OBNAMIA, James Evan I.

11684917

Atty. Ayo

PLDT vs. CA

G.R. L-57079. September 29, 1989

FACTS:

Sps. Esteban were driving along Lacson, where they resided, when they over a mound of
earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning light or
signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained
injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while Antonio
suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered. They filed a suit for damages
against PLDT.

PLDT denies liability, contending that: (1) the injuries sustained by the spouses were due
to their own negligence, and (2) that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and
Co. [Barte] who should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte,
alleging that under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any
accident or injuries arising from the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed
that it was not aware, nor was it notified of the accident, and that it complied with its
contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate signs.

Sps. Esteban allege that they were just driving at 25km/hr.

RTC: Ruled in favor of the spouses.

CA: Reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban - NO

RATIO:

The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was
not imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. The accident would not have
happened if bot due to the jeep running quite fast (more than 25kph) on the inside lane and
for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the
accident mound. Then Antonio had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have
put on his regular lights which should have made him see the accident mound in time. The
mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of
the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous times.

The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but
goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to
the spouses. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the
injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of PLDT.

The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act
would have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there;
hence, the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident.
Furthermore, Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to PLDT.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving
the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail.
The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of
PLDT. What was presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the
unverified photograph of a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police
report and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where the spouses
were allegedly treated have not even been explained.

JARCO MARKETING vs. CA

G.R. 129792. December 21, 1999

FACTS:

In the afternoon of May 9 1983, Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter, Zhieneth, were at the
2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store owned by Jarco Marketing in Makati City.

While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the counter, she felt a sudden gust of
wind and heard a loud thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's body pinned by
the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming
for help. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around
in lifting the counter and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was quickly rushed
to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on., but she unfortunately died after
14 days.
After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the
reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which
they had incurred. But, they refused to pay.

Criselda filed a complaint for damages

Jarco Marketing answered with counterclaim and denied any liability on the grounds that:
(1)Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing
her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances, and (2) Zhieneth
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its
eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy
wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.

Jarco Marketing maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection, supervision and control of its employees.

RTC: dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. It held that the proximate cause of the fall
of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging to it.

CA: favored Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a
structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top
wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither
evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective,
unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from
the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already
previously brought to the attention of the management the danger the counter could cause.
But the latter ignored their concern.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident - YES

RATIO:

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the

defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens."

On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury."

The test in determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We
rule that the tragedy which befell Zhieneth was no accident and that Zhieneth’s death could
only be attributed to negligence.

It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements

made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered
under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and
concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and
in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life.

We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., Zhieneth performed
no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or
omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of
the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the
situation petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good
father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over
the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter
was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused
the counter to collapse.

The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped
like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.

Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, Zhieneth held
on to Criselda’s waist, later to the latter's hand. Criselda momentarily released the child's
hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was
reasonable and usual for Criselda to let go of her child. Further, at the time Zhieneth was
pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-
wrapping counter was just four meters away from Criselda. The time and distance were
both significant. Zhieneth was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want
to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that
she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

YLARDE vs. AQUINO

GR No. L33722. July 29, 1988

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School in
Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that time, the
school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop destroyed in
World War II.

In order to help, defendant, gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig
beside a one ton concrete block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left
unfinished so after class he called 4 of the 18 students including the Novelito Ylarde to
complete the excavation.

Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to get the key to the school
workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged that before leaving, he told the
children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, the children playfully jumped into the pit
when suddenly the concrete block slide down. Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde was pinned
to the wall causing serious physical injuries which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days
thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against
both Aquino and Soriano.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person; (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own
reckless imprudence.

CA: Affirmed RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Soriano can be held liable - NO

Whether or not Aquino can be held liable for damages - YES

HELD:

The court held that Principal Soriano cannot be held liable. As held in Amadora vs CA, “it
is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students”. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, this is the general rule. However, in case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable
for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it
is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held
liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and he did not give any
instruction regarding the digging.

A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his students should make sure that the children
are protected from all harm. The excavation instructed clearly exposed the students to risk
and should not be placed under the category of Work Education such as school gardening,
planting trees etc. Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence where instead of availing
himself of adult manual laborers he instead utilized his students. Furthermore, the
warning given is not sufficient to cast away all serious danger that the concrete block
adjacent to the excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to pay
damages to the petitioners.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous
site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it
was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just
had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into
the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil
was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into
the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight.
Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of
private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it
not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives
of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not
consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to
be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A
minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be
judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard
of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, w e cannot
charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

FRANCISCO vs. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS, INC.

G.R. No. 193577. September 9, 2011

FACTS:
Since 1965, Petitioner Francisco has been the owner and manager of a Caltex station. In
1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to sickness. In 1993 four persons, including
Gregorio Bacsa (Bacsa), came to Francisco’s Caltex station and introduced themselves as
employees of CBCI.

Bacsa introduced himself as a radio operator and confidential secretary of a certain Mr.
Inawat (Inawat), CBCI’s manager for operations. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain
quantity of CBCI’s diesel fuel at a lower price.

After checking Bacsas identification card, Francisco agreed to purchase CBCIs diesel fuel.
Francisco imposed the following conditions for the purchase: (1) that Petron Corporation
(Petron) should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at his business address which should be
properly indicated in Petrons invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is sealed; and (3) that Bacsa
should issue a separate receipt to Francisco.

The deliveries started on 5 April 1993 and lasted for ten months, or up to 25 January 1994.
There were 17 deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions were complied with. The
transaction was covered receipts which were typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper
to remove doubts as to his legitimacy as a seller.

It turned out that Basca was not authoritzed by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel. In February
1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel fuel delivered to him but
which had been paid for by CBCI. CBCI demanded that Francisco pay CBCI P1,053,527 for
the diesel fuel or CBCI would file a complaint against him in court. Francisco rejected
CBCI’s demand.

CBCI argued that Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell and Caltex
are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum products in the Philippines, the diesel fuel
came from illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal, acts.

RTC: Francisco was not liable for damages in favor of CBCI because the 17 deliveries were
covered by original and genuine invoices. The trial court declared that Bacsa, as
confidential secretary of Inawat, was CBCI’s authorized representative who received
Francisco’s full payment for the diesel fuel

CA: Reversed RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Francisco exercised the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct
of his business - NO

RATIO:

Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and place. The most
common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably
prudent person. To determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use
as basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly person.

However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a
reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use. Physical
handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for
a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.

We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex
station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business until this
time. In this instance, however, we rule that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of
conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.

(1) Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was
authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa.

(2) Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might
be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel
fuel.

(3) Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on a half sheet
of plain bond paper.

If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official receipt
issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s invoice, does not
show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco
failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind