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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

*
G.R. No. 149451. May 8, 2003.

REMEDIOS S. PADILLA, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT,
respondents.

Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases

brought to it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.—The jurisdiction of
this Court over cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. We have good
reason to apply this well-entrenched principle in the instant case
because the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirm the
findings of fact of the CSC.
Civil Service; Resignation; Like removal for just cause,
voluntary resignation results in the abdication of all present and
future rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all
work-related ties between the employer and the employee.—
Petitioner used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk II
before the disapproval of her appointment for Labor Development
Assistant, a higher permanent position. Thereafter, she
voluntarily resigned and later came back to occupy casual
positions only despite passing the eligibility requirement for a
permanent position. Like removal for just cause, voluntary
resignation results in the abdication of all present and future
rights accorded to an employee and in the severance of all work-
related ties between the employer and the employee. When she

_______________

* EN BANC.

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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

returned to work for respondent DOLE, the same was not a

continuation of her previous service but the start of a new work
slate. Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent
DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under Section
24 (d) of PD 807 inasmuch as she was never unjustly removed.
Same; Casual Employees; Expiration of Employment; There is
no need to furnish a casual employee of a notice of termination
since he is aware of the date of expiration of his or her temporary
appointment.—Not having been unjustly removed from the
service, it follows that petitioner’s right to due process was not
violated. In fact, there was no need to furnish her a notice of
termination since, as a casual employee, petitioner was aware of
the date of expiration of her temporary appointment.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORONA, J.:
1
Before this Court is a petition for review of the decision
dated January 22, 2001 of2 the Court of Appeals affirming
(1) Resolution No. 980256 dated February 5, 1998 of the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing petitioner3
Remedios Padilla’s appeal, and (2) Resolution No. 981425
dated June 10, 1998 of CSC denying her motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts, as found by respondent CSC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, follow.
On January 18, 1982, petitioner Remedios Padilla
assumed the permanent position of Clerk II in the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment. On May 11, 1983,
petitioner was promoted to the position of Labor
Development Assistant. Without waiting for the CSC’s
approval of her appointment, she assumed her new
position.

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and concurred in

by Associate Justices Andres Reyes, Jr. and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador;
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Rollo, pp. 27-34.

2 Rollo, pp. 51-53.
3 Id., at pp. 55-57.

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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

On March 4, 1985, CSC-NCR Regional Director Aurora de

Leon sent a 1st Indorsement to the Minister of Labor and
Employment disapproving petitioner’s appointment as
Labor Development Assistant on the ground that she failed
to meet the eligibility requirement for the position. Maria
Esther Manigque, Officer-In-Charge of the Institute of
Labor and Manpower Studies, sought reconsideration of
respondent CSC’s ruling by pointing out petitioner’s
satisfactory performance. It was denied. In May 1985,
petitioner resigned from the service citing “personal
reasons.”
On July 28, 1985, petitioner took the Career Service
Examination (Professional Level). After passing the same
in August, 1985, she re-applied at the respondent
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). She was
appointed as Casual Research Assistant on October 17,
1988, effective until November 30, 1988. Upon expiration of
her appointment, the same was extended to December 31,
1988. From January 1989 until December 1989, petitioner
occupied the position of Casual Technical.
Due to the implementation of RA 6758, otherwise known
as the Salary Standardization Act of 1989, casual items
such as Casual Research Assistant and Casual Technical
were abolished. Petitioner was offered the position of Clerk
II (the only available permanent position then) for which
the Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she
declined the offer.
On January 2, 1990, petitioner was appointed Casual
Clerk III, effective till the end of June 1990. After the
expiration of her appointment as a casual employee,
petitioner was no longer given any position. She then
requested the monetary conversion of her unused sick and
vacation leaves which respondent DOLE granted.
Nevertheless, petitioner appealed her alleged
termination
4
as casual employee to the CSC but this was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed
to then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona. The letter-
complaint was forwarded to respondent DOLE and later to
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the CSC for appropriate action. Acting on the complaint,

the CSC treated the same as a petition to seek relief. In its
Resolution No. 980256 dated February 5, 1998, the CSC
dismissed the petition and denied petitioner’s

_______________

4 Resolution No. 96-0846 dated February 8, 1996.

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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

claim. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied

in CSC Resolution No. 981425 dated June 10, 1998.
Petitioner appealed the CSC resolutions to the Court of
Appeals. On January 22, 2001, the appellate court
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED

and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Resolution No. 98-0256 dated February 5, 1998 issued by
the Civil Service Commission dismissing the petitioner’s appeal,
as well as its Resolution No. 981425 dated June 10, 1998, is (sic)
AFFIRMED. 5
SO ORDERED.”

The Court of Appeals held that the CSC had the power to
revoke the appointment of a public officer whose
qualification did not meet the minimum requirements of
the law. To refute petitioner’s contention that respondent
DOLE was obliged to give her a permanent position upon
becoming eligible, the appellate court ruled that, although
the petitioner was a civil service eligible, her acceptance of
a temporary appointment as a casual vested her no right to
security of tenure. Her appointment depended 6
exclusively
on the pleasure of the appointing authority. 7
On July 4, 2001, the appellate court issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal based on the following assignments
of error:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMINATION OF PETITIONER IS

LEGAL.

II

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WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF HER COMPLAINT

BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE 8COMMISSION
WAS PROPER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Petitioner does not question anymore the disapproval of

her appointment as Labor Development Assistant due to
her failure to

_______________

5 Rollo, p. 34.
6 Id., at pp. 29-34.
7 Id., at pp. 35-36.
8 Id., at p. 18.

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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

meet the eligibility requirements. However, she invokes

her alleged right to be reinstated to a permanent position
considering that she has since attained the required civil
service eligibility and that she used to hold a permanent
position. Petitioner bewails the fact that she ended up as a
casual employee despite her civil service eligibility and
without any derogatory record during her stint in the
government. To support her claim, she cites Section 24 (d)
of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Law of
1975, which states that “(a)ny person who has been
permanently appointed to a position in the career service
and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been
separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the
same level for which he is qualified.”
She also contends that she was not accorded due process
when she was removed from her permanent position
without prior notice. Neither was she given an opportunity
to explain why she should not be removed from office.
Did respondent DOLE violate petitioner’s purported
right to security of tenure? We do not think so.
The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals via Rule 459 of the Rules of Court
is limited to reviewing errors of law. The factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are 10
generally conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal. We have good reason to apply
this well-entrenched principle in the instant case because
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirm the
findings of fact of the CSC.
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One of the exceptions to the rule is when the appellate11

court’s factual disquisitions are not supported by evidence.
In the case at bar, petitioner seeks reinstatement on the
ground that she was unjustly removed from the service,
which was contrary to the appellate court’s finding that she
voluntarily resigned. Considering that petitioner’s
submission was premised on an alleged misapprehension of
facts, she had the burden of showing that the CSC and the
appellate12 court’s findings of fact were not supported by
evidence. However, she fell short of that responsibility
and ended up with hollow claims.

_______________

9 Malugcot-Aw v. Malugcot, 329 SCRA 78 (2000).

10 Republic v. Sodsod, 330 SCRA 400 (2000).
11 Bañas v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259 (2000).
12 Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court.

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Padilla vs. Civil Service Commission

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), representing respondents CSC and DOLE,
adequately proved that petitioner voluntarily resigned and
was never removed from the service. The OSG presented as
evidence petitioner’s own
13
letter in 1990 addressed to Sec.
Flerida Ruth Romero, then Special Assistant to the
President and Presidential Legislative Liaison Officer,
which read:

In 1985, The Civil Service Commission (CSC) disapproved my

appointment because the qualification standard for the position of
Labor Development Assistant was raised from sub-professional to
professional level. Despite my best effort to appeal before the Civil
Service Commission, I never got a favorable response.
14
I was hurt
so much that I decided to resign in April 1985. (italics supplied)

Petitioner used to occupy the permanent position of Clerk

II before the disapproval of her appointment for Labor
Development Assistant, a higher permanent position.
Thereafter, she voluntarily resigned and later came back to
occupy casual positions only despite passing the eligibility
requirement for a permanent position. Like removal for
just cause, voluntary resignation results in the abdication
of all present and future rights accorded to an employee

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and in the severance of all work-related ties between the

employer and the employee. When she returned to work for
respondent DOLE, the same was not a continuation of her
previous service but the start of a new work slate.
Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent
DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under
Section 24 (d) of PD 807 inasmuch as she was never
unjustly removed.
We agree with the observation of the OSG that when
petitioner re-applied for and was offered the position of
Casual Research Assistant and later Casual Technical, she
readily and unqualifiedly accepted the said offer. Having
accepted the position of a casual employee, petitioner
should have known that she had no security of tenure and
could thus be separated from the service anytime.
We also take note of the fact that in December 1989,
after finishing her contract as a Casual Technical,
respondent DOLE of-

_______________

13 Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

14 Rollo, p. 58.

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fered to petitioner the permanent position of Clerk II (the

only available permanent position then) for which the
Selection Board deemed her qualified. However, she
declined the offer and instead opted to accept another
casual position as Casual Clerk III. Respondent DOLE
therefore gave her the opportunity to re-assume a
permanent position but petitioner was apparently bent on
acquiring a position equal to a Labor Development
Assistant, a position she could not obtain by right due to
her earlier resignation. On the ground of estoppel,
petitioner is barred from asserting her right to a
permanent position.
Not having been unjustly removed from the service, it
follows that petitioner’s right to due process was not
violated. In fact, there was no need to furnish her a notice
of termination since, as a casual employee, petitioner was
aware of the date of expiration of her temporary
appointment.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No

costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Notes.—Abandonment of office is a species of

resignation—while resignation in general is a formal
relinguishment, abandonment is a voluntary
relinguishment through nonuser. (Sangguniang Bayan of
San Andres, Catanduanes vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA
276 [1998])
There is no valid resignation where it was made without
proper discernment, such as when an employee’s writing
and handing in of his resignation letter to his employer
were a knee-jerk reaction triggered by that singular
moment when he was left with no alternative but to accede,
having been literally forced into it by being presented with
the more unpleasant fate of being terminated. (Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 284 SCRA 308 [1998])

——o0o——

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