." Soldiers are currently

recruited into both of these MOSs by U.S. Army Recruiting Command recruiters along with

soldiers of other MOSs, and are not assessed for their potential as HUMINT collectors. The

Army does plan to change the recruitment process for the 97B MOS and accept only second-term

enlistees from the 97E MOS into it, contingent on an assessment of their suitability for the MOS

that does take into account some of the needed characteristics. 97Es, though, will be able to

continue on in the MOS with no assessment of their suitability for duty as a HUMINT collector.

41

For reasons that are not clear, more careful assessment and selection of 97E soldiers is considered

unnecessary.95 What this system will produce will be HUMINT collectors of sometimes

inadequate or inappropriate personal qualities. Except in the 97B MOS, when it does produce

collectors of good or high quality, it will do so by happenstance.

Another principle of HUMINT is that the collector should have a high degree of area

knowledge, an understanding of the culture and politics of the region in which he is working.

This aspect of a HUMINT collector can be 'designed' into the collector by way of education and

training. While natives of an area employed as collectors will obviously have the best area

knowledge, it is possible through education and in-country experience to bring a non-native to a

very high degree of area knowledge. This area knowledge makes a collector able to work much

more readily with the people of the region, makes the collector a much better judge of those

people, and makes deception of the collector much more difficult. The Army addresses the issue

of area knowledge for the two HUMINT MOSs only insofar as it provides the opportunity for

some individuals to receive language training and notes that units should maintain up-to-date

country studies for use by collectors. 96

A further principle of HUMINT is that a collector should be matched as closely as

possible to the intended source, in particular as regards professional background. Doing so gives

the collector a better chance of establishing commonality and rapport with the source, enables the

collector to better assess the source and the information provided, and helps the collector to ask

more intelligent questions concerning the information of interest. This principle is not addressed

by Army HUMINT practice at all. An Army collector generally starts in a HUMINT MOS in his

first-term enlistment and has the knowledge of another occupation or walk of life only by chance.

95
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Directorate of Counterintelligence, Foreign Disclosure, and Security, "CI and HUMINT Transformation,"
internal memorandum dated 26 November 2001.
96
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "CI and HUMINT Transformation"
memorandum; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 34-60: Counterintelligence , 30 October 1995,
1-12; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, FM 34-7-1: Tactical Human Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Operations, April 2002, 7-14.

42

Plans to initiate an assessment process for the 97B MOS are designed to take the large majority of

those assessed from the 97E MOS rather than other MOSs throughout the Army. 97

The organizational questions of leadership and quality control are also problem areas.

Just as there currently exists no real assessment process for the enlisted HUMINT career fields,

there is also no assessment process for HUMINT officers. There is such a process for HUMINT

warrant officers, who nearly always come from the enlisted HUMINT career fields, and these

warrant officers are usually apt, experienced, and well-trained. Company-grade officers,

however, undergo no screening before they are admitted to HUMINT training. Further, this

training is not HUMINT-specific, but rather a portion of a CI course that mainly covers CI

investigations and operations and touches on HUMINT mostly as it relates to CI operations. One

thing that these officers do not receive is hands-on experience in HUMINT operations. Warrant

officers and enlisted HUMINT collectors train for HUMINT collection operations and actually

meet sources in operational settings, but commissioned officer leaders do not. This makes it very

difficult for a company or battalion commander to truly command his HUMINT collectors. As

commanders have usually never conducted source meetings or other aspects of HUMINT

operations personally, it is very difficult for them to lead their units by example, assess the

operations of their subordinates, or coach and mentor them.

One of the root causes of the HUMINT problems consistently identified by Army

leadership is that the Army deploys young collectors who may or may not have suitable personal

characteristics, area knowledge, professional background of any kind, or indeed much in the way

of life experience. One writer on HUMINT says that in this intelligence discipline "using young

recruits…is wasteful, if not pernicious. They are unlikely to know their own minds sufficiently,

97
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "CI and HUMINT Transformation"
memorandum.

43

nor is it easy to assess someone accurately before he [the collector] has been exposed to the

turbulence of 'real life'; it is unlikely that his character has already been fully formed."98

The general nature of the HUMINT problem as discussed in this paper is challenging; the

challenge Army HUMINT collectors face can be even more daunting. They may be deployed to

a region in which the U.S. had not expected to become involved and therefore have little time to

study the area. In many areas, such as Eastern Europe, the Orient, or the Middle East, they will

interact with people who either have a long cultural tradition of intrigue and spying; a recent

necessity to contend with a pervasive, efficient, and vicious domestic intelligence service; or

both. People who have grown up in a culture that does not value personal straightforwardness

and that presents a counterintelligence problem of a very personal nature on a daily basis will be

amongst the most difficult sort of potential sources. The problem of establishing and assessing

relationships with people in these kinds of areas and collecting reliable, useful information will be

quite challenging. Further, low-intensity conflicts such as counter-insurgencies and other

stability operations may require collection of information from sources with whom young soldiers

have little or nothing in common, such as local politicians, businessmen, tribesmen, or criminals,

and may also present a myriad of cultural, political, and economic complications. Given that the

Army does little to ensure that suitable people are put into these situations, it is not surprising that

leaders would be dissatisfied with Army HUMINT.

The Army's HUMINT organization also does not provide for independent CI review of

HUMINT operations. This independent review is needed to provide HUMINT collectors with an

objective look at their sources by someone who has no personal stake in the relationship with the

source. Army HUMINT doctrine addresses this problem to some degree, specifying that the

HUMINT Analysis Team (HAT) at the division or corps level Analysis Control Element (ACE)

should analyze source reliability and credibility as reflected in the information reported. The

HAT is independent of tactical HUMINT collection teams. The HAT, however, only looks at

98
Laquer, The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, 321.

44
reporting, not at the other aspects of the relationship with the source--such as the source's

motivation for meeting the collector and providing information--that might bear on the reporting

or indicate problems. This is left to the collector himself and to his superiors, who both have

some incentive to present each source in the best possible light. 99

Models

There are other organizations that the Army might use as models to improve its HUMINT

capabilities. The first of these are the British Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. The British

Army selects its HUMINT collectors from amongst the entire force, as well as from members of

the naval and air forces. The qualities desired in British Army HUMINT collectors are much the

same as those desired throughout history, including integrity, honesty, resourcefulness, ability to

empathize, and judgment. What the British Army seeks overall are high-grade soldiers who

enjoy personal interaction. The British also look for maturity, for people who have sufficient

experience of life to be able to easily engage with others. Approximately one in nine who start

the selection process end by completing it. Officers involved in HUMINT undergo the roughly

the same selection, assessment, and training process. 100

The selection system for HUMINT collectors in the U.S. Marine Corps is similar to that

of the British Army, though shorter and less rigorous. The Marine Corps accepts applicants for

their CI/HUMINT MOS from those completing their first enlistment in any Marine MOS. Like

the British Army, the Marines seek out those with the qualities that have always been desirable in

HUMINT collectors, amongst them character professionalism, experience, appearance and

bearing, speaking and writing ability, and general knowledge of world affairs. Marines who

complete the initial screening process are then assigned to limited duties in a CI/HUMINT unit

under the supervision of trained personnel. This probationary period is intended as a further

99
See page 39 above.
100
LTC Hockenhull interview and email. Interestingly, the British Army also requires a high
degree of physical fitness and skill in combatatives, largely due to the hazards of operations in Northern
Ireland.

45

assessment over an extended time of the suitability of Marines as HUMINT collectors. 101 As in

the British system, the selection and assessment process for all involved in Marine HUMINT--

enlisted, warrant officer, or commissioned officer--is the same, which has the effect of training

HUMINT leaders as well as HUMINT collectors. 102

An advantage of both the British and Marine Corps systems is that all HUMINT

collectors in both systems have had training and experience in another career field. Marine

HUMINT collectors may well have been aircraft maintainers, artillerymen, communications

technicians, or any one of a multitude of other job descriptions; the British system adds the

additional career fields of the naval and air services to the possibilities. This can be especially

advantageous when HUMINT collectors are gathering information on the intentions or

capabilities of an enemy's military. Collectors who have military experience of a broader nature

will be able to ask better questions, separate the important from the unimportant, and be less

susceptible to deception.

Another excellent model for improvement of Army HUMINT is the U.S. Army attaché

system. Attachés are generally selected from the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program.

This program trains selected officers in foreign area studies and languages with the intention that

they become expert on their region of interest. This training includes graduate-level study of the

target region at a civilian university, intensive language training, and a year of study and travel in

the region. From the pool of FAO officers, the Defense Attaché Service then conducts interviews

with and reviews the records of candidates to determine their suitability for service as an attaché.

Those who are suitable are then given attaché-specific training, including in the overt collection

and reporting that attachés, like all diplomats, have as a part of their duties. 103 One of the main

101
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 3850.1H "Policy and Guidance for
Counterintelligence Activities," 27 June 1995.
102
Email from U.S. Marine Corps Captain Vincent H. Bridgeman. Captain Bridgeman is a
Marine intelligence officer serving at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
103
Author's personal experience. The author went through this process and eventually served as
an attaché in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

46

reasons for the effectiveness of the Army attaché corps is that its members are drawn from across

all Army career fields. This provides officers who are highly capable of engaging with officers

from other nations based on their common profession, and puts collectors in the field who possess

a great deal of professional expertise.

A possible model for the proper organization of CI support to HUMINT operations

would be that of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Attachés and other DIA collectors

come under the control of the DIA Directorate of Operations (DO). Dedicated CI officers

assigned to the Directorate of Administration (DA) provide CI support to those collectors. Those

officers have complete access to all HUMINT operations they support and work very closely with

collectors to ensure that HUMINT operations provide reliable information. The DA's main

responsibility, as its title implies, is to provide administrative support in the personnel and finance

areas. CI officers are assigned there solely to put them under a separate supervisory chain from

the collectors they support. 104

Recommendations

What would be appropriate for improving Army HUMINT at the tactical level--corps

level and below--would be a mixture of the selection processes of the British Army and U.S.

Marine Corps (for collectors of every rank), the training given Army attachés, and type of CI

support provided DIA HUMINT collectors.

HUMINT collectors of both Army HUMINT MOSs should not be allowed to enter the

MOS on their first enlistment. Allowing recruits to enter the MOS at the recruiting station

prevents any sort of assessment of their potential and suitability as a HUMINT collector.

HUMINT collectors should be selected from amongst first and second term enlistees of any MOS

who have already been successful in another career field, and who are older, more mature, and

have a more fully developed and settled character. This kind of selection process, in addition to

104
Edwards email.

47
ensuring the overall suitability of HUMINT collectors, would have the additional benefit of

producing a group of collectors with a wide range of military experience and expertise.

Commissioned officers who will lead HUMINT units should undergo a similar screening and

training process and be given the opportunity to participate in HUMINT collection operations. In

addition to honing their proficiency in preparation for command of HUMINT units,

commissioned officers will be a better match with many sources than enlisted soldiers, such as

mid-level politicians or foreign military officers.

After the selection process, new HUMINT personnel should then be given area and

language training as a part of their training as collectors. This training in its initial stages ought to

be a shorter, less involved version of the training given to foreign area officers. First-term

HUMINT soldiers should concentrate on language mastery. When language skills are

sufficiently developed--and when the soldier's suitability as a collector is more certain--more

advanced language training and area study would be appropriate, including study or travel in the

region of interest. The prospect of this kind of training could be used as an incentive for soldiers

to enter and continue in the MOS, as well as for a reward for achievement. While it would seem

that giving soldiers a regional specialty in this manner might limit their utility in other parts of the

world, in reality the understanding of and immersion in a foreign culture, especially those that are

far different than one's native culture, tunes the ability to understand all foreign cultures and gives

a head start in doing so. 105 As with the selection and screening process, this training should also

be extended to commissioned and warrant officers.

Finally, HUMINT organizations must make provision for independent CI review of

HUMINT collection operations. What is important is that the CI Support must be a part of a

different chain-of-command than the HUMINT collectors. For example, in a U.S. Army division

105
The author, after completing nearly three years of service in the Balkans, went directly to
Afghanistan to serve in a similar position. Though the cultures are dissimilar, the intimate familiarity with
the culture of Bosnia created a sensitivity to simple things, such as manners at table and proper modes of
greeting, that made the transition to Afghanistan much easier than it would have been otherwise.

48

HUMINT collectors are a part of the division's Military Intelligence (MI) battalion. CI personnel

supporting those collectors must be in a chain -of-command that does not include the MI battalion

commander, but they also must have full access to the details of HUMINT operations in order to

ensure effective quality control. One possibility would be that CI support to HUMINT fall under

the division G-2 (Intelligence) officer, who does not work for the MI battalion commander, but

rather for the division chief-of-staff.

Implementation of a selection and training process for HUMINT collectors of this nature,

as well as of the organizational changes recommended, obviously has important implications for

personnel policy and manning, resources, and a myriad of other areas. These considerations may

keep any program from being ideal. However, it is beyond question that the Army HUMINT

program must begin some kind of selection and assessment process for its personnel beyond that

done at the recruiting station, and also that it should begin to take advantage of the pool of

potential HUMINT collectors in the rest of the Army. Further, the capability to make a

sophisticated, independent CI review of HUMINT operations is necessary in order to guard

against the possibility of HUMINT becoming a net liability through willful deception or

inadvertent misunderstandings. These changes are the keys to resolving the Army's long-standing

dissatisfaction with its HUMINT capability. The result of this kind of program would be a force

of well-led and productive HUMINT collectors selected, trained, and employed in keeping with

sound principles of HUMINT, and some result in the long search for improved Army HUMINT

capability.

49

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