Page |1

Republic of the Philippines parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de

SUPREME COURT oficio, pleaded not guilty.
Manila
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's
SECOND DIVISION counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was
insanity.
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
RULING
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. "To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant. clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from
AQUINO, J.: disease of the mind, as not, to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong."
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camiguin convicting him of parricide, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test,
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone
Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-C). supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility
of a person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the product of a
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving
under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a
located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a
Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a
water and medical assistance. condition not considered capable of improvement or
deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F.
body. She was placed in an improvised hammock and brought 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat
(Exh. B and G). As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal
responsibility may be stated to be the capacity to understand the
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to
after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the distinguish between right and wrong as to such act, and in a
barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
(Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral
confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten
surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he case exists along with the "irresistible impulse" test or some
had liquidated his wife. other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the
ground that, although he knew the act was wrong, he was
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which unable to refrain from committing it.
was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His
shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak. Since the broadest test suggested, which is
the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured inability to distinguish between right and
by quarrels and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact wrong to be considered, even though it
that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it
chose to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The would appear that insanity which meets this
couple had eight children. test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel over whether there are some cases in which
induced by Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was the right-and-wrong test is not met, but in
afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration. which a defense on grounds of insanity
Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead should nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am
("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That remark infuriated Ambal Jur 2d 118.)
and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of
parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary examination, sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of
the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally
March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease
or defect.

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The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left,
surrendering to the law-enforcing authorities is incontestable notified the Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B.
proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her
he was going to be punished for it. bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and
pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as
voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).
Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death.
The lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence RULING
of one mitigating circumstance and the absence of aggravating
circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code). When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
responsibility, the evidence on this point must refer to the time
EN BANC preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of
its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981 be proven by clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos,
44 Phil. 204).
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death Francisca Col because he had chronic schizophrenia since
sentence is under review. 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8,
1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a
form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and
AQUINO, J.: freedom of will.

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. that the accused must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver,
entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of
72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is
Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
saying: "Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17,
several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead. 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA
275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see
in the bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a I Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and
tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's eyes art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a
neighbor of Aling Kikay. In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the
killing as murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed
had taken refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength
following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing
kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa but exclaim " Diyos ko ".
matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na
iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly
tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. " weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes
the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which qqqs sex
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which
Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house of his second the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman,
cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612;
Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62
to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the Phil. 446).
record.
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be
appreciated because the evidence does not show (a) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

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manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial
determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the Court of the Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe,
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates,
L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247). The pertinent facts of the case are:

The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
culpable juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It Pampanga filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the
is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder,
de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) committed as follows:
"por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada
por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y
la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident, That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the
meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga,
externos, no de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3). Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with
deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
account of her old age should be appreciated as generic unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in
because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body
intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly
manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De
Jesus, 14 Phil. 190). All contrary to law, and with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and
the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the where public authorities are engaged in the discharge
offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength
reaction) which diminished his will-power without however and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs.
Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and
People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.) On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder
should be imposed (Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal
Code). The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established
that on March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office
sentenced to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After
trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio. a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was
carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing
SECOND DIVISION the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991 bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp.
5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant. Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14)
wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant. Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that,
sometime in the latter part of February, 1987, the accused
Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of
his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the
accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure
in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
PARAS, J.: "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further
testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent
the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses

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due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, COURT
1987).
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case,
insane at the time of the commission of the offense. Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words
because he was aware when he did the act?
RULING
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis
was supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation. supplied)
However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a
specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of
the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of intelligence. The statement of one of the expert witnesses
the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew
was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that
not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals. accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As
stated by the trial court:
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the
effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of The Court is convinced that the accused at the time
his act at the time he committed it. To quote: that he perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence
shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal
trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the
Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill the
his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is waiting for victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the
his counsel to appear and because his counsel did killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the
not appear, he asked for the postponement of the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after
hearing of the case and to reset the same to another he stabbed the victim several times, he was
date. With those facts, do you consider him insane? apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an
indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest.
This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir. was conscious and knew the consequences of his
acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be
insane? There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and
appreciation of the evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160
A Yes, sir. SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can
COURT discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.

Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of
will be your conclusion? the accused.1âwphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt
as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity.
The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests
A Having examined a particular patient, in this on the defense. Thus:
particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in
short all the assessment necessary to test the
behavior of the patient, like for example praying for In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that the
is one situation to consider if the patient is really law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art.
insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305)
situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be
violent behavior, then he appears normal he can voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts
reason out and at the next moment he burst out into were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil.
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
one of the difficulties we have encountered in this defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S.
case. When we deliberated because when we v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145
prepared this case we have really deliberation with all SCRA 451)
the members of the medical staff so those are the
things we considered. Like for example he shouted The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption
out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular of sanity is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
criminal case. beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

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satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies
of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the came his way.
crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither
punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People v. did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any
Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned motive for assaulting them.
decision is hereby
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and
AFFIRMED without costs. his acts, with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the
sense of entailing criminal liability.
EN BANC
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933 the fact that the apparent lack of a motive for committing a
criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but
that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
appellee, away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also
vs. conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant. a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the
Carlos S. Tan for appellant. case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife whom he
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the
defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and
AVANCEÑA, C.J.: under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and
Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred
from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of,
barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, but also motives for not committing said acts.
1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the
to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room same opinion. The doctor stated that considering the
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right
Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after mind.
which he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then
seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that
wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the the wound of the deceased was direct result of the defendant's
mother's womb. act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say
further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have been
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody
and upon conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the
costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed. deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the
door of the room as he was coming out. The defendant did not
dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was
of the crime the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to
come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was
stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was appealed from, the courts finds that the defendant is not
sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it
stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
was then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds
he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs
with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he de oficio. So ordered.
got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting
him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him
that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

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SECOND DIVISION and saw the latters firearm. He picked it up and when Chief of
Police Balquin arrived, he turned over the firearm to him.[5]
Robert Hautea[6] and Luz Cuepas,[7] both residents of
Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of Dominador.
[G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999]
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben
claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the
evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City
attending to his wife who earlier underwent a caesarian
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
operation.[8] Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that
RUBEN ESTEPANO, RODNEY ESTEPANO and
they were at home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene,
RENE ESTEPANO, accused-appellants.
who was only thirteen (13) years of age then, testified that he
came to know about the incident that same night when his
DECISION mother awakened him to inform him about it.[9] Rodney, on the
other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed
BELLOSILLO, J.: Enrique Balinas.[10]
ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for
which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney, Dante and Rene, The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that
all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo the trial court erred: (a) in giving credence to the testimony of
died during the trial and before judgment could be rendered. prosecution witness Florencio Tayco; (b) in finding the existence
Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case of conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged; and, (c)
was archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on in finding them guilty of murder.[11]
reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney and Rene were found
guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion RULING
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants
in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and P9,500.00
Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano guilty of murder as the
for actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
killing was attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they
insolvency.[1] suddenly and unexpectedly attacked the victim while the latter
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking to Dominador
testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that on 16 April 1991,
Estepano. There was treachery because the following requisites
at around ten oclock in the evening, he was on his way home in
concurred: (a) the culprits employed means, methods or forms
Barangay IV, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, with Lopito of execution which tended directly and specially to insure their
Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met Dominador safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the
Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture,
offended party, which meant that no opportunity was given the
according to Florencio, Lopito started to talk to Dominador while
latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner of
he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. [31] The
without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on them in
guinunting.[2] Ruben who was armed with a cane cutter and
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[32]
Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the
in hacking Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador told records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of age at the
his companions, You better kill him! [3] time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of
Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around
The Revised Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age
ten oclock in the evening, while he was walking home with and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is
Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to
Estepano at the BM Trucking compound near the house of here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is
Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw two incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted
(2) persons, both naked from the waist up, pass by. He
otherwise.[33]
recognized one of them to be Rodrigo Estepano. Soon after, he
heard a couple of splashing sounds and a ring, which made him A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed
turn around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo to prove that accused-appellant Rene Estepano acted with
from the neck of Enrique. He also saw another person, who was discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio
armed with a cane cutter, standing near the fallen Enrique. He Tayco only attempted to establish, as it did, Renes presence at
asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador the crime scene and his supposed participation in the killing of
replied that that was the result of intense hatred. He then Enrique Balinas. Thus -
hurriedly left for home. On the way he met some military men
and told them about the incident. The military men assured him Q: Aside from Ruben Estepano alias Texas and Dante
that they would report the matter to the police authorities. [4] Estepano who helped in attacking Enrique Balinas,
Dominador Estepano gave his own version of the incident. were there other persons involved or helped aside from
According to him, on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the these two?
evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They A: Yes, sir.
were about to eat supper when he heard Enrique Balinas call Q: How many more (who) helped?
out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.
window and saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to
xxxx
the ground Rodrigo hastily fled. There was no other person in
the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim was
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 Page |7

Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by Texas (Ruben)?

A: Cane cutter (espading).
xxxx Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with
Q: How about Rene? modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
A: Bolo.[34] of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779
convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish
Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner
not in any way attempt to show his discernment. He was merely (then only 12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of
asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
April 1991 and whether he participated therein. [35] Accordingly,
even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City,
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y
age.[36] The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive age and under fifteen (15) but acting with discernment, by
indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there
government miserably squandered the opportunity to willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
incriminate him. complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor,
seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Contrary to law.[3]

Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and RODNEY
ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of The Case for the Prosecution
Murder and are accordingly sentenced each to reclusion
perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of their victim Enrique Balinas y Gran the amount of The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P50,000.00 as moral Pasay City.[4] One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on
damages, P9,500.00 as actual damages and P367,920.00 for December 8, 1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the
loss of earning capacity. Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and
attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.[7]
Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in
the absence of proof that he acted with discernment; Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold
consequently, his immediate RELEASE from confinement is quail eggs at a nearby church.[8] Adjacent to their house was
ORDERED unless he is detained for some other lawful cause. that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision start selling at 6:30 p.m.[9] Next to Teofistos residence was a
and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon vacant house.[10]
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived
home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded
FIRST DIVISION to her mothers store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home
the container with the unsold quail eggs.[11] Debbielyn did as
told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant house, she
NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040 saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow
blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little
Petitioner, light from the lamp post.[12] She resisted to no avail.[13]
Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she
complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
his own. He got on top of her.[14] She felt his penis being
inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.[15] She felt pain and
Respondent. Promulgated: cried.[16] She was sure there were passersby on the street near
the vacant house at the time.
April 26, 2006
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the
DECISION girls cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of
Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at
petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Debbielyn to inform her parents about what happened.[17] She
told her father about the incident.[18] Her parents later reported
what happened to the police authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the
police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.[20]

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 Page |8

Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p.

375, 1998 Ed.), writes that discernment is more than the mere
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the
he went out of their house to get his barbecue grill. He heard mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to
someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.[21] fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act (People v.
He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a
down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her minor accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to
anus.[22] The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, Hoy, understand the difference between right and wrong, which may
bakit ginawa mo yan?[23] Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on be known and should be determined by considering all the
and fled.[24] Neighbors who had heard Teofisto shouting circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his
arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to the police appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not only
investigator regarding the incident.[26] before and during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial should be taken into consideration (People
v. Doquena, supra).
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he
was inside their house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly
told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
by petitioner.[27] He rushed to the place and found her daughter minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied that she circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then minors cunning and shrewdness.
left.[28] He then looked for petitioner and found him at his
grandmothers house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion,
barangay hall.[29] On September 25, 2002, he brought her dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near
daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to
at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto
S. Castillo. Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the
scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
RULING mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being
arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,[57]contending tanods arrived and took him into custody.
that the prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with
discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding
denied the motion in a Resolution[58] dated November 12, 2004 grade school student and even received awards. While in Grade
on the following finding: I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He
represented his class in a quiz bee contest.[86] At his the age of
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted 12, he finished a computer course.
with discernment, his conduct during and after the crime betrays
the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
the act he made. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, the criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic
fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence
the scene and hid in his grandmothers house intimates that he of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
knew that he did something that merits punishment. essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.
Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.[84] On the
accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic awards other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand
and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is thus burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors his age evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not
could, which conduct is right and which is morally only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
reprehensible.[59] and during the trial.[85] The surrounding circumstances must
demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of
is defined as follows: the discernment that constitutes an the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with
an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended
the difference between right and wrong (People v. Doquena, 68 party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial
Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years courts ruling.
of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of the effects
of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26,
1989).

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 Page |9

SECOND DIVISION with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment"
connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989 People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case
We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets
the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner, accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner
vs. completes his syllogism in saying that:
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner. intent', then the allegation in the information
that the accused acted with discernment and
willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate
or cause to be fired in a reckless and
PARAS, J.: imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is
an inherent contradiction tantamount to
failure of the information to allege a cause of
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari action or constitute a legal excuse or
against the Honorable Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the City exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful 97, Rollo)
questions of law which We are tasked to resolve. Considering
the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We impleaded
the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the
resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo). ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under
Article 265 of the RPC.

The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:

On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment
and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
with his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other
children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984.
They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around The word "intent" has been defined as
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle
borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, (a) design; a determination to do a certain
Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which things; an aim; the purpose of the mind,
caused his unfortunate death. including such knowledge as is essential to
such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal determination with which a person acts.' (46
exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the CJS Intent p. 1103.)
unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The
victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a
ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term
1985 was consequently filed, which narrated in part: discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case
of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9
years but below 15 years of age and acting The discernment that constitutes an
with discernment, did then and there, without exception to the exemption from criminal
taking the necessary precautions to prevent liability of a minor under fifteen years of age
and/or avoid accident or injuries to persons, but over nine, who commits an act prohibited
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate by law, is his mental capacity to understand
and cause to be fired, in a reckless and the difference between right and wrong . . .
imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said RULING
carelessness and imprudence one
TEODORICO PABLO ALMINE at the left
side of the body with its pellet, causing On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed,
injuries which directly caused his untimely raising two (2) issues, to wit:
death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
I
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing
of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE
Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 P a g e | 10

CRIME OF HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS but over nine, who commits an act prohibited
IMPRUDENCE, AND by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong . . .
II (Emphasis supplied) p. 583

WHETHER THE COURT HAD From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT products of the mental processes within a person, the former
DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY refers to the desired of one's act while the latter relates to the
LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo) moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence a
person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
of a corollary controversy with respect to the first issue raised is therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above
evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then
Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that "discernment" friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time
connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
People vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case
We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill . . ." amply meets
the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and
accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic reason behind the
completes his syllogism in saying that: enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article
12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second
intent', then the allegation in the information element of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
that the accused acted with discernment and
willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate
or cause to be fired in a reckless and The second element of dolus is intelligence;
imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is without this power, necessary to determine
an inherent contradiction tantamount to the morality of human acts to distinguish a
failure of the information to allege a cause of licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
action or constitute a legal excuse or because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence,
exception. (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.
97, Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)

If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and
ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a quasi-offense under below are not capable of performing a criminal act. On the other
Article 265 of the RPC. hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are
not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be
without criminal capacity, but which presumption may be
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of
and intent are two different concepts. We agree with the Solicitor appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that
General's view; the two terms should not be confused. (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
The word "intent" has been defined as embraces the concept of discernment as used in Article 12 of
the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs.
(a) design; a determination to do a certain Doquena, supra. It could not therefore be argued that
things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to
including such knowledge as is essential to two different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment,
such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or is a distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an
determination with which a person acts.' (46 offense.
CJS Intent p. 1103.)
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence, freedom of
means of committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such
the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term felonies. However, intelligence remains as an essential
discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above nine but
of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in
committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-offense. For
him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
The discernment that constitutes an wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor
exception to the exemption from criminal over nine years of age but below fifteen may be held liable for
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 P a g e | 11

said Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch
phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction or exception manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively.
made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and
"intent" and "discernment" used under the law, he cites the ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store,
case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the
present the qualifying sentence preceding the ruling he now payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of
invokes, which reads: wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then
beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body
pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure.
That requirement should be deemed amply ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although
met with the allegation in the information that shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the
she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and people around in lifting the counter and retrieving ZHIENETH
there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push from the floor.[3]
one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep place of ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
the Peñaranda River and as a consequence Center where she was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost
thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by
right then and there.' This allegation clearly writing on a magic slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil
conveys the Idea that she knew what would on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after the accident
be the consequence of her unlawful act of or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.[4]
pushing her victim into deep water and that The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she
she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis sustained. The provisional medical certificate[5] issued by
supplied) ZHIENETHs attending doctor described the extent of her
injuries:
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the After the burial of their daughter, private respondents
words "intent" and "discernment." What We meant was that the demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
combined effect of the words used in the information is to hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses[6]
express a knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay.
wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for
validly contend that since the information now in question damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought
alleged "discernment", it in effect alleged "intent." The former the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for
may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees and an unspecified
the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity. amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any
FIRST DIVISION liability for the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH.
They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care
and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam
around in a store filled with glassware and appliances.
ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she
[G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999] climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her.
Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy
wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the
past fifteen years since its construction.
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation
JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, vs. maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees.
AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents. The other petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in
the performance of their duties and countered that the complaint
was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and
DECISION mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and
an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
their favor.
In its decision[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint and
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of the evidence
the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the reversal of the 17 June favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall
1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV of the counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It
37937 and the resolution[2]denying their motion for believed petitioners witnesses who testified that ZHIENETH
reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with
1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In
Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how
damages and attorneys fees to private respondents Conrado and the counter fell. The trial court also held that CRISELDAs
Criselda (CRISELDA) Aguilar. negligence contributed to ZHIENETHs accident.
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of
Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 P a g e | 12

RULING attention of the management the danger the counter could cause.
But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals faulted
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as the petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the incident
errors of the trial court its findings that: (1) the proximate cause that befell ZHIENETH could have been avoided had petitioners
of the fall of the counter was ZHIENETHs misbehavior; (2) repaired the defective counter. It was inconsequential that the
CRISELDA was negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; (3) counter had been in use for some time without a prior incident.
petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the counter; The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was
and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH. below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that
should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child since a child under nine (9) years could not be held liable even
below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence. for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old ZHIENETH could
And even if ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was already not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also
capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong
impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. She or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to
had a small frame (four feet high and seventy pounds) and the walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.
counter was much higher and heavier than she was. Also, the The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the
testimony of one of the stores former employees, Gerardo witnesses of petitioners. It found them biased and prejudiced. It
Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness
to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied Gonzales. The Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as
petitioners theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. actual damages, the amount representing the hospitalization
Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the
doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, [N]othing, I did not hospital's statement of account.iv It denied an award for funeral
come near the counter and the counter just fell on me. i expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a
Accordingly, Gonzales testimony on ZHIENETHs spontaneous compensatory damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of
declaration should not only be considered as part of res gestae ZHIENETH.
but also accorded credit.
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision,v
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA thus:
for it was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the
precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the
lower court is SET ASIDE and another one is entered against
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the [petitioners], ordering them to pay jointly and severally unto
proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death, was petitioners [private respondents] the following:
negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter
permanently nailed. 1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the
death of Zhieneth Aguilar, with legal interest (6% p.a.)
On the other hand, petitioners argued that private from 27 April 1984;
respondents raised purely factual issues which could no longer
be disturbed. They explained that ZHIENETHs death while 2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization
unfortunate and tragic, was an accident for which neither expenses incurred; with legal interest (6% p.a.) from
CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held 27 April 1984;
faultless and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial
courts rejection of Gonzales testimony as unworthy of credence. 3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;

As to private respondents claim that the counter should 4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorneys fees; and
have been nailed to the ground, petitioners justified that it was 5. Costs.
not necessary. The counter had been in existence for several
years without any prior accident and was deliberately placed at a Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the
corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they acted without decision but the same was denied in the Court of Appeals
fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the resolutionvi of 16 July 1997.
matter. In fact, the criminal caseii for homicide through simple
negligence filed by private respondents against the individual Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals
petitioners was dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in decision and the reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court.
their favor. Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding the factual findings and conclusions of the trial
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private court. They stress that since the action was based on tort, any
respondents and reversed the appealed judgment. It found that finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents
petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally would necessarily negate their claim for damages, where said
dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted L iii negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. The
with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight injury in the instant case was the death of ZHIENETH. The
of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported proximate cause was ZHIENETHs act of clinging to the counter.
by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and This act in turn caused the counter to fall on her. This and
dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or CRISELDAs contributory negligence, through her failure to
a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former provide the proper care and attention to her child while inside the
employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the store, nullified private respondents claim for damages. It is also

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

 P a g e | 13

for these reasons that parents are made accountable for the A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the
damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor children. child. And when the doctor asked the child what did
Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held you do, the child said nothing, I did not come near the
responsible for the accident that befell ZHIENETH. counter and the counter just fell on me.
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
already separated from Syvels at the time he testified; hence, his
testimony might have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them. You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?

For their part, private respondents principally reiterated ATTY. BELTRAN

their arguments that neither ZHIENETH nor CRISELDA was Yes, your Honor.
negligent at any time while inside the store; the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals are substantiated by the COURT
evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who heard
ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the Granted. Intercalate wala po, hindi po ako lumapit
hospitals emergency room should receive credence; and finally, doon. Basta bumagsak.xiv
ZHIENETHs part of the res gestae declaration that she did
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETHs
nothing to cause the heavy structure to fall on her should be
statement formed (and should be admitted as) part of the res
considered as the correct version of the gruesome events.
gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:
We deny the petition.
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence; and (2) subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
due and reasonable care while inside the store premises. res gestae.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain
fault or negligence attaches to the defendant.vii It is a fortuitous or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without considered declarations and admissions.xv All that is required for
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.viii declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH,
something which a reasonable man, guided by those a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and credence to Gonzales testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH
reasonable man would not do.ix Negligence is the failure to performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly,
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances make stable the counters base.
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. x
Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping
one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person counter proved their negligence, thus:
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to
any means suggested by common prudence.xi keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping
counter proved their negligence, thus:
The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith,xii thus: Did Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
floor, will you please describe the gift wrapping counter, were
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person you able to examine?
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.xiii
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no that counter and since it is not nailed and it was only standing
accident and that ZHIENETHs death could only be attributed to on the floor, it was shaky.
negligence.
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at xxx
the scene of the incident and accompanied CRISELDA and Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 oclock [sic]
ZHIENETH to the hospital: in the afternoon on [sic] May 9 1983?
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or beside the verification counter. And since the top of it
notice anything while the child was being treated?

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was heavy and considering that it was not nailed, it can It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of
collapse at anytime, since the top is heavy. witnesses, the appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb
xxx the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to
Q And what did you do? determine the same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of
A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic] actually hearing the testimony of and observing the deportment
shaky and since Mr. Maat is fond of putting display of the witnesses.[26] However, the rule admits of exceptions such
decorations on tables, he even told me that I would put as when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or
some decorations. But since I told him that it not [sic] failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight and
nailed and it is shaky he told me better inform also the substance which could affect the result of the case.[27] In the
company about it. And since the company did not do instant case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the
anything about the counter, so I also did not do exception.
anything about the counter.[24] [Emphasis supplied] Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9)
the testimony of Gonzales, thus: years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
Q Will you please described [sic] to the honorable Court the In his book,[28] former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
counter where you were assigned in January 1983?
xxx In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
ordered me to carry that counter to another place. I told is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
him that the counter needs nailing and it has to be presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
nailed because it might cause injury or accident to obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years
another since it was shaky. of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.
Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and
second floor on February 12, 1983, will you please required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal
describe that to the honorable Court? or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in good conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that
[sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her that we had to the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
nail it. negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen
Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]? years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir. therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as
that the counter was shaky? a matter of law. [Emphasis supplied]
A She told me Why do you have to teach me. You are only
my subordinate and you are to teach me? And she even
got angry at me when I told her that. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
xxx ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any, injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that
did Ms. Panelo or any employee of the management do the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail
to that (sic) six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The
xxx physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court
of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence[29]on record reveal
Witness: otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an
inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its
the counter after the accident happened.[25] [Emphasis base was not secured.[30]
supplied] CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDAs waist,
supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the later to the latters hand.[31] CRISELDA momentarily released the
unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to childs hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip.
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the stores At this precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for
employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot
miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just
father of a family. four meters away from CRISELDA.[32] The time and distance
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did
petitioners failed to establish that the formers testimonies were not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even
biased and tainted with partiality. Therefore, the allegation that admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did
Gonzales and Guevarras testimonies were blemished by ill not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
feelings against petitioners since they (Gonzales and Guevarra)
were already separated from the company at the time their
testimonies were offered in court was but mere speculation and
deserved scant consideration.

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC

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denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel

Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at
Guinobatan, Albay.

On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9

finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
imposed the penalty mentioned above.

EN BANC The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of
the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
vs. its Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
RULING
DECISION
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s]
parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother
affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No.
4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been
"Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape 3 stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims who
committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of for a girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly
and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate,
imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be
the award of civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and awarding expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00 man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own
for moral damages. daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the
rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s
against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical
AAA’s father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her
herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay
upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond
September 5, 2000 reads: reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be
imposed on him.
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality
of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Act No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-
with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law,
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is
feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of
years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was
prejudice. committed, was alleged in the information and proven during
trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be
imposed.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with
the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion
that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article
AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant
Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 P a g e | 16

2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the
old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found docile cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related to
by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge
any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10,
was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in
assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister,
it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases,
Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000
this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a
lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.34 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when
he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing
and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender
the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently,
is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty ordered dismissed.
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. 35
commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is
reclusion perpetua. extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly
considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the
accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the
damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is
committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack
that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the
award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence
here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
Republic of the Philippines
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Supreme Court
Doña Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. Manila
While he knows [AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they go
to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does
not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from THIRD DIVISION
Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in
the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of
the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No
seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present
were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they
transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from CARPIO
barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña VELASC
Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in - versus - PERALT
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while ABAD, a
his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard MENDO
testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years
old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between Promulg
1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily Accused-Appellant. July 20,
routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon after school
before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at
the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1
kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his -------x
mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most
surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows DECISION
Saling Crisologo and the latter’s place which is more than half
kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
PERALTA, J.:
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7,
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 P a g e | 17

Criminal Case No. 10250

That on or about the evening of
For this Court's consideration is the Decisioniii dated October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgmentiii dated jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, above-named accused, without authority of
Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond and feloniously sell zero point zero four one
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine
Republic Act (RA) 9165. hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu
which is a dangerous drug.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of
Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).iii
informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17)
years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Criminal Case No. 10251
Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was That on or about the evening of
organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the
P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, and feloniously possess zero point six one
Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust three one (0.6131) grams of
operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other.
Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of
the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).iii
appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers
and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police
officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried
appellant as he was leaving the place. jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and
Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big In its Omnibus Judgmentiii dated September 14, 2005,
sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
the appellant on the ground.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
After the operation, and in the presence of the same finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory of the GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in
items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a
of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small dangerous drug, as defined and penalized
sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A.
peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by 9165, where the offender is a minor, the
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of penalty for acts punishable by life
the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra- imprisonment to death shall be reclusion
violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as the perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba
two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine
Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, (P500,000.00).
who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory
examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the In Criminal Case No. 10251, the
presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and Court likewise finds accused Allen
the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were reasonable doubt for illegally possessing
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride. shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131
gram as defined and penalized under
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of and accused being a minor at the time of the
Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following: commission of the offense, after applying the
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 P a g e | 18

suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in

Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until
as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with
the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
RULING objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court
law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his minority in his
conflict with the law has willfully failed to
suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17)
comply with the condition of his/her
years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the
disposition or rehabilitation program, the
said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
child in conflict with the law shall be brought
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
before the court for execution of judgment.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while
If said child in conflict with the law has
the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September
reached eighteen (18) years of age while
14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC
under suspended sentence, the court shall
did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of
determine whether to discharge the child in
P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32
accordance with this Act, to order execution
of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
of sentence, or to extend the suspended
the Law,[32] the laws that were applicable at the time of the
sentence for a certain specified period or
promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for
until the child reaches the maximum age
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
of twenty-one (21) years.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one
entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and
(21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38
68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of
would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under
Sentence. - Once the child who is under
its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the
commission of the offense is found guilty of
age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in
the offense charged, the court shall
2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been
determine and ascertain any civil liability
elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the
which may have resulted from the offense
sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to
committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows
the judgment of conviction, the court shall
the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
place the child in conflict with the law under
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D.
suspended sentence, without need of
603.[34]
application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years
minority[39] can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty that
(18) of age or more at the time of the
should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the
minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated
Upon suspension of sentence and after
above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than
considering the various circumstances of the
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
child, the court shall impose the appropriate
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
disposition measures as provided in the
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
(ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the
Conflict with the Law.
penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC
 P a g e | 19

circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.[40] The ISLAW is

applicable in the present case because the penalty which has
been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible
penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

ARTICLE 12 OF THE RPC