460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

*
G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005.
1
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG: BERTULDO HINOG II,
BERTULDO HINOG III, BERTULDO HINOG, JR., JOCELYN
HINOG, BERTOLDO HINOG IV, BERTOLDO HINOG V,
EDGARDO HINOG, MILAGROS H. PABATAO, LILIAN H.
KING, VICTORIA H. ENGRACIA, TERISITA C. HINOG, PAZ H.
BESANA, ROBERTO C. HINOG, VICENTE C. HINOG, ROEL C.
HINOG, MARILYN C. HINOG, BEBOT C. HINOG, LORDES C.
HINOG, PABLO CHIONG, ARLENE LANSANG (All represented
by BERTULDO HINOG III), petitioners, vs. HON. ACHILLES
MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 4, 7th
Judicial Region, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO
BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS
BALANE, respondents.

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Jurisdictions; Court’s original jurisdiction

to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive; It is shared with Regional Trial
Courts and the Court of Appeals.—Although the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated in People vs. Cuaresma:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

1 Also spelled as “Bertoldo” in the records.

 461

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 461

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

Same; Same; Same; Two-Fold Rationale for the Rule.—The rationale

for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious
time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances
had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under
the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Court will not entertain direct resort to
certiorari unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction.—This Court will not entertain direct resort to
certiorari unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held
present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to
bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on
bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-
Padilla on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB
vs. Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs.
Corona on the so-called “Win-Win Resolution” of the Office of the
President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial
area.

Same; Same; Same; If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he

cannot thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case.—After
recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in
their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents,
petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial
court’s jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case. To rule
otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is
against the policy of the Court.

462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

Same; Same; Same; Docket Fees; While the payment of the prescribed
docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time
of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as
the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.—
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Manchester rule has been modified in
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion; Guidelines Involving the
Payment of Docket Fees.—Time and again, the Court has held that the
Manchester rule has been modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs.
Asuncion which defined the following guidelines involving the payment of
docket fees: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fees within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counter-claims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial
court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the
same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

463

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 463

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Sun Insurance effectively modified SC
Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and awards that
cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the
trial court.—The fact that private respondents prayed for payment of
damages “in amounts justified by the evidence” does not call for the
dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March
24, 1988 which required that all complaints must specify the amount of
damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer
in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively
modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for damages and
awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally
granted by the trial court.

Same; Same; The remedy against an interlocutory order is generally

not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due
course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal
in the manner authorized by law.—The remedy against an interlocutory
order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with
the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court issued
such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief
will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
interlocutory order. Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in
the present case.

Same; Same; Estoppel; Although the issue of jurisdiction may be

raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is
nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of
laches or estoppel.—After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of
the case before the trial court and even invoked the trial court’s authority in
order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they merely
stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by
estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. Although the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is
conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from
raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.

464

464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

Same; Same; Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope

and inflexible in character; Its principal function is to keep an inferior
tribunal within its jurisdiction.—To be sure, certiorari under Rule 65 is a
remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility
tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its
principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can
be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, not to be used for any
other purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous
conclusions of law or fact. A contrary rule would lead to confusion, and
seriously hamper the administration of justice.

Same; Actions; Parties; Substitution of Party; Non-compliance with

the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the
trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the
persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding.—No formal substitution of the parties was
effected within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose
behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to
due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution
would render the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because
the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be
binding.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Veronico G. Petalcorin for petitioners.
Paulino Clarin for private respondents.
465

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 465

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court which assails the Orders dated March 22,
1999, August 13, 1999 and October 15, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, of Tagbilaran City, Bohol in Civil Case No. 4923.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas
and Honorio, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for “Recovery
of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and
Damages” against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo for brevity). They
alleged that: they own a 1,399- square meter parcel of land situated
in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714;
sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of
the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a
small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of P100.00
only, considering the close relations of the parties; after the
expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the
occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but
Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire
property.
Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from
the premises of the subject property and restore upon themselves the
ownership and possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral
and exemplary damages, attorney’s2 fees and litigation expenses “in
amounts justified by the evidence.”
On July 2, 1991, Bertuldo filed his Answer. He alleged
ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas 3
Pahac with the
knowledge and conformity of private respondents.

_______________

2 Original Records, p. 1.
3 Id., p. 17.

466

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18,

1997, private respondents rested their case. There-upon, Bertuldo
started his direct examination. However, on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo
died without completing his evidence.
On August 4, 1998, Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as
counsel for Bertuldo as his services were terminated by petitioner
Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Veronico G. 4Petalcorin then entered his
appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.
On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to
expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court
proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify
in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the
correct docket fees; and that under 5
Manchester Development
Corporation vs. Court of6 Appeals, non-payment of the correct
docket fee is jurisdictional.
 In an amended motion, filed on October 2, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin
further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct
docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be
estimated as it is7 for recovery of ownership, possession and removal
of construction.
Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the
following grounds: (a) said motion was filed more than seven years
from the institution of the case; (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that
the death of the original defendant requires a substitution of parties
before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant and
the motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party whom
he is representing; (c) collectible fees due the court can be charged
as lien on

_______________

4 Id., p. 163.
5 G.R. No. 101550, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562; cited in SC Circular No. 7,
dated March 24, 1988.
6 Original Records, p. 169.
7 Id., p. 182.

467

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 467

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

the judgment; and (d) considering the lapse of time,8

the motion is
merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners.
In their Rejoinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time
does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the case due to failure
to pay the correct docket fees. As to the contention that deficiency in
payment of docket fees can be made as a lien on the judgment,
petitioners argued that the payment of filing
9
fees cannot be made
dependent on the result of the action taken.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court, while ordering the complaint
to be expunged from the records and the nullification of all court
proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees,
nonetheless, held:

The Court can acquire jurisdiction over this case only upon the payment of
the exact prescribed docket/filing fees for the main cause of action, plus
additional docket fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in the
complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same can be
considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. Upon the complete
payment of such fees, the Court may take appropriate action in the light of
the ruling in the10 case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.

Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency

docket fee, private11respondents filed a manifestation with 12prayer to
reinstate the case. Petitioners opposed the reinstatement but on
March 22, 1999, the 13
trial court issued the first assailed Order
reinstating the case. 14
On May 24, 1999, petitioners, upon prior leave of court, filed
their supplemental pleading, appending therein a Deed

_______________

8 Id., p. 197.
9 Id., p. 200.
10 Id., p. 207.
11 Id., p. 210.
12 Id., p. 218.
13 Id., p. 225.
14 Id., p. 238.

468

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor
15
of Sale dated November 15, 1982. Following16
the submission of
private respondents’ opposition thereto, the trial court, in its Order
dated July 7, 1999, denied the supplemental pleading on the ground
that the Deed of Absolute Sale is a new matter which was never
mentioned in the original answer dated July 2, 1991, prepared by
Bertuldo’s original counsel and which Bertuldo verified; and that
such
17
new document is deemed waived in the light of Section 1, Rule
9 of the Rules of Court. The trial court also noted that no formal
substitution of the parties was made because of the failure of
defendant’s counsel to give the names and addresses of the legal
representatives of Bertuldo, so much so that the supposed
18
heirs of
Bertuldo are not specified in any pleading in the case.
On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court
having expunged the complaint and nullified all court proceedings,
there is no valid case and the complaint should not be admitted for
failure to pay the correct docket fees; that there should be no case19to
be reinstated and no case to proceed as there is no complaint filed.
20
After the submission
21
of private respondents’ opposition and
petitioners’ rejoinder, the trial court issued the second assailed
Order on August 13, 1999, essentially denying peti-

_______________
 15 Id., p. 241.
16 Id., p. 250.
17 SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—Defenses and objections
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no juris- diction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
18 Id., p. 252.
19 Id., p. 255.
20 Id., p. 269.
21 Id., p. 275.

469

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 469

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

tioners’ manifestation/rejoinder. The trial court held that the issues

raised in such manifestation/rejoinder are practically the same as
those raised in the amended motion to expunge which had already
been passed upon in the Order dated January 21, 1999. Moreover,
the trial court observed that the Order dated March 22, 1999 which
reinstated the case was not objected to by petitioners within the
reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion 22
for
reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
On August23 25, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court in its
third assailed Order dated October 15, 1999. The trial court held that
the Manchester
24
rule was relaxed in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs.
Asuncion. Noting that there has been no substitution of parties
following the death of Bertuldo, the trial court directed Atty.
Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. The trial court also reiterated that the Order dated
March 22, 1999 reinstating the case was not assailed by petitioners
within25 the reglementary period, despite receipt thereof on March 26,
1999.
On November 19, 1999, Atty. Petalcorin complied with the
directive of the trial
26
court to submit the names and addresses of the
heirs of Bertuldo.
On November 24, 1999, petitioners 27
filed before us the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition. They allege that the public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case
to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee
deficiency since the trial court had earlier

_______________
 22 Id., p. 279.
23 Id., p. 282.
24 G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285.
25 Original Records, p. 294.
26 Id., p. 299.
27 SC Rollo, p. 4.

470

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all

proceedings of the case and such ruling was not contested by the
private respondents. Moreover, they argue that the public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be filed
and denying the manifestation with motion to dismiss, despite the
defect in the complaint which prayed for damages without
specifying the amounts, in violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated
March 24, 1988.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstating the
complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees because
petitioners did not object thereto within the reglementary period.
Besides, Atty. Petalcorin possessed no legal personality to appear as
counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo
28
until he complies with Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
At the outset, we note the procedural error committed by
petitioners in directly filing the instant petition before this Court for
it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give 29
the petitioner
unrestricted freedom 30of choice of court forum. As we stated in
People vs. Cuaresma:

_______________

28 SC Rollo, p. 38.
29 Zamboanga Barter Goods Retailers Association, Inc. (ZAMBAGORA) vs.
Lobregat, et al., G.R. No. 145466, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 624; Yared vs. Ilarde,
G.R. No. 114732, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53, 61; People vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 128297, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 566, 569-570; Aleria, Jr. vs. Velez,
G.R. No. 127400, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 611, 618-619; Tano vs. Socrates,
G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154, 172-174.
30 G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415.
 471

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 471

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.

It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons there-for, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive31
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition

upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped
32
to resolve the issues because this
Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certio-

_______________

31 Id., pp. 423-424.

32 Liga ng mga Barangay National vs. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599,
January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 562, 573; Santiago vs. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.

472

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

rari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional

and compelling circumstances33 were held present in the following
cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms; 34
(b)
Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on bail
in extradition 35proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs.
Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving modernization
and computerization of voters’ 36
registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status 37
and existence of a public
office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called “Win-Win
Resolution” of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and
compelling circumstance analogous to any of the above cases has
been adduced by the petitioners so as to justify direct recourse to this
Court. The present petition should have been initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the petition at bar.
In any event, even if the Court disregards such procedural flaw,
the petitioners’ contentions on the substantive aspect of the case fail
to invite judgment in their favor.
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this
case is borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the
Order dated March 22, 1999 which they never sought
reconsideration of, in due time, despite receipt thereof on March 26,
1999. Instead, petitioners went through the motion of filing a
supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or after
more than three months have

_______________

33 G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534.

34 G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623.
35 G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002, 389 SCRA 353.
36 G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718.
37 G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624.

473

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 473

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not have
been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no
jurisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be
expunged.
 After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking
affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading
upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively38 barred by
estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot
39
thereafter challenge the
court’s jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would
amount to speculating 40on the fortune of litigation, which is against
the policy of the Court.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression
of the trial court as well as the private respondents that petitioners
are barred from assailing the Order dated March 22, 1999 which
reinstated the case because it was not objected to within the
reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for
reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an
incidental matter which does not41 touch on the merits of the case or
put an end to the proceedings. It is an interlocutory order since
there leaves something else to be done by the

_______________

38 Soliven vs. Fastforms Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 389; Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, G.R. No. 134895,
June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 715, 732.
39 Ibid.
40 Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124262,
October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 502, 509.
41 Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
143706, April 5, 2002, 380 SCRA 285, 292; Diesel Construction Company, Inc. vs.
Jollibee Foods Corporation, G.R. No. 136805, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 844,
854.

474

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor
42
trial court with respect to the merits of the case. As such, it is not
subject to a reglementary period. Reglementary period refers to the
period set by the rules for appeal or further review of a final
judgment or order, i.e., one that ends the litigation in the trial court.
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally
not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in
due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is 43handed down, to
take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. Only when the
court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order
is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be 44considered an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. Such special
circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case.
Time and again, the Court has held that the Manchester rule has45
been modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion
which defined the following guidelines involving the payment of
docket fees:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow

_______________

42 Ong vs. Mazo, G.R. No. 145542, June 4, 2004, 431 SCRA 65, 63; Tolentino vs.
Natanauan, G.R. No. 135441, November 20, 2003, 416 SCRA 273, 280.
43 Resoso vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124140, November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 238, 244;
Quiñon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 113908 & 114819, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 575, 592.
44 Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company vs. Valencia-Bagalasca, G.R.
No. 139776, August 1, 2002, 386 SCRA 103, 109; J.L. Bernardo Construction vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 105827, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 24, 34.
45 Supra, Note No. 24.

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VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 475

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

payment of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party

claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the
fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates
46
a willingness to abide
by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient
filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no
intention
47
to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not
apply.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement
of the complaint was just and proper considering that the cause of
action48of private respondents, being a real action, prescribes in thirty
years, and private respondents did not really intend to evade the
payment of the prescribed

_______________

46 Go vs. Tong, G.R. No. 151942, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 557, 567.
47 Soriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100633, August 28, 2001, 363 SCRA
725, 743.
48 Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides: “Real actions over immovables
prescribe after thirty years. x x x”

476

476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for
inadequate assessment because
49
the clerk of court made no notice of
demand or reassessment. They were in good faith and simply relied
on the assessment of the clerk of court.
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for
payment of damages “in amounts justified by the evidence” does not
call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular
No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all complaints must
specify the amount of damages sought not only in the body of the
pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted and admitted
for filing. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by
providing that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be
estimated
50
constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial
court.
Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property
valuation, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and
judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or
as may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional
filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would
then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or
his duly authorized51deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
the additional fees.
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2,
1991, he did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-
payment of correct docket fees. Instead, he based his defense on a
claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before the
trial court. It was only in September 22,

_______________

49 Original Records, p. 210.

50 Supra, Note No. 24.
51 Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64,
July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 26, 63; Ballatan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125683,
March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 34, 42; Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122860, April 30, 1999, 306 SCRA 516, 521-522; Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum, Davao
del Norte, G.R. Nos. 880075-77, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433, 444.

477

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 477

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

1998 or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the
auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was raised
for the first time in the motion to expunge by Bertuldo’s heirs.
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case
before the trial court and even invoked the trial court’s authority in
order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that they
merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively
barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled
that a party
52
may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or
estop-pel.
Moreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected
within thirty days53from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to

_______________

52 Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 138822, January 23, 2001, 350
SCRA 113, 120; National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123215,
February 2, 1999, 302 SCRA 522, 532.
53 SECTION 16. Death of party; duty of counsel.—Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof,
and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure
of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

478

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor

stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of

the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the 54
suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-
compliance with the rule on substitution would render the
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court
acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives
or of the 55
heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be
binding. Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate
any future claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the
litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him.
The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted
sixteen months after the death of Bertuldo and only when the trial
court directed Atty. Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Strictly speaking therefore,
before said compliance, Atty. Petalcorin had no standing in the court
a quo when he filed his pleadings. Be that as it may, the matter has
been duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated October 15,
1999.

_______________

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
54 Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999, 316 SCRA
393, 400; Torres, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120138, September 5, 1997, 278
SCRA 793, 811.
55 Brioso vs. Rili-Mariano, G.R. No. 132765, January 31, 2003, 396 SCRA 549,
557.
 479

VOL. 455, APRIL 12, 2005 479

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor
56
To be sure, certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope
and inflexible
57
in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal
workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal 58
function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can
be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of 59
discretion which is tantamount to lack or 60
in excess of jurisdiction,
not to be used for any other purpose, such as to cure errors61 in
proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. A
contrary rule would lead to confusion, and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
Petitioners utterly failed to show that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. On the
contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

_______________

56 Rules of Court.
57 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August
25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455, 479; San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant vs.
Laguesma, G.R. No. 116172, October 10, 1996, 263 SCRA 68, 84-85.
58 Almuete vs. Andres, G.R. No. 122276, November 20, 2001, 369 SCRA 619,
628; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95533, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA
63, 70.
59 Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers’ Association (TMPCWA) vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 148924, September 24, 2003, 412 SCRA 69; Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 480.
60 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119322, June
4, 1996, 257 SCRA 200, 232; Garcia vs. Ranada, G.R. No. 60935, September 27,
1988, 166 SCRA 9.
61 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Gold City
Integrated Ports Services, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appel-late Court, G.R. Nos. 71771-
73, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 579.

480

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garingan vs. Garingan
 No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario,

JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—Even as a trial court’s order may merely be interlocutory

and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the
same where it is rendered with graver abuse of discretion. (Pefianco
vs. Moral, 322 SCRA 439 [2000])

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