Gerochi Vs DOE
Gerochi Vs DOE
Gerochi Vs DOE
DECISION
NACHURA , J : p
(a) Payment for the stranded debts 4 in excess of the amount assumed by the
National Government and stranded contract costs of NPC 5 and as well as
quali ed stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the
restructuring of the industry;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable
sources of energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-
hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be
used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall
be managed by NPC under existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding
three (3) years.
The Facts
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. 7
On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group 8 (NPC-SPUG) led with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition
for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electri cation,
docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-165. 9
On May 7, 2002, NPC led another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No.
2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the
Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59,
be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF) managed by respondent
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) 1 0 for the rehabilitation
and management of watershed areas. 11
On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order 1 2 in ERC Case No. 2002-165
provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPC-
SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electri cation and authorizing the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from
its end-users on a monthly basis.
On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision 1 3 (for ERC Case No. 2002-165)
modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority
granted to petitioner National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group
(NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modi ed to the
effect that an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to
the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized by the Commission in the
said Order. Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby
APPROVED for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as
its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electri cation (UC-ME)
effective on the following billing cycles:
Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the
amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and remit the same to PSALM on or before
the 15th day of the succeeding month.
In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30,
2004, a detailed report to include Audited Financial Statements and physical
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status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format.
SO ORDERED.
On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG led a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC,
among others, 1 4 to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which the ERC granted in its
Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the "Motion for
Reconsideration" led by petitioner National Power Corporation-Small Power
Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
June 26, 2003 is hereby modified accordingly.
2. Location
4. Period of completion;
SO ORDERED. 1 5
Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the
NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the
Universal Charge. 1 6
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc.
(PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the Universal
Charge as re ected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.
17
Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is
collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the cases 1 9 invoked by the
respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is
not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the respective funds 2 0 were created in order to
balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the
changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be
adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate
powers to administrative bodies. 2 1 Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed
not for a similar purpose.
On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the O ce of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income
for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or
payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a speci c
regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
Thus, it is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise,
PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the
latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and
implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA. 22
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax because
it is levied for a speci c regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's
electric power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police
power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the
essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the bene t of the
electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on
electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's
ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that there is undue delegation of legislative
power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth su cient determinable standards which
would guide the ERC in the exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue
that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is an
exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due
process. 2 3
On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electri cation and Environmental Fund components
of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case
Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise, PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46 2 4 of the
EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR. 2 5
The Issues
The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a
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tax; and
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part
of the ERC. 2 6
Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall rst deal with an obvious procedural
lapse.
Petitioners led before us an original action particularly denominated as a
Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA imposing the Universal
Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They
impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury
as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.
However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they led this
"Complaint" directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is bereft of any allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the
Court to consider it as a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution 2 7 categorically provides
that:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or a rm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the rules of court may provide, nal judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the regional trial courts and
the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum
from which to seek such relief. 2 8 It has long been established that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment
of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. 2 9 This
circumstance alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.
This procedural in rmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue
raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not
resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of
this litigation, and probably involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid
unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.
The instant complaint is bereft of merit.
The First Issue
(d) To enhance the in ow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of
the power generation, transmission and distribution sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector
entities in the process of restructuring the electric power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of
electric utilities and other providers of electric power;
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(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and
infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy
resources in power generation in order to reduce dependence on imported
energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and
liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to
ensure consumer protection and enhance the competitive operation of the
electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the e cient use of energy and other modalities of demand side
management.
From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal
Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Public
welfare is surely promoted.
Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power. 3 8 I n Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al . 3 9 and in
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank , 4 0 this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund (SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the
police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmeña v. Orbos 4 1 with respect to the OPSF.
Thus, we disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different from the
aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also
created under the administration of PSALM. 4 2 The STF has some notable characteristics
similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:
1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a
review to determine whether there is under-recovery or over recovery and
adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of
an over-recovery, the ERC shall ensure that any excess amount shall be
remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created for these amounts
which shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for
stranded cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost recovery period, any
remaining amount in this account shall be used to reduce the electricity
rates to the end-users. 43
2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for
the same is greater than the actual availments against it, the PSALM shall
retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall
occurs. 4 4
3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be
transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF attached agencies as designated
by the DOF Secretary. 4 5
This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an
exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives. The STF reasonably
serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal
Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry.
The Second Issue
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim
potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated).
This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own
judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. 4 7
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative
power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle. 4 8 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if
the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized elds — the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the rst test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. 4 9
The Court nds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec.
34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that "within one (1) year from the
effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, xed and approved by the ERC,
shall be imposed on all electricity end-users," and therefore, does not state the speci c
amount to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43 (b) (ii) of the EPIRA
provides:
SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. — The ERC shall promote competition,
encourage market development, ensure customer choice and penalize abuse of
market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC
is authorized to issue cease and desist order after due notice and hearing.
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Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the
restructured industry:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and
enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code
which shall include, but not limited to the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the
TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That in the formulation of
the nancial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be
considered: Provided, further, That such standards are set to ensure that the
electric power industry participants meet the minimum nancial standards to
protect the public interest. Determine, x, and approve, after due notice and public
hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all electricity end-users pursuant
to Section 34 hereof;
Moreover, contrary to the petitioners' contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec. 51 (d) and (e) of
the EPIRA 5 0 clearly provides:
SECTION 51. Powers. — The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its
functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of
NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the
universal charge;
(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales
and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the
universal charge.
Thus, the law is complete and passes the rst test for valid delegation of legislative
power.
As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as su cient standards
the following: "interest of law and order;" 5 1 "adequate and e cient instruction;" 5 2 "public
interest;" 5 3 "justice and equity;" 5 4 "public convenience and welfare;" 5 5 "simplicity, economy
and e ciency;" 5 6 "standardization and regulation of medical education;" 5 7 and "fair and
equitable employment practices." 5 8 Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to
ensure the total electri cation of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power" 5 9 and "watershed rehabilitation and
management" 6 0 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the ERC's power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
It may be noted that this is not the rst time that the ERC's conferred powers were
challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission , 6 1 the Court
had occasion to say:
In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions
of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather, the law must be read in
its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one
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general purpose and intent. Its meaning cannot to be extracted from any single
part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole.
Considering the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute
in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the jurisdiction of the
regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms
sought to be accomplished by the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden
the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers
already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC
possesses only the powers and functions listed under Section 43 of the EPIRA is
to frustrate the objectives of the law.
In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 6 2 in the same case, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of police power in relation to
the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a
vital public utility, to wit:
Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to
the preservation of public health, safety and morals, which used to be the primary
social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume
an a rmative duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the
concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now
exerted "to further the public welfare — a concept as vast as the good of society
itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for the governmental authority to
further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all government." When police
power is delegated to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise
should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even broader dimension
in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role
in balancing the many con icting interests in society. The Questioned Order was
issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of police power.
We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach
is more compelling in the eld of rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric
power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth
that affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in
encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines of progress may
come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of
pesos would be lost as a result of power outages or unreliable electric power
services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with
great flexibility, when the need arises.
Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry,
including the privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC),
the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various
government agencies and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the
industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation, transmission,
distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized
and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter. 6 7
Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nulli cation, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. 6 8 Indubitably, petitioners failed to
overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA. We nd no clear violation of the
Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18
of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Sec. 4 (ddd) of the EPIRA provides that the Universal Charge refers to the charge, if any,
imposed for the recovery of the stranded cost and other purposes pursuant to Section 34
hereof.
2. Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 9136, entitled "Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001, (IRR) approved on February 27, 2002, particularly Rule 4 (rrrr)
provides that the "Universal Charge" refers to the charge, if any, imposed for the recovery
of the Stranded Debts, Stranded Contract Costs of NPC, and Stranded Contract Costs of
Eligible Contracts of Distribution Utilities and other purposes pursuant to Section 34 of
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the EPIRA.
3. Particularly denominated as Complaint dated September 15, 2003; rollo, pp. 3-15.
4. Sec. 4 [vv] of the EPIRA provides that Stranded Debts of NPC refer to any unpaid financial
obligations of NPC which have not been liquidated by the proceeds from the sales and
privatization of NPC assets.
5. Sec. 4 [uu] of the EPIRA also provides that Stranded contract costs of NPC or distribution
utility refer to the excess of the contracted cost of electricity under eligible contracts over
the actual selling price of the contracted energy output of such contracts in the market.
Such contracts shall have been approved by the ERB as of December 31, 2000.
6. Rule 4 (ddd) of the IRR provides that Missionary Electrification refers to the provision of
basic electricity service in Unviable Areas with the ultimate aim of bringing the
operations in these areas to viability levels.
7. Manila Electric Company, Inc. v. Lualhati, G.R. Nos. 166769 and 166818, December 6, 2006.
8. IRR, Rule 4 (bbbb) states that Small Power Utilities Group or SPUG refers to the functional
unit of NPC created to pursue Missionary Electrification function.
9. ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-165, pp. 1-7.
10. PSALM is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Sec. 49 of the
EPIRA, which shall take ownership of all existing NPC generation assets, liabilities, IPP
contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets. All outstanding obligations of the
NPC arising from loans, issuances of bonds, securities and other instruments of
indebtedness shall be transferred to and assumed by the PSALM.
11. ERC Record for ERC Case No. 2002-194, pp. 1-5.
14. NPC-SPUG's Motion for Reconsideration dated August 13, 2003 also prayed that it be
allowed (1) to have flexibility in the utilization of UC-ME considering its mandate to
implement the MEDP responsive to the needs and constraints of missionary
electrification; (2) to authorize it to re-prioritize its CAPEX and its OPEX to the extent
possible, for CY 2003; and (3) to give it the flexibility to reallocate available UC-ME funds
among the revised priority activities/projects for CY 2003, Id. at 225-236.
17. Rollo, p. 8.
24. SECTION 46. Fines and Penalties. — The fines and penalties that shall be imposed by the
ERC for any violation of or non-compliance with this Act or the IRR shall range from a
minimum of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to a maximum of Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Any person who is found guilty of any of the prohibited acts pursuant to Section 45 hereof
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the
court.
The members of the Board of Directors of the juridical companies participating in or covered in
the generation companies, the distribution utilities, the TRANSCO or its concessionaire or
supplier who violate the provisions of this Act may be fined by an amount not exceeding
double the amount of damages caused by the offender or by imprisonment of one (1)
year or two (2) years or both at the discretion of the court. This rule shall apply to the
members of the Board who knowingly or by neglect allows the commission or omission
under the law.
Any case which involves question of fact shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and
those which involve question of law shall be directly appealable to the Supreme Court.
The administrative sanction that may be imposed by the ERC shall be without prejudice to the
filing of a criminal action, if warranted.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the penalty of prision correccional or a fine ranging from
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00), or both, at the
discretion of the court, shall be imposed on any person, including but not limited to the
president, member of the Board, Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer of the
corporation, partnership, or any other entity involved, found guilty of violating or refusing
to comply with any provision of this Act or its IRR, other than those provided herein.
Any party to an administrative proceeding may, at any time, make an offer to the ERC,
conditionally or otherwise, for a consented decree, voluntary compliance or desistance
and other settlement of the case. The offer and any or all of the ultimate facts upon
which the offer is based shall be considered for settlement purposes only and shall not
be used as evidence against any party for any other purpose and shall not constitute an
admission by the party making the offer of any violation of the laws, rules, regulations,
orders and resolutions of the ERC, nor as a waiver to file any warranted criminal actions.
In addition, Congress may, upon recommendation of the DOE and/or ERC, revoke such
franchise or privilege granted to the party who violated the provisions of this Act.
25. PECO's Memorandum dated April 18, 2005; rollo, pp. 205-210.
26. Supra note 21, at 125.
30. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, 330 Phil. 392, 404 (1996).
31. Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165027, October 16,
2006, citing Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara, 216 SCRA 790, 798 (1992).
32. National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 449 Phil. 233, 248 (2003).
33. Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882,
March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 586, 604, citing U.S. v. Torribio, 15 Phil. 85, 93 (1910) and
Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).
34. JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5,
1996, 260 SCRA 319, 324.
35. Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Ruben D. Torres, G.R. No. 101279,
August 6, 1992, 212 SCRA 298, 304, citing Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989).
36. Progressive Development Corporation vs. Quezon City , G.R. No. 36081, April 24, 1989, 172
SCRA 629, 635, citing Manila Electric Company v. El Auditor General y La Comision de
Servicios Publicos, 73 Phil. 133 (1941); Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Lines, 143 Phil. 158,
163 (1970).
37. The purposes are:
(a) Payment for the stranded debts in excess of the amount assumed by the National
Government and stranded contract costs of NPC and as well as qualified stranded
contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;
(b) Missionary electrification;
(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of
energy vis-à-vis imported energy fuels;
(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour
(P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an environmental fund to be used solely for
watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC under
existing arrangements; and
(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3)
years.
38. Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19, at 710, Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, supra note 19, at
632, Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, No. L-75697, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 208,
216, and Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 (1955).
39. Supra note 19, at 539; Decided jointly with Citizen's Alliance for Consumer Protection v.
Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. L-78888-90, and Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v.
Energy Regulatory, Board, G.R. Nos. L-79690-92.
42. Last paragraph, Sec. 34, EPIRA provides: The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund,
shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the purposes
specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the
universal charge shall be distributed to the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable
period to be provided by the ERC.
43. EPIRA, Sec. 33, last paragraph and IRR, Sec. 5 (f), Rule 17.
46. Supra note 23, at 177-178, citing Osmeña v. Orbos, supra note 19.
47. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 and 168730,
September 1, 2005, 469 SCRA 10, 115-116.
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, supra note 47, at
117 and Santiago v. Comelec, 336 Phil. 848, 897-898 (1997), citing People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937).
49. Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. DFA, G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, citing Beltran v.
Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168, 191 (2005); The Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, 313 Phil. 592, 606 (1995); and
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, G.R. No. L-
76633, October 18, 1998, 166 SCRA 533, 543.
58. The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, supra note 49.
59. Sec. 2 (a) and (b), Declaration of Policies of the EPIRA.
63. G.R. No. 163935, February 2, 2006, 481 SCRA 480, 515-516, citing Freedom from Debt
Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 61.
64. Rollo, pp. 108-109.
65. Republic v. Kalaw, G.R. No. 155138, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 401, 406.
66. Lopez v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, February 19, 1999, 303 SCRA 448, 460, citing Ty v.
Trampe, 250 SCRA 500 (1995).
67. Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 61, at 171-172.
68. Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. Nos. 152895 & 153151, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 142,
citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary , 361 Phil. 251, 263 (1999).