Positive Psychology, leading scholars of contemporary psychology set a research agenda for the

scientific study of human strengths. Aspinwall and Staudinger feature contributors who bring
both supportive and challenging voices to this emerging field to stimulate discourse. In many
cases, their findings have turned "established wisdom" on its head. What results is a
comprehensive book that provides a forward-looking forum for the discussion of the purpose,
pitfalls, and future of the psychology of human strengths. This volume offers commentary on
positive psychology and its antecedents. It is a must-read for those looking for new ways of
thinking about such topics as intelligence, judgment, volition, social behavior, close relationships,
development, aging, and health as well as applications to psychotherapy, education,
organizational psychology, gender, politics, creativity, and other realms of life. (PsycINFO
Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved) Table of Contents: Contributors

Preface Introduction A psychology of human strengths: Some central issues of an emerging field
Lisa G. Aspinwall and Ursula M. Staudinger / 9-22 Human strengths as the orchestration of
wisdom and selective optimization with compensation Paul B. Baltes and Alexandra M. Freund /
23-35 The human's greatest strength: Other humans Ellen Berscheid / 37-47 Constructive
cognition, personal goals, and the social embedding of personality Nancy Cantor / 49-60 A
conception of personality for a psychology of human strengths: Personality as an agentic, self-
regulating system Gian Vittorio Caprara and Daniel Cervone / 61-74 Human aging: Why is even
good news taken as bad? Laura L. Carstensen and Susan T. Charles / 75-86 Three human
strengths Charles S. Carver and Michael F. Scheier / 87-102 The malleability of sex differences in
response to changing social roles Alice H. Eagly and Amanda B. Diekman / 103-115 Toward a
positive psychology: Social developmental and cultural contributions Nancy Eisenberg and Vivian
Ota Wang / 117-129 Light and dark in the psychology of human strengths: The example of
psychogerontology Rocío Fernández-Ballesteros / 131-147 Intervention as a major tool of a
psychology of human strengths: Examples from organizational change and innovation

Dieter Frey, Eva Jonas and Tobias Greitemeyer / 149-164 Judgmental heuristics: Human strengths
or human weaknesses? Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman / 165-178 Positive affect as a source of
human strength Alice M. Isen / 179-195 The parametric unimodel of human judgment: A fanfare
to the common thinker Arie W. Kruglanski, Hans-Peter Erb, Scott Spiegel and Antonio Pierro /
197-210 Turning adversity to advantage: On the virtues of the coactivation of positive and
negative emotions Jeff T. Larsen, Scott H. Hemenover, Catherine J. Norris and John T. Cacioppo /
211225 A holistic person approach for research on positive development David Magnusson and
Joseph L. Mahoney / 227-243 Harnessing willpower and socioemotional intelligence to enhance
human agency and potential Walter Mischel and Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton / 245-256 The
motivational sources of creativity as viewed from the paradigm of positive psychology Jeanne
Nakamura and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi / 257-269 Ironies of the human condition: Well-being
and health on the way to mortality Carol D. Ryff and Burton Singer / 271-287 Political symbols
and collective moral action David O. Sears / 289-303 Positive clinical psychology Martin E. P.
Seligman and Christopher Peterson / 305-317 Driven to despair: Why we need to redefine the
concept and measurement of intelligence Robert J. Sternberg / 319-329 The ecology of human
strengths Daniel Stokols / 331-343 Author index Subject index About the editors

A PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS: SOME CENTRAL ISSUES OF AN EMERGING FIELD LISA G.

ASPINWALL AND URSULA M. STAUDINGER

A growing number of scholars in psychology are interested in investigating positive aspects of

well-being and health, rather than negative aspects such as distress and disease (for reviews, see
Ickovics & Park, 1998; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Seligman & Czikszentmihalyi, 2000). Arguing that
scientific psychology has focused disproportionately on pathology and repair, Seligman and
Czikszentmihalyi recently issued a broader call for the study of strengths and prevention, as well
as the individual, community, and societal factors that “make life worth living.” In the history of
psychological science, this interest in salutogenesis (Antonovsky, 1987), mental health rather
than mental illness (Jahoda, 1958), and maturity and growth (e.g., Erikson, 1959) is certainly not
new. The current revival, however, may be of a larger scale (and possibly greater impact) than
ever before. Thus, the field may be at a critical juncture for revisiting and redefining some central
issues in the understanding of human strengths. Our goal in this volume is to generate critical
discourse on different ways the study of human strengths might progress. In this chapter, we
highlight several questions and issues that we believe will be important to 9

the development of a field of human strengths. In doing so, we draw on lessons learned from
our respective research programs on optimism and coping with adversity (LGA) and wisdom,
resilience, and lifespan development (UMS), as well as some more general observations about
this emerging field. This list of questions and issues we address in this chapter is not intended to
be comprehensive, but rather to stimulate discussion and provide some guiding perspectives
when reading the other chapters included in this volume.

THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING HUMAN STRENGTHS One of the reasons that the repair and
healing approach in psychology historically has been predominant seems to be a value issue. It is
much easier to define the desired or adaptive direction of change if the goal of such change is to
restore an earlier or a “normal” state. It is much more difficult to define a human strength if one
considers psychological changes other than return to prior levels of functioning. Relatively
speaking, different areas of psychological functioning may involve more or less difficulty making
such determinations (e.g., Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995). For instance, with regard to
cognitive functioning, it seems rather obvious that solving a problem quickly is better than
solving it slowly, but how would this logic be applied to such concepts as personality growth or
successful aging? If psychologists are interested in assessing more than return to prior
functioning, we are faced with several difficult sets of questions. For example, do we determine
which characteristics represent a human strength vis-&vis their adaptiveness or functionality?
And if so, how then do we operationalize adaptiveness or functionality? Do we use subjective
(e.g., subjective well-being) or objective (e.g., longevity) indicators? Should we consult ethical or
value systems, such as the seven primary virtues of Christian ethics or the Aristotelian ethos
composed of selection and sagacity? If so, why these, and not others? And whose standpoint
should be used to decide what is good or optimal? For example, should we assess perceptions of
improvement or change from the perspective of the person, or of those with whom he or she
interacts, or of experts or of lay people? These normative issues need to be discussed and
settled when studying human strengths. As research on resilience has demonstrated (e.g., Rutter
& Rutter, 1993; Staudinger et al., 1995), objective and subjective criteria often result in very
different ideas about what is functional or adaptive; therefore, it seems that both kinds of
criteria may need to be considered and would ideally be balanced when drawing conclusions
about what is a human strength. The approach taken in the study of wisdom-a prototypical
human strength with a long cultural history-may provide some

10

ASPINWALL A N D STAUDlNGER

guidance. Defining functionality as balancing one’s own good and the good of others-one of the
core definitional features of wisdom (e.g., see Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 1998)-may
solve some of the value problems involved when studying human strengths. This definition of
wisdom combines objective (“the good of others”) and subjective (“one’s own good”) criteria
and at the same time does not prescribe what that “good” is. Rather, the definition is placed on
a meta-level. The decision about when this balance between one’s own good and the good of
others is reached does not follow an absolute truth criterion but rather, as is the case with any
complex and ill-defined decision, follows a consensus criterion of truth. Research on wisdom has
reliably demonstrated that there is high consensus about whether or not a certain judgment
satisfies the wisdom definition and to what degree (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Staudinger,
in press). Further, it is important that the definition of balancing one’s own good with the good
of others does not link human strengths too closely to given circumstances, as is often the case
with definitions of adaptivity (e.g., when adaptivity is defined as increasing subjective well-being
or increasing objective rewards, such as income or prestige). Rather, it is crucial for a definition
of human strengths to include the possibility of transcending and improving given personal and
societal circumstances. Thus, searching for the definition of “human strengths” or “the good life”
on a meta-level rather than a concrete level and adopting a consensus rather than an absolute
criterion of truth seem to be worthwhile suggestions to discuss. The chapters in this book
address multiple aspects of these fundamental definitional questions and their implications for
understanding mental and physical health, as well as processes and outcomes in such domains
as social development, aging, intelligence, and judgment. It is important to emphasize that these
definitional questions are not purely academic. Many societal decisions rest on how human
strengths and capabilities are defined, measured, and used-for example, to open the doors of
educational and professional opportunity (or to close them; see Sternberg, chapter 22, this
volume), to evaluate the outcomes of different medical and psychological treatments (see Ryff &
Singer, chapter 19, this volume; Seligtnan & Peterson, chapter 21, this volume), or to develop
interventions in such areas as peace education (Eisenberg & Ota Wang, chapter 9, this volume)
and corporate cultures of excellence (Frey, Jonas, & Greitemeyer, chapter 11, this volume).
HUMAN STRENGTHS: CHARACTERISTICS OR PROCESSES? One of the first associations with the
term “human strength” is probably a personality characteristic. Many efforts to understand and
identify CENTRAL ISSUES OF AN EMERGING FIELD

11

human strengths have focused on the individual-level traits-intelligence, optimism, self-efficacy,

ego resilience-associated with good life outcomes (e.g., Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2000). The trait
approach, while often fostering important developments in measurement and allowing the
study of mean-level changes of traits over the life span or in response to interventions such as
psychotherapy, may represent only one type of human strength. Dispositional approaches
typically do not consider the underlying processes or dynamics, nor do they focus on the
interplay between dispositions and particular situations (see Mischel & Shoda, 1999). Several
important processes may be involved in any given trait or strength, and understanding such
processes is essential to understanding how people will encode and respond to different
situations and to developing interventions that promote the development of human strengths
(see, e.g., Mischel & Mendoza-Denton, chapter 17, this volume). In the following sections, we
will explore some of the potential advantages of complementing a trait approach with a process-
oriented approach to human strengths, using dispositional optimism as an example. Optimism,
conceptualized in terms of generalized positive expectancies (Scheier & Carver, 1985) or in terms
of explanatory style (Peterson & Seligman, 1984), has been linked to good outcomes over the life
course, but how are such outcomes realized? In some frameworks, the benefits of optimism are
seen to reside primarily in its link to persistence in goal pursuit (Carver & Scheier, 1990).
Optimists are those who see their prospects favorably and thus will continue efforts to meet
their goals. Such an approach would likely yield good outcomes much of the time, but it might
also carry certain liabilities if the tendency to assess one’s prospects favorably predisposed one
to ignoring objective information about risks in the environment or to devoting continued effort
to goals that cannot realistically be met. One approach to understanding how optimists navigate
these risks has been to examine the prospective relation of optimism to the processing of
negative information and to problem-solving efforts for both solvable and unsolvable problems
(see Aspinwall, Richter, 6r Hoffman, 2001, for a review). These examinations have found that
optimism is associated with greater, not lesser, attention to self-relevant negative information
and that optimists, when presented with unsolvable problems, are quicker, rather than slower, to
disengage from them when some alternative task is available. These findings suggest two
important properties of optimism that would not be apparent from a trait-level analysis alone:
(a) Optimism is not maintained by ignoring negative information-optimists attend closely to
relevant risk information-and (b) optimism seems to be flexibleoptimists vary their behavior
depending on the objective properties of the problems they face. These and other findings give a
different view of what constitutes a
12

ASPINWALL A N D STAUDINGER

human strength. It seems that it is not so much one or the other personality characteristic-for
example, an optimistic outlook or internal control beliefs-that should be called a human
strength. Rather, it seems that human strengths may primarily lie in the ability to flexibly apply
as many different resources and skills as necessary to solve a problem or work toward a goal
(e.g., Staudinger et al., 1995; Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2000). Such strengths may draw on
discriminative facilities (see Cantor, chapter 4, this volume; Mischel & Mendoza-Denton, chapter
17, this volume) and selfregulatory skills or algorithms that help people draw on the optimal
characteristic or regulatory mechanism at the right time to the right degree (e.g., Frederick &
Loewenstein, 1999; Staudinger, 2000; see also Baltes 6r Freund, chapter 2, this volume). For
instance, returning to the optimism example, there is evidence that people seem to deploy
optimism strategically, using favorable beliefs to motivate action toward implementing plans, but
suspending such beliefs at the point at which specific plans are made (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995;
see also Armor & Taylor, 1998). These findings, in turn, give rise to an interest in understanding
the cognitive, behavioral, and social processes that support such flexible self-regulatory efforts,
among them the ability to change one’s perspective on a problem and to elicit and use
information from one’s own or others’ experiences with particular problems in planning one’s
own course of action (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Aspinwall, 1998, 2001; Aspinwall, Hill, & Leaf,
2002). Identifying such processes provides a way of understanding flexible problem solving and
suggests ways of teaching specific skills to increase human strengths rather than just yielding a
general injunction to be more optimistic.

ARE ALL HUMAN STRENGTHS CONSCIOUS AND INTENTIONAL? A related issue that arises from
this consideration of characteristics and regulatory processes is the question of whether all
human strengths are necessarily conscious and intentional. Even though reflexivity is one of the
major discriminating features of the human species, it may not necessarily be the case that
human strengths are always conscious and linked to intentional action or reaction. Rather, it is
possible that human evolution, as well as ontogenesis, has produced “strength patterns” of
perception, action, and reaction on an automatic and unintentional level. For instance,
subjective well-being in heterogeneous samples of adults on a scale from 0 to 10 is always
located slightly above 6, rather than 5, which would be the theoretical mean of the scale. Well-
being researchers have argued that the ability to retain or regain slightly positive feelings of well-
being may have had a survival advantage (Diener, 1994). The development of expertise provides
another example of the “unintentional” facets CENTRAL ISSUES OF AN EMERGING FlELD

13

of human strengths. With increasing levels of knowledge and skill in a given domain, actions and
reactions become increasingly automatized and intuitive (e.g., Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Thus,
limiting the study of human strengths to the conscious and intentional realm would exclude
many important phenomena (see also Berridge, 1999).

HUMAN STRENGTHS IN DEVELOPMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND MATERIAL CONTEXT In trying to define

and study human strengths, it is crucial to acknowledge contextual dependencies. It seems
useful to emphasize that even if observed or measured in the individual, the microgenesis and
ontogenesis of many (if not all) human strengths involve interactions with certain material or
person contexts or some combination of these. The identification of particular developmental,
material, and social contexts that promote or debilitate human strengths thus should be an
important focus in a psychology of human strengths. In research on lifespan development that
addresses contextual dependencies and the plasticity of human development, this has always
been a topic of pivotal interest (see Baltes & Freund, chapter 2, this volume; Carstensen &
Charles, chapter 6, this volume; FernBndez-Ballesteros, chapter 10, this volume; Magnusson &
Mahoney, chapter 16, this volume). Another research area emphasizing the importance of
considering context when studying human strength is human social ecology (see Stokols, chapter
23, this volume). Understanding the situations and experiences-both everyday and
extraordinary-that promote the microgenesis and ontogenesis of strengths will be an important
goal in the study of human strengths. What is known so far, for instance, is that experiencing and
mastering very difficult and threatening situations in the long run often support the
development of personal growth. Research on lifespan development (e.g., Elder, 1998), as well
as investigations in the area of post-traumatic stress syndrome (e.g., Maercker, Schiitzwohl, &
Solomon, 1999) speak to the ontogenetic importance of context. However, it is not only over
time that people need contexts to develop human strengths; in addition, within a given situation
certain contextual features promote and others debilitate the expression of human strengths.
Research on wisdom again serves as an example; it has been demonstrated that wisdom-related
knowledge and judgment concerning difficult life problems were increased by one standard
deviation if participants were offered the possibility to discuss the difficult life problem with a
person whom they knew well before they gave their individual response (Staudinger & Baltes,
1996).Thus, the opportunity to talk with a familiar person about the problem at hand, exchange
thoughts, and create new ideas and perspectives supported the strength of good insight into
difficult life mat-

14

ASPINWALL AND STAUDINGER

ters. Research in organizational psychology on the conditions of corporate culture that foster and
sustain effective group decision making and organizational innovation provides additional
examples (Frey et al., chapter 11, this volume). Thus, a contextual and social perspective on
human strengths may be especially important to researchers interested in creating interventions
to promote human strengths. There is another important sense in which human strengths may
be wedded to the social context: Many human strengths are themselves relational or collective.
Based on a wide range of evidence linking close relationships to health and happiness, the ability
of human beings to form loving bonds with one another is possibly one of their greatest
strengths (Berscheid, chapter 3 , this volume). Given the importance of forming and maintaining
social bonds, we suspect that many human strengths may be found (and developed) in each
person’s relationships with other people. Such interpersonal and relational strengths as
patience, empathy, compassion, cooperation, tolerance, appreciation of diversity, understanding,
and forgiveness, though they remain understudied in comparison to “individual” strengths, seem
ripe for continued investigation from evolutionary, developmental, and social perspectives (see,
e.g., Eisenberg & Ota Wang, chapter 9, this volume). Still other kinds of strength may be found at
the collective or group level (see, e.g., Caprara & Cervone, chapter 5, this volume; Frey et al.,
chapter 11, this volume).

THE POSITIVE AND THE NEGATIVE: INTERDEPENDENT OR INDEPENDENT PROCESSES? Another

central task for a psychology of human strengths is to understand whether and how positive and
negative experiences depend on each other and work together. Thus, a call for the scientific
study of such positive states as joy, play, hope, and love-of what is positive, successful, and
adaptive in human experience-should not be misunderstood as a call to ignore negative aspects
of human experience. That is, a psychology of human strengths should not be the study of how
negative experience may be avoided or ignored, but rather how positive and negative experience
may be interrelated (see, e.g., Baltes & Freund, chapter 2, this volume; Carstensen & Charles,
chapter 6, this volume; Larsen, Hemenover, Norris, & Cacioppo, chapter 15, this volume; Ryff &
Singer, chapter 19, this volume). Indeed, some philosophical perspectives suggest that the
positive and negative are by definition dependent on each other; that is, human existence seems
to be constituted by basic dialectics, such as gains and losses, happiness and sorrow, autonomy
and dependency, or positive and negative (e.g., Riegel, 1976). It is part of the very nature of such
pairs that one component cannot exist without the other. Thus, from this perspective, CENTRAL
ISSUES OF AN EMERGING FIELD

15

the goal of a psychology of human strengths should not be to cultivate exclusively positive
outcomes, but to intervene such that the balance between the two components of any such
pairs is optimized with regard to the respective circumstances. Examining the positive aspects of
negative states and the negative aspects of positive states would thus be an essential part of a
psychology of human strengths. The study of stress, coping, and adaptation provides many rich
examples of the interrelation of positive and negative phenomena. First, the importance of
positive beliefs, such as optimism, in adapting to negative experience has been demonstrated in
many different contexts, including life-threatening illness (see, e.g., Carver et al., 1993; Taylor et
al., 1992). Second, in many cases, positive beliefs seem to develop because of people’s
experience in dealing with adversity. For example, Taylor’s pioneering ( 1983) work on
adjustment to life-threatening illnesses identified several cognitive strategies people used when
trying to find meaning in their illness and to restore a sense of self-esteem and mastery in their
new situations. Many patients reported learning that they were stronger than they would have
believed prior to their illness, saw advantages in their situation that they had not previously
appreciated, and accentuated positive aspects of their lives in creative ways (see also Affleck &
Tennen, 1996; Carver & Scheier, chapter 7, this volume; Updegraff & Taylor, 2000). That people
deliberately accentuate the positives in life to better deal with the negatives is surely a human
strength. That people can draw on these strengths without ignoring or diminishing the negative
realities of their situations is also important. Indeed, later studies showed that people who
experienced such positive changes as a result of having a serious illness also reported many
negative ones (see, e.g., Collins, Taylor, & Skokan, 1990) and that the relative balance of positive
and negative changes depended on important features of the life domain, such as whether
improvements were likely to be amenable to the patient’s control. Similarly, the study of lifespan
development has promoted a systematic investigation of the relation between gains and losses
(e.g., Uttal & Perlmutter, 1989). Evidence can be found for independence; that is, growth and
decline may happen independently of each other. But it has also been demonstrated that often
the advent of losses promotes growth or that some growth may be possible only because of
losses (e.g., Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998). Two examples may illustrate these two
points. Consider, for instance, the losses in physical functioning that come with age. It is exactly
those losses that have promoted the development of many technical means to compensate. O r
take language development. With increasing language ability in their mother tongue (gain),
infants lose their ability to discriminate sounds from other languages (loss). In this case growth
actually depends on loss. Despite these illustrations of fundamental dependencies between pos-

16

ASPINWALL AND STAUDINGER

itive and negative phenomena, it would be a serious mistake to assume that all or even most
positive experiences and characteristics must derive (or derive their meaning from) negative
experiences and characteristics, or that positive experiences and characteristics have no
functional benefit or importance in their own right. Such assumptions have hindered the
development of research on positive phenomena in many ways. For example, negative
motivations are frequently ascribed to positive characteristics (for example, creative
accomplishment may be interpreted as the narcissistic pursuit of fame; see Nakamura &
Csikszentmihalyi, chapter 18, this volume). As another example, it is often assumed that positive
states are simply the inverse in form and effect of related negative states-that is, that negative
and positive states are symmetrical in form and effect (see Isen, chapter 13, this volume).
However, such assumptions may lead to misleading conclusions about positive states or to
research designs that mask distinct effects of positive states. For example, in research on mood,
many experiments have compared the effects of positive and negative mood inductions;
however, without a neutral condition, it is impossible to tell whether any observed differences
are due to the effects of positive mood, negative mood, or both. Experiments that include a
neutral condition clearly show that the effects of positive and negative mood on decision making
and on social behaviors such as helping are not symmetrical (see Isen, 1993; chapter 13, this
volume). Further, emerging evidence in affective neuroscience suggests that the relations
between positive and negative experiences are likely to be much more complex than a simple
opposite or reciprocal relation and that these different affective phenomena may be supported
by different neurotransmitters and brain structures (see Berridge, 1999; Davidson & Sutton,
1995; Isen, 2002, for reviews). Finally, abandoning the assumed symmetry of positive and
negative states may open up new areas of research by allowing the study of other configurations
and blends of positive and negative experience, such as the coactivation of positive and negative
states (see Larsen et al., chapter 15, this volume). As these examples suggest, discarding the
assumptions that positive phenomena either derive from or are simple opposites of negative
phenomena may change the profession’s understanding of human strengths and may open the
door to new research questions.

TEMPTATIONS TO BE RESISTED IN DEVELOPING A PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS As

excited as we are about potential developments in the understanding of human strengths, we
see several areas in which caution must be exercised if a psychology of human strengths is to
advance scientific understanding. The first, and perhaps most important, is to avoid using
findCENTRAL ISSUES OF AN EMERGING FIELD

17

ings in this area to prescribe what people should do and how they should live. Linked to the
value problem discussed at the outset is the danger of prescribing universal ideals. There is only
a small step from investigating human strengths in order to improve the well-being and welfare
of people to adopting a given value system and preaching this value system. This behavior
carries many dangers for psychology as a scientific discipline. A second caution involves the
possibility that there are situations and contexts where attributes or processes that work as
strengths in one setting may be liabilities in another, and vice versa. Many findings suggest that
for some characteristics that have been identified as “strengths,” counterexamples can be found.
For instance, there is research that shows that internal control beliefs and problem-focused
coping may become highly dysfunctional under conditions of high constraints, such as poor
health (Staudinger, Freund, Linden, & Maas, 1999), and situations that cannot be controlled
(Filipp, 1999). Among certain people (e.g., defensive pessimists; see Cantor, chapter 4, this
volume; Frese, 1992; Norem, 2001) and in some non-Western cultures (e.g., Asian cultures; see
Chang, 2001), pessimism has been found to be adaptive rather than dysfunctional, because it
promotes active problem solving. In these cases, focusing on the underlying processes (how
people discriminate controllable from uncontrollable situations, how worry may promote
problem solving and preparation) may provide more information about strengths that appear to
take different forms in different situations. Our third caution comes from the observation that
not everything that shines is gold. It would be a major mistake to assume that all that is positive
is good-that is, that all positive beliefs, characteristics, and experiences have beneficial effects on
well-being and health, both for people and for their social networks. Instead, efforts to
understand when positive beliefs are linked to good outcomes, when they may not be, and why
will yield a more realistic and balanced view.

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HUMAN STRENGTHS AS THE ORCHESTRATION OF WISDOM AND SELECTIVE OPTIMIZATION WITH

COMPENSATION PAUL B. BALTES AND ALEXANDRA M. FREUND

One approach to the concept of human strengths is to define human strengths not as a set of
specific properties but as wisdom, or knowledge about fundamental pragmatics of life and
implementation of that knowledge through the life management strategies of selection,
optimization, and compensation (P. B. Baltes & Baltes, 1990; P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000;
Freund & Baltes, 2000). We conceive of this end state as being universal and bound by general
principles associated with wisdom and the theory of selective optimization with compensation.
In addition, because of variations in individual, social, and cultural contexts, the conceptual
frame we propose in this chapter permits variations in phenotypic expressions of the end state.
The concept of human strengths is inherently multidisciplinary, contextually dynamic, and norm
dependent. It is multidisciplinary because human strengths entail properties that reach from the
physical over the social-economic and psychological to the spiritual (Baltes & Baltes, 1990;

23

Staudinger, 1999). These properties exist somewhat independently, but also suggest some form
of transdisciplinary linkage if not integration. Sayings such as “a healthy mind in a healthy body”
make this point. The concept of human strengths is contextually dynamic, because the function
of a given human behavior depends on its context and its outcomes. Age, gender, social group,
ethnicity, geographic migration, and the like signify different contexts. Moreover, these contexts
are dynamic; contexts not only differ among people but also change during their lifetimes.
Finally, the concept of human strengths is norm dependent, because it is a fundamental property
of human society that it contains normative-that is, prescriptive -information about what is
desirable and undesirable human behavior. The ensemble of multidisciplinary, contextual, and
normative factors and perspectives that need consideration when delineating the concept of
human strengths may be reason for despair. Universal statements seem unattainable. Whatever
criterion one considers, others will highlight the flaws of the approach chosen. What seems
possible, however, is to use a particular theoretical orientation-such as life span psychology (P. B.
Baltes, 1997; P. B. Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998)-and to specify its implications for
the concept of human strengths. In this line of inquiry and recognizing the boundedness, or
constraints, implied in a given theoretical orientation, it may also be possible to advance some
propositions about human strengths that within the frame chosen purport to generalize across
individuals, time, and space. This chapter addresses how human strengths can be understood
from the perspective of lifespan psychology. One of the emphases of the field of lifespan
psychology has been the search for the optimal human mind or the optimal or ideal person. One
exemplar of the notion of the optimal human mind is the idea of wisdom (P. B. Baltes & Smith,
1990; P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Kekes, 1995; Sternberg, 1998). Another emphasis is the
search for optimal strategies of life management, one exemplar of which is the strategy of
selective optimization with compensation, referred to as the SOC model (P. B. Baltes & Baltes,
1990; Freund & Baltes, 2000; Marsiske, Lang, Baltes, & Baltes, 1995). Using work on these two
concepts as the guiding theoretical framework, we propose to view the orchestration of wisdom
and selective optimization with compensationthe theoretical knowledge about the good and
right life (wisdom) and its practical implementation (S0C)-as an expression and target of human
strengths.

END STATES: FROM A DOMAIN-SPECIFIC TO A SYSTEMIC AND DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE Our

selection of the joining of wisdom and SOC as an ideal “metaend state” of the mind and the
person requires further justification, because

24

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some authors consider end states an abandoned concept in developmental psychology. The
central question of traditional developmental psychology had been how people achieve
predefined end states in various domains of functioning. For instance, developmental stage
theories such as Piaget’s ( 1970) model of cognitive development and Erikson’s (1968) model of
psychosocia1 stages have great theoretical merits and have stimulated many empirical studies.
However, the goals and contexts of human development are more complex, dynamic, and
variable than these traditional views of domain-specific definitions of end states suggest.
Moreover, there is a high degree of cohort and historical variation (e.g., Elder, 1998). For
instance, in previous historical times, people’s life courses were more clearly scripted and had
higher stability than they do nowadays (e.g., Settersten, 1997). In fact, it is arguable that the
modern world accentuates a condition where the central point is not the definition of a
particular end state, but the delineation of a behavioral system that promotes as a “whole” the
continued adaptation to and mastery of new life circumstances. In this vein, the search for a
concept of human strengths requires an integrative and systemic perspective, such as the
concept of “the art of life” (Staudinger, 1999) or a version of holistic theory (P. B. Baltes & Smith,
1999; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998).

THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CENTURY OF THE PERMANENTLY INCOMPLETE MIND The argument for
a new, more domain-general, and more dynamic conception of human strengths is strengthened
by certain fundamental changes in modern life. Whereas in the past the world presented a set of
conditions where adulthood was akin to maturity, where becoming an adult was a relatively
fixed goal, and where “being” (i.e., achieving and staying in a relatively stable state) was a
possibility, adulthood in the modern world is not the final stage of life. In the modern world,
adulthood remains a state of continued “becoming,” of permanent transitions to subsequent
events and phases. Several reasons make this so. Among the most important are increased
longevity, rapid technological changes, and globalization. The average length of life has
dramatically increased during the past century (Kannisto, Lauritsen, Thatcher, & Vaupel,
1994),but development of a culture of old age has lagged behind (P. B. Baltes, 1997; Riley &
Riley, 1992). Such a culture is most needed in old age because humans are genetically not well
equipped for old age. At the same time, older people are expected to continue to actively
participate in social life and to optimize their level of functioning. Because of the need to keep
abreast of rapidly changing technological ORCHESTRATION OF WfSDOM AND SOC

25

knowledge and the ease of accessibility of knowledge through modern communication, the half-
life of knowledge and professional skills has declined at a faster pace than was true in the past.
For those who want to participate efficiently in modern society, selective unlearning of past skills
and learning of new skills is necessary. Technological changes are closely associated with the
globalization of human lives. Globalization (i.e., the interconnection of the world as a market of
ideas, technology, and labor) is bringing about a new level of selection pressure regarding
adaptive fitness and human strengths. For instance, globalization places one in professional
competition with experts around the world. Together, these changes have generated what could
be called a state of “permanent incompleteness” (P. B. Baltes, 1999; see also Brandtstadter,
2000). On the one hand, this new scenario offers more chances for personal growth throughout
the life span. O n the other hand, it puts pressure on people to ceaselessly acquire new
information and skills in order to adapt flexibly to the ongoing changes. In our view, “lifelong
learning nonstop” is an appropriate metaphor for modern life, because it hints at both the gains
and losses that result from these historical changes. Increasingly, developmental acquisitions
and outcomes are never final; they are under continuous pressure to demonstrate their adaptive
fitness.

TOWARD A NEW AND DYNAMIC CONCEPTION OF END STATES It seems, then, that the idea of a
fixed and domain-specific end state as conceptualized by Piaget or Erikson has come under
additional challenge not only by the articulation of new conceptions of human development, but
also by the way the world as a whole is developing. Specific expressions of high-level expertise,
such as formal-logical intelligence, are not sufficient. The longer life span and technological and
global changes require a new target: The new target of human strengths is an ensemble of
properties or competencies that make the individual an effective navigator in a world of change.
In this vein, the concept of human strengths needs to be transformed to a more dynamic
conception of adaptive fitness. It needs to be seen as a genuine developmental and open-
systems construct. More specifically, we argue that the concept of human strengths is a dynamic
and context-general property in the sense of adaptive fitness or a general-purpose mechanism;
represents a condition for lifelong learning and flexibility in mastery;

26

BALTES A N D FREUND

regulates the direction of goals of individual development, as well as of the means of goal-
attainment; and contributes not only to help individuals develop, but also to make them
effective participants in the creation of the common good. To return to the question of the
meaningfulness of the concept of an end state, in this change in what constitutes a good life and
good development, our view is that the search for ideal end states associated with the idea of
human strengths continues to be a central concern. However, instead of conceptualizing good
development as a fixed, domain-specific end state of “being,” it seems more appropriate to think
of it as “becoming,” highlighting the overall adaptive fitness of the behavioral systems involved.
In this spirit, we argue that the integration of wisdom and SOC represents one important facet of
human strengths that can be viewed as an ideal outcome of development.

WISDOM: A DESIRABLE END STATE OF DEVELOPMENT What is wisdom? In the traditions of

philosophy and cultural anthropology, and at a high level of abstraction, one of the most general
definitions of wisdom is that it characterizes the convergence of means and ends for the highest
personal and common good (P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Kekes, 1995). In this sense, and
when approached with the methods of psychology, in our own work we conceptualize wisdom
as an expert knowledge system about the fundamental pragmatics of life, including knowledge
and judgment about the conduct, purpose, and meaning of life (P. B. Baltes & Smith, 1990; Smith
& Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). The following seven general criteria of the Berlin
wisdom model are based on cultural-historical and philosophical accounts of wisdom: 1. Wisdom
addresses important and difficult questions and strategies about the conduct and meaning of
life. 2. Wisdom includes knowledge about the limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the
world. 3. Wisdom represents a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice. 4.
Wisdom constitutes knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and balance. 5.
Wisdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and character, that is, an orchestration of knowledge
and virtues. 6. Wisdom represents knowledge used for the good or well-being of oneself and
that of others. ORCHESTRATION OF WISDOM AND SOC

27

7. Wisdom, though difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily recognized when manifested.

The notion of fundamental pragmatics was chosen to mark the specific subject matter (domain)
of wisdom. It includes knowledge and judgment about the most essential aspects of the human
condition and the ways and means of planning, managing, and understanding a good life, that of
ourselves and that of others. Concrete examples are knowledge about the social, cultural,
biological, individual, and historical conditions of life, about between-person and between-
context variability, about ontogenetic changes of development, about the limitations of one’s
own knowledge, about the tolerance and reciprocity that are essential to implementing
fundamental human rights in a multicultural world, and about ways to bring intelligence,
emotion, and motivation into convergence to promote the individual and common good (P. B.
Baltes, Gluck, & Kunzmann, 2002). In the Berlin wisdom model (P. B. Baltes & Smith, 1990; P. B.
Baltes & Staudinger, 2000), a model that was advanced to assess with empirical observations the
degree and quality of wisdom, the concept of wisdom is operationalized as wisdom-related
knowledge. An ensemble of five criteria defines this expert body of knowledge. These five
criteria are meant to be approximations to the “utopian” ideal of wisdom-which incidentally is
not only located in individual minds but as a matter of principle is a collective construct. The first
two criteria, (a) rich factual (declarative) and (b) procedural knowledge about the fundamental
pragmatics of life, stem from the expertise literature (e.g., Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Based on
lifespan theory, three additional metacriteria are considered to be specific for wisdom: (c)
Lifespan contextualism identifies knowledge about the many themes and contexts of life (e.g.,
family, work, leisure, the public good of society), including their interrelations and cultural
variations, and incorporates a lifetime temporal perspective. (d) Relativism of values and life
priorities concerns the acknowledgment of and tolerance for variability in individuals, cultures,
and societies. This does not at all imply full-blown relativity of values but rather an explicit
concern with the essence of wisdom: that is, the bringing into convergence of the goals and
means of the individual and the common good. (e) Recognition and management of uncertainty
evolves from the awareness that human information processing is necessarily constrained, that
individuals have access only to select parts of reality, and that there is always uncertainty about
what happened in the past and what will happen in the future. Wisdom is considered to be the
rare case when excellence in all five criteria are integrated into one coordinated whole body of
knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life. Furthermore, it is important to recognize
that the Berlin model of wisdom does not limit the substance of wis-

28

BALTES AND FREUND

dom to the cognitive. Rather, “wisdom identifies a state of mind and behavior that includes the
coordinated and balanced interplay of intellectual, affective, and motivational aspects of human
functioning” (P. B. Baltes & Staudinger, 2000, p. 123). What is the implication of this concern
with wisdom for a conceptualization of human strengths? Proposing to consider wisdom as the
most general good of human development and the most general indicator of optimality spans a
general frame for defining the goal territory of the end state of human development. Wisdom
can be considered the most general end state of human development for two reasons: First, it
represents the highest level of knowledge about the goals and means of life that, according to
philosophical and cultural anthropological analysis, human evolution has generated. Second, it is
general because it is conceived of at a high level of abstraction, permitting therefore variations in
phenotypic expressions. In this sense, it combines universalism with cultural, regional, or
personal particularism. Wisdom, then, forms the most general cognitive, emotional, and
motivational space of goals and means within which specific realizations of living a good life can
proceed. In this sense, wisdom gives direction to the nature of adaptive fitness that people are
expected to move toward. At the same time, wisdom is dynamic and open to individual, social,
and cultural variations in life circumstances. It is important to recognize, however, that these
variations are bound by the criterion of convergence between means and ends of life and the
joint attention to the individual and common good that the concept of wisdom requires.

SOC: A WAY TO HUMAN STRENGTHS As indicated by many areas of research, the correlation
between knowledge and behavior is far from perfect. For this reason, there is an important
difference between wisdom as knowledge and wisdom as wise behavior. A key question,
therefore, is how wisdom-related knowledge is acquired and especially translated into
development-enhancing behavior directed at oneself as well as others. How expressions of
wisdom are possibly acquired and how wisdom as a theoretical frame may be translated into
practical behavior is a key concern of SOC, a model that describes a specific strategy of effective
life management (M. M. Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; P. B. Baltes, 1997; P. B. Baltes & Baltes, 1990;
Freund & Baltes, 2000; Marsiske et al., 1995). As is true for practically all domains of life beyond
wisdom, we argue that selection, optimization, and compensation are central processes for the
acquisition and behavioral expression of wisdom-related knowledge as well (Freund & Baltes,
2002). The SOC-related processes do not specify what ORCHESTRATION OF WISDOM AND SOC

29

goals and means might be ethically and morally appropriate. Criminals and Mafia bosses, for
instance, can be masters of SOC. In other words, the specification of the norm-based valence or
desirability of goals and means is the topic of wisdom, not of SOC. In a nutshell, the SOC model
posits that there are three fundamental processes of developmental regulation across the life
span: selection, optimization, and compensation. The processes can be active or passive,
external or internal, and conscious or subconscious. Selection, optimization, and compensation
can occur at various levels of analysis or integration ranging from the macro-level (e.g., societies)
to the micro-level (e.g., biological cells). Knowing how to orchestrate selection, optimization, and
compensation is a very powerful “general-purpose mechanism” by which individuals, groups,
and societies move ahead in reaching higher levels of functioning and in mastering future
challenges.

Selection Selection (developing, elaborating, and committing to goals) gives direction to

development by directing and focusing resources on certain domains of functioning
(specialization) and guiding behavior across situations and time. Selection can occur either
electively (“elective selection”) or as a response to losses (e.g., focusing on the most important
goals, a mechanism we call “loss-based selection”). The importance of the selection of goals is
also empirically supported. For instance, on a more micro-level of analysis, goals guide attention
toward the kind of information that is goal relevant (for an overview, see Gollwitzer &
Moskowitz, 1996). O n a more macro-level of analysis, goals contribute to a sense of purpose
and meaning in life (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 2000; Staudinger, 1999).

Optimization

Ogtirniwtion denotes the process of acquiring, refining, coordinating, and applying the relevant
means or resources to attain goals in the selected goal domains. The importance of optimization
in achieving higher levels of functioning has been demonstrated in different areas of psychology.
O n the one hand, there are means-such as reading, writing, and arithmetic -that have a high
degree of generalization. O n the other hand, there are means that are domain specific, such as
the cognitive skills required to play chess. The literature on expertise has demonstrated the
central role of deliberate practice of skills, encompassing the acquisition of new skills, the
refinement of existing skills, and the integration and automatization of skills, for achieving peak
performance (Ericsson & Smith, 1991).

30

BALTES AND FREUND

Compensation In our definition, compensation concerns the use of alternative means when
existing means are lost in order to maintain a given level of functioning. Management of
transient or permanent losses is a central aspect of human strengths (cf. the notion of resilience,
e.g., Rutter, 1987; Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995). Key processes related to compensation
involve the substitution of means either by acquiring new ones (e.g., a wheelchair to
compensate for loss in mobility) or by activating unused internal resources (e.g., training muscles
that support balance) or external resources (e.g., asking friends for help when walking).
Returning to the functional coordination of SOC and wisdom, the concept of wisdom can be
considered a selector mechanism for means, whether these are part of optimization or
compensation. O n the one hand, wisdom encompasses general knowledge about means-ends
relationships, or which means best serve to achieve a given goal in a specific person-context
constellation. O n the other hand, wisdom also specifies which means are in accordance with
and maximize both the personal and the common good. Clearly, when wisdom is involved,
means that serve personal ends at the cost of others’ well-being would not appear acceptable.

WISDOM AND SOC: AN INTEGRATION FOSTERING HUMAN STRENGTHS Our central position,
then, is that wisdom and SOC constitute an ensemble of knowledge and behavioral strategies
that if operative in a conjoint manner constitute a major component of human strengths.
Wisdom provides a selector concerning which goals and means are of fundamental significance
in the life course and, in addition, are ethically and morally desirable. SOC specifies how goals
are reached, irrespective of the nature of the goals and means involved (see Figure 2.1). Because
we argue that the general cognitive, emotional, and motivational space of wisdom, as well as the
principles of SOC, evince a high degree of universality (Baltes & Freund, in press; Baltes &
Staudinger, ZOOO), we suggest that the use of coordinated wisdom-related knowledge as a
selector of SOCrelated strategies carries high generalizability. What about the more direct
reciprocal relationship between SOC and the acquisition of wisdom itself? SOC-related behaviors
should also be important for acquiring and refining wisdom-related knowledge. Learning to
select and optimize goals and to compensate for losses in a way that fosters successful
development should provide insights into what goals are best suited for a person of a specific
age living in a given sociohistorical context. Moreover, acquiring and refining optimization and
compensation ORCHESTRATION OF WISDOM AND SOC

31

Human Strengths

Effective life management Desirable range of goals and means

selection optimization compensation

Figure 2.7. The concept of human strengths as the integration of wisdom, for example, the
knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life, and the life management strategies of
selection, optimization, and compensation.

bring knowledge about means-ends relationships that is also part of the pragmatic knowledge
about how to live a good life. In this sense, it is likely that with the acquisition and refinement of
SOC, the kind of knowledge evolves that we have characterized as the core of wisdom-that is, an
expertise in the fundamental pragmatics of life. Similarly, as wisdom-related knowledge evolves,
for instance during late adolescence (Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 2001), we expect a
corresponding advance in SOC.

CONCLUSION As developmental psychology extended its reach to the entire life span, considered
gains and losses as functional parts of any developmental process, attended to the systemic
whole of functions, and included the varied cultural contexts in which individuals live, the
traditional notion of fixed end states of development lost status. The level of dissatisfaction grew
even further when noncognitive aspects were considered, such as the role of values and
multiculturation. Thus, there was a tendency to avoid the search for end state-oriented
conceptions of human strengths. These reservations about ideal end states of human
development cannot be taken to imply that developmental psychologists should completely
abstain from efforts to give substance to the concept of human strengths. Guidance is necessary
because, aside from the notion of developmental advances toward a state of “maturity,” rapid
technological changes, glob32

BALTES AND FREUND

alization, and increased longevity stress the necessity for lifelong learning.

On the one hand, this lack of a predefined end state can be seen as opening

up possibilities for continued growth and encouraging people to explore personal strengths even
in unconventional ways. It gives a large share of freedom to the course of individual
development. On the other hand, this freedom can turn into a ruthless pressure to fulfill the
ideal of permanent growth and achievement of higher and higher levels of functioning at the
expense of others, both individuals and societies. We see the contribution of this chapter as
being its outline of an alternative “general-purpose” and “universal” constellation of properties
of human strengths. In this line of argument, we kept the search for an end state. This end state,
however, we propose to define not as a specific property such as logical thinking, but as a system
of means and goals that are integrative and consider the person as a whole and in the context of
society and citizenship. In this integration, we propose that wisdom, the knowledge about
fundamental pragmatics of life, be viewed as a desirable end state of human development that
can be lived and implemented through selective optimization with compensation. In this view,
the end state is relativistic and dynamic in that its expression depends on the specific (social,
historical, life span) context and the characteristics of a person. On an abstract level, however,
this conception of an end state is universal and bound by the general principles of wisdom and
of the fundamental life-management processes of SOC that conjointly allow the pursuit of the
individual and common good. We consider this integration of wisdom and SOC to be the most
general version of a psychology of human strengths. As an ensemble, we expect the
orchestration of wisdom and SOC to be a powerful regulator as people navigate their lives in a
changing society.

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and Society, 16, 397-422. Baltes, P. B. (1997). On the incomplete architecture of human
ontogeny: Selection, optimization, and compensation as foundation of developmental theory.
American Psychologist, 52, 366-380. Baltes, P. B. (1999). Lebenslanges Lernen: Das Zeitalter d e s
Unfertigen Menschen (Akademische Causerie) [Lifelong learning: The incompleteness of
humankind]. Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Baltes, P. B., &
Baltes, M. M. (1990). Psychological perspectives on successful aging: The model of selective
optimization with compensation. In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), Successful aging:
Perspectives from the behavioral sciences (pp. 1-34). New York: Cambridge University Press.
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theory of wisdom. Review of General Psychology, 2, 347-365.

ORCHESTRATION OF WISDOM AND SOC

35

THE HUMAN’S GREATEST STRENGTH: OTHER HUMANS ELLEN BERSCHEID

Almost half a century ago, Maslow sharply criticized psychologists for neglecting to study the
antecedents and consequences of one human’s love for another human: It is amazing how little
the empirical sciences have to offer on the subject of love. Particularly strange is the silence of
the psychologists, for one might think this to be their particular obligation. Probably this is just
another example of the besetting sin of the academicians, that they prefer to do what they are
easily able rather than what they ought, like the not-so-bright kitchen helper I knew who opened
every can in the hotel one day because he was so very good at opening cans. (Maslow, 1954, p.
235)

At the time Maslow wrote those words, psychologists had tried many times

to open the can labeled “human emotion,” whose many fascinating contents include love.
Discouraged each time, they chucked that unyielding can back into the dusty depths of the
cupboard of human behavioral phenomena. There it remained relatively undisturbed until
Schachter (e.g., 1964) performed his seminal emotion experiments in the early 1960s and
stimulated a renaissance of theory and research on human emotion that

37

continues to the present day. That psychologists got a late start on human emotional
phenomena, and that as a consequence human emotion continues to be poorly understood, is
reflected in the fact that even the most fundamental questions about emotion-including just
what an emotion is -remain controversial (see Ekman & Davidson, 1994). The troubled history of
emotion in psychology is partially a consequence of psychologists’ neglect of the fact that each
human’s behavior is embedded in his or her relationships with other humans. Neglect of this
fundamental truth in the study of emotion is surprising, because Darwin (1899), who lifted
human emotion from the realm of philosophy and firmly placed it in the scientific arena,
emphasized from the very beginning the social nature of emotion and its role in the survival of
the species. Nevertheless, the implications of Darwin’s insight were neglected for many years.
Today, however, most emotion theorists at least formally recognize the close association
between relationships and the experience of emotion. Zajonc ( 1998) succinctly described the
association: Emotions, even though their hallmark is the internal state of the individual-the
viscera, the gut-are above all social phenomena. They are the basis of social interaction, they are
the products of social interaction, their origins, and their currency. (pp. 619-620)

But beyond cursory recognition of the fact that people usually experience emotion most
frequently and intensely in the context of their close relationships with other people (Berscheid
& Ammazzalorso, 2001), its many implications for human emotional experience mostly remain
unexplored. An understanding of many other behavioral phenomena has suffered from neglect
of the fact that humans are embedded in a web of relationships with other humans from their
conception to their death and, thus, that most human behavior takes place in the context of
interpersonal relationships. The omnipresent relationship context both influences an individual’s
behavior and is influenced by it (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000). For
this reason, no science that aspires to understand human behavior can afford to continue to
overlook the human’s social nature and the effects an individual’s relationships with others have
on that person’s behavior. It seems particularly obvious that recognition of the fact that humans
are embedded in a web of relationships with others throughout their lives is vital to the
development of a psychology of human strengths. Paramount among these strengths is surely
the human’s inclination and capacity to form and maintain relationships with other humans. It is
within relationships with others that most people find meaning and purpose in their lives (e.g.,
Klinger, 1977); that they typically experience the positive emotions of love, joy, happiness, and
contentment; and that they successfully over-

38

ELLEN BERSCHEfD
come the physical and psychological challenges to well-being and survival all humans encounter.

THE EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE There is growing agreement among evolutionary

psychologists that relationships constitute the single most important factor responsible for the
survival of Homo supiens. For example, Buss and Kenrick (1998) stated, evolutionary psychology
places social interaction and social relationships squarely within the center of the action. In
particular, social interactions and relationships surrounding mating, kinship, reciprocal alliances,
coalitions, and hierarchies are especially critical, because all appear to have strong consequences
for successful survival and reproduction. (p. 994)

Many now argue, for example, that the small, cooperative group has constituted the primary
survival strategy of humans from the beginning of evolutionary time. As Brewer and Caporael
(1990) put the thesis, social relationships “provided a buffer between early hominids and the
natural physical environment, including protection from predators, access to food supplies, and
insulation from the elements” (p. 240). Many evolutionary psychologists thus reason that if the
capacity to form and maintain cooperative relationships with other humans was critical to
human survival, then biological characteristics of humans selected for at the individual level
should have been features that facilitated those relationships. They hypothesize, therefore, that
over evolutionary time humans were biologically wired with properties that promote the
formation and maintenance of relationships with conspecifics. Evidence in support of their thesis
is accumulating in many areas of psychology. For example, psychoneuroscientists have proposed
that because relationships with other humans undoubtedly were necessary to human survival,
one of the most important tasks of our ancestors’ perceptual systems was recognition of the
faces of other humans. They have reasoned that if face perception was of special importance,
then humans may have evolved a special neurological processing system for face perception
different from the system used in other forms of object perception. Evidence in support of their
thesis has been obtained in findings that face perception and object perception depend on
different regions of the brain, that the two systems are functionally independent, and that the
systems process information differently (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; see also
Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun,

1 998).

Yet another apparently innate system that facilitates the formation and maintenance of
relationships is the “attachment” system, first identiTHE HUMAN’S GREATEST STRENGTH: OTHER
HUMANS

39

fied by Harlow (e.g., 1958) in his experimental studies with infant primates and by Bowlby (e.g.,
1969/1982) in his observations of human infants. Both viewed attachment behavior as an
evolved tendency for the individual to maintain proximity to another stronger, wiser, caring
member of the species. The defining feature of attachment over the human life span is that the
attachment figure serves as a source of reassurance and aid in the face of perceived threat.
There is evidence that an attachment bond between a human infant and his or her caregiver
emerges universally in the second half of the first year of human life (Reis et al., 2000). Evidence
also is mounting that the close relationships adults later form with romantic partners, friends,
and others often function in ways similar to the attachments formed between a child and a
caregiver (e.g., Shaver & Hazan, 1993). As appears to be true of other species (Latane &
Hothersall, 1972), the human is especially likely to turn to attachment figures in times of stress;
indeed, the mere presence of an attachment figure may reduce the intensity of the individual’s
physiological reactions to the stressful event (e.g., Lynch,

1977).

Although the importance of the human attachment system for infant survival has been widely
acknowledged, its role in the development of the human brain only recently has been
recognized. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that because the human brain is not completely
differentiated at birth, the infant’s experiences with the social environment interact with gene
expression to shape neurological circuits within the major structures of the brain (e.g.,
Blakemore, 1998). Reviewing much of this evidence, Siege1 (1999) argued that the infant’s early
social relationships “have a direct effect on the development of the domains of mental
functioning that serve as our conceptual anchor points: memory, narrative, emotion,
representations, and states of mind” (p. 68). In support of this proposition, evidence from
nonhuman species suggests that even minor deprivation of early contact from responsive
conspecifics results in abnormal neuroanatomical structures and impaired endocrinological
sensitivity associated with stress. Studies of human infants who have had few opportunities to
interact and form relationships with other humans also reveal neurohormonal abnormalities
(e.g., Gunnar, 2000). Finally, at the psychological level of analysis, there is an impressive array of
evidence that humans possess what Baumeister and Leary (1995) termed a fundamental “need
to belong.” This evidence suggests that the individual’s need to belong to the human community
is fulfilled by frequent and affectively pleasant interactions with at least a few other people so
long as those interactions take place in the context of a stable and enduring framework of the
partners’ mutual concern for each other’s welfare. Satisfaction of this need (e.g., as in the
formation of a new friendship or romantic relationship or acceptance by a larger group) is
usually manifested in the experience of positive emotions and feelings, whereas its frustration

40

ELLEN BERSCHElD

(e.g., rejection by others) typically results in the experience of negative emotions and feelings.
MORBIDITY, MORTALITY, AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS Evidence supporting the
supposition that relationships with others were critical to the survival of Homo supiens now is
supplemented by evidence that relationships with other humans continue to play a critical role
in human physical and mental health. Durkheim (1897/1963) long ago systematically
documented the association between the likelihood of the individual’s committing suicide and
his or her degree of “social integration,” or his or her maintenance of relationship ties with
others. Nevertheless, only within the past few decades have psychologists begun to investigate
the role that relationships play in human physical well-being and survival. Evidence documenting
the association between human physical health and relationships with others is strong and
robust. House, Landis, and Umberson’s ( 1988) review of five large-sample, long-term
prospective epidemiological studies concluded that low social integration is a major risk factor
for premature death. The strength of the association is illustrated by the fact that this review and
others (e.g., Atkins, Kaplan, & Toshima, 1991) concluded that the age-adjusted relative risk ratio
between low social integration and mortality exceeds that of the highly publicized risks
associated with smoking and obesity. Psychologists’ attempts to identify the causal pathways
between social relationships and morbidity and mortality have centered on the construct of
social support. The central hypothesis has been that relationships with others promote physical
well-being through the health-promoting actions of those with whom the individual is in
relationship. Unfortunately, and similar to the current state of affairs in the study of human
emotion, the immaturity of social support theory and research is revealed by the fact that few
social support researchers agree on the proper definition of their central construct (see
Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Vaux, 1988). Nevertheless, as Reis et al. (2000) observed, “nearly all
existing [social support] research incorporates some of the basic themes involved in positive-
quality relationships, such as affection, caring, reassurance of worth, advice and guidance,
proximity to caregivers, coping assistance, opportunities to nurture, reliable alliances, and
tangible assistance” (p. 853). As this overflowing basket of positive relationship qualities reflects,
discovery of the precise causal connections between social relationships and physical well-being
is likely to occupy psychological researchers for some time, and further adTHE HUMAN’S
GREATEST STRENGTH: OTHER HUMANS

41

vances will require closer attention to the nature and qualities of the individual’s interpersonal
relationships.

RELATIONSHIPS: THE SOURCE OF HUMAN HAPPINESS Most people are surprised to learn of the
close association between the status of their social relationships and their risk of premature
death. Few, however, are surprised to learn of the association between their mental health and
happiness and the state of their interpersonal relationships. Not even Americans, who have one
of the world’s most individualistic cultures and thus who are most likely to deny and minimize
their dependence on other people (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998), are surprised by
this finding. A wealth of research documents that when Americans are asked what makes them
happy, most cite their close personal relationships with other people (see Berscheid & Reis,
1998). Indeed, people who have formed and maintain satisfying relationships with others do in
fact appear to be happier than those who have not succeeded in doing so. Diener, Suh, Lucas,
and Smith (1999) concluded from their review of the data that married people, for example,
tend to be happier than unmarried people, whether always single, divorced, or widowed, and
this is true for both men and women of all ages. O n the other side of the coin, the significant
associations between loneliness and unhappiness, as well as between loneliness and a multitude
of mental and physical ills, have been well documented (see Berscheid & Reis, 1998).
Additionally, meta-analyses of a wealth of studies reveal the deleterious impact that discordant
and disruptive family relationships have on children’s physical and psychological wellbeing, both
during childhood and in later life (Amato & Keith, 1991a, 1991b). Because psychologists have
only begun to systematically investigate the role that relationships with others plays in human
life, the causal pathways between relationships and psychological well-being have yet to be
mapped. Like those investigating many other psychological phenomena integral to the human’s
omnipresent relationship context, the efforts of these investigators will be dependent on the
further development of a science of relationships.

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE OF RELATIONSHIPS Many psychologists now are in the process of

remedying psychology’s neglect of the human’s social nature. They are doing so with astonishing
speed and determination. Developmental, clinical, and social psychologists currently are among
the major contributors to the rapidly developing sci-

42

ELLEN BERSCHElD

ence of relationships, an endeavor that is engaging scholars in almost all of the behavioral and
social sciences and in several of the biological and health sciences as well (Berscheid, 1998). If it
is true that the human’s greatest strength is the inclination and capacity to form and sustain
relationships with others of the species, then the further development of relationship science
and the development of a psychology based on human strengths will prove to be symbiotic
enterprises. The maturity of these two scientific endeavors is likely to result in a different
portrait of the human than that currently painted by psychological theory and evidence. The
present unflattering picture of Homo sapiens is reflected by the fact that if one were to place in
one pile all the psychological theories and research directed toward an understanding of human
aggression and competition, including the many theories that assume humans are innately
aggressive, and put in another pile all theory and evidence focused on human altruism and other
prosocial behaviors, the first pile surely would tower over the second. Similarly, if one were to
stack all psychological theory and research pertaining to the experience of negative emotion,
such as anger and fear, alongside that directed toward love and the other positive emotions, one
would see a similar disparity. Strangely, this is true despite the fact that the word “love” has one
of the highest frequencies of usage of any in the English language and, as Harlow (e.g., 1958)
noted in his reports of infant attachment, it also has the highest frequency of any word cited in
Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations (1957). Nevertheless, as many emotion theorists have observed
(e.g., Berscheid, 1983), psychological theories of emotion historically have had great difficulty
accounting for the positive emotions. The problem arises from the fact that most theorists have
taken their principal task to be an accounting of the negative emotions.

HUMAN “NATURE’ Psychology’s traditional focus on the negative both reflects and contributes to
popular assumptions about the nature of humankind. In his book Human Nature Explored,
Mandler (1997) noted that when people are asked to list the characteristics of human nature,
“Usually the result looks something like this: Greed, Competition, Ambition, Jealousy, Violence,
Intelligence, Joy, Aggression” (p. 4). Discounting intelligence (presumably affectively neutral), the
only positive trait popularly believed to be characteristic of humans is the capacity to be joyful.
Mandler continued, “It is only after some probing that the positive side of human nature
emerges in everyday discourse. It is often referred to as one’s ‘essential humanity,’ which refers
to the caring, empathic nature of beast” (p. 5 ) . Commenting on Gould’s (1993) observation
that, in comparison with THE HUMAN’S GREATEST STRENGTH: OTHER HUMANS

43

other animals, “Homo sapiens is a remarkably genial species” (p. 281), Mandler speculated that
because most human interactions are positive or neutral, truly destructive acts, such as
aggression and violence, stand out against this background of general human harmony and
appear to be more prevalent than they actually are. Psychology’s failure to “accentuate the
positive”- its emphasis on the dark side of human behavior-at least partially has been the result
of the noble motivation to “eliminate the negative.” Many have believed that only by subjecting
the human’s liabilities to close scrutiny can understanding-and, ultimately, prevention and
remedy-of human flaws and weaknesses be achieved. Nevertheless, psychology’s failure to
appreciate human strengths and assets may be retarding effective prevention and control of
undesirable human behaviors. For example, if it is true that humans are above all else social
creatures whose evolved biological properties promote harmonious bonds with other humans,
then a different light is thrown on the destructive acts humans sometimes perpetrate on other
humans. To illustrate the difference in perspective, one need only consider Shelley’s (1831/1992)
classic tale of Frankenstein’s monster, who confessed at the end of his life, “I have murdered the
lovely and the helpless; I have strangled the innocent as they slept, and grasped to death his
throat who never injured me or any other living thing” (p. 184). Reviewing his wretched life, in
which his ugly appearance prompted horror, revulsion, and cruelty by others, the monster also
sadly recalled, Once I falsely hoped to meet with beings, who, pardoning my outward form,
would love me for the excellent qualities which I was capable of unfolding.. . . When I run over
the frightful catalogue of my sins, I cannot believe that I am the same creature whose thoughts
were once filled with sublime and transcendent visions of the beauty and the majesty of
goodness. But it is even so; the fallen angel becomes a malignant devil. . . . I am alone. (p. 183)
A portrait that depicts the human as teeming with innate malignan-

cies toward other humans-malignancies that require containment, at minimum, and exorcism, if
possible-has different implications for the treatment and control of undesirable human
behaviors than does a portrait that depicts the human as eager to love other humans and to be
loved by them. One wonders how many human monsters were born ready and eager to love and
to be loved but were denied the expression of what appears to be a fundamental human quality.
In sum, Homo sapiens is an extraordinarily tough animal to have survived on planet Earth for as
long as it has. It seems likely that our ancestors survived, and that we survive today, only with
the aid of other humans. The development of a positive psychology, one that focuses on human
strengths rather than weaknesses, would do well to lay its founda-

44

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tion on this fundamental fact of human existence. Whether it does so or not, no psychology-
whether positive or negative-can advance its understanding of human nature by ignoring the
fact that, far from being born predisposed to be hostile toward other humans, it appears that we
are innately inclined to form strong, enduring, and harmonious attachments with others of the
species-or, as Harlow (1958) simply put it, to “love” them.

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& D. Perlman (Eds.), Advances in personal relationships (Vol. 4, pp. 29-70). London: Jessica
Kingsley.

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Shelley, M. (1992). Frankenstein. New York: St. Martin’s Press. (Original work published 1831)
Siegel, D. J. (1999). The developing mind: Toward a neurobiology of interpersonal experience.
New York: Guilford Press. Vaux, A. (1988). Social support: Theory, research, and intervention.
New York: Praeger. Zajonc, R. B. (1998). Emotions. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.),
The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 591-632). New York: McGraw-Hill.

THE HUMAN’S GREATEST STRENGTH: OTHER HUMANS

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CONSTRUCTIVE COGNITION, PERSONAL GOALS, AND THE SOCIAL EMBEDDING OF PERSONALITY

NANCY CANTOR

In considering a psychology of human strengths, I begin with the view that personality
psychology has more often than not emphasized the shortcomings of individuals as compared
with their potentials. In this regard, one can point to four dimensions of what I call a “normative
analysis’’ (admittedly an overgeneralization) in personality psychology that encourage this
emphasis on shortcomings. Now, I should say from the outset that I plead as guilty as the next in
following this approach. Fortunately, there are also emerging trends in the field that may serve
as an antidote to our traditional ways, and, after briefly noting some features of the normative
approach, in this chapter I will comment on where to search for alternatives. In particular, I will
argue that we should be looking for evidence of the opportunistic proclivities of individuals
embedded in what they are trying to do, often as these goals change over time and place, and in
the ways in which people garner social supports in their meaningful life activities.

49

LIMITATIONS OF THE NORMATIVE APPROACH First, however, let me consider some of the facets
of our traditions that may serve to hide these human strengths. Emphasis on Outcomes

First, individual differences have traditionally been characterized in terms of the outcomes that a
person has achieved (i.e., what he or she has), as contrasted with the processes in which the
individual is engaged (i.e., what he or she is doing or trying to do). This emphasis, which I have
previously portrayed as a “having” versus “doing” approach to personality (Cantor, 1990), tends
to focus attention on failures of attainment rather than possibilities for the future. This emphasis
is particularly ironic in the analysis of personal goals, when the focus shifts from the motivational
process-for example, from how a person’s goals have mobilized energy and behavior-to the
distance between a current state and the desired outcomes. Search for Simplicity

A second feature of the normative approaches is a desire to find parsimony or simplicity in the
characterization of fundamental individual differences (e.g., five-factor model, basic goals) with a
parallel eschewing of complexity in the portrait of personality. Whereas it is certainly an
appropriate and important task to find a fundamental scheme for personality, unfortunately it is
difficult to do so without moving to a level of abstraction that turns quickly into a contrast
between “good and bad” or functional and dysfunctional attributes (e.g., optimistic vs.
pessimistic, approach vs. avoidance goals). In placing a person on these fundamental
dimensions, it is very hard not to use the positive reference point as a benchmark against which
many fall short. Moreover, the desired level of generality in such descriptions typically
encompasses quite a range of behaviors and life situations, thereby moving a person closer, on
average, to the good or bad pole than he or she might be if we attended closely to the specificity
of day-to-day actions and motivations. Focus on Consistency and Stability

In a related vein, a third feature of many approaches is the search for broad-based patterning
instead of the specificity of behavior and goals. Whereas cross-situational consistency in
behavior may have its virtues, from the perspective of a “positive psychology,” there is much to
be claimed for individuals’ discriminative facilities (Mischel, 1973) as they adapt to 50

NANCY CANTOR

the exigencies of different situations with different behaviors (e.g., Mischel, 1999; Shoda, 1999).
Similarly, we may miss a great deal about adaptive human behavior by looking for temporal
stability in behavior aggregated over periods in a person’s life. That is, by focusing on stable
aspects of personality rather than malleable ones, perhaps the individual’s novel responses to
opportunities are overlooked (Cantor, Zirkel, & Norem, 1993; Helson, Mitchell, & Moane, 1984).
Isolation of the Individual Another, often defining feature of most characterizations of
personality is the attempt to separate the individual from the social context (cf., Stewart & Healy,
1989). This feature has many aspects to it, some of which are captured by the emphasis on
cross-situational consistency and temporal stability. However, an important part of this
normative approach also involves isolating the individual as an independent actor, attributing
only to the individual those things that are not somehow dependent on others. So, for example,
we rarely characterize people in terms of their characteristic interdependencies, such as the
ways in which they work with others who complement their skills or get help from others in
constructive ways.

A COGNITIVE-MOTIVATIONAL-SOCIAL BASIS FOR PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR For the

most part, therefore, personality psychologists typically characterize individuals in terms of
attributes that are simple, general, consistent, stable, and independent of social relationships.
This normative approach might profitably be contrasted with an approach that emphasizes what
individuals are trying to do, often differently in each new setting and over time, and with the
help of others, therein capturing perhaps more of people’s opportunistic proclivities. So the
question then becomes, what units of analysis or perspective on personality will be most likely
to reveal these opportunistic proclivities? No doubt, there are many such approaches.
Personally, I have gravitated to the study of the cognitive bases of personality and social
behavior in large part because I believe that the creativity and ingenuity and resilience of
individuals often reside in the mind and frequently are imperfectly translated into action (Cantor,
1990; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). As Kelly ( 1955) so insightfully argued, constructive
altemativisrn permits people to construe events, and other people, and even themselves, in a
new light, as well as to see things differently than others do. Of course, the literature also is
replete with examples of the ways in which the mind can be doggedly rigid and self-defeating
(e.g., Fiske & COGNITION, GOALS, AND SOCIAL EMBEDDING

51

Taylor, 1984). Nevertheless, there are important aspects of everyday cognition that do not
always get enough emphasis in the literature and that show instead people’s ability to imagine
and contemplate a different world than the one in which they are currently operating (Bruner,
1986). People’s willingness to engage in counterfactual thinking and to construct possibilities for
themselves and for others, supplemented by the occasional openness to changing their minds,
provides reason to believe that thinking can constructively inform behavior (Cantor, 1990; Fiske,
1992; Markus & Nurius, 1986). Constructive cognition is especially important because it
connects to the motivational bases of social behavior-that is, to what people are trying to do in
their daily lives (Snyder & Cantor, 1998). The proclivity to imagine worlds other than those that
currently exist, and to take the cognitive perspective of others in ways that open up new
possibilities for the self, can energize new strivings, projects, goals, and tasks. This then becomes
a basis for individuals’ heightened sensitivity to social affordances, so that they look for
opportunities to take part in activities and to join groups that foster goal pursuit (Cantor, 1994).
The tendency to select and to shape environments to fit personal needs is, for the most part, a
human strength that should always be recognized and emphasized (Buss, 1987; Snyder, 1981) .
Most social situations afford different specific tasks ideally suited to serve different motivations,
as Snyder and his colleagues (e.g., Snyder & Omoto, 1992) have detailed in their analyses of the
alternative goalssome more self-interested and some more purely prosocial-at stake in
volunteerism. Therefore, there is a great deal of room for opportunism in goal pursuit. And, at its
best, constructive cognition mobilizes motivation and guides social behavior toward and within
environments that afford personal fulfillment and renewal. What observers of human behavior
often lose sight of are the alternative routes that different individuals take toward personally
fulfilling ends. By focusing on the process of working on goals -how individuals see their tasks,
what they are trying to do, what kinds of social supports they mobilize in the process-it is often
possible to see meaning and positive purpose in what may appear to an observer to be at best
unnecessary or at worst self-defeating behavior. As noted previously, the sometimes disparaging
view of people in personality psychology may also derive from a perceived mandate to isolate
what is characteristic about the person, separating person and context as if in a signal detection
analysis of signal and noise. This may be problematic because people are fundamentally social
beings (Cantor, 1990; Caporael & Brewer, 1991), interdependent with and even dependent on
the talents and supports and behaviors of others (in dyads, in groups, in organizations and
collectives), and so much of what people accomplish doesn’t stand well on its own. This
inherently social and embedded feature of personality

52

NANCY CANTOR

and of people implies that a substantial side of human strengths resides in the proclivity and
ability to find fulfilling social niches (Cantor, 1994; Snyder & Cantor, 1998)-that is, in individuals’
intelligence for seeing how to embed the self in “helpful environments” that facilitate goal
pursuit (Cantor & Sanderson, 1999) and how to mix and match individual talent with the skills
and attributes of others. Personality psychology may underplay the strengths of individuals by
inadequately recognizing their constructive interdependencies with others.

REVEALING HUMAN STRENGTHS In the service of concretizing this alternative approach, I will
briefly

describe some examples of ways in which human strengths can be revealed

by looking at how people think, what they are trying to do, and how they

enlist social and contextual supports in goal pursuit.

Constructive Cognition One of the signature features of individuals’ proclivity for constructive
cognition is its creativity, as contrasted with two attributes-accuracy and straightforwardness-
that one might instead expect to characterize the strengths of social cognition. In fact, a great
deal of what people think about themselves and others is adaptive precisely to the extent that it
plays creatively with “reality.” For example, there are a host of widely recognized nonconscious
cognitive biases that bolster the self and motivation in the face of threats to self-esteem (Kernis,
1995). In this regard, people are decidedly nonaccurate in evaluating their own individual
performance (e.g., self-serving attributions) and contributions to group performance (e.g.,
contribution biases), at least as compared to evaluations from observers or partners. Similarly,
people enhance their own positions with downward social comparisons and with other selective
interpretations, even when they are in quite trying life circumstances or belong to stigmatized
groups (Baumeister, 1998; Crocker & Major, 1989). Importantly, the creativity of these examples
of constructive everyday cognition is not restricted to ostensibly self-enhancing strategies, as
Norem and I (e.g., Cantor & Norem, 1989; Norem & Cantor, 1986; Norem & Illingworth, 1993)
demonstrated in our work on the strategy of defensive pessimism. Defensive pessimists readily
acknowledge their past successes, even as they fully embrace their likelihood of failing at the
upcoming task, extensively simulate this worst-case scenario in their minds, and at the same
time work hard to avoid a disappointing outcome-thereby ensuring, once again, their success.
Their strategy is anything but apparently optimistic or straightforward, but it is quite adaptive
and mobilizes motivation COGNITION, GOALS, AND SOCIAL EMBEDDING

53

for risky tasks. Unlike either self-handicapping or real pessimism, this form of constructive
cognition is a positive force, though it certainly doesn’t appear as such at first glance. In other
words, in considering the effectiveness of cognitive strategies, it is critical not to be taken in by
appearances, nor should one expect to straightforwardly equate positivity of outlook with
success and negativity with failures. What is adaptive about constructive cognition is not that it
is optimistic in some decontextualized and deindividualized sense, but rather that it serves to
mobilize a person’s energy to try to do what they want to do in that circumstance. Most of the
time, an optimistic outlook does the trick (see Baumeister, 1998), but this is not the case for all
individuals and in all contexts. In fact, sometimes the most constructive response is to construe
one’s current goals as unfeasible to attain and to relinquish them with grace (Brandtstadter &
Renner, 1990). Mobilizing Goals and Seeing Opportunities Just as a real virtue of everyday social
cognition is the proclivity for “creative” construal, it is also critical that individuals be ready to
mobilize energy for goal pursuit to meet the particular opportunities that arise in different
situations and at different points in the life course (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). This discriminative
facility (Mischel, 1973)-that is, sensitively picking up on social affordances across contexts-is a
signal human strength that psychologists sometimes underplayed in portrayals of (consistency
in) personality. For example, everyday life situations vary a great deal in the profile of behavior
commonly observed in them (e.g., libraries are less accepting of loud socializing than are
parties), and one signature of dysfunctional behavior is to fail to pick up on these diagnostic
affordances, thus perhaps rigidly displaying preferred dispositions under lessthan-ideal
circumstances (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). There is also a systematic affordance structure to the
tasks that are typically encouraged in different life periods. For example, midlife is frequently
seen as a time for career and family, whereas older adulthood sometimes affords more time for
community engagement and social and leisure time (Havighurst, 1953). As such, there is often a
“right time” to pursue particular goals or tasks, and individuals do better if they can pick up the
cues of the “social clock” (Helson et al., 1984). Again, this aspect of individuals’ discriminative
facility may be missed in analyses of crosstemporal stability in relatively broad dispositions
(Costa & McCrae, 1980). This is not to say that dispositional stability is unimportant-in fact, Caspi
and Moffitt ( 1993) argued that individuals’ dispositional signatures emerge clearly during
periods of life transition-but instead, researchers should also notice individuals’ facility for trying
new tasks or

54

NANCY CANTOR

pursuing familiar goals in new ways across the life course (Cantor et al.,
1993).

This latter ability to be opportunistic and discriminative in goal pure suit can contribute
substantially to increases in well-being (Cantor & Sanderson, 1999). Harlow and Cantor (1996)
observed two forms of well-timed discriminative goal pursuit in a longitudinal analysis of life
satisfaction among older adults. In that study, participation in social and community service
pursuits contributed significantly to increased life satisfaction among retired (as compared with
nonretired) adults. Among the retirees in the sample, there were two patterns of changing
participation across time. For some, these social pursuits represented a shift in participation
patterns (from a self-directed career focus), producing a new source of life satisfaction in line
with the normative affordances of this life stage. Others had always been socially motivated, but
in earlier stages they had pursued their motivation through relationships at work and now had
shifted to a more explicitly social arena in retirement, also with a resulting boost in life
satisfaction. In this latter instance, we saw how discriminative goal pursuit can go hand in hand
with continuity in personality and motivation (Sanderson & Cantor, 1999). Socially Embedded
Goals and Behavior

As much as we like to think of personality as residing within the individual, and to think of
motivation and goal pursuit as attributes of the person, a great human strength is the propensity
for enlisting others in one’s projects and the ability to embed oneself in supportive environments
with others whose talents complement one’s own. The literature on social support amply
documents the benefits for well-being of both receiving (e.g., Cutrona, 1986) and giving (e.g.,
Brickman & Coates, 1987) support, and it also shows individuals’ sensitivity and intelligence in
their choices of supporters, supportees, and partners. What is in some sense most remarkable
about this aspect of social intelligence is its routineness in daily life; that is, people turn to the
right people at the right time for support, for example, amidst the normal fluctuations of daily
hassles and uplifts (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Langston, 1994). As an example of this social
sensitivity and intelligence, Harlow and Cantor (1995) used daily experience sampling of
emotions, social interactions, and goal pursuits to show that when participants’ social pursuits
went poorly, they differed systematically in terms of the types of people to whom they turned
for support and social contact. Not only were these differentiated patterns of support seeking
systematic, they were also sensible in light of the particular goals of the individuals. Specifically,
participants who were focused on the outcomes of their social pursuits looked for emotional
support when things went poorly, whereas participants who were COGNITION, GOALS, AND
SOCIAL EMBEDDING

55

eager for improvement in their social lives turned to others who personified their ideals and who
therefore could provide informational support at times of distress. Most importantly, these
differentiated and sensitive patterns of reassurance seeking occurred in a very “natural” way,
without prompting or intervention, in the course of busy daily life pursuits. Similar instances of
“social intelligence” can be observed in the more consequential choices that individuals make to
help others and to “partner” with others in their sustained life task pursuits. For example, Snyder
and his colleagues (e.g., Omoto & Snyder, 1990; Snyder, 1993) have shown a close link between
the nature of individuals’ motives for volunteerism and the type of volunteer role they pursue. If
someone does volunteer work to meet prosocial motives, then a role that involves providing
direct help and support to others will be most attractive, whereas someone who strives for self-
recognition may prefer to take on a supervisory role in a volunteer organization to meet their
needs and still help others. Sanderson and Cantor (e.g., 1995, 1997) observed a related form of
complementarity between college students’ personal goals and their preferences for dating.
Students with relatively strong needs for interpersonal intimacy gravitated toward and derived
more satisfaction from steady dating relationships, whereas more self- and identity-focused
students preferred exploring multiple dating partners. Thus, people sustain both volunteering
and dating engagements better and longer when they have chosen goal-congruent roles and
partners. Of course, sometimes there is little room for such fine-tuned preference seeking,
and/or one may purposely choose to try something a bit outside one’s comfort zone. Under
those circumstances, it is a sign of intelligence to willingly take the lead of others and to rely
more assertively on the affordances in the situation. For example, Sanderson and Cantor ( 1997)
found that once in steady dating relationships, individuals who themselves did not possess
strong intimacy goals were especially dependent on social affordances, such as time alone with
the partner or support giving from the partner, to derive relationship satisfaction and in the
maintenance of their relationships. That is, individuals who were relatively less inclined
themselves to focus on and elicit intimacy prospered much more in their close relationships
when they could be in situations in which opportunities for intimacy were available to them. As
Miller (1990) suggested, for example, partners in relationships can go a long way to set up the
context for intimacy so as to elicit relationshipstrengthening actions (e.g., self-disclosure) from
their mate. Hence, another important side of social intelligence and a distinct human strength
rests in how individuals embed themselves within personally fulfilling and supportive social
relationships, be it in dyads or groups or in institutions (Snyder & Cantor, 1998).

56

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THE PERSONALITY GLASS: HALF FULL AND HALF EMPTY In summary, I see human strengths in
people’s capacities for construc-

tive cognition, for trying to reach goals and seizing opportunities to do so, and for interacting in a
social world in ways that can support and complement the self. Of course, it is also important to
take note of the ways in which such capacities can mislead and deter people from reaching their
goals. Again, the capacity for constructive cognition can be very adaptive when individuals use
their personal constructs (Kelly, 1955) to take control and to navigate in their world. Conversely,
it can mislead them about the complexity of the world, constraining their vision of what is
necessary to do to reach a goal and perhaps leading them to fail to be alert to novel
opportunities for goal fulfillment. Cantor and Kihlstrom (1987) referred to this as the “double-
edged sword of social intelligence.” By building up expertise about the social world and about
the self, people free themselves from the strain of deliberation at every turn. O n the other
hand, they also often narrow their vision to the familiar, seeing more of what they expect to see
than might be good for them. And to the extent that, optimally, constructive cognition can
mobilize motivation and heighten sensitivity to opportunities in the social environment, then
narrowing one’s horizons is not altogether good. Whereas responding effortlessly (and thus
mindlessly) in familiar arenas of expertise can free cognitive capacity for attunement to
opportunities in the social environment, it is not always the case that people take advantage of
this freedom to explore. Sometimes they are cognitively-and motivationally-lulled by the ease of
continuing to see, to strive for, and to do the familiar, and their engagements with the same
people and groups reinforce these routines. As such, it is possible to have too much expertise
and security, to be too insulated and thus not sufficiently opportunistic. At other times, people
get too opportunistic, setting goals and taking risks that are, by any standard, out of reach and
failing to see when they should relinquish them in favor of more feasible pursuits. In these
regards, however, I would say that if psychologists pay more attention to human strengths-for
example, to constructive cognition, to what people are trying to do, and to how they embed
themselves in situations and with others-we will also see some of these human frailties, and the
glass will be both half full and half empty. By contrast, as I suggested at the outset, our more
typical analyses of personality have tended, instead, to a more one-dimensional (albeit quite
coherent) portrayal of individuals’ central tendencies as functional or dysfunctional, intelligent or
not, good or bad. This happens, I believe, because we focus narrowly on the outcomes of
people’s efforts (rather than their strivings), on their general tendencies aggregated over time
and place (rather than on their disCOGNITION, GOALS, AND SOCIAL EMBEDDING

57

criminative fiacilities), and on people by themselves (rather than on the network of social
affordances on which they intelligently rely). A fuller, more differentiated portrait of people
would most likely reveal instead both the strengths and the frailties, the good and the bad, as
they vary from person to person and across the contexts within which these pluses and minuses
emerge, thus pointing the way to arenas worthy of personal effort and intervention for the
better. Researchers already know a great deal about how to uncover these more differentiated
personal portraits; we just need to start looking for them more regularly. A focus on human
strengths may well induce us to do just that.

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44, 30-42.

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A CONCEPTION OF PERSONALITY FOR A PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS: PERSONALITY AS

AN AGENTIC, SELFcREGULATING SYSTEM GIAN VITTORIO CAPRARA AND DANIEL CERVONE

Appeals for a psychology of human strengths commonly are introduced with a lament. The
discipline of psychology, writers complain, has overemphasized human vulnerability, frailty, and
vice. It thus has deflected attention from human resilience, hardiness, and virtue. This argument
has much validity, despite the many lines of theory and research that have explored human
strengths over the years. A key question, however, is not just the degree to which vulnerabilities
have been overemphasized in the past; a broader question is why research programs might
overrepresent a select subset of the human experience. Why do research trends so rarely
capture a broad representation of human proclivities and potentials? One answer to this
question is that research programs commonly are not embedded within a comprehensive
portrait of human nature. Investigators frequently study isolated variables without locating these
constructs in a broad network of determinants of psychological functioning (cf. Mag-

61

nusson, 1999). A challenge for a psychology of human strengths is to avoid this narrow focus.
Although investigators of the past quarter century may have overestimated human
vulnerabilities, the solution to this problem is not for investigators of the next quarter century to
overestimate human strengths. The “swinging pendulum” approach can be avoided by centering
research on human strengths within an integrated, comprehensive model of the person.

PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY’S MODELS OF THE PERSON The subdiscipline of psychology that is

most directly charged with providing a model of the person is personality psychology. A basic
claim of this chapter is that recent advances in personality psychology (Caprara & Cervone, 2000)
do, indeed, yield a comprehensive portrait of the individual that can inform, and profitably
guide, a psychology of human strengths. This claim may at first seem unwarranted. Personality
psychology currently contains popular theoretical frameworks that seem to say more about
human limitations than potentials. In some views, personality consists of inherited dispositional
tendencies that exhibit little change across the life course (Costa & McCrae, 1994). In others, the
mind is composed of evolved, domain-specific mechanisms whose basic structure and
functioning similarly are fixed across the course of life, even if environmental inputs may alter
the threshold of activation of a given mechanism (Buss, 1999). In such views, personality is
determined primarily by genetic endowment. People appear to have little potential to develop
their capacities in a selfdirected manner. Despite their popularity, however, these particular
theoretical views are only a narrow segment of the overall trends in personality psychology in
recent years. Much work provides a more uplifting perspective on the human capacity for
positive self-direction. This work is grounded in an analysis of the nature of the causal processes
that underlie the development of the individual.

Person- Situation Reciprocity People do not develop according to fixed paths that are
determined by a genetic blueprint. Personality develops through more complex causal processes
that feature dynamic transactions between people and the sociocultural environment (e.g.,
Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Caspi, 1998). Internal personality factors, overt
behavior, and the social environment reciprocally determine one another (Bandura, 1986, 1999).
This claim is supported by numerous longitudinal studies of personality

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development. Findings reveal that a complex-yet understandable-matrix of personal,

interpersonal, and sociocultural factors determines the psychological qualities of the individual.
To take but one example (Magnusson, 1992; see also Magnusson & Mahoney, chapter 16, this
volume), adolescent girls who experience relatively early biological maturation are more likely to
experience problem behavior (e.g., truancy, drunkenness). The effects of biology, however, are
neither direct, nor inevitable, nor enduring. Early maturing girls develop different peer relations,
and these interpersonal relations are found to be more direct determinants of self-image and
behavior in adolescence. Later in life, as interpersonal relations change, few differences between
early and late maturers are found (Magnusson, 1992). The study of such interactions among
biology, interpersonal relations, and behavior helps one to understand why individuals are highly
resilient to long-term effects of even severe negative experiences that may occur at a particular
age of development (see also Kagan, 1998). Human strengths, then, reside partly in the
interpersonal nets that nurture the resilient qualities of the individual. At this point in the history
of personality psychology, person-situation reciprocity is so well documented and widely
recognized that reciprocal interactionism functions as a metatheoretical principle that organizes
much of the theoretical and empirical work in the field (Caprara & Cervone, 2000). This
viewpoint is bolstered by numerous findings outside of personality psychology per se. Neural
systems are found to display extraordinary plasticity in the face of new behavioral experiences
(Garraghty, Churchill, & Banks, 1998; Kolb & Whishaw, 1998). Gene expression is influenced by
environmental factors that affect hormone levels and the cytoplasm of cells (Gottlieb, 1998).
Humans evolved through a “coevolutionary” process in which biological and cultural factors
shaped one another (Durham, 1991). Lewontin (2000) compellingly argued that reciprocal
transactions between organisms and the environment are a basic feature of biological life. All
organisms, he stressed, partly construct their environments. The Self-system and Personal
Agency
In the case of human development, the general biological capacity to construct one’s
environment is combined with the unique human capacities to anticipate future contingencies
and to reflect on one’s capability to cope with them. These capacities for forethought and self-
reflection underpin a most central aspect of personality functioning-namely, people’s ability to
exert intentional influence over, or to “self-regulate,” their experiences and actions. The capacity
for self-regulation rests on a number of distinct component processes. These include the abilities
to evaluate one’s action in relation to internalized standards of performance, to plan and to set
goals PERSONALITY AS Ah’ AGENTIC. SELF-REGULATING SYSTEM

63

for the future, to assess one’s personal efficacy for upcoming challenges, and to motivate one’s
actions through affective self-evaluation, especially feelings of pride versus dissatisfaction with
current and prospective attainments. These distinct self-regulatory mechanisms are functionally
interrelated. They thus do not operate as independent influences on behavior, but as parts of a
coherent psychological system through which people regulate their emotions and actions
(Caprara & Cervone, 2000). Extensive bodies of theory and research have explored the
development and functioning of the self-system (Bandura, 1986; Boekaerts, Pintrich, & Zeidner,
2000; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harter, 1999; Higgins, 1999; Mischel, Cantor, &
Feldman, 1996; Schunk & Zimmerman, 1998). The analysis of self-regulatory processes has a
major implication for an overall view of the nature of personality: Personality need not be
viewed as a collection of biologically determined tendencies or evolved modules. Such views
underestimate human strengths by implicitly depicting persons as passive carriers of a
predetermined personality structure. Instead, the study of self-regulatory processes, and of
reciprocal relations between the self-regulating individual and the social environment, indicates
that people contribute agentically to the development of their personalities. People are not
passive. They are proactive. By selecting, interpreting, and influencing the environments they
encounter, people contribute to the development of their own capacities and tendencies.
Personality itself, then, can be conceptualized as an agentic, self-regulatory system (Bandura,
1999, 2001; Caprara & Cervone, 2000). In this view, people are proactive agents who are capable
of planfully making things happen by their own actions. In an agentic view, a basic goal of
personality psychology is to shed light on the self-regulatory processes through which people
contribute to their experiences and personal development. This goal cannot be achieved by
studying individuals in isolation. Instead, one must study people in context (e.g., Cervone,
Shadel, & Jencius, 2001), including an analysis of environmental settings and interpersonal
relations that promote the development of the self-system. Such an agenda obviously speaks
directly to a psychology of human strengths. Interestingly, it does not do so by asking whether
one or another isolated individual-difference variable is related to effective functioning. Instead,
it takes up the question of how a dynamic, interactive system of personal qualities contributes to
human self-direction and resilience. By providing a coherent, system-level view of the individual,
personality psychology may help the psychology of human strengths to avoid a narrow focus that
illuminates only isolated aspects of human experience. It is of note that viewing personality as
an agentic, self-regulating system speaks not only to a psychology of human strengths, but also
to the traditional agenda of personality psychology. T h e psychological structures that form the
self-regulatory system are enduring personality factors that

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contribute to the coherence of personality functioning and to stable differences among

individuals (see Cervone & Shoda, 1999b; Mischel & Shoda, 1998). The nature of personality and
its agentic functions must be considered in light of recent evidence from cultural psychology.
Conceptions of personal agency vary across cultures (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Markus,
Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). People in European and American societies appear more oriented
toward self-enhancement, personal achievement, and personal control than people in Asian
cultures, for whom social obligations and group-level accomplishments are more salient. This,
however, does not imply that people in Eastern cultures have little capacity for self-regulation
and personal agency, but merely that the aims of their actions and the role of specific self-
referent beliefs in motivation may vary from one culture to another. People with communal
goals may exert much self-control in an effort to reach these aims. Potentials An agentic view of
personality highlights the fact that personality psychology must include the study of not only
habitual dispositions, but also individual potentials (Caprara, 1999; Caprara & Cervone, 2000).
Personality psychologists have the responsibility to address the personal and social processes
that can contribute to the full expression of human capacities. The inclusion of potentials in the
discipline of personality psychology goes beyond the focus on static dispositions or traits that
have dominated the recent history of the discipline (Cervone 6r Shoda, 1999a). It surely is
important to assess what people typically “are like,” that is, their typical dispositions. However, it
is of equal importance to explore what they can become. Society demands that personality
psychology contribute not only to the assessment of individual differences but also to the
development of individual potentials. Boykin ( 1994) compellingly advanced this point in
discussing the educational attainments of African American youths: “We must shift from a
preoccupation with talent assessment . . . [to] a commitment to talent development. . . . [This]
will require a fundamental change in . . . how we conceptualize the individual” (p. 119). His point
applies not only to the study of intellectual capacities, but to the study of the whole person. A
potentialist view goes hand in hand with the focus on reciprocal interactionism noted earlier.
People may possess potentials that can be realized only as they act within particular
environments. Kagan (1998) provided an apt analogy: A rock lying at the bottom of a lake
belongs to the category “potentially dangerous object.” Its “dangerousness” is not an inherent,
isolated property of the rock itself (as is its mass or hardness). Instead, dangerousness is a
relational quality. It describes the relation bePERSONALITY AS AN AGENTIC. SELF-REGULATING
SYSTEM

65
tween the rock and particular settings (e.g., being thrown indoors). Similarly, many psychological
qualities are not inherent properties of isolated minds or brains. Instead, they are relational, in
that the expression of the quality requires a social setting that elicits, supports, or requires the
quality in question. One cannot be “sociable” by oneself. Many readers of this text are
“potentially great parents,” although that quality may not yet have expressed itself. A focus on
potentials erodes the traditional distinction between nature and nurture. As many investigators
now realize, “nature” and “nurture” are not distinct opposing forces. Biology and experience
influence one another. The nature of this influence must be given particular attention in a
modern world that features rapid changes brought by technological innovation. The traditional
dimensions of human life associated with the categories of time and space have dramatically
changed due to the prolonged length of life, the speed of social movement, and the multiplicity
of interpersonal encounters people experience. As new opportunities are made available, new
problems arise and new decisions are required for which established capacities are outmoded.
Thus, nature has to be nurtured to meet the challenges of modernity. People’s immense
potential to manage new environments must be fostered by novel methods of promoting
personal growth. The rapidly changing world requires that people develop new visions and
capacities to deal with the outer world and themselves. The control people may exert over the
environment and themselves becomes particularly critical in an age in which people are able to
extend their control over evolutionary processes through biotechnologies. The ability to exert
control over one’s own biology and that of one’s offspring heightens the impact of personal
psychological qualities on one’s biological being. Self-directedness and personal choice come to
govern domains that, throughout all prior stages of human history, were products of chance and
necessity. SELF-REFLECTIVE CAPABILITIES AS THE CORE O F HUMAN STRENGTHS

A psychology that can promote the realization of potentials and the development of human
strengths must focus heavily on self-reflective capacities. Consciousness is at the heart of
prediction, control, and people’s ability to plan in a generative manner for the future.
Consciousness enables people to contemplate and predict the behavior of others and
themselves (Humphrey, 1984). It allows people to plan courses of action and gauge their
capacity to act. People often face novel challenges that might, in principle, be solved if one could
optimally orchestrate one’s skills. The organism “may have resources in it that would be very
valuable in the 66

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circumstances if only it could find them and put them to use in time! ” (Dennett, 1991, p. 222).
Conscious reasoning about a problem enables people to anticipate challenges and to maximize
their personal resources and chances for success. As Bandura (2001) put it, “consciousness is the
very substance of mental life that not only makes life personally manageable but worth living”
(p. 3). What ultimately matters is the quality of consciousness, especially whether one’s
conscious thoughts are full of fear and preoccupation or of hope and trust. Perceived Self-
Efficacy

A critical aspect of self-reflection involves people’s reflection on their capabilities for action. This
aspect of mental life is studied most directly in research on perceived self-efficacy (Bandura,
1997). Self-efficacy beliefs are a central feature of human strengths and potentials for a number
of reasons. First, self-efficacy perceptions directly contribute to decisions, actions, and
experiences. People who doubt their efficacy for performance tend to avoid challenges, to
abandon activities when faced with setbacks, and to experience debilitating anxiety (Bandura,
1997). Second, selfefficacy beliefs influence other cognitive and emotional factors that, in turn,
contribute to performance. People with higher efficacy beliefs tend to commit themselves to
more challenging goals (Locke & Latham, 1990), to attribute positive outcomes to stable and
controllable factors (McAuley, Duncan, & McElroy, 1989), and to develop superior strategies for
coping with highly complex tasks (Cervone, Jiwani, & Wood, 1991). A third consideration is that
self-efficacy perceptions may moderate the impact of other variables that have the potential to
enhance achievement. The acquisition of skills and knowledge enhances achievement, but not if
people so doubt their capabilities that they fail to put their knowledge into practice. Though
often studied in achievement contexts, self-efficacy perceptions also are crucial to interpersonal
behavior and experience. Findings reveal that beliefs in one’s efficacy to regulate emotional
experiences directly influence rates of depression and prosocial behavior. Further, people’s
perceptions of self-efficacy for regulating emotions influence their appraisals of their capabilities
for effective interpersonal functioning, which, in turn, contribute to rates of prosocial behavior,
antisocial behavior, and depression (Caprara, Scabini, et al., 1999). The social-cognitive analysis
of self-efficacy processes also facilitates the psychology of human strengths by providing
concrete tools for boosting self-efficacy beliefs and achievement. A wealth of research
documents that the most reliable way of instilling self-confidence is through firsthand success
experiences (Bandura, 1997). The personal experience of mastery is difficult to deny, even
among individuals who typically doubt their perforPERSONALln AS AN AGENTIC, SELF-
REGULATING SYSTEM

67

mance capabilities. Novel experiences of mastery in domains of personal significance have the
potential to generalize to diverse life domains and thus to have a broad-based impact on
people’s lives (Weitlauf, Cervone, & Smith, 2001; Weitlauf, Smith, & Cervone, 2000).

The Role of Collective Efficacy Psychological strengths cannot be understood by viewing

individuals in isolation. A great many of the capacities that we call human strengths derive from
the strengths of the communities in which people live. This raises the question of the
psychological mechanisms that mediate the influence of community factors on individual
actions. Recent work has highlighted the mediating influence of collective efficacy-that is,
people’s beliefs in the ability of their surrounding social group to function in a cohesive and
effective manner in accomplishing group goals. Sampson and colleagues’ analysis of
neighborhood characteristics, collective efficacy, and violent crime is exemplary (Sampson,
Raudenbush, &. Earls, 1997). The effects of neighborhood characteristics (involving poverty,
immigration, and residential stability) on violent crime were found to be mediated heavily by
people’s beliefs that their community was a socially cohesive setting in which community
members would intervene to maintain social order when necessary. More recent work has
explored how appraisals of personal efficacy can influence perceptions of collective efficacy
(FernAndez-Ballesteros, Diez-NicolAs, Caprara, Barbaranelli, & Bandura, 2002). In this work,
participants rated Personal Efficacy beliefs-that is, their capability to manage common, daily
demands involving family, work, finances, and health. They also judged their Individual Social
Efficacy, or their efficacy in contributing to improvements in social problems such as terrorism,
unemployment, corruption, crime, and economic crises. Finally, they also indicated their
Collective Efficacy beliefs-that is, their perceptions of the capability of society as a whole to
effect desired improvement in major societal conditions. Results suggested that Personal and
Individual Social efficacy beliefs influenced their Collective Efficacy beliefs. It is likely that
perceived selfefficacy for managing daily demands contributes most to personal efficacy in being
able to contribute to society, whereas personal efficacy in improving social conditions affects
collective efficacy beliefs. In organizational settings, both personal and collective efficacy beliefs
are critical to indicators of motivation such as commitment, job involvement, and satisfaction. It
is likely that self-efficacy beliefs influence individuals’ construals of an organization, including its
main figures, roles, operations, and relationships. Individuals with higher perceptions of personal
efficacy may select more effective organizations, contribute more actively to their functioning,
and perceive organizational operations and relation-

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ships more positively. In a study involving more than 600 junior high school teachers from Rome
and Milan, efficacy beliefs were found to influence directly climate perception, collective efficacy,
work commitment, and job involvement and satisfaction (Caprara, Borgogni, Barbaranelli, &.
Rubinacci, 1999). Although commitment has often been highlighted as a main determinant of
job involvement and satisfaction, people have no reason to feel committed to an organization if
they do not relate to its goals. Collective efficacy, specifically the firm and shared belief in the
ability to master collective goals through concerted knowledge and action, proved to be a critical
determinant of organizational commitment and a mediator of the influence of personal self-
efficacy beliefs on commitment, and through commitment on job involvement and satisfaction.

A PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS IN A NEW MILLENNIUM The challenge of personality

psychology is to address the complex interplay among multiple biological and sociostructural
constituents of human functioning and to do so while promoting people’s capacities for
intentional and responsible actions. As we have stressed, this requires a psychology of
personality that illuminates the personal determinants of action that enable people to take
control of their lives and adapt to a rapidly changing world. In the new millennium, technological
innovation, market globalization, and multiculturalism are not merely terms in vogue. They are
very real components of modern life. Technological innovations are changing the lives of people
at an unprecedented rate. New information and communication technologies are tools through
which people may act to maximize their individual choice and opportunities for personal growth.
These technologies provide broad access to knowledge and education while also creating new
interpersonal bonds, new communities, and new forms of collective consciousness by spreading
ideas, values, and styles that often supplant traditional ones. Global market forces are
restructuring national economies with a tremendous impact on social policies, work
organization, and governmental leadership, as well as on relations among generations. Massive
migrations are changing the ethnic compositions of populations, with societies becoming less
distinctive and cultures no longer insular. Such changes open tremendous opportunities for the
extension of personal freedom and growth. Simultaneously, they place greater burden on
individuals for their own success, as life paths are less strongly determined by social class and
rank and are less predictable than in the past. The more people are able to master the
challenges of their own lives in selecting and construing the PERSONALITY AS AN AGENTIC, SELF-
REGULATING SYSTEM

69

environments conducive to the maximization of their potentialities, the higher their probability
of success will be. Technological changes require self-directed lifelong learning that, if pursued,
can enable people to cope with change and to capitalize on occupational opportunities. In a
highly interconnected world, social pursuits related to the protection of human rights and the
promotion of communal well-being require shared commitments and concerted efforts. The
more people can mobilize and coordinate their efforts and resources in the service of shared
goals, the more they will experience latitude of freedom and opportunity and, in this sense,
justice (Rawls, 1971). To these aims, the contribution of psychology in general, and personality
psychology in particular, may be critical in that this field can supply knowledge that can
contribute to the creation of new psychosocial technologies that, in turn, can help people to
acquire the skills, beliefs, goals, and conduct that enable them to exert greater control over their
lives. Thanks to the spread of the Internet, these technologies increasingly involve the creation
of communication networks through which people can mobilize to promote educational,
interpersonal, occupational, or political goals. The creation of these networks and pursuit of
these goals often require not only a robust sense of personal efficacy, but also confidence that
the collective group of which one is a part can achieve its purposes. To make this contribution,
personality psychology, and psychology as a whole, need to follow a somewhat different path
than ones that have often prevailed in the past. Psychologists have commonly embraced models
of human nature in which internal mental structures and overt actions are determined by
preformed essential qualities that unfold in a fixed manner in the course of development,
exerting control from within to the world without. Today science increasingly recognizes that
heredity does not provide a fixed blueprint for life, but rather a vast range of potentialities that
are realized only through interactions with the environment. The environment-as selected,
interpreted, and transformed by the individual-plays a decisive role in the development of inner
strengths. Throughout much of its history, personality psychology has been concerned with
individual differences in what may be termed “surface tendencies,” that is, observable variations
in styles of behavior. Ultimately, one must identify the psychological mechanisms that underlie
patterns of individual differences and intraindividual coherence-that is, the proximal and remote
determinants of those patterns and their modes of operating. The pursuit of underlying
mechanisms illuminates the causal processes and structures that subserve human capacities and
that are the repository of human potentialities. Psychologists have mostly addressed the dark
side of human behavior -failure, despair, pathology, violence-by focusing on the struggle
between the opposing constraints and demands of nature and culture. Today

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it seems reasonable to complement the traditional reparatory and compensatory views with one
that aims to maximize the opportunities provided by both culture and nature. Knowledge of the
determinants and mechanisms of personality functioning can enable psychology to expand the
control people may exert over their own lives and thus contribute to human freedom and to
individual and collective welfare. The compelling tasks for the field are to extend the horizons of
human capacity and thereby grant people greater ability to adapt to the world's rapidly changing
contingencies and demands. Taking a potentialist view does not lead one to neglect the miseries
of the human condition, however. One must recognize that people's inherent capacity for self-
regulation may be thwarted by economic or sociopolitical conditions that fail to support
individuals' efforts to realize their capacities (Cervone & Rafaeli-Mor, 1999). A potentialist view
does, however, lead one to reconsider the possibilities of individual development and to explore
the conditions that promote the full expression of human capabilities.

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McAuley, E., Duncan, T. E., & McElroy, M. (1989). Self-efficacy cognitions and causal attributions
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nature of willpower and self-control. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology:
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(1998). Reconciling processing dynamics and personality dispositions. Annual Review of
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HUMAN AGING: WHY IS EVEN GOOD NEWS TAKEN AS BAD? LAURA L. CARSTENSEN AND SUSAN
T. CHARLES

At the close of the 20th century, news magazine programs regularly featured interviews with
prominent citizens who were asked about the greatest accomplishments or inventions of the
century. Respondents mentioned memorable events like “man walking on the moon” or named
inventions like the Internet, the automobile, or television. Not a single person mentioned the
creation of old age. Yet, in one short century, 30 years of life were added to average life
expectancy.’ For the first time in the history of the human species, the majority of those born in
the Western world survive into old age. The enormity of this advance is unprecedented. A new
stage has been added to the life cycle. It came about not because of a single medical advance
and certainly not by means of evolution (i.e., increasingly heartier generations). Rather, culture
gets the credit for the creation of old age. Systematic efforts to accumulate and share scientific
knowledge and communitywide efforts to inoculate children and improve sanitation effectively
changed the natural course of life, and reductions in the number of children ‘To be clear,
individuals have lived into advanced age for a very long time. But most people didn’t survive to
old age; it was not normative.

75

born (by virtue of cultural prescription) changed the percentage of older adults in the world’s
population. The demographic shift in response to these adaptive advances is affecting work,
health care, education, and public policies. Every aspect of life has been affected, including the
nature of family, business markets, and political attitudes. No domain of life has remained
untouched for old and young alike. Despite the magnitude of these social advances, few have
recognized the ramifications of these changes or celebrated the social inventions that were able
to expand the quality and length of life. Rarely do debates and impassioned discussions focus on
how people will use their extended years. Indeed, most people are deeply ambivalent about
aging, and their ambivalence is fueled by alarming statistics that appear regularly in newspapers
and on television. People have come to associate individual aging with dementia, poverty, and
physical frailty and population aging with depletion of medical insurance funds and bankruptcy
of government programs. On the one hand, old age is unattractive. On the other, so is the
alternative. Living longer is not inherently bad. And there is nothing inherently wrong with older,
more mature societies. But few laypeople or researchers tout the benefits of old age. We argue
in this chapter that social science, particularly psychology, has contributed to the negative views
of old age by adopting an approach to the study of aging that has been characterized by some as
“counting the wrinkles of age.” There is an overwhelming tendency in the sciences to document
deficiencies and to focus on problems associated with later life. Young and old are compared,
and where there are differences, decrement is assumed. Aging people, and we all are, anticipate
decline. There is nothing wrong with studying problems of old age. Compelling evidence
suggests that aging is related to declines in physical and sensory functioning. Hearing often
becomes impaired, vision worsens, and fewer taste buds are available in savoring meals.
Cognitive abilities deteriorate; one struggles increasingly to remember names and recall where
one heard what one thinks one knows. Many negative aspects of aging deserve scientific
attention and federal research dollars. However, by focusing only on the problems associated
with aging, researchers and laypeople alike will not identify potential strengths. Restricting
empirical questions exclusively to those concerned with loss will inevitably obscure gains.
Societies cannot afford to ignore the tremendous resources that older people offer. Considerable
growth occurs with age, and social scientists overlook it too frequently, mainly because of this
focus on loss. As scientists and as citizens in a rapidly changing society, psychologists cannot
afford to limit the scope of their inquiries and the explanations for findings to aging deficits. In
the following discussion we consider examples from our own research related to socioemotional

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functioning in later life and attempt to show that negative presumptions interfere with scientific
progress.

AGE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION One of the most reliable findings in social gerontology is that
social interaction decreases with age (e.g., Harvey & Singleton, 1989; Lawton, Moss, & Fulcomer,
1987; Lee & Markides, 1990). Why? For decades all of the theoretical models offered to explain
the phenomenon presumed that loss was at its core. Explanations were often based on
assumptions and stereotypes instead of research findings, and many were incorrect. These
explanations included such statements as m

Old people are depressed, so they withdraw.

They have little to offer in social exchanges, so relationships weaken. Their friends die. They are
too sick or cognitively impaired to maintain friendships. They become emotionally flattened and
socially disengage in preparation for death. Empirical findings published in the last decade,
however, reveal that older people are less likely to be clinically depressed than younger and
middle-aged people (although this assertion still appears in textbooks!; Lawton, Kleban, & Dean,
1993; Wittchen, Knauper, & Kessler, 1994). Cognitive declines also are not responsible. A t least
in nursing homes, cognitively impaired people interact lots more than people who are
functioning well cognitively; it’s the cognitively intact nursing home residents who are most likely
to remain in their rooms (Carstensen, Fisher, & Malloy, 1995). Older people are more satisfied
with their relationships than younger people and feel strong bonds to close friends (Lansford,
Sherman, & Antonucci, 1998). In addition, emotional closeness with family members and close
friends also increases into the later years (Carstensen, 1992). The number of close friends and
confidants is very similar for centenarians and middle-aged people. Decreases in overall rates of
social interaction are accounted for by decreases in casual acquaintances, not by fewer contacts
with emotionally meaningful social partners (Lang & Carstensen, 1994; Lang, Staudinger, &
Carstensen, 1998), and importantly, the loss of most social partners appears to be volitional, not
due to deaths of friends and family (Lang, 2000). Several years ago, we began to investigate
whether older adults were taking a proactive role in their social world by “pruning” it so that
only the most important people remained. In conversations with older people, HUMAN AGING

77

we kept hearing the same comment: “1 don’t have time for those people.” Although they never
complained about the time spent with close family or friends, they said regularly that they had
no interest in exploring new friendships and social partners. Eventually, we realized that when
they referred to time, they meant time left in life, not time during the day. When we examined
age-related change for different types of social interaction, a pattern emerged that dispelled the
widely accepted assumptions of ubiquitous decrement. Although adults did report fewer
interactions with casual acquaintances and strangers as they moved through young and middle
adulthood, time spent with family members increased during this same period (Carstensen,
1992). Over the years, and after many studies, we developed a conceptual model called
socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Charles &
Carstensen, 1999), which argues that under time constraints, emotional aspects of life are
illuminated. Goals shift from the search for novelty or information to the quest for emotional
meaning. According to the theory, older people are not suffering from limited opportunities to
pursue social relations with others. Rather, they are investing carefully and strategically in the
people who matter most. This strategy is not used only by older adults; throughout the life span
people who find themselves at life transitions perceived as endings use the same strategy
(Charles & Carstensen, 1999). Life transitions that signal endings are often experienced with a
mix of emotions. Graduation from high school, for example, brings the excitement of new
freedom and opportunities, but also the sadness that a stage of life is coming to a close. The
conditions that limit time may deepen the complexity of emotion (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr,
& Nesselroade, 2000). And because age is inextricably correlated with the time left in life, age is
associated with changes in emotion. Our research subsequently turned more explicitly to
emotion.

AGE AND EMOTIONAL FUNCTIONING When we first began to explore emotion in older adults,
we turned to the literature on emotion. As expected, we observed that the field presumed loss
in the domain of emotional functioning. Although relatively little was known about emotional
functioning in later life, researchers often invoked “emotional disinhibition” to explain age
differences in performance on experimental tasks. In studies of source memory, researchers
found that whereas younger adults were better at recalling perceptual and visuospatial
information related to source, older adults recalled more thoughts, feelings, and evaluative
statements when recalling perceived or imagined situations in the laboratory (Hashtroudi,
Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1990). Although Hashtroudi and her colleagues interpreted these findings

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as age differences in what people focus on during the task (i.e., either emotional aspects or
perceptual details), others have taken a different view. Researchers have often interpreted
findings such as these as examples of cognitive disinhibition for emotional information and other
“irrelevant information” which interferes with recollection of contextual and factual details
(Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000). Researchers evaluating studies of language also have used emotional
disinhibition to explain age differences. There are qualitative differences between old and young
in story recall, for example. Older adults engage in what researchers call “off-topic verbosity.”
That is, when recalling a story, older people often talk about feelings that are not explicitly part
of the story and may tell personal stories or recall stories previously read in the laboratory
(Gould, Trevithick, & Dixon, 1991). Off-topic verbosity is believed to be due to the inability to
suppress unrelated thoughts (Arbuckle & Gold, 1993), a phenomenon that is partially mediated
by psychosocial factors such as loneliness and a need to reinforce the self-concept at a time
when social roles have been lost’ (Gold, Andres, Arbuckle, & Schwartzman, 1988). However,
there are problems with the disinhibition explanation. Burke and her colleagues (e.g., James,
Burke, Austin, & Hulme, 1998) found that although older storytellers did exhibit more off-topic
speech, their stories were judged as more interesting and informative and of higher quality than
those of younger storytellers. In this study, younger and older adults were asked to tell stories,
and then these stories were judged by a different set of younger and older adults. When off-
topic speech was examined apart from age, stories that were high in off-topic speech were also
rated as more interesting and higher in story quality. Furthermore, the number of elaborations
by older adults increased relative to the number of listeners in their audience, suggesting that
older adults view elaborations as a strategy to engage listeners and therefore use more
elaborations when attempting to engage a larger audience (Gould et al., 1991). Moreover,
elaboration that was evaluative or interpretative did not correlate with accuracy of recall by the
storyteller, so memory for the actual story is unrelated. In short, the finding itself is highly
reliable: Older adults use more elaborations (evaluations and interpretations) than younger
adults. At present, evidence is not conclusive for disinhibition in working memory as an
explanation of age differences in language processing, relative to other explanations such as
older adults more often forming new connections in memory or language processing serving
different social goals with age (Burke, 1997). Indeed, elaborations may simply serve to enhance
storytelling, with older adults possibly producing more entertaining stories. ‘Assuming that the
self needs to be reinforced in old age is also a negative assumption that has not received
empirical support. In fact, some would argue that the self is better integrated in old age (M. M.
Baltes & Carstensen, 1996).

HUMAN AGING

79

In an effort to directly assess memory for emotional versus neutral information, we used an
incidental memory paradigm to assess memory in younger and older adults (Carstensen & Turk-
Charles, 1994). We found that older adults recalled greater proportions of emotional material
relative to nonemotional material. Importantly, there were no differences in the amount of
emotional material recalled between age groups; the proportional increase was driven by
reductions in nonemotional material among the older age groups. These findings suggest that
instead of emotional material clouding the memories of older adults and representing poor
cognitive functioning, memory for emotional material is one area which is well preserved. Very
recently, we replicated this finding with memory for slides showing positively and negatively
valenced emotional and nonemotional images (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2002). After
being presented with a series of slides, older adults show relatively superior memory for
emotionally positive images than for negative or neutral images. What about emotional
experience? According to socioemotional selectivity theory, age differences in emotional
salience reflect motivational changes. If, as the theory suggests, older people are more likely to
pursue emotionally meaningful goals, this shift in motivation should be reflected in attention to
emotional aspects of life. In several studies we hypothesized that older adults, motivated to
realize emotionally gratifying experience, would perform better on interpersonal tasks drawing
on the regulation of emotion and, in day-to-day life, would benefit experientially. We and other
researchers in the field have supported this position. When younger and older married couples
were observed discussing conflicts in their relationship, older couples expressed less negative
emotion and more affection toward their partners (Carstensen, Gottman, & Levenson, 1995).
Older adults have been found to solve emotionally salient problems better than younger adults
and to be more likely to view interpersonal problems from multiple perspectives (Blanchard-
Fields, 1986; Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1994; Labouvie-Vief, 1997). Older people have reported
better control over their emotions and less frequent experience of negative emotions (Gross et
al., 1997). Recently, in an experience sampling study, we found that older and younger people
experienced positive and negative emotions at comparable levels of intensity. However, age was
related to a reduction in the frequency of negative emotions (until roughly age 60 when the
decrease levels), and older adults experienced positive emotions just as frequently as their
younger counterparts (Carstensen et al., 2000). Older adults, relative to their younger
counterparts, also have reported more differentiated emotional experience and were more likely
than younger adults to experience positive and negative emotions during the same sampling
occasion (Carstensen, Charles, Isaacowitz, & Kennedy, in press). Thus, socioemotional
functioning appears to be an area of continued 80
CARSTENSEN AND CHARLES

growth well into advanced old age. Interpersonal relationships are strong, and emotional
experience is, by and large, deeply satisfying. Interestingly, emotional experience in old age is
best characterized not as “happy” but as richer and more complex and increasingly comes to
entail episodes in which joy and sadness are intermixed in the same moment. As people
approach the end of life and realize the fragility of life, simple distinctions between “positive”
and “negative” blur, and emotional poignancy may dominate the horizon. A n elderly couple,
quoted in Ann Landers on December 13, 1995, described it well. They wrote, “When we are old,
the young are kinder to us and we are kinder to each other. There is a sunset glow that radiates
from our faces and is reflected on the faces of those about us. But still, it is sunset.’’ This greater
complexity may be why older adults report fewer emotions of surgency, such as excitement, yet
report more contentment (Lawton et al., 1993). Greater complexity may also be why researchers
have found that older adults are more adept at multipleperspective taking in highly emotional
situations (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Schocke, & Hertzog, 1998). Cognitions may become more
complex as no one emotion dominates a situation, which in turn may lead to enhanced emotion
regulation.

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES A FOCUS ON THE POSITIVE MAKE? Traditional theories were often built
on assumptions of loss, thereby framing age-related changes in negative terms and focusing on
areas where these age-related changes reflect reduced functioning. Our research embedded in
socioemotional selectivity theory focused on areas where age-related changes result in
enhanced functioning. Indeed, the same age-related change can be seen as a loss or a gain,
depending on the criteria with which it is measured. There are many reasons to believe that
recognition of positive aspects of aging would improve the science and probably the lives of
older adults. In our own area of research, presumptions of loss have obscured gains. A focus on
the positive will also force people to ask how the aging process might be improved. Certainly, old
age, as we know it today, does not reflect optimal old age, so research focused on ways to
enhance processes involved in optimal aging is indicated. Research on cognitive aging, for
example, shows that many of the widely documented declines in cognitive performance (e.g.,
memory) can be improved with modest training (P. B. Baltes & Lindenberger, 1988; Schaie,
1990). Social dependency can be modified by changing environmental contingencies (M. M.
Baltes, 1995). A great many of the physical health problems afflicting older adults can be
postponed or reversed through diet and exercise (Whitbourne, 1985). Moreover, across widely
disparate domains, from physical health to HUMAN AGING

81

cognitive functioning, variability in the population increases with age of cohort (Dannefer, 1987).
Chronological age becomes an increasingly poor marker of functioning in successively older
cohorts. To scientists, age variability is intriguing because it suggests the potential for specifying
conditions that facilitate or obstruct adaptive outcomes. Variability also speaks against
inevitability. In considering social and policy changes, it is in our best interest not only to find
ways to limit or ration services to the elderly population, but also to find ways to facilitate the
productive contributions of older citizens. Although the older population does indeed include
severely demented people, it also comprises the wisest members of society. Identifying the
strengths of older people will serve us all well. Importantly, as the population rapidly grays,
social scientists need to rethink the systemic relationships between individual behavior and
societal structures throughout the life span (Riley, Foner, & Riley, 1999). We must recognize and
consider deeply the intermingling of cultural supports and individual functioning. Cohort
differences evident in this century demonstrate unequivocally that the social structures into
which people are born alter the aging process: This influence does not begin in old age. Cohort
differences in health care, standards of living, and educational opportunities influence people
throughout the life course. Consider, for example, the fact that in 1900, 50% of infants born in
the United States were dead before the age of 5, and illnesses like polio and rheumatic fever
seriously compromised the lives of many survivors. In contrast, the vast majority of children born
in the United States today are expected to live out their full life spans; they will be healthier and
better educated than any previous cohort in human history.

WHAT’S WRONG WITH A “POSITIVE’ PSYCHOLOGY MOVEMENT? Given the argument we have
made so far, readers may expect that we’d be delighted by the prospect of positive psychology.
But we see as many problems as advantages. Deconstructing the scientific status quo and
revealing evidence that negative presumptions have guided much of the research is one thing.
Carrying a banner for a movement forcing the pendulum to swing in the other direction is quite
another. Psychology is the discipline that has shown that investigators do not and cannot leave
their worldviews at the doors of their laboratories. The lesson in this is not to give up the effort
to objectively assess the gains and the losses associated with aging (or any other phenomenon
under study) and join a movement to be more “positive.” Rather, it is to generate an even-
handed characterization of the problems and the strengths associated with aging. Scientific
psychology should not have an objective to prove or disprove positive

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aspects of life. It should instead seek to understand psychological phenomena in their totality.
The positive psychology movement may benefit from lessons learned in gerontology, where a
focus on “successful aging” began about 10 years ago. Recognizing the tremendous
heterogeneity in aging outcomes, a number of gerontologists and life span developmental
psychologists began to consider how to achieve positive outcomes in old age. The first step, of
course, was to define successful aging, which in and of itself proved problematic. The initial
thinking was that successful aging would entail long life, freedom from disease, good mental
health, and social embeddedness. Quickly, however, problems with this shift in focus emerged.
For one, successful aging sounds a lot like not aging at all. Middle-aged standards of health were
applied to old people. Should older people who become sick, or simply experience reliable
cognitive changes in old age, be considered unsuccessful? If so, research on aging will focus only
on an elite group of people who fit this definition, with most people culled out as soon as they
show any evidence of decline. The study of older adults would be generalized only to a select
few who are not representative of their age group. For example, nearly half of the population
aged 65 and older report having arthritis (Helmick, Lawrence, Pollard, & Heyse, 1995), so nearly
half of the older adult population would be excluded based on one chronic illness. Does it make
sense to adopt a model of successful aging in which all people ultimately fail simply by surviving
into old age? Certainly not. A far more satisfying approach, advocated by P. B. Baltes (1987), is to
acknowledge that all stages in life have strengths and weaknesses and that all changes entail
both gains and losses. It is essential that social scientists identify inevitable deficits and exploit
potential opportunities to build a society that optimizes the likelihood that all individuals will live
healthy and productive lives well into old age. Given the well-documented increases in the older
population, the vitality of their social and economic institutions is in jeopardy if societies do not
begin serious discussions, informed by scientific findings, that will lead to the development of
effective policies that allow them to maintain their economic and social vigor. It is critical that
social scientists ascertain the real gains and real losses associated with aging. We cannot do this
by denying old age. We cannot do it by focusing only on problems. We cannot do it by
succumbing to a polemical movement to search for the positive. We cannot do it by ignoring
who people really are. Hopefully, we are all going to get old, and definitely, we are all going to
die. The knowledge that our years are limited may be precisely what makes life precious. Older
people, in record numbers, are entering a stage of life that has few social scripts and even fewer
supportive social structures that offer guides for roles and societal responsibilities. They do so at
a point in history HUMAN AGING

83

when less is known about the last 30 years of life than the first 5. However, considering what is
known, it is inaccurate, and most certainly unwise, to characterize these 30 years as solely a time
of frailty. Social scientists must study the strengths of older people, but just as surely they must
understand the problems of older people if society is to harness this social resource and reap the
benefits that can potentially accrue as people begin to realize their entire life spans.

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Psychiatry, 165, 16-22. Zacks, R. T., Hasher, L., & Li, K. 2. H. (2000). Human memory. In F. I. M.
Craik & T. A. Salthouse (Eds.), The handbook of aging and cognition (2nd ed., pp. 293-358).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

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THREE HUMAN STRENGTHS CHARLES S. CARVER AND MICHAEL F. SCHEIER

The concept “human strength” will probably be taken by most people as referring to ways in
which humans overcome daunting obstacles, triumph over adversity, and emerge successfully
from transactions that have pressed them to their limits. Strength is the solidity to stand firm
against the rockslides of an uncertain world. Strength is flexibility with tensile reserve, allowing
people to bend but not break when facing raging winds. Strength is the ability to maintain
equilibrium and remain at the surface of a desert’s shifting sands or in a maelstrom of crashing
waves. Another common view would see human strength as reflected in the ability to transform
the world, to turn visions arising from one’s imagination into reality. Human strength is
manifested in the sustained exertions that clear fields for crops and cities, the harnessed efforts
that raise buildings and aircraft thousands of feet in the air, the imagination and knowledge that
channel the forces of nature into electrical power. Human strength is the mental and physical
prowess that lies behind the creation of artifacts conceived by human minds. These views share
the theme that human strength involves a kind of Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by
grants CA64710, CA64711, CA78995, and P50CA84944 from the National Cancer Institute and
grants P50-HL65111 and P50-HL65112 from the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute.

87

victory over the world outside the self-either by successfully resisting outside forces or by
exerting one’s own force successfully on the world. Human strength is expressed in resilience
against deformative pressures. Human strength is expressed in the ability to plan and to manifest
that plan in a world characterized by opposition or indifference. Human strength is the capability
of forcing external elements into a desired order (or a desired disorder). Human strength is
about overcoming, succeeding. These views have much to recommend them. The ability to
persevere and overcome is an important-indeed critical-human strength. But that is not the
entire story of human strength. Strength is not entirely about victory. It is partly about being
overcome, about defeat and what follows from defeat. Strength is partly about holding on, but
partly about letting go (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1992). Strength is also partly something else:
changes that take place within the self. Strength is inherent in the processes of psychological
growth. This chapter concerns these three domains of human strength.

PERSEVERANCE AS HUMAN STRENGTH The picture of human strength as reflected in persistence

and performance is a familiar one. Discussions of these aspects of experience often stress the
important role in human behavior played by commitment to goals and confidence about their
attainment. Commitment and confidence interact to foster persistence and perseverance, even
in the face of great adversity. These ideas form the cornerstone of a good part of what is touted
as “positive psychology” (e.g., Ryff & Singer, 1998; Seligman, 1999; Snyder & Lopez, 2002; Taylor,
1989). Because these ideas are so familiar to so many readers, we discuss them only briefly here.
The idea that commitment and confidence are keys to success is embedded in generations of
expectancy-value models of motivation (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Bandura, 1997; Carver & Scheier,
1998; Feather, 1982; Klinger, 1975; Kuhl, 1984; Kukla, 1972; Lewin, 1948; Scheier & Carver, 1992;
Shah & Higgins, 1997; Snyder, 1994; Vroom, 1964; Wright & Brehm, 1989). In such models,
engagement of effort requires both a goal that matters enough (value) and also sufficient
confidence in its eventual attainment (expectancy). People do not take up goals that don’t
matter to them, and if they did, they wouldn’t persist when things got difficult. The greater the
goal’s value, the greater the person’s commitment to it. Still, if a goal seems unattainable (even
though desirable), people won’t commit themselves to it. If they do, and fail to make progress
for long enough, they won’t persist. If people are hopeful or confident, on the other hand, they
will hold onto valued goals and remain engaged in attempts to move forward, even when the
effort thus far has been futile.

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Discussions of these theories usually emphasize the positive-the idea that continued effort can
result in attaining desired goals. That emphasis is quite reasonable, as many of these theories
have roots in analyses of achievement behavior. A person who gives up whenever encountering
difficulty will never accomplish anything. To accomplish things, people must make persistent
effort when confronting obstacles. Given the importance of persistence in attaining desired ends,
attempts to foster human strength from this perspective often focus on enhancing persistence.
Often enough, from the expectancy-value approach, this translates directly into building people’s
confidence about successful outcomes to the point where effort is self-sustaining. Put simply, the
attempt is to turn pessimists into optimists. Building confidence is not as straightforward as it
might seem, however. For one thing, confidence can have many focuses. People can become
confident that they will encounter no adversity or confident that adversity will fall away as soon
as they exert effort. Such types of confidence are unlikely to yield the desired result, however.
They are too easily disconfirmed and broken. Rather, people must be confident about eventually
overcoming the adversity. The longer a span of effort is reflected in the sense of “eventually,” the
greater should be the person’s persistence under adversity. Although there are other ways to
view this phenomenon (e.g., Amsel, 1967), we see it as reflecting confidence about the eventual
result of extended efforts, even given the likelihood of shorter-term failures. With confidence of
eventual success, people continue to struggle toward their desires. The originators of a garage-
based start-up company may endure years of hardship while their product slowly takes root. The
struggling student may work for months toward the completion of a project that is very difficult.
People even return to rebuild their homes in war-torn territories. The ability of people to
struggle forward, to persevere against great odds even in the face of failure, represents a very
important human strength.

GIVING UP AS HUMAN STRENGTH Although perseverance is important in a great many activities

of life, this is only part of the story. A n equally important role is played by processes that are
precisely the opposite of those just discussed. A critical role in life is also played by doubt and
disengagement-by giving up (Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2000; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, in
press). Giving up has a bad reputation in Western thought: “Winners never quit and quitters
never win” is the credo of sports and business alike. However, everyone quits sometimes. No
one goes through a lifetime without confronting an insoluble problem. Disengagement from
failed efforts turns THREE HUMAN STRENGTHS
89

out to be a necessity-a natural and indispensable aspect of effective selfregulation (Klinger,

1975). Giving Up in Behavioral Self-Regulation The expectancy-value theories that place such an
emphasis on perseverance also have an important role for disengagement, although one would
be hard-pressed to realize it from most presentations of those theories. In general, giving up is
treated within those theories as a wholly undesirable response. The emphasis has been on the
failure per se. Indeed, giving up has sometimes been equated with “helplessness,” in which the
person subsequently fails to exert effort toward a wider variety of goals (cf. Seligman, 1975;
Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Further thought makes it apparent, however, that this is too simple a
picture. To talk about the consequences of failure, one must make a distinction between giving
up effort and giving up commitment to the goal. Reducing effort while staying committed has
clear negative consequences in the form of distress (cf. Carver & Scheier, 1990). The person is
stucknot trying, yet unable to turn away. If commitment to the goal can be dissolved, however,
failure at goal attainment does not have these consequences (Carver & Scheier, 1998). With no
commitment to the unattainable goal, there’s no basis for distress over the fact that the goal
cannot be attained. What determines goal commitment? It depends partly on the goal’s value-
its perceived importance. Real helplessness occurs when a goal cannot be reached and also
cannot be abandoned, because it matters too much. What determines a goal’s importance? To
answer this question properly, we must address the principle of hierarchicality among the goal
values of the self. We believe that goals provide the structure that defines people’s lives. The
goals of the self take a variety of forms. Some are concrete (e.g., taking out the garbage); others
are more abstract and ephemeral (e.g., being a good parent). What makes one goal matter more
than another? Generally speaking, the higher in the hierarchy a goal is, the more important it is
(the more central to the overall sense of self). Concrete action goals acquire importance from
the fact that attaining them serves the attainment of broader, more abstract goals (Carver &
Scheier, 1998; Powers, 1973; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985).The stronger the link between a
concrete goal and the deepest values of the self, the more important is that concrete goal.
Unimportant goals are easy to disengage from. Important ones are hard to disengage from,
because giving them up creates a disruption (an enlarging discrepancy) with respect to higher-
level core values of the self. Thus, giving up on an important goal is difficult and painful.

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The disruption at the higher order can potentially be remedied, however. How? The answer
derives from the fact that people often can engage in diverse activities to satisfy a given higher
order goal. For example, many actions serve as pathways to maintaining good health, including
exercising, healthful eating, taking vitamins, getting regular checkups, and avoiding cigarettes
and alcohol. The pathways to a given higher order goal sometimes compensate for one another
(cf. Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), so that if progress in one path is impeded, the person can shift
efforts to a different path (see Figure 7.1, Path 1). As an example, consider a woman who values
being an environmentalist. If a chronic illness were to stop her from engaging in regular
volunteer work for her local environmental group, she might compensate by increasing her
charitable contributions to that organization. As one path is disrupted, another path may be
taken instead, and indeed may become more important over time. By taking up an attainable
alternative, the person remains engaged in forward movement. Sometimes people don’t turn to
alternative paths that are already in place, but rather step outside their existing framework and
develop new ones. Though there are many ways in which this can occur, we think they share a
common element. We believe that the newly adopted activity will almost inevitably be one that
contributes to the expression of some preexisting core aspect of the self (see Carver & Scheier,
1999). Thus, the effect is to continue the pre-existing sense of purpose in life (Figure 7.1, Path 2).
Sometimes disengagement involves shifting from one activity to another. Sometimes, however, it
involves only scaling back from a lofty goal in a given domain to a less demanding one. This is a
disengagement, in the sense that the person is giving up the first goal while adopting the lesser
one (Figure 7.1, Path 3). It is more limited than the cases already considered, in the sense that it
does not entail leaving the domain. This limited disengagement keeps the person engaged in
activity in the domain he or she had wanted to quit (cf. Sprangers & Schwartz, 1999). By scaling
back the goal-giving up in a small way-the person keeps trying to move ahead, thus not giving up
in a larger way. The person thereby retains the sense of purpose in activities in that domain. It
will be apparent from this discussion that many instances of goal disengagement occur in the
service of maintaining continued efforts toward higher order goals. This is particularly obvious
regarding concrete goals for which disengagement has little cost: People remove themselves
from blind alleys and wrong streets, give up plans that have been disrupted by unexpected
events, and come back later if the store is closed. The same is also true, however, with regard to
certain goals that are deeply connected to the self. It serves the longer term benefit of the self to
disengage and move on with life after the loss of a close relationship (e.g., Orbuch, 1992; THREE
HUMAN STRENGTHS

91

Form new goal, new path to higher order goal

v Potential for positive outcomes

Choose alternate path to higher order goal

v Potentialfor positive outcomes

1
t

Potentialfor positive outcomes

Scale back to limited goal in the same

Give up goal commitment, disengage from goal

Aimlessness, emptiness, loneliness

Figure 7.7. Responses to the perception that a goal is unattainable. The person (A) can remain
committed to the goal and experience distress or (B)can dissolve the commitment and disengage
from the goal. Disengagement has four potential patterns: (1) Choosing an alternative path to
the same higher order value produces a situation in which positive outcomes and feelings are
possible. (2) Choosing a new goal yields a situation in which positive outcomes and feelings are
possible. (3) Scaling back aspirations while remaining in the same domain creates a situation in
which positive outcomes and feelings are possible. (4) Giving up commitment without turning to
another goal, however, results in feelings of emptiness.

Distress, futility, helplessness

Give up effort, but remain committed to goal

appraised as too great to overcome

Stroebe, Stroebe, & Hansson, 1993) or to disengage from a career path that has not worked out.
People need multiple paths to the core values of the self (cf. Linville, 1987; Showers & Ryff,
1996). That way, if one path becomes barricaded, they can jump to another one. Not every
disengagement serves this adaptive function, of course. In some cases there appears to be no
alternative goal to take up. In such a case, disengagement is not accompanied by a shift, because
there is nothing to shift to. This is perhaps the worst situation, where there is nothing to pursue,
nothing to take the place of what is seen as unattainable. If the commitment to the unattainable
goal wanes, the result is simply emptiness (Figure 7.1, Path 4). More generally, disengagement
appears to be a valuable and adaptive response when it leads to-or is tied to-the taking up of
other goals (cf. Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). By taking up an attainable alternative, the person
remains engaged in activities that have meaning for the self, and life continues to have purpose.
The willingness to make this shift, when circumstances require it, is an important human
strength. Giving U p in Lifespan Development

The foregoing discussion addressed giving up as a human strength in moment-to-moment self-

regulation. The idea that disengagement plays a critically important role in life more broadly also
finds support with respect to life span development (this discussion is adapted from Wrosch et
al., in press). Humans have a vast potential for what they can become and accomplish in a
lifetime. However, because time and resources are limited, people must make choices about
which goals to pursue and which to give up (Schulz & Heckhausen, 1996; see also Carstensen,
Hanson, & Freund, 1995). Such choices can be either proactive (in response to opportunities) or
reactive (in response to dwindling resources or sociocultural constraints) (Baltes, 1997; Marsiske,
Lang, Baltes, & Baltes, 1995). Successful selfmanagement requires that people choose the right
goals at the right time, and it requires the ability to disengage from goals that are unattainable
or too costly to attain. Consistent with this, elderly persons who report being more adept at
making loss-based goal choices also report less agitation and more positive well-being (Freund &
Baltes, 1998). There are several ways in which goals can be rendered unattainable (or too costly).
One is the fact that the biological resources available to a person have a cycle of growth and
decline over the life span (Baltes, Cornelius, & Nesselroade, 1979; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995).
At the simplest level, this cycle imposes constraints on attainable goals at a given point in the life
course. Running 100 meters in 10 seconds might be a feasible goal for a 20-year-old, but not for
a 5-year-old or an 80-year-old. It would be adaptive for the 5-year-old and the 80-year-old not to
be committed to THREE HUMAN STRENGTHS

93

that goal at present (though it may become adaptive for the 5-year-old later on). The pattern of
growth through the middle years followed by a decline through old age also has another
implication. Early in development a person makes choices electively as he or she actively tries to
select pathways that enhance personal growth and optimize personal resources. Later on, goal
selection becomes more loss based, as the person tries to replace goals that are no longer
attainable because of diminishing biological resources and reserves (Baltes, 1997; Marsiske et
al., 1995). Stated differently, there is a shift over the life span from an assimilative mode of
coping to an accommodative mode of coping (Brandtstadter & Greve, 1994; Brandtstadter &
Renner, 1990).Assimilative coping is the person’s attempt to adjust ongoing life circumstances to
match goals, needs, and desires. Accommodative coping is the opposite-adjusting personal
preferences and goals to the situational and contextual constraints. Biological limitations also
arise from genetic variations. The potential behavioral repertoire of humans is vast, but a
person’s capacity to reach high levels of functioning in a given domain may be constrained
genetically (e.g., Plomin, Pedersen, Lichtenstein, & McClearn, 1994; Scarr, 1993). Becoming a
professional athlete is an unattainable goal for someone who does not have the needed physical
attributes. Becoming a rocket scientist is an unattainable goal for someone who lacks the needed
intellectual attributes. Optimal development entails providing children opportunities to test their
potential in various areas. Put simply, some goals will be out of reach no matter how hard one
tries, and an important task of early development is to figure out what goals are appropriate and
what goals are better abandoned. Constraints also result from the flow of behavior over time,
channeling developmental processes into biographical tracks (cf. Baltes, 1993). A n example is
professional specialization. People acquire increasing expertise in their chosen field, but they do
so at the expense of breadth across other fields. Effort directed to greater expertise in one’s
specialization is effort diverted from keeping up elsewhere. The strategy of specialization lets the
person optimize functioning in the chosen track, but makes it correspondingly more difficult to
maintain goal possibilities in other tracks. Another very important constraint is the limited time
span of the human life. Whatever is to be achieved or experienced in life has to be done in a
finite period of time. Acquiring knowledge and skills of any sort takes time. This limits the extent
to which people can maximize functioning in multiple domains. Because there are limits on the
time available, there are limits on the ability to shift from one domain to another. These various
points can be summarized as follows: Because life is short and resources are limited, people
must make decisions about where to invest those resources. Resources invested in one activity
cannot be used

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for an alternative activity. Sometimes an activity is begun that proves not to be worth sustaining,
given the many constraints on the person’s life or changes in the social environment. In such
cases, the activity-the goal -must be abandoned. Doing that allows the person to expend the
resources more profitably in other domains of life. Thus, giving up seems to play an important
role in how people negotiate development across the life span.

Choosing We have argued that perseverance reflects human strength and that giving up reflects
human strength. Those statements hold no paradox, but they hide a difficult problem (at least,
they have done so thus far in this chapter). The problem is how to know when something is truly
unattainable (or not worth the effort required to attain it). In truth, whenever the issue arises, it
is impossible to be certain of the answer. To persevere may turn out to be glorious stupidity. To
give up may turn out to be tragic loss. The well-known serenity prayer asks for “the wisdom to
know the difference” between these cases. Whether the answer comes from a divinity or from a
lifetime of experience, the ability to choose wisely (or at least believe that one has chosen
wisely) and follow one’s choice fully is also an important strength.

GROWTH AS HUMAN STRENGTH A final human strength also concerns development in a sense,
but
does so from a very different angle. Specifically, people grow and evolve psychologically across
time and experience. We were drawn to consider this aspect of human strength partly by our
discovery of a developing literature on how people respond to jolts in life serious enough to be
viewed as trauma. Consideration of responses to trauma led us to think more closely about
growth more generally. Discussions of trauma have noted that such events can have diverse
long-term consequences. Sometimes people remain diminished in some way; sometimes they
return to their prior levels of functioning. It’s possible, though, for people to respond to trauma
by surpassing their prior functioning. This possibility has been discussed under a number of
labels, including thriving (O’Leary & Ickovics, 1995), post-traumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi,
1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995)’ and stress-related growth (Park, Cohen, & Murch, 1996). A
substantial number of people have begun to note the possibility that serious adversity can
eventually bring about benefit (see also Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Aldwin, 1994; Antoni et al.,
THREE HUMAN STRENGTHS

95

2001; Ickovics & Park, 1998; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Updegraff & Taylor, 2000).

There are several ways to think about the nature of such gains (Carver, 1998). People may
emerge from disruptive and even traumatic events with new skills for managing the external
world or for managing their distress. The “skill” may be an actual skill, it may be an enhanced
knowledge base, it may be enhanced social support. With new skills, people are better prepared
to deal with an unpredictable world. With new pathways to get from one place to another,
people are more flexible in confronting the unknown. Along with the ability to do something
new can come a sense of mastery (Aldwin, 1994). Along with having gotten through a painful
experience can come confidence (“I survived this, I can deal with other hard things too.”). Having
this confidence can also make subsequent difficulties easier to approach (Affleck, Tennen, &
Rowe, 1991). Confidence is a key contributor to keeping people engaged in efforts to cope
(indeed, this looks like precisely the sort of confidence that is most conducive to staying engaged
through adversity). In sum, gains following trauma appear to reflect one or another kind of
growth: growth in skill, growth in knowledge, growth in confidence, greater elaboration and
differentiation in one’s ability to deal with the world. This leads to an interesting question: If
thriving reflects growth in response to adversity, does this growth differ in principle from any
other growth experience? One possible difference is that thriving occurs in circumstances in
which growth would be unexpected. O n the other hand, it’s noteworthy that many kinds of
growth occur only in response to stress. Muscle development occurs when a muscle is
systematically worked close to its limits. Without that, there’s no change in strength. Similarly,
cognitive skills develop because the person’s existing understanding of reality is too limited to
handle current experiences. It takes a mismatch between the person and the world-a
disequilibration (Piaget, 1963, 1971) or a failure of prediction (Kelly, 1955)-to force the growth
and elaboration to occur (see also Ruble, 1994). These considerations suggest that thriving
reflects an extreme case of the same growth processes. It is extreme in the sense that it occurs
in circumstances at the outer limit of tolerability. Indeed, if circumstances are even more
extreme, growth (thriving) may be precluded. Perhaps trauma changes the situation so much
that growth (if it occurs at all) is speeded up. Thus, responses to trauma may provide observers a
clearer window on processes that also take place in less extreme circumstances, but normally
are more hidden from view because they are slower. This idea is reminiscent of Kelly’s (1955)
discussion of two kinds of changes in people’s construct systems. He distinguished between
(gradual)

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elaboration of a system and a sudden reorganization that can occur when there has been a
massive failure of prediction (usually, though not always, involving a traumatic event). The latter
changes are in some respects the same as in normal evolution of the construct system, but they
occur suddenly rather than gradually. What is the nature of these changes? Our view of the
tendency toward growth over time and experience-whether gradual or sudden-is a nai've
position that echoes both Piaget (1963) and Kelly (1955), among others. We think humans
continuously strive toward better prediction. Better prediction (both as an observer and as an
actor) leads to better outcomes and more efficiency. We think a gradual shift toward efficiency
occurs when people continue to pursue an activity over multiple repetitions. We regard gradual
change toward greater efficiency as a self-adjusting process that is characteristic of the human
cognitive machinery (see MacKay, 1956). Piaget (1963) viewed growth as resting on the broad
processes of differentiation (making greater distinctions among the elements of reality),
organization (integrating simple elements into more complex wholes, which may have emergent
properties), and adaptation (testing the structures so they fit the constraints of reality). The
process of organization supplies the efficiency, adaptation ensures that the efficiency continues
to predict accurately, and differentiation ensures that more and more subtle aspects of reality
are taken into account over accumulated experience. There are also resonances of this view in
ideas about the function of consciousness. Some hold that consciousness is involved in making
decisions under uncertainty, but that the repeated decisions made in some domain begin to
form a pattern, gradually yielding default values for perception, thought, and action (Bargh,
1997; Norman & Shallice, 1986). As the defaults form, processing is more automatic and requires
less attention. Automaticity attained in one domain frees attention for other domains or for
more elaborate decision making in the same domain. The person thus evolves to become both
more complex and more integrated. As people become capable of handling more and more
complexity automatically, they take into account more and more variables at once, thereby
stretching themselves yet further (Carver & Scheier, 1998, chapter 16). The making of ever more
subtle distinctions, the forming of organizations from elements, the testing of those
organizations against reality, and the attainment of automaticity-taken together, they constitute
a kind of growth. Taken together, as growth, they also represent an important core of human
strength.
CONCLUSION We described in this chapter three kinds of human strength: perseverance, giving
up the unattainable, and growth. Unknown at present are THREE HUMAN STRENGTHS

97

the relations among them. Even perseverance and giving up, which seem so antithetical, may
not be. Perhaps the reality is more that strength is expressed in the selection of some threads of
life to pursue diligently while others wither away, much as the pruning that occurs among neural
projections over time and experience. In any event, we think it important to note that the
strengths on which we have focused in this chapter do not belong only to a select few
individuals. Rather, they are part of everyone’s experience, to a greater or lesser degree. A
psychology of human strengths is no less than a psychology of human nature. As such, it will
remain important for the foreseeable future.

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THE MALLEABILITY OF SEX DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING SOCIAL ROLES ALICE H.

EAGLY AND AMANDA B. DIEKMAN

The scientific study of sex differences and similarities is critical to understanding human
behavior. Because gender is one of the most fundamental distinctions people make between
human groups, scientific knowledge about the ways in which female and male behavior does or
does not differ has far-reaching implications for explaining human functioning. The potential of
such knowledge to promote understanding of human strengths emerges in part from the
questions that it raises concerning the malleability of male and female behavior in response to
changing conditions. As the roles and responsibilities of the sexes become more similar, as they
have especially in many Western societies in the 20th century, do the psychological attributes of
women and men become more similar as well? Or do people who differ by sex show divergent
behavioral tendencies, regardless of changes in their social roles? In this chapter, we consider
some answers to these questions. Preparation of this chapter was supported by National Science
Foundation Grant SBR-

9729449 to Alice H. Eagly.

103
We use two lenses to view the malleability of sex differences in response to changing social
roles. The first lens is social perceivers' experiences in their daily lives, which yield a common-
sense psychology of everyday thinking about women and men.' The second lens is the
observations produced by scientific research, which yield a scientific psychology of sex
differences. In common-sense psychology, the flexibility of human sex differences in response to
the changing life circumstances of women and men receives considerable emphasis. In scientific
psychology, assumptions about the malleability of sex differences vary depending on
researchers' theoretical positions, and empirical research has begun to address the question of
whether sex differences in psychological dispositions have changed in response to changing
social roles.

THE COMMON-SENSE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES That people believe that there are
differences between the typical characteristics of men and women is a clear conclusion from
research on gender stereotypes (see review by Kite, 2001). Nonetheless, people do not view the
sexes as very different in the sense that they locate men and women on opposite ends of
psychological dimensions (e.g., men are aggressive, women are unaggressive). Rather, the
implicit statistical model underlying these beliefs consists of sex differences in central tendency,
with distributions of women and men overlapping to a greater or lesser extent depending on the
domain (Swim, 1994). A very important aspect of the common-sense psychology of sex
differences is the perceived malleability of these differences-that is, the extent to which people
believe that the attributes of women and men change in response to a change in the typical life
circumstances of each sex. In a research program addressing this issue, we examined the beliefs
that social perceivers have about the characteristics of women and men at different time
periods-the past, the present, and the future (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). We hypothesized that
because of the increasing similarity of the lives of women and men, people would discern
convergence in their characteristics. To the extent that women or men or, for that matter,
members of any social group are perceived to change their characteristics over time, they should
acquire a cultural representation that incorporates this change -in our terminology, a dynamic
stereotype. Why would members of a social group be viewed as changing their attributes?
According to social role theory (Eagly, 1987; Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000), the role behavior of
group members shapes their stereo'Heider (1958) introduced the term common-sense
psychology and maintained that scientific psychology has much to learn from the study of how
people construe behavior in everyday life.

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type because perceivers assume correspondence between people’s behavior in their everyday
social roles and their inner dispositions (see Gilbert, 1998). Perceivers fail to give much weight to
the constraints of social roles in inferring the dispositions of role occupants. Therefore, groups
should have dynamic stereotypes-that is, be perceived as changing their inner dispositions-to
the extent that their typical social roles are perceived to change over time. Applied to men and
women, this theory predicts that perceivers should think that sex differences are eroding
because of increasing similarity in the social roles of men and women. Moreover, the stereotype
of women should be more dynamic than that of men, because much greater change has taken
place in the roles of women than in those of men. The increasing similarity in the roles of
women and men is thus primarily a product of women’s increased wage labor, which has
occurred without a commensurate change in men’s domestic labor (Shelton & John, 1996), and
of women’s entry into male-dominated occupations, which has occurred without a similar shift
of men into female-dominated occupations (Reskin & ROOS,1990). In our studies examining
contemporary perceivers’ beliefs about the typical attributes of women and men of the past,
present, or future, women and men were perceived to converge strongly in their masculine
personality characteristics (e.g., competitive, dominant) from the years 1950 to 2050. Also, the
sexes were perceived to converge moderately in their masculine cognitive characteristics (e.g.,
analytical, good with numbers) and masculine physical characteristics (e.g., rugged, muscular).
This convergence in masculine characteristics reflected perceived change in women but not in
men. Although there was no convergence in feminine cognitive characteristics (e.g., imaginative,
intuitive) or physical characteristics (e.g., cute, petite), there was modest convergence in
feminine personality characteristics (e.g., gentle, kind) that was a product of women’s perceived
loss of these characteristics and (only in some studies) of men’s gain as well. The common-sense
psychology of gender thus features belief in considerable malleability over a 100-year time span,
and the trends that people project over time primarily reflect the belief that women’s attributes
are changing. People believe that women of the present are more masculine than women of the
past and that women of the future will be more masculine than women of the present,
especially in their personality characteristics. This perceived shift in women’s attributes
encompassed even masculine personality characteristics that are unfavorably evaluated (e.g.,
egotistical, arrogant). Belief in complementary change by which men increase their feminine
tendencies in personality, cognitive, and physical domains was not consistently demonstrated in
this research, nor was belief in change by which women decrease their feminine tendencies. We
predicted these results because the increasing similarity in the roles of women SEX DIFFERENCES
AND CHANGING SOCIAL ROLES

105

and men is primarily a product of change in women’s roles. Because the modal situation for
women now incorporates paid employment along with domestic responsibilities, perceivers
should believe that women’s attributes have shifted to incorporate the personal characteristics
identified with men and employees. Functioning as implicit role theorists, people apparently
believe that personal characteristics, especially personality attributes, adapt to social structure.
When change takes the form of a substantial proportion of a social group changing their social
roles, people believe that the characteristics of these group members change as well to meet the
requirements of the new roles. It is especially revealing that people extrapolate changes in
women’s roles and characteristics into the future. This common-sense belief that women will
continue to change should foster continued upward change in the status of women. Despite
some resistance to the shifts in women’s roles, especially among more politically conservative
social groups, the shared belief that women will augment their masculine personality, cognitive,
and physical characteristics in the future should expand women’s access to maledominated roles
and to the socialization experiences and training opportunities that will allow them to assume
these roles. It is thus likely that stereotypes’ representation of change in group members’
characteristics functions in the service of social change, despite the potential for stereotypes’
representation of group members’ present characteristics to justify the status quo (e.g., Jost &
Banaji, 1994). Dynamic stereotypes may thus be an important part of the positive psychology of
everyday life.

THE SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES How do social perceivers’ beliefs about sex
differences correspond to the findings of research psychologists who study these differences
with scientific methods? Does research validate the common-sense psychological principles that
men and women have stereotypic attributes and that these sex-typed attributes are converging,
with women increasingly manifesting attributes previously associated with men? It is surely
possible that this common-sense psychology is incorrect, perhaps even particularly illusory, in its
understanding of the malleability of male and female characteristics. Concerning the scientific
psychology of sex differences, research psychologists have a somewhat complicated tale to tell.
Many psychologists have been hesitant to use their research to produce conclusions about sex
differences. This reluctance stems from understandable roots-in particular, from the fear that
scientific validation of differences would suggest that one sex is inherently inferior to the other.
Displaying ambivalence about investigating sex differences, psychologists have debated whether
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female data should even be separately reported and compared (see Kitzinger, 1994). Given this
disinclination of many research psychologists to study male-female differences, the gap in
knowledge has been exploited by popular writers such as John Gray (1992), who offer the public
accounts of sex differences that are grounded in personal experiences and informal
observations. Regardless of whether such writers correctly discern sex differences and
similarities, their generalizations do not have the credibility of research that uses scientific
methods. Therefore, some researchers have responded to the public’s quite insatiable interest in
understanding female and male behavior by producing scientific knowledge that has begun to
replace speculation.

Theories of Sex Differences Scientific knowledge develops in conjunction with theories that are
tested empirically. Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers have proposed theories of sex
differences and similarities (see Eckes & Trautner, 2000). In social psychological theories, the
causes of sex-differentiated behavior include sex-typed skills, beliefs, self-concepts, attitudes,
and social expectations. In personality and developmental theories, the causes include the
socialization experiences of girls and boys in conjunction with their interpretations of sex-typed
environments. Theorists who have addressed the more ultimate causes of differences have taken
primarily an essentialist or a social constructionist perspective. Essentialist perspectives
emphasize the basic, stable sex differences that arise from inherent causes such as biological
factors and evolved psychological dispositions (Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Social constructionist
perspectives emphasize variation in sex differences across societies and across contexts within
societies (e.g., Bohan, 1993). In this view, sex differences depend on the constraints that
particular contexts place on social interaction. Our preferred perspective is social role theory,
which is an interactionist approach because it draws explicitly on both essentialist and
constructionist ideas (see Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000). In this analysis, sex differences in
social behavior arise from the distribution of men and women into social roles within a society.
In current industrial and postindustrial economies, these roles are organized so that women are
more likely than men to assume domestic roles of homemaker and primary caretaker of
children, whereas men are more likely than women to assume roles in the paid economy and to
be primary family providers. The different positions of men and women in the social structure
yield sex-differentiated behavior through a variety of proximal, mediating processes. One such
process is the formation of gender roles, by which people of each sex are expected to have
characteristics that equip them for the tasks that they SEX DIFFERENCES AND CHANGING SOCIAL
ROLES

107

typically carry out. Gender roles, along with the specific roles occupied by men and women (e.g.,
provider, homemaker), then guide social behavior. This guidance is mediated by sex-typed
socialization practices] as well as by processes detailed in social psychological theory and
research (e.g., expectancy confirmation, self-regulatory processes). Social role theory is
interactionist in its assumptions about the determinants of sex-typed roles within a society
(Wood & Eagly, in press). These determinants include the variable factors represented by the
social, economic, technological, and ecological forces present in a society and inherent sex
differences represented by each sex’s physical attributes and related behaviors, especially
women’s childbearing and nursing of infants and men’s greater size, speed, and upper-body
strength. These physical sex differences, in interaction with social and ecological conditions,
influence the roles held by men and women because certain activities are more efficiently
accomplished by one sex than by the other. The benefits of this greater efficiency emerge
because women and men are often allied in cooperative relationships in societies and engage in
a division of labor. In brief, then, we argue that psychological sex differences are a function of
gender roles and other proximal causes, which in turn arise from the distal causes that define
the positions of women and men in the social structure.

Scientific Descriptions of Sex Differences What have research psychologists found when they
compared men and women? Increasingly, psychologists have drawn their conclusions
systematically by taking many studies into account. Faced with very large research bases
composed of multiple studies (e.g., the hundreds of studies that have compared the self-esteem
or leadership style of men and women), research psychologists have turned to the methods
known as quantitative synthesis or meta-analysis, which provide statistically justified methods
for synthesizing research (see Johnson & Eagly, 2000). Meta-analysts typically represent the
comparison between male and female behavior for each relevant study in terms of its effect size
(or d), which expresses the sex difference in units of the study’s standard deviation. Calculating
effect sizes places each study’s sex difference on a continuum that ranges from no difference to
large differences. With each finding represented by an effect size, multiple studies are
collectively represented by taking an average of their effect sizes. This central tendency of effect
sizes is also located along this quantitative continuum and thus does not provide a simple yes or
no answer to the question of whether the sexes differed in general in the available studies. Also,
because findings generally differ from one study to the other, this variability illuminates the
conditions under which sex differences are larger, smaller, and sometimes reversed from their
typical direction. 108

EAGLY A N D DlEKh4AN

Given these sophisticated scientific methods for integrating research findings, have psychologists
produced clear descriptions of sex differences and similarities? To some extent, the answer is
yes. Psychologists have shown that differences between the sexes appear in research data as
distributions that overlap to a greater or lesser extent. Some sex differences are relatively large
compared with other psychological findings-for example, some cognitive performances (e.g., on
the Shepard-Metzler test of mental rotation), some social behaviors (e.g., facial expressiveness,
frequency of filled pauses in speech), some sexual behaviors (e.g., incidence of masturbation),
and one class of personality traits (tender-minded and nurturant tendencies). However, most
aggregated sex-difference findings are in the small-to-moderate range that appears to be typical
of research findings in psychology. Nonetheless, even small differences are not necessarily
inconsequential in everyday life. When small differences cumulate over time and individuals,
they can produce substantial effects (e.g., Martell, Lane, & Emrich, 1995).

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
OF SEX DIFFERENCES To understand the relation between the common-sense psychology and
the scientific psychology of sex differences, researchers have examined the overall accuracy of
gender stereotypes by comparing these stereotypes to the meta-analyzed results of research on
sex differences. This research has shown that, for the most part, gender stereotypes match
research findings on sex differences, thus yielding the conclusion that people are in general
competent to correctly discern the typical or average behaviors of men and women in everyday
life. For example, in a study examining 77 meta-analyzed traits, abilities, and behaviors, Hall and
Carter (1999) found a correlation of .70 between the mean of student judges’ estimates of sex
differences and meta-analytic effect sizes in the 77 areas. These judges displayed an
understanding of the relative magnitude of differences in addition to their male or female
direction. However, as Hall and Carter showed, some people perceive sex differences more
accurately than other people do; and, as Diekman, Eagly, and Kulesa (2002) showed, there are
some systematic biases that affect the accuracy of perceptions of men and women. Nonetheless,
one way of describing the sex differences established by scientific research is that they generally
conform to people’s ideas about men and women. As we have explained, consistent with the
ability of humans to adapt psychologically to changing social conditions, the common-sense
theory that perceivers hold about sex differences incorporates malleability in the characteristics
of men and women in response to changes in social roles. SEX DIFFERENCES AND CHANGING
SOCIAL ROLES

109

Research has shown that the substantial change that has occurred in women’s roles is itself
reflected in shifts of attitudes toward greater approval of nontraditional roles for women (e.g.,
Twenge, 1997a) and of women’s participation in the labor force, equal pay for women, and
nonmaternal care for children (see Kahn & Crosby, 1985).Yet the critical question with respect to
perceivers’ assumptions about malleability is whether research on personality, social behavior,
and cognitive abilities has produced evidence of actual change over time in the personal
attributes of women and men. Such evidence is difficult to produce because it requires the
collection of comparable data over long time periods. Also, if research methods or participant
populations have changed as a research area matures, the effects of such shifts on findings must
be controlled in order to discern genuine change in behavioral tendencies (Knight, Fabes, &
Higgins, 1996). Despite these complexities, in research literatures in which studies extend over
several decades, the hypothesis that sex differences are decreasing in size is amenable to testing
by relating the year that the data were collected to the outcomes of the studies. From the
perspectives of the common-sense psychology of sex differences and of social role theory,
convergent male and female secular trends should be observed most clearly in research areas
that reflect masculine, but not feminine, personality, cognitive, and physical dispositions, and
this convergence should be accounted for mainly by change in women. Some findings support
these predictions. For example, the career plans of male and female university students showed
a marked convergence from 1966 to 1996 that is accounted for mainly by changes in women’s
career aspirations (Astin, Parrott, Korn, & Sax, 1997). Also, a meta-analytic synthesis of sex
differences in reports of job attribute preferences showed that job attributes such as freedom,
challenge, leadership, prestige, and power became relatively more important to women, in
comparison to men, from the 1970s to the 1980s and 1990s (Konrad, Ritchie, Lieb, & Corrigall,
2000). As the gender barriers to opportunity declined during this period, women’s aspirations
rose to obtain jobs with these attributes. Also, a metaanalysis of self-report measures of
masculine and feminine personality traits found that women’s masculinity increased linearly
with the studies’ year of publication (Twenge, 1997b). Men’s masculinity showed a weaker
increase with year, and their femininity increased slightly as well. Some meta-analyses of sex
differences in specific domains of stereotypically masculine behavior also showed a decrease in
the magnitude of these differences. For example, a meta-analysis of sex differences in risktaking
behavior found a decrease over time in the tendency of men to engage in riskier behavior than
women (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). A meta-analysis of leader emergence in small groups
found a decrease over time in the tendency for men to emerge more than women (Eagly &
Karau, 1991). One meta-analysis showed convergence over time in the aggres-

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siveness of women and men (Hyde, 1984), although another did not show such convergence
(Eagly & Steffen, 1986). Also, studies of performance on tests of cognitive abilities demonstrated
some declines in the size of sex differences favoring men on tests of mathematics and science
but no decline in the size of differences favoring women on tests of reading and writing
(Campbell, Hombo, & Mazzeo, 2000; Hedges & Nowell, 1995; Hyde, Fennema, & Lamon, 1990).
Also, the marked increase in women’s athletic participation (National Collegiate Athletic
Association, 1997) suggests that women may even be physically stronger than in the past. O n
balance, in view of some evidence of actual convergence in masculine personal characteristics,
perceivers may be reasonably accurate observers not only of the current attributes of the sexes,
but also of changes in these attributes.

CONCLUSION The common-sense psychology of sex differences is compatible with the scientific
psychology of social role theory because both emphasize the capacity of the sexes to change
their characteristics as their social roles change. Both perspectives portray the sexes as
converging in their psychological attributes mainly through women assuming some of the
attributes that have traditionally been associated with men. The research literatures of
psychology have produced some evidence that human behavior is actually changing in this
manner in the United States. Such changes would probably also be evident in other nations in
which the status of women has shown substantial upward change in recent decades. It is of
course difficult to array the evidence of large research literatures to test overarching
propositions about change over time, despite the advantages offered by meta-analysis. Yet, as
research extends over longer periods of time and researchers refine their use of meta-analytic
techniques, conclusions about the secular changes in sex differences will become more firmly
grounded in empirical data. Some readers may be surprised to find that change in men and
women over time appears to be asymmetrical, with women adopting men’s masculine
characteristics without much reciprocal change whereby men adopt women’s feminine
characteristics. From a social role theory perspective, men’s characteristics would not change
until they change their social roles by accepting substantially more domestic responsibility and
entering female-dominated occupations. Because any changes in this direction have been small,
there is little basis for predicting that men would adopt more feminine characteristics. Groups
alter their actual characteristics as they prepare for and occupy roles that have new demands:
Women but not men SEX DlFFERENCES AND CHANGING SOCIAL ROLES
111

have undergone such transitions on a major scale in recent decades in the United States and
many other industrialized nations. Another possible direction of social change is that roles
change to accommodate new role occupants. For example, in relation to the managerial roles
that women have entered in large numbers, rather than women conforming to the typical
behaviors of male managers, the managerial role might change by encompassing the more
relational qualities of women (see Eagly & Karau, 2002). Although many social roles are flexible
enough to accommodate a range of behavioral styles, new role occupants’ accommodation to
the requirements of roles may override roles’ accommodation to the characteristics of new role
occupants, if only because the newcomers are at least initially only a small minority. However, if
the proportion of new occupants of a social role increases very substantially, so that it becomes
dominated by the new group, the role may change greatly in its wage structure and cultural
representation (e.g., see Preston’s [1995] analysis of the formation of public school teaching as a
woman’s profession). Have psychologists proceeded in this research area in a manner that allows
their research and theory to contribute to an understanding of human strengths? In showing
that people are for the most part accurate observers of sex differences, the study of gender
stereotypes has corrected the negative view that people are misguided in their everyday life
about as fundamental a matter as the characteristics that are typical of women and men. In
suggesting that dynamic stereotypes can foster upward change in the status of groups, this
research has opened up the possibility that the universal tendency of people to stereotype social
groups is not necessarily destructive to group members’ aspirations for changing their situation.
The dynamic stereotypes that people hold about women can operate in the service of social
change by opening doors to opportunities previously unavailable to women. Moreover, in
demonstrating that the common-sense psychology of sex differences includes belief in their
malleability in response to changes in social roles, our research has demonstrated a
commonsense optimism about the ability of humans to adapt to changing conditions. Finally, in
maintaining an open-minded perspective about the potential of men and women to develop
characteristics that allow them to fulfill nontraditional as well as traditional roles, scientific
investigators of sex differences have begun to produce evidence that people can fulfill their
hopes and dreams without being seriously limited by sex-typed psychological characteristics.

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TOWARD A POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTAL AND CULTURAL CONTRIBUTIONS

NANCY EISENBERG AND VIVIAN OTA WANG

Quite recently, there has been a flurry of interest in positive psychology. It has been argued that
psychologists have focused on deficits in human functioning and that positive development and
functioning have been neglected. Although problems in adjustment, including violence and
psychopathology, have been more popular topics for study than healthy or positive
development, research on positive aspects of psychological and behavioral development
certainly is not new. What is new is the widespread use of the term positive psychology. Many
aspects of positive human functioning have been examined for decades (or longer) and in
considerable depth. For example, research on prosocial behavior, that is, voluntary behavior
motivated to benefit another, has been published for many decades, with a number of books on
the topic written in the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g., Darley & Latane, Writing of this chapter was
supported by a grant and a Research Scientist Award from the National Institutes of Mental
Health (R01 HH55052, R01 MH60838, and KO5 M801321) to Nancy Eisenberg.

117

1968; Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977). In fact, the popularity and quantity of research on this
topic has merited review chapters in the major handbooks in developmental (Eisenberg & Fabes,
1998; Radke-Yarrow, ZahnWaxler, & Chapman, 1983) and social (Batson, 1998) psychology.
Similarly, theory on emotional empathy-that is, feeling an emotion consistent with another’s
emotional state or situation-has been an important area of interest since the 1970s (see Batson,
1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1995, 2000). Moreover, there has
been considerable work for decades on topics such as the development of social competence
(see Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 1998) and subjective well-being (Diener, 1984; Diener, Suh,
Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Thus, to some degree, the notion of positive psychology is not novel but is
merely an effort to emphasize domains of psychology that may have been overshadowed by the
current focus on maladjustment and the darker side of human nature. The fact that positive
psychology is not new does not mean that a stronger emphasis on the topic is unnecessary. In
recent years in the United States, funding has been increasingly targeted toward work on mental
health problems and relations between psychological processes or stress and poor physical
health. In developmental psychology, more and more scholars have been drawn into research
related to problem behaviors and maladjustment, such as work related to prevention and
developmental psychopathology. Concurrently, in the domain of prosocial development, there
has been a marked drop in the number of scholars working primarily on the topic in the last
decade (Batson, 1998). Nonetheless, even in this work, there has been a focus on processes that
promote positive adjustment despite stress and adversity, such as coping (e.g., Wolchik &
Sandler, 1997) and resiliency (Masten & Coatsworth, 1995). Thus, human strengths are, and have
been, a part of the study of human frailty.

PITFALLS IN STUDYING POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Positive development can be intrapersonal (in

terms of happiness and life satisfaction), as well as interpersonal. Whereas prosocial behavior
and empathy-related responding seem central to the issue of positive development in the
interpersonal domain, coping is an important topic if one wishes to understand human strengths
in dealing with stress, interpersonal or otherwise. We will use these domains of research for
examples of pitfalls when studying human strengths.

Discrepancies Between True and Apparent Prosocial Behavior One potential pitfall in studying
positive development and behavior has been the failure to clearly differentiate between what is
and what

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EISENBERG AND OTA WANG

merely appears to be positive functioning or behavior. Of course, it often is difficult to define

what is genuinely “positive,” much less develop ways of differentiating truly positive functioning
from less positive functioning that merely appears positive. An apt example can be found in the
study of altruism. Altruism is a type of prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior generally is defined
as voluntary behavior intended to benefit others. Prosocial behaviors such as helping, sharing,
and comforting can be enacted for many reasons, from concern for another to attempts to curry
favor or obtain rewards. Altruism is intrinsically motivated voluntary behavior intended to
benefit another-acts motivated by internal motives such as concern for others or by internalized
values, goals, and self-rewards rather than by the expectation of concrete or social rewards or
the avoidance of punishment (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). Because of the emphasis on genuine
caring and internalized motives and values, altruism has been highly relevant to an
understanding of the development of morality and caring for others. Unfortunately, because of
the difficulties in differentiating between altruistically motivated actions and actions motivated
by more ignoble concerns, people have often studied prosocial behaviors such as helping and
sharing without knowing if the motives behind the given behaviors were altruistic. Investigators
have often tried to increase the probability that an enacted prosocial behavior is altruistic by
assessing the behavior in a context in which the likelihood of receiving material or social rewards
for prosocial action is minimized. Moreover, a body of literature exists, primarily in social
psychology, in which investigators have tried to differentiate between altruistically motivated
prosocial behaviors (e.g., motivated by sympathy) and those motivated by the avoidance of guilt
or aversive, self-focused distress, empathic positive emotion, or identification with another
person (e.g., Batson, 1998). However, the manipulations involved in this work, such as whether
the potential helper has to deal with the helpee in the future (which could induce distress) or
whether the helper sees the aid recipient’s reactions to the receipt of assistance (which could
induce empathic positive emotion) have been subtle and difficult to implement and have
resulted in inconsistent findings across studies (see Batson, 1998). Thus, in general it has been
quite difficult to know if behaviors that appear to be positive are truly as moral as they seem. Of
course, one could argue that it doesn’t matter much why people help one another, as long as
they do so. But if people help for egoistic reasons, they will do so primarily in those
circumstances in which they perceive some sort of self-gain. In contrast, if people assist others
due to sympathetic concern or based on the desire to live up to internalized values, they are
more likely to display altruistic behavior in circumstances in which others are in need, when
there is little reason to expect self-gain. An extreme example is individuals in Europe who
assisted Jews in Nazioccupied territories during World War 11. These individuals often seemed
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219

to provide assistance due to concern or internalized values that extended to individuals outside
their immediate social world (Oliner & Oliner, 1988), and they would have been unlikely to do so
if they wished to obtain rewards or approval (although some individuals no doubt assisted
because of connections with other individuals-e.g., in their church-who asked them to assist).
Positive Behaviors With Negative Responses

A second difficulty in assessing human strengths and positive behavior has been that some
behaviors that appear to be strengths or adaptive also may lead to behaviors or internal
processes that are not especially positive or adaptive. Consider the example of empathy, defined
as an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another’s
emotional state or condition and which is identical or very similar to what the other person is
feeling or would be expected to feel (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). For some time, theorists and
researchers assumed that empathy generally engendered other-oriented concern and prosocial
behavior toward others (Feshbach, 1978; Hoffman, 1995, 2000). However, as Batson (1998)
pointed out, when empathy is experienced as aversive, people tend to become concerned about
themselves rather than others. This may occur when individuals experience overly high levels of
empathy with negative emotion-that is, empathic overarousal. We have argued that empathy is
most likely to lead to sympathetic concern and to altruistic behavior when empathy is
experienced at a moderate level. In fact, some evidence is consistent with the view that high
empathic arousal is associated with lower levels of prosocial behavior (see Eisenberg & Fabes,
1998). Thus, the capacity to experience others’ emotional states or empathize with their
situation, which generally is considered a human strength, may sometimes undermine caring
interpersonal reactions and behavior. Contextual Considerations

A third difficulty in studying human strengths is that what is good for the individual may not be
viewed as a strength by people around the individual. Thus, what is viewed as positive
development or a human strength likely varies across individuals and, as a consequence, may
engender immediate or long-term costs for behaviors or characteristics that are viewed as
positive by others. For example, preschool children who cope with their negative emotion in
peer interactions by avoiding the situation appear to be viewed positively (as socially
appropriate) by adults (e.g., teachers or adult observers). However, such avoidant behavior in
the preschool years is associated with externalizing problems 2 and 4 years later (Eisenberg et
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coping may be viewed as a strength in some contexts and as a dysfunctional response in other
situations. For example, instrumental or secondary coping -taking control of situations and trying
to influence objective events or conditions-appears to be productive in contexts in which the
individual has control but is associated with more negative outcomes (e.g., distress or
frustration) in situations in which individuals do not have control (e.g., Altshuler & Ruble, 1989;
Weisz, McCabe, & Dennig, 1994). Cultural Considerations Another issue to consider in
conceptualizing and measuring human strengths is that what is seen as a strength undoubtedly
differs across cultures. For example, achievement of personal happiness and well-being, as well
as the maintenance and enhancement of one’s overall evaluation of the self, is likely to be
viewed more positively in individualistic cultures than in collective cultures (Diener et al., 1999;
Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Similarly, valuing of prosocial behavior
may differ across cultures. Hindu Indians, school-aged and adult, tend to focus more than
Americans on the importance of responsiveness to others’ needs in discussing moral conflicts
(Miller & Bersoff, 1992). In contrast, Americans tend to view interpersonal responsiveness and
caring as less obligatory and more of a personal choice, particularly if the other person’s need is
moderate or minimal or if friends or strangers (rather than parents and children) are potential
recipients (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). Thus, what is viewed as a strength or as positive
behavior may be highly influenced by cultural norms and values.

IMPORTANT HUMAN STRENGTHS Given that conceptions of human strengths differ within and
across individuals and cultures, there is likely to be considerable disagreement about what are
important human strengths. In thinking about human strengths and positive psychology, one can
consider strengths that are important at the individual level and those significant for the
functioning of the larger society. At the individual level, qualities that contribute to approaching
life in a positive manner rather than to being overwhelmed by stress and negative emotion when
dealing with the difficulties of everyday living are important. In addition, because of the
centrality of human relationships for most aspects of functioning, including happiness and
survival, social competencies are essential if individuals and groups are to cooperate, work, and
live together in an affirming and constructive manner. Thus, strengths that foster positive
interpersonal relationships, cooperation, peace, and understanding among people are especially
worthy of study. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTAL AND CULTURAL CONTRlBUTlONS

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Regulation of Emotion and Emotion-Related Responding What characteristics of people are

especially important for enhancing interpersonal relationships, personal interactions, and
adjustment? We would argue that the abilities to regulate emotions and cope effectively are
essential strengths for achieving these outcomes. The abilities to effortfully regulate one’s
internal emotional and physiological states and one’s overt behaviors (including those associated
with internal emotion-related states; e.g., facial expressions, aggression, or venting of emotion)
have been associated with adjustment and social competence (see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, &
Reiser, 2000). Regulation is not the same as control; in our view, regulation is optimal control
(with control defined as inhibition or restraint). Like a number of other investigators, we believe
that wellregulated individuals are not overly controlled or undercontrolled; wellregulated people
have the ability to respond to the ongoing demands of life experience with a range of responses
that are socially acceptable and sufficiently flexible to allow for spontaneous as well as delayed
reactions as needed (Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994). Whereas regulation generally has been viewed
as adaptive, it can be differentiated from control of behavior, which may be adaptive or
maladaptive depending on its flexibility and if it can be voluntarily managed. A key distinction in
thinking about regulation and control may be voluntary or effortful versus involuntary (or less
voluntary) control. Welladjusted, regulated children would be expected to be relatively high in
the ability to voluntarily control their attention and behavior as needed to respond in an
adaptive manner. Rothbart and Bates (1998) defined effortful control as “the ability to inhibit a
dominant response to perform a subdominant response” (p. 137). Effortful control involves both
attentional regulation (e.g., the ability to voluntarily focus attention as needed) and behavioral
regulation (e.g., the ability to inhibit or activate behavior as appropriate) and involves the notion
of “will” or “effort.” In contrast to effortful types of regulation, aspects of control, or the lack
thereof exist, often appearing to be involuntary or so automatic that they are not usually under
voluntary control. These might include some types of impulsivity or, at the other extreme, very
low impulsivity as in overcontrolled children who are timid, restrained, and lacking in flexibility in
novel or stressful situations. Extremes of involuntary control appear to be maladaptive. Initial
work has suggested that well-regulated individuals-not overly or undercontrolled but effortfully
regulated-are likely to be resilient and to cope more effectively with life’s stresses (Asendorpf &
van Aken, 1999; Block & Block, 1980; Eisenberg et al., 2000). Recent work in other countries has
suggested that children who appear to be optimally regulated or resilient, in comparison to
undercontrolled or overcontrolled children, get along with others better in adolescence and
adulthood, are more adjusted,

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and express less negative emotion (Asendorpf & van Aken, 1999; Hart, Hofmann, Edelstein, &
Keller, 1997; Newman, Caspi, Moffitt, & Silva, 1997; Robins, John, Caspi, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-
Loeber, 1996). Thus, an important human strength that appears to influence many aspects of
individuals’ functioning is their ability to regulate themselves in an optimal manner. Indeed,
effortful regulation has been positively associated not only with social competence but also with
sympathy and prosocial behavior (see Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). Moreover, people who can
regulate themselves tend to experience more positive and less negative emotions (Derryberry &
Rothbart, 1988; see Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000). Thus,
the ability to effortfully regulate behavior when needed (but not extremes of control) seems to
underlie a variety of positive aspects of human functioning and positive well-being. Tolerance
and Understanding: Requirements for Peace

Another critical human strength is the capacity of individuals for tolerance and understanding of
people different from themselves-a capacity necessary for peaceful coexistence and cooperation
among people from various cultures and racial or ethnic backgrounds. Although this human
strength is related to sympathy and prosocial behavior, for many people it also involves
extending personal and social boundaries in regard to who is a target of understanding,
sympathy, and caring. Moreover, selfacceptance and self-understanding may be equally
important contributors to acceptance of others (Carter & Helms, 1992; Johnson, 1987).
Recognizing the importance of such human qualities, some international organizations have
launched programs to promote human strengths related to human rights and peace. For
example, assuming a positivist approach for understanding human strengths, the United Nations
has taken up the challenge of translating theoretical advancements in the understanding of
human strengths into practice. By regarding individual and group peace and human rights as
essential human strengths, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) has begun developing more psychologically responsive international peace and
human rights programs. These programs reflect a perspective that values the importance of
nurturing individual inner peace as a fundamental vehicle for meaningful and sustainable
prosocial behaviors. For example, UNESCO’s Culture of Peace Program has developed and
promoted educational efforts using “a holistic approach based on participatory methods and
taking into account the various dimensions of education for a culture of peace: peace and non-
violence; human rights; democracy; tolerance; international and intercultural understanding;
cultural and linguistic diversity; gender related issues” (Savolainen, 1999, p. 53). SOCIAL
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A case in point, their Asian-Pacific Network for International Education and Values Education
(APNIEVE) curriculum has served as a culture-

sensitive educational framework for contributing a more integrated psychological perspective of

prosocial behaviors for personal, community, and social peace for the Asia-Pacific region
(Quisumbing, 1999; UNESCO, 1995b, 1998a). This framework characterizes peace as a dynamic,
holistic and lifelong process through which mutual respect, understanding, caring, sharing,
compassion, social responsibility, solidarity, acceptance, and tolerance of diversity among
individuals and groups . . . are internalized and practiced together to solve problems and to work
toward a just and free, peaceful and democratic society. .. . This process begins with the
development of inner peace ... of individuals engaged in the search for truth, knowledge, and
understanding . . . [and] requires that quality of relationships at all levels is committed to peace,
human rights, democracy, and social justice in an ecologically sustainable environment.
(Quisumbing, 1999, pp. 110-

111)

UNESCO’s initial peace education efforts have focused on individual and institutional racism,
discrimination, structural injustices, and historical oppression. However, a growing number of
people have become increasingly critical of some of these efforts because they have resulted in
superficial “celebrations” of external and social cultural differences without a critical
understanding of the relationship between the inner psychological dimensions of peace values
and prosocial behaviors. Additionally, others have raised concerns over the primary focus on
inner or personal peace. These critics have suggested that narrowly limiting the psychological
development of inner personal peace may ultimately lead people to selfcentered,
overindividualistic states of mind or contentment with attaining personal peace instead of
appreciating how inner peace can interact with subsequent work toward societal and global
understanding. In accordance with these concerns and challenges, the United Nations has
recently developed a number of standard-setting instruments, declarations, and action plans
that have provided the basic framework for promoting human strengths and peace worldwide
(UNESCO, 1995a, 1999a) that are consistent with earlier directives advocating that “education
shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations, 1948, Art. 26, Para. 2)
that includes “principles of human diversity as a life-enhancing condition; conflict as a normal
process to be managed constructively; and social responsibility as the human capacity . . . to
reflect and apply ethical norms to personal and public decisions” (UNESCO, 1999b, p. 56).

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CONCLUSION In many ways, nurturing peace, human strengths, and prosocial behaviors
between and within similar and different cultures will eventually have to involve a new
philosophy of thinking, learning, and being that must be capable of accommodating to the new
and unforeseen demands and challenges of the 21st century. Major challenges for positive
psychology include recognizing the reality of what exists versus the “appearance” of positive
behavior and taking into account the diverse personal, social, and cultural contexts in which
positive development is conceptualized, expressed, and regarded. Recognition of the difficulty in
defining what is positive development, and according to which individuals or groups, is critical. In
addition, the fact that positive development can be intra- or interpersonal and that positive
development in these two domains can be complementary or conflicting is important to thinking
about the costs and benefits of interventions designed to promote positive development, peace,
and understanding. With these issues in mind, positive psychology must consider how regulating
inter- and intrapersonal relationships, interactions, and adjustment at the levels of the
individual, organization, and larger society truly encourages and discourages human strengths
and prosocial behaviors. In addition, psychologists will need to select and use findings from
relatively individual-focused psychological perspectives (e.g., work on individual differences in
prosocial behavior and regulation and their relation to developmental outcomes) in ways that
are sensitive to what is known about group and cultural processes and interactions. One key to
lifelong learning and development is nurturing meaningful and sustainable relationships
between individuals and communities by first helping people develop and sustain internally
peaceful environments that allow honest exploration and understanding of real and perceived
personal and group differences. Additionally, the development of psychological peace, although
indeed essential, may need to be linked with empowerment for structural transformations
across various levels of a person’s life-personal, interpersonal, work, and institutional
environments-so that collective prosocial actions can draw on inner values of peace. People do
not live as isolated independent units; they are in fact interconnected and related to one
another psychologically and socially. As stated in the 1998 UNESCO World Education Report
(1998b), because the world we leave to our children depends in large measure on the children
we leave to our world, those concerned with peace must go beyond examining and negotiating
conflicts. People and organizations will need to invest in accepting and understanding new and
possibly unfamiliar ways as valid and valuable ways of knowing. Intervention procedures have
been shown to foster tolerance; for example, Bohmig-Krumhaar, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTAL AND
CULTURAL CONTRlBUTlONS

125

Staudinger, and Baltes (2002) found that they could foster adults’ valuerelativistic thinking (i.e.,
tolerance, empathy) by sending participants on a virtual journey around the world and having
them consider given difficult life problems a t different places around the world. Additionally,
individuals must consider the fact that learning about other cultural perspectives will not
necessarily make one more culturally sensitive or competent. People must first understand that
the self is related to others, so that they will become more flexible and capable of understanding
similarities and differences. How to promote human strengths related to such an understanding
is the challenge for everyone.

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10

LIGHT AND DARK IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS: THE EXAMPLE OF

PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY R o d 0 FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS

Positive psychology and psychology of human strengths are new combinations of key words that
appear to be related to an emerging field in psychology and even in the social sciences in
general. Over the past decade several outstanding and powerful psychologists have claimed to
improve a psychology that is especially (or even exclusively) devoted to pathology by defining a
new field of research and enquiry focusing on positive psychological attributes or characteristics
at several levels: The field of positive psychology at the subjective level is about valued
subjective experiences: well-being, contentment, and satisfaction (in the past); hope and
optimism (for the future); and flow and happiness (in the present). At the individual level, it is
about positive individual traits: the capacity for love and vocation, courage, interpersonal skill,
aesthetic sensibility, perseverance, forgiveness, originality, future mindThe author expresses her
gratitude to ldoya Barrenechea, expert on literature metrics, for her assistance in developing
Figure 10.1.

131

edness, spirituality, high talent, and wisdom. At the group koel, it is about the civic virtues and
the institutions that move individuals toward better citizenship: responsibility, nurturance,
altruism, civility, moderation, tolerance, and work ethic. (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000a, p.
5; italics added) This new approach can be seen to have a “light” and a “dark” side: light because
its focus on positive human characteristics can illuminate, reinforce, and promote adaptive
individual and social conditions; dark when this perspective hides relevant negative traits or
neglects them or when its interpretations and theoretical developments are biased. The birth of
positive psychology at the end of the millennium allowed it to take advantage of the positive
millennia1 spirit that supposedly compensates for alarmist notions related to the millennium
bug and all the other apocalyptic scenarios predicted for humankind. Psychologists appear to
have joined the search for characteristics that are functional for human beings, society, the
planet, and perhaps even the future of human life on Earth (e.g., Hay,

2000).
This chapter examines some aspects of the light and dark in this psychological frame of
reference. I discuss two core questions affecting positive psychology: Is psychology focused on
negative conditions? And are positive constructs new in psychology? I then suggest some
conceptual dimensions that should be helpful to the scientific study of human strengths. Finally, I
analyze the field of aging from the point of view of successful aging and positive
psychogerontology.

HUMAN STRENGTHS OR POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AS A “NEW” FIELD OF RESEARCH The recent

literature has cited “the exclusive focus on pathology that has dominated so many of our
discipline’s results” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000a, p. 5.) Two questions arise from the
thesis of positive psychology that should be reviewed and answered: Is psychology focused
exclusively on pathology? And are strengths or positive constructs totally new in psychology?

Is Psychology Focused on Negative Conditions? Throughout the history of human thought

(across cultures, religions, and philosophies), forces influencing human life have usually been
defined in terms of opposition: good and evil, Eros and Thanatos, yin and yang. Philosophical
systems have adopted opposing perspectives on the nature of the human being and on life in
general and social life in particular: for example, whereas for Hobbes people are like wolves in
their relations with

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ROCfO FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS

others, Rousseau held that humans are good by nature; whereas Leibniz argued that this world is
the best of all possible worlds, Schopenhauer considered that the only true fact of the real world
is suffering. Thus, throughout history, the qualities of the human being, the nature of life, and
the status of the external world have been conceptualized from different and polar perspectives
or as opposite forces. Psychology is a scientific discipline defined, depending on the different
theoretical frameworks, as the science of consciousness, behavior, or the mind as emergent
operations of the human being. In any case, because it is devoted to the study of behavior and
psychological processes and structures (e.g., attention, perception, learning, memory, problem-
solving, reasoning, intelligence, emotion, and personality), it cannot be claimed that psychology
is devoted to “positive” or “negative” conditions, given that both terms refer to evaluative and
ethical concepts and are thus inapplicable to scientific subjects. At the end of the 20th century,
psychology is a science with more than 100 years behind it, and one cannot say that it has had a
“negative” bias. Nevertheless, although it is true that general psychology is searching for the
basic principles applicable to ‘‘normal” behavior or psychological structures and processes, there
may be “abnormal” versions of them, and in this sense psychologists might talk about “negative”
behavior, processes, or structures. Some branches of psychology-such as psychopathology and
clinical psychology-are precisely devoted to the study, assessment, and treatment of abnormal
psychological conditions. Of course, these subdisciplines of psychology (mainly applied) are
devoted to behavioral disorders that are negative in the sense that they are linked to human
suffering. However, can one criticize psychopathology or clinical psychology for emphasizing and
being devoted to negative processes or structures? It would be the same as criticizing clinical
biology for dealing with abnormal developments of organisms. In the lay or public arena,
psychology is usually reduced to psychopathology and to clinical psychology dominated by
“negative” or psychopathological constructs and conditions. In no way should psychologists
generalize from the lay perspective on psychopathology and clinical psychology to the entire
science and profession of psychology. Scientific psychology is not devoted to “positive” or
“negative” human conditions; these are evaluative rather than scientific terms. Are Human
Strengths and Positive Constructs New in Psychology? The proponents of the “new” field of
positive psychology place emphasis on its novelty. The key words positive psychology’ and
psychology of ‘In Spanish, “positive psychology” (“psicologia positiva”) means psychology that is
developed with the positivistic method proposed by Comte as the basic tool of science.

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133

human strengths are indeed relatively new. Nevertheless, throughout the history of applied
psychology and through several paradigms, research participants’ strengths have been taken into
consideration as resources, or “competence.” For example, in work and organizational
psychology, several abilities (other than basic human skills) have formed the basis for personnel
selection (e.g., intrinsic motivation, self-determination); in educational psychology, creativity,
giftedness, and talent in children have been carefully studied; finally, in psychotherapy and other
clinical settings, assets, abilities, outcome expectancies, self-efficacy , self-actualizution, and
other human strengths have been considered human resources from several theoretical
perspectives, including behavioral psychology (e.g., Tolman, 1938; Bandura, 1977), gestalt
psychology (e.g., Lewin, 1938), and humanistic models (e.g., self-actualization, Maslow, 1954). Is
the content claimed as the core of this field really new? To answer this question, I selected the
following constructs from common scientific literature databases: creativity, emotional
intelligence, empathy, giftedness, happiness, optimism, prosocial behavior, self-determination,
solidarity, well-being (including its variants well being and wellbeing), and wisdom. Constructs
such as courage, spirituality, and “civil virtues” in general do not appear in the scientific
literature, perhaps because they come from scholastic philosophy, catechisms, or civil and
religious rhetoric and have never reached the status of scientific subjects. Nevertheless, they are
human “virtues,” and once they can be operationalized and submitted to scientific criteria, they
may become psychological constructs. A search on the selected constructs in PsycLIT from 1930
to February 2000 yielded interesting results. As shown in Table 10.1, the constructs, with the
exception of prosocial behavior, are present in the very earliest references. Several of the key
words have shown rapid growth in many cases doubling from one decade to the next. However,
if one compares the evolution of the four most frequently cited strengths constructs (well-being,
creativity, empathy, happiness) with the general evolution of the psychology literature since the
1980s, only well-being has grown more than the scientific literature in general (see Figure 10.1).
Thus, the constructs at the core of this “new” field have been in use for decades, and of the
most frequently cited constructs, the possibility of an increased emphasis in the literature was
borne out only for well-being.

CONCEPTUAL DIMENSIONS IN THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL HUMAN STRENGTHS Leaving

aside possible criticisms, psychological characteristics that can be considered as human strengths
are undoubtedly a subject for scientific psychology. However, as mentioned above, Seligman and
Csik-

134

ROCfO FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS

P 8<

R8

v)

rn

f?

-I

40 51 38 584.6

10

6 40 8 131 26 0
0

30-39 29 5 129 47 0 9 50 59 34 501.26

91

40-49 256 3 169 129 132 42 0 27 45 78 38 81 2.03

50-59 1,362 3 284 50 106 68 3 19 43 104 40 1,025.57

60-69 1,997 6 813 54 323 164 95 73 103 401 96 2,105.1

70-79

2,754 14 1 579 280 772 31 9 481 208 253 2,220 349 3,625.48

80-89

3,321 45 2,148 427 1,118 885 748 558 344 5,871 699 5,104.78

90-00

Note. The total number of documents in PsycLlT was divided by 100 because of the large number
of documents in PsycLlT and to facilitate comparisons of the growth of specific constructs with
the growth of the total psychological literature.

Creativity Emotional Intelligence Empathy Giftedness Happiness Optimism Prosocial Behavior

Self-Determination Solidarity Well-Being Wisdom Total

Strengths construct

Decade

TABLE 10.1 The number of articles in PsycLlT per decade on selected strengths constructs from
1930 to February 2000, compared to the total number of documents in PsycLlT divided by 100

1000
-

2000 -

3000 -

30-39

40-49

Happiness

Empathy

Creativity

50-59

Total documents divided by 100

Well-being

-.-

Decade

60-69

70-79
80-89

90-00

Figure 70.7. The number of articles in PsycLlT per decade on the four most frequently cited
strengths constructs (well-being, creativity, empathy, and happiness) from 1930 to February
2000,compared with the total number of documents in PsycLlT divided by 100.

t:

Q)

.O

co

4000

5000 -

6000

szentmihalyi’s proposed list (quoted in the first paragraph of this chapter) includes a mixture of
cognitive, affective, and social psychological attributes and other moral virtues with different
epistemological and methodological significance. It is therefore important to analyze the
scientific status of the items in this provisional list and to decide on which criteria to base a
consideration of psychological characteristics as “human strengths” or as “positive.” Criteria for
Structuring the Concept of Human Strengths From the provisional list proposed by Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi (2000a), and taking into account other publications on positive psychology
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000b), two types of human strengths characteristics can be
identified: (a) psychological and (b) ethical or moral. Psychological characteristics are those with
an epistemological and methodological scientific status, whereas ethical or moral characteristics
remain within the philosophical, civil, or religious arena. Of course, there is an overlap between
scientific and ethical characteristics-for example, solidarity could be considered a civil virtue, and
prosocial behavior is one of the latest psychological characteristics in the field of social and
personality psychology (Caprara, 1987). The only difference between the two categories lies in
their differential scientific status. It may be premature to try to develop a conceptual network
with all the scientific constructs listed. A first classification has been proposed by Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi (2000): subjective level, individual level, and group level. The first group of this
classification system could be considered a homogeneous (in that they are subjective) set of
variables, all of them with very close relationships and all of them referring to positive
experience (i.e., well-being, contentment, satisfaction, hope, optimism, happiness). In contrast,
the second group involves a mixture of moral virtues (e.g., capacity for love and forgiveness,
courage, spirituality, etc.) and scientific cognitive characteristics (originality, talent and wisdom).
Finally, at the group level, the classified items could all be considered as civil virtues, and cannot
be accepted at least until they are operationalized in an appropriate way. Moreover, there are
other psychological characteristics that could be taken into consideration because of evidence of
their positive role in the development or status of human beings: intelligence, creativity,
selfefficacy, self-determination, empathy, spontaneity, intrinsic motivation, self-determination,
and life satisfaction (among others). These elements can be classified in five classical categories:
emotional, motivational, intellectual, social interaction, and social structure. Table 10.2 lists the
five categories of human strengths and examples of potential positive psychoTHE EXAMPLE OF
PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY

137

TABLE 10.2 Classification System and Examples of Potential Human Strengths Category Emotional

Motivational

Intellectual

Social interaction

Social structure

Examples Optimism Well-being Happiness Satisfaction Self-efficacy Self-determination Intrinsic

motivation Self-realization Originality Creativity Talent or giftedness Wisdom Emotional
intelligence Empathy Interpersonal skills Prosocial behavior Spontaneity Social network and
social support Social opportunities Physical and social diversity Egalitarian socio-economic
resources

logical conditions. It should be noted that there are often strong relationships between different
characteristics in the same category. In the first Category, optimism, well-being, happiness, and
satisfaction refer to positive subjective (reported) emotions and have been discussed under the
concept of (‘positive emotionality” (Depue & Spoont, 1986; Hammer, 1996; Lykken & Tellegen,
1996). The motivational category refers to selfperceived ways of controlling external situations,
and these will probably covary considerably. The intellectual category refers to cognitive skills
that, even in the case of emotional intelligence, are strongly related to intelligence or cognitive
abilities. The social interaction category includes psychological characteristics that facilitate
human relationships, such as empathy, interpersonal skills, prosocial behavior, and spontaneity.
The social structure category refers to the external world in which microsocial structures (social
network and support) and macrosocial ones (social opportunities and egalitarian socio-economic
resources) allow the development of human strengths. The classification system suggested is not
exhaustive, has a rational basis, and should be empirically tested. In subsequent iterations, it
should be complemented with inclusion criteria. In other words, researchers should attempt to
arrive at agreement on a definition of the concept equipped with norms for considering certain
characteristics as “human strengths.”

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ROCfO FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS

Criteria for Defining Psychological Human Strengths To define a new configuration of

psychological constructs considered human strengths or positive characteristics, criteria for
inclusion should be first proposed and then evaluated. The most important criterion for
considering a psychological condition as a human strength may be that it is instrumental or
functional in both biological and sociocultural success. The search for the best criteria for
measuring biological and sociocultural success is important in establishing a theory of human
strengths. Human behavior and psychological characteristics, processes, and structures are, in
principle, neither positive nor negative, but they can be considered as adaptive or maladaptive.
As sociobiology and evolutionary psychology have indicated, current mental mechanisms and
behavioral conditions are outcomes of a selective process and therefore involve inherited
biological mechanisms (Buss, 1999). Looking at human history-and attempting to remain
parsimonious -there is a sociodemographic indicator that could be considered as an index of
human and social development: life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth refers to mortality, and
consequently to morbidity; thus, all human characteristics that relate positively to life
expectancy and negatively to mortality or morbidity (and are also positively related to quality of
life) could be considered as positive or as human strengths, at least from a biological point of
view. However, life expectancy is not a purely biological indicator of human success: It depends
on social and cultural factors. Estimations of life expectancy across the history of humanity
suggest that there were no changes until approximately the 20th century. From 1900 to 2000
average life expectancy doubled; for example, at the beginning of the 20th century, average life
expectancy in Spain was 36; in the year 2000, it was 77-74.5 for men and 81.5 for women
(Fernhdez-Ballesteros, Diez-NicolAs, & Ruiz Torres, 1999), but this is not the case in many
developing countries. Over the same period, life expectancy in Sierra Leone, Somalia, and
Zimbabwe, for example, did not increase at all. Even within the same country, this indicator may
fail to reflect differences between social groups; in South Africa, for example, until the 1990s
White people had significantly higher life expectancy than Black people (United Nations, 1999).
Life expectancy in a given country may thus be an index of unequal conditions between groups.
Social and environmental conditions determining increases in life expectancy are well known:
education, hygiene, nutrition, access to health care, and economic development are among the
socio-economic variables associated with such improvement. Are there psychological conditions
related to life expectancy? This is undoubtedly a possibility. In principle, researchers should look
for empirical evidence about all the psychological characteristics included in Table 10.2. THE
EXAMPLE OF PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY

139

A first source of evidence links human strengths with “salutogenic” bio-

logical conditions or health functioning. For example, there is strong evidence supporting the
direct effects of positive (and negative) emotional experience and expression on physiology,
especially in the enhancement of the immune system, with implications for health outcomes
(e.g., Salovey, Rothman, Detweiler, & Steward, 2000). Also, with respect to motivational
characteristics, there is experimental evidence that perception of selfefficacy can activate a wide
range of biological processes that mediate human health and disease (e.g., Bandura, 1997). A
second source of evidence relating life expectancy to psychological conditions comes from
longitudinal studies in which psychological characteristics are taken as predictors of survival or
longevity. Bearing in mind that no single variable can explain longevity, several psychological
conditions have been associated with survival. For example, intelligence and cognitive measures
were predictors of survival in several longitudinal studies (for a review, see Schroots, 1993) and
of mortality due to accidents and suicide (O’Toole & Stankov, 1992). Also, life satisfaction (more
positive mood or morale), greater social participation, activities outside the family, and
involvement in community activities characterized survivors in the Bonn longitudinal study (Lehr,
1982). A final source of evidence linking psychological characteristics with mortality and life
prolongation comes from the relationships identified between emotional states and physical
health. Positive thinking and positive emotional states such as positive emotionality, optimism,
and self-efficacy appear to be psychological resources related to health protection, illness
prevention, and life prolongation (Affleck, Tennen, Croog, & Levine, 1987; Kemeny &
Gruenewald, 2000; Salovey et al., 2000; Scheier & Carver, 1987; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower, &
Gruenewald, 2000). In sum, several cognitive, emotional, and social characteristics can be
considered human strengths in the sense that they are linked to criteria of biological success
such as mortality, morbidity, life expectancy, and health functioning. However, the human being
and his or her psychological equipment are also social products, and human evolution and social
evolution are interacting, mutually interdependent isomorphic processes. Thus, the behavior
and psychological attributes of human beings are governed not only by biological (or Darwinian)
laws, but also by cultural and social conditions (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Dawkins, 1976; Gould,
1977). As several authors have pointed out, even if it is difficult to evaluate independently the
relative influence of biological and cultural factors on the characteristics of human beings, it is
accepted that there are causal relationships among human behavior, biology, and culture
(Massimini & Delle Fave, 2000; Richerson & Boyd, 1978). Thus, human strengths would be those
psychological characteristics associated with both biological evolu-
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ROCfO FERNANDEZ-BALLESTEROS

tion and cultural and social progress. It is therefore extremely important to establish a link
between human strengths and sociocultural evolution. What are the criteria for evaluating social
and cultural progress? International organizations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, and the
World Health Organization have developed hundreds of socio-economic, educational, cultural,
and health indicators to evaluate the comparative status of different countries and cultures in
terms of development. It is of great importance to know how and how much psychological
characteristics such as intelligence, creativity, originality, self- and collective efficacy,
interpersonal relationships, and optimism contribute to national development to set up inclusion
criteria. As yet there are no empirical data about this important question, but without doubt
psychological human strengths are behind socio-economic, cultural, and social progress.
Returning to our previous proposal about the inclusion criteria for the category of human
strengths, there is important and easily accessible experimental evidence supporting the idea
that psychological conditions are strongly linked to health promotion and illness prevention, and
therefore to health functioning and morbidity and, in turn, to life prolongation and life
expectancy. The continued search for the best criteria to determine those psychological
characteristics that could be considered as human strengths is an essential task.

HUMAN STRENGTHS IN OLD AGE, OR POSITIVE PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY Positive

psychogerontology, as an applied field of psychology, constitutes a good example for positive
psychology, because it includes both the light and the dark characteristics of the field of
psychology. Psychogerontology is the psychological subdiscipline devoted to the study of age
(stage of life), aging (the lifespan process), and the aged population (older persons with needs
for support and help; Birren, 1996). Even though several positive characteristics emerge from the
aging process, psychogerontology has been devoted mainly to the study of the decline of and
damage to psychological structures, processes, and behavior; in other words, the study of the
aged population has been more important than the study of the process of aging or the stage of
age. Moreover, in the study of aging and age, the targets of psychological study have been the
conditions that are likely to decline or become damaged through age. In the 1 9 9 0
~gerontologists ~ began working on a new perspective called “successful aging,” “aging well,”
“vital aging,” and “competent ag’There are antecedents of the search for positive characteristics
in old age, for example, in Hall (1922) or Mira y Lopez (1961).

THE EXAMPLE OF PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY

141

ing” (e.g., Baltes 6 Baltes, 1990b; Fernhdez-Ballesteros, 1986; Fries, 1989; Klein & Bloom, 1997;
Rowe & Kahn, 1987). This perspective has been extremely successful, at least from the point of
view of the scientific literature produced. For this reason it is very difficult to summarize, but let
me begin by referring to some empirical antecedents. The successful aging perspective emerged
from three well-observed facts: (a) the substantial heterogeneity (variability) in the process of
aging; (b) the lack of a clear distinction between changes due to age and changes due to illness
(as a covariate of age); and (c) the positive effects on the aging process of manipulating
behavioral factors such as diet, exercise, personal habits, and psychosocial dimensions
(Fernhdez-Ballesteros, 1997). The majority of authors would agree with the proposal of Rowe
and Kahn (1997) (based on the MacArthur Foundation Midlife study) that successful aging
includes three main components: low probability of disease and disease-related disability, high
cognitive and physical capacity, and active engagement in The successful aging perspective has
two main purposes. The first is to increase successful aging- that is, to develop and implement
strategies with the purpose of promoting successful aging, attempting to change modifiable
(negative) physical characteristics linked to illness, optimizing or compensating for cognitive and
physical capacities, and increasing social interactions and engagement in life (see Baltes & Baltes,
1990a). The second purpose is to search for positive conditions of aging (FernhdezBallesteros,
1997). This second field of research has uncovered psychological characteristics linked to the
aging process, such as wisdom, philosophy of life, serenity, coping strategies, adaptive capacities,
prosocial behavior, social and civic involvement, and so forth. Strategies for Aging Well Changes
in mortality and life expectancy have occurred at the same time as changes in morbidity and
morbimortality; as Fries (1989) pointed out, acute disease has been replaced as a cause of death
by chronic diseases. Chronic diseases are strongly associated with behavioral factors such as
lifestyle (e.g., diet, exercise), coping mechanisms, social networks, and social support. In other
words, pathological aging is moving from biology to psychology. Aging well basically means
“doing” well; to counter problems linked to age, behavioral solutions can improve health (by
optimizing and compensating using the selective optimization with compensation model by
Baltes & Baltes, 1990a; see also Baltes & Freund, chapter 2, this volume), as well as cognitive,
emotional, and social functioning (see FernAndezBallesteros, 1997). ’The model proposed by
Rowe and Kahn does not take into consideration any environmental or external variables, such
as health and social services (see FemPndez-Ballesteros, 2001).

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Development Versus Decline During Later Adulthood As Atchley (1999) pointed out,
“Development can be defined as movement toward evolutionary possibilities.. . . Most scholars
agree that biological development is completed in young adulthood but also agree that most
aging adults retain their capacity for psychological and social growth” (p. 12). Biological models
of aging cannot be transferred to psychological aging because psychological development
continues throughout the life span. It is true that there are decrements in cognitive functioning
(fluid intelligence), but such declines can be compensated for by cognitive training and, where
they occur, have little effect on everyday functioning (Baltes & Willis, 1982; FernBndez-
Ballesteros & Calero, 1995; Schaie, 1996). Also, empirical evidence suggests that personality
characteristics are quite stable across the life span (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1994), and the
development of internal patterns such as self-concept, value systems, social roles, and other
internal or external behavioral patterns appear to support the continuity theory (Atchley, 1999):
We age as we have lived! If researchers listen to the elderly population, becoming older would
appear to lead to thousands of positive experiences. For example, in the 20-year Ohio
Longitudinal Study of Aging and Adaptation, most participants reported finding aging to be
generally a positive experience. From an emotional point of view, people usually reported feeling
much more serene and relaxed than at other stages of life; from a cognitive perspective, elderly
people reported having a broader capacity for the analysis of problems (both intellectual and
social); from a social viewpoint, a new type of relationship-with grandchildren-begins, one they
described as extremely pleasant. Perhaps because they have followed the biological model of
aging, psychologists have not taken an interest in these positive characteristics or human
strengths that increase during old age; these and other positive descriptions should stimulate
psychologists to study this area of development and growth in old age. Heckhausen, Dixon, and
Baltes (1989) studied gains and losses perceived by different age groups throughout adulthood.
Participants (N = 112, three age groups) were asked to rate a list of person-descriptive adjectives
with respect to three aspects of developmental increase: the degree to which it occurs over the
adult life span, its desirability, and the age at which it is expected to start and finish. Results
yielded a consensus on beliefs within and across adult age groups, but older adults had a more
complex conception of development throughout adulthood than younger adults. When the
authors analyzed their data to establish the relative numbers of desirable attributes (gains) and
undesirable ones (losses) accrued over the adult life span, perceived losses were found to
increase; however, even up to age 80, about 20% of the expected changes were considered to be
gains. Perceived developmental gains greatly outnumbered perceived THE EXAMPLE OF
PSYCHOGERONTOLOGY

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losses throughout adulthood, with the exception only of advanced age (beyond 80), when more
losses than gains were expected. Most importantly, from this and other studies there emerges a
consensus not only on the fact that there are positive characteristics linked to the process of
aging, but also that perhaps the most important of them is wisdom. Thus, one of the
paradigmatic human characteristics for this field of research is wisdom. Until about 10 years ago,
wisdom belonged to the field of philosophy; it was little more than an implicit theory in people’s
minds. In the past decade psychogerontologists and developmental psychologists, under the
auspices of the Max Planck Institute of Berlin (for reviews, see Baltes & Staudinger, 1993, 2000),
have taken on a worthwhile challenge in developing a complex research program on wisdom.
Wisdom has been defined as an expert knowledge system concerning the fundamental
pragmatics of life. It has been operationalized through qualitative methods of data collection,
such as think-aloud protocols during which participants complete several tasks related to
problems occurring in life (e.g., life planning, life review, life management). Wisdom-related
performance is associated with intelligence, creativity, cognitive style, social intelligence, and
personality. Currently, wisdom is gradually becoming, without doubt, a positive psychological
characteristic that can be considered as the peak of human evolution and therefore as a human
strength. Philosophers sometimes indicate the best path: Epicurus (341-270 BC) ended his
Maxims for a Happy Life with advice along the following lines: Search for wisdom, you shall drink
from an inexhaustible well for the health of the soul.. . . Wisdom is the seed of happiness.. . .
Those who declare that they are still not of an age to love wisdom, to philosophize, or that such
a time is passed, are like those who state that it is still not time for them to be happy, or that it is
too late for that now. Epicurus was concerned with human strengths 2,300 years ago. Today, it is
psychology that is responsible for researching these human characteristics. Its methods, as
epistemic activity, have been developed more as a positive product of phylogenesis than of our
genes!

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disposition/situation debate and research on aggression. European Journal of Personality, I , 1-
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11

INTERVENTION AS A MAJOR TOOL OF A PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN STRENGTHS: EXAMPLES FROM

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND INNOVATION DIETER FREY, EVA JONAS, AND TOBIAS
GREITEMEYER

Psychology is a science that studies the attitudes, emotions, motivation, cognition, and behavior
of individuals, as well as interaction processes within and between groups. Furthermore,
psychology studies the structures and cultures individuals and groups establish. It is a fascinating
science, because its practitioners have the basic knowledge necessary to diagnose mentalities,
attitudes, and patterns of behavior and to change them. Psychology has a deeper understanding
than other disciplines of the subjective experiences of people and their behavior as individuals
and in groups. It has many elaborate theories that classify, describe, explain, and predict
behavior on the individual as well as group level. Using these theories and this knowledge,
psychologists can design intervention programs for achieving positive goals and aims, and it is
this activity that lies at the heart of the term “positive psychology.” Psychological theories and
knowledge can be applied directly to the analysis of

149

organizational cultures, structures, and teams in social and commercial organizations for the
purposes of managing change processes and promoting innovation in processes, products, and
services. In this chapter we describe some areas of our own research relevant to organizational
change and innovation. The success of social and commercial organizations in modern societies
depends on how well individuals, as well as teams, can be motivated and how successfully their
potential for creativity and innovation is activated. These processes depend on the application of
psychological knowledge to change the mentalities and behaviors of members of organizations,
as well as organizations’ structures, values, and cultures. This chapter describes how psychology
can contribute to these endeavors.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY Laypeople, and also many scientists outside the
field of psychology, think that psychology has to do only with abnormal and pathological
behavior and emotional problems and with psychotherapy. Outsiders (and even some
psychologists) often have a very narrow-minded view of the field. Psychologists have much to say
concerning prevention, rehabilitation, and intervention techniques in all settings of society, and
those settings include commercial as well as social organizations. The challenge psychologists
face is to better communicate the relevance of their research, of their knowledge and theories,
to people who have misconceptions about the field. Psychologists must show that they can solve
real-life problems, and not just problems of theoretical interest. In addition, it is very important
to convey to our psychology students that we have knowledge that we can be proud of, and that-
although we do not have all the wisdom we would like to have-psychological theories provide
considerable knowledge about how individuals and groups function. Furthermore, there are lots
of opportunities for applying psychological understanding. To neglect to teach these concepts
would be extremely costly for individuals, organizations, and society as a whole. From a Lewinian
perspective, basic research, applied research, and the application of research findings should
always be done according to the philosophy “Nothing is as practical as a good theory.’’

APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY TO CHANGE-MANAGEMENT PROCESSES IN ORGANIZATIONS Psychology

has a lot to say about the important problems of our time, including globalization, change
processes in organizations, mergers, and a

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rapidly changing marketplace. A lot of psychological theories can contribute to efforts to

increase organization members’ motivation and innovation in facing these challenges, including
control theory (Skinner, 1996), social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), goal setting theory (Locke
& Latham, 1990a, 1990b), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985), theories of fair
treatment (Tyler, 1994), and theories about the self (Dweck, 1991). Success Factors for Change
Management Psychological theories and research clearly reveal that it is not simply a matter of
chance whether organizational changes, including mergers between organizations with different
cultures, are successful and accepted by the organizations’ members. People are willing to
accept change processes wholeheartedly if certain factors are considered (e.g., Frey & Schnabel,
1999). People have to see that the change process is definite, inevitable, and irreversible, and
they must understand why the change is necessary. It is of great importance that they know
what awaits them; they must be able to foresee the process and to be clear about rules and
responsibilities. They have to feel as if they are a part of the decision-making process-that is,
they have to be able to participate in the change process. The whole process must be
communicated professionally. People have to feel they are being treated fairly, for example, in
decisions concerning resources and positions. Further, it is important that they see that human
aspects count as well. Therefore, anxieties, stress in the workplace, and similar topics have to be
discussed explicitly. They have to see that they are not mere “instruments” for success and that
the employer is interested in the employees’ future as well-inside and outside the company. In
addition, employees must see the utility of the change for themselves and for the team, in the
short run as well as in the long run. The closer the cultural fit between the old culture and the
new culture, the higher the probability that those involved will accept the change process and
identify with the emerging culture. Finally, people have to see that changing themselves is part
of their duties, and the top managers must serve as role models. Very often, people who are
responsible for changing processes in organizations, who have to make the relevant decisions,
and who are responsible for the implementation of those decisions have a poor understanding
of how human beings and groups function on a psychological level. So many mergers, takeovers,
and change processes ultimately fail because of the inability of those responsible to correctly
assess the anxieties, hopes, and expectations of employees and to communicate what changes
are necessary and why and how. INTERVENTION AND HUMAN STRENGTHS PSYCHOLOGY

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Work Motivation, Top Performance, and Innovation The globalization of markets is leading to
increased competition between companies. To be internationally successful, companies depend
more than ever on the top performance of their employees. To motivate employees for high
performance, a high level of leadership skills from managers is required. Wendt and Frey
(Wendt, 1998; Wendt & Frey, 2002) identified central factors that are responsible for high
performance and high satisfaction in the workplace. Their findings show that motivation, as well
as identification with the organization and with individual leadership figures, depends on the
following principles, which are summarized from Frey’s Principles of Leadership and Motivation
(Frey, 1998):

Principle of providing meaning and vision. People must feel that their work has meaning and
makes sense. A vision of their work as part of a larger picture, such as a joint aim pursued by the
whole company, is even more motivating. When these conditions are fulfilled, employees are
likely to identify with their place of work and to do their work with enthusiasm. Principle of
transparency. Employees have to be informed about conditions that affect the context of their
work, including the company’s aims and impending changes. People who feel that they are not
sufficiently well informed do not feel motivated, lack a feeling of control, and cannot react
adequately to changing conditions. Transparency cannot be achieved only via abstract
information; direct, specific communication is the best way to prevent misunderstandings,
reduce uncertainty, and build trust and loyalty. w Principle of participation and autonomy. The
more people feel they participate from the beginning in workplace decisions, the higher their
identification and satisfaction with their work and the greater their willingness to take on
responsibility will be. w Principle of a sense offit. The closer the fit between the skills and
personal interests of individuals and the demands of their job, the likelier they are to find their
work fun and to be intrinsically motivated. Principle of goal setting and goal negotiation. Clear,
specific, high, and realistic goals increase performance. Goals have informational as well as
motivational value. When goals are set in an authoritarian fashion, employees are less likely to
accept and identify with the goals. Employees also need periodic feedback about progress
toward goal achievement. w

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Principle of constructive feedback and appreciation. Praise and constructive criticism can
increase motivation and performance when it is done correctly. Just like all people, employees
strive for positive appreciation and respect from leadership figures. The slogan “Tough on the
issue, soft on the person” summarizes the philosophy behind this principle. Being “tough on the
issue” means being very clear about goals, standards, and rules. Being “soft on the person”
means being highly tolerant of individual variation, showing appreciation for individuals, and
avoiding the violation of human dignity-in other words, treating people as partners. Principle of
professional and social integration. A challenging job that one can feel proud of and positive
social relationships within the working group provide employees with emotional support and a
feeling of emotional and social integration, resulting in a commitment to the organization. The
burnout literature describes numerous strategies for avoiding burnout, including celebrating
successes, integrating social networks by holding organizational “family days,” revising
procedures to avoid waste of time and energy, and improving work routines. Principle of
personal growth. People must have room for development and for growth. When employees,
especially those who are achievement-oriented, do not see a future orientation in the
organization, their motivation suffers. Principle of situational leadership. Leadership style must
fit the situation and the person. When called for, leadership must be very directive, clear, and
even authoritarian, but it must also be very partnership-oriented. Situational leadership has a lot
to do with the so-called androgynous leadership style, which involves a mixture of “masculine”
and “feminine” leadership. Masculine leadership styles mean saying no and being tough,
whereas feminine or “soft” leadership involves asking questions, listening, showing emotions,
standing aside and letting others be heard, admitting faults, and being a mentor and trainer
instead of being the boss. Principle of fair and equitable material reward. Top performance calls
for top rewards. However, when the reward is seen as being sufficient and fair, additional
rewards do not increase motivation. Our research among service and industrial companies
shows that when these principles are fulfilled in the eyes of employees, their satisfaction with
work and work performance are higher, illness and turnover rates are lower, and employees
make more suggestions for improvement (Frey, 1998; Frey Isr Ludorf, 2002; Wendt, 1998; Wendt
6r Frey, 2002). INTERVENTfON AND HUMAN STRENGTHS PSYCHOLOGY
153

Research on innovation and idea management, too, shows how important psychological
processes are. We studied the reasons for the varying numbers of suggestions for improvements
across the departments of an organization. The more employees perceived that they were given
independence in their work, the more they felt informed and perceived that they could
participate in decisions, and the more satisfied they were with their work, the higher the
number of suggestions for improvement their departments made (cf. Frey, Raabe, & Jonas, 2002;
Kauffeld, Jonas, & Frey, 2002). Our research demonstrates that the quality of communication and
the existence of trust, which are important components of the atmosphere at work, are
correlated with the sickness rates of the employees, their performance and degree of goal
attainment, and their evaluation by customers (Frank, Maier, Frey, & Wendt, 2002). So
communication, as well as the existence of trust, seem to be key variables not only for
satisfaction and identification, but also for economic success. In view of the globalization of the
markets and the increasing competition among companies, it could be advantageous for
companies, at least in Western countries, to take this psychological research into account to
motivate their employees to give their best performance at work and to prevent disengagement,
burnout, and resignation. Existing psychological research on the subject of how to increase work
identification, satisfaction, and performance is important not only for economic reasons; it also
goes hand in hand with humanitarian considerations. Furthermore, top performance,
innovation, and humanitarian considerations are interdependently related: When employees see
that words and deeds are not consistent with each other, when they see inconsistency,
hypocrisy, and dishonesty, they do not activate their full potential. At least in Germany, but also
in many other countries, schools provide no direct education in the professionalism of
leadership- that is, how to communicate, how to praise, how to constructively criticize, how to
convince others, how to solve conflicts, and so forth. There is thus a great deal of room for
improvement in the application of psychological knowledge to increasing motivation,
identification, creativity, and innovation in social and commercial organizations, as well as in
administration.

Top Performance of Teams Companies depend on the top performance not only of single
employees, but also of teams. Moreover, many important decisions in organizations, as well as in
everyday life, are made by small groups rather than by individuals. Groups are assumed to have
access to a wider range of information relevant to the decision. Interestingly, the main focus of
research so far has been on the negative aspects of group decision making and has suggested
that group decisions are seldom better than decisions

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made by individuals, mainly due to a lack of critical discussion in groups (e.g., Janis, 1982;
Steiner, 1972; Stroebe & Diehl, 1994). However, there is growing evidence that top performance
can be achieved in groups under certain conditions (Levine & Moreland, 1998; West, 1994).
Those conditions include the following:

rn

rn m rn rn rn

Team members agree on the rules for dealing with each other, are able to communicate
honestly, and respect each other and display loyalty. Team membership represents a
heterogeneity of talents, experiences, education, and background. The team has a vivid
commitment to excellent output and an ethos for achievement. All members take responsibility
for the team’s success. The team sets itself clear, specific, and high goals. Team members fit
together on a technical and personal level. Team members are able to profit from their individual
strengths. The team is able to use the tool of team reflection (i.e., regular joint reflection about
social and task matters) to discuss what is good and should be sustained and what is bad and
should be improved.

In reality, group decision making does not always take place under these conditions. Instead,
most groups strive for group harmony and unanimity, fostering an uncritical attitude that can
result in the “groupthink” phenomenon, or an excessive tendency among group members to
strive for concurrence (Janis, 1982). Such groups suppress opinions and arguments that go
against the present majority position, leading to quick decision making and high confidence of
group members in the correctness of their joint decision but also to disastrously wrong
decisions. Hence, a high degree of harmony and certainty among group members does not
guarantee that the chosen course of action is a good one. All signs of a phony peace (e.g.,
absence of critical discussion and controversial debate) should be taken as a warning signal. The
groupthink effect is relevant in all decision-making processes, including the identification of
problems, analysis of causes, development of decision alternatives, evaluation of alternatives,
decision making, decision implementation, and control of decisions. For this reason, much of the
research on groupthink has dealt with disclosing the conditions under which successful group
decisions can occur (for a summary, see Frey, SchulzHardt, & Stahlberg, 1996). Our research on
group decision making shows that homogeneity in group member preferences leads groups to
select supporting over nonsupporting information, whereas heterogeneous groups
INTERVENTlON AND HUMAN STRENGTHS PSYCHOLOGY

155

seek information in a much more balanced way (see Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici,
2000). Moreover, Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt (2002) found that
heterogeneous groups made somewhat better decisions than homogenous groups by basing
them on a more thorough exchange of information. Groupthink distortions are more likely to
occur-and will be more pronounced-if groups are homogeneous. Thus, heterogeneity in groups
can lead to a higher decision quality by optimizing flexibility and creativity in the decision-
making process (Levine & Moreland, 1998). Further, effects of groupthink are stronger when the
group is hierarchically structured and weaker when the group functions along egalitarian lines.
Another line of research in the group decision-making literature deals with motivation effects in
groups. Again, most of the existing literature focuses on loss of motivation in groups (for a
review, see Shepperd, 1993). Recent evidence, however, suggests that group decision making
can also give rise to increases in motivation, and when at least some group members work
harder, group performance is enhanced (e.g., Hertel, Kerr, 6r Me&,

2000).

What does this have to do with positive psychology? The message is that there is considerable
empirical evidence supporting strategies for promoting individual and group decision making in
organizations: The group leader should take the role of impartial coordinator, the self-confidence
of minority members should be built, external experts should be called in, artificial conflicts
should be incorporated into the group decision process (for instance, through devil’s advocacy or
dialectical inquiry), and group members should be made responsible for the decision-making
process and outcome (for a summary of these interventions, see Frey et al., 1996). Center of
Excellence Cultures Research in psychology has shown that attitudes and norms are important in
predicting behavior. The culture of a company and the philosophy its managers communicate
shape the attitudes and standards of its other members and accordingly strongly influence their
behavior. To achieve top performance as a global player in the international market, all
employees must have a high achievement ethos, must constantly learn and improve processes,
and must show responsibility and courage. According to Frey (1996a, 199613, 1998; Frey &
Schulz-Hardt, 2000b), these characteristics are included in the framework of “center of
excellence cultures.” (The terms ‘culture’ and ‘subculture’ here are used in the sense of a system
of generally accepted norms, expectations, and behavior patterns.) Center of excellence cultures
are the most important cultures and philosophies of an organization and seem to be the most
important for high performance in social and commercial organizations. These cultures

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have been found relevant in investigations of “hidden champions,” which are relatively small
companies in Germany that have achieved excellence with their products (Simon, 1996; see also
Frey & Schulz-Hardt, 2000a). The more these center of excellence cultures are present, the more
successful an organization’s products, procedures, and services will be (Simon, 1996; Frey &
Schulz-Hardt, 2000a). The following are examples of center of excellence cultures:
B

Customer orientation culture. The expectations of internal as well as external clients must be
fulfilled, and employees must understand what needs to be done to increase the satisfaction of
the customer. Competitor orientation and benchmarking culture. Organizations must be guided
by the best in the world, and the best in one’s own field-and, also, by the best within one’s own
organization. A competitor orientation leads an organization to learn the best practices in all
fields and on all levels. Net production and entrepreneurial culture. All employees must be
conscious of the entire production process to which they themselves make only partial and
specific contributions. They have to consider the economic implications of their actions; they
must bear in mind costs and benefits. The intention behind the culture of net production is for
employees to develop an attitude akin to that of an entrepreneur in the enterprise-that is, an
attitude of responsibility and initiative. To foster such an attitude, employees must have
contextual information and must be enabled to make decisions, factors described in control
theory (Skinner, 1996). Culture of permanent improvement and innovation. To achieve
improvements and innovations, several subcultures have to be established that shape the
attitudes of employees. A “problem-solving culture’’ fosters the development of solutions to
problems and discourages mere complaining about problems. A “mistakes-as-learning-
opportunity culture” focuses on viewing mistakes as opportunities or even “gifts” that can be
connected with causal analysis (i.e., five “why” questions) and promotes the realization that
each mistake is an opportunity to improve things. A “creativity and fantasy culture” seeks to
increase innovation by having employees “dream” about ideal states of the organization and
consider how could these could be achieved. A “questioning and curiosity culture” focuses on
asking questions, being curious, and leading by questioning, as well as supporting the asking of
questions in general. Finally, a “courage culture” places INTERVENTfON AND HUMAN
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value on the courage to criticize when things go wrong and to stick to one’s own opinions and
beliefs. Recognition-of-diuersity and synergy culture. Organizations benefit greatly by selecting
people (and combining them) in a way that promotes a high degree of diversity within teams in
members’ talents, experiences, and abilities, but at the same time promotes homogeneity in
team rules and values. In addition, such a culture welcomes new ways of thinking and
establishes something like a cosmopolitan environment with intercultural talents, personalities,
and mentalities represented within the organization. Constructive confrontation and conflict
culture. The best organizational decisions are made when different views are discussed
constructively and false harmony is avoided. An open, critical discussion culture tolerates open
confrontation, constructive criticism, critical analysis, and a culture of open debate. This
communication style helps to settle differing views and use conflict to the organization’s benefit.
The social life of human beings will always entail certain conflicts, simply because people have
different interests, backgrounds, and values. It is not conflict itself that causes problems; the
central question is how such conflicts are dealt with. Social and organizational psychological
research demonstrates that conflicts that are discussed on the factual level improve the quality
of decision-making processes. Even if people with different opinions are not right, they stimulate
the discussion, lead to divergent thinking, and thus increase creativity and decision quality.

Center of excellence cultures are implemented more easily when employees have a motivational
leadership culture characterized by meaning and transparency, participation and autonomy, and
constructive feedback. The more an employee is motivated, the more he or she is eager to
implement these cultures.

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM PHILOSOPHY? The success of a social or commercial organization
has a lot to do with how it treats human beings. This in turn has a lot to do with the
“Menschenbild,” or view of humanity, and values held by the company’s leadership. This leads to
the question, Where do people derive their values? In our view, five philosophers who
emphasize specific aspects of the Men-

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schenbild help provide an answer to this question. Many elements of the center of excellence
cultures can be deduced from these philosophers.

Immanuel Kant Kant’s philosophy emphasized the release of humans from adolescence and the
importance of emancipation and responsibility for one’s actions. Kant’s categorical imperative
states, “Always act in such a way that you can also will that your maxim should become a
universal law” (Kant, 2000/ 1788, p. 140). This imperative includes the necessity to change one’s
perspective-for example, a leadership figure’s aim should be to treat others in ways he or she
wants to be treated or to lead others as he or she wants to be led. The same holds true with
regard to clients: Employees should treat clients as they would like to be treated as a client.
Kant’s philosophy set forth the ideas of autonomy, independence, and responsibility, as well as
the necessity to change one’s perspective and to show regard for others.

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing In Nathan der Weise, Lessing proclaimed tolerance for different value
systems and cultures (Lessing, 1919). He emphasized that variety is a blessing. Applied to social
and commercial organizations, Lessing’s work urges groups to strive for heterogeneity instead of
homogeneity, to accept different personalities, and to use synergies.

Hans Jonas Jonas held that human beings are obliged to take responsibility because they are the
only organism on this planet able to take responsibility for the planet, as well as for their own
rights and dignity (Jonas, 1989). Managers from social and commercial organizations can find
support for the relevance of responsibility for future, for the team, and for the organization in
the ideas of Jonas.

Sir Karl Raimund Popper In his philosophy of critical reasoning, Popper showed that living is
problem solving. In society as in science, he argued, humans can eliminate deficits by means of
critical rational discussion (Popper, 1992). Popper also emphasized that eliminating deficits may
be a better strategy than striving to achieve an ideal state. According to Popper, progress is
learning from mistakes. Social and commercial organizations can learn from Popper’s philosophy
the relevance of critical rational discussion in solving problems, the relevance of viewing
mistakes as opportunities, and the idea of a constructive conflict culture. l N T E R V E N T l O N A
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Confucius Many centuries ago Confucius spoke of the value of lifelong learning and continuous
improvement. A person, a group, or a nation who does not learn from its mistakes will make
even greater mistakes, according to Confucius (Konfuzius, 2000). The ideas of Confucius have not
lost their importance for organizations. Philosophy’s Contribution to Psychology Psychology can
help us understand how to realize the teachings of these philosophers. Tolerance, responsibility,
lifelong learning, critical rational discussion, and change of perspectives do not come about by
chance. The more people are treated according to solid leadership principles, the more people
are willing to behave in line with the philosophers’ postulates. Organizations that are active in
different regions and markets of the world will have to incorporate the philosophers’ teachings
into their cultures. The reason is this: A global player has to act on two fronts. O n the one hand,
organizations have to implement certain universal fundamental values and principles that are
valid across all locations. O n the other hand, organizations have to adapt to different regional
identities. To implement fundamental values worldwide, a global player cannot accept many
heterogeneous value systems. The philosophers have pointed out substantial values that are
relevant for all locations in the world: how people are treated, what rules of negotiations apply,
and so forth. Only the global players with the best and most qualified employees will be
successful. To develop the best employees, organizations must be guided by a view of the person
that involves individual emancipation, responsibility, and respect and the principles emphasized
by the philosophers. Thus, the globalizing market is leading to the implementation of values
proclaimed by these philosophers, and a globalized economy may be a substantial step towards
the development of a so-called world ethics. Some view globalization as leading to
Westernization and therefore as limiting the available points of view. But this may be only a
short-run consideration. In the long run, especially as the underdeveloped countries continue to
develop, globalization will increase our horizons.

CONCLUSION Psychology is a science that seeks to analyze, explain, and predict human behavior.
Psychological theories provide its practitioners with methods not only to explain human
behavior (e.g., Why does someone become aggressive? Why is a person unmotivated?), but also
to predict

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human behavior (e.g., How will a person’s motivation and performance change?). Psychological
theories and knowledge are very important for changing mentalities, attitudes, climates,
structures, and behavior in social and commercial organizations. Hence, psychological theories
can be used to launch intervention programs. Many in leading positions in science, politics, and
economics are not well-informed about the relevant psychological mechanisms that lead to
identification with an organization’s work. A great deal of inner resignation, burnout, and low
performance in organizations can be explained by the fact that fundamental psychological
aspects are neglected in the dayto-day interactions and communication in social and commercial
organizations. Because of this neglect, and partly because of a corresponding arrogance (in
ignoring fundamental knowledge about human functioning, such as wishes, anxieties, sorrows,
and hopes), many organizations are a long way from realizing their potential. Ignoring
psychological knowledge is very expensive. Psychologists must communicate their knowledge to
the public more than is currently the case, and they must introduce it into companies, social
organizations, and administrations. Psychologists should become more adept at using their
methodology and theories in politics, as well as in economics. The factors that increase internal
resignation, burnout, and depression have been clearly specified. Thus, psychologists have the
tools to take a more active role in forming the structures and conditions in social and commercial
organizations; organizations that do not function adequately are a cause of many personal and
social disorders. Present psychological knowledge has the potential to bring about substantive
change. Therefore, the cooperation of scientists and practitioners, a science market, and action
research are needed. Courageous promoters are needed to convey psychology’s knowledge and
ideas to leading figures in social and commercial organizations, in politics, and in science. But
more contributions are also needed from practitioners in the field in the form of asking
questions and articulating problems that need to be solved. This would help to center research
in problems of reality rather than those of the literature. Thus, we think it would be very helpful
to introduce “science markets” where psychologists could build a dialogue between the practical
field (e.g., teachers, managers, organizational leaders) and the field of scientific psychology. One
component of the science market could be a “problem exchange market,” where participants
would identify which problems exist and what solution ideas are being developed and where
practitioners would formulate their questions and problems and could establish contacts with
scientists. Another component could be a “psychological science market,” in which psychologists
would present their research findings and the knowledge they consider relevant for solving
actual problems. INTERVENTION AND HUMAN STRENGTHS PSYCHOLOGY

161
The idea behind the science market is that the science, psychology, would have a forum for
communicating its knowledge and solving practical problems and practitioners would have the
opportunity to discuss problems and generate solutions together with researchers. In addition, it
would be worthwhile to have as science “traders” or “brokers” social engineers who carry out
interventions and evaluate them and who convey the results of the social sciences to the
practical field to help solve practical problems. Well-trained social engineers are needed who are
familiar with psychological research, who are able to communicate it to heterogeneous social
and commercial organizations, and who can implement it there. This process could be very
similar to that described by Lewin, who referred to this as “action research” (Lewin, 1951).
Lewin’s saying “Nothing is as practical as a good theory” is also applicable to the field of positive
psychology. Psychology’s many theories and a great deal of psychological knowledge can be
directly applied to solve existing problems and to increase satisfaction, identification, and
acceptance of change management processes, as well as innovations in social and commercial
organizations. A final word to those working in universities: The research we have presented in
this chapter involves social and commercial organizations. All of this knowledge can also be
applied to universities and the researchers working there. The productivity and creativity of
psychology could be much better if we would apply our own psychological knowledge to
optimize processes and services.

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12

JUDGMENTAL HEURISTICS: HUMAN STRENGTHS OR HUMAN WEAKNESSES? DALE GRIFFIN AND

DANIEL KAHNEMAN

Everyone complains of his memory and nobody complains of his judgment. -La Rochefoucauld

Few would claim that human behavior or physical performance defines optimal behavior or
performance. Similarly, few would claim that human perceptual performance is optimal. The
statement that observed performance in these domains is inferior to optimal models will not stir
controversy. In the domain of judgment, however, such claims violate the rationality
presumption and are subject to intense and often hostile scrutiny. Many philosophers,
economists, and political scientists, as well as quite a few psychologists, hold the strong belief
that normal educated human judgment is rational. We believe that this rationality presumption
is unduly constraining and that descriptive models of judgment that abandon this presumption
do indeed belong in a psychology of human strengths. Good and poor judgments are both
normal, and the processes that produce brilliant intuitive insights are also the cause of
systematic biases. The study of judgment errors provides a map of the regions of danger where
fast and confident intuition should give way to slower reasoning processes and where
automatized cognitive skills should give way to formal rules and guidelines.

I65

In this chapter, we consider how one descriptive approach to human judgment, the heuristics
and biases (HB) program, fits into the positive psychology perspective. From its beginning
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), the heuristics and biases tradition of research on human judgment
included both descriptive and critical research agendas. The descriptive agenda of HB research
was to identify and characterize the “judgmental heuristics” of intuitive thinking about
probability and likelihood. The critical agenda was to identify the “biases” that distinguish
intuitive thinking from idealized formal models of probability and statistical inference. The study
of systematic judgment errors was not intended to document a pessimistic view of human
nature. The idea of cognitive biases was intended as a corrective to two separate ideas that were
prevalent at the time: (a) that idealized models of inference and decision (e.g., statistical
decision theory) are adequate descriptive theories of how people actually think and choose and
(b) that errors of judgment and choice are due primarily to motivated thinking, not to the
inherent biases of intuition. The general issue of human rationality was not addressed in the
early studies of heuristics and biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), although other
investigators with a similar agenda were perhaps less restrained. The rationality presumption
was bypassed by an emphasis on the similarities between intuitive judgment and perceptual
processes. Nonetheless, the perspective on human rationality that is suggested by
demonstrations of cognitive biases has been the subject of some sharp criticism. Critics have
argued that the HB perspective offers an unjustifiably pessimistic view of humans as irrational,
and accused researchers in this tradition of promoting a distorted view of human reason by
focusing selectively on entertaining examples of foolish thinking. Defenders of the rationality
presumption and critics of cognitive biases were motivated by two distinct ideas. One generic
claim for optimality is that rationality does not exist outside of human thought, and therefore
(normal) human thought must be rational (e.g., Cohen, 1981). A second and increasingly
common claim comes from the logic of evolutionary optimization: A priori, it is suggested,
pressures of natural selection will guarantee that surviving organisms will hold mostly true
beliefs and make rational decisions (Dennett, 1984). Note that these positions do not require
that people demonstrate rational judgments in all situations. They recognize that people make
mistakes for a variety of reasons but view these errors as rather uninteresting failures of
performance, rather than as consequences of flaws in basic cognitive competence. These claims
imply a “true score plus error” model in which optimal judgment can be distorted by inadequate
attention, effort, or consideration. The heuristics and biases perspective is qualitatively different
from these positions in proposing that truth and systematic error are produced by the same
cognitive mechanisms.

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BACKGROUND TO THE HEURISTICS AND BIASES PROGRAM The HB program was directly
influenced by ideas and observations from two quite distinct sources: the use of visual illusions
as a diagnostic tool for the understanding of perceptual processing and the demonstrations of
systematic flaws in clinical reasoning (e.g., Goldberg, 1959; Hoffman, 1960; Meehl, 1954). The
ground for the HB program was prepared by Simon in his Nobel-winning research on bounded
rationality and organizational economics and by a variety of others working at the same time
(see Griffin, Gonzalez, & Varey, 2001, for a review). Simon (1956, 1957) challenged the
predominant notion that “economic man” should be modeled as an unbiased processor of
prodigious memory and effortless calculation and argued that people “satisfice” (by achieving
limited goals) rather than optimize (by achieving the best possible outcome). Because of
cognitive limitations, Simon argued, people sought to do “well enough” rather than to optimize
their outcomes. The same limitations led people to use relatively simplistic “heuristics,” or rules
of thumb, rather than exhaustive normative methods of decision making, but such heuristic
approaches were often good enough for survival in both life and the marketplace. In this view
people are “substantively rational” in the sense of planning, reasoning, and goal setting, but
because of the bounds of computational limitations, people fail the tests of “procedural
rationality,” which demands exhaustive consideration of alternatives and coherence among
related judgments and decisions. Simon stressed that evolutionary pressures on both organisms
and organizations led to local (“better than”) rather than global (“best of”) optimization, and he
dismissed arguments that natural selection or economic competition would lead toor even
encourage-behavior that meets the formal definitions of rationality. Instead of full-blown
rationality, Simon argued, people needed and demonstrated “myopic rationality,” a combination
of reasoned deliberation in planning and goal-setting and inconsistency among preferences and
beliefs that was in sharp violation of the coherence principles central to rational models (Simon,
1983). The critical or negative message from Simon’s work was simply that idealized
multiattribute models of rational decision making dominant in economics were much too
complex to describe not only limited-capacity human information processors but even the most
powerful computer. His positive message was that simple heuristics could take advantage of
environmental regularities and perform pretty well in a range of environments. Furthermore,
because both marketplace and evolutionary success required local satisficing (beating the
immediate competition) rather than global optimization, performing pretty well was often good
enough to survive and prosper. Empirical programs inspired by Simon’s positive message are
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ing in a number of areas, including computer science, artificial intelligence, and psychology. For
example, the Adaptive Decision Making program (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) explores
how people selectively invest their limited attentional resources according to the importance of
various tasks; people are assumed to selectively raise the standard of their satisficing heuristics
when solving more important problems. Gigerenzer and his ABC (Adaptive Behavior and
Cognition) colleagues have studied how presumably evolved “fast and frugal” processes can
exploit the structure of the environment (summarized in Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research
Group, 1999). Gigerenzer’s position has developed in two distinct phases, moving from a firm
defense of the rationality presumption to a strong advance of bounded rationality. Gigerenzer
initially argued that biases in judgment disappeared in ecologically (and evolutionarily) valid
conditions and that people naturally reason according to normative methods (Gigerenzer, 1991,
1994). These claims, which are not in the spirit of Simon’s original critique, have received little
empirical or theoretical support (see, e.g., Griffin & Buehler, 1999). However, the current ABC
research on heuristics of choice is very much in the spirit of Simon’s positive message, starting as
it does with assumptions about simplicity and efficiency. The HB program also adopted the idea
that intuitive thinking is simplifying-though not necessarily simple-and generally efficient. The
guiding idea was that the processes of intuitive thinking are an evolutionary development of the
processes that serve perception (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The early HB work reflected
experiences acquired in laborious efforts to overcome erroneous intuitions in teaching statistics
to undergraduates. Intuitions about probability seem closer to direct perceptions of likelihood
(e.g., in immediately experienced “feelings” of surprise) than to logical consideration of set
inclusion relations that define the extensional rules of probability theory. Demonstrations of the
persistence of samplesize neglect in the intuitive thinking of trained statisticians (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1971) and of the prevalence of base-rate neglect and illusions of validity in clinical
judgment (Meehl & Rosen, 1955; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) suggested that these errors
represent fundamental characteristics of the human mind that education can override, but not
eradicate (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).

THE HB RESEARCH STRATEGY Heuristics and Cognitive Illusions

The term heuristic was used in the HB program to distinguish the uncontrolled strategies of
intuitive statistical judgment from the algorithmic solutions proposed in formal treatments of
probability and prediction.

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Heuristics were shortcuts relative to the optimal algorithmic solution, but they were nonetheless
built on complex cognitive processes such as the computation of the prototypicality of an
instance (the representativeness heuristic) or the ease of retrieving and generating multiple
instances (the availability heuristic). These judgmental heuristics were used to describe how
people evaluated the frequency, commonness, or probability of some outcome. (In contrast,
Simon had focused on decision heuristics for selecting which action to choose.) judgmental
biases served as the diagnostic markers of judgmental heuristics-deviations from ideal or optimal
judgments were used to pinpoint phenomena that needed to be explained. Both the heuristic
processes and the biases used to diagnose them were modeled on studies of human perception,
especially the study of visual illusions. The human visual system comprises an impressive and
efficient set of analytical processes. It allows us to recognize a face or a shape despite
tremendous changes in light, shadow, color, and viewing angle. More remarkably, these flexible
processes occur extremely quickly and without perceived effort. However, the same extremely
efficient shortcuts used to organize information in the visual system lead to predictable mistakes,
or illusions. Simple manipulations of context make shorter lines appear longer, white
backgrounds appear colored, and straight lines appear bent. These visual illusions offer insights
into how the visual system operates by identifying the ways in which the cues provided by the
world are weighted and combined to construct a representation of the environment (Brunswik,
1955; Coren & Girgus, 1978). Finding the ways in which the visual system can be “fooled” is a
useful part of the tool kit of visual scientists. More generally, of course, many psychological
processes are studied by examining their failures: Much of what is known about memory is
drawn from studies of forgetting and misremembering. “The focus on bias and illusion is a
research strategy that exploits human error, although it neither assumes nor entails that people
are perceptually or cognitively inept” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 313). The vignettes that
were a prominent tool in HB research were designed to fool the judgment system. The metaphor
of visual illusions was used at many levels and mapped onto the concept of “cognitive illusions.”
The visual system is quick, efficient, and usually accurate, but it shows predictable biases in
specific situations. Visual illusions can be measured against the actual stimulus information and
the bias revealed, but even when the perceiver “knows” an illusion to be false, the subjective
appeal of the illusion remains. Reason and rules can be decisive, but they do not make the visual
experience less compelling. Similarly, cognitive illusions often remain compelling even when
normative rules of reasoning are brought to bear. Visual illusions differ in robustness-some are
relatively easy to overcome; others are persistent even for the informed viewer.
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nitive illusions also differ in the ease with which they can be overcome and in the accessibility of
the relevant logical rules. The vignettes and other short problems that were used in early HB
research were simultaneously tests and demonstrations of the role of judgmental heuristics.
Scenarios were couched in everyday terms and settings rather than in the traditional metaphors
of urn sampling and dice throwing, both because the former settings were more interesting and
because they were less transparently a test of mathematical or logical reasoning. Readers of
academic articles were faced with the same puzzles as the original subjects of the experiments,
and the true test of the heuristics and biases account was whether the cognitive illusion
“worked” on the sophisticated reader. This method was borrowed from the classic works of
gestalt psychology, in which illustrations of the rules of grouping or figure-ground organization
served both as a description of an experimental method and as a n implicit report of the results.
Cognitive illusions are not as compelling, of course, and the demonstrations were accompanied
by statistics of responses, but the approach was much the same. One of the earliest
demonstration studies was this word problem: The frequency of appearance of letters in the
English language was studied.. . . Consider the letter R. Is R more likely to appear in the first
position? -the third position? (check one). (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, pp. 211-212)

R is more frequent in the third than the first position. However, the first

letter of a word is a better search cue than the third letter, and words beginning with r are easier
to bring to mind than words with r in the third letter. Subjects estimated that such letters were
twice as common in the first than the third position, and readers were given the chance to “feel”
the operation of the availability heuristic in action. A common question about such
demonstrations is whether the phenomenon has “ecological validity”-whether such judgmental
biases are characteristic of consequential real-world judgments. There are two distinct answers
to that question. The first is that several judgment biases have been observed both in the
laboratory and in ecological studies of the performance of experts (see reviews in Gilovich,
Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The second is that the frequency
of errors in the real world is no more relevant to the study of cognitive illusions than to the study
of visual illusions. Both types of illusions are valid objects of study even if both the visual system
and the cognitive system work well-and even if few people complain about the qualities of their
perceptual or cognitive systems. Illusions, whether visual or cognitive, provide cues to processes
that also deliver impressively accurate representations of the world.

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Many laboratory studies of perception have been inspired by observations of illusions in the real
world; the moon illusion is a salient example. There are parallel phenomena in the study of
judgment. In particular, the analysis of intuitive prediction in terms of representativeness
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) was drawn from three real-world observations: (a) the “interview
illusion”-the tendency to make strong inferences about an individual on the basis of a short
personal interview; (b) the “illusion of validity”-the high confidence that people have in their
judgments, even when they know that their judgments are generally invalid; and (c) baserate
neglect-the willingness of people to predict the occurrence of rare events on the basis of weak
evidence (Meehl & Rosen, 1955). Evidently, intuitive predictions do not follow the rules of
Bayesian inference or regression analysis. It seems that people often make predictions by
choosing the outcome that is most representative of the image they formed, regardless of the
quality of the evidence on which the match is based. To capture these characteristics of intuitive
prediction, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) used the following vignette: Tom W. is of high
intelligence, although lacking in true creativity. He has a need for order and clarity, and for neat
and tidy systems in which every detail finds its appropriate place. His writing is rather dull and
mechanical, occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by flashes of imagination of the
sci-fi type. He has a strong drive for competence. He seems to have little feel and little sympathy
for other people and does not enjoy interacting with others. Self-centered, he nonetheless has a
deep moral sense. (p. 238)

One group of participants was asked to rank the relative frequency of nine fields of graduate
education. A second group of participants was asked to rank Tom’s similarity to the typical
graduate student in each graduate specialization. Finally, a third prediction group was told that
the description was based on projective psychological tests and was asked to rank the nine fields
in terms of the likelihood that Tom was a graduate student in that field. The correlation between
the mean ranks in the similarity group and the rankings of the likelihoods was almost perfect.
Differences in the base rates of outcomes had no distinguishable effects on judgments unless
predictions were made for an individual about whom no information was provided. The
representativeness heuristic could not be applied in the absence of case-specific information.
This experiment accomplished two objectives: It provided experimental confirmation for
hypotheses derived from informal observations in the real world, and it provided direct evidence
for the explanation of these observations in terms of representativeness by demonstrating a
perfect correlation between predictions and judgments of representativeness. JUDGMENTAL
HEURISTICS

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Judgmental Heuristics: Not “Effort-Saving Devices” The HB approach to intuitive reasoning differs
from the “cognitive miser” perspective in social psychology. The latter approach is similar to one
of the possible interpretations of Simon’s notion of bounded rationality: It focuses on the
individual’s unwillingness to think deeply or carefully as an explanation of errors. Failures of
reasoning or overreliance on salient cues are treated as manifestations of energy-saving
strategies. The implicit assumption is that people could do better if they were willing to pay the
“costs of thinking” associated with getting an accurate answer. In contrast, the standard HB
assumption would be that confidence in intuitive judgment is often so high that people do not
feel any need to improve their judgments, and even when people are very motivated to be
accurate, they may be unable to perform the operations that would minimize likely errors.
Incentives and attention may matter when the individual knows logical or statistical rules that
could prevent errors and the situation provides cues that evoke the relevant rules.

Multiple Levels of Reasoning: Heuristics, Rules, and Algorithms According to the

representativeness model, intuitive statistical inference and statistical prediction are sensitive
only to the similarity between a target individual and the prototype of a category, or between a
sample and a population; information about base rate, sample size, and cue validity is simply
neglected. This model is an oversimplification: There is ample evidence that people have many
valid intuitions about statistical rules, although they often fail to apply these rules to particular
problems. The relevance of base rates and sample sizes is quite intuitive-in principle, if not
always in practice. Indeed, some everyday maxims are actually statistical rules in a memorable
form. The physicians’ guideline “When you hear hooves, think horses, not zebras” means
nothing other than “Remember the base rate: rare events are unlikely.” There is also
considerable evidence that people trained in formal statistics can transfer concepts and rules
when reasoning in new domains (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983).Overall, the heuristics
and biases tradition fits a three-level model of reasoning: automatic, associative heuristic
reasoning in system 1 (exemplified by judgmental heuristics); controlled rule-based reasoning
(including rule-based heuristics) in system 2; and external cognition using formal rules and
decision models in system 3. This scheme extends the distinction between the two modes of
thinking that Stanovich and West (2000; see also Sloman, 1996) labeled system 1 and system 2.
Judgmental heuristics make use of the outputs of even lower-level judgment processes termed
“natural assessments” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The natural assessments continuously
compute attributes such as

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similarity, prototypicality, causal potency, retrieval fluency, and affective value. For an example,
consider the statements “Woody Allen’s aunt wished him to be a dentist” and “Madonna’s
mother wished her to be a nun.” It appears impossible to comprehend the meaning of those
phrases without also going beyond the literal meaning by computing the fit (representativeness)
of the individual and the relevant social stereotype. The misfit between target and category gives
rise to astonished amusement in the first case and a sense of disquiet in the second case. The
examples of Woody Allen and Madonna suggest that the relation of representativeness is
computed automatically, even in the absence of any particular cognitive goal. However, natural
assessments are highly accessible and readily recruited by the goal of making a relevant
judgment. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) offered an “attribute-substitution model” of heuristic
judgments, in which attributes that are highly accessible and relevant to the task are substituted
for the relevant attribute that the individual intends to evaluate. Thus, an assessment of
representativeness may be mapped onto the probability scale, or an assessment of availability
may be transformed into a judgment of frequency. More generally, any highly accessible
attribute may be substituted for a target attribute if the target attribute is difficult to assess and
if the potential heuristic attribute passes a threshold of relevance. Natural assessments and
judgmental heuristics form what Sloman (1996) called the “associative system” of reasoning,
also referred to as system 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000). This system is closely tied to the
perceptual system and provides output that is directly experienced as a property of the stimulus.
However, the heuristics and biases tradition also recognizes a role for the “rule-based” system of
thought, or system 2. Consider the following scenario (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, pp. 297-300):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student,
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated
in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1
For the most probable. Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F) Linda is a bank teller. (T)
Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. (T 6r F)

When only three items are ranked, the problem is “transparent” for those who are trained in the
conjunction rule of probability: Statistically sophisticated subjects (but not untrained subjects)
find the logical rule that bank tellers (T) must be more common than feminist bank tellers (T & F)
decisive, even though the representativeness heuristic makes the conjunction “feel” mote likely.
However, when eight items are ranked, or when the conjunction is ranked separately from the
general category, both staJUDGMENTAL HEURISTICS

173

tistically sophisticated and statistically naive subjects rank the items in accord with
representativeness and are not constrained by the rules of logic. The rules of set inclusion are
most compelling in a within-subjects design when the question is asked in terms of relative
frequency (number of people) rather than probability. In many cases, the associative and rule-
based systems work together and lead to the same answer, but setting up conflicts between the
systems can reveal fundamental contradictions between the outputs of the two systems. As
Sloman (1996) noted, disagreements between the associative and rule-based systems are
characterized by the subjective state of “simultaneous conflicting belief”: In cases such as the
Linda example, most people agree, on reflection, that the conjunction must be less likely than
the constituents but cannot shake the feeling that Linda really is more likely to be a feminist
bank teller than a bank teller. The rule-based system (system 2), characterized by limited
capacity, deliberate attention, and serial processing, is not synonymous with normative or
rational thought. The majority of deliberate reasoning processes are best characterized as
“system 2 heuristics,” or simplifying rules of thumb that are consistently applied and logically
defensible. For example, people can recognize that a larger sample size increases the reliability
of a poll result (a statistical heuristic corresponding to the law of large numbers) but nonetheless
find the notion of predicting the votes of millions of people from samples of hundreds to be
highly counterintuitive (because intuitions are not statistically based). The “fast and
frugal’’decision heuristics posited by the ABC group are system 2 heuristics, in that they refer to
deliberate decision strategies. The same holds true for the evaluation heuristics identified in the
study of consumer behavior (e.g., the price-quality heuristic, or the assumption that expensive
products are better products) or the persuasion heuristics identified in social psychology (e.g.,
the length means strength heuristic, or the assumption that long messages are more
informative, information held constant). System 2 thought can override the associative heuristics
when the problem structure or content activates the relevant logical rules or heuristics, but such
overriding will usually provide qualitative guidelines rather than the precise quantitative
adjustments required to match formal normative models. Formal rationality is best thought of as
a third external system that requires explicit calculation and is not captured by either system of
human intuition. This is underlined by the remarkable fact that the most basic rules of
probability were not codified until the past 300 years, which in turn helps explain the striking
difficulty that introductory statistics students have in thinking about the basic rules of
probability. The associative system of natural assessments and judgmental heuristics is a fast,
efficient, and well-tested system that compresses a great deal of information into a simple
output and therefore yields many correct in-

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ferences at the cost of some systematic biases. The rule-based system, in contrast, may be seen
as an evolutionary work in progress. Its limited capacity for abstract manipulation of symbols
provides the basis for discovering and using formal models and calculations, but it is generally
too slow and cumbersome for everyday reasoning (Sloman, 1996). The cognitive miser metaphor
in social psychology is a good description of the effortful rule manipulation of system 2, but a
better characterization of system 1 would be a “cognitive busybody”: Due to its more parallel,
automatic nature, the problem is that too many associations are triggered, not too few. The
heuristics and biases approach does not see human reasoning as a “true score plus error” model
in which formal rationality is somehow hidden inside distorted judgments. Rather, good and bad
judgments follow from the same basic processes and can occur within both systems of
reasoning.

RATIONALITY AND POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY Simon (1983) described formal models of rationality
as “jewels of intellectual accomplishment” (p. 3). Any positive perspective on human thought
and reason must celebrate the immense step forward represented by formal models and by the
capacity of humans to reason using abstract logic and symbols. As we have suggested, there is
also much to be celebrated in the efficiencies of system 1 thought, especially the immensely
efficient ability of the system to easily and effortlessly “pattern-match” an instance with such
complex categories as “nerdy computer student” or “comedian dentist.” However, it is neither
productive nor positive to succumb to the temptation to assume that because humans have
“made it to the moon,” thanks to the use of formal models, optimal modes of reasoning are in
some way “natural.” Neither is it correct to confuse evolutionary adaptations with optimal
models of reasoning. As Gould noted, “even the strictest operation of pure Darwinism builds
organisms full of nonadaptive parts and behaviors.. . . All organisms evolve as complex and
interconnected wholes, not as loose alliances of separate parts, each independently optimized
by natural selection” (Gould, 1997, p. 51). High-level systems such as reasoning are typically built
on the foundations of earlier mechanisms; evolution cannot throw out (all) the old to make
room for the new. When a qualitatively new system arises, such as the abstract language-based
system 2, it shows an uneasy coexistence with what came before, both cooperating and
competing with the earlier system. Both systems show considerable intelligence, and individual
differences in both kinds of intelligence are likely. Simon spoke of the expert chess player as one
with a huge repertoire of domain-specific patterns available for pattern-matching (system 1)
heuristics (Chase & Simon, 1973). JUDGMENTAL HEURISTICS

175

Is there any particular value in searching for the positive message of human strengths in the
heuristics and biases tradition? One attempt to hold the middle ground argues that the
apparently competing visions of the HB approach and the evolutionary adaptationists differ
primarily in rhetoric but agree in core claims (Samuels, Stich, & Bishop, 2002). Thus, it is
tempting to invoke the refrain that the glass of human cognition may be seen as half full or half
empty. However, we believe there is more to the debate on rationality than differing
perspectives, and more to considering how visions of human rationality fit into a psychology of
human strengths than simply searching for the most positive angle or “spin.” The true challenge
in amplifying human abilities, we believe, is helping people distinguish between the amazingly
efficient human ability to form opinions and the less developed ability to evaluate those
opinions. Creativity, spontaneity, and other celebrated strengths of human thought and feeling
are integral to the ability to form opinions, to develop hunches, and even to dream of someday
traveling to the moon. But it is the societal system of formal thought-a human strength to be
celebrated in its own rightbased on thousands of years of shared intellectual tradition that
provides the testing ground for those opinions and hunches, as well as the tools for making the
moon voyage a reality. Stanovich and West (2000) contrasted the “meliorist” perspective of the
heuristics and biases program with the “Panglossian” perspective of its main critics. These labels,
although fanciful, do have some merit in defining the kind of positive psychology each side
brings to bear. The positive psychology of the meliorists is the message that the intellectual tools
to improve judgment exist as a kind of external intelligence. Paradoxically, a Panglossian message
that people are perfectly rational animals when in the right environment leaves little scope for
improving the multitude of judgments required of those who do not live in small hunter-
gatherer groups on the savannah. Based on advances in formal methods in optics, some research
teams now believe that human vision could be surgically altered to yield twice the acuity of
normal 20-20 vision. Great advances in formal theories of decision-making have taken place in
the past century, and although no surgical procedures will be available to improve judgment (in
the near future, anyway), there are exciting challenges ahead in designing other ways to increase
the acuity of human judgment.

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13

POSITIVE AFFECT AS A SOURCE OF HUMAN STRENGTH ALICE M. ISEN

In recent years there has been increasing interest in affect or emotion

as a topic of scientific investigation in psychology, and there appears to be an increasing

tendency to consider affect in a way that is integrated with cognition, motivation, and
neurophysiological functioning (see Isen, 2000, 2002a, for discussion). In earlier decades, affect
was not typically a major focus of investigation, and was certainly not considered as an
integrated component of cognition or motivation. In fact, affect was generally omitted from
cognitive theories and models, or was considered only as “arousal” (e.g., Duffy, 1934; Lindsley,
1951), or as a mechanism for interruption in case of a need for redirection of attention (e.g.,
Simon, 1967; see Isen & Hastorf, 1982, for further discussion). Although intense affect can surely
serve such an alerting function, a growing body of work now shows that even mild, and even
positive, affect has important influences on cognition and behavior and that affect’s influence
goes far beyond that gross, alerting function and is more subtle, complex, and multifaceted, as
well. Not only has the field’s understanding of affect increased greatly, as a result of the
newfound legitimacy of studying affect, but this affective revolution, because it has integrated
affect with cognition and motivation,

179

has enriched understanding of those subfields as well. Researchers now know, for example, that
positive affect (but not negative affect) is a category in memory used spontaneously by people to
organize their thoughts. This knowledge comes from studies published in the late 1970s and
early 1980s showing that induced mild positive affect served as a retrieval cue for positive
material learned during an experimental session-without any instruction to use affective state as
an organizational scheme-but that the same was not as true for induced negative affect,
particularly sadness (e.g., Isen, 1987; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Snyder & White, 1982;
Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale & Russell, 1983; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980). Even the
emerging new neuroscience fields are being integrated with the study of affect, contributing to
understanding of affect, and benefiting from application of information learned from the affect
literature (see, e.g., Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Depue & Collins, 1999). The realization that
affect is a regular part of thought processes and motivation or processing goals has enriched
conceptualizations in those fields, and they have grown more realistic and complex as a result. In
addition, by identifying ways in which affect influences well-researched processes in, for
example, cognitive psychology, researchers have learned a great deal about affect that would not
have been learned by introspection or only by focusing more obviously on affect, how it feels,
and how people describe the experience of it. Thus, the past three decades have seen a great
enrichment in psychologists’ understanding of affect and a great enrichment of the entire field,
because of the field’s recognition of affect as a regular influence on, or part of, all other
processes. However, as a field, psychology still carries some baggage from its older affectless
theories and approaches and past attitudes toward affect; and these represent challenges that
must be overcome if researchers are to make further progress. Therefore, in this chapter I will
point out what I think are some of these assumptions and approaches that, although outdated,
may still infuse the field’s thinking about affect, for the most part unwittingly. The purposes of
this chapter are, to present some of the research findings indicating that positive affect is a
source of human strength-that it encourages and supports flexible, open-minded cognitive
processing that enables people to do what needs to be done and make the most of the
situations they are in-and to explore these findings in more detail, considering their implications
and the circumstances in which they are most likely to occur or not occur. In addition, a goal will
be to address some misconceptions or puzzles that have grown up about these findings and that
may relate to some of the outdated assumptions surrounding the concept of affect. Some of
these misconceptions include, (a) that affect-even mild

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positive affect-typically, by its nature, distorts or disrupts orderly, effective thinking; (b) that the
goals or processes induced by affect are unlike other goals, and as a result that they are in some
sense more singular and more irresistible; (c) that positive and negative affect have similar or
parallel effects; and (d) that true influences of affect can arise only from long-term, stable
affective dispositions, whereas induced affect produces only very short-lived, inconsequential
impacts. Before discussing these misconceptions in detail, I will first suggest a broader
conceptual issue that may be responsible for many of them.

TOWARD DISPELLING SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT AFFECT Viewing Affect and Cognition as
Separate Many of these misconceptions themselves stem from the legacy of psychology’s past
orientation that viewed affect and cognition as separate, even opposite or opposing, forces or as
characterized by fundamentally different kinds of processes. This orientation is sometimes
referred to as the “hot-cold” dichotomy (e.g., Abelson, 1963; see also Lepper, 1994) and is
represented in many ways in both the basic theoretical literature and the applied literatures as,
for example, contrasts between “thinking versus feeling” approaches to persuasion. In
neuroscience, as well, it is often assumed that affect and cognition compete for brain resources.
In this chapter, I will suggest that such conceptualizations of affect and cognition as by nature
different, even opposing, forces are not necessary and, in fact, hold back progress in
understanding human functioning. This view of affect as separate had its roots in the tripartite
conceptualization of psychological processes, or mind, which posited three basic components of
mind-cognition, conation (“will,” corresponding to motivation and behavior), and affect or
affection (see also, Hilgard, 1980; Isen & Hastorf, 1982; Isen, 2002b, for discussion and
application). As others had before us, we called for the integration of these three functions,
rather than their maintenance as separate “faculties,” to develop a modern view of human
functioning. The data that have now accumulated regarding the impact of affect reveal some
specific ways in which the assumption that affect, cognition, and motivation are separate is
holding the field back. In particular, the view fosters three of the four misconceptions mentioned
earlier: that all affect disrupts orderly thinking, that positive and negative affect have similar or
parallel effects, and that the fundamental goals and processes associated with affect are, by
nature, different from those of cognition (e.g., that they are more irresistible). To consider why I
am suggesting that these POSITIVE AFFECT AS A SOURCE OF HUMAN STRENGTH

181

are misconceptions and need to be abandoned or at least modified substantially, let us consider
what the research literature has found. Misconception That Positive Affect Disrupts Thinking

Positive Affect Facilitates Cognitive Flexibility

A growing body of research indicates that positive affect (happy feelings) has important
facilitating effects on thinking and on people’s ability to function. For example, it promotes the
sought-after abilities underlying innovation and creativity, creative problem solving, and indeed
problem solving more generally (e.g., Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994,
1997; George & Brief, 1996; Greene & Noice, 1988; Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz,
1996; Isen, 1999, 2002b; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson,
1985; Isen, Rosenzweig, & Young, 1991; Kahn 6r Isen, 1993; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Staw &
Barsade, 1993). This has been found for both children and adults, in research laboratory tasks
and in applied settings, and among managers, consumers, medical students, and physicians
performing a diagnostic task, to name just a few. This finding has also been obtained in a face-to-
face negotiation situation where, without the introduction of mild positive affect, the session
became very hostile, angry, unpleasant, and unproductive. In contrast to the situation of the
control condition, people in whom mild positive affect had been induced were more likely to
take a problem-solving approach (rather than contending for their own position, withdrawing, or
yielding), to reason constructively, and thus to achieve the optimal solution possible in the
situation for both parties (Carnevale & Isen, 1986). Compatibly with these findings and the
results showing that positive affect promotes cognitive flexibility and the ability to take different
perspectives, very recent work is showing that positive affect, and its first cousin, optimism, may
also be a source of self-control and a resource for coping ability in difficult situations (e.g.,
Aspinwall, 1998, 2001; Aspinwall & Brunhart, 1996; Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Taylor &
Aspinwall, 1996; Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998). Optimism and positive affect
have been shown to reduce “defensiveness” and to lead people to be more open to seeing
things as they really are: more accepting where things cannot be changed, but more active in
changing them where they can be changed (e.g., Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986). In
addition, not only has positive affect been found to facilitate innovation and creative problem
solving, as noted, but it has also been shown to guide and facilitate organization in memory (e.g.,
Isen et al., 1978; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), to enable cognitive
efficiencies that result from this organization (e.g., Estrada et al., 1997; Isen 182

ALlCE M. lSEN

et al., 1991; Lee & Sternthal, 1999), and thus to facilitate thinking and judgment and enable
them to be more flexible (e.g., Barone, Miniard, & Romeo, 2000; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, &
Lowrance, 1995; Isen, Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992; Kahn & Isen, 1993; Urada & Miller, 2000; just
to name a few). For example, studies have now shown that people in positive affect consider
more alternative ways of solving problems or meeting needs (e.g., try more solutions to difficult
problems, Isen et al., 1987; have larger consideration sets in decision making about safe,
enjoyable products, Kahn & Isen, 1993); engage in more reasonable processes and have better
outcomes in an integrative bargaining situation, as described earlier (Carnevale & Isen, 1986);
are more responsive to negotiation partners’ moves in a zero-sum type of negotiation (Labroo &
Isen, 2000); are more comfortable with reasonable (but not with unrealistic) extensions of
existing concepts or categories; and can think about people and social groups, as well as other
concepts, in more flexible ways (Barone et al., 2000; Dovidio et al., 1995; Isen & Daubman, 1984;
Isen et al., 1992; Urada & Miller, 2000). These data show significant interactions with the type of
stimuli or materials, indicating that such effects are not simply mindless elevations of evaluation,
akin to those that would result from putting on “rose-colored glasses,” nor thoughtless
categorization of all stimuli together. Rather, the effects of positive affect vary with particulars of
the situations and materials and indicate that positive affect fosters careful, though flexible,
consideration of the materials and concepts, in the situation.

Positive Affect Promotes Helpfulness Also relating to the misconception that positive affect
disrupts thinking, it should be recalled that there is a large literature indicating that positive
affect promotes reasonable helpfulness, generosity, and social responsibility (see Isen, 1987, for
review). Compatibly, Baron (1984) has also reported that mild positive affect leads to reduced
conflict in organizational settings. It has been proposed that this social behavior may itself result
from the impact of positive affect on memory and thinking (Isen et al., 1978); and, importantly,
empirical work shows that these effects, too, are not mindless, but reflect the person’s decision
about the most appropriate course of action in the situation (e.g., Isen & Simmonds, 1978; see
Isen, 1987, for review). Thus, the main thing that is wrong with the assumption that affect -even
mild, positive affect-typically disrupts orderly thinking is, first and foremost, that the evidence
does not support such a view. This is not to say that there may not be times when some affects
may disrupt some processes. But to assume that any positive affect, by its nature, will interfere
with systematic processing whenever it has impact is to ignore a great deal of data showing that
positive affect often facilitates cognitive processing, POSITIVE AFFECT AS A SOURCE O F HUMAN
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and to miss much of positive affect’s potential for benefiting human functioning (e.g., Forgas,
2002; Mackie &Worth, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; but see Bless et al., 1996, for a modified
view). Although some studies have reported effects that appear to show that positive affect
interferes with thinking carefully or with reasoning (e.g., Melton, 1995), as noted, many others
indicate that positive affect enhances many cognitive abilities and processes. Therefore, it will be
important to try to determine under what conditions positive affect interferes with task
performance and under what conditions it is facilitating, rather than just to assert that by its
nature it typically disrupts Systematic processing if it has any effect at all. In fact, current work is
addressing this question, and it appears that when a task is both unpleasant or annoying, and
unimportant, people in positive affect may be less likely than controls to engage the task or to
work on it carefully (Isen, Christianson, & Labroo, 2001). These studies also found that the kind
of task used by Melton (1995) is one that is perceived by experimental participants to be very
annoying and that when the reasoning task was made either more pleasant or more important,
people in positive affect performed better than controls on it. The fact that people in positive
affect are less likely to work on an unpleasant, unimportant task may relate to the fact that,
more than controls, they themselves determine what is appropriate to do in the situation.
Misconception That Affect Always Takes Precedence or That Goals Induced by Affect Are Always
More Influential In view of these accumulating data, it is now possible to consider in more detail
the question of what it may mean for affect and cognition to be integrated or not fundamentally
distinct. To think of affect as a component of cognitive and motivational processes (and cognition
and motivation as integral components of affect, at the same time), rather than as an outside,
separate process, involves a subtle but meaningful change in the way many people currently
think about affect, but one that is supported by the data. First, it would mean recognition that
the basic nature of affect, cognition, and motivation is similar or at least compatible and
integratable, if not identical, and that the processes involved in these functions are not
fundamentally different. One implication of this view is that these functions can influence one
another. A second is that all three of these functions are seen to be integrated by a person’s
purposive determination of the appropriate response to the situation as the person sees it.
Consequently, for example, motives engendered by mild positive affect would be considered no
more irresistible or urgent than motives fostered by other plans and considerations. Bearing in
mind the general principle that behavior is multidetermined and that motives operate in concert
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to produce behavior, one expects that people will always be determining courses of action based
on combinations of goals, situational considerations, and motives or plans arising out of many
aspects of the situation. Even when affect is playing a role and fosters some motive, this will
simply be one of many in the situation and may or may not be acted on, depending on the other
factors in the situation. For instance, although there is evidence that positive affect engenders a
motive to maintain the positive state (e.g., Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 1988; Isen & Patrick, 1983;
Isen & Simmonds, 1978), this motive may not take precedence over other motives, goals, or
plans and may be no more likely than any of a host of other considerations to determine
behavior. Thus, people in positive affect should not be expected to distort or ignore useful
negative, threatening, or disconfirming information in an effort to maintain their good mood,
although they may avoid unnecessary exposure to risks, danger, or unpleasant material (see
Isen, 2002a, for discussion). Indeed, this is what data from several domains are now showing:
positive affect has been reported to lead to less distortion or ignoring of information that did not
fit with a preliminary hypothesis in a diagnostic task, and to more thoughts about losing when a
real, meaningful risk was being contemplated (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998; Estrada et al., 1997; Isen &
Geva, 1987). That is, people have motives that result from affective states, but these are not
necessarily more pressing or more urgent or more determining of behavior than other
considerations in the situation. For another example, it has been found that positive affect leads
to greater persistence on tasks, especially tasks that are enjoyable or functional (e.g., Erez &
Isen, in press), and it is commonly assumed that optimists will persist longer than pessimists on
unsolvable tasks; but a recent study has found that optimists switched from the unsolvable task
sooner if there were alternative tasks to work on in the situation (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999).
Conversely, there can be plans or interests that are just as captivating, or more so, than motives
stemming from positive feelings. For example, seeing a newspaper article headline on a topic
that is of interest prompts the person to pay attention to the article and to turn to read it. It does
not need to be “emotional” to capture attention or motivate behavior. For another example,
wanting to attend a meeting sets in motion a whole series of behaviors designed to get the
person to the right place at the right time. Even without affect generated, one makes plans and
acts on them. Thus, the processes involved in affect, cognition, and motivation are not
necessarily or fundamentally different. This relates to the “hot-cold” or “hot-cool” distinction
that is sometimes drawn in the literature to describe thinking under different circumstances
(e.g., Abelson, 1963), and is sometimes assumed to correspond to emotional versus
nonemotional processing. What I am suggesting is that the hot-cool or “go versus know” system,
as it is called by Mischel and colleagues (e.g., Mischel & Mendoza-Denton, POSITIVE AFFECT AS A
SOURCE OF HUMAN STRENGTH

I85
chapter 17, this volume), should not be assumed to map directly onto “emotional” versus “non-
emotional” decision making or thinking. This suggestion, of course, is perfectly compatible with
the way Mischel and colleagues have used the terms “hot” and “cool,” speaking of two different
kinds or levels of motivation, or two different ways of resolving a motivational dilemma, not
necessarily relating to emotion. Many people assume that the “go” system corresponds to
“emotion,” and the “know” system to “cognition.” But the evidence shows that, using the
terminology of this dichotomy, sometimes mild positive affect can “cool” things down, in the
sense that “cooling” means enabling people to be more reasonable and reasoning, more careful
and thorough and organized in their thinking and evaluating of their long-term best interests,
better able to switch perspectives, and even better able to build and branch out and self-
regulate (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998; Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade,
2000; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen et al., 1991; Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope &I Pomerantz, 1998).
Thus, even if it turns out that strong emotion does sometimes energize the “go” system or
orientation or approach, mild positive affect would not be similar to intense affect or negative
affect or the other systems that are discovered to foster that kind of responding. (At the same
time, it should be noted that pressing, nonaffective motives may also prompt the “go” system, as
for example if one wants to be finished with the present task and move on to something else, or
a participant in a study wants to finish the session and go to class. Then one may not be as
careful or as willing to wait for rewards, but not because of emotion.) This line of reasoning
points out, in still another context, that all affect is not the same in its effects, that different
feeling states have different effects on thinking and behavior, and that these effects themselves
usually depend on the context of the task and behavior. And, just as all affect does not have the
same influence on thinking, affect need not be considered fundamentally different from
cognition, at least in the processes it sets in motion or utilizes.

Misconception That Positive Affect and Negative Affect Are Symmetrical Another misconception
stemming from a simplified, unitary view of affect, and related to the idea that affect is separate
from cognition, is the notion that positive affect and negative affect should have opposite or
parallel effects. Again, it was the empirical evidence that first led to the realization that such
preconceptions about negative and positive affect are misleading. For example, in the helping
literature, as noted above, it was discovered that positive affect, induced in a variety of ways
(e.g., finding a small amount of money unexpectedly, receiving a small free sample or 186

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gift, receiving a report of success on a task) increased a person’s tendency to help others, also
measured in several different ways (e.g., Cunningham, 1979; see Isen, 1987, for review).
However, negative affect was not regularly found to have the same effect, as might be expected
by theories that considered all affect as simply “arousal” and therefore as alike in impact.
Neither did negative affect always decrease helping, as one might expect if one conceptualized
these two states as opposites or as reciprocally related. To the contrary, negative affect was
found to be much more variable than positive affect, sometimes increasing helping, sometimes
decreasing it, and sometimes having no effect (e.g., Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1972;
Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; Isen, 1970). Similarly, in the cognitive domain, positive
affect and negative affect were not found to have the same effects or parallel effects. For
example, induced positive affect was found to cue positive material in memory, but negative
affect, especially sadness, the presumed “opposite” of positive affect, was typically not found to
serve as an effective retrieval cue for negative material in memory or was found to be much less
effective as a cue (for more extensive discussion of this asymmetry between positive and
negative affect, see, e.g., Isen, 1987, 1990, 1999). Misconception That Small Positive Affect
Inductions Cannot Have Important, Potentially Enduring Effects

A fourth misconception that needs to be addressed involves the assumption that induced
positive affect is too fleeting to have real significance, along with the corollary assumption that
stable affective traits or dispositions are the only important sources of affective impact on
thinking and behavior. This assumption seems to be gaining application, especially in
organizational settings, where there has been some effort to base personnel decisions on
measured affective traits or dispositions. It should be noted, however, that the data do not
support such a view regarding induced affect versus dispositional affect. First, the results
discussed above, showing strong effects of induced affect on several aspects of cognition, social
cognition, and social behavior have been observed in studies where seemingly very mild
occurrences were used to induce affect and where participants were randomly assigned to the
experimental condition. This means that whatever people’s affective predispositions, they were
apparently overridden by small, subtle affect inductions, such as seeing 5 minutes of a
nonaggressive, nonsexual comedy film, receiving a report of success on an unimportant task,
receiving a small bag of 10 wrapped candies, receiving a useful free sample or a small gift worth
under $1.OO, and so forth. Further, these studies involved small numbers of participants per
condition (15 to 30), indicating that the effects observed are statistically powerful. Third, the
idea that these effects typically last POSJTIVE AFFECT AS A SOURCE OF HUMAN STRENGTH

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only a few minutes has been shown not to be true, as some studies reported significant effects
of these affect inductions even after 45 minutes had elapsed and two complex intervening tasks
had been performed (e.g., Estrada et al., 1994, 1997). In addition, studies that have used
measured (dispositional) positive affect or optimism have obtained very similar results to those
obtained with induced positive affect (e.g., Aspinwall & Richter, 1999; Staw & Barsade, 1993).
Further, a recent study that looked specifically at the relative effects of dispositional versus
situational affect on job satisfaction in a work setting found that reported pleasant mood on the
job made a significant and independent contribution, beyond affective disposition, to overall job
satisfaction (Weiss, Nicholas, & Daus, 1999). Although this is only one context, it is illustrative of
the fact that temporary feeling states may have an impact beyond that of dispositional affect.
Further, it adds to the evidence showing that affect occurring in response to situational factors
can have important and potentially lasting influence. That induced positive affect should be
maintained and continue to influence thought and behavior for more than a few minutes makes
theoretical sense, as well. Because positive affect promotes a tendency to maintain the positive
state and induces cognitive and social vehicles for doing so, all else equal, people who are feeling
happy should be expected to retain those feelings, or at least to be more likely to experience
them than others, until something happens specifically to disrupt them. That is, all else equal,
people in whom positive affect has been induced have easier access to positive material in
memory, perform better on tasks that are important or interesting, and have more pleasant
social interactions with the people they encounter. These capabilities may, in addition, cause
reciprocity of helping from others, which can contribute to maintaining one’s own positive
affective state. It may even set up a chain reaction in organizations or other settings, or influence
“organizational culture” in the direction of being more pleasant, helpful, and enjoyable. As just
one illustration, in the negotiation study reported by Carnevale and Isen (1986), not only did the
bargainers in the positive-affect condition demonstrate a problem-solving approach and obtain
better joint and individual outcomes, but also, for that group, the whole session was more
pleasant, enjoyable, and devoid of conflict than it was for controls.

TOWARD UNDERSTANDING HOW THESE EFFECTS OCCUR In trying to understand how positive
affect has these far-reaching effects on cognition and behavior, we have proposed that this may
occur because of positive affect’s influence on the content of cognition. That is, positive affect
cues positive material in memory (e.g., Isen et al., 1978; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979), and this
material is diverse and extensive (e.g.,