Philippine National Bank vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI

2/9/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 209
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine National Bank vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI
G.R. No. 63201. May 27, 1992.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASIG—
BRANCH XXI, PRESIDED BY JUDGE GREGORIO G.
PINEDA, CHUNG SIONG PEK @ BONIFACIO CHUNG
SIONG PEK AND VICTORIA CHING GENG TY @
VICTORIA CHENG GENG TY, AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF RIZAL, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND/OR
HIS DEPUTIES AND AGENTS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Notices; Service by registered

mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee but if he fails
to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the
date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.—Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, provides that service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the
date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at
the expiration of such time. The fair and just application of that
exception depends upon the conclusive proof that the first notice
was sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The best evidence of
that fact would be the certification from the postmaster.
Same; Same; Same; The postmaster has the official duty to
send notices of registered mail and the presumption is that official
duty was regularly performed.—Hence, as between the denial of
the petitioners' counsel that he received the notice of the
registered mail and the postmaster's certification that said notices
were sent to him, the postmaster's claim should prevail. The
postmaster has the official duty to send notices of registered mail
and the presumption is that official duty was regularly performed.
Civil Law; Contracts; Contracts are to be interpreted
according to their literal meaning and should not be interpreted
beyond their obvious intendment.—Clearly, the option of the
lessee to extend the lease for another period of twenty years can
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000168d23500dc697691b1003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/11
be exercised only if the lessee as corporation renews or extends its

corporate term of existence in accor-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
295
VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 295
dance with the Corporation Code which is the applicable law.

Contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning
and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.
Thus, in the instant case, the initial term of the contract of lease
which commenced on March 1, 1954 ended on March 1, 1974.
PBM as lessee continued to occupy the leased premises beyond
that date with the acquiescence and consent of the respondents as
lessor.
Corporation Law; When the period of corporate life expires, the
corporation ceases to be a body corporate for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was organized.—Section 11 of
Corporation Code provides that a corporation shall exist for a
period not exceeding fifty (50) years from the date of incorporation
unless sooner dissolved or unless said period is extended. Upon
the expiration of the period fixed in the articles of incorporation in
the absence of compliance with the legal requisites for the
extension of the period, the corporation ceases to exist and is
dissolved ipso facto (16 Fletcher 671 cited by Aguedo F. Agbayani,
Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. 3, 1988 Edition p. 617).
When the period of corporate life expires, the corporation ceases
to be a body corporate for the purpose of continuing the business
for which it was organized. But it shall nevertheless be continued
as a body corporate for three years after the time when it would
have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and of enabling it gradually to
settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property
and to divide its assets (Sec. 122, Corporation Code),
Same; Involuntary Dissolution; Grounds for the involuntary
dissolution of a corporation under a quo warranto proceedings.—
The quo warranto proceeding under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, may be instituted by the Solicitor General only for
the involuntary dissolution of a corporation on the following
grounds: a) when the corporation has offended against a provision

of an Act for its creation or renewal; b) when it has forfeited its
privileges and franchises by non-user; c) when it has committed or
omitted an act which amounts to a surrender of its corporate
rights, privilege or franchises; d) when it has misused a right,
privileges or franchise conferred upon it by law, or when it has
exercised a right, privilege or franchise in contraven-tion of law.
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the then

Court of First Instance of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 21.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

296

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court seeking to annul and set aside the orders of
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch
21 (now Regional Trial Court) dated April 22, 1982,
September 14, 1982 and January 12, 1983 in LRC Case No.
R-2744 on the ground that they had been issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Private respondents are the registered owners of three
parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila covered by OCT No.
853, TCT Nos. 32843 and 32897 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal.
On March 1, 1954, private respondents entered into a
contract of lease with Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., Inc.,
(PBM for brevity) whereby the latter shall lease the
aforementioned parcels of land as factory site. PBM was
duly organized and incorporated on January 19, 1952 with
a corporate term of twenty-five (25) years. This leasehold
right of PBM covering the parcels of land was duly
annotated at the back of the above stated certificates of
title as Entry No. 9367/T-No. 32843.
The contract of lease provides that the term of the lease
is for twenty years beginning from the date of the contract
and "is extendable for another term of twenty years at the
option of the LESSEE should its term of existence be
extended in accordance with law." (p. 76, Rollo). The
contract also states that the lessee agrees to "use the
property as factory site and for that purpose to construct
whatever buildings or improvements may be necessary or

convenient and/or x x x for any purpose it may deem fit;
and before the termination of the lease to remove all such
buildings and improvements" (pp. 76-77 Rollo).
In accordance with the contract, PBM introduced on the
land, buildings, machineries and other useful
improvements. These constructions and improvements
were registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and
annotated at the back of the respondents' certificates of
title as Entry No. 85213/T-No. 43338.
On October 11, 1963, PBM executed in favor of
Philippine National Bank (PNB for brevity), petitioner
herein, a deed of assignment, conveying and transferring
all its rights and interests under the contract of lease
which it executed with private
297
VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 297

respondents. The assignment was for and in consideration

of the loans granted by PNB to PBM. The deed of
assignment was registered and annotated at the back of
the private respondents' certificates of title as Entry No.
85215/T-No. 32843.
On November 6, 1963 and December 23, 1963
respectively, PBM executed in favor of PNB a real estate
mortgage for a loan of P100,000.00 and an addendum to
real estate mortgage for another loan of P1,590,000.00,
covering all the improvements constructed by PBM on the
leased premises. These mortgages were registered and
annotated at the back of respondents' certificates as Entry
No. 85214/T-No. 43338 and Entry No. 870971/T-No. 32843,
respectively.
PBM filed a petition for registration of improvements in
the titles of real property owned by private respondents
docketed as Case No. 6530.
On October 7, 1981, private respondents filed a motion
in the same proceedings which was given a different case
number to wit, LRC Case No. R-2744, because of the
payment of filing fees for the motion. The motion sought to
cancel the annotations on respondents' certificates of title
pertaining to the assignment by PBM to PNB of the
former's leasehold rights, inclusion of improvements and
the real estate mortgages made by PBM in favor of PNB,
on the ground that the contract of lease entered into
between PBM and respondents-movants had already
expired by the failure of PBM and/or its assignee to

exercise the option to renew the second 20-year lease
commencing on March 1, 1974 and also by the failure of
PBM to extend its corporate existence in accordance with
law. The motion also states that since PBM failed to
remove its improvements on the leased premises before the
expiration of the contract of lease, such improvements shall
accrue to respondents as owners of the land,
On April 22,1982, respondent court issued an order
directing the cancellation of the inscriptions on
respondents' certificates of title. The dispositive portion of
the order provides:
"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds having jurisdiction over

the movant's land Certificates of Title Nos. 853, 32843 and 32897
is hereby ordered, upon the payment of the corresponding fees, to
cancel therein memoranda/inscriptions/entries Nos. 85213/T-No.
43338,
298

85215/T-No. 32843, 85214/T-No. 43338 and 87097/T-No. 32843.

"SO ORDERED." (pp. 147-148, Rollo)
Petitioner PNB filed a motion for reconsideration of the

above order of the respondent court but the latter denied it
on June 28, 1982.
On August 25, 1982, private respondents filed a motion
for entry of final judgment and issuance of a writ of
execution of the order of April 22, 1982.
On September 14, 1982, respondent court granted the
aforesaid motion for entry of final judgment and ordered
the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to cancel the entries
on respondents' certificates of title stated in the order of
April 22, 1982.
Petitioner PNB filed an omnibus motion to set aside the
entry of judgment as ordered by the respondent court on
the ground that it has no prior notice or knowledge of the
order of respondent court dated June 28, 1982 which
denied its motion for reconsideration of the order of April
22,1982 and that while there was a certification from the
Bureau of Posts that three registry notices were sent to
petitioner's counsel, there was no allegation or certification
whatsoever that said notices were actually received by the
addressee.
On January 12, 1983, the respondent court denied the

omnibus motion.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that respondent court acted
capriciously and arbitrarily in issuing the orders of
September 14, 1982 and January 12, 1983 which
considered its previous order of April 22, 1982 as having
become final on the ground that it had no notice or
knowledge that the order of June 28, 1982 denying its
motion for reconsideration was issued; that the notices of
registered mail allegedly containing the order of June 28,
1982 were not received by petitioner's counsel of record,
and that the certification of the Bureau of Posts refers only
to the fact that registry notices were sent, and not to the
fact that the notices were actually received by the
addressee.
In resolving this matter, the respondent court stated in
the questioned order of January 12, 1983 as follows:
299
VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 299

"The respondent PNB filed a motion of May 20, 1982 to set aside
the Order of April 22, 1982. This was denied by the Order of June
28, 1982. Then the movants filed a motion of August 25, 1982 for
entry of judgment, based on the postmaster's certification that not
only one but three notices of the registered mail containing a copy
of the order of June 28, 1982 was sent to respondent PNB's
counsel at the PNB Building at Escolta, Manila which is his
address of record in this case. Consequently the entry of judgment
Order of September 14, 1982.
"x x x.
"The respondent PNB's counsel at the hearing of said incidents
on October 12, 1982 admitted that the aforesaid registered notices
could have been received by PNB's regular Receiving Section at
the PNB Building at the Escolta but could not have been
forwarded by said Receiving Section to said counsel's Litigation
and Collection Division, Legal Department at an upper floor of the
same building. Thus the presumption that official duty was
regularly performed by the postmaster was not overcome, as most
recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in Feraren vs. Santos
promulgated on April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA 707 x x x." (p. 195,
Rollo)
Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

provides that service by registered mail is complete upon
actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his

mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date
of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at
the expiration of such time. The fair and just application of
that exception depends upon the conclusive proof that the
first notice was sent by the postmaster to the addressee.
The best evidence of that fact would be the certification
from the postmaster (Barrameda v. Castillo, L-27211, July
6, 1977, 78 SCRA 1).
In the instant case, the respondent court found that the
postmaster's certification stated that three (3) notices of
the registered mail which contained the order of June 28,
1982 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of
April 22, 1982, were sent to petitioner PNB's counsel at
Escolta, Manila which is the address stated in the record of
the case. The factual findings of the trial court bear great
weight and is binding upon this Court. Hence, as between
the denial of the petitioners' counsel that he received the
notice of the registered mail and the postmaster's
certification that said notices were sent to him? the
postmaster's claim should prevail. The postmaster has the
300

official duty to send notices of registered mail and the

presumption is that official duty was regularly performed
(Aportadera, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41358,
March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695).
Petitioner alleges that it is not the respondent court but
the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
jurisdiction over the private respondents' motion, which
raised as issue the corporate existence of PBM. Petitioner
further submits that the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation of entries in
the certificates of title of respondents on the following
grounds: 1) the motion for cancellation would amount to a
collateral attack upon the due incorporation of PBM which
cannot be done legally, 2) the contract of lease between
PBM as petitioner's assignor and private respon-dents did
not expire since PBM exercised its option to renew the
lease with the acquiescence of private respondents, and 3)
respondent court's ruling that ownership over the
improvements passed from PBM to private respondents
upon the expiration of lease violates the law and the
contract between the parties.
Even if We were to set aside the questioned orders

directing the entry of finality of the order cancelling entries
in the titles, petitioner's case must still fail on the merits.
Private respondent's motion with the respondent court
was for the cancellation of the entries on their titles on the
ground that the contract of lease executed between them
and PBM had expired. This action is civil in nature and is
within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. The
circumstance that PBM as one of the contracting parties is
a corporation whose corporate term had expired and which
fact was made the basis for the termination of the lease is
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Securities and
Exchange Commission over the case. Presidential Decree
No. 902-A, as amended, enumerates the cases over which
the SEC has exclusive jurisdiction and authority to resolve.
The case at bar is not covered by the enumeration.
Anent the issue of whether the cancellation of the
entries on respondent's certificates of title is valid and
proper, We find that the respondent court did not act in
excess of its jurisdiction, in ordering the same.
The contract of lease expressly provides that the term of
the
301
VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 301

Philippine National Bank vs, CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI
lease shall be twenty years from the execution of the

contract but can be extended for another period of twenty
years at the option of the lessee should the corporate term
be extended in accordance with law. Clearly, the option of
the lessee to extend the lease for another period of twenty
years can be exercised only if the lessee as corporation
renews or extends its corporate term of existence in
accordance with the Corporation Code which is the
applicable law. Contracts are to be interpreted according to
their literal meaning and should not be interpreted beyond
their obvious intendment. Thus, in the instant case, the
initial term of the contract of lease which commenced on
March 1, 1954 ended on March 1, 1974. PBM as lessee
continued to occupy the leased premises beyond that date
with the acquiescence and consent of the respondents as
lessor. Records show however, that PBM as a corporation
had a corporate life of only twenty-five (25) years which
ended on January 19, 1977. It should be noted however
that PBM allowed its corporate term to expire without
complying with the requirements provided by law for the

extension of its corporate term of existence.
Section 11 of Corporation Code provides that a
corporation shall exist for a period not exceeding fifty (50)
years from the date of incorporation unless sooner
dissolved or unless said period is extended. Upon the
expiration of the period fixed in the articles of
incorporation in the absence of compliance with the legal
requisites for the extension of the period, the corporation
ceases to exist and is dissolved ipso facto (16 Fletcher 671
cited by Aguedo F. Agbayani, Commercial Laws of the
Philippines, Vol. 3, 1988 Edition p. 617). When the period
of corporate life expires, the corporation ceases to be a body
corporate for the purpose of continuing the business for
which it was organized. But it shall nevertheless be
continued as a body corporate for three years after the time
when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and of
enabling it gradually to settle and close its affairs, to
dispose of and convey its property and to divide its assets
(Sec. 122, Corporation Code). There is no need for the
institution of a proceeding for quo warranto to determine
the time or date of the dissolution of a corporation because
the period of corporate existence is provided in the articles
of incorporation. When such period expires and without
any extension having been made
302

pursuant to law, the corporation is dissolved automatically

insofar as the continuation of its business is concerned. The
quo warranto proceeding under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, may be instituted by the Solicitor
General only for the involuntary dissolution of a
corporation on the following grounds: a) when the
corporation has offended against a provision of an Act for
its creation or renewal; b) when it has forfeited its
privileges and franchises by non-user; c) when it has
committed: or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender
of its corporate rights, privileges or franchises; d) when it
has misused a right, privilege or franchise conferred upon
it by law, or when it has exercised a right, privilege or
franchise in contravention of law. Hence, there is no need
for the SEC to make an involuntary dissolution of a
corporation whose corporate term had ended because its
articles of incorporation had in effect expired by its own

limitation.
Considering the foregoing in relation to the contract of
lease between the parties herein, when PBM's corporate
life ended on January 19, 1977 and its 3-year period for
winding up and liquidation expired on January 19, 1980,
the option of extending the lease was likewise terminated
on January 19, 1977 because PBM failed to renew or
extend its corporate life in accordance with law. From then
on, the respondents can exercise their right to terminate
the lease pursuant to the stipulations in the contract.
We now come to the question of the ownership over the
improvements constructed by PBM over the leased
premises, which improvements were mortgaged in favor of
PNB, petitioner herein.
The rights of the lessor and the lessee over the
improvements which the latter constructed on the leased
premises is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code
which provides:
"Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful

improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may
suffer damage thereby. He shall
303
VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 303

not however, cause any more impairment upon the property

leased than is necessary.
x x x"
The aforequoted provision gives the lessee the right to

remove the improvements if the lessor chooses not to pay
one-half of the value thereof. However, in the case at bar,
the law will not apply because the parties herein have
stipulated in the contract their own terms and conditions
concerning the improvements, to wit, that the lessee,
namely PBM, bound itself to remove the improvements
before the termination of the lease. Petitioner PNB, as
assignee of PBM succeeded to the obligation of the latter
under the contract of lease. It could not possess rights more
than what PBM had as lessee under the contract. Hence,
petitioner was duty bound to remove the improvements

before the expiration of the period of lease as what we have
already discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Its failure
to do so when the lease was terminated was tantamount to
a waiver of its rights and interests over the improvements
on the leased premises.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that
respondent court did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in directing the cancellation of entries on private
respondents' certificates of title as set forth in the
questioned order.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed orders of respondent court dated April 22,1982,
September 14, 1982 and January 12, 1983 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed; orders affirmed.
——o0o——
304
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Philippine National Bank vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI

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Philippine National Bank vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI

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2/9/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 209

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 63201. May 27, 1992.*

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Notices; Service by registered

be exercised only if the lessee as corporation renews or extends its

VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 295

Philippine National Bank vs. CFI of Rizal, Pasig, Br. XXI

dance with the Corporation Code which is the applicable law.

grounds: a) when the corporation has offended against a provision

PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the then

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

whatever buildings or improvements may be necessary or

VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 297

respondents. The assignment was for and in consideration

expired by the failure of PBM and/or its assignee to

"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds having jurisdiction over

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

85215/T-No. 32843, 85214/T-No. 43338 and 87097/T-No. 32843.

Petitioner PNB filed a motion for reconsideration of the

On January 12, 1983, the respondent court denied the

VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 299

Section 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

official duty to send notices of registered mail and the

Even if We were to set aside the questioned orders

VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 301

lease shall be twenty years from the execution of the

complying with the requirements provided by law for the

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pursuant to law, the corporation is dissolved automatically

articles of incorporation had in effect expired by its own

"Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful

VOL. 209, MAY 27, 1992 303

not however, cause any more impairment upon the property

The aforequoted provision gives the lessee the right to

petitioner was duty bound to remove the improvements

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed; orders affirmed.

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