GUTHRIE The Thirty Years War The Lech

Chapter6
Gustavus's Run ofVictory:

From Stettin to the Lech
On May 11, 1630, Swedish diplomats presented the Imperials with an

ultimátum.' On July 20, Gustavus Adolphus landed on the German mainland.
On August 24, Wallenstein was dismissed from command.
There was nothing sudden about this invasion. Gustavus had begun domestic
propaganda about a crusade against Catholicism in 1623, he had been part of the
anti-Hapsburg coalition of 1625, and he had been issuing criticisms of imperial
policy since 1628. A Swedish garrison was placed in Stralsund in June 1628,
and in March 1630, the Swedes cIeared the Imperials from the island of Rugen.
The Imperials made no real effort to defend the offshore is1ands, given Swedish
control of the sea.
Historians have disputed the king's goals in invading the Empire: he made no
effort to conceal them. Sweden wanted assecuratio and satisfactio, security and
compensation. By "security" he meant Swedish domination of the Baltic coast;
by "compensation" he meant whatever else he could gel. Less materialistically,
he intended to "relieve the sufferings of the German Protestants.,,2
THE POMERANIAN CAMPAIGN

Gustavus had intended to strike with 46,000 men, but due to lack of transport,
his initial force mustered only 14,000? On June 13, he landed at Peenemunde on
the island of Usedom. Within a month, three islands, Rugen, Usedom, and
Wollin, were safely in Swedish hands, plus the mainland foothold of Kammin.
Wallenstein had anticipated the invasion and had garrisoned Pomerania and
Mecklenburg with a nominal 30,000. Unfortunately, they were not well
deployed. The barren Baltic coast was incapable of sustaining troop
concentrations. While the Swedes with their naval transport were not dependent
on local supply, the Imperials certainly were-this was to hamper Imperial
operations on the Baltic throughout the war. In theory, the coast was defended
by an army of 50,000 under the incompetent Conti, in fact, the Imperials had
150 BattIes oftheThirty Years War
some 20-25,000 scattered in 28 garrisons and four cornmands." For political

reasons, they had left the capital of Stettin unoccupied. On July 20, Gustavus
sailed into the neutral port and forced the duke into "alliance," effectively slicing
the Imperial defense right up the middle. Up to the end of the war, the fortress
complex of Stettin-Damm would constitute Sweden's principal base in Germany.
Now began the slow process of expanding the bridgehead. There was nothing
"Napoleonic" about this stage of Gustavus's war, only the tedium of too-slow
reinforcements, inflexible logistic constraints, and the patient reduction of
strongholds. As every man landed required food, and each ship carrying supplies
was one less carrying troops, Gustavus had to assemble his army in dribblets.
His immediate goal was to secure the Pomeranian coast. For this, he had 20,000
men, his original landing force plus 6000 in Stralsund, but garrisons ate up over
half. Although the Swedish monarch had campaigned against Denrnark, Poland,
and Russia, he had not yet faced a first rate opponent, and his experience with
Arnim in Poland indicated that the Imperials would be formidable. In any case,
he showed uncharacteristic caution.
Damm, Stettin's auxiliary across the Oder, was occupied on July 22. Gustavus
then (Aug 14) entered weakly held East Pornerania, securing the insignificant
places of Greifenberg, Treptow, Stargard, Saalzig, Gollnow, Naugard, and
Plathe. At the same time, a column from Prussia occupied the strongholds of
Stolp, Rugenwalde, and Koslin. By the end of August, the Imperials had fallen
back into the strong fortress of Kolberg, leaving the balance of East Pomerania
in Swedish hands.
Simultaneously, Gustavus struck west as well. His intention there was to
establish a land connection between Stralsund and Stettin. The veteran
Knyphausen with 5105 men overran the river crossings of Uckermunde and
Anklam (July 31) and reduced the fortress of Wolgast.? This drawn-out (Aug 2-
25) siege was won through superior engineering. Further advances being
blocked by the fortress of Greifswald; Knyphausen was shifted to Kolberg. An
attempt to open Stralsund's line of communications via Pasewalk (Sept 13-17)
was terminated when an unexpected Imperial counterattack, the first so far,
destroyed that outpost.
By mid-Septernber, Gustavus had assembled 26,000 men in Pornerania, of
which 11,000 were tied up in garrison-only 4230 cavalry were available.
Emboldened by the supine defense, he now planned a more ambitious operation.
When the Swede landed, he had expected welcome and support from the
German Protestants. Aside from dispossessed exiles like the Mecklenburg
dukes, he received none; Saxony and the moderates were frankly hostile. But by
Septernber, he had rallied such old Protestant partisans as the Landgrave of
Hesse-Cassel Franz Karl Sax-Lauenburg and the Sax-Weimars. Even more
importantly, pro-Swedish elements had assumed control of Magdeburg, key to
the middle Elbe (Aug 11).
Although the Catholic armies totaled over 100,000 when Gustavus landed,
their polítical position was weak. The emperor had assumed that peace was at
hand. With the defeat of Denmark, the Edict of Restitution marked a final
settlernent, the satisfaction of all Catholic demands. It but remained to convince
the Lutherans to accept their diminished status and disband the armies.
Unfortunately for the ernperor, he found himself embroiled in an unwanted war
Gustavus's Run ofVictory 151
with Sweden. Then the summit of electors (Regensburg, July-Aug, 1630)

refused to ratify the settlement. The Catholics under Maximilian and the
Protestants under Johann Georg for once presented a united front: Wallenstein
must go! The emperor yielded. The Imperial army would be reduced to 40,000,
that of the League to 20,000, and TilIy would assume command of both. The
levying of arbitrary kontributions would cease; the armies would be supported
by a general tax according to Imperiallaw ("Roman months").
The planned reductions were aborted by the Swedish invasion, and the tax
only supplemented kontributions, but Wallenstein was gone. The concessions
conciliated the Catholics, but the Protestants still refused to accept the Edict.
Even moderates like John Georg suspected that it was only the beginning, not
the end of Catholic demands. The moderates now rejected both Swedish king
and German emperor.
Conti, the Imperial commander on the Baltic, was about as incapable as any
general of the war, moreover, he was sick. But the disarray of the defense was
not entirely his fault. The fall of Wallenstein had left the Imperials without
direction, without reinforcements, and with no supplies except what they could
steal locally. Conti's departure in December only increased the confusion. The
Imperials were thrown back on local commanders, Savelli in Mecklenburg,
Schauenburg" at Gartz, Hatzfeld at Greifswald. It would be months before TilIy
was able to restore order.
Had the Swedes landed in an area held by TilIy's Leaguers, they would have
had more trouble. But Wallenstein's "Armada" was essentially improvisation, a
mixed bag of good troops, raw recruits, and Protestant deserters, too-hastily
expanded. In any case, the best units were in Italy. Thus the Imperial defense of
Pomerania was not so much the outpost of a invincible army as a scattering of
garrisons waiting passively to be gobbled up one by one.
To Gustavus, the allegiance of Magdeburg seemed like the turning point of
the invasion. He would brush aside the Imperials and secure the Elbe from
Magdeburg to Meissen. As a start, he would restore the exiles to Mecklenburg.
This "first invasion of Mecklenburg" was elaborately planned. In late
September, Gustavus would assemble 12,000 men at Stralsund, then, supported
by his fleet, cross into the duchy. At the same time, Franz Karl Sax-Lauenburg
would strike from the west. Savelli's 5400 Imperials would be crushed between.
Things went badly from the start. The king was unable to scrape up more than
5582 men. The fleet was immobilized by unfavorable winds. Gustavus decided
to proceed anyway (Oct 2). With the aid of his artillery, he easily overran the
Imperial outposts of Damgarten and Ribnitz and secured the key crossing over
the Recknitz River (Oct 6-7). He then pushed up to Rostock, the principal
Mecklenburg stronghold.
The hoped-for general Protestant uprising did not materialize; the cautious
Mecklenburgers preferring to wait and see. Franz Karl mismanaged his part of
the operation. Having failed to surprise the 50-man garrison of Ratzeburg, he got
bogged down besieging it (Oct 5). He next attracted the attention of
Pappenheim, commanding the Leaguers on the lower Elbe. Assembling some 8-
9000 men, he surprised and annihilated Franz Karl's much smaller force.'
Savelli had assembled 3000 foot and 2400 horse for the defense of Rostock,
while Gustavus now had les s than 5000. If Pappenheim suddenly struck east and
152 Batdes of the Thirty Years War
joined Savelli, the Swedes would be doomed. Gustavus prudently retired (Oct
25). Pappenheim rather unenterprisingly returned to the Elbe, and Savelli was
content to leave Ribnitz in Swedish hands. In this first test of strengths,
Gustavus had definitely come in second.
Undaunted, the king prepared his strategic plan for 1631. The army would be
increased to 100,000 men (inc1uding garrisons), divided into five corps. The
royal army (30,000) would secure the Baltic, while Horn (15,000) would
advance up the Oder from Stettin, supported by Teuffel (11,000) from Kolberg
and Falkenberg (11,000) in Magdeburg. An English expedition under Hamilton
(15,000) would land at the mouth of the Weser and pin the Leaguers. The
Imperial position on the Baltic would be eliminated and the Swedes would drive
up the Elbe and Oder into Bohemia and Silesia.8 The plan was "Napoleonic,"
dazzling in its scope. Each army would function as part of the overall plan, Iike
a 19th century corps. Unfortunately, the optimistic king had disregarded
inescapable constraints of finances, logistics, and numbers. In 1632, when these
constraints were les s pressing, a more evolved version saw a dozen armies
occupying all Germany.
Gustavus's immediate concern was the capture of Gartz. As long as this
stronghold remained in Imperial hands, progress up the Oder was impossible,
communications with Magdeburg were uncertain, and Stettin was under threat.
Conti, fully aware of this, mas sed such forces as he had around the town. In
mid-Novernber, Conti felt sufficiently secure that he could assist the long
beleaguered fortress of Kolberg, dispatching a small detachment under
Colloredo.9 On November 23, Horn intercepted them with a scratch force of
4000 men and eight Iight guns. Horn got the worst of it, losing 400 men and five
ensigns to 40 Imperials, but Colloredo lost his nerve and returned to Gartz.
Kolberg would not be relieved.
This action did not interrupt Gustavus's preparations for the Gartz operation.
By New Years 1631, he was ready. As noted before, the Imperials were having
logistical difficulties, and these constrained Schauenburg when he went into
winter quarters in December. He had, in all, some 12,000 men, 7000 foot, not
quite 5000 horse, and 28 guns. However, he was forced to divide his force into
three smaller groups: the main body, 6500 strong, in Gartz itself; 1500 infantry
under Col Capua in nearby Greifenhagen, and some 3000 foot and 800 horse
under GWM Cratz at the village of Pyritz, about 20 miles east.
Gustavus moved out January 3, with 13,000 men, 50 guns, and supporting
barges on the icy Oder. The Imperials were unprepared-they had assumed the
fighting was over for the winter-but the surprise was wasted in overrunning the
outpost at Greifenhagen. Most of the garrison escaped to Gartz, which thus had
ample warning when the Swedes arrived on the 5th. When he saw their superior
artillery, Schauenburg realized that his position was untenable; he conducted a
very professional retreat. Gustavus chased him to Kustrin, but was thwarted by
the able rearguard. At Kustrin, to the king's amazement and fury, the
Brandenburger garrison sheltered the defeated Imperials (Jan 8). He could not
understand how German Protestants could aid German Catholics against
Swedish Protestants.
A detachment had been sent to de al with Cratz, but he eluded them and fell
back to Landsberg (Jan 6-7). Gustavus next tried to seize Landsberg in a coup-
Gustavus's Run of Victory 153
de-main, but the garrison was alert and the se heme failed (Jan 11). The offensive
having fizzled out; Gustavus returned to Stettin.
The Gartz operation was a bit of a disappointment. The Imperials lost about
500 men and retired intact. However, it accomplished its main goal: the Oder
was open. Schauenburg's crew was demoralized, the Swedes correspondingly
encouraged.
Even as Gustavus was pursuing the defeated Schauenburg, Tilly was en route
to assume command. In a notable forced march,'" he reached Frankfort January
24. He had intended to strengthen Schauenburg enough to hold the Oder and
relieve Kolberg. Losing Gartz left him a good deal taken aback. Clearly it was
no longer possible to simply contain the Swedes; moreover, he had lost
confidence in Schauenburg.
The capture of Gartz and the arrival of Tilly marked the second stage of
Gustavus's war. No longer could he simply prey on passive and uncoordinated
defenses. Now he found himself in a strategic duel with an able opponent, the
Swede trying to break out into Germany proper, the Walloon to throw him back
into the sea. Had Tilly arrived four months earlier, the war might have already
been decided.
THEDUEL
As noted in Chapter 1, Tilly was in an unen viable strategic situation. At
Stettin, Gustavus enjoyed interior lines; as the apex of a shallow triangle, he was
much closer to the Imperial corps in Mecklenburg or Frankfort than they were to
each other. Moreover, the logistics were bad: neither Pomerania nor
Brandenburg could support an army of sufficient size, and Mecklenburg was
worse. Additionally, as long as Magdeburg remained in Swedish hands, it posed
both an obstacle and a threat, a key crossing point and a potential base. Finally,
of the three sectors needing attention, TilIy could only be at one at a time. What
he needed was three armies, each capable of beating Gustavus's field force, and
three competent, reliable subordinates. What he had was less than double the
Swedes under Schauenburg, Pappenheim, and Savelli. Schauenburg was reliable
but not competent, Pappenheim was competent but not reliable, and Savelli was
neither competent nor reliable.
Tilly's original idea had been for Pappenheim to de al with Magdeburg, while
Savelli stood on the defense, and he and Schauenburg advanced down the Oder.
This seheme was derailed by the Gartz fiasco. Far from advancing, Schauenburg
would require reinforcement to hold on to Frankfort. It might seem from the
map that TilIy's next move should have been to screen Magdeburg with a small
force while Pappenheim and the League veterans advanced east through
Mecklenburg. But Mecklenburg was incapable of feeding such an army, and this
was doubly true in winter.
Gustavus's position was slightly more promising. He had established himself
firmly in Pomerania-only Greifswald and Kolberg rernained in Imperial
hands-and he was able to strike at either Mecklenburg or Brandenburg.
However, advancing away from the coastal ports would entail logistical
difficulties, and he was running short of money. In the long run, he couldn't
maintain the war without support from the German Protestants, most
irnrnediately the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg. It was necessary to relieve
154 Battles of the Thirty Years War
the embattled town of Magdeburg: if Tilly could demonstrate that the Swedes
could not protect their friends then his chances of gaining backing would
eyaporate like Christian's in 1626. However, the town was too far from his
occupied zone, blocked by both Brandenburg and Saxony. It was a circular
argument; without support he couldn't save Magdeburg, but he couldn't expect
sU.QQ9rtunless he saved it.
A wild card in the game, Johann Georg's moderates now had their own army.
At the Leipzig Conference (Feb-Apr 1631) they formed an Evangelical Union, a
"third force" inimical to both sides. The allies Gustavus needed were flocking to
Saxony, not Sweden.
The defeat at Gartz forced Tilly to waste January reorganizing Schauenburg's
crew at Frankfort-on-Oder. Thus it fell to Gustavus to make the first thrust in
their duel, the second invasion of Mecklenburg (Feb 8-27). This time, he had
9300 men available, 6100 foot, 3200 horse, and 90 guns. He did not use the
secured crossing at Ribnitz, as might have been expected, but struck at the
southern end of the river at Neu-Brandenburg, and rolled up the Imperial
defense line. The outposts of Neu-Brandenburg, Malchin, Treptow, and Loitz all
fell in rapid succession; the town of Demmin put up more resistance. Savelli's
own headquarters, it was defended by 1880 men and 36 guns. Unfortunately, its
water defenses, river, moat, and marshes, were frozen and useless. The siege
was brief (Feb 22-25). Savelli had placed his reliance on a single key sconce;
when it fell, he surrendered." Loss was !ight, 200 Swedes to 100 Imperials.
Gustavus concluded the operation by capturing the outpost of Tribsee.
During the first invasion, nothing had gone right; this time nothing went
wrong. Although Mecklenburg remained Imperial, the line of the Trebel and
Recknitz rivers was now in Swedish hands, exposing Rostock and protecting
Pomerania. As a bonus, Kolberg, despairing of relief, surrendered March 6.
Hearing of the threat to Demmin Tilly put together a scratch force and moved
to Havelberg, but his parry carne too late. Savelli had not given him enough
time. Nevertheless, he resolved to strike back (Mar 12). Gustavus prepared a
riposte, stripping his garrisons to assemble a superior army, 19,029 strong. Tilly
was marching into a trapo
Uncharacteristically, Gustavus hesitated.F While Tilly had only 13,000 men,
the Swedish cavalry were not in good condition. The king decided not to risk a
battle.P Hearing that Tilly was moving on Neu-Brandenburg, he first ordered
that it be held to the last, then that it be evacuated or surrendered. Finally, he
decided to divert Tilly by threatening to cut him off.
Unluckily, Tilly's reconnaissance was poor; he was completely unaware of
both the Swedish concentration and his supposed encirclement. Single-
mindedly, he closed in on the town.
Although the southern anchor of the river !ine, Neu-Brandenburg was a weak
place, its water defenses frozen. Knyphausen held it with 750 men and three
regimental guns. On March 19, Tilly carried it by storm. The Imperials lost 40
killed and as many wounded, the Swedes 250 dead and 500 captured. The
Swedes claimed the garrison had been massacred in cold blood: this was untrue,
but it was a justification for reprisals.
Tilly was not satisfied. The defense at Neu-Brandenburg had been more
determined, more costly, than such a weak position merited. Also, the failure of
Gustavus to react seemed ominous. Regarding Gustavus with cautious respect,

TilIy conjectured that the Swede meant to wear him out on outposts, then strike
back. Had he known that a superior Swedish army was moving to envelope him,
he might have worried less. In any case, he fell back and carne safely away.
Tilly's new plan was to concentrate on Magdeburg while Schauenburg and
Virmond (Savelli's successor in Mecklenburg) stood on the defensive. This
stroke had definite merits: the Magdeburg position was far superior, logistically,
to the Baltic or the Oder; much of the League army was already there, and if
Gustavus tried to relieve it, he would have to move away from the safety of the
Baltic. He might be drawn out to his destruction.
In 1631, siegecraft had not yet attained the perfection to be associated with
Vauban. Defenses relied heavily on outlying earthworks, sconces, ravelins, and
hornworks. These were intended to keep the enemy at a distance from the inner
defenses. The besiegers would surround the fortifications-sometimes
entrenchin a line of circumvallation-suppress the defending guns with a
covering battery, then sap their way up to the defending works. The wall could
then be breached by cannonfire or undermined, and the breach assaulted by
infantry. Alternatively, a wall could be scaled or a gate blown open. Only after
the outlying works were secured could the town itself be attacked.
The defenders might prolong the process by an "active" defense employing
sorties, counterattacks, and lavish use of firepower. This assumed a garrison
prepared to take losses and an ample supply of ammunition. Particularly strong
fortresses might have to be starved into surrender; sometimes the besiegers
starved first.
Magdeburghad been under a loose blockade since December of 1630, but it
was only with Tilly's arrival Apr 3) that the siege began in earnest. The year
before, Gustavus had dispatched Falkenberg, one of his trusted paladins, to
assume command. The town was fairly strong to begin with-it had defied
Wallenstein in 1625 a~d 1629-but the industrious Falkenberg had strengthened
the defenses with an additional dozen sconces and outworks." His garrison
mustered so me 2500 soldiers and 5000 militia-from a total population of
30000-with 77 guns. Unfortunately, the supply of gunpowder was low, and
too muc~ what they did have was wasted defending minor outworks. Tilly
had 17,000 men plus a powerful siege train of 30 demicannon (24 pdr) and two
"full" cannons (35 pdr). With careful planning, he gnawed off individual
outworks. Trotz- Tilly fell April 10, and Falkenberg advised Gustavus that the
town could not hold out much longer than the beginning of May.
Gustavus resolved to assist Magdeburg by a diversion. This was a popular
ploy, as 1t seemed to promise results at minimal risk. But, as with Neu-
Brandenburg earlier, a diversion that fails to divert is useless. Gustavus's plan
was to threaten Frankfort, the Imperial bastion on the Oder front. Schauenburg
was completely surprised (as usual!); he had 6400 men to Gustavus's 20,327.
When the king saw how unprepared Frankfort was, he could not resist launching
an immediate assault. Struck at two points, Imperial resistance quickly collapsed
-the ebullient Swedes avenged the Neu-Brandenburg "massacre" on hundreds
of Imperials trying to surrender. Schauenburg and most of the garrison escaped
across the bridge to safety-they had learned to retreat, if nothing else!
Gustavus lost 130 men killed and wounded, the Imperials 1700 killed and 1000
captured. The Oder was open and the road to Silesia as well (Apr 13).
In his eagerness to score a quick hit, Gustavus had swallowed his own bait.
\ When Tilly heard that Frankfort was in danger, he interrupted his operations so
a~ to prepare a relief force. But when he was later informed that the town was
already lost he decided to finish off Magdeburg. The diversion had failed.
The scheme was, in any case, a dubious one. Even had Tilly gone to
Frankfort, he would have left Pappenheim at Magdeburg.
TilIy still had hopes of drawing Gustavus into the open, away from his
defenses. He was not afraid of battle; the arrival of the League army from
Westphalia had brought him up to 25-30,000 men. Even if the king remained
cautious, the loss of Magdeburg would be a serious blow to his cause. Progress
continued, patient, but steady. By May L all the outworks were in TilIy's hands;
on te, the suburbs fel\. The town had been stripped to its inner defenses.
Gustavus was now forced to see that he had to intervene directly. However,
he was unwilling to expose his army. It would have been possible for Gustavus
to simply march directly on Magdeburg and force Tilly to battle, but if he were
defeated, the war might be lost at a stroke. He wanted to secure his line of
communications/retreat by occupying so me of the intervening fortresses held by
Brandenburg.
Elector Georg Wilhelm was caught between the two: he did not want Tilly to
capture Magdeburg, neither did he want to aid Gustavus's invasion, and he
certainly didn't want to hand over control of his fortresses! Weeks were wasted
in negotiation. Finally (May 14), a compromise was reached. Gustavus marched
to Potsdam.
The king was unwilling to advance farther without the support of Saxony.
Johann Georg had no interest in Magdeburg; he wanted the town to negotiate a
reasonable surrender. He refused all assistance, point blank. This effectively
terminated any chance of relief, although neither Gustavus nor Falkenberg were
willing to admit it.
Till attempted to open negotiations, May 4-16, even as his grip tightened
around the town. By then it was obvious to the less fanatical citizens thatthe
situation was hopeless, but through sheer determination Falkenberg managed to
keep the fight ~oing. Even when Tilly sent a final ultimatum on the 18th, he was
able to block surrender, swearing to the citizens that the king was on his way.15
Tilly's patience had worn thin. At noon on May 19, he summoned a council of
war. The general assault would include six simultaneous attacks on the town's
perimeter, the most important being Pappenheim's storm of the northeast bastion
called the "New Work." The field word would be "Jesu Maria."
At 7:00 A.M. of the zo", Pappenheim set off six cannon shots, signaling the
general assault. Falkenberg, who thought that TilIy was still waiting for his
surrender, was taken by surprise. Pappenheim took the covered way without loss
and scaled the ramparts. Falkenberg rushed the reserve to the New W ork.
Between 8:00 and 9:00, the Imperials broke in; Falkenberg and his officers were
cut down. Some of the columns breached the weakened defenses, while others
were admitted by their more successful colleagues. Diehard resistance dragged
on for over an hour.
Heavy cavalry had followed Pappenheim's infantry into the town, Croats
behind them. A dozen fires broke out. The town was brutally sacked and burned,
.
"
more than 20,000 perishing. The Imperials lost 300 killed and 1600 wounded.
TiIly was displeased with the outcome. He was disappointed in his troops'
conduct, and the.destruction of the town had eliminated the wealth and supplies
he had hoped to secure.
If ~agdeburg was a disappointment to Tilly, it was a shock to Gustavus.
Never very realistic about German politics, he had convinced himself that
Johann Georg would eventually be persuaded, that Magdeburg would hold out
until he was. Now Swedish prestige lay in ruins. But in a way the shock proved
salutary; TiIly had wounded his opponent, not killed him.
Gustavus's first reaction was, characteristically, to blame the two electors for
his failure; his second was to abandon his "diplomatic" caution. He decided to
occupy Brandenburg and pressure the Elector into alliance. Given the
circumstances, Georg Wilhelm proved remarkably stubborn; over a month
passed before he accepted subordination to Sweden.
It might seem that TiIly should have exploited his success by moving directly
against Gustavus, at the least pushing into Brandenburg and preventing
Gustavus from gaining control. The Swedish victories at Gartz and Frankfort
had impressed the old marshal, and the devastation of Magdeburg created
logistical difficulties for such an advance. Also, by the time Magdeburg fell,
Gustavus was already in possession of the electorate. In any case, Tilly had
more pressing concerns. Johann Georg's Evangelical Union was assembling an
army of 40-50,000 men and in control of key cities in southern Germany, plus
powerful field armies in Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. Historians regard this
association as a joke; TiIly did not have that luxury. He had never trusted the
moderate Protestants, but now they had proven themselves as hostile as those
openly supporting the invasion. Tilly would not support Georg Wilhelm because
he was already an enemy.
Between recruits, garrison troops, and force s returning from Italy, Tilly had
three corps in southern Germany, under Furstenberg, Aldringer, and Fugger,
totaling over 30,000 men. However, they were endangered by the Evangelical
troops. The Saxon army was a threat to Tilly's own position. Ideally, therefore,
the Catholic-Imperial corps would first eliminate the Evangelicals then reinforce
Tilly. This concentration would overwhelm the Swedes. As Tilly had been
forbidden by the emperor from attacking Johann Georg, he divided his army into
two. Pappenheim would secure the area Halberstadt-Magdeburg-Havelberg,
while TiIly himself marched into Thuringia to put a scare in the troublesome
Sax-Weimar brothers.
Things went much as TiIly envisioned. Furstenberg and Aldringer easily
crushed Wurtemberg (July 11) and Ulm (July 22), the Sax-Weimars and
Franconians surrendered without a fight. Fugger wasn't strong enough to deal
with Hesse; perhaps TilIy should have gone to Cassel rather than Weimar. This
victories were purely short-term; if a Protestant leader should gain a major
success, these temporarily cowed dissidents would eagerly rally to him.
Up until the treaty with Brandenburg (June 22), Gustavus had maneuvered as
a conventional, if aggressive, commander. In his systematic reduction of strong
points, his occupation of base areas, and his preoccupation with defensive lines,
avenues of retreat, and diversions, we see not the celebrated "precursor of
Napoleon," but sound 17th century generalship. Already eleven of Gustavus's
allotted 29 months were past.

From this point, he begins to assume a more active stance, although the shift
is gradual. By the middle of June, he had established a forward defense line
based on the Havel and Spee rivers, Rathenow-Alt-Brandenburg-Fehrbellin-
Spandau. The fall of Greifswald (June 21) cost the Imperials their last toehold in
Pomerania. Gustavus now dispatched the trusted Tott to deal with Mecklenburg.
While a scratch force observed Schauenburg's old crew, now Tiefenbach's army
of Silesia, the royal army would operate on the Havel.
Pappenheim had not been idle. With 13,000 men, he had established a
fortified bridgehead at Tangermunde and forward outposts at Havelberg,
Werben and Burg. Whatever offensive schemes he was contemplating were
stillborn. With 6000 horse, 600 dragoons, and 2000 musketeers, the king slipped
past Pappenheim's 9000 men 16 and surprised Tangermunde, taking the bridge
intact (July 12). Baner and Winckel followed up by storming Havelberg (350
men) on July 22. Pappenheim quickly evacuated his outposts and fell back.
Believing that Tilly would soon riposte, Gustavus decided to concentrate his
forces to meet him. If he could assemble his full field force of 30,000 before
Furstenberg arrived, he could offer battle at acceptable odds. However, if Tilly
appeared before the concentration was complete, the army would be endangered.
So the king needed a strong defensive site where he could wait in reasonable
safety. He selected the town of Werben (July 20).
After rejoining Pappenheim, Tilly was still not especially strong, some 17-
20,000. Fortunately for him, the Swedes were al so weak, with only 15,115
available. Unfortunately, their position was the strongest that he had ever seen.
Werben was located in a bend of the Elbe, protected on two sides by the river
and covered to the front by marshy streams." Gustavus had laid out a camp
large enough for his combined arrnies, protected by the fortified town and a
chain of redoubts, linked by earthworks into a common system. Some 3000
musketeers held the line with the bulk of the army behind in reserve. No less
than 150 guns were available. Cavalry pickets formed a forward screen behind
the stream Taube-Aland, about a kilometer in front of the redoubts. Some
thought it the strongest defense in Europe-this was in comparison with the
elaborate siege lines of the Dutch. Its only weakness lay in its rear; the sol e line
of supply/retreat was a double pontoon bridge across the Elbe. Although the
Swedish field forces were still scattered, the defenses were ready. "he [Tilly] did
but march ... in the day," Monro boasted, "[but] we with spades and shovels
wrought ourselves day and night. ... " 18
Actually Tilly's approach had been rather leisurely. Not only was time spent
linking up with Pappenheim, he wasted over a week waiting on Saxony's
reaction to the emperor's latest overtures. It was becoming apparent to Tilly that
diplomacy was not solving the problem of the new Saxon army.
Curiously, Gustavus was thinking along the same lines. His success in
Brandenburg made a similar approach to Saxony seem feasible. Johann Georg
would be forced to choose sides.
While TilIy delayed, he had established a camp at Wolmirstedt. On July 26,
the king led 2000 cavalry on a reconnaissance. On the rr: they engaged Tilly's
outposts, the Action of Burgstall. Three cuirassier regiments had been quartered
in three nearby villages, Montecuccoli in Burgstall, Holk in Angern, and
Gustavus's Run of Yictory 159
Bernstein in Wenddorf, a total of 1100 men. Gustavus dispatched parties to

Burgstall and Angern, keeping a good reserve behind. Montecuccoli was
surprised and routed without a tight. Holk, warned by the alarm from Burgstall,
managed to mount a brief defense. The Swedes were unaware of Bernstein's
presence; they counterattacked and almost defeated Soop, until their colonel was
killed. The Swedes harried the defeated Imperials back to Wolmirstedt. The
vanquished lost 100 men, mostly prisoners, plus baggage, horses, and two
cornets; the victors conceded ten dead. TilIy was chagrined by this setback."
On August 5, TilIy tinally reached Werben, establishing a camp at Berge, six
kilometers to the south. He realized at once that the position was, if not actually
impregnable, at least beyond his capacity to carry. He certainly did not intend to
dash himself to pieces in a frontal attack.
The morning of the 6th was veiled in a dense fog, "so thick that you couldn't
see a pistol flash." Tilly formed into battle order and, under cover of the fog,
marched up to the outermost stream, the Gross Wasserung, about 1500 meters
from the redoubts. When the fog cleared, he opened tire with 18 demicannon;
the Swedes replied, but the range was too great for either to do much damage.
Tilly hoped that the king would take the opportunity to fight in the open.
Gustavus did want a battle, but not at these odds. A1though he estimated Tilly at
only 17,000 to his 15,000, he preferred parity, or better yet superiority, in
numbers. He had at least 10,000 more men on the way. In any case, the Werben
position was not well suited to battle, as it lacked a line of retreat.
During the night, the king sent 500 musketeers from Mackay Infantry
Regiment to reinforce the cavalry outposts along the stream. At dawn on August
7, some Imperial cavalry-mostly Croats-drifted up and started harassing the
outposts. The Scots returned their tire with interest. Gustavus sent 800 horse
(Smaland Regiment and Wunsch), 1000 detached musketeers, and four
regimental guns to support Mackay. He then decided to lead a counterraid to the
right. He, Teuffel, and Baudissin took some cavalry and the Yellow Infantry
Regiment and pushed through the Croats and 1000 cuirassiers to the edge of
Tilly's campo When TilIy started to react, the Swedes returned to their works.
Tilly again deployed in battle-order and offered battle along the Gross
Wasserung. Gustavus again declined. Tilly returned to camp in the afternoon,
and the next day, August 8, he broke contact and marched away. In two days'
skirmishing, the Swedes lost a few hundred men killed and wounded, the
Imperials a little more-les s than a thousand together.
Swedish propaganda, desperate for victories, grossly exaggerated this
defensive success, claiming 6-7000 casualties inflicted, TilIy wounded,
Pappenheim killed etc. Some of these claims are still repeated in otherwise
respectable histories.
In the following weeks, both commanders waited and gathered their forces.
Despite his best efforts, Gustavus could not seem to push his field army above
24,000--he needed 15,000 men for garrisons, 8000 for Tott, and 6000 to watch
Tiefenbach. The arrival of Furstenberg (Aug 31) brought Tilly to almost 35,000,
but Fugger and Aldringer still did not appear.
The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, left isolated by the collapse of the
Evangelicals, now signed an alliance with Gustavus (Aug 22). This seemed to
contirm TilIy's worst fears. On August 24, he sent his fatal ultimatum to Saxony,
leading directly to Breitenfeld and disaster.

It is often generalized that the Thirty Years War had no true (i.e., pseudo-
Napoleonic) strategy, that the armies simply blundered around in search of food
and forage. It is said that Tilly "had" to invade Saxony because the destruction
of Magdeburg left him no other way to supply his troops. A recent exponent has
gone so far as to say, "Breitenfeld occurred, not because Gustavus Adolphus was
confident of his capacity to defeat TilIy's veterans and anxious to seek out battle
as quickly as possible, but because of the need to expand the Contribution-base
of his own army and to deny TilIy the opportunity of using Saxony for the same
purpose. ,,20
A detailed examination does not support these views. Logistics was certainly
a constraint on Gustavus and Tilly, but not the driving force. Secure occupation
of fortified bases and relative numbers were far more important. TilIy did not
enter Saxony until almost four months after Magdeburg's destruction. Gustavus
hoped to ally with Saxony, not conquer it. Gustavus went on the offensive the
moment he achieved the superior numbers he wanted, and TilIy would certainly
have abandoned the "needed Contribution-base" and retreated to safety, had
Pappenheim not forced the issue.
Needless to say, both commanders were glad to subsist off of Saxony as long
as wider considerations brought them there anyway. In the event, neither TilIy
nor Gustavus ended up in occupation of the Meissen valley, as the war
subsequently shifted southward.
EXPLOIT A TION OF VICTORY

The rapid collapse of the Catholic predominance in Germany after Breitenfeld
is difficult to explain; it can only be compared with the Swedish collapse after
Nordlingen. There were many factors, the uprising of imperfectly suppressed
Protestants, over-extension, above all, effective exploitation of opportunity by
the Swedish king. But the chief reason was a massive loss of confidence by
Le~ue and Imperials, a panic spreading, from the lowest trooper right up to
Elector Maximilian and the emperor. Whole formations dissolved into rout,
strong fortresses surrendered without a fight, frightened leaders abandoned their
capitals, The long run of victories from White Mountain to Magdeburg had
conferred ~upon Tilly an his army" an aura or-invinci iility. he total,
r: -<¡:..> _ irre ievable destruction of this reputation was a ~L. blow than any merely
military reversal.
In this atmosphere of defeat, the few men who kept their heads, Tilly,
Pappenheim, Wallenstein, assumed decisive importance.
Up to this point, Gustavus had campaigned in a reasonable 17th century
manner, securing forts and outposts, building defensive lines and lines of retreat.
He fought only after achieving superior numbers, with reserves and a prepared
battle plan. The recklessness of Alte Veste or Lutzen was not in evidence. As the
sun set on Breitenfeld, a _new Gustavus surfaced, the daring, "Napoleonic"
/. Gustavus so admired by historians. He was the right man for the job. P unging
( /;f? ) forward fearlessly, heedless of communications, security, or over-extension, he
achieved maximum exploitation of the Imperial disorder.
After Breitenfeld, Gustavus was confronted with three options: he could strike
through Bohemia toward Vienna, he could move to the Rhine-Main valley and
possess the heart of Germany, or he could pursue TilIy's defeated remnant to

destruction.
The Vienna scheme was favored by the French, who regarded the emperor as
the real enemy. A threat to his heartlands would force him to agree to any terms
Gustavus demanded. Also, it would leave the League intact, a wedge of French
influence in Catholic Germany. Ideally, Bavaria might keep its gains, while the
Hapsburgs suffered all the losses.
Roberts regarded the third option as the correct one, Gustavus's second great
blunder." Certainly, it is what Napoleon would have done. But this was 1631,
not 1806. Tilly could flee faster than Gustavus could follow; there were
numerous fortresses as refuges, and the corps of Aldringer and Fugger, over
20,000 strong, were still intact. Ultirnately, TilIy's army was a fleeting target; the
Swedes could harry him right back to Munich without gaining an inch more
ground than they stood on.
Gustavus opted for the second approach, the conquest of Germany proper.
The League, not the emperor, was the primary enemy. Also, he was no longer
interested in peace, atleast not such a peace as any ernperor could accept. It was
no longer enough to control the Baltic coast and to free the German Protestants.
He now hoped to unite them all, Lutheran, and Calvinist, moderate and
extremist, into a "Corpus Evangelicorurn" with himself as "director," crush the
League, and establish Protestant (i.e., Swedish) supremacy in Germany.
Gustavus was at last able to implement one of the multi-arrny schemes of
which he was so fondo Tott would finish off Mecklenburg and take Bremen;
Baner would take Magdeburg and deal with Westphalia, Hesse-Cassel would
strike south toward Frankfort, and Arnim's Saxons would deal with Bohemia.
Thurn's small force would conquer Silesia. The royal army would occupy Erfurt,
ready to move south, east, or west as events warranted.
On the whole, the plan was successful: Tott did secure the north, Arnim
managed to take Prague, and Thurn pushed into Silesia against feeble resistance.
TilIy had been beaten but was not dead. By October 13, he had reorganized
his scattered army and been joined by Aldringer and Fugger, giving him 25,000
men to threaten Hesse-Cassel. The Landgrave appealed to Gustavus for help; he
was told to stop worrying.
Gustavus had calculated, correctly, that his own offensive, a thrust to the
German "heart," would divert Tilly from the Hessians. On October 6, the royal
army left Erfurt in two columns under the king and Horn. Proceeding through
Franconia, they converged at Wurzburg. Gustavus was not a systematic siege
engineer; his methods relied heavily on aggressiveness, assaults, bluff, good
luck, and dazzling displays of artilIery expertise. This worked poorly against a
determined, well-organized defense " but was precisely adapted to the
demoralized garrisons he was facing. Konighofen (Oct 10), Schweinfurt (Oct
12), Wurzburg itself (Oct 15), all surrendered without a fight; the strong castle
of Marienberg (Wurzburg's citadel) fell to an improvised storm (Oct 18).
Between Catholic collapse and Protestant uprisings, he mastered Franconia in
two weeks.
Gustavus had di verted TilIy from Hesse, but the old master still had a trick or
two left. Moving south from Fulda (Oct 19) he united with a corps under Duke
Charles of Lorraine at Aschaffenburg (Oct 25). With the combined army of
40,000 men and 26 guns Tilly menaced Wurzburg and the nearby fort of
Ochsenfurt.
Now, in a moment of panic (or sanity), Gustavus realized just how dangerous
his position was, overextended, surrounded by hostile natives, facing an army
twice his size.23 He sent urgent messages for help to Hesse, Baner, Arnim, the
Sax-Weimars, but they were, of course, too far away. His fear cornrnunicated
itself to his troops, and it was a deflated and desperate body that prepared
Ochsenfurt for defense (Nov 10). This was Tilly's last great chance to win the
war: if he destroyed the royal army, Catholic disintegration would be haIted and
the Protestant revival stillborn.
Tilly hesitated and was lost. He cannot be faulted for doubting the steadiness
of his forces, a combination of demoralized survivors and Lorraine's green
recruits. He had always relied on well-trained veterans, moral and qualitative
superiority, superiorities now resting with the enemy. Battle would be a risk, the
sort of risk Maximilian had directed him to avoid. In retrospect of course, not
fighting was the greater risk. Tilly turned away and marched east, to chastise the
Swedes' new allies in Franconia.
This lucky escape seemed to justify the king's recklessness. In renewed
overconfidence, he contri ved an even bolder scheme, the conquest of the middle
Rhine. This represented a radical shift of emphasis; hereafter his military center
of gravity would rest on the Rhine-Main confluence, not the Baltic.
Communications with Sweden were no longer a priority; north Germany was of
secondary importance. 24
Under the new plan, Horn would complete the conquest of Franconia with
7000 men, while Gustavus with 13,000 would strike at Mainz. The Hessians
would be summoned from Westphalia to support the king.
The campaign started well, the ceremonial capital of Frankfort-on-Main
falling without resistance (No v 27). Then Tilly again interfered. The old marshal
had overrun so me minor places, Rothenburg, Windsheim, and Ansbach, then
laid siege to Nuremberg (Nov 29). Nuremberg was the strongest of the free
cities, the richest, the most Protestant, and a firm ally to Sweden. If Tilly could
take it, it would be a second Magdeburg, a terrible blow to the still-fragile
Protestant alliance. This was a serious diversion. Gustavus halted operations and
prepared to march to its relief (Dec 6).
The delay was brief. Tilly was unprepared to deal with so determined a
defense so late in the season. By the time the king was ready to move, he'd
already lifted the siege and gone into winter quarters. This was another mistake;
Tilly had not put a foot right since Werben. Pappenheim, enraged at this
"defeatism," applied for an independent command "; Lorraine returned to Alsace
with his army.
The minute Spanish garrison in the Lower Palatinate tried to obstruct
Gustavus's invasion. There were only 500 horse and a few hundred foot, but
they deployed to prevent a river crossing. The Rhine is sufficiently wide that the
Swede could not simply mass his guns and blast. His men would have to cross in
boats and the Spaniards could assauIt each party as it landed.
Instead of bypassing the obstacIe, Gustavus looked for a weak point. At the
island of Gemminger Au, the Rhine makes a sharp bend, forming a peninsula,
also the island itself, in the middle of the river, is within effective range of both
banks. By seizing the island and landing simultaneously at four points, the king
maneuvered the Spanish out of their position without losing aman. This
"Crossing of the Rhine," (Dec 17) a forced crossing of a major river, was an
unprecedented feat, winning the admiration of all Europe.
Once across, the Rhine defenses collapsed as easily as the Main. Oppenheim,
the Spanish headquarters, was stormed on December 18, Worms surrendered on
the 19th, Mainz yielded after a meager resistance (Dec 20-22)?6 A few places
resisted, Philipsburg, Heidelberg, Kreuznach-the Rhine was full of fortified
towns!-but the king was in effective control.
Horn's little army had done almost as well, taking Mergentheirn, Windsheirn,
Wimpfen, and Heilbronn. The year ended with desultory skirmishing along the
upper Rhine and in Alsace.
The year 1631 had seen the most radical possible shift in the political and
military situations, and financial as well. The loot, the wealth that Gustavus now
possessed staggered imaginations accustomed to the poverty of barren Sweden.
The king could have easily paid off his debts, loans and pay arrears both. He
didn't, in fact he contracted massive new loans, on the credit of the non-existent
Corpus Evangelicorum. As for the troops, with the luxurious quarters he'd given
thern, they didn't need cash. AII the money he could gather was needed for his
latest scherne, a plan for total victory in 1632!
Victory was having a strange effect on Gustavus. Leaving aside his rapidly
intlating demands-they grew with each success-re peace negotiations, he was
now talking of raising an army of 225,000 men (double Wallenstein and Tilly
together), crushing Bavaria and Austria and then looking west. He wrote
Sweden about precautions to be taken in the event of war with Spain or France
or both of them. Suddenly tiny Sweden was in a position to challenge the two
Great Powers of Europe!
The plan for 1632 was the final development of his ideas about coordinated
operations by multiple armies. In this plan there would be nine: Horn in
Wurzburg (29,000), Baner at Magdeburg (37,000), Tott in Mecklenburg
(29,000), Hesse-Cassel (18,000), Georg of Brunswick-Luneburg (6500),
Wilhelm Sax-Weimar (8500), Arnim's Saxons (24,000), plus force s in Silesia,
garrisons, and Brandenburgers (30,000). The king himself would command the
main army ~nz (44,000). These have been compared to Napoleonic corps
-misleadingly. Gustavus had no way to coordinate these forces. Essentially,
each army was independent, central direction being limited to the king's
infrequent, always delayed letters. The would eac pursue a local war with
their Catholic counterparts, winning and losing on their own. The king paid little
attention to these sideshows except to intervene at awkward moments,
distracting the commanders or raiding them for reinforcements. It was the only
way that such numbers could be managed, as no individual region could support
more than 30,000, and the time lag between the widely separated corps was
inescapable. Gustavus hoped that together this array could overwhelm the
Imperials-the royal army striking the decisive blow of course! This decision, to
attack simultaneously in every region, was one of the most significant of the
war.
As Gustavus and his allies had only about 95,000 men, it would be necessary
to raise 130,000 over the winter. This would entail a massive sacrifice of
164 BattIes of the Thirty Years War
quality; only a few "old" units retained the level of 1630. Equally, Tilly and
Wallenstein were raising new armies for the emperor. Germany was running dry
of recruits; Gustavus complained that too many new infantry regiments had 800
men or less, rather than the proper 1200. In 1630, he would have rejected such
units. This massive recruitment drive required concentration on that task; the
king therefore ordered operations suspended until spring. Bogus negotiations
were opened with Bavaria and a truce agreed upon.
THE BAMBERG IMBROGLIO

Unfortunately for the king's plans, the easy conquests of 1631 had infected
even the steady Horn. In defiance of both the royal directive and the armistice,
he began a local offensive in Franconia, seizing Hochstadt (Jan 20) and the
important town of Bamberg (Feb 11). Maximilian was not amused. Although
increasingly pessimistic, Tilly had succeeded in assembling 34,749 men for the
defense of Bavaria. He was now instructed to deal with Horn.
Tilly's army was composed of both League and Imperial troops, the latter
under Aldringer, also Tilly's second-in-command. Now that Tilly was no longer
Imperial commander-he had been replaced by Wallenstein in December-
there was friction. At New Years, the army was divided into three corps:
Aldringer at Rothenburg, Cratz in the Upper Palatinate, and Tilly himself at
Nordlingen. After the truce, however, Aldringer, who as an Imperial was not
inc\uded, had to pull back to Memmingen.
Gustavus was not pleased with Horn's actions, which he saw as both a
violation of the truce and a premature provocation of Bavaria. The possibility of
a counterattack was c\ear, nevertheless, he was unwilling to concede the
exposed position. He decided that Horn should gather reinforcements and fortify
the town. Horn also sent his cavalry to blockade Forchheim.27
Tilly had available for his counterstrike 21,382 of his own Leaguers, but over
10,000 were raw recruits. In this crisis, he had filled out his ranks with militia
and formed garrison troops into improvised regiments. Only about 5000 were
fully reliable. Tilly, as always, considered that veterans were essential to victory;
he therefore waited for Aldringer's 6630 Imperials, even though this meant a
delay of over a week.
Gustavus was aware of Tilly's movements, but he assumed that Bamberg was
safely fortified, garrisoned by 6000 foot and supported by 4000 horse. He
thought that Tilly might strike west, toward the Rhineland.
In fact, Horn had only 10,000, not the 12,000 the king had ordered-2000
recruits did not arrive in time. After detaching 1500 horse and 500 musketeers to
screen the Main crossings, Horn had 3800 foot and 4200 horse at Bamberg.
More importantly, the defenses were far from complete.
Gustavus's massive recruitments 1631-32 necessarily implied a considerable
dilution in quality. Of Horn's 8000, about 3000 were recruits, but the king, then
and later, tended to treat these numbers at face value-=ii místake he dícf-;;-t
make in his own corps.
The Action at Bamberg began just after noon, March 9, 1632, on the northeast
bank of the Main. Horn had placed the green Solms Cavalry Regiment as a
forward screen while massing the bulk of his horse on his left. The equally green
Solms Infantry held the unfinished earthworks while the older infantry were
behind, on the southwest bank. Aldringer commanded the attack, 18,012 strong,
while Tilly remained in reserve with 10,000 recruits. Aldringer advanced
cautiously, leading with the horse and his 6000 Imperial foot.
Pessimistically, Horn had already begun to pull back, sending his baggage
and guns ahead. As a result, his troops had no artillery support. Baudissin
Cavalry Regiment began an unauthorized attack on Aldringer's van and had to
be personally retrieved by Horn; he sent them to join the foot west of the river.
While Horn was so distracted, the Cronberg Cuirassiers enveloped and routed
the Solms Cavalry. The fleeing cavalrymen panicked the Solms Infantry, who
abandoned their works without a fight. The Imperial foot, led by the Fahrenbach
and Sulz infantry regiments, thrust inside the defenses. Fahrenbach reached the
bridge and crossed into the town proper, but a counterattack by the Thurn and
Wildenstein regiments pushed them back onto the east bank and recaptured the
bridge. Sulz was killed, but Wildenstein was captured. With the east bank lost,
Horn decided, around midnight, to abandon the town, his cavalry retiring north
and the foot (with the Baudissin Cavalry) west. Tilly sent cavalry to pursue the
latter, capturing most ofthe train, four guns, and 400 foot. In all, Horn lost 1300,
500 dead and 800 prisoners. Tilly's loss was slight.
This last victory of Tilly vindicated his faith in the superiority of experienced
troops; Horn appears to have callously sacrificed his recruits to salvage his
veterans.
Gustavus held Horn responsible for the setback. He should not have taken
Bamberg in the first place; he should have fortified it securely; it would have
been better to abandon it without a fight than to lose the action. He was aware
that the Swedish moral superiority was mostly bluff, and was very sensitive to
the possibility that a reversal would expose his weakness. "We must not," he
scolded Horn, "let the enemy get any courage whatever against US.,,28 His
reputation of invincibility was worth 50,000 men.
Gustavus's first thought was to mousetrap Tilly between himself and Baner,
but the old general had already pulled back to Ingolstadt. The setback had to be
avenged. Up to this time, the king had been considering an invasion of Bohemia
via Saxony, or, less seriously, returning north to de al with Pappenheim. Now
these plans were shelved; the first target for 1632 would be Tilly and Bavaria.
Further, operations would begin at once: even though his recruitment was
incomplete.t" Tilly's little operation had, therefore, a major impact on the
coming campaign. First, Gustavus had not completed his preparations, and
second, he had been di verted from the major goal, Austria, to the minor one,
Bavaria. On the other hand, recruitment had already reached the point of
diminishing returns-Gustavus, Wallenstein, and Tilly had between them just
about drained the German manpower pool-and it is sound strategy to eliminate
the weaker enemy before dealing with the stronger.
By summoning reinforcements from the lesser armies, Westphalia, Thuringia,
the Rhine, the king quickly assembled a host of 24,643 infantry, 14,862 cavalry,
and 72 guns, including most of his Swedes and veterans. The first to feeI his
wrath was Tilly's outpost at Donauwerth?O In a model attack, this weak place-
it was dominated by surrounding high ground-was subjected to one of
Torstensson's most dazzling artillery displays. Most of the garrison wisely
decamped during the night (Apr 5-6). The defeated Imperials lost 800 dead and
500 prisoners, moreover there was a nasty massacre as the Swedes entered.
Surrendering Catholic soldiers and we1coming Protestant townsmen were cut
down with equal abandono 2000 men were left as a garrison, while the arrival of
Baner and Wilhelm Sax-Weimar brought the army to its full 37,505.
Tilly established his defense along the Lech River with his principal
concentration at Rain, a secondary group at Augsburg, and light screening forces
between. His army was weak, both in numbers and in quality. The main force
numbered 16,806 foot, 5312 horse, and 20 guns, less than half of them veterans.
Tilly's plan was not so much a "last stand" in defense of Bavaria as a delaying
action; he hoped to assume so strong a position that Gustavus would be deterred.
He knew, of course, that the Swedes could outflank him south of Augsburg or
even push through the lightly he Id area between, but his purpose was to gain
time, to permit the arrival of Imperial reinforcements.
The Lech is one of a series of parallel waters running from the Alps to the
Danube. It is not a distinct river like the Rhine, but a network of interwoven
streamlets around a main bed. The largest of these associated streams are the
Schumutter to the west and the Ach to the east. Unfortunately for Tilly, the west
bank is some 20 feet higher than the eastern, giving the attackers the dominant
position. On the plus side, heavy s~ring rains and melting Alpine snow had
swollen the river to its maximum.' Most of the east bank was covered by
woods, marsh, or both. The bridge at Rain being safely destroyed, the most
practicable crossing was somewhat to the south. Here Tilly deployed and dug in.
The main body of foot lay in a fortified camp just east of the Ach, some 7-800
meters from the river bank. The cavalry formed two supporting wings. A smaller
redoubt was raised to the west of the camp, 3-400 meters from the bank. The
redoubt was protected by a thick line of chevaux-de-frise to the south and west,
woods to the north, and swamp to the front. A screen of musketeers occupied
these obstacles. The redoubt itself was garrisoned by two trustworthy infantry
regiments supported by a dozen light guns in three bastions along its front face.
The few heavier (12 pdr and up) guns formed a support battery in the main
camp; they had the range to reach the riverbank from so far back. This camp was
on a wooded hillock and somewhat protected, plus earthworks. The infantry
there were mostly recruits and mili tia. A reserve of reliable foot lay behind.
By April 12, Gustavus had reduced Tilly's outposts to the west and was
reconnoitering along the river. Although the south was he Id only by covering
forces, the king decided to force a crossing at the most heavily defended point,
Rain itself-presumably in hopes of demolishing the defending army altogether.
His skillful eye-he conducted the reconnaissance personally'é=-had spotted a
vulnerability.
THE BATTLE OF THE LECH, APRIL 14-16, 1632

The crossing where Tilly had placed his works was near a sharp westward
bend of the Lech, raising the possibility of placing the defenders under
converging fire from multiple batteries. Also there was a small islet in the
middle of the main course. If it was sol id ground, it could be used as a halfway
point, as at Gemminger Au. Unlike the Rhine, the Lech is relatively narrow and
it was feasible to place the east bank under fire from the west.
In the council of war, Horn argued against the king's scheme on the grounds
that it was unnecessarily hazardous. Individually, either Tilly's works or the

Lech barrier would be considered formidable obstacJes, but together they
represented too great a risk. After all, the river could easily be crossed at a less
defended point.
As might be expected, Gustavus overruled him. Tilly's people, he said
(correctly enough), were mostly raw recruits. Speed wa~of the essence-they
had to take out Tilly before Wallenstein could come to his aid. As for the Lech,
his Swedes were well accustomed to much larger rivers. Anyway, even in the
unlikely event of a disaster, the fortress of Donauwerth would secure the retreat.
On the morning of April 13, the Swedes occupied the village of Oberndorf,
slightly north and west of Tilly's line. It would act as forward headquarters for
the operation. The army deployed opposite Tilly's redoubt in line of battle. The
formation was based on Breitenfeld with twelve infantry brigades in two
echelons flanked by cavalry wings, also in two lines. The horse were
strengthened by musketeer detachments. Only a few light guns were with these
troops; the bulk of the artillery, 72 guns of all calibers, had been massed in a
single command under Torstensson.
The battle line was misdirection. Gustavus did not intend to try to simply push
across; the deployed army was merely a cover for the engineers. First, every foot
of the bank was tested for firmness and its field of fire determined. Next they
began three great earthworks, not completed until after dark. These were to
shelter massive arti1lery batteries, each of 24 guns.33 The batteries would be able
to - place Tilly's redoubt, no more than 400 meters east of the river, under
effective fire, but only the larger guns could strike at his main campo During the
night, bridging material was brought up.
Tilly, of course, was well aware of their activities, and he knew Gustavus well
enough not to dismiss the possibility of a crossing, however suicidal it might
appear. He was equally aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of his own
position, but those of the Swedes were obscured by their mantle of invincibility.
Anyway, Tilly placed his own 20 guns to reply to Torstensson, the lights
forward in the redoubt, the heavier behind in the campo This impromptu artillery
th
duel continued for the whole of the 14 • While Tilly's fire was directed against
the batteries, most of Torstensson's fell on the infantry in the redoubt. Between
the extended range and the strength of the works, neither side suffered heavily.
This was as Gustavus had planned it. The artillery duel was more
misdirection; while Tilly's attention was fixed on the threatening guns, t e real l!s~
operation was farther south, against the islet. AII the wood in the district was '"/
seized to supplernent the material s brought up. Tilly had taken the precaution of
burning the boats along the river, but the king had more dragged from the
Danube. Oberndorf became an assembly point for bridges.
Late that afternoon, Gustavus again drew up his army in and began to march
toward the bank, as if to ford the swollen stream. Disbelievingly, TilIy's men
stood to their arms to resist the anticipated onset. Torstensson now directed his
larger guns against the main campo The shelter of the trees pro ved a doubtful
blessing as the 24 pound balls shattered trunks and showered the defenders with
splinters. Actual loss inflicted was light, but the terrifying cracks and falling
wood had a drastic effect on the moral e of the recruits, This threat was merely
another feint, however, and was broken off at sundown.
.168 BattIes of the Thirty Years War
Activity continued at the islet. Unseen by the Catholics, the bank was being
converted into the staging area for a major assault. Entrenchments were dug; the
boats and bridge sections were carried down. To maximize surprise this was
delayed until after dark. By 5:00 AM. on April 15, the Swedes were ready. The
bridge sections were in place, and supporting earthworks holding 18 guns" and
2000 musketeers had been compieted. Tilly had been deceived; he was entirely
unaware of their activities.
The operation began at 8:00 AM. The 334 Finns of the Hastfer Infantry
Regiment crossed to the islet in boats and established themselves. A trestle
bridge was extended across and the islet occupied by infantry and light guiis.
At this point the Swedish timetable seems to have met with a hitch. While
they were wasting time on the islet, TilIy's outposts advised him of this activity
to their south. The Swedes might have done better to have moved to the islet
during the night and crossed to the east bank at dawn. By the time the first stage
was complete, TilIy was leading his reserve toward the threatened bank,
The islet was now firmly held by three brigades.l" Hastfer's Finns, whom
Gustavus regarded as natural commandos, again crossed the Lech in their boats.
This time they were approaching a defended shore, but they had support. The
king and Torstensson had devised a smokescreen of green wood, wet straw.and
I gunpowder; the thick black blinded Tilly's vanguard.: The moment they were
across, Gustavus began extending his bridge. It was an ingenious design, in
connecting sections, and made to lay flush on the river surface so as to minimize
the target. The bridgehead was established.
There it stayed. Tilly's superior numbers prevented any advance. The Finns
were heroes, but they would certainly have been wiped out had it not been for
tl!.e supporting guñs on the islet and the east bank. As it was, they barely held
their own. The fighting spread into the shallows surrounding the bridgehead, and
the bridge itself. Tilly, Aldringer, and Maximilian fearlessly exposed themselves
to Swedish fire, encouraging the troops. Both sides poured reinforcements into
the tiny foothold. As the battle dragged on into the afternoon, about a thousand
fell on each side.
Seeing that Tilly's attention was entirely fixed on the bridgehead, Gustavus
directed his right wing comrnander, Duke Wilhelm Sax-Weimar, to take his
cavalry two kilometers south of the action and ford the river, At the same time,
400 more horse, each with a musketeer tucked behind his saddle, would move a
similar distance north and try to swim across. Thus TilIy would be threatened on
both flanks, but the southern wing was theserious one. The maneuver
succeeded; by 4:00 Wilhelm had thrown his vanguard safely across. These were
Gustavus's veteran Swedes, Stenbock, Soop, Silversparre, Sack, Sperreuter, and
Stalhansk, some 1972 rnen. They were immediately counterattacked by TilIy's
cavalry reserve, about 3000 men under BilIehe and Cronberg. Once again
Gustavus's superior cavalry saved the situation; after withstanding two assaults,
the Catholic horse disengaged and fell back.
The left wing detachment also succeeded in crossing, but were pinned down
before they could achieve anything.
About the same time, 4-5:00, Aldringer was struck in the head by a falconet
bal1.36 Almost immediately afterward, Tilly was al so shot down, his thigh
shattered by a 3 pdr. Both general s being put out of action, command devolved
on Maximilian, a civilian.
The action ended by sundown, around 6:00. Gustavus had some grounds for
satisfaction. His main group held the merest toehold across the river, but by
dawn it would be heavily entrenched, with plenty of guns. Further, his right
wing cavalry was across, outflanking Tilly to the south, and could be reinforced
at will. Gustavus was unaware that TilIy and Aldringer were disabled, and he
was al so unaware of the discouragement in the Catholic campo As far as he
could see, the defenders had done fairIy well. He intended to renew the battle on
th
the 16 , striking with his horse from the south, while the bridgehead group,
reinforced with fresh troops, counterattacked toward the redoubt.
Maximilian summoned his colonels to a hasty council of war on the
battlefield itself. He was well aware that if he conceded the Lech line, he would
expose all Bavaria to destruction. However, he was outgunned, the Swedes were
dug in at their bridgehead, and both his flanks were threatened with enveloping
cavalry. Reluctantly, he directed that the army retire to Ingolstadt, sacrificing the
country, but saving the troops.
The retreat was so well managed that the Swedes didn't realize it was going
on. At dawn on the is", they discovered that the redoubt was empty. Horse were
at once dispatched to harry the Cathólíc escape, but they caught only a few of
the slower wagons. Sorse supplies were taken at Rain, but Maximilian had
extricated his arm intact, without loss of aman or gun. Gustavus prowled the
field, dissatisfied. He declared himself impressed with Tilly's redoubt,
remarking, "Had 1 been the Bavarian, 1 wouldn't have abandoned these works
even if the ball had carried off my chin as well as my beard!,,37 However, it was
not the los s of his beard, but the outf1anking cavalry, that had induced
Maximilian's retreat.
Totalloss carne to so me 2000 Swedes and less than 3000 Catholics. Despite
the king's disappointment, the successful passage of so well defended a position
added new luster to the "invincible" Swedish arms. TilIy was criticized for
plácing his works too close to the enemy, "He tried to defend his army with the
river, not the river with his army." "He should have placed his forces farther
back, out of range of the Swedish artillery, and counterattacked when Gustavus
tried to cross.":" And, it had been a mistake to use the woods as shelter from
artillery fire.
TilIy might have pointed out that his purpose had not been to win a battle, but
to deter an attack, and that too many of his foot were recruits and militia-
perfectly capable of defending an earthwork, but useless in a open fight. AIso,
when he did counterattack the landing force, artillery preserved them from
destruction. Finally, it was not the earthworks that lost the battle, but the cavalry
reserve.
TilIy divided his last hours between religious devotions and military advice to
Maximilian. Tilly was an able, thoroughly experienced soldier, a competent
strategist, with considerable operational ability. He was never Gustavus's equal
as an organizer or innovator, however, and, in an historical irony, his hard-won
practical approach to warfare was directly contrary to the doctrines of the
dawning linear periodo
Tilly made mistakes, so me of them serious, during the campaign. Possibly he
should have left Pappenheim to deal with Magdeburg while he either thrust up
the Oder to Stettin or secured Mecklenburg. Probably he should have moved

into Brandenburg after Magdeburg, and pursued Gustavus more energetically
after Werben. He should certainly not have provoked Saxony the way he did,
nor have risked his army against superior numbers at Breitenfeld. He showed a
lack of aggressiveness dealing with Gustavus at Wurzburg and Horn at
Bamberg. But, in all fairness, Gustavus made plenty of mistakes too. It was
Tilly's bad luck to face Gustavus at his military peak at a time when he himself
was past his prime.
SOURCES
These operations attracted considerable scholarly attention in the 19th century,
but those works are mostly obsolete. The principal treatment in English is
Roberts. The most detailed study is Sveriges Krig, Vols. 11, I1I, and IV.
Contemporary sources in English inelude Monro and the first and second parts
of The Swedish Intelligencer.
APPENDIX A: GUSTAVUS'S INVASION, JUNE 1630

Gustavus had some 72,460 troops divided between Sweden, Finland, Livonia, Prussia
and Stettin; 36,095 were required for garrisons.
Division Available Garrison
Sweden 13,640 15,830
Finland 5,395 6,455
Livonia 1,990 4,560
Prussia 11,340 7,505
Stettin 4,000 1,745
36,365 36,095
The troops in Sweden, Finland, and Livonia could only reach Germany by ship, but it
was possible for the Prussia units to march there through Poland. Unfortunately, the
unfriendly Poles insisted that they move in small, separated groups so as not to endanger
their "hosts." Therefore, it took almost as long for them to make the trip.
Gustavus's initial force consisted of 13,641 men, mostly from Sweden.
Unit ~ Nation Notes:
Duwall IR 4 Swede Norrland IR
J. Brahe IR 4 Norrland IR
N. Brahe IR 8 Uppland IR
Axel Lillie IR 4 Narke- Varmland IR; 1 bn
Ulfsparre Bn 4 East Gothland IR
Ekeblad IR 8 West Gothland IR
Hard IR 8 West Gothland IR (2)
Kagge IR 8 Smaland IR
Royal Guard Coy 1 Mixed
Mackay IR 7 Scot LtCol. Monro
Spens IR 2 Only a detachment
Knyphausen IR 11 German
Falkenberg IR 8 German
Mitschefall IR 9
Sperreuter IR 8
Effem-Hall IR 2 Only a detachment
Free Coys 2
98 10,413 infantry
Per Brahe CR 8 Swede Smaland CR
Soop CR 8 West Gothland CR

Rotkirch CR 4 East Gothland CR; only I sqd
Free Coys 3 German
23 2755 cavalry
Torstensson Artillery 6 4 artillery, I fireworker, 1 engineer: 473 gunners &
train; 81 3pdrs, 43 heavy guns.
When Gustavus landed, Wallenstein's Imperials were scattered from the Baltic to north
Italy. Conti's Baltic corps was first to engage the Swedes:
Pomerania lO IR (75 coy) & 2Y2 CR (12 coy)
Gartz 3 IR (26) & 2Y2 CR (17)
Mecklenburg 4Y2 IR (40) & 2 Croat coys
Brandenburg & Anhalt 3 IR (20) & 2 CR (15)
161 coys = 16-20,000 infantry; 46 coys = 2-3000 cavalry
The three other corps thus:
Anholt (AIsace, Lower Palatinate, Wurtemberg) 6Y2IR (69) & 4Y2CR (38Y2)
Nassau (Julich, Berg) 3 IR (35) & 8 CR (45)
conato (Italy) 19 IR (162) & 9Y2 CR (60)
There were some minor detachments:
Middle Elbe 1 IR (5) & I Y2 CR (7)
Silesia I IR (10) & 1 CR (5)
Total: =
442 coys 40-60,000 infantry; 201 coys =
10-12,000 cavalry
The Catholic League army under TilIy and Pappenheim mustered some nine infantry
and seven cavalry regiments, perhaps 25,000 men in al!. These were mostly deployed in
the area Hesse- Westphalia-North Sea.
To the regular League units must be added garrison companies in Bavaria, Mainz,
Cologne, and Wurzburg and local forces in Westphalia. Bavaria had a peasant militia as
wel!. The emperor had a few garrisons in the hereditary lands which were not part of
Wanenstein's armada.
Finally, there were minor Spanish forces garrisoning the Lower Palatinate and on the
Lower Rhine. In all, the Catholics exceeded 100,000 men, although not by mucho
Unfortunately, over a third were in Italy, and many of the others were tied down in
garrison.
APPENDIX B: THE POMERANIA CAMPAIGN

Knyphausen besieged Wolgast with 5105 men:
Unit Qll Strength Nation Notes:
Duwall Bn 4 316 Swede Norrland IR
Hastfer IR 8 926 Finn
Forbes Bn 4 352 Metstake IR
Winckel IR 12 1315 German Blue IR
Vitzthum IR 8 1064 White IR
Knyphausen IR 6 607 battalion
Leslie IR 2 150 Scot detachment
Soop CR 2 250 Swede detachment; West Gothland
Dragoon Coy 1 125 German
4730 foot & 375 horse
Gustavus had only 5582 for the 1SI invasion of Mecklenburg:

Unit Qll Strength Nation
Royal Guard Coy 1 111 Mixed
Metstake IR 8 456 Finn
172 Batt1es of the Thirty Years War
Wincke11R 12 1136 German B1ue IR

Vitzthum IR 8 674 White IR
Kriegbaum IR 4 472 1 bn
Rosen IR 4 483 1 bn
SoopCR 7 688 Swede West Gothland
Stalhansk Sqd 4 487 Finn
Aderkas Sqd 1 139 Livonia detachment
Tott CR 1 136 German detachment
4132 foot & 1450 horse
Conti's deployment Sept.1630-Jan.1631:

Unit Date ~ Est Str Notes:
Kolberg Gar: Conti IR 1627 5 600 detachment; LG
1120 men Hardeck IR 1630 4 400 detachment; HG
68 guns Capua KUR 1630 2 120 detachment; German
Greifswald Perusis IR 1629 8 700 German
Gar: 1020 Neu-Saxon IR 1626 6 350 High German
Tribsee Gar Marrazino IR 1625 5 500 detachment; LG
Dernmin-Loitz Savelli IR 1629 10 2000? Full Str?; LG
Gar: BosseARK 1626 4 250 detachment
2490 Wengersky ARK 1625 4 240 detachment; Ger
Rostock Colloredo IR 1625 2 400? detachment; Bohemia
Garrison: LobellR 1630 3 900?? detachment; LG
3750? Perusis IR 1629 4 350 detachment; Ger
Virmond IR 1624 10 2000? High German
Wengersky ARK 1625 1 100? detachment; Ger
Wismar Gar: Geramb IR 1630 12 910 Low German
Domitz Gar: LobellR 1630 2 600 detachment; LG
Gartz Corps Butler IR 1630 ? 600 detachment
10,100 foot Morando IR 1628 10 2000? Walloon
2,850 horse Neu-Saxon IR 1626 13 650 High German
28 guns Holk IR 1630 8 1600? Low German
12,950 total K Liechtenstein 1630 10 2000? High German
M Liechtenstein 1621 5 750 detachment; HG
Bosse IR 1630 6 1200? German
Alt-Saxon IR 1618 10 700 High German
B. Waldstein IR 1629 10 600 Low German
Alt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 600 Low German
Gotz KUR 1626 6 400 German
Bemstein KUR 1627 2 120 detachment; Ger
Sparr KUR 1629 10 600 German
Capua KUR 1630 4 240 German
Colloredo ARK 1630 6 540 German
28 field guns (2-6 pdr) & 10 mortars
Landsberg Gar Dohna IR 1626 3 600? detachment; HG
Frankfort Gar: Dohna IR 1626 1 200? detachment; HG
1200 Fememont IR 1627 5 1000? Low German
Alt- Geramb IR 1630 3 600? detachment; LG
Brandenburg Holk IR 1630 2 400? detachment; LG
1600 Virmond IR 1624 3 600? detachment; HG
M agdeburg Holstein IR 1626 10 2000? High German
Blockade: WanglerlR 1628 10 2000? LowGerman
4000 foot Bemstein KUR 1627 6 360 German
Gustavus's Run of Vietory 173
1800 horse Treka KUR 1629 2 120 detaehment; HG

BonninghausenK 1630 7 420 German KUR
HolkKUR 1630 5 300 LowGerman
Piceolomini ARK 1629 3 180 detaehment; LG
HareaueourtARK 1630 5 300 Walloon
Isolano Croats 1625 2 120 detaehment
By the Gartz operation, Gustavus's field strength was up to 13,000:

Unit Q!y Strength Nation Notes:
N. Brahe IR 8 504 Swede Uppland
Axel LiIlie IR 4 180 Narke- Varrnland; 1 bn
Adams Bn 4 174 Kagge IR, Smaland
Ulfsparre Bn 4 201 J. Brahe IR, Norrland
Teuffel IR 12 1200 German Yellow, Royal Leib
Winekel IR 12 700 Blue
Thum IR 8 378 Blaek
Dargitz IR 8 741
Duwall IR 4 400
Effem-Hall IR 8 438
Waldstein IR 6 470
Hepbum IR 6 700 Seot Green
Spens IR 9 684 LtCol Lumsden.
94 6870 infantry
P. Brahe CR 8 400 Smaland
Wunseh Sqd 3 300 Finn
Aderkas Sqd 5 402 Livonia Livonia CR
Dornhoff Sqd 4 177 Kurland Kurland CR.
Baudissin CR 12 1000 German
Rhinegrave CR 12 1326
Ortenburg CR 10 800
Effem-Hall CR 4 300 1 sqd
DamitzCR 3 300 1 sqd
Caldenbaeh Sqd 4 445
Tott CR 2 200
70 5983 eavalry
Guns: 10 x 24pdr demieannon, 40 x 3 pdr regimental guns.
Sehauenburg mustered 11,750 defenders:

Unit Date Q!y Str? Notes:
Alt-Saxon IR 1618 10 700 High German
M Lieehtenstein 1621 10 750 High German
Neu-Saxon IR 1626 7 650 High German
Mohr von Wald IR 1628 10 1500 Walloon, ex-Morando
Neu-Sehauenburg 1629 6 900 High German
B. Waldstein IR 1629 10 600 Low German
Butler IR 1630 5 700 detaehment
K Lieehtenstein 1630 2 300 High German
Bosse IR 1630 6 900 German
66 7000 foot
AIt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 600 Low German
Gotz KUR 1626 11 600 German
Bernstein KUR 1627 10 600 German

Sparr KUR 1629 10 600 German
Capua KUR 1630 6 350 German
Hydrou ARK 1628 5 300 German
Piccolomini ARK 1629 3 250 Low German
Colloredo ARK 1630 6 500 German
Isolano Croats 1625 7 450
Losy Croats 1631 5 500
73 4750 horse
28 field guns (2-6 pdr) & 10 mortars
Some 6505 foot and 4694 horse survived the attack.
APPENDIX C: THE DUEL

Gustavus had 9300 for the 2nd invasion of Mecklenburg:
Unit ~ Est Str Nation Notes:
Ekeblad IR 8 450 Swede West Gothland
Axel Lillie IR 4 150 N arke- V arrnland; 1 bn
Winckel IR 12 1000 B1ue
Baner IR 8 1200
Dargitz IR 8 800
Waldstein IR 8 800
Mackay IR 8 500 Scot
73 6100 infantry
Ortenburg CR 8 800
Caldenbach Sqd 4 400
36 3200 cavalry
Torstensson: approx. 90 guns.
The Imperial garrisons:

Neu- Marrazino IR 1625 5 330 Low German
Brandenburg: Butler IR 1630 3 130 Low German
Marrazino 610 Montecuccoli KUR 1626 3 150
MaIchin: Wengersky DR 1630? 150 detachment
Treptow: ? ?
Loitz: Savelli IR 1629 400 detachment; LG
Demmin: Savelli IR 1629 10 1200 Low German
Savelli 1880 Holk IR 1630 7 400 Low German
Montecuccoli KUR 1626 4 200
Croats 1 80
Tribsee: Marrazino IR 1625 50? detachment; LG
Tilly's army at Neu-Brandenburg was 13,000 men and 16 guns:

M Liechtenstein I 1621 10 750 IMP; High German
Baden IR 1630 10 1850 IMP; High German
Holstein IR 1626 10 1900 IMP; High German
Wangler IR 1628 10 1900 IMP; Low German
K Liechtenstein I 1630 2 300 IMP; High German
Musketeers 1200 Mixed IMP & League IRs
Gustavus's Run of Vietory 175
42+ 7900 foot

Tilly Leib Coy 1 100 League; High German
Cronberg KUR 1620 10 900 League; High German
Sehonberg KUR 1620 12 1000 League; High German
Alt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 500 IMP; Low German
Strozzi KUR 1619 3 150 IMP; Walloon
Bemstein KUR 1627 10 500 IMP; German
Wengersky ARK 1625 10 500 IMP; German
Colloredo ARK 1630 6 300 IMP; German
Hareaueourt ARK 1630 5 250 IMP; Walloon
Wengersky DR 1630? 8 400 IMP; German
Isolano Croats 1625 5? 250 IMP; detaehment
Losy Croats 1631 5? 250 IMP; detaehment
85 5100 horse
IMP guns: 2 demieannon (24 pdr) 2 demieulverins (12 pdr) 2 falcon (6 pdr)
League : 2 demieannon (24 pdr) 4 demieulverins (12 pdr) 4 falcon (1x6 pdr; 3x4 pdr)
Knyphausen at Neu-Brandenburg:
Unit {;Qy Est Str Nation
Knyphausen IR 5 400 German
Maekay IR 6 350 Seot Lindsay's bn
3 regimental guns (3 pdr).
Gustavus's Concentration Against Tilly (19,029)

Royal Army (Pasewalk):
Unit {;Qy Est Str Nation
Ulfsparre Bn 4 231 Swede Norrland
Adams Bn 4 300 Smaland
Winekel IR 12 1378 Blue
Damitz IR 12 1182 White
Thum IR 8 759 Blaek
Effem-Hall IR 8 694
Duwall IR 250 detaehment
Spens IR 9 830
Brahe CR 8 600 Smaland
Wunseh Sqd 3 300
Aderkas Sqd 5 400 Liv
DomhoffSqd 4 300 Kurland
Courville CR 8 600
Effem-Hall CR 6 600
Caldenbaeh Sqd 4 400
Hom LeibCoy 1 200
Taupadel DR 4 500
8957 infantry + 5668 eavalry = 14,625
Baner's Corps (Friedland):
Axel Lillie Bn 4 214 Swede Narke- V armland
Maekay IR 4 322 Seo! Monro Bn
Vitzthum IR 8 880 German White

Baner IR 8 612 AII musketeer
Ortenburg CR 10 900
Tott CR 6 450
Mecklenburgers 50
2028 infantry + 2376 cavalry = 4404
Falkenberg's garrison at Magdeburg mustered 4000 in December, but only 3000 in

April and 2500 in May:
Unit Coy Est Str Nation Notes:
Town Coys 2 400 German
Christian Wilhelm 1 250 Administrator Leib coy
Falkenberg IR 8 750
Longius IR 4? 400
Trost Bn 4? 450 German Schneidwinds IR
Uslar Sqd 4? 250 Cavalry
Guns: 5 demicannon, 21 culverins and demiculverins, 3 "old" (iron?) demicannon, 36
smaller pieces, and 12 obsolete iron guns of small caliber.
5000 militia in 18 "quarters": 12 for the wall, 3 along the river bank, and 3 in reserve.
Gustavus Mustered 20,327 Against Frankfort

Royal Army:
Unit Q!y Str Nation
Teuffe1 IR 12 1779 German Yellow, Royal Leib
Winckel IR 12 1258 Blue
Vitzthum IR 8 612 White
Dargitz IR 8 710
Thum IR 8 759 Black
Effem-Hall IR 8 694
Rosen IR 6 621
Duwall IR 250 detachment
Hepbum IR 12 1402 Scot Green
Mackay IR 6 638 Monro Bn
Spens IR 9 830
Brahe CR 8 600 Swede Smaland
Wunsch Sqd 3 300
Aderkas Sqd 3 250 Liv detachment
Dornhoff Sqd 2 150 Kurland detachment
Courville CR 5 350
Effem-Hall CR 6 400
Ortenburg CR 10 600
DamitzCR 3 300 German
Caldenbach Sqd 4 400
Taupadel DR 4 500
10,882 infantry + 5640 cavalry =16,522
Baner's Riverine Group:

Ulfsparre Bn 4 231 Swede Norrland
Adams Bn 4 300 Smaland
Axel Lillie Bn 4 214 Narke-Varmland
N. Brahe IR 8 427 Uppland
Baner IR 8 980 All musketeer
2152 infantry
Horn's Corps:
Sperreuter Sqd 4 425 East Gothland
Goltz CR 8 400 German
Sperreuter CR 8 220 Same cmdr as East Goths
Horn Leib Coy 1 200
1653 cavalry
Artillery: "about 200 guns"
Schauenburg had 6400 Imperials to defend the town:

Unit Date {;Qy Est Str Notes:
Neu-Saxon IR 1626 10 600 High German
Fernemont IR 1627 lO? 900 Low German
Conti IR 1627 5 500 LG
Mohr von Wald IR 1628 10 800 Walloon, ex-Morando
Neu-Schauenburg 1629 6 400 detachment; High German
Butler IR 1630 lO? 600 Low German
Hardeck IR 1630 4 400 High German
52 coy = 4200 foot
GotzKUR 1626 10 650 German
Sparr KUR 1629 10 600
Capua KUR 1630 6 350
Hydrou ARK 1628 5 300 German
Piccolomini ARK 1629 3 300 Low German
34 coy = 2200 horse
Guns: 51 of all types.
The Imperials lost 1700 killed and 1000 captured; 3700 escaped. The Swedes lost 30
killed and 100 wounded.
The Leipzig Evangelicals mustered 44,100 men (on paper):

Baden-Durlach 1 IR 2-3000
Nordlingen 2 inf coy 600
Strassburg 1 IR 1500 2 cav coy 200
Ulm 6 inf coy 1800 2 cav coy 200
Wurtemberg 2 IR 4000 3 cav coy 300
Swabia total: 10,900 inf & 700 cav
Bayreuth 3 inf coy 1000 5 cav coy 500
Franconians 5 cav coy 500
Nuremberg 1 IR 3000 1 cav coy 100
Franconia total: 4000 inf & 1100 cav
Hesse-Cassel 5 IR 5000 5 CR+I DR 2000
Saxony 7 IR 14,000 8 CR 6,400
Grand Total: 33,900 infantry + 10,200 cavalry
Furstenberg had 6 IR (6000) + 6 CR (4000) = 10,000

178 Battles ofthe Thirty Years War
Action at Burgstall, July 27,1631

Imperials:
Monteeueeoli KUR 1628 6 250 IMP; Low German
HolkKUR 1630 8 400 IMPLG
Gustavus:
Unit ~ Str Nation Notes:
Soop CR 8 600 Swede West Gothland
Wunseh Sqd 4 400 Finn
DornhoffSqd 4 200 Kurland
Rhinegrave CR 12 800 German
APPENDIX D: THE ACTION AT WERBEN, AUGUST 7-8, 1631

Gustavus defended Werben with 15,115 men:
Unit ~ Str Nation
Axel Lillie Bn 8 756 Swede Narke- Varrnland-Uppland
Winekel IR 12 1240 German Blue
Vitzthum IR 8 512 White
Thum IR 8 455 Blaek
Baner IR 8 662 AII musketeer
Effem-Hall IR 8 491
Rosen IR 8 492
Maekay IR 8 470 Monro
SpensIR 8 608 Lumsden
Soop CR 8 600 Swede West Gothland
Lilliesparre CR 8 600 Smaland
Stalhansk & Wunseh 8 800 Finn Finland CR
Aderkas Sqd 5 300 Liv
Dornhoff Sqd 4 200 Kurland
Courville CR 5 300
Effem-Hall CR 12 600
Ortenburg CR 10 500
Damitz CR 4 200
Alt-Caldenbach 4 400
Taupadel DR 4 364
Torstensson ISO guns
8698 foot, 6053 eavalry, 364 dragoons and 150 guns
Tilly's attaeking force numbered over 16,155:

Alt-Tilly IR 1620 8 1200 League; Wurzburg
Blankhart IR 1620 9 910 " Low German
Geleen IR 1620 8 800 " High German
Reinaeh IR 1620 ? 800
Comargo IR 1620 ? 300 League; High German
Pappenheim IR 1622 10 1200

Wah1IR 1625 8 1100
Goess IR 1621 10 900 IMP; High German
Ho1stein IR 1626 10 1900 IMP; HG
Wangler IR 1628 10 1900 IMP; Low German
Savelli IR 1629 10 800 IMP;LG
Cratz IR 1630 5 600 IMP; LG
88+ 10,810 foot
TilIy Leib Coy 1 100 League; High German
Cronberg KUR 1620 8 600
Schonberg KUR 1620 9 600
Erwitte KUR 1620 8 550
Baumgarten ARK 1621 6 500
Mansfeld Leib Coy 1 75 IMP; High German
Strozzi KUR 1619 6 200 IMP; Walloon
Alt-Saxon KUR 1625 10 400 IMP; Low German
Montecuccoli KUR 1628 6 150 IMP; Low German
Bonninghausen KUR 1630 6 400 IMP; German
Ho1kKUR 1630 8 200 IMP; Low German
Coro nini ARK 1624 5 200 IMP; Bohemia
Picco1omini ARK 1630 3 120 IMP; Low German
Colloredo ARK 1630 6 400 IMP; German
Hareaucourt ARK 1630 5 300 IMP; Walloon
Iso1ano Croats 1625 7 300 IMP
105 5345 horse
APPENDIX E: THE ACTION AT BAMBERG, MARCH 9, 1632

Catholics
Aldringen's Corps:
Pappenheim IR 1622 7 2000 League; High German
Wahl IR 1625 11 3300
Jung-Furstenberg 1631 1 300 League, High German
Free Coys 3 900
Furstenberg IR 1628 8 1000 IMP; German
Savelli IR 1629 10 400 IMP; Low German
Fahrenbach IR 1631 6 1000 IMP; High German
Rittberg IR 1631 10 600 IMP; German
Cronberg KUR 1620 13 1145 League; High German
Blankhart CR 1631 5 375
Cratz CR 1631 2 200
Hasslang CR 1631 2 200
MerodeCR 1631 5 375 "LG; Merode-Gehoy.
O. H. Fugger Croats 1631 4 360
Free Coy 1 100 "HG
Dragoons 3 100 " Ellwangen (HG)
Free Coy 1 80 IMP; German
Croats 2 100 IMP
Artillery (League): 2 demicannon (24 pdr), 4 demiculverins (12 pdr), 13 sakers (6 pdr), 1
fa\con (4 pdr), 2 fa\conets (3 pdr) = 22 guns plus 2 howitzers of 45 pdr.
180 Battles ofthe Thirty Years War
Cratz's Corps:
Reinach IR 1620? 1000 League; High German
Sulz IR 1626 12 2300 IMP; Wa1loon
Merode IR 1626 4 700 IMP; Walloon; Merode-Varoux
J. Fugger CR 1622 5 400 League; Low German
D'Espagne CR 1631 6 627
Bredow KUR 1631 6 250 IMP; High German
Merode ARK 1625 5 200 IMP; Walloon; Merode-Varoux
Forchheim Garrison: 2302 foot (surviving veteran):

AIt- TilIy IR 1620 4 1152 League; Wurzburg; detachment
Comargo IR 1620 4 1150 League: HG; detachment
Rudolf Sax-Lauenburg's Corps (Donauwerth):

Fugger IR 1631 2 700 League; HG; detachment
Ruepp IR 1632 3 900 " High German
Witzleben IR 1629 4 800 IMP; German
Pappenheim IR 1631 10 600 IMP; High German
Baldiron IR 1630 5 433 IMP; Spanish
BilIehe KUR 1620 9 720 League; HG; ex-Schonberg
Free Coy s (Cav) 2 226
O. H. Fugger Croats 1631 1 90 " detachment
Bucquoy KUR 1631 3 180 IMP; Walloon
Croats 3 150 IMP
3000 infantry & 1799 cavalry = 4799 men
Swedes
Hom:
Swedish Bn 754 Swede detached from 5 Swede/Finn IR
Reihe IR 8? 727 German
Thum IR 4? 318 detachment
Wildenstein IR 8 819
Solms IR 16 1803 newly recruited
Sperreuter Sqd 4 168 Swede East Gothland
Hom Leib Coy I 80
Hom CR 5 397 LtCol Witzleben
Kochtitzky CR 5 376
Solms CR 9 775 newly recruited
E. Sax-Weimar CR 8 600 "Duke Emst.
Du Menys DR 4 431
Dragoon Coy s 4? 380
Artillery: I demicannon (16 pdr), I quartercannon (12 pdr). 12? regimental guns (3 pdr)
En Route (2000 foot):

Truchsess IR 1000 German newly recruited; musket detachment
Muffel IR 7 lOOO? New recruit (Bayreuth-Kulmbach)
Truchsess's Corps (1500 horse & 500 foot):
Truchsess IR 500 German newly recruited; musket detachment
Truchsess CR 5 900
Brandenburg CR 4 300 " Margrave Hans; detachment
Schonberg Sqd 4 300
APPENDIX F: THE BATTLE OF THE LECH, APRIL 15, 1632

Swedes (Gustavus Adolphus):
Hand IR 12 1212 Swede East Gothland, Dalama, Uppland
Hard IR 8 608 West Gothland
Royal Guard Coy 1 ? Mixed
N. Brahe IR 12 1445 German Yellow, Leib; ex-Teuffel
Winckel IR 12 1080 Blue
Thum IR 8 659 Black
Baner IR 8 986
B. Sax-Weimar IR 13 1540 Duke Bemhard Leib
BurtIR 8 1124
Chernnitz Bn 3 228 W. Sax- Weimar corps .
Forbes IR 6 618 W. Sax-Weirnar corps
HomIR 8 458
Kagge IR 8 966 Baner corps
Kanoffsky IR 8 374
Liebenstein IR 7 514 W. Sax-Weimar corps
Mitschefall IR 8 692 W. Sax-Weimar corps
MitzlaffIR 8 758 Baner corps
Monro of Fowles IR 8 665 W. Sax- Weimar corps
Riese IR 8 764 W. Sax-Weimar corps
Schaffalitsky IR 8 464
B. Schlammersdorf IR 12 1860 Nuremberg
T. Schlammersdorf IR 8 596 W .Sax-Weimar corps
Schneidwinds IR 1\ \094 Baner corps
Truchsess IR 8 584
Wildenstein IR 7 682
Hepbum IR 12 1248 Scot Green
Mackay IR 8 518 LtCol Monro
Spens IR 8 608 LtCol Lumsden
22,643 infantry
Stenbock CR 8 456 Swede Smaland
SoopCR 8 404 West Gothland
Silversparre Sqd 4 332 Uppland; Baner corps
Sack Sqd 4 332 Sodermanland; Baner corps
Sperreuter Sqd 4 161 East Gothland
Stalhansk CR 4 287 Finn Noding Sqd
Tiesenhausen Sqd 4 293 Livonia
Dornhoff Sqd 4 332 Kurland
Berghofer CR 5 440 W. Sax-Weimar corps
B. Sax-Weimar CR 10 643 Duke Bemhard Leib
Courville CR 5 440 W. Sax- Weimar corps
E. Sax-Weimar CR 8 552 Duke Emst
HomCR 5 360 LtCol Witzleben
Kochtitzky CR 5 297
Baden CR 6 348
Monro of Fowles CR 4 332 W. Sax-Weirnar corps
Schonberg Sqd 4 332
Solms CR 9 616 LtCol Bulach
Sperreuter CR 8 684
Streiff Sqd 4 272 From Prussia; Baner corps

TottCR 12 765
Truchsess CR 5 477
UslarCR 9 772 W. Sax-Weimar corps
WedelCR 5 440 Baner corps
W. Sax-Weimar CR 13 1404 W. S-W; Duke Wilhelm Leib
OhmCR 8 464
Hom LeibCoy 1 88
Free Coy 1 88 Hauditz
Du Menys DR 4 372
Taupadel DR 12 1296 Baner corps
14,862 cavalry & dragoons
Torstensson: 72+ guns = 18 demicannon (24 pdr); 18? quartercannon & demiculverins
(12 pdr); 36+ falconets & regimental guns (3 pdr)
22,643 infantry + 14,862 cavalry + 72 guns = 37,505
Imperial-League Army (Tilly):

Alt-Tilly IR 1620 10 1606 League; Wurzburg
Reinach IR 1620 ? 1000 " High German
Comargo IR 1620 10 1600 " HG
Pappenheim IR 1622 7 2000 " HG
WahlIR 1625 11 3300 " HG
Jung-Furstenberg 1631 1 300 " HG
Free Coy s 3 900 League; High German
Beck IR 1626 12 2300 IMP; Walloon; ex-Sulz
Merode IR 1626 4 700 IMP; Walloon; Merode-Varoux
Contreras IR 1628 8 1000 IMP; Ger; ex-Furstenberg
Savelli IR 1629 10 400 IMP; Low German
Witzleben IR 1629 50 IMP; Ger: ruined al Donauwerth
Baldiron IR 1630 50 IMP; Spanish "
Fahrenbach IR 1631 6 1000 IMP; HG
Rittberg IR 1631 10 600 IMP; German
16,806 infantry
Cronberg KUR 1620 13 1145 League: HG
Billehe KUR 1620 9 720 " HG; ex-Schonberg
J. FuggerCR 1622 5 400 League, Low German
B1ankhart CR 1631 5 375 ".LG
D'Espagne CR 1631 6 627 "LG
Cratz CR 1631 2 200 "HG
Hasslang CR 1631 2 200 ".HG
Merode CR 1631 5 375 ".LG; Merode-Gehoy
Free Coy 1 100 "HG
Dragoons 3 100 "HG
O. H. Fugger Croats 1631 4 360
MerodeARK 1625 5 200 IMP; Walloon; Merode-Varoux
Bucquoy KUR 1631 3 180 IMP; Walloon
Free Coy 1 80 IMP; German
Croats 5 250 IMP
5312 cavalry
Guns: 20
16,806 infantry + 5,312 cavalry + 20 guns = 22,118
APPENDIX G: SWEDISH WAR FINANCE

During the period 1611-1630, Gustavus Ado1phus effectively tripled government
revenue to finance his wars. Moreover, his conquests provided extra revenue, from
Livonia. Prussian and Pomeranian. To this must be added the subsidies paid by France
and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, his operations in Germany were primarily financed by
kontributions, "making war support war." These, of course, were most1yfood and fodder.
The cash requirements of the war had to be sought elsewhere. The importance of the non-
German sources was that they paid in cash rather than kind.
Table 6-1
Non-German War Income (rixdalers = talers)
Year Sweden Prussian Pomeranian France* Dutch*
1630 2,843,580 329,209 5,132 120,000 --
1631 1,881,021 540,218 50,000 400,000 100,000
1632 662,439 626,154 36,557 300,000 40,000
1633 129,573 662,632 40,000 200,000 40,000
1634 ? 812,118 40,000 200,000 --
* see 6-2
To this should be added the levies frorn Prussia and Livonia, which carne to 758,000 in 1630. By
1633, the net frorn Estonia-Livonia was 59,774.
Table 6-2
Allied Subsidies 1630-48
Year France Dutch
1630 300,000 1ivres= 120,000 rdr
1631 1,000,000 = 400,000 250,000 florins = 100,000 rdr
1632 750,000=300,000 100,000=40,000
1633 500,000=200,000 100,000=40,000
1634 500,000=200,000
1635 500,000=200,000
1636 ----
1637 1,000,000=375,000
1638 1,000,000=350,000
1639 1,000,000=340,000
1640 1,000,000=333,333
1641 1,200,000=400,000
1642 1,200,000=400,000
1643 1,200,000=400,000
1644 1,200,000=400,000
1645 1,200,000=400,000
1646 1,200,000=400,000
1647 1,200,000=400,000
1648 516,000= 172,000
Note French inflation after 1635.
Had Sweden been forced to continue spending at the rate of 1630, it would no doubt
have suffered financial and political strain.
German income was based on a kontribution system similar to Wallenstein's. Each
district had an obligation assigned by Gustavus. The agreement with Brandenburg (1631)
was typical: the margravate was divided into ten districts each liable for 3000 talers per
month (nominally, the support of a single cavalry regiment) for an annual total of
360,000. During the Breitenfeld campaign, the Elector of Saxony agreed to 40,250 a
month. Pomerania was liable for 200,000 ayear.

As Gustavus move d south, his demands grew increasingly outrageous. The
archbishopric of Magde burg (after the sack!) was assigned 52,000 a month; Wallenstein
had asked 20,000. The smallish town of Erfurt was assigned 14,000; Nuremburg and
Augsburg, 20,000 each . In theory, these were to be cash payments, in addition to
fluctuating "in kind" d emands. Over an eight-month period, Erfurt had to pay an
additional 354,848 in foo d.
Many of these, especi ally Saxony's, were not paid in full, most were paid in kind rather
than cash, and large sum s were extorted locally which were not counted by the central
war treasury.
Table 6-3
German Income (Mont hlv Maximums)
Year Pomerania Mecklenburg Brandenburg Saxonv Other (approx)
1630 16,667 -- -- -- 35,000
1631 16,667 5000 30,000 40,000 60,000
1632 16,667 5000 30,000 40,000 150,000
1633 16,667 5000 30,000 40,000 530,000
In 1634, Oxenstierna persuaded the Heilbronn Bund to vote 13 "Roman Months"

monthly, ten in cash and three in kind, for a nominal total of 156 ayear. This gargantuan
sum, had it actually been paid, would have been the heaviest kontribution of the war.
Table 6-4
1634 Plan
Re ion Pala tinate Upper Rhine Franconia Swabia Magdeburg
Roman Month 2,06 8 4,047 6,382 4,806 -
Year Total 322, 608 631,332 995,592 749,736 627,000
At this time, Oxensti ierna estimated the cost of troops at 44 talers ayear for each
infantryman and 123 fo r cavalry. During the peak years 1632-34, total army cost may
have exceeded 20,000,0 00 talers ayear, but 1ess than 20% of this was paid by the central
treasury (e.g., 4,377,732 in 1633).
Table 6-5
Swedish War Ex endit ure 1630-34 (talers)
Year Central T reasury Estimated Costs
1630 4,174,417 3,490,500
1631 3,787,148 2,915,250
1632 3,747,949 10,375,500
1633 3,250,04 1 10,647,000
1634 1,063,70 1 10,638,000
In kind expenditures would double or triple the estimate to 20-30 million. During the
period 1630-48 the Swe des did not issue full pays (Solde), but supplied only subsistence
(Lohnung), normally in kind, at a nominal rate of half the full pay. Swedish expenditures
were based on this "half- pay" rate.
Map6-1
The Battle of the Lech, AprilI4-15, 1632
,Ir
,-.~~'-'
Vvoods ~,~
<'t //
.... ~~~/
-. I """ Camp """ I:::

Tilly::;' i-. ,\", Ach River
::.
/,
c.'"
t...J,.I ,~--,¡
1111\\\'>;-" __-
IZI f!l
D~~~~
f!l
Sax-Weimar
~.""""J"'wpppp", 4
~."""""'''''PrPPif!l
>
Gustavus
~z- o
!
250500
, ! ,
1000 1500
!
2000
!
Meters
A - Movement of Catholic reserves 1 - 2nd position of batteries

B - Chevaux-de-frise 2 - Hastfehr's landing
C - Tilly & Aldringer 3 - Bridgehead
O - Billehe & Cronberg 4 - Outflanking by Sax-Weimar
5 - Minor outflanking
NOTES
1. Gerhard Benecke, Germany in the Thirty Years' War (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1978), pp. 46-47.
2. Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, pp. 372-74,422-24,462-64
3. 10,413 infantry, 2755 cavalry, and 124 guns.
4. Mecklenburg, West (Greifswald- Wolgast-Anklarn), and East Pomerania (Kolberg-
Koslin), and up the Oder around Gartz.
5.5-600 men.
6. Imperial FM Hannibal von Schauenburg, AKA Schaumburg, Schawenburg.
7. October 23. He had less than a thousand men.
8. A revised version envisioned support from Hesse, Saxony, and Wurtemberg.
9.2000 foot, 2500 horse, and two guns.
10. Halberstadt to Frankfort-on-Oder with three IR and one CR; 200 miles in ten days
in the dead of winter.
11. The Swedes quipped that the dapper Savelli was more clotheshorse than soldier.
12. Perhaps he was in one of his "down" moods.
13. Roberts thought this one of his greatest blunders; Gustavus Adolphus, pp. 478-79.
14. Including the topically named "Trotz-Kaiser" (i.e., "We defy the Emperor!"),
"Trotz-Tilly," "Trotz-Pappenheirn," and "Magdeburger Succurs."
15. In faimess to Falkenberg, he believed it himself.
16. The summer of 1631 was so dry that Gustavus was able to ford the Elbe on foot.
17. Largely dried out in that hot August.
18. Monro, Expedition, p. 49.
19. This rninor action was a serious blow to the Imperial cavalry, the first
demonstration of Swedish superiority. Tilly thereafter relied on his veteran League horse.
20. David Parrott "Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War," in Clifford J.
Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 243-44.
21. Roberts, Gustavus Adolphus, pp. 539-47.
22. E.g., Kolberg in 1630, Greifswald in 1631, or Ingolstadt in 1632.
23. Gustavus had something over 20,000; he thought Tilly had 50,000.
24. Tott's capture ofWismar and the elimination ofWallenstein's little navy, a key goal
in 1630, was now only a footnote.
25. See Chapter 8.
26. The garrison numbered 2000 men.
27. The strongest fortress in Bamberg, it was he Id by 2302 ofTilIy's best men.
28. Fletcher, Gustavus Adolphus, p. 24l.
29. He was 90,000 men short of his goal. Roberts describes the campaign as having
"gone off at half-cock." Gustavus Adolphus, p. 695.
30. 4800 strong.
31. Norrnally the Lech is no more than 6-10 feet deep, but in April it almost doubles,
with a stronger current. The banks overflow and woods are submerged.
32. Hence the famous anecdote of his conversation with a Bavarian sentry on the bank
33. The total 72 included 1824 pdr demicannon and about as many 12 pdrs.
34. Presumably borrowed from the batteries.
35. Probably Swedish, Yellow, and Blue = 4345 men.
36. A glancing blow, luckily for him.
37. Friedrich Schiller, The History o/ the Thirty Years' War in Germany (Weimar
Edition, 1901), p 237.
38. This approach was attempted unsuccessfully at 2nd Lech in 1648.

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Chapter6

Gustavus's Run ofVictory:

On May 11, 1630, Swedish diplomats presented the Imperials with an

THE POMERANIAN CAMPAIGN

some 20-25,000 scattered in 28 garrisons and four cornmands." For political

with Sweden. Then the summit of electors (Regensburg, July-Aug, 1630)

Gustavus to react seemed ominous. Regarding Gustavus with cautious respect,

allotted 29 months were past.

Bernstein in Wenddorf, a total of 1100 men. Gustavus dispatched parties to

leading directly to Breitenfeld and disaster.

EXPLOIT A TION OF VICTORY

possess the heart of Germany, or he could pursue TilIy's defeated remnant to

THE BAMBERG IMBROGLIO

THE BATTLE OF THE LECH, APRIL 14-16, 1632

that it was unnecessarily hazardous. Individually, either Tilly's works or the

the Oder to Stettin or secured Mecklenburg. Probably he should have moved

APPENDIX A: GUSTAVUS'S INVASION, JUNE 1630

Soop CR 8 West Gothland CR

APPENDIX B: THE POMERANIA CAMPAIGN

Gustavus had only 5582 for the 1SI invasion of Mecklenburg:

Wincke11R 12 1136 German B1ue IR

Conti's deployment Sept.1630-Jan.1631:

1800 horse Treka KUR 1629 2 120 detaehment; HG

By the Gartz operation, Gustavus's field strength was up to 13,000:

Sehauenburg mustered 11,750 defenders:

Bernstein KUR 1627 10 600 German

APPENDIX C: THE DUEL

The Imperial garrisons:

Tilly's army at Neu-Brandenburg was 13,000 men and 16 guns:

42+ 7900 foot

Gustavus's Concentration Against Tilly (19,029)

Vitzthum IR 8 880 German White

Falkenberg's garrison at Magdeburg mustered 4000 in December, but only 3000 in

Gustavus Mustered 20,327 Against Frankfort

Baner's Riverine Group:

Schauenburg had 6400 Imperials to defend the town:

The Leipzig Evangelicals mustered 44,100 men (on paper):

Furstenberg had 6 IR (6000) + 6 CR (4000) = 10,000

Action at Burgstall, July 27,1631

APPENDIX D: THE ACTION AT WERBEN, AUGUST 7-8, 1631

Tilly's attaeking force numbered over 16,155:

Pappenheim IR 1622 10 1200

APPENDIX E: THE ACTION AT BAMBERG, MARCH 9, 1632

Forchheim Garrison: 2302 foot (surviving veteran):

Rudolf Sax-Lauenburg's Corps (Donauwerth):

En Route (2000 foot):

APPENDIX F: THE BATTLE OF THE LECH, APRIL 15, 1632

Streiff Sqd 4 272 From Prussia; Baner corps

Imperial-League Army (Tilly):

APPENDIX G: SWEDISH WAR FINANCE

month. Pomerania was liable for 200,000 ayear.

In 1634, Oxenstierna persuaded the Heilbronn Bund to vote 13 "Roman Months"

-. I """ Camp """ I:::

A - Movement of Catholic reserves 1 - 2nd position of batteries

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