University of Sarajevo

Faculty of Political Sciences Sarajevo

MOiD – English 3
Student presentations

Team:
1.Dino Majstorović
2.Sana Halilović
3.Selim Bećirbegović
4.Melisa Gluhalić

UNIT 8 – “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Case of Iran“

HANDOUT

“There is, in fact, an axiom of proliferation. It states that as long as any state holds nuclear
weapons, others will seek to acquire them.” Richard Butler, former Australian UN
Ambassador

Proliferation: is the build-up of weapons, it is a rapid multiplication of parts or the increase

in the number of something.
Nuclear proliferation: is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-
applicable nuclear technology and information.

History of Nuclear Proliferation

The first attempts to promote non-proliferation of nuclear material is dating back to just after
World War II when the Truman administration proposed the Baruchov plan, a proposed
international supervision over the use of nuclear energy with the aim of avoiding the free
dissemination of nuclear technology.

The Baruchov plan was presented at a meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission of the
United Nations (United Nations Atomic Energy Commission - UNAEC) under which the
Atomic Development Authority should oversee the development and use of nuclear energy, to
manage any installation costs that could be used to produce parts for a nuclear bomb, and
inspect any nuclear facility linked to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

After rejecting the Baruchov plan, US President Eisenhower presented the 1953 program
"Atoms for Peace" within which thousands of scientists from around the world trained in the
field of nuclear science.
Dual-use technology
Dual-use technology refers to those technologies that serve military purposes but can also be
used to benefit civilian commercial interests.
In nuclear terms, dual-use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian
nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a
nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that several stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle allow diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.
Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors increases nuclear
proliferation risks. A fundamental goal of global security is to minimize the proliferation risks
associated with the expansion of nuclear power.
If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the
nuclear future will be dangerous".

Good governance: characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and
management.

These characteristics include:

Low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own
personal gain)
High degrees of political stability
High governmental effectiveness and
Strong degree of regulatory competence

Outcomes of proliferations:
-NUCLEAR technology spread to less power countries
-The fear of MAD (MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION)
-Mass quantities of conventional weapons were being sold to developing countries in Africa
and the Middle East
-Threat of nuclear war seemed possible at any moment
PROS AND CONS:
PROS:
1. Global Defense
Nuclear weapons are likely key weapons to major wars flaring up and acts of aggression by
rogue nations. With such power behind them, nations that have nuclear weapons are far less
likely to be attacked by another nation, even if that other nation also has a nuclear arsenal.
The better a nation can defend itself, the more likely it is that no one will want to risk going
against them and that results in more peacetime.
2. Power Supply
Nations that have nuclear weapons can benefit from the power and status that comes with the
territory, other nations pay attention to their actions and wishes since they have a large
fighting force and a small amount of nuclear weapons.
3. War Deterrent
Smaller nations can stand a chance of defending themselves against larger nations that have
more money and military capabilities when they have nuclear weapons. This can increase the
peace and make it less likely that certain nations will get bullied or invaded. Alliances have
this same affect when a nation that has nuclear weapons is allied with nations that do not have
them.
CONS:
1. Cost and Maintenance
Like everything else that a nation owns and operates, nuclear weapons cost money to build
and maintain. Unlike some other national resources, nuclear weapons cost quite a bit to own
and can negatively affect the treasury
2. Lack of Morals
The morals that are associated with lawful nations and people are seriously put into question
when nuclear weapons come into play. It is considered much more honorable to get rid of
nuclear arms and reduce their numbers.
3. Environmental Impact
There is an extraordinary amount of damage done to people and the earth with the use of
nuclear weapons and none have been used in over 50 years.
4. Physical Damage
The damage they can cause among nation who uses the bomb and the nation that is being hit
can last for decades. Conflicts that escalate to levels that bring nuclear weapons into play are
dangerous for the entire planet and can hurt everyone.
Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Proliferation:
“Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or non-state entities that do not have, but are
acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them
“Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are
increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or
reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons
Controlling proliferation: ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons -involves national
governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional
organizations, and society at large.
TREATY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
The spread and threat of nuclear weapons continue to be major concerns facing the global
community. There are two ways in which this problem has been addressed: non-proliferation
and disarmament.
Disarmament is the work that is done to dismantle, destroy and dispose of those weapons that
are already in existence.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy,
Non–nuclear-weapons states that are parties to the NPT undertake an avoidance of acquisition
or production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, in return for acquisition of
nuclear technologies for peaceful activities, such as power generation, and for protection by
the nuclear-weapon states.
Having more nuclear-weapon states would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of
miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions,
nuclear conflict.
A total of 191 states have joined the Treaty. The NPT is the most widely-accepted arms
control agreement. Four UN member states have never joined the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan
and South Sudan. The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United
States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China
KEY PROBLEMS OF THE TREATY
PROVIDING FOR THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ALL PARTIES TO NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACFUL PURPOUSES FAILS TO RECGONIZE THE INHERENT
LINKS BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
NO TIMEFRAME OR CLEAR STEPS FOR DISAMAMENT AS OBLIGATED IN
ARTICLE 6 WAS PROVIDED WITHIN THE TREATY.
The Treaty is based on four pillars: articles
Pillar One – Non-Proliferation: Article 1 of the NPT states that nuclear weapon state
countries (N5) should not transfer any weapon-related technology to others.
Pillar Two – Ban on possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states namely that non-
nuclear states should not acquire any form of nuclear weapons technology from the countries
that possess it or acquire it independently.
Pillar Three – Peaceful use of nuclear energy: It not only allows the use of nuclear
technology for peaceful purposes, but even stresses that it is “the inalienable right” of every
country to do research, development and production, and to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, without discrimination,
Pillar Four – Nuclear disarmament: Article 6 makes it obligatory for nuclear states to get rid
of their nuclear weapons. The Treaty states that all countries should pursue negotiations on
measures relating to the nuclear arms race and “achieving nuclear disarmament”.
While nuclear powers have worked hard to prevent other countries from acquiring nuclear
weapons, they have further developed and upgraded those weapons, and have made them
more capable of use on battlefields.
IAEA - INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
THEIR JOB IS TO TRY AND GET COUNTRIES TO STOP DEVELOPING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND USE NUCLEAR POWER IN A PEACEFUL WAY ALL COUNTRIES
THAT SIGNT THE NPT MUST AGREEE TO PERMIT INSPECTIONS BY THE IAEA
The IAEA is generally described as having three main missions:
Peaceful uses: Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its member states,
Safeguards: Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear energy is not used for military
purposes, and
Nuclear safety: Promoting high standards for nuclear safety.
SAFEGUARDS
They prevent nuclear proliferation in the same way that auditing procedures build confidence
in proper financial conduct and prevent embezzlement. Their specific objective is to verify
whether declared (usually traded) nuclear material remains within the civil nuclear fuel cycle
and is being used solely for peaceful purposes or not.
Non-nuclear-weapons state parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures
applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare
detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. The
aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful
use by maximizing the risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the
international community that the inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the
possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities.

The system relies on;

•Material Accountability – tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials
in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site
inspections, review and verification of operating records.
•Physical Security – restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.
•Containment and Surveillance – use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to
detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-
site.
ARMS CONTROL TRATIES LIMIT OR REGULATE THE NUMBER OR THYPES OF
WEAPONS A NATION CAN POSSES
SALT 1 AND 2 –both aimed limiting the production of future nuclear weapons between the
U.S and USSR
ABM TREATY-limit missile defense systems and production of specific offensive warheads
START 1 AND 2 TREATIES(strategic arms reduction treaties)
First to reduce strategic nuclear weapons
TREATY OF MOSCOW-Requires U.S and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic
warheads by two third.
DISARMAMENT TREATIES ACTUALLY REDUCE THE EXISTING NUMBER OF
WEAPONS OR BAN CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS ALTOGETHER

IRANS NUCELAR HISTORY AND PROGRAM

Iran's interest in nuclear technology dates to the 1950's, when the Shah of Iran began
receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Although Iran signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)as a non-nuclear weapon state in
1968 and ratified it in 1970, the Shah may have had nuclear weapons ambitions. However, the
1979 Iranian Revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq war limited the nuclear program's
expansion. In the 1990's Iran began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by
developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and
enrichment
The nuclear program has evolved through four phases.
Phase one: Period of consensus 1987-2002
The period of maximum consensus on Iran’s nuclear program spanned 15 years. The revival
of the shah’s nuclear program was initially presented as necessary to diversify energy sources.
Nuclear technology was equated as cutting edge for development and indispensable for any
self-respecting power.
But the regime only presented a rationale for energy; it did not acknowledge whatever
weapons intentions it had. The program progressed slowly during this phase, as Iran
encountered problems of organization and getting access to technology that had to be acquired
clandestinely abroad.
Phase two: Early controversy 2003-2005
Throughout this period, the nuclear program was largely a concern of Iran’s political elites.
The 2002 revelation about Iran’s construction of an undeclared enrichment facility put Tehran
on the defensive. The reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami won agreement
in the Supreme National Security Council to meet international concerns halfway.
In 2005, newly elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, backed by Iran’s supreme leader,
began enriching uranium again. The deal with the Europeans was dead.
Phase three: Deep divisions 2005-2012
Iran’s nuclear program became increasingly political during this phase. By 2005, both the
executive branch and parliament were dominated by hardliners and conservatives. Their use
of the nuclear issue as an instrument of partisan politics ended the phase when the nuclear
program was supposed to be a national issue.
Yet the nuclear issue gradually slipped from the hands of the elite to the street. In 2006,
because of Iran's noncompliance with its NPT obligations, the United Nations Security
Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs. In 2007, the United States
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stated that Iran halted an alleged active nuclear weapons
program in fall 2003
Two factors spurred intense backlash—and a reaction on the other side of the street.
First, the United Nations imposed a series of U.N. resolutions between 2006 and 2010 that
included punitive sanctions. The United States and the European Union imposed even tougher
unilateral sanctions.
Second, Iran’s disputed 2009 election—won by Ahmadinejad amid widespread allegations of
fraud. A new Green Movement opposition was born. Many conservatives also had growing
concerns about the populist hard-line president, particularly his economic mismanagement.
Ahmadinejad’s policies produced high inflation, low growth, and massive government
corruption.
Iran’s motivations
Prestige
National pride and sovereignty
Leadership in the gulf region
Survival of the Islamic regime
Deterrence
Iran says it wants uranium enrichment and plutonium for peaceful purposes only
But developed nuclear program in secret in violation of NAEA rules and consistently lied
about it
Years away from capability to make nuclear weapons
The UN Security Council has passed six resolutions condemning Iran
1. July 2006: Resolution 1696 called on Iran to halt all enrichment of uranium, while calling
on countries not to aid the Iranian nuclear program in any way.
2. December 2006: Resolution 1737 was passed in response to Iran's failure to comply with
the July 2006 resolution.
3. March 2007: Resolution 1747 was passed as a result of Iran's failure to comply with the
previous two resolutions. It called on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to prove that
its nuclear program is solely peaceful.
4. March 2008: Resolution 1803 censured Iran for refusal to comply with any of the previous
resolutions and asked again that the Islamic Republic cooperate fully with the IAEA
5. September 2008: Resolution 1835 reaffirms the previous four resolutions as well as the
Security Council's commitment to a negotiated settlement.
6. June 2010: Resolution 1929 reiterated the demands made in previous resolutions to cease
and desist from all activities pertaining to uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons
development..
The nuclear proliferation of Iran
Iran’s possible development of nuclear weapons has now come front of weapons of mass
destruction. It has assumed particular importance because of its potential to reshape the
security and politics of an already turbulent and critical region. In the middle of the Middle
East, such a capability would at the very least lead to a basic reassessment by countries near
and far of a full range of security, political, and other issues. That assumes that such a
competition might be limited to the region and that Iran or any other regional actor could
aspire to the role of the most influential country in the Gulf. Such an assumption makes little
sense given the almost certain deep engagement of the United States and its allies in the
Middle East militarily, economically, and politically for the foreseeable future.

Regional Cascade
While an agreement might defuse the stand-off between Iran and world powers, Israel and
Saudi Arabia have warned it could fuel a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Under this
scenario, countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia could seek to equip themselves with
nuclear weapons before Iran gets a chance to. There is, of course, almost certainly more
involved in Iranian thinking about a nuclear weapons program than its own palpable sense of
insecurity. The perceived prestige of having nuclear weapons, another “Islamic bomb,” is no
doubt one element. Such thinking is misguided because an Iran with nuclear weapons would
become even more of a pariah state, especially to many of its Arab neighbors, given religious,
political, economic, and other traditional rivalries.
PREVENTING A REGIONAL CASCADE
1.Accept full transparency with enforceable verification and
2.Concentrate on the technologies they really need, while staying away from the sensitive
parts of the fuel cycle
How to prevent proliferation and what to do if prevention fails. There is confidence that a
country bent on developing nuclear weapons can forever be prevented from doing so by the
now-traditional technological safeguards.
Phase four: from ‘resistance’ to ‘heroic flexibility’, 2013-2015
In the run-up to the presidential elections of 2013, several candidates criticized the
government for not being serious about a diplomatic solution to the nuclear question.
The prime domestic imperative was sanctions relief. If achieved, he could take credit for it. If
unsuccessful, he had already laid the groundwork for blaming starry-eyed idealists for the
failure.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
On 15 July, 2015 the P5+1 States and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The Plan is designed to limit Iran's "breakout time" to a nuclear weapon from what is
currently estimated at a few months to one year or more. This will be accomplished by
introducing several measures to limit Iran's ability. Additionally, Iran has agreed to ratify the
Additional Protocol, in addition to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and enact
inspection measures that will allow access to its nuclear facilities at un-precedented levels by
IAEA inspectors.
Among the conditions of the agreement are:
• Iran will reduce its enrichment capacity by two-thirds. It will stop using its underground
facility at Fordow for enriching uranium.
•Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium will be reduced .It will achieve this reduction either
by diluting it or shipping it out of the country.
•Iran will allow UN inspectors to enter sites, including military sites, when the inspectors
have grounds to believe undeclared nuclear activity is being carried out there. Inspectors will
only come from countries with diplomatic relations with Iran, so no Americans.
•Once the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has verified that Iran has taken steps
to shrink its program, UN, US and EU sanctions will be lifted.
•Restrictions on trade in conventional weapons will last another five years, and eight years in
the case of ballistic missile technology.
•If there are allegations that Iran has not met its obligations, a joint commission will seek to
resolve the dispute for 30 days. If that effort fails it would be referred to the UN Security
Council, which would have to vote to continue sanctions relief.
Iran says it does not want a nuclear bomb, but insists on exercising its right to run a peaceful
nuclear industry. It also wants crippling international sanctions lifted quickly. Many countries
do not believe Iran's declared intentions, and there is therefore a fear of what Iran might do
with a nuclear weapon, and of the prospect of a nuclear arms race in one of the world's most
unstable regions.

Sources:
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1982. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations
Sheehan, Michael. 1988. Arms Control: Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
Kerr, Paul (26 September 2012). "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status" (PDF). Congressional
Research Service. Retrieved 2 October 2012.
Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Prevent able Catastrophe (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 2004)
Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962)
Nathan E. Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004
12. United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Biological and
Environmental Effects of Nuclear War: Summary Analysis of Hearings, June 22–26, 1959.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1959
] "Iran's Nuclear Program: 1950s and 60s: Atoms for Peace," Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
David Sanger, Helen Cooper, "Iran is warned over nuclear 'deception'," The New York
Times, 25 September 2009; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the
Director General, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 November 2011.
] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31
December 2011, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov
Jeremy Binnie, "Iran announces new missile tests," IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 February
2014, www.janes.com.
David Albright; Andrea Stricker; Christina Walrond (25 May 2012). "ISIS Analysis of IAEA
Iran Safeguards Report:" (PDF). Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved 27
May 2012.
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/08/01/422786/-Zarif-calls-for-a-nuclearweaponsfree-
Middle-East