FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 10245. August 16, 2017.]

ELIBENA A. CABILES , complainant, vs . ATTY. LEANDRO S. CEDO ,

respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO , J : p

Complainant Elibena Cabiles (Elibena) led this administrative complaint 1

before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Leandro Cedo (respondent lawyer) for neglecting the two cases she referred to him to
handle.
The Facts

According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle

an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 entitled "Danilo
Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico Guido, " where therein
respondents were Elibena's business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid
Php5,500.00 2 for drafting therein respondents' position paper 3 and Php2,000.00 4 for
his every appearance in the NLRC hearings.
During the hearing set on March 26, 2009, only Danilo Ligbos (Danilo), the
complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply. 5 On the other hand,
respondent lawyer did not le a Reply for his clients, 6 despite being paid his
appearance fee earlier. 7
In a Decision 8 dated March 31, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled for Danilo, and
ordered the clients of respondent lawyer to pay Danilo backwages, separation pay, and
13th month pay.
Worse still, on October 27, 2009, the NLRC likewise dismissed the appeal of the
clients of respondent lawyer for failure to post the required cash or surety bond, an
essential requisite in perfecting an appeal. 9
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was
Danilo who was absent during the said hearing on March 26, 2009; and that moreover,
because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash
vouchers 1 0 that would refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular employee.
With regard to the non-perfection of the appeal before the NLRC, Elibena claimed
that respondent lawyer instructed them (his clients) to pick up the said Memorandum
only on the last day to le the appeal, i.e., on May 28, 2009; that the memorandum was
ready for pick up only at around 2:30 p.m. that day; that left to themselves, with no help
or assistance from respondent lawyer, they rushed to le their appeal with the NLRC in
Quezon City an hour later; that the NLRC Receiving Section informed them that their
appeal was incomplete, as it lacked the mandatory cash/surety bond, a matter that
respondent lawyer himself did not care to attend to; and, consequently, their appeal
was dismissed for non-perfection.
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 Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance 1 1 in the position paper and
in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared. Elibena pointed to a certi cation 1 2
issued on June 29, 2010 by the MCLE O ce that respondent lawyer had not at all
complied with the rst, second, and third compliance periods 1 3 of the (MCLE)
requirement. CAIHTE

Elibena also averred that in May 2009, she hired respondent lawyer to le a
criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita Claudit; that as evidenced by a May 5,
2009 handwritten receipt, 1 4 she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the
expenses for the ling of the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00;
and that in order to come up with the necessary amount, she sold to respondent lawyer
her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale being covered by an
unnotarized Deed of Sale 1 5 dated August 1, 2009.
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent
lawyer did not exert any effort to seasonably le her Complaint for unjust vexation
before the City Prosecutor's O ce; that the O ce of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City dismissed her Complaint for unjust vexation on September 10, 2009 on the ground
of prescription; and that although she moved for reconsideration of the Order
dismissing the case, her motion for reconsideration was denied by the City
Prosecutor's Office in a resolution dated October 19, 2009. 1 6
In his Answer, 1 7 respondent lawyer argued that the March 26, 2009 hearing was
set to provide the parties the opportunity either to explore the possibility of an
amicable settlement, or give time for him (respondent lawyer) to decide whether to le
a responsive pleading, after which the case would be routinely submitted for resolution,
with or without the parties' further appearances. As regards the cash vouchers,
respondent lawyer opined that their submission would only contradict their defense of
lack of employer-employee relationship. Respondent lawyer likewise claimed that
Elibena was only feigning ignorance of the cost of the appeal bond, and that in any
event, Elibena herself could have paid the appeal bond. With regard to Elibena's
allegation that she was virtually forced to sell her car to respondent lawyer to complete
payment of the latter's professional fee, respondent lawyer claimed that he had fully
paid for the car. 1 8
Respondent lawyer did not refute Elibena's claim that he failed to indicate his
MCLE compliance in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a May 18, 2011 Report and Recommendation, 1 9 the Investigating

Commissioner found respondent lawyer guilty of having violated Canons 5, 17, and 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for two years. Aside from respondent lawyer's failure to comply with the
MCLE requirements, the Investigating Commissioner also found him grossly negligent
in representing his clients, particularly (1) in failing to appear on the March 26, 2009
hearing in the NLRC, and le the necessary responsive pleading; (2) in failing to advise
and assist his clients who had no knowledge of, or were not familiar with, the NLRC
rules of procedure, in ling their appeal and; 3) in failing to le seasonably the unjust
vexation complaint before the city prosecutor's o ce, in consequence of which it was
overtaken by prescription.
In its March 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
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 approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, but modi ed
the recommended administrative sanction by reducing the suspension to one year.
The Court's Ruling
We adopt the IBP's nding that respondent lawyer violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also agree with the recommended penalty.
Violation of Canon 5

Firstly, Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as
an additional requirement to enable them to practice law. This is "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 2 0 Non-
compliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a delinquent
IBP member. 2 1 In Arnado v. Adaza, 2 2 we administratively sanctioned therein
respondent lawyer for his non-compliance with four MCLE Compliance Periods. We
stressed therein that in accordance with Section 12 (d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, 2 3 even if therein respondent attended an MCLE Program covered by the
Fourth Compliance Period, his attendance therein would only cover his de ciency for
the First Compliance Period, and he was still considered delinquent and had to make up
for the other compliance periods. Consequently, we declared respondent lawyer therein
a delinquent member of the IBP and suspended him from law practice for six months
or until he had fully complied with all the MCLE requirements for all his non-compliant
periods.
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings led in
the said labor case the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certi cate of Compliance
for the Third Compliance Period, i.e., from April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010, considering
that NLRC NCR Case No. 00-11-16153-08 had been pending in 2009. In fact, upon
checking with the MCLE O ce, Elibena discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to
comply with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that
respondent lawyer violated Canon 5, which reads:
CANON 5 — A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW
SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND
ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
Violation of Canons 17 and 18 and Rule
18.03 DETACa

The circumstances of this case indicated that respondent lawyer was guilty of
gross negligence for failing to exert his utmost best in prosecuting and in defending the
interest of his client. Hence, he is guilty of the following:
CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT
AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
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 Furthermore, respondent lawyer's act of receiving an acceptance fee for legal
services, only to subsequently fail to render such service at the appropriate time, was a
clear violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 4
Respondent lawyer did not diligently and fully attend to the cases that he
accepted, although he had been fully compensated for them. First off, respondent
lawyer never successfully refuted Elibena's claim that he was paid in advance his
Php2,000.00 appearance fee on March 21, 2009 for the scheduled hearing of the labor
case on March 26, 2009, during which he was absent. Furthermore, although
respondent lawyer had already received the sum of Php45,000.00 to le an unjust
vexation case, he failed to promptly le the appropriate complaint therefor with the City
Prosecutor's O ce, in consequence of which the crime prescribed, resulting in the
dismissal of the case.
We have held that:
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care
or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client
before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences,
preparing and ling the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client
or the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in ful lling his duties subjects him to
disciplinary action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact
formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. 2 5
"[A] lawyer 'is expected to exert his best efforts and [utmost] ability to [protect
and defend] his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise
serves the ends of justice.'" 2 6 However, in the two cases for which he was duly
compensated, respondent lawyer was grossly remiss in his duties as counsel. He
exhibited lack of professionalism, even indifference, in the defense and protection of
Elibena's rights which resulted in her losing the two cases.
With regard to the labor case for which he opted not to file a Reply and refused to
present the cash vouchers which, according to Elibena, ought to have been submitted
to the NLRC, we hold that even granting that he had the discretion being the handling
lawyer to present what he believed were available legal defenses for his client, and
conceding, too, that it was within his power to employ an allowable legal strategy, what
was deplorable was his way of handling the appeal before the NLRC. Aside from
handing over or delivering the requisite pleading to his clients almost at the end of the
day, at the last day to le the appeal before the NLRC, he never even bothered to advise
Elibena and the rest of his clients about the requirement of the appeal bond. He should
not expect Elibena and her companions to be conversant with the indispensable
procedural requirements to perfect the appeal before the NLRC. If the averments in his
Answer are any indication, respondent lawyer seemed to have relied heavily on the
NLRC's much vaunted 'leniency' in gaining the successful prosecution of the appeal of
his clients in the labor case; no less censurable is his propensity for passing the blame
onto his clients for not doing what he himself ought to have done. And, in the criminal
case, he should have known the basic rules relative to the prescription of crimes that
operate to extinguish criminal liability. All these contretemps could have been avoided
had respondent lawyer displayed the requisite zeal and diligence.

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 As mentioned earlier, the failure to comply with the MCLE requirements
warranted a six-month suspension in the Adaza case. Respondent lawyer must likewise
be called to account for violating Canons 17, 18, and Rule 18.03. In one case involving
violation of Canons 17 and 18 where a lawyer failed to le a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, the lawyer was penalized with a six-month suspension. 2 7 In another
case, 2 8 involving transgression of the same Canons, the guilty lawyer was meted out
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months and
admonished and sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar acts would
be dealt with more severely.
"[T]he appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts." 2 9 Given herein respondent lawyer's
failure to maintain a high standard of legal pro ciency with his refusal to comply with
the MCLE as well as his lack of showing of his fealty to Elibena's interest in view of his
lackadaisical or indifferent approach in handling the cases entrusted to him, we nd it
apt and commensurate to the facts of the case to adopt the recommendation of the
IBP to suspend him from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of
violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a
similar act will be dealt with more severely. aDSIHc

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Cedo's personal record as

attorney-at-law. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the O ce of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
said copies to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 2-9.

2. Id. at 10.

3. Id. at 11-15.
4. Id. at 17. One instance in which Atty. Cedo was paid the amount was on March 6, 2009, when
he received from Platinum Autowork Php2,000.00 labeled as "Attorney's Fees."
5. Id. at 23.

6. Id. at 28, as pointed out in the Labor Arbiter's Decision.

7. Id. at 19.
8. Id. at 28-29.

9. Id. at 37-41.
10. Id. at 24-27.

11. In violation of Bar Matter No. 1922 dated June 3, 2008. The pertinent portion which states:
xxx xxx xxx
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   The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in
all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of
issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be
applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. x x x
12. Rollo, p. 82.

13. 1st Compliance Period was from April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004; 2nd Compliance Period
was from April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from
April 15, 2007 to April 14, 2010.

14. Rollo, p. 44.

15. Id. at 54.
16. Id. at 45.
17. Id. at 56-59.
18. Id. at 49-52.

19. Id. at 89-98.

20. Arnado v. Adaza, A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015, 768 SCRA 172, 179-180.
21. Bar Matter 850, Rule 13, Section 2. Listing as delinquent member. — A member who fails to
comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired,
shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the
MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be
conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE
Committee.
22. Supra at 180.
23. d. A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a
Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show
compliance with the requirements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx

  The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. (Emphasis
ours)
24. Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Atty. Dioneda, 447 Phil. 408, 413
(2003).
25. Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Atty. Cabanes, Jr., 713 Phil. 530, 538 (2013).

26. Mattus v. Atty. Villaseca, 718 Phil. 478, 483 (2013).

27. Abiero v. Atty. Juanino, 492 Phil. 149, 159 (2005).
28. Penilla v. Atty. Alcid, Jr., 717 Phil. 210, 223 (2013).
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 29. Fabie v. Real, A.C. No. 10574, September 20, 2016.

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