(William - A. - Wallace - (Auth.) ) - Galileo's Logical Treatises A Translation, With Notes and Commentary PDF
(William - A. - Wallace - (Auth.) ) - Galileo's Logical Treatises A Translation, With Notes and Commentary PDF
(William - A. - Wallace - (Auth.) ) - Galileo's Logical Treatises A Translation, With Notes and Commentary PDF
Editor
VOLUME 138
WILLIAM A. WALLACE
University of Maryland al College Park
GALILEO'S LOGICAL
TREATISES
A Translation, with Notes and Commentary,
of His Appropriated Latin Questions on Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics
PREFACE xi
ABBREVIA TIONS xix
INTRODUCTION
Description of MS 27 4
Galileo's Sources: Manuscripts Of Printed Works? 6
Vallius and Carbone 9
Vallius's Logica 9
Carbone's Work 11
Dating the Manuscripts 13
Possible Sources of MS 27 14
Lorinus 17
Carbone 20
Vitelleschi 23
Rugerius 25
lenes 25
Vallius as the Source of MS 27 27
Correlations and Comparisons 31
Ordering of Questions 35
The Time and Place of Composition of MS 27 37
Clavius and Vallius 37
Time of Appropriation 39
MS 46: The Physical Questions 40
The Questions and Possible Sources 40
Menu 42
Vallius 45
Correlations and Comparisons 47
The Problem of Dating MS 46 50
Treatises on the Heavens 51
Treatises on Generation 56
Carbone Again 57
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGES
AND FOREKNOWNS
F2 On Foreknowledges of Principles
F2.1 Must every principle be foreknown to be true? 107
F2.2 Must nominal definitions of terms in first principles
be foreknown? 108
F2.3 Must principles be foreknown actualIy or habitualIy? 109
F2.4 Must principles be self-evident and incapable of proof? 110
F3 On Foreknowledges of Subjects
F3.1 What does Aristotle mean by the "is" of the subject? 112
F3.2 Can a science demonstrate the existence of its
adequate subject? 116
F3.4 Can a science demonstrate the existence of its
partial subject? 118
F3.5 Can a science manifest the real definition of its
subject? 119
F3.6 What does Aristotle mean by foreknowledge of the
subject's quiddity? 120
F4 On Foreknowledges of Properties and Conclusions
F4.1 Must the existence of a property be foreknown? 121
F4.2 Is the conclusion known simultaneously with
the premises? 122
TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION
Dl First Disputation: On the Nature and Importance of
Demonstration 127
D1.l On the definition of demonstration 127
Dl.2 Is demonstration the best of alI instruments of
scientific knowing, or is definition? 129
D2 Second Disputation: On the Properties of Demonstration 138
D2.1 Is demonstration composed of true premises? 138
D2.2 Must demonstration be made from premises that are
first and prior? 140
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES
XI
xii PREFACE
later, of Galileo 's Early Notebooks: The Physical Questions (Notre Dame
1977), which contained a reworked translation of the manuscript along
with an historical and paleographical commentary. I then put together a
volume of studies document ing my supporting research on MS Gal. 46;
this appeared some years later as Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval
and Sixteenth-Century Sources ojGalileo's Thought (ReideI1981).
Meanwhile, in 1972, while verifying Favaro's transcription of MS Gal.
46 against the autograph conserved in the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale
in Florence, I took the opportunity to examine the autograph of MS Gal.
27 and actually began to transcribe portions of it myself. My interest then
was mainly one of checking the authorities cited by Galileo in that
manuscript so as to compare them with those cited in MS Gal. 46. At that
time I was corresponding with Alistair Crombie about GaIiIeo's early
Latin manuscripts, and he informed me that a transcription of MS Gal. 27
had already been made by one of his former students, Adriano Carugo.
Crombie, in fact, arranged for Carugo to provide me with a copy of his
transcription, and Carugo did so late in 1972, with the understanding that
the work was for my private use only. From it I obtained the citation
information I was seeking and appended it to a note of an essay I was then
preparing on "Galileo and the Thomists." Upon my return to the U .S. at
the end of 1972, I compared Carugo's transcription of MS Gal. 27 with a
microfilm I happened to possess of Ludovico Carbone's Additamenta to
the logic textbook of Franciscus Toletus (Venice 1597). To my surprise I
found a number of word-for-word parallels between the latter work and
Galileo's manuscript. This served to confirm a thesis to which I was
inclining at the time, which had been reinforced by Crombie's earlier
discovery that two questions in MS Gal. 46 seem to have been extracted
from Christopher Clavius's Sphaera (Rome 1581). This was that Galileo's
early manuscripts were directly connected with the teachings of Jesuits at
the Collegio Romano. But in view of the facts that the transcription of MS
Gal. 27 was for my private use only, and that Crombie and Carugo had
assured me that it was to be published within a year, I simply filed it away
and continued to focus my attention on the sources of MS Gal. 46.
In 1975 I was back in Italy again, this time to investigate handwritten
reportationes of lectures given at the Collegio Romano as possible
additional sources of MS Gal. 46. In effect the only printed sources of late
sixteenth-century Jesuit teachings relating to that manuscript, apart from
Clavius, were the textbooks of Franciscus Toletus and Benedictus
Pererius, and a thorough search of all three had turned up only fifteen
PREFACE xiii
in English, then to have the volume put out by the Cent ro as part of its
publication series. We outlined this proposal to Ezio Riondato, Director
of the Centro, and received his enthusiastic support. I then returned to the
University of Padua for two months during the academic year 1983-1984
to lecture on MS Gal. 27 and its sources. During that period I worked out
the problem with the demonstrative regressus that had bothered Edwards
(see Lat. Ed., 288-302), and mapped out the work that remained to be
done. The completed edition, entitled Galileo Galilei, Tractatio de
praecognitionibus et praecognitis and Tractatio de demonstratione, was
published by Editrice Antenore in 1988, with Edwards being responsible
for the transcription and its apparatus and I for the introduction, notes,
commentary, bibliographies, and indexes.
In view of the book's being published in Italy there was no thought at
the time of including in it an English translation of the Latin text. AlI
agreed, however, that this would be a desideratum in view of the fact that
much research on Galileo's logical methodology had been going on in the
U.S. and the U.K. Accordingly, aided by a grant from the National
Endowment for the Humanities, I set to work on making Galileo's logic
intelligible to the Anglo-American world. The present volume is the fruit
of that enterprise.
In view of the needs of most English readers the translation of the
manuscript presented herein is as literal as possible consonant with clear
expression, with technical terms given in vernacular equivalents and the
Latin supplied in notes. The text translated is obviously not a finished
piece of work but represents the effort of a young professor to abbreviate
and reformulate teachings contained in a classic of logic, difficult enough
in the original Greek and no less so in Latin versions. On this account
Galileo's style is more cryptic than one might expect, and there are
occasional slips or errors in his exposition. In some cases interpolations
had to be made in his text to complete a thought or simply make it
intelIigible to modern readers; in others, corrections or emendations had
to be introduced in order to render his thought consistent. Insertions of
the first type I have shown in square brackets [], those of the second in
curly brackets or braces {}. The rationale behind the latter I explain in each
case in an accompanying note.
In place of the line numbers used in the Latin Edition, 1 have numbered
the paragraphs of Galileo's text in that edition successively, and have used
these numbers in this volume for cross-references. As will be seen, the
manuscript contains two treatises, the first dealing with the fore-
xvi PREFACE
the most recent information on the dating and likely sources of alI three
of Galileo's Pisan manuscripts, as well as a more detailed analysis of the
sources of MS Gal. 27. The concluding section of the Introduction then
provides an alI too brief evaluation of how Galileo's appropriated
treatises on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics may have influenced the
development of his science. For a fuller account the re ader should consult
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof, for reasons now to be explained.
As will become clear from the Introduction, the treatises found in MS
Gal. 27 were appropriated from but a small portion of a logic course being
taught at the Collegio Romano in the last two decades of the sixteenth
century. The course itself, which has been described in general terms in
Galileo and His Sources, lasted for an entire year and covered all the
materials found in Aristotle's Organon. The part of the course Galileo
copied out, namely, that devoted to the first book of the Posterior
Analytics, was taught in about a month and a half toward the end of the
course. The text of the Analytics is itself difficult to understand, and
indeed most of the prior instruction in the course was directed to building
up the knowledge required for its comprehension. To further complicate
matters, the concepts of logic elaborated previous to the part of the course
Galileo appropriated and the concepts of science treated in the part
following it are very different from those taught in logic courses in the
present day. Yet they are crucial for understanding not only the logica
docens (or "logic teaching") contained in MS Gal. 27 but also the logica
utens (or "logic in use") Galileo employed in his various scientific
investigations.
Awareness of this situation, which became progressively clearer as 1
worked through the translation and the materials required for its proper
comprehension, led to another fruit of the enterprise sponsored by the
National Endowment. This is a companion volume, entitled Galileo's
Logic of Discovery and Proof, much of which was written subsequent to
my preparing the translation and commentary. Actually it has turned out
to be both propadeutic and complementary to the translation, since it lays
out in full detail the logical system Galileo appropriated and then explains
how he employed it in developing his new sciences of the heavens and of
local motion. The translation volume, of course, is still basic, since it
documents Galileo's actual wording of the logical teaching he
appropriated from the Jesuits. But to make it more useful to the reader
who desires a deeper understanding of the epistemology and ontology that
lies behind that teaching, 1 have cross-referenced the commentary of this
XVlll PREFACE
W.A.W.
College Park, Maryland
ABBREVIATIONS
XIX
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
3
4 INTRODUCTION
DESCRIPTION OF MS 27
Crombie re port that the paper on which the logicai treatises were written
is unwatermarked, whereas Drake sees evidence on some folios of a bell-
shaped watermark that is uncircled, which he conjectures to be of Pisan
origin. Drake's dating ofthe Pisan manuscripts, MS 27 included, ma de on
the basis of these watermarks generally agrees with our own, to be
discussed below. Carugo and Crombie, on the other hand, propose very
different datings on the basis of published works from which they think
two of the manuscripts in which we are interested, MSS 27 and 46, are
derived. Their datings raise the question whether Galileo's sources were
actually published works, as they surmise, or manuscripts, as held first by
us and now also by Drake. 5
We preface, 1 say, an Introduction that was explained by us 34 years ago [i.e., in 1588]
in the Collegio Romano and given to our hearers shortly thereafter. This work, with very
little of the fruits of our labors changed in it, was published at Venice by some good
author, who added some preliminary matter and made some inversions (or rather
perversions) of its order that, in my judgment, achieve no better results. We wish to warn
you the reader of this, so that, should you come across this book, you will recall that he
took it from us. And since he stole this and similar matter from us and from the writings
of our Fathers [i.e., other JesuitsJ, perhaps he should have added the author's name to
these books, had he known it or thought it due us [VLl: 4].
Vallius then announces that his second volume will contain his expositions
of the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics, and to this he will add
a disputation on science, of which he further remarks:
The same thing happened to this Disputation as 1 explained happened to the
Introduction. But this we have now so enlarged and perfected that it would hardly be
recognized by anyone except the author as the fetus of the same [VL1: 4].
Although Vallius does not name the "good author" who plagiarized his
work, there can be no doubt that this was Ludovico Carbone, who in 1597
published at Venice his Introductio in logicam, which contains the
Introduction to which Vallius refers, and then in 1599, also at Venice,
printed an Introductio in universam philosophiam, which includes the
Disputation on science here described by Vallius.
The preface to Vallius's second volume is even more helpful for
establishing Carbone's identity. By the time he had come to its
preparation Vallius had decided that he would append four complete
tractates to his commentaries on the Analytics and not merely the one
disputation on science. These he now enumerates as treatises on
foreknowledge, on demonstration, on definition, and on science.
Concerning the order of these treatises he alerts the reader to the
following:
About twenty years ago [i.e., around 1600], a certain individual- possessing a doctorate,
having published a number of small books, and being otherwise well known - had a book
printed at Venice in which he took over and brought out under his own name a good part
of what we had corn posed in our an science and had taught at one time, 34 years before
this date [i.e., in 1588], in the Roman gymnasio. And having done this, this good man
thought so much of other matters we had covered in our lectures that he took from them,
and claimed under his own name, a large part of an the syllogism, an reduction, an
joreknowledges, and an instruments oj scientijic knowing, and proposed these as kinds
of Additamenta to the logic ofToletus, especially to the books ofthe Prior Analytics. He
also saw fit to publish, again under his own name, our Introduction to the whole of logic,
having changed only the ordering (disordering it, in my judgment), along with the
INTRODUCTION 11
introductions and conclusions. 1 wish you to know this, my reader, so that, should you
see anything in either, you will recognize the author. 1 say, "should you see anything in
either," for we have so expanded our entire composition that, if you except only the
opinions (which, once explained, we have not changed), hardly anything similar can you
see in either. So in those works you have what he took from me, in this what 1 have
prepared more fully and at length [VL2: 1].
Here, then, was the solution to the puzzle. The "good man" to whom
Vallius makes reference was no doubt Ludovico Carbone, for Carbone
did publish a number of small books (libellz) between 1587 and 1597. 7
Indeed, in 1588 he put out an edition of Toletus's introduction to
dialectics (Introductio in dialecticam), acknowledging in it that Toletus
was his teacher, and adding to it some preludes (praeludia) and tab les
composed by himself. In its preface he also mentions that he taught an
introduction to logic in Rome in that same year (1588), to the great benefit
of his students. In 1597, moreover, he published at Venice the
Additamenta to which Vallius refers, whose full title translates as
"Additions to the Commentaries,of Franciscus Toletus on the Logic of
Aristotle: Preludes to the Books of the Prior Analytics; Treatises on the
Syllogism, on Instruments of Scientific Knowing, and on Foreknowledges
and F oreknowns." These are precisely the disputations Vallius charges
Carbone with appropriating, and the conjunction of their titles with an
infrequent collective noun such as Additamenta places beyond doubt the
identity of the "good man" who put them together. Aiso to be noted is
Vallius's statement that he did not change his explanations of the opinions
and positions on the various questions. We may reasonably expect from
this that the citations of authorities and sources in the printed text of 1622
will be the same as in the lecture notes of 1588.
On the basis of this evidence, the materials contained in Carbone's
Additamenta are considered throughout this volume to be the product of
joint authorship. They are therefore attributed to Vallius-Ciubone and
assigned the dates 1588-1597, the first being the date when Vallius's
exemplar was completed and the second that of Carbone's publication. A
few details about Carbone and his activities may now prove helpful for
forming a judgment of the respective contributions of the two authors to
the final result.
by the J esuits of the Collegio Romano. 8 She speculates that Carbone was
a student with them in the early 1560's, where he was a devoted member
of one of their sodalities, the Congregatio Beatae Mariae Annuntiatae.
This squares with Carbone's statement that he had studied logic under
Toletus, for Toletus taught the logic course at the Collegio in 1559-1560.
Early in his career he prepared a study guide for a popular compendium
of rhetoric by the Portuguese Jesuit, Cipriano Soarez, entitIed De arte
rhetorica, which Carbone claims to have seen in manuscript. This was
first published in 1562 and then reprinted 134 times down to 1735. In the
preface to this guide, which bore the titIe Tabulae Rhetoricae Cipriani
Soarii and which he published along with his commentary, De arte
dicendi, in 1589, Carbone praises his professors at the Collegio for the
content of their lectures and the manner in which they instructed their
students. He wrote then that he was actively preparing ten more works
that would benefit not only his own students but also those who attend
Jesuit schools. Moss suspects that some of these are based on
reportationes of lectures on rhetoric she has uncovered at the Collegio
Romano. Since these are of Jesuit authorship, this would corroborate
Vallius's charge that Carbone had stolen not only his writings but also
those of other Jesuits. She has also discovered a manuscript containing
Carbone's commentaries on the De caelo and De generatione which bear
considerable affinity to J esuit lectures on these works and also to
Galileo's MS 46. 9 Yet her judgment of Carbone's appropriation of all
these materials is less harsh than one might expect, for she concludes on
the note that "the piety he exhibits towards his mentors and his own
expres sed concern to further their teachings helps to excuse his lack of
concern for what we moderns would term plagiarism."lo
Summing up Moss's and other evidence with regard to Carbone, we
may gather that: (1) he had studied philosophy at the Collegio prior to
1562, probably beginning in 1559 under Toletus; (2) he taught an
introduction to logic in Rome in 1588 and probably at the Collegio, where
Vallius had taught a similar introduction in late 1587; (3) he published in
1588 some preludes to, and tables for, Toletus's introduction to logic,
adumbrating materials that would later appear in his own Introductio of
1597, now known to be based on Vallius's lectures; (4) he published in
1589 a guide and tables to Soarez's rhetoric, at which time he stated that
he was preparing ten more works related in some way to Jesuit teachings;
(5) he wrote out in 1594 manuscript notes on the De caelo and De
generatione based on Jesuit materials, probably also in Rome and
INTRODUCTION 13
possibly one of the ten works then under preparation; (6) he published in
1597 and under his own name an Introductio in logicam, appropriating
ValIius's similar introduction from the latter's lectures given in 1587; (7)
in 1597 he likewise published under his own name an Additamenta to
Toletus's Logic, similarly appropriating materials in it from Vallius's
logic course; and (8) in 1599 an Introductio in universam philosophiam
was published under his name (posthumously), containing a treatise De
scientia alleged by Vallius to be also based on the latter's logic course.
On the matter of Carbone's possible contribution to alI of these
reworked treatises, Moss's considered view is that his part was mainly that
of the pedagogue - ordering the materials so that their connections could
readily be seen and supplying apt illustrations to make them intelligible.
In her judgment he was an outstanding teacher. His style, she writes, "is
direct but elegant, not flowery but explicit, and replete with pertinent
illustrations from the classics."11 Apart from Vallius's prefaces,
therefore, on the bases of Carbone's own testimony and Moss's study of
his style, it seems reasonable to attribute the basic content of the
Additamenta and the appropriated treatises in the Introductio in logicam
and the Introductio in universam philosophiam to Vallius's lectures of
1587-1588. The stylistic and pedagogical innovations in them, on the
other hand, would seem to be the re suIt of Carbone's editorial work in
1597 for the Additamenta and the Introductio in logicam, and some time
later for the Introductio in universam philosophiam.
POSSIBLE SOURCES OF MS 27
Much of the foregoing research would not have been possible had not a
copy of the rotulus of professors at the Jesuits' Roman college, indicating
their subjects and the years in which they taught, survived to the present.
Apparent1y it was a custom for each professor to deposit a set of his
lectures in the Collegio's library. Some of these were sent to other
institutions, usually Jesuit, to serve as models there, and yet others were
copied and recopied for various purposes. Onlya small number of these
are extant, but fortunately enough of them are available from the period
around 1590 to permit a reasonably accurate dating of Galileo's
compositions.
At that time the course of studies at the Collegio was c1early prescribed
and a fairly standard syllabus was being taught in each of the subjects.
The subjects themselves were arranged in a three-year cyc1e and followed,
in the main, the text of Aristot1e. The first year was devoted to logic as set
forth in the Organon and concluded with a detailed study of the Posterior
Analytics; the second year focused on natural philosophy, covering the
Physics, the De caelo, and the Meteorology; and the third year, after
conc1uding the study of natural philosophy with the De generatione,
treated the Metaphysics and the De anima to complete the cyc1e. Usually
a professor would begin with a class in the first year and then take that
c1ass through all three years of the cyc1e. Occasionally, however, a
professor would manifest particular competence in logic or natural
philosophy, say, and would be assigned to teach that specialty more than
once. As can be seen from the rotulus, portions of which are reproduced
in Galileo and His Sources, p. 7, Ioannes Lorinus filled that function in
INTRODUCTION 15
logic and Antonius Menu in natural philosophy. Both left rather complete
sets of notes, which apparently were used by their successors to map out
their own lectures. Some selectivity and reordering of the materials is
detectable from year to year, possibly reflecting the varying pedagogical
abilities of the lecturers, and yet a remarkable uniformity characterizes
the teaching as a whole. The resulting repetition of titles and subtitles into
which the various courses were divided makes it difficult to identify any
one professor's notes as Galileo's source, but a careful study of the
wording can reveal varying degrees of similarity and other clues that point
to notes dating from a particular year as Galileo's likely exemplar.
One professor, though probably not himself Galileo's source, deserves
special mention for the thoroughness of his lectures throughout the three-
year cycle and for the fact that he meticulously numbered and dated aU of
his lectures in the margins of his teaching notes. This is Ludovicus
Rugerius, a Florentine, who began the cycle in 1590 and concluded it in
1592, delivering a total of 10881ectures in the process. All of these lectures
are preserved in a series of codices now in the Staatsbibliothek Bamberg.
They were probably sent to the Jesuit college there at the behest of
Christopher Clavius, then a colleague of Rugerius, who was originally
from Bamberg and who may have wished to provide his fellow Jesuits
there with a model teaching program. The course of Rugerius's teaching
is plotted in Figure 1. The points circled on the plot designate the dates,
recorded in his notes, on which he ended one tract of a course and began
another; many of these correspond to his finishing a commentary on one
of Aristotle's works or on a book within a particular work. The
cumulative number of lectures is shown along the ordinate, and the total
number of lectures on a particular work is given in parentheses under its
title. The abscissa, on the other hand, is divided into months, from
November of one year to October of the next.
Since MSS 27 and 46 have been the main concern thus far, as can be
seen in Figure 1, their contents correspond to only a small portion of the
materials covered each year in these lectures at the Collegio Romano. One
of the standard divisions for each course was the treatise, and as already
noted MS 27 contains only two treatises, the first of which may be
incomplete; MS 46, on the other hand, contains three treatises, more or
less complete, and a fragment of a fourth, much of which has clearly been
lost. The two treatises in MS 27 derive from the portion of the year-long
logic dealing with Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, whereas the first two
treatises of MS 46 correspond to the matter covered in Aristotle's De
16 INTRODUCTION
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MONTHS
cae/o, the second two to the matter covered in his De generatione, both
from the year(s) devoted to natural philosophy. Since we may presume
that professors worked their way through the course at about the same
rate as Rugerius, the chronology of his lectures proves useful for dating
when these treatises might have been completed in a particular year and
thus indicate the earliest time at which they could have been available to
Galileo.
Six sets of notes from the course on logic at the Collegio Romano
between the years 1584 and 1592 are available to further substantiate the
dating of MS 27 as composed not before August of 1588 and most
probably in late 1588 or early 1589. Four of these are straightforward
records of course work, whose professors and dates of completion are
known to be as follows: Ioannes Lorinus (1584), Mutius Vitelleschi
(1589), Ludovicus Rugerius (1590), and Robertus Jones (1592). The
remaining two are connected with the course completed by Paulus Vallius
in 1588, presumed now to be Galileo's exemplar; one is Carbone's
plagiarized Additamenta of 1597, the other Vallius's reworked logic
course as published in 1622. These two versions thus refIect in varying
ways Vallius's original commentary on the Posterior Analytics. The
similarities between them and the contents of MS 27 are so striking that
they effectively rule out any other way of accounting for Galileo's
organization and precise wording of the materials he there appropriated.
To elaborate somewhat on this analysis, and incidentally to furnish
details that prove helpful for dating MS 46, we now give an overview of
the contents of all six of the extant logic courses that contain matter
similar to that in MS 27. Were we to provide more precise correlations
with them as possible exemplars, the proper procedure would be to make
comparisons of each of the paragraphs in MS 27 with corresponding
materials in the different courses to see precisely how much of the content
of each question has counterparts in a possible exemplar. Apart from the
content and degree of correlation, the ordering of the questions could also
prove important, since the ordering might vary with each reorganization
of the subject matter. Such procedures have not proved necessary for
determining the source and dating of MS 27, but we mention them here
for their later application in the analysis of MS 46.
Treatise on demonstration
[On demonstration)
On the nature of demonstration
On the definition of demonstration DJ.I
What the conclusion must be like
[On the conditions of demonstration)
On the first condition: that the premises be true D2.I
On the second condition: that they be ... immediate
What is an immediate proposition D2.3
Must every demonstration contain immediates D2.4
Do axioms enter into demonstrations D2.5
On the third condition: that they be more known F4.2;D2.6
On the fourth condition: that they be prior D2.2
On the fifth condition: that they contain a cause D2.2
On the sixth condition: that they be said of every instance D2.1
On the seventh condition: that they be essential
On the modes of speaking essentially, in general D2.8
What propositions are in the first ... second...
third... fourth modes of speaking essentially D2.9
What modes ... enter into a demonstration D2.10
On the eighth condition: universal, primary, commensurate D2.II
On the ninth condition: that the premises be necessary D2.1
On the tenth condition: that they be proper
INTRODUCTJON 19
Table 2. Continued.
1620. (A more detailed outline of his course, with the precise Latin titles
and the respective foliation and pagination for the various questions in the
two versions, is to be found in the Latin Edition, pp. xx-xxiii.) Lorinus
was born at Avignon in 1559 and, after entering the Society of Jesus,
taught logic at the Collegio during the academic year 1583-1584. Later he
went on to a professorship in Scripture there and served as a censor
librorum within the Jesuit order. He lived until 1634. In Table 1 the
questions he treated in his logic lectures that correspond to questions in
Galileo's MS 27 are shown in italics, with the number of Galileo's parallel
question indicated in the column on the right. This is an abbreviated
listing; the full titles of the questions with their subdivisions are in the
Latin Edition, noted above. Even a quick peru sai of Table 1 and a
comparison of it with our Table of Contents will show that a substantial
portion of Galileo's material had already been covered by Lorinus.
Another noteworthy feature of the course, though not apparent in the
list of questions, is Lorinus's citation of authorities, opinions, and
positions. These are practically identical in both versions, indicating that
he had added no new sources in the intervening years; Vallius made a
similar claim for his two versions, as noted above. Lorinus cites St.
Thomas and his followers frequently, as one might expect in view of the
long Thomistic tradition at the Collegio Romano. Of Thomists alone
there are 178 citations in the exposition ofthe Posterior Analytics, with 69
to Thomas de Vio Caietanus, 26 to Soncinas, 22 to Soto, 18 to Dominicus
de Flandria, 11 each to Capreolus and Ferrariensis, and so on. More
surprising is Lorinus's even more extensive knowledge ofthe teachings of
the Peripatetics in the Italian universities. Here there are 235 citations in
all, with Balduinus having 46 citations, Paulus Venetus 43, Zabarella 31,
Niphus 23, and Zimara 19, to mention only the most frequent. Compared
to these numbers he is quite sparing in his use of nominalists, with only 33
citations, Jesuits with 8, and Scotists with 7. The Jesuits to whom he
refers, predictably, are only two in number: Toletus and Pererius.
20 INTRODUCTION
TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE:
Foreknowledge of principles:
F2.1 767 486 (63070) 314 (65070) 41070
F2.2 1344 467 (35070) 275 (59070) 20070
F2.3 1344 378 (28070) 218 (58070) 16070
F2.4 1289 712 (55070) 384 (58070) 30070
(Average: 43070) (Average: 58070) (Av.25OJo)
TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION:
lecture notes, with some slight additions of his own; (2) that Carbone's
additions, in accordance with Moss's findings, were mainly in the area of
exemplification or illustration; and (3) that Carbone's editorial
preoccupation, as Vallius himself was aware, was one of reordering the
INTRODUCTION 23
(On foreknowledges)
What is foreknowledge, and how many kinds are there
On what is usually said about foreknowledge
On the foreknowledge that something exists
(On science)
(On demonstration)
On the definition of demonstration given by Aristotle DJ.J
Must the premises of a demonstration be true, and how D2.1
What does Aristotle mean by the expression "first and
immediate proposition " D2.3
What is an immediate proposition D2.3
What are the kinds of immediate proposition ...
Must a demonstration be composed of immediates, and how D2.4
On Aristotle's division: more known to nature and to us
Does demonstration require more known to nature or to us F4.2
Must the premises of a demonstration be more known than
the conclusion, and how... D2.6
Must a demonstration be composed of propositions that are
said of every instance D2.7
Does Aristotle give a correct dejinition of the first mode
of speaking essentially
What propositions are contained... in this first mode
of speaking essentially D2.8
What is the second mode of speaking essentially D2.8
What propositions are contained in the second mode ... D2.8
On the third mode of speaking essentially
On the fourth mode of speaking essentially
The four modes being explained, what ones will enter
into a demonstration D2.JO
Is every essential proposition necessary ... (and isI every
necessary proposition essential
What is a first and commensurate predicate
What are jirst and universal predicates D2.11
Jones. Robertus Jones, an English Jesuit who also used the names of
Holland, Draper, and perhaps Northe, entered the Society in Rome in
26 INTRODUCTION
Disputation on demonstration
Treatise on foreknowledges
Whether there are such, in general. ..
Does each and every teaching come about through preexistent
knowledge, and how
What are foreknowledges, and what kinds are there
What is foreknowledge of principles and how is it described
For what principles is foreknowledge of existence required F2.i
Is foreknowledge of definition also required for principles F2.2
What principles must be foreknown earlier and what later
What is foreknowledge of subject and property, and how is it described
What is meant by the existence of the subject F3.i
Must the existence of the subject necessarily ... be foreknown
Must the nominal or the real definition of the subject
be foreknown F3.6
How does the property's definition differ from the subject's
Must the existence of the property also be foreknown F4.i
Treatise on the conditions of a demonstration
What is a demonstrat ion Fl.l
Whether a demonstration must be made from truths and causes
Must the premises ... be true F2.2
Must the premises... be causes F2.3
Must ... a demonstration be madefromfirsts et immediates
Must the premises... be immediate [propositionsj F2.4
Must a demonstration be made from propositions that are
prior and more known F4.2;D2.6
What is a predicate that is said of every instance D2.7
What is a mode of speaking essentially, and how many are there
How are the modes of speaking essentially divided D2.8
What is the first mode ... the second mode... D2.9
What is a commensurate universal and what propositions can
be said to be commensurately universal
Are these ali properties of a demonstration, and how D2.iO
Must a demonstration be made from proper [principlesj D2.i2
Can there be demonstration of corruptibles and singulars
Treatise on the species of demonstration
How many species of demonstrat ion are there D3.i
How would one describe demonstration of the reasoned fact
How would one describe demonstration from a remote cause D3.2
How would one describe demonstration from an effect D3.2
Whether, why, and how one may have a demonstrative regress D3.3
INTRODUCTION 27
Disputation on demonstration
On the essence of demonstration in general
What is demonstration Dl.l
Must demonstration be made from true [propositions] D2.I
Must every demonstration be made from firsts and immediates D2.2
What and how many are the kinds of immediate proposition D2.3
Must every demonstration be made from propositions that are
more known, prior to, and causes of the conclusion D2. 2;2. 5
Whether and how every demonstration is made fram necessaries D2.7
What prapositions and how many kinds of them are contained
under the first mode of speaking essentially D2.8
What propositions and how many kinds of them are contained
under the second mode of speaking essentially D2.8
On the species of demonstration and on the demonstrative regress
What and how many are the species of demonstrat ion D3.I
Is demonstration of the fact true demonstration D3.2
Is there a demonstrative regress and circular [reasoning] D3.3
What kind of demonstrative middle term is required for most perfect
demonstration, namely, that of the reasoned fact
Apart from the records of his teaching at the Collegio Romano, his
Logica, and these censorship reports, little has been known about Vallius.
Recently, however, while working in the Roman Archives, Mario Biagioli
has uncovered a Ietter from the General of the Jesuits to a Ioannes
Sagredo in Venice and dated November 17, 1601. 12 It seems that Sagredo
INTRODUCTION 29
Disputation on foreknowledges
On foreknowledges in general
What is foreknowledge, in general
Is the foreknowledge of definition that of the nominal
definition only, or of the real definition also F3.6
How many kinds of foreknowns are there
On foreknowledge of principles ...
Must the nominal definitions of terms occuring in principles
be foreknown prior to demonstration F2.2
Must principles be foreknown to be true F2.I
Is it necessary that they be foreknown habitually ... F2.3
How first principles ... can be proved F2.4
Whether and how assent to the premises is included in assent
to the conclusion F4.2
On foreknowledge of the property ...
Must the existence of the property be foreknown prior to
demonstration F4.I
On foreknowledge of the subject
Is the existence of the subiect always supposed in a science F3.I
What are the conditions of the subiect or obiect of a science F3.2
How partial subiects can be proved [to exist} in a science F3.4
What kind of existence must be foreknown of the subiect ...
The "is" of essence must be foreknown of the subiect F3.5
Disputation on demonstration
On the principles of demonstration, in general
On the nature and conditions of demonstration
What is demonstration Dl.l
Must demonstration proceed from true [propositions} ... D2.I
What proposilions are immediate and first D2.3
Must true demonstration proceed from immediates D2.4
[Axioms} do not enter into ... each demonstration D2.5
Must demonstrat ion proceed from causes... D2.2
Must demonstration proceed from more knowns and priors ... D2.6
What is a proposition said of every instance ... D2.7
On the modes of speaking essentially, in general D2.8
What propositions are in the first mode ... the second mode ... D2.9
Which of these... serve the needs of demonstration D2.IO
1s every necessary proposition essential, and vice versa
What is a first or commensurate predicate, and ils kinds D2.II
Must demonstration proceed from necessary [propositionsj. .. D2.I2
On the species of demonstration
How many kinds of demonstration are there D3.I
Is demonstration of the fact true demonstration DJ.2
lNTRODUCTION 31
Table 7. Continued.
again with the same discussion of opinions and the same decisions
reached.
Table 8. Textual Correlations for the Logical Questions: Galileo, Carbone and Vallius
TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION:
an the nature and importance of demonstration:
D1.1 13r17 2:220
D1.2 14rl5 28va-3lva 2: 123 ,406-409
an the properties of demonstration:
D2.1 17vl7 2:221
D2.2 18v2 2:224
D2.3 19v1O 2:229
D2.4 20v6 2:235
D2.5 21rl6 2:238-240
D2.6 22r7 2:228,250
D2.7 23v5 2:253
D2.8 24r33 2:255
D2.9 26vl 2:268
D2.1O 27rl8 2:266
D2.11 27v23 2:273,276
D2.12 28r28 2:281
Table 10. The Order of Questions in Various Logic Courses at the Collegio, 1584-1592
VALLIUS 1588 F3.6 F2.2 F2.1 F2.3 F2.4 F4.1 F3.1 F3.2 F3.4 F3.5 F4.2 II
CARBONE 1597
GALILEO F2.1 F2.2 F2.3 F2.4 F3.1 F3.2 F3.4 F3.5 F3.6 F4.1 F4.2 II
MS27
VITELLESCHI o
1589
VALLIUS P3.6 F2.2 F2.1 P2.3 P2.4 F3.5 F4.1 F3.1 F3.2 F3.4 F3.5 II
1622
LORINUS 01.1 02.1 02.302.4 02.5 04.2 02.6 02.2 02.7 02.8 02.9
1584 02.10 02.11 03.1 03.2 03.3 16
Carbone and Vallius blocked out. Primafacie, on the basis of Table 9 one
would have to favor Lorinus as the likely source, and date Galileo's
writing of MS 27 in 1584 or shortly thereafter. Rugerius would be the next
best candidate, and his selection would move the likely date back to 1590.
Table 10, on the other hand, might give ground for pause, since it shows
that Rugerius best duplicates the order of Galileo's composition, and thus
there could be reason, admittedly slight, to favor him. In either event the
result would not be conclusive, and the best one might do is locate the
composition somewhere between 1584 and 1590.
Clavius and Vallius. Since the path by which he apparently did so has
been explained in Galilea and His Saurces (pp. 91-95, 223-225), only its
main lines need be sketched here. As Galileo achieved proficiency in
mathematics he set to work on a treatise on centers of gravity entitled
Thearemata circa centrum gravitatis salidarum, a draft of which he
completed in 1587. He showed copies of this to various mathematicians,
and during a visit to Rome in that year left some of its propositions with
Christopher Clavius, the mathematician of the Collegio. Fortunately
portions of an exchange of correspondence between Clavius and Galileo
on the treatise have been preserved, and these show that Clavius had
reservations about the logic of one of the proofs offered in it by Galileo,
38 INTRODUCTION
Collegio from 1589 to 1592, and on this account have been taken into
account in the Notes and Commentary of the Latin Edition.
already noted the first two treatises, on the universe and on the heavens
respectively, treat matters from De caelo, and the remaining two, on
alteration and on the elements respectively, treat matters from De
generatione. Folios are definitely missing from the beginning of the
treatise on alterat ion and from the end of the treatise on the elements, and
yet more folios are probably missing from the end of the treatise on the
heavens. Some idea of the missing matter can be gained from the
following survey of the sources on which Galileo's questions in this
manuscript are likely based.
Three complete courses from the Collegio are available for purposes of
comparison, and three other partial treatments supplement these. The
complete courses are those of Antonius Menu, who taught De caelo and
De generatione in 1578; of Mutius Vitelleschi, who taught the same in
1590; and of Ludovicus Rugerius, who did likewise in 1591. The partial
treatments include those of Christopher Clavius, from whose Sphaera of
1581 or 1585 Galileo's questions [G] and [H] seem to have been
appropriated almost word-for-word, and of Paulus Vallius, whose
expositions of De caelo and De generatione have apparently been lost, but
who appended a Tractatus de elementis to a course he taught on the
Meteorology some time between 1586 and 1589; this treatise shows strong
correlations with Galileo's Tractatus de elementis, i.e., with questions [P]
through [Y]. (The remaining document is the manuscript of Ludovico
Carbone recently uncovered by J. D. Moss, which offers mainly
confirmatory evidence and need not be considered here.)
GALILEO
ON ARISTOTLE'S BOOKS DE CAELO Paragraph
Tractate on the universe Agreement
On the origin of the universe ... opinions ... [C) 90f9
... the truth about it ... [D) 70f8
Is it demonstrable that the universe was made in time
Could the universe have existed from eternity [E) 5 of 27
On the unity of the universe, or, is there only one [F) 80f8
On the perfection of the universe [E) 15 of 15
Tractate Ion the heavens)
On the nature and essence of the heavens
Are the heavens an element or composed of them [1] 350f47
Are the heavens composed of matter and form [K] 106 of 183
Are the heavens incorruptible by their nature [J] 170f36
Are the heavens animated... [L] 22 of 41
What is an as si sting form, and in what ways ... can an
intelligence be called an assisting form
On the accidents of the heavens
On their quantity and shape
On the rarity, density, hardness, transparency, and
opaqueness of the heavens
Is there a difference of positions in the heavens ...
On the motion and the subject of motion of the heavens
Are the heavens moved by an intelligence or
by a proper form
Is the circular motion of the heavens natural
Do the stars have light of their own or do they receive
it from the sun
On the action of the heavens
Do the heavens act on lower bodies
Whether the heavens act through light, and if so, when
Do the heavens act through influences
GALILEO
Paragraph
How does intension and remission come about [O) 50f9
[Tractate on action and passion]
What is action and passion ...
Is ali action effected through contact, and if so, how
Can anything act on itself, and if so, in what way
Is the reflex action of anything on itself to be admitted
Can a thing act on something similar to itself, and if so, how
[Tractate on the elements]
On the elements in general
On the term 'element' and other terms [P) 12 of 15
What science treats of the elements .. .
Proposal of matters to be treated ... in the following
On the existence of the elements
On the final and efficient causes of the elements [R) 40f4
On the matter of the elements [R) 20f2
What are the substantial forms of the elements [S) 13 of 17
Do the forms of the elements undergo intension
and remission [T) 100f21
On the definitions of elements [Q) 12 of 17
[On the number and distinction of the elements]
[On the quantity, transmutation, and other accidents of
the elements)
Can elements be immediately transmuted into each other
How there is an easier transition in symbol elements ...
On maxima and minima of the elements [U) 27 of 74
On rarity and density ...
On the place of the elements
On the shape of the elements
On the ratios of the elements
On the number and purity of the elements
On alterative qualities
On the number of qualities [U) 6 of 10
Are the four primary qualities real and positive [W) 10 of 17
Why are hotness and coldness said to be active [X) 60f21
How are qualities related in resistance [Y) 4 of 25
On the definitions of humid, hot, etc.
Can both qualities exist in the highest degree ...
The qualities of the intermediate symbol elements
On motive qualities
What is gravity and levity
Whence do gravity and levity arise
The motive qualities of the intermediate and simple elements ...
What brings about the mot ion of the elements
On the violent motion of heavy and light projectiles
INTRODUCTION 45
material that Galileo might have incorporated into notes that have since
been lost - the missing folios referred to above. These would include
substantial amounts relating to the accidents of the heavens and the
actions of the heavens on the sublunary world, entire treatises on
generation and on action and passion, and a goodly part of the treatise on
the elements, particularly the part relating to their motive qualities, with
its lengthy discussion of gravitas and levitas - extremely important for
anyone interested, as was Galileo, in tracts De motu gravium et levium.
GALILEO
Tractate on the elements Paragraph
On the elements in general Agreement
On the essence of the elements
Are there elements in the order of nature [PI 14 of 15
an the efficient cause of the elements [RI 60f6
an the mafter and form of the elements (SI 15 of 17
Do the substantial forms of the elements undergo remission (TI 14 of 21
an the definitions of the elements in general (QI 13 of 17
an the number and distinction of the elements (VI 30f6
On the active qualities of the elements
Are there only four primary qualities [VI 6 of 10
Are aII primary qualities active ... [XI 10 of 21
and positive ... (WI 14 of 17
How are these qualities related in resistive act ion [YI 9 of 25
On the definitions of these qualities
Are symbol qualities of the same species ...
Does each quality exist in an element in the highest degree
Apart from actual qualities are there ... virtual also
On the transmutation of the elements
Are the elements transmutable into each other
Are aII elements immediately and mutually transmutable
1s there an easier transition in symbol elements than
in those that are not
Can a third distinct element be made from two elements
that are not symbol elements, and how
On the quantity of the elements
Are there maxima and minima in elements [UI 41 of 74
Are there ratios in the elements with respect to quantity
What is rarity and density, and how many kinds are there ...
1s quantity acquired anew in rarefaction ...
On the shape and the purity of elements in their own spheres
On motive qualities
What is gravity and levity
Whence do levity and gravity arise
Are the motive qualities of the intermediate elements simple
and different in species from the extreme elements
On the place of the e1ements
Are the elements moved by themselves or by the generator. ..
What moves projectiles
On the elements in particular
1s there an elementary fire
On the properties of fire
1s air hot of its very nature
INTRODUCTION 47
GALILEO
Tractate the elemeots
00 Paragraph
Is water larger and colder than earth
Is earth the heaviest and driest element
Do air, water, and earth gravitate in their own spheres
Tractate 00 perfect compouods
explained below, that he would want Galileo to have his most recent
course on De caelo and De generatione for the note-taking that similarly
shows up in MS 46.
This line of thought would seem to be confirmed by the data presented
in Table 15, analogous to those previously given in Table 10. Note here
that there are no counterparts for Galileo's question [A] prior to 1590 or
for his question [B] prior to 1591, and that question [V] has no precedent
prior to Vallius's De elementis. Also, despite minor variations in the
ordering of the questions, Vitelleschi and Rugerius best preserve Galileo's
ordering in MS 46. The early anticipations in Menu's notes of 1578 need
not be a sign of Galileo's copying from them directly, any more than the
anticipations in Lorinus's logic notes of 1584 were such a sign of Galileo's
direct use of Lorinus for MS 27. An indirect influence of these earlier
notes would be sufficient to explain ali of the correlations. Similarly, the
preservation of more extensive correlations in Vitelleschi and Rugerius
need not be a sign of Galileo's having copied from these later authors.
Thus, arguing a pari from the materials presented in Tables 9 and 10, the
materials presented in Tables 13 and 14 point to Vallius as the Collegio
professor who was likely behind the composition of MS 46, just as we
know him to have been the professor who was behind the composition of
MS 27.
Earlier we mentioned that Stillman Drake has agreed with the dating
established for the writing of MS 27 by the methods outlined above, and
that this dating is confirmed by the watermarks he has identified on sheets
of that manuscript. In a more extensive study of watermarks on ali of
Galileo's pre-Paduan writings, Drake has attempted to extend his results
to MSS 46 and 71 also. 14 In this enterprise he uses our dating of MS 27 at
about 1589 as a reference point, and with that as a keystone constructs a
chronological arch extending back to 1584 and forward to 1591, to which
he attaches at various points portions of MSS 46 and 71. The results to
which he comes for MS 46 differ somewhat from those implied above, for
instead of having the entire manuscript written at Pisa after MS 27, he
conjectures that its three parts were composed at separated intervals, as
follows: (1) the treatises relating to Aristotle's De caela were written at
Pisa in 1584; (2) those relating to De generatiane were written at Florence
in 1588; and (3) the memoranda on motion were composed at Florence
INTRODUCTION 51
Table 15. The Order of Questions in Physics Courses at the Collegio, 1578-1594
CLAVIUS GH (2)
1581
IOn the elementsj
VALLIUS PRSTQU VWXYU (10)
1589
Questions designated by letters in bold face type contain paragraphs with passages that show
word-for-word similarity; totals enclosed in parentheses are those for portions of courses or
for courses that are incomplete.
and Pisa at various times between 1587 and 1590. According to Drake's
dating, therefore, the physical questions of MS 46 were written before the
logical questions of MS 27, and either before or contemporaneously with
the memoranda on motion at the end of the manuscript.
actually teaching the Physics and the De cae/o in the academic year 1588-
1589. Once Galileo had seen the thoroughness of Vallius's teaching notes
for the Posterior Ana/ytics, it would be natural for him to turn to Vallius
for similar expositions of his teachings on the universe and the heavens.
Galileo's motivation, on this accounting, would not be to get a position
teaching Aristotelian philosophy, as Drake has conjectured; at the time he
had no special competence in that area, whereas he had shown himself to
be quite good at mathematics, only requiring improvement in the
application of that discipline to astronomy to discharge his new duties
properly.
If Galileo did contact Vallius for his teaching notes on the De caelo in
the summer of 1589, a peculiar situation would have developed that might
serve to explain the otherwise intractable 1580 dating associated with the
biblical chronology found in MS 46, referred to above. At that time, as
can be seen in Figure 1, Vallius would not yet have finished his course on
De caelo, and so could not have sent his own notes to Galileo; he probably
had at hand, however, a very good set of notes deriving from his
predecessor, Antonius Menu. Now Menu covered De cae/o in 1577-1578,
at which time his lecture notes show very good agreement for 7 of the 8
paragraphs in Galileo's question [D] - the only paragraph missing being
the last paragraph containing the now notorious biblical chronology Y
But, as already mentioned, Menu also taught De cae/o one last time, in
1580-1581. It seems quite possible that, when revising his lecture notes in
1580, he decided to fix the date of the origin of the universe and so added
the chronology. If he did so, Galileo would have received a set of notes in
which the "present time" would have been given as 1580, whereas he
himself would have been appropriating them late in 1589 or in 1590, in
accordance with the dating proposed above. Again, when improving his
lecture notes in 1580, Menu could have added the introductory matter
contained in Galileo's questions [A] and [B], thus accounting for presence
of these two questions in the lectures of subsequent professors.
Before leaving the De cae/o portion of MS 46, in light of the foregoing
conjecture we may also inquire into the provenance of Galileo's questions
[G] and [H], which, though having counterparts in Clavius's Sphaera of
1581, do not appear in subsequent Jesuit lectures on the De cae/o. As can
be seen in our commentary on MS 46 in Galileo's Ear/y Notebooks, in
1977 we had already questioned whether Clavius's textbook was the direct
source of Galileo's two questions, since there are copying errors in them
that suggest derivation from a manuscript rather than from a printed
INTRODUCTION 55
questions on gravitas and levitas, which would lead directly into the De
motu treatises to be discussed below. This possibility is more conjectural,
since it turns on the precise exemplar available to Galileo - whether it
contained only Menu's materials or, alternatively, substantial additions
from De Angelis and Vallius that were later incorporated into the lectures
of Vitelleschi and Rugerius.
Again, the phrase "one period of time" allows for considerable latitude;
if he wrote the Dante lecture in late 1588 from a new stock of paper, he
could well be using the same stock of paper through 1589 and even into
1590 and beyond.
Unlike Drake's inference, moreover, there is now no need to posit a
long interval between Galileo's writing of the De caelo and the De
generatione portions of MS 46. If there was such an interval, it could have
been occasioned by Galileo's having to wait for Vallius to finish his latest
lectures on De generatione. According to calculations based on Figure 1,
Vallius lectured on the De generatione in late 1585-early 1586, again in
late 1586-early 1587, and for the last time in late 1589-early 1590.
Assuming that Galileo had worked on MS 27 in early 1589, then continued
with theDecaeloportion ofMS 46 in mid- or late 1589, he would nothave
gotten to the De generatione portion until late 1589 or early 1590,
precisely when Vallius's latest teaching notes would have become
available. And then, regardless of the watermarks on the paper he was
using, he would have been at Pisa, teaching full time at the University.
This, to be sure, is not the only scenario one might excogitate. For
example, if Vallius sent Galileo an exemplar of the De caelo lectures of
one of his predecessors, such as Menu, it would probably have been a
codex containing that predecessor'sDe generatione lectures also, since the
materials are closely related and not infrequently are found in the same
codex. Considering the many lacunae in the information available to us,
particularly the unavailability of De Angelis's lectures on De caelo and De
generatione, it is almost impossible to evaluate possibilities such as these.
Yet we should not overlook the significance of the data that are available
and that have been presented in Tables 14 and 15, for these show that the
most significant correlations with Galileo's questions in MS 46 occur in
the lecture notes of Vallius, Vitelleschi, and Rugerius. These are all fairly
late, and thus are discouraging for anyone wishing to situate the
completion of MS 46 substantially earlier than 1589 or 1590.
Carbone Again. Having mentioned Tables 14 and 15, we may finally call
attention to the last entry in both tables, the name of Carbone, which yet
further complicates the possibilities. Reference has earlier been made to
the previously uncatalogued manuscript turned up by Moss that
summarizes lectures on De caelo and De generatione attributed to him and
dated 1594. 22 The contents of the manuscript are extensive: its lectures on
De caelo are divided into five treatises containing 38 questions in ali, ten
58 INTRODUCTION
portions of MS 46. Drake, lacking watermark evidence that would tie its
composition to either Florence or Pisa, locates it in Siena between 1586
and 1587 29 ; this dating is also possible, particularly in view of the
similarity of its arguments to those in the Theoremata on centers of
gravity dating from that period.
The remaining treatises on motion are much more problematical, with
their dating being a subject of dispute between Drake and Fredette. 30 In
our Galileo and His Sources we followed Fredette's dating, while
acknowledging in a note that some elements of Drake's ordering fit in
better with the Jesuit materials being analyzed in that work. Briefly put,
the problem is whether the incomplete De motu preceded the complete De
motu or was intended as a partial revision of it; related to that problem is
where to locate the two-folio revision of the first two chapters. On the
basis of watermarks Drake holds that the incomplete De motu was written
in Florence in 1588, that the revisions were made in Pisa in 1590, and that
the complete De motu was written at Pisa (and possibly Florence) in 1590-
1591. Fredette, on the other hand, finding more parallels for the later
memoranda in the incomplete De motu, sees it as being written later than
the complete De motu, in which more parallels for the earlier memoranda
are to be found; if the chronological composition of the treatises follows
the sequence of the memoranda, as has generally been held, then Fredette
has the better of the argument. The two-folio revisions, on the other hand,
represent a consistent attempt on Galileo's part to remove levitas
completely from the work and to replace leve by minus grave. For
Fredette, therefore, the earlier versions had gravitas and levitas as two
independent principles of natural motion whereas the later versions had
gravi/as only, merely assigning to it various degrees. Drake is forced to
hold the opposite position, namely, that Galileo opted first for gravi/as as
a single principle and then returned to the Aristotelian insistence on both
gravi/as and levi/as as dual principles of natural motion. The Jesuits
argued the relative merits of both positions and carne down on the side of
two principles. Thus, if Drake is correct, there could be a more
pronounced Jesuit influence in Galileo's treatise than has previously been
recognized. AIso, in support of Drake, our examination of a microfilm of
MS 71 shows that the folios of what has been referred to above as the
complete De motu are numbered sequentially by Galileo in his own hand,
a fact that has hitherto been unnoticed by scholars. Even though Galileo
failed to number the chapter headings of the treatise, therefore, this is an
indication that he felt he had in it a fully ordered account.
62 INTRODUCTION
sources while at Pisa around 1589-1590, and for his having completed MS
71, also showing Jesuit influences though more indirectly, by 1591-1592,
before his move to Padua. These are very helpful indications for working
out the details of the logic al methodology to which he was committed at
that time and which he would attempt to apply to the subject matters then
holding his interest.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
429]; a cause precedes that of which it is the cause [GG8: 31]; a difference
in the cause produces a difference in the effect [GG7: 471]; for any one
cause there is only one proper effect [GG 1: 164, 7: 423, 8: 601; and a cause
is that which, being present, the effect is there, and being removed, the
effect is taken away [GG4: 55, 112]. All of these passages are identified by
Helbing in his commentary on Buonamici's text. 37
Probably the most important area of agreement, however, is the status
each accords to mathematics both as a science in its own right and as an
aid in investigating the secrets of nature. Buonamici lists the three
speculative sciences as physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, and insists
that students should begin their study with mathematics, then proceed on
to physics, and ultimately to metaphysics. Again, mathematics for him is
the discipline that can raise one to divine science. It is also a true science
that satisfies the requirements of the Posterior Analytics; in justifying this
view Buonamici explicitly rejects the teachings of Pererius, whose
invectives against the mathematicians are well known, and takes a
position similar to that of Clavius and his student Blancanus. And its
demonstrations are not limited to reductions to the impossible, as some
have held, but they include ostensive demonstrations of all three types: of
the fact, of the reasoned fact, and most powerful, making it the most
exact of the human sciences. 38 Despite his rejection of Archimedes,
moreover, Bounamici further accords validity to the middle sciences
(scientiae mediae), which he differentiates from pure mathematics. He
lists these as optics, catoptrics, harmonics, astronomy, navigation
(nautica), and mechanics, and sees them as valuable adjuncts for the study
of nature. 39 This part of Buonamici's instruction seems to have deeply
influenced Galileo and set him on the course that would bring him
ultimately to Clavius and the Collegio Romano by the route outlined
earlier in this essay.
Two Chief World Systems [OG7: 445-446, 499], another on the motion of
heavy and light bodies (1575), also cited by Galileo in MS 71 [GG1: 333,
367], and the third on method (1584), cited by Neal Gilbert in his
Renaissance Concepts of Method. 40
Borro seems to have been the type of Peripatetic philosopher against
whom Galileo reacted most violently. He was very different from
Buonamici in that he took most of his knowledge of Aristotle from
medieval authors, especialIy Averroes in Latin translation; his writings
manifest little acquaintance with the Greek text, cite none of the Greek
commentators whose works had recently become available, and show him
very much opposed to Platonism and to the attempts being made in his
day to reconcile Aristotle's ideas with those of his teacher. His anti-
Platonism, coupled with his attraction to Averroes, are further revealed in
his vehement rejection of mathematics and of the use of mathematical
methods in the study of nature. Borro focused instead on the empirical
side of Aristotelian philosophy, stressing the importance of observation
and experience in uncovering the secrets of nature, and in this respect
undoubtedly exerted an inf1uence on Galileo.
This particular inf1uence is seen in MS 71, where Galileo shows his
acquaintance with an experiment performed by Borro and described by
him in his work on motion [OG 1: 333]. The context is an attempt to decide
an argument over whether air has weight in its proper place, that is, in air,
an affirmative answer to which would go against the teachings of
Archimedes and thus would be of interest to Galileo. To solve the problem
Borro dropped two objects in air, one having more element al air in its
composition than the other, to see if both would falI with the same speed
or if the one with the gre ater air content would falI faster. As he describes
the test, he obtained a piece of lead and a piece of wood of equal weight,
as far as he could judge, and projected the two simultaneously from a high
window. While he and other parties to the dispute watched, contrary to
their expectations the wood reached the ground before the lead. This they
tried not once but many times, always with the same result. From this test
(and Borro uses the Latin periculum and experimentum interchangeably
when describing it), he concludes that air must have weight in its proper
region, since there is more air in the wood than in the lead and the former
falls faster through air as a medium. 41 It is in his discussion of this
experiment performed by Borro that Galileo mentions his own tests with
falling bodies made "from a high tower," presumably the Leaning Tower
of Pisa. Charles Schmitt has remarked on the irony of Galileo's most
68 INTRODUCTION
noting that his own knowledge of the theorem that the angle inscribed in
a semicircle is a right angle is not nearly as firm as that "of the famous
mathematician, Filippo Fantoni. "44
already been argued in Galileo and His Sources. 50 The case was made
there on the basis of Galileo's continued use of terms that recur in the
logical treatises, particularly his insistence on having achieved
demonstrations and thus having fulfilled the Aristotelian idea of scientia,
especially when dealing with questions in mechanics and in the study of
local motion. Terminological similarities are notably present in treatises
that have a mathematical cast, such as the Theoremata on centers of
gravity, the De motu antiquiora in its later drafts, the questions on
mechanics (Le meccaniche), the Trattato delia Sfera, and the De motu
accelerato fragment that recurs and figures prominently in the Two New
Sciences. All of these works, except the last, are commonly agreed to have
been written before Galileo's discoveries with the telescope, and not a few
authorities would also include the De motu accelerata fragment among
them. 51 Important works written after 1610 similarly make use of the
canons explained in the Posterior Analytics, the more significant among
them being the Discourse on Bodies on or in Water, the Letters on
Sunspots, the Letter to Christina, the Discorso de flusso e reflusso del
mare, the Two Chief World Systems, and the Two New Sciences.
Probably the most striking feature of Galileo's use of these canons is
his detailed enumerat ion and justification of the various suppositiones on
which his reasoning is based. To this should be added his predilection for
the expression ex suppositione when explaining his mode of arguing or
demonstrating in a variety of subject matters. 52 The fact that the Latin
suppositio is a proper translation for the Greek hupothesis has led some
commentators to propose, anachronistically, that such usage signals his
use of the hypothetico-deductive method of modern science. Yet such a
method, it is commonly agreed, could never achieve the certainty Galileo
claimed for his results. On this account it seems preferable to locate him
in a logical context that first sought effect-to-cause relationships in the
phenomena he was investigating, and then used the cause he uncovered,
or believed he had uncovered, to provide a proper explanation for the
phenomena. This is the general procedure of the demonstrative regressus
invoked by the Paduan Aristotelians and appropriated by Galileo in the
last question of his treatise on demonstration [D3.3].
Just how well Galileo understood the technicalities of this procedure
may be open to question, for he seems to have been confused at times in
his understanding of the resolutive and compositive procedures it
involved. 53 There are indications, moreover, that he adapted the regressus
procedure to accomodate it to his experimental techniques and his
74 INTRODUCTION
crescent and gibbous phases. The second progessus simply reverses the
procedure and demonstrates from the cause, now recognized "formally"
as the cause, the various phenomena that appear as its proper effects
under the stated conditions.
Galileo's discovery of the mountains on the moon can be seen as a
similar application of the same method [GG 3.1: 62-75]. Here the first
progressus leads him to suspect that the shadows on the moon' s surface he
has observed with the telescope are an appearance caused "materially" by
its mountainous terrain. This insight leads directly to the intermediate
stage, a period of observational and even experimental activity, to see
whether or not this is the proper explanation. (Apparently Galileo
constructed a model of the moon, then illuminated it and viewed it from
various angles, to see if mountains were the adequate cause. S6 ) Once
convinced of the adequacy, the second progressus simply identifies the
cause formally and draws the conc1usion that there actually are mountains
on the moon.
Galileo's discovery of the satellites of Jupiter is another graphic
illustration. S7 The discovery of "the four Medicean stars" and their
changes of place with respect to Jupiter sets up the first progressus,
namely, one in which the movements of the newly discovered heavenly
bodies are traced "materially" to their being moons of Jupiter. At first
this is merely suspected, but the suspicion sets up the second or
intermediate stage wherein detailed examinat ion of the seemingly erratic
motions leads to the conviction that they result from the bodies' actually
revolving around the planet, at different periods corresponding to their
distances from its center. This brings on the second progressus, wherein
these revolutions are recognized "formally" as the proper cause of the
changes of position of the new "stars," with the conclusion further
implied that they are actually moons of Jupiter.
A final example is Galileo's observation of Venus and his discovery
that it revolves around the sun and not the earth [GG7: 349-352]. Again
the procedure is much the same. The first progressus, undoubtedly
suggested to him by Copernicus's system, compares the appearances of
Venus as seen through the telescope, say, its apparent mag nit ude and
phases, with a likely cause of those appearances, namely, a possible
revolution around the sun. The intermediate stage then checks this out, as
it were, with more detailed observations and ca1culations, to ascertain
whether such a revolution is formally the cause of the observed
appearances. The final step, the second progressus, explicitly identifies
76 INTRODUCTION
The Study of Motion. More difficult to explain is the route by which one
can emply the regressus and reasoning ex suppositione to achieve
apodictic results in the study of local motion. This problem exercised
Galileo in his later life, and his writings offer few clues to how he
understood the logic involved, although there are no doubts about the
claims he made for its validity. It seems that in general he preserved the
three stages of the demonstrative regressus already explained, except that
rather than have the first stage conclude to a cause "materially"
suspected, as stated in D3.3.14, he began to think of the cause at the end
of this stage simply as "supposed," that is, taken ex suppositione. The
second stage would then consist of examining alI of the relationships
between the supposed cause and its effect to see whether the former is
both the necessary and the sufficient condition for the latter under
appropriate suppositions. Some ofthese suppositions would be concerned
with the removal of impediments, such as friction and resistance to
motion, which could be regarded as accidental or adventitious causes that
INTRODUCTION 77
prevent one from arriving at its essential and proper causes. The
suppositions themselves would then have to be reasonably justified, either
experimentally or by measurement in cases involving physico-
mathematical reasoning. If one could concIude this empirical program
successfully, then one would have certified the aposteriori part of the
reasoning and could proceed with deducing, in a priori fashion, the results
the proper cause entails. This could be done in the fashion of a
mathematical treatise, especially when the phenomena investigated admit
of physico-mathematical analysis in the manner associated with the
scientiae mediae.
Two examples may serve to illustrate how this type of regressus could
work for Galileo, the first in the context of the arguments he offered in the
Two Chief World Systems and the second in the similar context of the
Two New Sciences.
The argument for the earth's motion from the tides may be begun, in
this view, with the first progressus stated in suppositional fashion: if the
earth is rotating daily on its axis and revolving annually around the sun,
then certain tidal variations will be caused in seas on the earth's surface.
The intermediate stage that follows this is crucial, for the alleged cause,
the earth's motion, is certainly problematical, going as it does against
sense experience and the public and reiigious sentiment of Galileo's day.
In his attempts to certify the reasoning Galileo invoked the so-called barge
experiments, his observations of the tides, and a variety of secondary
causes (e.g., the depth of the sea beds and the shape of their boundaries)
that might account for the deviations he encountered from expected
results. 58
The main question that has occupied Galileo scholars for years is
whether or not he himself believed that he had concluded this stage
successfully. In the Letter to Christina he made claims that would induce
one to think he felt he had done so, but there are sufficient qualifications
to give pause, and one cannot be sure. A reasonable view would be that by
1615 he himself was not certain that he had solved ali the difficulties, but
was sufficiently confident that they could be solved that he repeatedly
used the expression "necessary demonstration" when referring to his
proof in the letter. 59 The Two Chief World Systems was written under
such circumstances that Galileo could not boldly claim his tidal argument
to be demonstrative, although some theologians who examined the book
thought he had done SO.60 Others regarded the argument as made ex
suppositione but as invoking a false cause, just as Galileo had evaluated
78 INTRODUCTION
the principles behind Ptolemaic astronomy. 61 The last view represents the
majority opinion to this day.62 The vera causa of tidal variation is now
thought to be the moon's motion and lunar attraction, so that even were
the earth at rest there would still be tidal variations. But the important
point to note is that Galileo's logical methodology was not defective. Rad
he been able to show that the earth's motion was a necessary and
sufficient condition for the tides to occur, he would have been able to
condude the second progressus and would have achieved the necessary
demonstration he was seeking. Unlike the Ptolemaic arguments, his was
not based on the fallacia consequentis and was not defective from the
viewpoint of his early notes on logic. 63
The demonstrative force of the arguments developed during the Third
and Fourth Days of the Two New Sciences to establish a nuova scienza of
motion are even more difficult to evaluate. Schematically, however, they
can be formulated in a single argument that shows how Galileo may have
thought them demonstrative in the light of a suppositional understanding
of the regressus. This argument applies to a ball projected horizontally
from the top of a table and then allowed to fall naturalIy to the floor. 64
The first progressus in this case is again expressed suppositionalIy: on the
supposition that the baII undergoes a uniform horizontal motion as a
result of the projection and at the same time undergoes a uniform vertical
acceleration during the period of its falI, the baII will folIow a
semiparabolic path to the floor. 65 (Other mathematical properties of the
resulting motion, such as satisfying the double-distance rule and the
times-squared rule, may also be specified, but these are already implied in
the parabolic trajectory.) The intermediate stage here again is the difficult
one, and it undoubtedly caused Galileo considerable "agitations of
mind."66 This consists in showing, from a large number of experiments
and calculations, that a uniform horizontal motion and a uniform
increase in velocity of falI with respect to time is the only way to explain
these mathematical properties within the accuracy of the observed results.
Apart from the problem posed by precision in measurement, the mental
examination involved suppositions about accidental impedimenta, such
as friction and resistance, being either eliminated or reduced to the
category of incidental causes that do not alter the "essential character" of
the motion. 67 In the long run, Galileo believed that such suppositions were
reasonable and that he had conduded this stage successfully, and so could
proceed to the second progressus. This, in effect, provided him with the
principles on which his science of motion could be based, namely,
INTRODUCTION 79
uniform velocity along the horizontal axis and uniform acceleration along
the vertical, in the absence of impediments that might perturb the result.
Thus he could organize his final treatise along the lines of a Euclidean
formal exposition, confident that his empirical foundations could sustain
a "new science" of kinematics or dynamics that would be on a par with the
science of statics Archimedes had formulated successfully so many
centuries earlier.
This analysis is presented here as merely suggestive, since fuller
documentation is now provided in Galileo's Logic of Discovery and
Proof. Yet it should give some idea how Galileo's later scientific
investigations, as well as his earlier ones, can be assimilated to the
methodological canons spelled out in MS 27. Now that these are being
made available in English as well as in Latin, it is expected that Galileo
scholars will be able to work through the entire corpus of his works and
evaluate them in terms of the canons he himself claims to have used.
Perhaps in this way some anachronisms may be eliminated from studies of
this "Father of Modern Science," who has been seen methodologically as
a Pythagorean, a Platonist, a Humean, a Kantian, even a positivist, but
rarely as the Renaissance Aristotelian he most probably was.
, This work has actually been in progress for two decades, though as yet its results are not
widely known. The pioneering efforts of Carugo and Crombie are described in A. C.
Crombie, "Sources of Galileo's Early Natural Philosophy," in Bonelli and Shea's Reason,
Experiment, and Mysticism in the Scientific Revolution, 157-175, 303-305. Related
research, reported in fuller detail, is described in Christopher Lewis, The Merton Tradition
and Kinematics in Late Sixteenth- and Early Seventeenth-Century Italy, Padua: Editrice
Antenore, 1980. The translator's early investigations are summarized in Galileo's Early
Notebooks: The Physical Questions, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1977; subsequent studies are detailed in his Prelude to Galileo and Galileo and His Sources.
Edwards' transcription of the autograph of the logical questions (MS 27) on which the Latin
Edition is based has, of course, made the present volume possible.
2 Indici e cataloghi, Nuova serie V. La collezione galileiana delia Biblioteca Nazionale di
Firenze, VoI. 1. Florence: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Libreria dello Stato, 1959,
106-107.
3 Indici e cataloghi, 107.
4 See Crombie, "Sources of Galileo's Early Natural Philosophy," 304-305, and Drake,
Printed Works?," Print and Culture in the Renaissance.· Essays on the Advent of Printing
80 INTRODUCTION
in Europe, eds. G. B. Tyson and Sylvia Wagonheim, Newark, De!.: University of Delaware
Press, 1986,45-54.
6 A. Carugo and A. C. Crombie, "The Jesuits and Galileo's Idea of Scienceand of Nature, "
presented at a Convegno Internazionale di Studi Galileiani entitled Novito Celesti e Crisi del
Sapere and held at Pisa, Venice, Padua, and Florence on 18-23 March 1983. This statement
and the summary that follows are taken from an abstract published in the Sommari degli
Interventi, Florence: Banca Toscana, 1983,7-9. A much expanded version of the paper may
be found in the Annali dell'Istituto e Museo di Storia della Scienza di Firenze 8.2 (1983),
3-68.
7 As will be seen in what follows there is good reason to believe that Vallius knew Carbone
personally and even may have furnished him with copies of his lecture notes. Thus one may
wonder why Vallius refers to him as "some good author" in the preface to his first volume
and again as "this good man" in the preface to the second. The expressions could have been
irony, but more probably are a sign that Vallius knew Carbone to be dead by the time he
published his Logica and did not wish to damage his reputation. For a list of Carbone's
publications see Galileo and His Sources, 12-13 n. 23, and the essays cited in the following
two notes.
8 J. D. Moss, "The Rhetoric Course at the Collegio Romano in the Latter Half of the
Sixteenth Century," Rhetorica 4.2 (1986), 137-151; "Aristotle's Four Causes: Forgotten
Topoi of the Italian Renaissance," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 17.1 (1987), 71-88;
"Rhetorical Invention in the Italian Renaissance," in Visions of Rhetoric: History, Theory
and Criticism, ed. C. W. Kneupper, Arlington, Tex.: Rhetoric Society of America, 1987,30-
-41; and "Dialectic and Rhetoric: Questions and Answers in the Copernican Revolution,"
Argumentation, 5 (1990), 17-37.
9 J. D. Moss, "Ludovico Carbone's Commentary on Aristotle's De cae/o, " in Nature and
Experiment, and the Sciences, eds. T. H. Levere and W. R. Shea, Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1990, 3-50.
14 In his "Galileo's Pre-Paduan Writings," noted above (n. 4).
15 In Galileo's Early Notebooks, 21-24; Prelude to Galileo, 217-225; and Galileo and His
Sources, 89-95.
16 "Galileo's Pre-Paduan Writings," 437.
18 Galileo's Early Notebooks, 263-269, commentaries on pars. G1, G13, G17, H12, and
J24.
19 See Table 1 in Galileo and His Sources, 7.
22 BNF Cod. CL XII, 64 Theatini. Moss summarizes the contents of this manuscript in the
17 That Galileo and Mazzoni were collaborating is clear from a letter written by Galileo to
his father on November 15, 1590 (GGIO: 44-45); see Prelude to Galileo, 227. Possible
int1uences of Mazzoni on Galileo, and particularly the possibility of their joint study of
Benedetti's work, are discussed in Galileo and His Sources, 225-230.
18 See Essay 10, "Filippo Fantoni, Galileo Galilei's Predecessor as Mathematics Lecturer al
30 See the bibliography cited in Galileo and His Sources, 230-231 nn. 22, 24; also 357-358.
31 Galileo and His Sources, 168-172, 184-202. The Jesuit philosophers may not have known
of Benedetti direct1y, but they do cite Jean Taisnier's plagiarism of his work, as noted on
185. Thereis no doubt that Clavius was acquainted with him, as detailed in our "Scienceand
Philosophy at the Collegio Romano in the Time of Benedetti," Atti del Convegno
Internazionale di Studio Giovan Battista Benedetti e il Suo Tempo, Venice: Istituto Veneto
di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1987, 113-126.
31 Galileo Studies, tr. John Mepham, Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978.
Editori, 1989.
34 Helbing, Buonamici, 54.
35 Buonamici, 352-361.
36 Buonamici, 364-370.
37 Buonamici,77-85.
38 Buonamici, 86-93.
39 Buonamici,94-97.
41 The Latin text ofthis passage is given in our Causalityand Scientific Explanation, 2 vols.,
49 See his "Mathematics and Platonism in the Sixteenth-Century Italian Universities and in
Vallius and Vitelleschi, as he informed the author by mail in December of 1989; see his
"L'Uso di Platone in Galileo," Siculorum Gymnasium 42 (1989),115-157, for details.
50 Part III. Galileo's Science in Transition, 217-349.
51 Antonio Favaro, for example, regarded the fragment as written in 1604, whereas Emil
Wohlwill and Alexandre Koyre both thought it written in 1609. For more details, see Galilea
and His Sources, 273, n. 105.
52 Ad indices: Galilea and His Sources, under "ex suppositione" and "suppositions,
composition were applied in mathematics and in the natural sciences; this matter is touched
on in various places in Galilea and His Sources, e.g., 119-122, 146-147,213,285,302, and
308. A detailed analysis is provided in Sec. 2.7 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
54 Proposals regarding Galileo's methodologieal innovations with the regressus are offered
in Galilea and His Sources, 338-347, Prelude ta Galilea, 150-156, and in Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof, Chaps. 5 and 6.
55 On the termprogressus and its value in traeing the sourees from whieh Galileo's teaehing
58 In the Two Chief World Systems, GG7: 442-489, esp. 456, where he makes referenee to
the machina he had used to investigate the phenomena; he had proposed similar arguments
in his preliminary draft, Discorso delflusso e reflusso del mare, GG5: 377-395, translated
in Finocehiaro, The Galilea Affair, 119-133.
59 This is the conclusion reached by J. D. Moss after a eareful analysis of ali of Galileo's
references to demonstration in the context of the Coperniean debates. See her "The Rhetoric
of Proof in Galileo's Writings on the Copernican System," in Reinterpreting Galilea, ed. W.
A. Wallace, Washington, D.C.: The Catholie University of America Press, 1986, pp. 179-
204; also her earlier essay, "Galileo's Lefter ta Christina: Some Rhetorical Considerations,"
Renaissance Quarterly 36 (1983), 547-576.
60 This was the judgment, for example, of Melchior Inchofer; see GGI9: 349-356.
61 Simplicio states this position explicitly in the Two Chief World Systems, GG7: 462.
62 A notable exception in Stillman Drake, who still argues for the eogency of the argument
from the tides in his Telescopes, Tides and Tactics, Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1983.
63 The regressus, as Galileo explained it and as it was understood by the Jesuits, required that
Galilea and His Sources, 264-268. To this should be added D. K. Hill's "A Note on a
Galilean Worksheet," Isis 70 (1979), 269-271; his "Galileo's Work on 116v: A New
Analysis," Isis 77 (1986), 283-291; and his "Dissecting Trajectories: Galileo's Early
Experiments on Projectile Motion and the Law of Fali," Isis 79 (1988), 646-668.
65 The argument is developed by Galileo in his Two New Sciences of 1638 (GG8: 273-276),
but the experimental work on which the thesis is based seems to have been done many years
earlier, around 1608-1609; see the literature mentioned in the previous note, plus R. H.
Naylor's "Galileo's Method of Analysis and Synthesis," Isis 81 (1990),695-707.
INTRODUCTION 83
•• When outlining his justification for adopting the principle of uniform acceleration on the
Third Day of the Two New Sciences, Galileo uses this expression (post diuturnas mentis
agitationes, GG8: 197); earlier he had used the same expression in a draft preserved in the
De matu accelerata fragment, GG2: 261.
'7 Galileo's wording in the context of the previous note, where he speaks of "the essence of
naturally accelerated motion" (essentia matus naturaliter accelerati, GG8: 197), indicates
that he was c1aiming only to have uncovered the essential character of the motion, being
aware of departures from it that would be attributable to accidental causes. Note also his
reference to the "natural experiments" (naturalia experimenta) on which his reasoning is
based, which would seem to suggest the free fali initiated in the table-top experiments rather
than the acceleration observed on an artifact such as that down an inclined plane.
GALILEO GALILEI
TREATISE ON
FOREKNOWLEDGES
AND FOREKNOWNS
MS 27, Fols. 4r - 13r
[F2.1] First Question: Whether for every principle2 [the answer to the
question "Is it [trueJ?"3 must be previously known 4 ?
[1] It seems not, [a] because one can have perfect knowledge of a
conclusion from principles that are proper and immediate S and thus
without any knowledge of first principles6 ; therefore [all principles need
not be foreknown]. AIso, [b] because special sciences 7 do not know the
existence of first principles beforehand and nonetheless they have perfect
knowledge of their conclusions; therefore knowledge of [the truth of] first
principles is not required.
[2] First conclusion: first principles must be foreknown in some way8
if the conclusion is to be perfectly understood, because the conclusion
cannot be perfectly known unless all the principles regulating it and on
which it depends in some way are known; but the conclusion depends in
some way on first principles; therefore [first principles must be
foreknown] .
[3] Second conclusion: proximate and immediate9 principles must be
previously known if the conclusion is to be known, for Aristotle says in
the first book of the Posterior Analytics, chap. 2, "that on account of
which something is so must be even more so itself"10; but the conclusion
is foreknown on account of the principles; therefore the principles
themselves must be even more known.
[4] You ask: in what way are first principles known? The reply: in as
many ways as there are different [kinds of] principles. For some are
primary and most universal, and these are grasped solely through a
knowledge of their terms, as is the principle "The whole is gre ater than its
part." Others are known solely through sense knowledge, as is this: "Fire
is hot." Some are known by induction, division, and hypothetical
syllogism,l1 as is the principle "All instruction [given or received by way
87
88 GALILEO GALILEI F2.1
who in the first book of the Physics proved that protomatter 12 exists from
transmutation, and who, in the eighth book of the Physics, inferred that
a first mover13 exists from the eternity of motion. Again, because
principles that are unknown can be proved through effects that are more
known in the science; but sometimes effects that are more known than
first principles are available in it; therefore [principles can sometimes be
proved through such effects]. Confirmation: for otherwise it would
follow that the question of existence would be eliminated from all sciences
except metaphysics.
[4] 1 say, second: principles that are not opaque to understanding,
which are for the most part those in the order of knowing, are usually not
proved in the sciences but are manifested 14 through some slight induction,
or division, or hypothetical syllogism.
[5] 1 say, third, first and immediate principles 15 cannot be proved in
any way, for otherwise they would not be first, since there would be others
prior to them through which they would be proved. You say: what is to be
said when first principles are opaque to understanding and cannot be
manifested aposteriori? 1 reply: it pertains to a subalternating science 16 to
prove such principles when they are proper, to dialectics 17 when they are
probable, and to metaphysics when they are common.
[6] To the first objection [la] 1 reply, with Philoponus and Averroes,
that Aristotle is speaking of first and immediate principles, and these
cannot be proved.
[7] To the second [lb] 1 reply by denying the antecedent, for although
the existence of a thing in common, being associated with essence in
common, pertains to the metaphysician, existence in particular, which is
associated with this or that being in particular, is the concern of the
particular sciences.
[8] To the third [lc] 1 reply that in demonstration a priori principles are
foreknown, whereas in demonstration aposteriori they are [not
foreknown but] sought. 18
[F3.1] First Question: What does Aristotle2 mean by the term "iS"3
when he says that the "is" of the subjecr must be joreknown?
[1] Note, first: subject 5 can be taken in many ways; at present we take it
to mean that of which some properties 6 or other are demonstrated, and
92 GALILEO GALILEI F3.1
sciences, they do indeed abstract from the existence of their subjects, for
they consider universals, and universals cannot be known as existents. If,
however, we attend to the condition sine qua non [i.e., if the subjects do
not exist they cannot be known in the sciencesJ, 1 deny that they abstract
from existence.
[13] Second objection: for a thing to exist is a contingent matter; but
sciences are not concerned with contingent matters 36 ; therefore [sciences
are not concerned with the existence of their subjects]. 1 reply: there are
two kinds of existence, the particular existence of this or that individual,
and that is contingent; and the existence of the species, and this is
considered in the science, and it is necessary, on the supposition of there
being a universe,37 at least for its temporal duration.
[14] Third objection: existence is proper to individuals; but science
does not consider individuals 38 ; therefore it does not consider existence. 1
reply: this or that existence in particular is proper to individuals, but the
existence that folIows on a universal nature, not in the abstract but
indeterminately in some individual, is proper to the species. [... )39 Note
here, however, that the existence of the species is more intended by nature
than is that of individuals, because nature is perfected more by species
than it is by individuals.
[15] Fourth objection: if God were to destroy alI corporeal species,
there would still be science of them, and yet their existence could not be
presupposed; therefore [their existence need not be foreknown]. 1 reply:
granted this event, there would still be science, but then it would be
necessary to foreknow the time of existence of the subjects, removing the
impediment of the divine Will,40 and that would suffice.
[16] Fifth objection: even if God created nothing and if he never
decreed to create anything, angels 41 could still know some of the
properties that are proper to corporeal nature; therefore [actual existence
is not necessary for scientific knowledge]. 1 reply, first: we are speaking
here of human sciences. 42 Second, 1 reply that then angels would know
that those properties are possibly present in such subjects, not that they
are there actually, in the same way that their nature is also possible.
[17] Sixth objection: sciences show merely that properties are possibly
present 43 in their subjects; therefore [their concern is only with possible
existence]. Confirmation: because sciences prove only that certain
propositions are necessary; but propositions of this kind abstract from the
"is" of existence; therefore sciences also [abstract from the "is" of
existence]. 1 reply: it may be that sciences show only that properties are
F3.2 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 95
possibly present in subjects; yet, for them to show that properties are
possibly present in real subjects, they must foreknow the "is" of the
existence of such subjects. I reply, second: generally sciences prove that
properties are present actually in their subjects, [therefore generally they
are not concerned solely with possible existence]. To the confirmation: I
reply that a proposition can be taken in two ways, either considering the
connection of its terms, and so considered it abstracts from alI existence;
or considering how it states that a predicate is present in a subject, and so
considered I deny that it abstracts from existence.
[18] Final objection: mathematics, abstracting as it does from being
and goodness,44 does not presuppose the "is" of existence of its subject.
I reply: mathematics abstracts from alI existence when demonstrating
properties, yet it foreknows the existence of its subject, because, since it
is a human science,45 it is concerned with existence.
"What is it?"; but a total science answers the [question] "What is it?" of
its subject'; therefore it can answer the [question] "1s it?" of it also. [d]
Fourth and last: because, among alI the questions usually asked about a
subject the first is "1s it?," and a total science ought not to omit
consideration of that [question]; therefore [a total science should prove
the existence of its subject].
[2] The second opinion is that of Themistius, on the first book of the
Posterior Analytics, chapter 21, and on the second book of the Posterior
Analytics, chapter 11; of Averroes, on the first book of the Posterior
Analytics, commentary 36, on the second book of the Physics, last
commentary, and on the first book of the Metaphysics, commentary 23;
and of Cajetan here, [i.e., on the first book of the Posterior Analytics] ,
first question; of the Conciliator, and of others, alI of whom say that a
science cannot demonstrate the existence of its subject either a priori or a
posteriori.
[3] Note that there are three kinds of things that are found in sciences:
some of these are completely known, and these cannot be demonstrated
since demonstration is needed only for the proof of what is unknown, and
things that are directly apprehended do not require proof; others of them
are not known, and these can be proved either a priori or at least a
posteriori; and yet others are partly known and partly unknown. The last
kind, though they cannot be demonstrated by any type of demonstration,
nonetheless can be manifested 8 either by induction or by hypothetical
sylIogism.
[4] 1 say, first: the existence of the total subject cannot be
demonstrated a priori in its own science, nor can it be proved aposteriori.
1 said "in its own science," for it can be proved in a higher science,9 just
as it can be manifested in its own science. Proof: first, from Aristotle, first
book of the Posterior Analytics, 25, where Aristotle teaches that the
existence of the total subject must be foreknown; therefore not sought;
therefore not demonstrable. Second, things considered in a science are
either principles or parts or properties of the object; but for alI of these the
existence of the subject itself is presupposed as most evident; therefore
[the existence of the total subject must be foreknown]. Third, because
science and its knowable object are correlatives 1o ; but correlatives are
coincident in nature, time, and knowledge; therefore, since the object of
a total science is correlative with the science, it cannot be demonstrated by
the science.
[5] 1 say, second: the existence of the principal subject l l cannot be
F3.4 TREA TISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 97
the partial objects taken together; therefore, if one has doubts about the
existence of one partial object he wiII also have doubts about the total
object as a whole.
[2] Others 3 affirm it, both because it pertains to the same science to
consider the quiddity and the existence of its object, and because in the
third book of De cae/o Aristotle proves that fire exists, and in the second
book of De anima that an agent sense exists in us, and, in the third book,
that an agent inteIIect exists. You say: AristotIe did this as one having the
habitus of a higher science. 4 But, to the contrary: first, because it is not
permissible to pass from one genus to another 5 ; second, because the
middle terms through which AristotIe proved the existence of such
subjects were physical; therefore [they were not metaphysical, and thus he
did not prove their existence through the habitus of a higher science].
[3] Note, first: the question has two senses. The first is whether a
science can demonstrate the existence of its partial subjects a priori. The
second is whether it can do so aposteriori.
[4] Note, second: for a science to show the existence of its partial
subjects a priori two things are required. One is that the quiddity of the
subject itself be known, for just as the "is" of the subject depends on the
quiddity, so also does the existence, which is the actuaIity of the subject,6
depend on the same quiddity; for this reason the existence cannot be
demonstrated perfectIy unless the quiddity of the subject is previously
known. The other is that the existence to be demonstrated must not be
known, for if it is known it cannot be demonstrated. But for the existence
to be demonstrated aposteriori only the second point is required, namely,
that the existence not be known.
[5] These matters presupposed, 1 say first: the existence of a partial
subject can be demonstrated within a science aposteriori when it is not
known, but this rarely happens, as the second opinion [2] maintains. The
proof, first: it can sometimes happen that the existence of a subject not be
known in a science, and yet that some effects be more known in it through
which this existence can be demonstrated; therefore [the existence of a
partial subject can sometimes be demonstrated in a science a posterionl
Second, otherwise the question "Is it?" would be [pointIess]' in every
science with the sole exception of metaphysics. Nor can you say it would
not be pointless because the existence of principles can be manifested in
the science, for the same reasoning appIies to principles as to partial
subjects; therefore, if the existence of partial subjects cannot be
demonstrated, neither can that of principles.
F3.5 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 99
[F3.5] Fifth Question: Can a science manifest the real definition l of ils
subject and explain 2 its {existence}3 apodictically?
[1] Two things are sought in this question, as is apparent from the title.
Concerning the first, whether a science [can manifest a real definition of
its subject], 1 say, first: a science can give real definitions of its partial
100 GALILEO GALILEI F3.5
subjects. The proof is from Aristotle, who in this book, in the second
chapter, taught what the quiddity of demonstration would be, and in the
second book of De anima, at text 6, what the quiddity of the soul would
be. 1 say, second: a science can give a real definition of its total subject a
posteriori only,4 because the real definition is not foreknown in the
science, therefore it is sought, therefore demonstrable.
[2] You say: it pertains to the same science to consider the existence and
the quiddity, from Aristotle, as above; but a total science does not
consider the existence of its adequate subject, thus not its quiddity either.
1 reply first: with regard to Aristotle's mind here there is no difficulty with
the proposition, "It pertains to the same science, etc.," for, as we have
explained above,5 Aristotle is speaking of existence in common. 6 1 reply,
second: abstracting from Aristotle, that proposition is true when it
pertains to the same science to consider the existence and the quiddity and
when one or the other is not known. When, on the other hand, one is
known and the other is not, 1 say that Aristotle's proposition is false, and
then a science can prove one and not the other.
[3] Concerning the second difficulty, it seems that a science cannot
manifest the existence of its subject apodictically. For, if one wishes to
demonstrate a priori the existence of its subject, one must beg the
question 7 in one or other of the premises. This is obvious, for if one wishes
to demonstrate a priori the existence of man with this demonstration,
"Every rational animal exists; every man is a rational animal; therefore
every man exists," one begs the question in the minor premise,8 since this
supposes what is to be proved.
[4] Nonetheless this can be said: a science can demonstrate the
existence of its subject apodictically, either because the apodictic proof9 is
sought, therefore demonstrable, therefore [the reply can be affirmative];
or because the existence of the subject has a particular cause, namely, the
quiddity of the subject itself, of which it is the actuality.l0 But sciences do
consider the quiddities of their subjects; therefore they can manifest a
priori the existence of their subjects apodictically.
[5] You inquire: by what method would a science be able to do this? 1
reply first: either by an enthymeme, as, for example, "Rational animal
exists; therefore man exists"; or by a syllogism, as, for example, "Every
rational animal exists; every man is a rational animal; therefore every man
exists." Note, however, that the word "is" in the minor premise does not
have the meaning of existence" but only affirms a connection between the
subject and the predicate, and this is not to be wondered at, because there
F3.6 TREA TISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 101
is a closer union of the essence with the subject than with the existence of
the subject.
[6] To the objections 12 : the reply is obvious from the foregoing.
[1] It seems that it must be: [a] for we always presuppose that the property
exists and then we seek the apodictic reason why it is present 4 in a
particular subject; second, [b] because even before we demonstrate a
property to be in a particular subject and the apodictic reason why it is
there, we must ascribe it to some subject; therefore we presuppose its
existence.
[2] Note, first: this question is to be understood not only of a proper
attribute S but also of all properties that are demonstrated of a particular
subject.
[3] Note, second: there are three kinds of demonstration, of the fact,6
of the reasoned fact,7 and most powerful. 8 That of the fact demonstrates
[a cause] from an effect; that of the reasoned fact gives the reason why a
property exists in a subject; and that which is most powerful both gives the
reason why a particular property exists in a subject and proves the
existence of that property.
[4] Note, third: there are two kinds of property: one is convertible with
its subject,9 as risibiIity with respect to man; the other is not convertible,IO
as white with respect to man.
F4.1 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 103
with the conclusion by nature and in time; therefore [they are known
simultaneously with the conclusion by nature and in time]. Proof for the
second part: for the dependence of one correlative is of the essence of the
other; but things that have one and the same essence are known by the
same act; therefore [the premises are known by the same act as the
conclusion] .
[5] 1 say, third 8 : the major and the minor, if taken in the third way, are
known by the same act, in such a way, however, that the act of knowing
bears first on the premises as on the means and then on the conclusion as
on the end. 1 explain the conclusion: since the premises are like the path
or means to the conclusion and the conclusion is like the end of the
premises, the premises cannot be known formally as a path unless the
conclusion is known as its end, and vice versa; but because the path is
prior by nature to its end, the act of knowing must first bear on the
premises as on the path before it bears on the conclusion as its end.
Confirmation, using the example of vision: in the same act sight focuses
on light and on color, but on light as a means [of seeing] that is prior by
nature, then on color as the terminus [of sight]. Proof from reason: we are
brought by one and the same act to the means and to the end; but the
premises are the means, the conclusion the end; therefore they are known
in the same act.
[6] First objection: the premises and their knowledge are the cause of
knowledge of the conclusion; therefore they cannot be known in one and
the same act. 1 reply: the premises taken by themselves are the cause of the
conclusion and are not known at the same time as it is; considered,
however, as they are the path and the means to the conclusion they
provide the formal reason for grasping the conclusion.
[7] Second objection: the many precisely as many cannot be known in
the same act; but the premises and the conclusion are many; therefore
[they cannot be known in the same act]. 1 reply: the premises and the
conclusion, when known in the same act, are known as one, namely,
insofar as the premises are the means and the formal reason for knowing
the conclusion, and insofar as they are united with their end in the
conclusion itself.
[8] Third objection: it would follow that there would be both {assent}9
and dissent in one and the same act, if this solution were true; but the
consequent is absurd; therefore, so is the antecedent. Proof of the major:
let there be a syllogism with one of its premises {affirmative} and the
conclusion {negative}lO; if one were to assent to that syllogism one would
106 GALILEO GALILEI F4.2
be assenting and dissenting at the same time; for one would be assenting
to the affirmative premise and dissenting from the negative conclusion. 1
reply: in such a case there is only a single assent, which bears on the
premises as on the means and on the conclusion as on the end; nor is it
true, as some have falsely believed, that any knowing of a negative
proposition is a dissent, for it truly is an assent.
[9] 1 say, fourth and finally: the premises taken in the fourth way are
known at the same time as the conclusion. 1 explain the conclusion: as
soon as one recognizes that the premises in a particular demonstration
have the proper syllogistic structure, one assents to its conclusion
immediately, in such a way, however, that one assents first to the major
premise, {then}11 to the minor, and lastly to the conclusion, but with no
time delay in between; and this is what 1 understand conclusion to mean
when 1 say that the conclusion is known at the same time as the premises.
Note, however, that in a demonstration there is a threefold assent which
does not pertain to our subject, namely, that of the major, that of the
minor, and that of the conclusion, each one of which comes before the
other. Proof of the conclusion, from experience: if one knows that all fire
is hot, and then [later] that this is fire, one knows immediately and fat the
same time}12 that this fire is hot. Proof from reason: every natural cause
that is sufficient to produce its effect does so necessarily as soon as the
requisite conditions are provided 13 ; but the intellect, together with the
knowledge of principles, is a cause that is natural and sufficient to
produce science; therefore [it grasps a conclusion as soon as it
understands the premises on which it is based].
[10] You ask, first: whence does it come about that, when we
understand the premises, we must assent to the conclusion necessarily? 1
reply, with St. Thomas in the first book of the Perihermenias: because
there are certain things that follow necessarily from the knowledge of
principles; for this reason, when the latter are known, the conclusions that
are contained in them virtually and are apt to be inferred are known
necessarily.
[11] You ask, second: in what genus [of cause] does knowledge of the
conclusion depend on knowledge of the premises? 1 reply: knowledge of
the conclusion, considered as it comes to be from the terms of the
premises, depends on knowledge of the premises in the genus of material
cause, from Aristotle, fifth book of the Metaphysics, chapter 2; but
knowledge of the conclusion as it is inferred from the premises depends
[on them] in the genus of efficient cause.
F2.1 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEOGE 107
1 Second Disputation: Galileo's labeling this the "second disputation" is an indication that
another disputation had preceded it. The title of the missing disputation is unknown, since
Carbone reorganized Vallius's notes and did not preserve the titles of the disputations into
which the treatise was originally divided. From a study of Vallius-Carbone's version one can
surmise that the first disputation was entitled "How many foreknowledges and foreknowns
are there?" It is probable that Galileo wrote out the disputation and that the folios of the
codex containing it were subsequently lost. Less likely is the possibility that Galileo did not
appropriate it and began his treatment directly with the second disputation. The entire
content of this second disputation, like that of the other three in this treatise, has
counterparts in Vallius-Carbone. When composing it Galileo apparently appropriated
about 25 % of the material available in his source; for this type of information and relevant
word counts, see Lat. Ed. xxxiv-xxxv.
2 for every principle: that is, for every premise or statement that enters into the
demonstration or bears on its conclusion, either directly or indirectly.
3 "Is it ItrueJ": Lat. an sit, literally "Is it?" As applied to a principle this is equivalent to
asking whether the principle is true and known to be such - an instance of complex truth;
see 02.1.2-3.
4 known beforehand: that is, foreknown, or known before the demonstration can be
that elicit immediate assent. An example would be definitions, such as that of a triangle; see
D2.5.
6 first principles: axioms or common principles that underlie aII reasoning, examples of
which are given in paragraph [4]. Sometimes "first principles" refers to proper principles,
but in this context the emphasis is on general or common principles; see D2.5.4-5.
7 special sciences: Lat. scientiae particulares, sciences concerned with particular subject
matters, alsa known as "partial sciences" and thus opposed to "total sciences," those broader
in scope; see F3.1.1 n. 8, and F3.2.1 n. 4. In this context, as can be seen from the reply in
paragraph [6], the special sciences are opposed to metaphysics, the science of being in general.
108 NOTES AND COMMENTARY F2.1
8 in some way: Lat. aliquo modo, not absolutely or simply but in a qualified way. Various
possible qualifications, such as being foreknown actually, habitually, or virtually, are
discussed in F2. 3.
9 proximate and immediate: the same sense as "proper and immediate" in paragraph [1]; see
n. 5 above.
10 "that on account ... more so itse/f': an expres sion occurring at 72a29 that is difficult to
translate but is usually rendered into Latin as propter quod unumquodque tale et i//ud
magis; it also occurs in Aristotle's Metaphysics at 993b24. The sense of the axiom, much
used in scholastic reasoning, is this: if water is made hot by fire, then the fire must possess
heat to a higher degree than the water. Galileo uses the axiom again in D2.6.1O.
Il induction, division, and hypothetical sy//ogism: this expres sion occurs again at F2AA
and, in truncated form, at F3.2.3. The principle it is invoked to support is, in effect, the
opening sentence of the Posterior Analytics on which the entire treatise on foreknowledge
is based, namely, "All teaching and all learning through discourse arise from previous
knowledge" (71al). In the remaining sentences of his first paragraph, Aristotle goes on to
offer a complete "induction" that is based on a "division" of the ways in which alllearned
disciplines are acquired. He mentions "syllogism" in this context, but not "hypothetical
syllogism." Perhaps the expres sion is to be understood in this way: to grasp the truth of this
principle, ali one need to do is divide knowledge acquired by teaching into its various kinds
(division), examine the different cases to show how some other knowledge is presupposed in
each kind (induction), and then argue hypothetically, if this is true of each and every kind,
it must be true of all (hypothetical syllogism). See D3.1 n. 38, Sec. 4.6 of Galileo 's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
1 nominal definitions: Lat. quid nominis, or meaning of the term, as opposed to quid rei,
or meaning of the thing. The first is usually called a nominal definition, the second a real
definition.
2 in text 2: medieval and Renaissance commentators on Aristotle divided his exposition into
sections, frequently of paragraph length, which they numbered for purposes of ready
reference. Here the reference is to the section marked off approximately by the Bekker
numbers 71aI2-17.
J existence: Lat. an sit; see F2.1 n. 3.
and predicate that serve as principles of knowing, as opposed to entities that serve as
principles of being for other entities (e.g., elements in relation to compounds) and in this
sense are simple. Complex principles are known by complex truth, simple principles by
simple truth; see D2.1.2. For the difference between principles of knowing and principles of
being, see F2A.2-4.
5 texts 13, 14, and 15: that is, Metaphysics ZA, 1030a3-b5.
6 texts 5 and 14: text 5 corresponds to the entire second chapter of the book, 71blO-72b4,
in which Aristotle sets out the requirements for knowing any subject scientifically; text 14,
F2.3 TREA TISE ON FOREKNOWLEOGE 109
to the latter part of the fifth chapter, 74a33-b4, where he explains what it means to know
universally and without qualification.
7 Averroes, Philoponus, and Themistius: commentators on the text of Aristotle. For
biographical and bibliographical details on these authars and their works, see the
alphabeticallisting by author in the Biographical and Bibliographical Register at the end of
the volume.
• make no mention: the question, as stated, is withdrawn in the last sentence of this
paragraph, where it is claimed that Aristotle does make mention of this foreknowledge in
texts 5 and 14, in chapters 2 and 5 respectively. Perhaps its sense is that Aristotle makes no
mention of it in chapter 1, where he expressly enumerates only two foreknowledges,
existence and meaning (7Iall-14), as stated in the second reply to the query.
, this foreknowledge: that is, the meaning of terms in principles, not the meaning of the
subject; see F3.6 n. 2 and F3.6.4 n. 12.
10 inventive science: alternatively, investigative science or dialectics, which employs topical
reasoning whose methodological procedures are set forth in the Topics. It is characteristic
of such science to proceed from common opinion, that is, from principles that are accepted
by ali and thus do no require special foreknowledge to be understood. See Sec. 2.8 of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
11 directing or acting foreknowledge: Lat. praecognitio dirigens ... agens, technical terms
that are explained in the missing "first disputation" of this treatise and are here
presupposed; they occur again at F3.6.3 and F4.1.12-13. The distinction is attributed to
Averroes. As Vallius explains it, directing foreknowledge assists one in knowing but does
not make one know, whereas acting foreknowledge actually produces new knowledge.
Vallius-Carbone liken directing foreknowledge to a conditio sine qua non and acting
foreknowledge to an efficient cause in the learning process. (For a fuller explanation, see
Sec. 4.1 of Galileo 's Logic of Discovery and Proof.) The most universal principles involved
in demonstration do not require this assistance nor are they efficient causes in a proper
sense; thus they do not require either type of foreknowledge.
3 efficient cause of the science: in the sense of being the efficient cause of the concJusion; see
02.6.14. For a fuJler explanation of the types of causality involved in demonstration and in
science, see 01.1.2.
4 cause and effect are correlatives: that is, a cause is a cause strictly speaking only when it
is actuaJly producing an effect, and thus the one, either cause or effect, cannot be known
without the other; further use of this line of reasoning is ma de in Galileo's treatment of the
demonstrative regress, 03.3.7-8.
110 NOTES AND COMMENTARY F2.3
to the impossible, see D 1.1.1 and D3 .1. The reason why demonstration to the impossible is
said to be imperfect is that it argues from false premises rather than from premises that are
true and certain (D3 .1.4); yet it is true demonstration (D2.I.S) in that it leads to a necessary
conclusion.
7 virtually: neither actually nor habitually, but in a way intermediate between the two. This
distinction was invoked by the Dominican commentator on St. Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan,
to explain how causes, and demonstrations based on them, could be applied in theology to
explain the divine attributes.1t was further used by commentators on the Posterior Ana/ytics
to solve problems relating to premises and the ways in which they can be said to be first,
prior, and immediate; see D2.2.7 and D2.4.4.
8 order of being ... order of knowing: in other words, though axioms may not serve as
principles in the order of being they may nonetheless serve as principles in the order of
knowing; this distinction is elaborated in the following question, particularly in F2.4.2-4.
9 to convince the obstinate: the statement here is cryptic, but the meaning seems to be that
reduction to the impossible is a type of ad hominem argument that can be used to convince
one of the absurdity of one's position, in which case it becomes a reduction to the absurd
(reductio ad absurdum).
1 so evident: Lat. ita nota, to be taken in the sense of the principles being per se nota or self-
evident and thus not requiring proof through antecedents that are more known. See Sec. 4.7
of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
2 cannot be proved by any reasoning: Lat. nulla ratione probari possint, that they cannot be
4 supposed: Lat. supponuntur, a technical term used by Aristotle to indicate that principles
concerned with explicating the universal properties of being as such. As the supreme science
it also takes on a critical role, justifying and defending principles (incIuding first principles)
against those who would reject them or attempt to deny them. See Sec. 3.3b of Galileo's
Logic of Discovery and Proof.
6 moderns: Lat. recentiores, possibly referring to contemporary but unnamed
F2.4 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEOGE 111
Neoplatonists. Galileo's source here speaks of "Avicenna and others," where the "others"
refers to Plato, Plotinus, Themistius, and Simplicius (for details, see Lat. Ed. 129).
7 as a physicist: that is, as a natural philosopher, equivalent in that day to a natural scientist.
and existence are the two basic principles of ali being, and in creatures, according to
Aquinas, they are really distinct from each other. For a being to exist it must first have an
essence; thus there is a certain priority in the principles themselves, with essence preceding
existence in the ontological order.
• the metaphysician: that is, the person who studies being in common, the subject of
metaphysics; see n. 5 above.
10 a priori: from cause to effect, from something prior in the order of being to something
Le., from effect to cause, from something posterior in the order of being to something prior
in the same order. (This reading emends that found in the Latin Edition, p. 6, whose critical
apparatus for line 21 indicates that Galileo omitted a priori at this point and wrote nisi
instead. If Galileo did so the text would read, in translation: "principles in the order of being
cannot be demonstrated [a priori) through principles in the order of knowing." Although
this conveys the correct sense, in view of the presence of the nisi it is more faithful to the text
to add the aposteriori after the nisi than to delete the nisi and substitute a priori instead.)
12 protomatter: Lat. materia prima, Gr. hyle prote, the primordial indeterminate substrate
that is a component of ali material being and is conserved in ali changes, substantial as well
as accidental, in the universe. Aristotle argues for the existence of such a substrate in Physics
1.7 (189b30-191a22) from an analysis of transmutation or substantial change. See also
03.2.3.
13 first mover: Lat. motor primum, the eternal and immovable mover required, according
but simply shown to the person who does not see them by the process described in F2.1.4 n.
11; see Sec. 4.6b of Galileo 's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
15 first and immediate principles: already mentioned in F2.1 and explained at length in 02.2
and 02.3.
16 subaltemating science: a science that is higher than another (called the subalternated
science) in the sense of being more abstract and more certain. For Aristotle mathematics
stands in this relation to physics and so can supply principles for "mixed sciences" such as
astronomy, optics, and mechanics, the ancient counterparts of mathematical physics. See
Secs. 3.3c and 3.4 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
17 dialectics: the branch of logic concerned with probable reasoning, whose canons are set
forth by Aristotle in the Topics; see Sec. 3.6 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
18 sought: Lat. quaesita, in the sense that principles are the end of the reasoning process
when one argues from effect to cause, whereas they are the beginning of the reasoning
process when one argues from cause to effect.
112 NOTES AND COMMENTARY F3.1
1 {of the Subjectl: this expres sion is missing in Galileo's manuscript; Galileo left a space for
it but then failed to return and fill the space in, thus omitting it inadvertently from the title
of the disputation.
2 Aristot/e: the reference is to the first chapter of the first book of Aristotle's Posterior
Analytics, where Aristotle maintains that to have demonstrative knowledge of the unit, one
must first know what the term "unit" means and whether or not a unit in this understanding
exists (71a16-17). The question thus relates to previous knowledge, i.e., to foreknowledge,
as this is required to demonstrate properties of some subject such as a unit.
3 "is": Lat. esse in the first occurrence, and an sit in the second. Literally esse means "to
be," and sometimes it is used as a synonym for "being," but it is employed in scholastic
Latin in a more technical sense to indicate existence, following the usage of St. Thomas
Aquinas. Similarly an sit literally means "Is it," "Whether it be," or "Whether it exists,"
but it is also used as a synonym for existence. Thus the question reads: What does Aristotle
mean by existence when he says that the existence of the subject must be foreknown?
4 subiect: the subject of a demonstration whose conclusion is usually expres sed in the form
Sis P, where S stands for the subject and P stands for the predicate or property attributed
to it.
5 subiect: subject can be taken for the subject of a demonstration, as above, or it can be
taken for the subject of a science. In the latter meaning it is sometimes used interchangeably
with object, in the sense that the subject of a science is also the object of its investigations.
, properties: predicates in the sense of proper attributes. Thus it is a property of a triangle
that the sum of its interior angles is equal to two right angles.
7 metaphysics: the highest of the speculative sciences, treating of being in the most general
means existence here and now, whereas potential existence means merely the ability to exist
or to come into being. A live human being has actual existence; a fertilized human egg has
actual existence as an egg but only potential existence as a human being.
II authorities: the reference here is to authors (auctores) who have treated this problem -
generally Greek, Arab, or Latin commentators on the Posterior Analytics. Many of them
are identified by name in what follows, along with references to the loci where they discuss
Aristotle's text.
12 for acquiring a science at the start: that is, at the time when a science is first being
developed by those who initiate it, its discoverers. The problem is slightly different for those
F3.1 TREA TISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 113
who later acquire a science from those who first discovered it and so may be said to learn it
from them. See Sec. 3.1 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
13 in the development of a science: Lat. in progressu scientiae. In Galileo's terminology,
progressus as applied to a science has a special technical sense explained in Sec. 4.9c of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof. Here he is simply referring to what is required for
the growth of any science, whether this comes about in those who initiate it or in those who
learn from them (cf. D3.3.1O nn. 18-19).
14 second "is": i.e., the "is" of existence, as opposed to the "is" of essence.
15 certain authors: these are not identified by Galileo. Vallius-Carbone name them as Marc
usually formulated in its definition. Thus, to demonstrate properties of a triangle one must
first know the essence of a triangle, that is, what a triangle is, namely, a three-sided plane
figure.
17 essence before... existence: this statement presupposes the Thomistic real distinction
19 of others: these are not identified by Galileo or by Vallius-Carbone, but Vallius mentions
not merely in the mind, and not potentially but in full actuality.
22 at aII times: Lat. semper. The word semper occurs twice in this sentence; the first
occurrence was apparently missed by Galileo in adapting his text from the source from
which he worked, since it is inserted in the text interlinearly. This question has significant
implications for the development of Galileo's science of motion, particularly for his
treatment of uniformly accelerated motion. The sense of the query is this: do the things of
which we seek scientific knowledge have to be real and existent at the very time our scientific
knowledge exists? For example: can there be a science of roses in winter, when ali roses are
dead; can there be a science of snow in mid-summer, when it is too hot for snow actually to
exist? See D2.1.9.
23 the "is" of the {essence}: Lat. esse essentiae; Galileo wrote esse existentiae here, obviously
25 there cannot be any demonstra/ion: usually the middle term of a demonstration states the
definition of the subject; if the definition of the subject, i.e., the "is" of its essence, is not
known, no middle term will be available and thus there cannot be a demonstration. See n.
16 above.
26 in real sciences: Lat. in scientiis realibus, i.e., in sciences concerned with real, extramental
beings, such as those in the world of nature. Real sciences are here implicitly differentiated
from rational sciences, those concerned with beings of reason, which have existence in the
mind only and not in the world of nature. Logical entities are commonly regarded as beings
of reason. See Sec. 2.3 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof; also n. 34 below.
114 NOTES ANO COMMENTARY F3.1
" at least . .. impediments: this expression was omitted by Galileo in his first draft of the
passage, and then inserted at its proper place in the margin of the manuscript. For the
importance of the marginal insert as evidence of the derivative nature of Galileo's
composition, see Galileo and His Sources, 41-42. The point of the qualification, as
explained by Ciubone in his version of the passage (Additamenta, 46vb-47ra), is that one
need not know of the actual existence of the subject of demonstration for all times and places
and under all conditions whatever. It is sufficient to know, for example, that roses actually
exist in the summer in the earth' s northern hemisphere, provided that there is no blight in the
region that would kill them; under these suppositions it is possible to have a science of roses,
even though no roses may actually be existent here and now. Galileo was interested
throughout his life in impedimenta, Le., accidental causes that interfere with the phenomena
of nature, and devoted much of his experimental activity to eliminating them. A good part
of his study of naturally accelerated motion, described on the Third Oay of his Two New
Sciences, was in fact directed at identifying impedimenta such as friction and air resistance
that would cause the actual fall of bodies to deviate from the uniform acceleration imparted
to heavy bodies by nature. On the supposition of such impediments being removed, one
could have a true science of naturally accelerated motion and demonstrate properties of it
as a subject. See Sec. 4.2c of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
,. human sciences: Le., sciences as possessed by human beings, and thus to be distinguished
from those known only to angels or to God. See Secs. 2.7a and 3.1 of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof; also n. 45 below.
19 an ris"] of actual existence: Lat. esse actualis existentiae; in writing this Galileo omitted
exceptions to the general principle established in the second conclusion, paragraph [9)
above. Although the total subject of the science must be foreknown to exist actually in a
general way, this requirement does not entail that everything included under the total subject
(spoken of in the following question as a "partial subject") need be foreknown in detail. For
example, to have a science of motion or change, one would have to know the principles that
are required for motion or change in general, without having to be aware that a special type
of change, known as "substantial change," requires protomatter or materia prima as its
proper subject. Similarly, onemight be aware that ali change requires an agent, without
knowing in detail that a special agent, or "prime mover," might be necessary to explain the
eternal movement of the heavenly bodies. Or again: one would need to foreknow that local
movement, or change of place, actually exists in nature in order to have a science of motion,
but one would not have to know that there is such a thing as naturally accelerated motion
at the outset of the science; indeed, one might prove the existence of the latter type of
motion, under certain conditions, as the science later develops. Much of Galileo's discussion
throughout the Third and Fourth Oays of the Two New Sciences seems directed at
elucidating this point.
Jl of demonstration in its proper sense: Le., demonstration of the reasoned fact, as opposed
F3.1 TREA TISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 115
to demonstration of the fact, the type discussed in the previous note. For fuller details see
Secs. 4.4b and 4.9a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
33 rational sciences, ijthere be such: in D2.1.8 Galileo gives the reason for the qualification
"if there be such," namely, that science must be concerned with real beings that are true in
an ontological sense. On this account Vallius-Carbone (and Vallius himself), while
occasionally referring to logic as a science, prefer to characterize it simply as an instrumental
habit; see Sec. 2.4a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
34 its "is" as an object: Lat. esse obiectivum, i.e., objective existence, or existence solely as
an object of consideration by a knowing power such as the intellect, and not existence in a
real or extramental sense.
35 sciences abstract from existence: an objection based on the abstractive theory of the
sciences deriving from Boethius and Aquinas. In this view the concepts on which a science
is based are abstracted from individual, sensible existents, and in the process are
universalized; thus they consider the essences or universal features of things, not their
singular or particular instantiations, and in this sense do not consider the existence of this
or that individual. For an explanation of the knowledge process on which this theory is
based, see Sec. 2.3 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
36 sciences are not concerned with contingent matfers: this is a variation of the objection in
paragraph [12), and the reply is the same except that essences or universal features of things
are replaced by species, which are not contingent in the way in which individual existents are.
On the difference between necessary and contingent matters, see Sec. 3 .5a of Galileo 's Logic
of Discovery and Proof.
37 on the supposition of there being a universe: Lat. supposito universo, that is, if there is
to be a uni verse ma de up of many species at any particular time, then those species are
necessary under that supposition. This is an instance of suppositional reasoning, frequently
employed by Galileo; see Sec. 4.2 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
38 science does not consider individuals: yet another variation of the objection given in
paragraphs [12) and [13], and the reply is again the same, except that nature now becomes
the universalizing principle. Medieval writers such as Jean Buridan regarded an argument of
this type as one ma de ex suppositione naturae, i.e., on the supposition of nature - an
observation which ties this reply to that of the previous argument.
39 [ ... ): the ellipsis indicated here is a blank space of about half a line that occurs in the
manuscript at this point. Galileo apparently had difficulty abbreviating the argument in his
source and so left a space to be filled in later. His lacuna here occupies six lines in Vallius-
Carbone, which translate as follows: "Since therefore species are conserved in individuals,
there must be some individual in which they exist. Thus the universal nature is foreknown,
not in the abstract but in some singular individual, though not one determinately assigned,
and that is in no way repugnant to the sciences" [Lat. Ed. 140).
40 removing the impediment of the divine will: note here that God's efficacious will, which
could annihilate the universe at any time, is regarded as an impedimentum to the work of the
natural philosopher; thus even this impediment has to be removed by an appropriate
supposition if one is to reason as a natural scientist.
41 angels: the objection is raised to differentiate human sciences, paragraph [9) above, from
those that may be acquired by spiritual creatures. Human beings obtain their knowledge of
natural kinds through a process of abstraction from individual existents perceived in sense
experience, and thus actual existents are necessary for their acquisition of a science, as noted
116 NOTES ANO COMMENTARY F3.1
in paragraph [3]. Angels, on the other hand, obtain knowledge through infused species and
without sense impressions; therefore they are not limited as are humans in this regard. Again
see Secs. 2.?a and 3.1 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooffor fuller background.
42 human sciences: i.e., sciences acquired by men, not those possible for angels; see nn. 28
and 45.
43 properties can be present: the objection makes the point that potential presence, as
opposed to actual presence, is sufficient for knowledge of the property, and therefore
potential existence might also be sufficient for knowledge of the subject - a restatement of
the argument proposed as the second opinion in paragraph [5] above. The reply, rather than
rejecting this opinion outright, acknowledges some element of truth in it.
44 mathematics... goodness: this Aristotelian maxim was quoted frequently by Galileo in his
and not merely a rational science like logic concerned with an esse obiectivum, as indicated
in paragraph [Il], n. 34. This being the case, it presupposes the actual extramental existence
of quantified beings in order to establish its subject, even though it abstracts from such
existence when demonstrating their properties.
1 adequate subject: Lat. obiectum adaequatum, an instance where subject and object are
science but stressing the proper formality under which the science considers it. In the case of
physics, this was taken by the Jesuits to be the natural body, which includes all bodies
studied in natural science [Sec. 4.3a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proofl.
J totalobject: Lat. obieclum totale, used interchangeably with total subject.
4 partial science: Lat. scientia partialis, the portion of a science that considers a partial
subject; for example, if the atmosphere is only a part of the sublunary region, the science
that treats this part of terrestrial nature, meteorology, is a partial science with respect to the
science that treats all of the elementary bodies (for Aristotle, the De caelo el mundo), which
therefore can be regarded as a total science. Partial and total are thus correlatives. The
science of the elements is a partial science with respect to the total science of physics, and the
science of earth (as one of the four Aristotelian elements) is a partial science with respect to
F3.2 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 117
the total science of the elements. See the following two notes.
, total science: Lat. scientia totalis - see the previous note. In a more proper sense, when
discussing the specification of the speculative sciences, Vallius-Carbone argue that here are
only three such total sciences, namely, physics, mathematics, and metaphysies. The basis of
this division is explained in Sec. 3.3b of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
6 a partial science... of its subject: a partial scienee has a partial subject or object, and the
possibility exists that it can demonstrate the existence of its partial subject. For example,
although earth and water and air give evidence of their extramental existence, it is not
completely clear that fire exists as an element, and thus it would be necessary to prove the
existenee of fire if one were to have a scienee of this element (ef. D3.2.3). This question
apparently had important ramifications for Galileo in the later development of his science.
For example, the second of the "two new sciences" he proposed to develop in his
masterwork of 1638 was the science of local motion; its total subject would therefore be this
type of motion, motion aceording to place (motus localis), and as he proposed it, it would
be composed of three partial subjects that eould count as its species: uniform motion,
naturally accelerated motion, and a combination of these two, projectile motion. For each
of these partial subjects, in turn, it would be necessary to offer experimental or aposteriori
proofs of their extramental existence.
7 the {question] "What is it" of its subject: Lat. quid sit sui subiecti, the definition or the
quiddity ofthe subject; see F3.1.4 n. 16 and F3.1.8 n. 25. In the second book ofthe Posterior
Analytics Aristotle argues that no science can demonstrate the definition of its subject, but
that nonetheless it can manifest that definition in a demonstrative way by showing the
relationships that obtain among its causal components; see chapter 10, 93b37-94a9.
8 manifested: Lat. ostendi; see F2.1.4 n. Il, F2.4.4 n. 14.
9 in a higher science: Lat. in {scientia] superiori, that is, in a subaltern ating science as
explained in F2.4.5 n. 16. For fuller details, agllin see Secs. 3.3c and 3.4 of Galileo's Logic
of Discovery and Proof.
10 are correlatives: Lat. sunt relativa, basically the same argument as applied to cause and
in his notes on Aristotle's De caelo et mundo Galileo identifies the heavens (caelum) as the
principal subject (obiectum principalitatis) of that treatise, GG 1: 16. See Sec. 4.3a of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
12 here: Galileo failed to identify the particular text of Aristotle on which the argument in
part [c] of paragraph [1] is based. A clue is given in Vallius-Carbone, however, who point
to the sixth book of the Metaphysics, ch. 1 (1025b17-18), as the source of the difficulty
[CA49ra; Lat. Ed. 146].
13 quiddity: Lat. quid sit, essence or definition, here again opposed to an sit, existence; see
15 habitus: habit in the sense of second nature; a scientific habitus perfects the intellect,
enabling it to function in an effortless way with its subject matter in much the same way as
the virtue of justice perfects the will of a just man and enables him similarly to act justly in
his dealings with others. This notion lies behind Vallius-Carbone's distinetion between
actual science and habitual science, as explained in Sec. 3.2 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery
and Proof.
118 NOTES AND COMMENTARY F3.2
1 Galileo enumerates this as the "Fourth Question" but actually it is the third of the
disputation. From a study of his handwriting and the contents of F3.2 and F3.4 one can
establish with near certainty that he did not skip a question here but merely made a mistake
in numbering the questions; for details, see Lat. Ed. 146 (16.17-20), 147 (17.1-2). Since
much the same termino10gy is employed here as in F3 .2, the reader should consult the notes
for that question to supplement those given below.
2 Some: Lat. Aliqui, not identified by Galileo. Vallius-Carbone note that their objections
derive from Averroes, who held the opposite opinion but listed these and other arguments
in order to refute them.
3 Others: Lat. AUi, again not named by Galileo but identified by Vallius-Carbone as
Averroes, Grosseteste, and Zimara. Other proponents are specified by Lorinus; see Lat. Ed.
148-149.
4 habitus of a higher science: see F3.2.10 nn.15-16.
5 to passfrom one genus to another: Lat. de genere in genus transcendere. The prohibition
here is usually referred to as that against metabasis or "passing over" from one genus to
another, voiced by Aristotle in A.7 of the Posterior Analytics (75a37-39), where he states
that one cannot use arithmetic to demonstrate a theorem in geometry. In this particular case
arithmetic, whose subject is discrete quantity, is regarded as being concerned with a higher
genus than geometry, whose subject is continuous quantity. Following this expression there
is an addition of six words in Galileo's composition; these are omitted here as representing
an incomplete thought and so not translatable - for details, see Lat. Ed. 149.
6 the actuality of the subject: Lat. actus ipsius subiecti, an application of St. Thomas's
teaching on potency and act as the basic components of ali being. In this view essence is
related to existence as potency is to act; thus existence is the ultimate actuality of the subject,
presupposing its quiddity as the potency it actuates. See F2.4.1 n. 8, F3 .1.4 n. 17.
7 [pointlessl: Lat. vana, omitted inadvertently by Galileo in this sentence but appearing
10 all causes ... the formal cause: a further explication of the parts of a definition as noted in
n. 8 above. Although ali four causes pertain to the definition or quiddity in a broad sense,
the formal cause is preeminent among them and thus serves best to characterize the quiddity.
The statement is corroborated in D2.2.4, where Galileo points out that demonstrations of
F3.5 TREATISE ON FOREKNOWLEDGE 119
the reasoned fact are more perfect the more they proceed from formal causes, which are
more intrinsic to the thing.
F3.5: Can a science manifest the real definition of its subject? For
background, see Secs. 2.5, 4.3, and 4.4 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery
and Proof, for an application, Sec. 6.1
1 real definition: Lat. quid rei, definition of the thing, as opposed to the quid nominis or
definition of the term, also called the nominal definition; see F2.2 n. 1, F3 .1,4 n. 18, F3.2.1
n.7.
2 explain".apodictically: Lat. reddere propter quid, that is, give a demonstration propter
existence; that it was intended is clear from the first sentence of paragraph [3] in his text.
4 aposteriori only: Galileo's first conclusion in this paragraph, that a science can show real
definitions of its partial subjects, is un problematic in view of his conclusions in F3,4; his
second conclusion relating to the total subject is more controversial in view of the related
discussion in F3.2. He thus qualifies the second conclusion by stating that the demonstration
manifesting the real definition of the total subject can only be aposteriori. Vallius-Carbone
explicate this by adding how this can be done: "through some effects that are more known."
An example might be the definition of nature given by Aristotle in Physics Il.l, 192b21-23,
based on its effects as described in 192b9-21.
5 as we have explained above: i.e., in F3,4.8.
6 existence in common: Lat. existentia in communi, the way in which existence is considered
animal. Precisely how this begs the question is not clear from Galileo's exposition, since he
will give exactly the same syllogism, with the same minor premise, in paragraph [5]. Vallius-
Carbone make the point more explicitly: the minor premise as here stated is understood to
mean that every man exists as a rational animal, taking the "is" of the premise to mean
"exists"; therefore it begs what was to be proved in the conclusion, namely, that every man
exists. See n. 11 below.
9 apodictic proof: that is, proof in the sense of that formulated in a most powerful
demonstration. How most powerful demonstration can be said to provide propter quid
proof of existence is explained at length in D3.1.
10 of which it is the actuality: Lat. cuius est actus; see F3,4,4 n. 5.
11 the word "is "". meaning of existence: this second formulation of the syllogism, though
120 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y F3.5
expressed with the same premises as that in paragraph [3], is meant only ta explicate the
content of the preceding enthymeme and not ta make any existence claim in the minor
premise. Thus the "is" is to be understood only as a logical copula, not as an ontological
affirmation.
12 To the objections: a superfluous addition made by Galileo and not found in his source.
The difficulty rai sed in paragraph [2] is answered in the same paragraph, that in paragraph
[3] in paragraph [5].
I What does Aristotle mean: that is, at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, 71a12-14,
of James the Venetian Greek is a cryptic but faithful rendering of the Greek text. It reads as
follows: Dupliciter autem necessarium est praecognoscere; alia namque quia sunt, prius
necesse est opinari, alia vero, quid est quod dicitur intelligere oportet. .. Difficult to
translate, this passage was generally taken to mean that two things must be known about the
subjects of demonstration, "that" they are (quia sunt) and "what" it is that is said of them
(quid est quod dicitur). Some commentators took the quid of the latter expression to refer
to the quid rei ar real definition, others to the quid nominis or nominal definition; see F2.2
n. 1, F3.2.1 n. 7.
3 Cajetan: the only recent expositor mentioned by Galileo; Vallius-Carbone identify Soto
17, F3.4.4 n. 5.
7 "that which the thing was ta be": Lat. quid quad era! esse rei, a literal translation of
10 "directing. " .. "acting": see the comment above at F2.2.5 n. 8 and the fuller discussion in
11 to experts: Lat. sapientibus, an expres sion based on the scholastic distinction between
principles evident to ali (per se nota omnibus) and those evident only to experts (per se nota
sapientibus), that is, those who have a competent grasp of a particular subject matter.
12 "How many things should be foreknown": Lat. Quot sint praecognita, the title of a
1 of the property: Lat. passionis, i.e., of the attribute that is predicated of the subject in the
contained in the foreknowledges of the subject and of the property that is predicated of it,
and thus it is redundant to treat it as a separate type of foreknowledge. As Galileo indicates
in his explanatory remark, however, he is doing so as a matter of convenience. Actually it
enables him to make a few notations about the time-sequence involved between knowing the
premises and knowing the conclusion in a syllogistic argument, as detailed in F4.2.
Indirectly, therefore, a type of "fore-knowing" is involved that can be discussed in a treatise
on foreknowledge.
3 the existence of a property: Lat. An de passione praecognoscendum sit quia est. The quia
est here is the equivalent of an sit or quod est, the first of the scientific questions (F3 .1.9 n.
30). By its very nature a property is a type of accidental being and as such its mode of
existence is that of existing in another as in a subject. This mode of existence poses special
problems for its foreknowledge that do not arise, for example, when discussing the
foreknowledge of subjects, most of which are substances that exist by themselves and so do
not depend on others for their existence.
122 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y F4.1
4 the apodictic reason why it is present: Lat. propter quid insit, the fourth of the scientific
treatment of the kinds of demonstration, see the last disputation in the treatise on
demonstration, D3; also Secs. 4,4a and 4.9a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
Vallius-Carbone note that the threefold distinction given here is attributable to Averroes.
7 demonstration of the reasoned fact: Lat. demonstratio propter quid.
9 convertible with its subject: Lat. reciprocam cum suo subiecto, usuaIly understood to be
a property in the strict sense, found solely in the subject and in every instance, as the croak
of a frog, the bark of a dog.
10 not convertible: Lat. non convertibilem, as round said of the earth.
12 essence: Lat. essentia. The essence of a property would be its quid rei or real definition,
and a real definition could not be shown of something whose existence was in doubt.
13 the property: Lat. passio; in their corresponding conclusion Vallius-Carbone give passio
convertibilis cum subiecto. That the intended reference here is to a convertible property is
clarified by Galileo in paragraph [8].
14 not convertible... convertible: Lat. non reciproca ... reciproca, as in n. 9 above.
" absolutely and simply speaking: Lat. absolute et simpliciter. The sense is that it is possible
for a property such as roundness to be known from experience with nature, say, in an
orange, before one comes to know that it is also a property of the earth.
16 never... not: the double negative obscures the sense. What Galileo means is that in a
20 real definition: Lat. quid rei. Galileo uses this query to add a coroIlary about
foreknowledge of the real definition of the property, as opposed to its nominal definition,
to which a special question was devoted by some commentators. See Lat. Ed. 165.
therefore S is P, where S and Pare the subject and predicate of the conclusion and M is the
middle term. The first premise, M is P, is called the major premise because it contains P, a
term of broader extension: the second premise, Sis M, on the other hand, is called the minor
premise because it contains S, a term of narrower extension.
4 as eause to effeet: that is, the way in which the mot ion of the hand precedes that of the pen,
as in the example given in F4.2 n. 2, even though both are temporally simultaneous.
5 [the path): Lat. via, written incorrectly by Galileo as quia and here emended, following the
reading in Vallius-Carbone.
6 as things are related... in being ... so ... in knowing: Lat. sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad
cognosci, a principle invoked repeatedly by Galileo; see F3.1.4, 01.1.11, 02.2.7, 02.2.9,
02.5.12, and 03.1.11.
7 by the same act: The basis for this teaching, as noted by Vallius-Carbone, may be found
in Aristotle, but it was extensively deveJoped by St. Thomas and his school, notably
Capreolus, Ferrariensis, and Cajetan; see Lat. Ed. 168-169.
B 1 say, third... : This conclusion is essentially the same as the third in Vallius-Carbone,
reads "its premises negative and its conclusion affirmative," clearly a copying error, since
the phrase does not cohere with the rest of the sentence. Again, one can have a valid
syllogism with a negative conclusion and an affirmative premise, but not one with a negative
premise and a positive conclusion, for this would violate the rules of the syllogism.
11 [then}: Lat. tunc, emending Galileo's tum, obviously a writing error.
12 [at the same timeI: Lat. simul, emending Galileo's simus, another slip of the pen.
13 every cause that is sufficient to produce its effeet... : a statement that is important for
TREATISE ON
DEMONSTRATION
MS 27, Fols. 13r - 31r
127
128 GALILEO GALILEI Dl.l
knowing. 11 Taken in the first way it has four causes: the efficient cause,
the intellect; the material cause, [which is twofold], the "in which," the
possible intellect 12 as receptive of intellection within itself, the "from
which," terms and propositions; the formal cause, proper arrangement
according to mode and figure; and the final cause, [again twofold,]
primarily, actual science of the conclusion, secondarily, habitual science 13
of it. Taken in the second way, the efficient cause, again the intellect; the
material cause, the subject, the predicate, and the middle term; the formal
cause, the necessary relationship of the middle term to the subject, the
predicate, and the conclusion; and the final cause, the same relationship.
[3] Note, third: two definitions of demonstration can be gathered from
Aristotle in this book: one is that it is a syllogism producing science l4 ; the
other that it is a syllogism consisting of premises that are true, first,
immediate, more known than, prior to, and causes of the conclusion.
[4] With regard to the first definition, note, first: 1 put "syllogism" in
place of the genus, because demonstration has this in common with the
probable and the sophistic syllogism; 1 say "in place ofthe genus" because
"syllogism" is not properly the genus, since it is composed of material
species and not of formal species. 15
[5] Note, second, that where 1 put "producing science," this is to be
understood either instrumentally, because the proper cause of science is
the intellect, or dispositively, 16 because demonstration is a kind of
condition that is necessary for us to know scientifically.
[6] Note, third, that where 1 put "science," this is to be taken for
perfect science,17 since a perfect science is one that yields knowledge
through causes.
[7] A first objection against this definition: let there be someone who
might have a particular perfect demonstration in his mind but would not
assent to its conclusion; demonstration in such a person would not
produce science and nonetheless it would be a true demonstration, as we
have supposed; therefore [a demonstrat ion is not a syllogism producing
science]. Some reply: it is of the essence of demonstration only that it be
apt to generate science, not that it actually produce it. Others reply, and
more to the point: to have a true and perfect demonstration there must be
certain and evident assent to the conclusion, and without this one would
not really have a demonstration.
[8] A second objection: the effect of demonstration is to know
scientifically; therefore this definition is not based on the final cause.
Confirmation: because effect and cause are opposed to each other; but to
D1.2 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 129
taken from their different ends. From this it follows that there will be as
many instruments of logic as are necessary for the perfect direction of the
operations of the intellect.
[2] Note, second: of the instruments that serve knowledge some are
natural, others adventitious. 3 The natural instruments are the intellect,
memory, intellectuallight,4 and sense. Among adventitious instruments,
some serve knowledge mediately, such as division and method; others
immediately5 but imperfectly, such as the probable syllogism, induction,
enthymeme, etc.; others immediately and perfectly, such as
demonstration and definition.
[3] Note, third: if we focus on instruments that serve to direct the
perfect operation of the intellect in some way, all are agreed that these are
six in number: definition; demonstration; division; proposition 6 ;
argumentation in general, containing under it the probable syllogism,
induction, enthymeme, etc.; and method. 7 Proof of this: these six
instruments are so related that one cannot be contained easily within the
other, and all others are reducible to them; therefore [six instruments are
necessary and sufficient]. Proof of the minor: resolution and
composition 8 are reducible to demonstration; and demonstration, since it
is a perfect instrument, cannot be contained under argumentation in
general. If, on the other hand, we focus on instruments that immediately
serve operations of the intellect but of a more perfect kind, these are two,
argumentation and definition. Proof of this: we know substance through
definition, accidents through various kinds of argumentation; also the
four questions that are enumerated by Aristotle at the beginning of the
second book of the Posterior Analytics can be answered by two
instruments, for the "What is it?" can be known by definition, the "Is
it? ," "What kind is it?," and "Why is it?" by various kinds of
argumentation, therefore [definition and argumentation suffice for
replying to the four questions]; yet again, an instrument receives its name
from its proximate end, but division is ordered directly to [definition}/
method to order, 10 proposition to composition; therefore [there are no
proximate ends from which these instruments can be denominated].
[4] Nor can you object: proposition is a third instrument distinct from
argumentation and definition that by itself serves perfectly to direct the
operations of the intellect. The reason is that the proposition, if
considered as one of the premises, is ordered to the syllogism; if, on the
other hand, it is considered as a principle that is self evident, then, since
it is known by the natural light [of the intellect], 11 it does not make a
D1.2 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRATION 131
[8] First: demonstration is the goal of aII matters treated in logic; for
the book of the Categories is ordered to the proposition; the proposition
to the sylIogism; and the sylIogism to demonstration. But whatever is the
goal in science is the most important [of its instruments]; therefore
[demonstration is the most important instrument].
[9] Second: the superior instrument should serve the superior
operation; but discourse is the best operation, and demonstration is its
instrument; therefore [demonstration is the superior instrument]. Proof
of the minor: because discourse is concerned with the superior object;
also, because, aIthough we might be similar to intelligences '4 in the first
operation [of the inteIlect] with respect to the manner of functioning, we
are more similar to intelligences with respect to the object, which is far
superior, through the third operation [of the inteIlect], because man is
constituted in his very being through discourse; but whatever is
constitutive of a thing '5 is most important; [therefore discourse is the
superior operation of the inteIIect].
[lO] Third: the superior instrument is what makes us know a thing
through a cause; but demonstration alone is of this kind, since Aristotle
says that we think we know a thing scientificaIly when we believe that we
have demonstrated something [of it through a cause]; therefore
[demonstration is the superior instrument]. \
[11] Fourth: the superior instrument is what is concerned w~th [a] the
superior and [b] the more extensive object '6 ; but definition is concerned
only with the quiddity '7 whereas demonstrat ion is concerned with both
the quiddities and the properties of things; therefore [demonstration is the
superior instrument].
[12] Fifth: the whole is superior to its part and the container is superior
to the thing contained, from Aristotle, the fourth book of De caelo, texts
25, 36, and 39; but definition is a part of, and is contained in,
demonstration; therefore [demonstration is superior to definition]. Proof
of the minor, from Aristotle in the first book of De anima, 11, and in the
first book ofthe Posterior Analytics, text 24, saying that the "what it iS"'8
is a principle in demonstration; but every principle is included in whatever
makes it be a principle; therefore [demonstration is superior to definition].
[13] You say: this argument proves that definition is contained in
demonstration as a middle term, not as an instrument of scientific
knowing. '9 To the contrary: a definition is put in a demonstration so that,
when the nature of the subject is known, we may gather one or other of
its properties; therefore a definition is put in a demonstration as an
D1.2 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 133
without movement, and the better something is the closer will it approach
the best; but the third operation involves movement 23 ; therefore [the first
operation is superior to the third]. Third: although definition depends on
demonstration instrumentally, nonetheless definition is it self the goal of
demonstration; but to be the goal of something is to precede it in dignity.
Add to this: most powerful demonstrations depend on definition.
[19] Themistius adopted this opinion in the first book of De anima,
chapter 24, and proved it with these arguments. First: by the first
operation we either know something to be completely true or we do not
know it at ali; by the second and third operations we can know both truth
and falsity. Second: to understand something is to embrace it and touch
it in some way; but in the second and third operations we merely go
around and circle the thing, whereas by the first we grasp it; therefore [the
first operation is superior to the second and the third].
[20] Note, fourth: it is one thing to know a thing perfectly, another to
know only its nature and some of its properties. For the first, definition
along with demonstration is required; for the second, if the nature alone
is known, definition suffices, if the properties, demonstration is enough.
[21] 1 say, first: definit ion in itself is far superior to demonstration.
Proof, first: for definition makes substance known, demonstration only
accident, from the second book of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 2; but
it is better to know substance than accident; therefore [definition is
superior to demonstration]. You say: both substance and accident are
known through demonstration. To the contrary:
[22] Second: the premises of a demonstration cannot be known
through the demonstration whose premises they are, but by some other
instrument, and this is nothing but the definition, which generates
knowledge of the quiddity that enters into the demonstration as a premise;
therefore [the premises are known by definition and not directly by
demonstration]. Confirmation: for each task there is only one natural and
adequate instrument; but quiddity is known through definition; therefore
it cannot be known through demonstration. Second: the instrument and
the thing known [by it] are correlatives. 24 Third: otherwise one or the
other would be superfluous. Fourth: quiddity is something simple/5 and
this can only be the object of the first operation of the intellect.
[23] Third: the end is superior to things ordered to it, from the fifth
book of the Metaphysics, chapter 2; but definition is the end of
demonstration; therefore [definition is superior to demonstration]. Proof
ofthe minor, from Aristotle in the twelfth book oftheMetaphysics, in the
D1.2 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 135
[27] You object: we {barely}29 are able to know any quiddity; therefore
definition as it is in us will not be a better instrument than demonstration.
Reply: the same would have to be said of demonstration, for this supposes
not only definition but other conditions as well. Second: here teachings on
definition and demonstration are intertwined, and thus the argument is
not to the point.
[28] You object, second: definition and the first operation of the
intellect as it is in us do not seem to offer more certitude than do the third
operation and demonstration; therefore definition as it is in us will not be
superior to demonstration. 1 reply, first: definition and the first operation
have their own certitude independently of that of demonstration; for, if
this is known, namely, that knowledge of the genus and differentia of a
thing being posited the knowledge of the quiddity and nature of that thing
is also immediately posited, it is likewise the case that whoever first
recognizes that this is the genus and this the differentia of the thing knows
the quiddity of that thing independent1y of demonstration. 1 reply,
second: even if definition as it is in us depends on demonstration
instrumentally - just as intellectual knowledge depends on sense
knowledge and demonstration of the reasoned fact depends on
demonstration of the fact instrumentally - no one would venture to hold
that demonstration of the reasoned fact or intellectual knowledge is not
superior to demonstration of the fact or sense knowledge; therefore
neither should one hold that definition is less perfect than demonstration.
[29] From these considerations 1 infer, first: definition and
demonstration are related analogically as instruments of scientific
knowing, in such a way, however, that definition is the primary analogate;
they are analogous by an analogy of proportion and also of attribution 30 ;
of proportion, because just as definition is related to knowledge of
quiddity so demonstration is related to knowledge of properties; of
attribution, because, since definition is the end of demonstration, and
demonstration, especially most powerful demonstration, depends on
definition for its certitude, [definition is the primary analogate to which
demonstration is attributed as an instrument of scientific knowing].
[30] 1 gather, second: definition is the end of demonstration; because
everything imperfect is reduci bie to the perfect; but demonstration is
imperfect when compared with definition; therefore [definition is more
perfect than demonstration and its end]. AIso, just as accidents are for
substance, from Aristotle as above [23], so also is the knowledge of
accidents for the knowledge of substance itself.
D1.2 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 137
[31] The reply to the first objection [8] is obvious from the foregoing.
[32] To the second [9], 1 reply: the first operation is superior to the
third, as we have shown in the last instance [30]; for the other difficulties
the reply is obvious from the foregoing. 1 reply, [second]: man differs
from other beings through the first operation in a way superior to that
through the third, since the first operation is superior.
[33] To the third 31 [11], 1 reply, concerning the first part [l1b]: it is
more obvious that demonstration is an instrument for knowing accidents.
Second: even accidents can be known through definition, since they can
be defined in their own way, indeed in a better way, for it is more
important to know what they are than why they exist in substances. 1
reply, second, concerning the second part [l1a]: definition is concerned
with the superior object, as we have shown above [26].
[34] To the fourth 32 objection [10], 1 reply: universally speaking the
major premise is false, because first principles make us know, and not
through a cause as does demonstration; moreover first principles are
superior because they are the efficient cause of demonstrative science;
therefore [definition is superior to demonstration]. 1 reply, second, by
denying the minor premise, because definition makes us know through
intrinsic and formal causes, and these are the most perfect of alI.
[35] To the fifth 33 [12], 1 reply: definition as it is an instrument of
scientific knowing is not a part of demonstration and is not contained
within it.
[36] To the sixth,34 1 reply: definition as it occurs in demonstration is
ordered to the conclusion as an end and terminus, just as are the premises;
indeed, because in a demonstration definition is ordered to the conclusion
only as it is the cause of proper attributes, it is not a part of demonstration
as an instrument of scientific knowing. 1 reply, second: the quiddity and
nature of a thing is indeed known in a demonstration, but through the
definition itself as it is an instrument of scientific knowing.
[37] You say35: the entire certitude of definition, to say the least,
depends on demonstration, for otherwise there would be no need for the
type of demonstration wherein the parts of a definition are discovered.
This is obvious from the example of other instruments, which are no
longer necessary after the task to which they are essentialIy ordained is
completed; but demonstration is always necessary for definition so that
the definition will be grasped with certitude; therefore [definition is
always dependent on demonstration]. 1 reply36: there is a difference
between instruments of scientific knowing and other instruments, because
138 GALILEO GALILEI D1.2
[1] In this question we will solve three difficulties. 3 The first is: when
Aristot1e says that the principles of demonstration must be true, of what
truth is he speaking, complex or non-complex?
[2] Note that truth is twofold 4 : one is rea}5 [Le., ontological truth],
which is nothing more than the conformity of a thing with its first real
principles; the other is of reason 6 [Le., epistemological truth], which is
found only in a knowing power. The latter is also twofold: one is simple,7
of the kind found in the first operation 8 of the intellect and in sense
knowledge, ofwhich Aristotle is mindful in the second book of De anima,
66; and this is nothing more than the conformity of what is apprehended
with the thing that is outside the knower. The other lis] complex,1 and this
is found in both the second and the third operation8 of the intellect, and
it is nothing more than the conformity of the proposition made by the
intellect with the unity that is outside the knower. On this account the
following proposition is said to be true: "Man is a rational, risible
animal," because, on the part of the object outside, man is truly
conjoined with animality, [rationality, and risibility].
[3] This understood, I say: when Aristot1e says that principles must be
true he is speaking of complex truth, because the principles of
demonstration can have only complex truth, and because otherwise
Aristotle would have proved nothing. For, he says, demonstration must
be made from true principles because what is known is true; but a
conclusion is true with complex truth; therefore [the principles on which
it is based must be true with complex truth also].
[4] First objection: truth can follow from false premises; therefore
demonstration does not necessarily contain true premises. I reply, first,
with Averroes: truth follows from false premises accidentally and not
essentially9; but demonstration must be made from principles that are
D2.1 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 139
this sense was not intended by Aristot1e. The other is: what is not, is not
known, i.e., what is not in a thing cannot be known [to be in the thing].20
And this sense is true; indeed it is true because otherwise falsehood could
be inferred from true premises, which is absurd. It is the sense intended by
Aristot1e, who states that demonstration must be established from true
premises because the conclusion that is known is true.
saying that the eastern region is the virtual beginning of the motion of the
heavens.
[3] Note, second: this question depends on two others. The first: can
the demonstration of which we speak be made through alI [four] causes?
The second: for such a demonstration is it necessary to have causes that
are true and proper in the order of being, or do causes that are merely
virtual suffice? Cajetan holds the second whereas others do noi.
[4] 1 say, first: demonstration of the reasoned fact can be made from
alI species of cause,8 but preferably it should be made from the formal
cause. Proof of the first part, from Aristotle, who offers extensive proof
of this in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, and from
experience: for sometimes we demonstrate a conclusion from a final,
sometimes from an efficient, sometimes from a formal, and sometimes
from a material cause. Proof of the second part: scientific knowing is the
effect of demonstration, and it consists in knowing a thing through the
cause that makes it be what it is; therefore a demonstration will be the
more perfect the more it proceeds from formal causes, which are more
intrinsic to the thing. 9
[5] 1 say, second: there can be demonstration of the reasoned fact only
through causes that are true and proper in the order of being. For to know
scientificalIy is to know a thing through a cause that makes it be what it
is; but only causes that are true and proper in the order of being make a
thing be what it is; therefore only through them can demonstration of the
reasoned fact be made. Second: demonstration of the reasoned fact
produces scientific knowing of the thing in an unqualified way; but
demonstration that proceeds from true causes effects this, whereas the
kind that proceeds from virtual causes, being made from a supposition, 10
is unable to produce such knowledge in an unqualified way.
[6] To the first objection [la] 1 reply: something can be more known,
in the matter that concerns us, in two ways: either with respect to nature
and with respect to us, and in this way the first principles of mathematics"
are more known, and these offer no difficulty; or with respect to nature
alone, and then, since nothing can be proved except through something
that is more known, a cause must be manifest before it can be taken as a
premise in a demonstration. And from this the reply to the objection is
obvious. To the second objection [lb] 1 reply: since God does not have a
genus or a difference, and since nothing can be designated in him that can
have the formality of being causative of him, it folIows that there can be
neither demonstration nor definition [of him], nor, as a consequence,
142 GALILEO GALILEI D2.2
[6] You ask, second: what are these immediate propositions? My reply:
they are, first, those in which a .definition or a part of a definition is
predicated of the thing defin~; second, those in which a primary property
is predicated of the definition of the subject; third, those in which
attributes are predicated of God; fourth, those in which one category [of
being] is denied of another 9 ; fifth, those in which one differentia is denied
of another. 10
[7] Note here that Aristotle divides immediate propositions other-
wise,l1 Le., into axioms and positions. Axioms are propositions that must
be known by anyone who would learn a science. Positions are
propositions that need not be foreknown by one learning a science. These
are twofold: some are suppositions,12 in which one thing is affirmed or
denied of another; others are [terms} or definitions, 13 in which nothing is
affirmed or denied of another.
[8] You ask, third: must every immediate proposition be self evidenp4?
My reply: propositions are known in two ways, either with respect to
nature or with respect to us. Those known with respect to us are those
that, from the viewpoint of our knowledge, have no proposition over
them through which they can be proved; those known with respect to
nature are those that, from the nature of the thing, 15 have no proposition
over them through which they can be proved.
[9] 1 say, first: these matters understood, every immediate proposition
is known with respect to nature, for otherwise it would not be immediate,
since it would have another proposition over it through which it could be
proved.
[10] 1 say, second: not every immediate proposition is known with
respect to us; for only axioms are of this kind, since they, being most
known, have no proposition over them that is more known and through
which [they can be proved].
[2] 1 say, first: every demonstration must be made in some way6 from
immediate premises. Proof: from the authority of Aristotle in this second
chapter [of the Posterior Ana/yticsJ, and from reason: for to know
scientifically is nothing other than to assent to a conclusion with certitude
and evidence; but one cannot assent to a conclusion with certitude and
evidence if the demonstration is not made from immediate premises;
therefore every demonstration must be made from immediate premises.
You say: a subalternated science has perfect demonstrations, and yet it
supposes its immediate principles as proved in its {subalternating)
science'; therefore [a perfect demonstration need not be based on
immediate principles]. 1 reply: a subalternated science is imperfect and
does not have perfect demonstrations, since it presupposes its first
principles as proved in the higher science; thus it generates a science from
a supposition and in a qualified way.8 From this the solution is obvious.
[3] 1 say, second: a most powerful demonstration must be made from
indemonstrables, 9 and this is proved both from the authority of Aristotle
and from reason. For scientific knowing is the more perfect the more
certain it is; but scientific knowing that is had through a demonstration
from indemonstrables is most certain; therefore a demonstration based on
indemonstrables, generating as it does most perfect science, will be most
perfect. 10
[4] 1 say, third: a demonstration based on virtually indemonstrable
premises" is true demonstration, though less perfect than the foregoing.
Proof of the first part: from Aristotle, in the first book of the Topics,
chapter 1, saying that demonstration is made either from true and first
premises, or at least from premises whose knowledge originates from true
and first premises - which is to say that demonstration is based on premises
that are immediate either actually or virtually.12 Also, from reason: a
demonstration based on causes produces true scientific knowing and is
true demonstration; but a demonstration based on premises that are
virtually immediate is of this kind; therefore [a demonstration consisting
of premises that are virtually indemonstrable is true demonstration].
Proof of the second part of the conclusion: a demonstration made from
actually indemonstrable premises is independent, whereas one made from
premises that are virtually immediate is dependent on another; but it is
more perfect for a demonstration to be independent than for it to depend
on another; therefore [a demonstration made from premises that are
virtually immediate is less perfect than one made from those that are
actually immediate].
D2.5 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRATION 147
[they cannot enter a demonstration actually]. For this proves only that
axioms cannot enter into a perfect and proper demonstration, not into
one that is improper and imperfect; and, indeed, when such axioms are
restricted to a particular subject matter (and only in this way do they
actually enter a demonstration) they have agreat similarity to true causes,
since they are prior, more known, simpler, and causes in relation to us.
[7] 1 say, second: such axioms lS do not enter any demonstration 16 either
actually or virtually. Proof ofthe concIusion: only principles on which the
concIusion depends intrinsically enter into the demonstration actually or
virtually; but a concIusion cannot depend intrinsically on such axioms,
since they are extrinsic principles; therefore [they do not enter actually or
virtually into a demonstration]. From which it follows: the afore-
mentioned axioms do not enter even virtually into mathematical
demonstrations if the demonstrations are considered in themselves,
although they do enter into them if such demonstrations are considered in
relation to our knowledge,17 because the truth of such axioms is more
known to us than are the proper principles in a mathematical demon-
stration.
[8] To the first objection [2a], 1 reply: AristotIe is speaking there of the
foreknowledges required for any teaching or discipline, not merely those
for demonstrative science. 1 reply, second: sometimes first principles must
be foreknown to be true, namely, when such principles enter actually into
{an imperfect} demonstration. 18
[9] To the second [2b], 1 reply: AristotIe there took the term axiom in
the second way, that is, most broadly as it incIudes all principles, proper
and intrinsic as well as improper and extrinsic.
[10] To the third [2c], 1 reply by denying that every syllogism depends
on those two principles: for they depend intrinsically only on their own
proper principles. And if one says that they do depend on them, this is in
the sense that one uses them against a person who denies the proper
principles of a particular science 19 by arguing from these two principles as
from something more known.
[11] Here one may inquire 20 whether or not a concIusion must be
resolved to first principles 21 if one is to have perfect scientific knowledge
of it. This supposed, scientific knowledge of a particular matter can be
had in two ways: either in an unqualified way and absolutely, or in a
qualified way and in a determinate genus. 22
[12] 1 say, firse 3 : for anyone to have perfect knowledge of any subject
matter one must make resolution to all principles aud causes, incIuding
150 GALILEO GALILEI D2.5
the first and most universal; or, better, one must know alI principles and
alI causes, including the first. This is against Giles, who argues that
resolution must be made to something more known; but the first cause is
not of this type, and so it folIows that a subject matter cannot be properly
resolved to the first cause. Proof of the conclusion: just as things are
related to being so they are related to knowing; but a conclusion depends
for its being on a subject and a predicate, and these depend for their being
both on their principles and on God; therefore [perfect knowledge of a
subject matter requires resolution to alI principles and causes, including
the first].
[13] 1 say, second 24 : for a subject matter to be known perfectly in its
genus it suffices to know its proper causes. Proof of the conclusion 25 : a
thing depends on determinate causes for its determinate being, and if
these are known perfectly, then the thing itself is known in its genus. But
with respect to US,26 for us to know perfectly the conclusion must be
resolved to first principles that are self evident, since with respect to us
such principles are also most known; and against those who deny them the
refutation must be based on those principles.
[8] Note, second: one knowledge is superior '9 to another, first, on the
part of the object: for this reason Aristotle says rightly that it is much
better to have slight knowledge of things divine with probability than it is
to have scientific knowledge of things here below. Second: from the
viewpoint of independence, for the more independent a science is, the
better it is, as is apparent in subaltern ating sciences. Third: from the
viewpoint of certitude, which consists in the firm adherence of the
intellect to its object. [Fourth]20: from the viewpoint of evidence, which is
nothing more than a certain clarity in apprehending an object that makes
the thing apprehended be more clearly perceived by us. Such evidence is
twofold, either intuitive or discursive. Intuitive evidence is had through
the knowledge of terms alone, and the evidence of first principles is of this
kind; discursive evidence is had through causes, and such is the evidence
of demonstrative science. Note here: although evidence is always
accompanied by certitude - for we cannot assent to something with
evidence if we do not firmly adhere to it - there can be certitude without
evidence, as is apparent in subalternated sciences and more clearly in our
faith. 21 Fifth: from the manner of knowing, for a science that is had
through a more perfect cause is superior to one that is had through a less
perfect cause.
[9] I say, first: knowledge of first principles 22 is more evident than
knowledge of the conclusion. Proof of the conclusion: because know-
ledge of such principles is simpler and prior and functions as the cause of
the conclusion deduced from them. Again, knowledge of first principles,
being had through knowledge of terms alone, is so evident that it can
easily be grasped by those who are inexperienced, whereas knowledge of
a conclusion deduced from first principles is not so evident, for the
intellect grasps things by themselves with gre ater evidence than it does
things that depend on others, and a conclusion is of the IaUer type since
it depends on first principles. The reason for this is that the intellect is
more distracted the more it considers, and the less it considers the more
clearly it understands. Thus knowledge of first principles lis called]23
wisdom by Aristot1e, as opposed to that of the conclusion, which he calls
science.
[10] I say, second: knowledge of immediate principles 24 is superior to
that of the conclusion. Proof, from Aristotle, text 5 of this book, saying
"that on account which something is, is even more so itself,"25 and
because one knowing prin cip les would be better prepared than one
knowing a conclusion; also because knowledge of immediate principles is
154 GALILEO GALILEI D2.6
if there are any, always and at any time whatever. In this it differs from
the prioristic statement, which is a universal proposition in which the
predicate invariably goes with the subject and with everything contained
under it, but abstracting from its inherence at all times. They also differ
in other ways. First, the names are different, as is obvious: one is said to
be the prioristic statement because it looks to the books of the Prior
Analytics and follows the syllogism according to form in general, and so
on; the other is said to be the posterioristic because it looks to the books
of the Posterior Analytics and follows the syllogism according to
matter. 11 Second: the prioristic statement, just as it abstracts from all
matter, so also from truth and falsity, and thus it can be found both in the
topical syllogism and in the sophistic; the posterioristic, on the other
hand, necessarily includes matter and truth. Third: the prioristic
statement requires a plurality of things contained under the subject such
that an actual distribution of the predicate can be made among the
inferiors; the posterioristic, on the other hand, does not require a plurality
of subjects, but only that the universal belong with the subject in such a
way that it would go with a number of inferiofs if there were any; for this
reason the proposition "God is unchangeable" 12 is a posterioristic
statement.
[3] Note, third: the statement said of every instance, the posterioristic
statement, and the commensurate or universal statement 13 are related as
higher and lower respectively; for the statement said of every instance is
obviously broadest in scope, the posterioristic is less so, and the universal
or commensurate lesser still. The proof: every proposition that is
essentiap4 is also said of every instance, as is apparent in the example,
"Every man has sense knowledge." for this proposition is essential, and
as a result is said of every instance; whereas the example, "Every man is
two-legged" is said of every instance, but it is not essential. The universal
Of commensurate proposition, on the other hand, is even narrower in
scope than the essential proposition, for the same reason; for the
proposition "Every man is risible" is commensurate and, as a
consequence, essential; whereas the proposition "Every man has sense
knowledge" is not commensurate although it is essential. Aristotle makes
no mention of the negative posterioristic statement - a proposition in
which the predicate is excluded from the subject at any time whatever,
exemplified in the proposition "No man is a stone" - because he intended
only to treat of ostensive demonstration, which has no use for this
negative statement. Also, because this can easily be gathered from what
D2.7 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 157
has been said. Similarly, in the books of the Prior Analytics he made no
mention of the negative prioristic statement - a proposition in which the
predicate is excluded from the subject and alI its inferiors, but abstracting
from the fact that it does not inhere at all times - for the same reasons.
[4] These matters presupposed, 1 say: every proper and perfect
demonstration of the reasoned fact 15 consists of propositions that are said
of every instance and are necessary. Proof of the conclusion: every
demonstration of this type makes a thing be known scientificalIy through
its causes by manifesting the properties of its first and adequate subject. 16
But a demonstration cannot do this unless it is made of propositions that
are said of every instance, because the property is manifested of its proper
subject, and that are also necessary, because to know scientificalIy is to
have knowledge of a thing that cannot be otherwise. Add to this: the
causes through which the thing is known are necessary.
[5] You inquire: how is demonstration said to be concerned with a
[contingent] effect l7 ? 1 reply: demonstration is concerned with things
eternal, not in the sense of things that exist for alI eternity, for this is true
of nothing except God; but it is concerned with things eternal, that is, with
things that have a true connection for alI eternity in the divine mind. You
object: [a] an eclipse is demonstrated ofthe moon, and yet an eclipse is not
taking place on the moon always and at alI times; therefore the conclusion
is invalid [and the demonstration is not concerned with things eternal].
Second: [b] there are some predicates that are demonstrated of subjects
and yet are not present in them always or are not present at a particular
time, as is apparent in things philosophers say of hail and like matters.
Some reply to the first objection: the ability to be eclipsed 18 and not the
eclipse itself is what is demonstrated. But, to the contrary:
mathematicians [demonstrate] eclipses 19 of the moon that are true and
real, as is obvious from the middle term they use 20 to prove them.
[6] 1 reply to the first [5a] and second [5b] objections: said of every
instance is threefold. 21 Either it is a proposition in which the predicate
inheres in the subject invariably and at alI times; or it is one in which the
predicate inheres in the subject invariably but not at alI times; or it is one
in which the predicate inheres in the subject for the most part but neither
invariably nor at alI times. Demonstrations can be made from alI three of
these2 2 ; and from this the solution is obvious.
158 GALILEO GALILEI D2.8
[1] Concerning the first query, 1 say, first: there are more modes of
speaking essentially than the four Aristotle enumerates in the fifth book
oftheMetaphysics, text 23. 3 1 say, second: the four modes enumerated are
the principal ones, and that is why Aristotle mentioned only them. You
say: why is it, since the first two are the only ones used in demonstration,
that Aristotle was mindful of the others? 1 reply: because, as he himself
teaches, things that are equivocal should be differentiated into their
principal meanings; and the modes of speaking essentially are equivocal;
therefore [he indicated the four principal meanings]. 1 say, third: it was
sufficient for Aristotle to enumerate these four modes only, although
others think otherwise; the reason is that three considerations can bear on
any matter: existence, activities, and predicates. If a thing exists in and by
it self, 4 that constitutes the third mode; if it is a cause in and by itself, the
fourth. Predicates are either essential to the thing of which they are
predicated, and so they constitute the first mode; or they are accidental,
and if so, they are either common and rejected as being of little value, or
they are proper, and then they make up the second mode of speaking
essentially.
[2] Concerning the second query, 1 say, first: propositions contained in
the first mode of speaking essentially are those in which the predicate is
the definition of the subject, or it is the ultimate genus or the ultimate
differentia, or it is a remote genus or a remote differentia. 5 To these can
be added propositions in which the predicate is an extrinsic entity through
which an object is defined, for example, the body in relation to the soul,
for the latter is defined in reIat ion to the former, and a subject with respect
to its properties, for the same reason. Note here, however, that just as
some things are contained primarily in the second mode of speaking
essentially, namely, those in which a property is predicated convertibly
with the subject, as in the examples "Man is risible" and "Animals are
sensible," and others are contained secondarily, e.g., those in which a
property is not predicated convertibly of its subject, as in the examples
"Man is capable of sight" and "Man is a being subsistingper se," so some
things are contained primarily in the first mode of speaking essentially,
others secondarily. Contained primarily are those in which a quidditative
predicate is predicated convertibly of its subject, as in the example "Man
is rational"; contained secondarily are those in which a quidditative
D2.8 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 159
[4] 1 say, second: "proper"ll can be taken in four ways. It means what
belongs to every instance, as man being two-legged; or solely, as man
being a philosopher; or to every instance and solely but not at all times, as
man becoming gray haired; or to every instance and solely and at all
times,12 as man being risible. Taken in the fourth way it fits the second
mode perfectly; in the third way, less perfectly; in the first way, if a
property and not a common accident, even less perfectly; in the second
way, not at all; and similarly in the first way, if the attribute is a common
accident. For this reason all of the following propositions constitute the
second mode: "Man is risible," "Man becomes gray haired," 13 and "Man
is capable of sight" - for the attribute is found in every instance, but as a
property [whose intrinsic formality pertains to the subject]. On the other
hand, the following propositions, "Man has color" and "Man is
grammatical," do not constitute the second mode of speaking essentially.
Moreover, propositions in which a property is predicated ofthe definition
are placed in the second mode, although some deny this on the ground
that propositions placed in the second mode must be those whose subject
provides the intrinsic formality of the predicate; but the definition is not
the subject of the property; therefore [a property predicated of the
definition is not predicated in this way of the subject]. But these [authors]
are mistaken: for there are two kinds of subject, one of predication or the
metaphysical subject, the other of inherence or the physical subject; and
a subject of either type suffices to place a proposition in the second mode.
Also located in the second mode of speaking essentially are propositions
in which a property that depends on an extrinsic cause l4 is predicated of
a subject, as in the example "The moon is eclipsed," for an eclipse
depends on the interposition of the earth as an extrinsic cause. The reason
for this is that not only is the extrinsic cause placed in the definition of the
aforementioned property, but the subject is also l5 ; thus, if one wishes to
define an eclipse, one must define it as follows: "An eclipse is an absence
of light on the moon arising from the earth's coming between it and the
sun"; therefore [not only the extrinsic cause, the earth's interposition, but
also the subject, the moon whose light is so affected, must be placed in the
definition]. You say: when a property is predicated of the extrinsic cause
in propositions of this kind, as in the example "An eclipse occurs from the
earth's interposition," these too are placed under the second mode. 1 reply
in the affirmative,16 because the extrinsic cause is of the essence of the
property, being placed in its definition.
[5] You ask: are propositions that are convertible in the first mode of
D2.8 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 161
that are predicated of a subject of inherence, and accidents are of this kind
whereas second substances are not.
[7) 1 say, fourth and last: all four causes 23 are contained under the
fourth mode, because the definition of a cause given by Aristotle is
applicable to each of the causes; therefore [each cause is contained under
the fourth mode). Proof of the antecedent: for Aristotle's definition is the
following: "A cause is that through which one thing is present in
another"; therefore [the definition is applicable to all four causes). Again,
causes involve an intrinsic relationship to what they cause; but, as such,
they can only be contained under the fourth mode; therefore [all four
causes are contained under the fourth mode). Proof of the minor premise:
they are not contained in the third mode, as is obvious; nor in the first and
the second, because these modes are essentially constituted by an intrinsic
relationship that involves existing and predicating; [therefore they must
be contained under the fourth mode).
[8) You ask, firse 4 : is a cause put in the fourth mode with respect to an
effect in potency as well as with respect to an effect in act? 1 reply: it is put
there with respect to an effect in potency, because an effect in potency,
precisely as involving a relationship to its cause, is not included in the first
mode or in the second, therefore in the fourth. Again, it is contained there
with respect to an effect in act, because Aristotle teaches this in the
example he gives of throat-cutting. 25 You say: a cause as it respects an
effect in act is contingent/6 therefore it cannot be placed in the fourth
mode. 1 reply: such a proposition is indeed contingent if one focuses on
the predication; it is not contingent, however, and this is our concern, if
one focuses on the connection of the predicate with the subject and the
causal relationship between the two.
[9) You ask, second: is the fourth mode of causing also one of
predicating27 ? 1 reply, first: there is nothing to prevent one and the same
proposition from being in the first and the second mode, and also in the
fourth, when taken in a different way. This can be seen in the proposition
"A rational animal is discursive," for this, when considered from the
viewpoint of the subject's being of the essence of its predicate, is in the
second mode of speaking essentially; yet viewed from the perspective of
the relationships between cause and effect, it is in the fourth mode. 1
reply, second, with common opinion and against ApoIlinaris 28 ; the fourth
mode of causing is not one of predicating. This is so because Aristotle,
having enumerated the first and second modes of speaking essentially,
teaches that things predicated of another subject are predicated
D2.9 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 163
[D2.1O] Tenth Question 1 : What are the modes2 that serve the purposes
of demonstration J ?
[1] Albert 4 says that all four modes serve the purposes of demonstration;
St. Thomas and Cajetan reject the third mode; Philoponus, Themistius,
and Averroes reject the third and the fourth.
[2] Note S that a proposition of a demonstration can be considered in
three ways: either with respect to the terms of which it is composed; or
with respect to the cause it involves; or with respect to predication.
[3] 1 say, first: the first and second modes of speaking essentially serve
the purposes of all perfect demonstrations, because Aristotle teaches this
166 GALILEO GALILEI D2.1O
These statements would not be true if what we have maintained were not
true also. Hence one may see the error of those who hold that a predicate
is universal or commensurate if it belongs to a subject by virtue of one of
its essential parts, the way, for example, "sensible" occurs in the
proposition "Man is sensible." You object: if this is so, why does
Aristotle teach in texts 11 and 1910 that essential propositions are universal
and commensurate? 1 reply: in those texts Aristotle means only that
essential propositions in a proper and perfect demonstration are universal
and commensurate, since elsewhere he likewise defines universal, saying
that it is what is said of a primary subject" and, through it, of other things
also. This definition, like the preceding, is obvious from the foregoing.
[4] Concerning the second query, many authors have many opinions. 12
Some understand universal propositions or those placed under a universal
predicate to be immediate. Others hold that they are those in which all
proper attributes are predicated of their subjects. Themistius maintains
that they are those in which the predicates belong to the subject with no
intermediate cause coming in between. So, according to him, the
proposition "Man is an animal" has a commensurate predicate, whereas
the proposition "Man is risible" has not, because there is an intermediate
cause between man and risible, namely, rational.
[5] Note: there are many and various grades 13 for each and every thing.
Some are common, for example, with respect to man: to be a substance,
to be a living body, to be an animal, and so ono Others are proper, and
through these objects are constituted in their being and set apart from all
others; such, for example, is the grade of rationality with respect to man.
Many proper attributes follow from this proper grade, for consequent on
rationality are discourse, wonder, and so on. 14
[6] Note, second: it is one thing to belong to an object essentially,
another to belong to it precisely as such 1S ; for common grades belong to
an object essentially and they are predicated of it in the first mode,16 but
they do not belong to the object precisely as such.
[7] These matters understood, we say: universal propositions, or those
that are commensurate,17 are those in which the predicates belong to the
object precisely as such 18 or according to its proper formality; so hold
Averroes, Philoponus, and Albert. The proof: from Aristot1e, in texts 11
and 14,19 where he states that propositions in which the predicate is said
convertibly of the subject are universal, such that, if the predicate were
removed, the primary subject would be removed also. You ask: whyare
such predicates said to be universal and primary? 1 reply: because they are
D2.12 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 169
found in everything contained under the subject and in ali its universality,
as is apparent in the proposition "Man is rational"; and because they also
belong with their subjects adequately and convertibly.
proceed from a true and proper cause8 ; but it cannot proceed from a
proper cause if it is not composed of essential propositions; therefore [it
must be so composed]. The minor premise is proved by induction. 9
[5] To the first objection to the contrary [la], I reply: an accidental
kind of being can be considered in two ways: either as it is merely an
accident, and as such it is eliminated from alI the sciences; or for the
reason that properties of a certain type are associated with it, such as
being beyond the intention of the agent, or happening rarely.lo In this
second way it can falI under a science. Aristotle treats of chance and
fortune in the second way in the second book of the Physics.
[6] To the second objection [lb], I reply: natural circular motion is a
proper attribute of the heavens; rest, on the other hand, is not proper to
earth, and thus the demonstration by which Aristotle proves that the earth
is at rest is not a true demonstration l l ; moreover, being the primary hot
body and being the primary moist body may be considered as the most
proper attributes of fire and air.
[7] To the third objection [lc], I reply: if accidents l2 did not have a
proper cause they could not be demonstrated in a proper sense, since a
proper cause is required for a perfect demonstration.
[8] I say, second: a most powerful demonstration must be made from
propositions that are essential and universal,13 for this is what Aristotle
teaches in text 11 14 and in chapter 6. AIso, because otherwise it would
folIow that one could construct a number of most powerful
demonstrations while keeping one and the same middle term, which is
quite absurd. Proof of the inference: if one were to use the definition of
animal to demonstrate a particular property, by keeping the same middle
term one could apply the same demonstration to alIliving species; and so
there would be as many demonstrations as there are species of animals.
This is apparent in the folIowing demonstration: 15 "Every corporeal
sensitive nature is apt to sense and to move in alI different directions; but
every animal is of this type; therefore [every species of animal is apt to
sense and to move in alI different directions]." Again, every most
powerful demonstration is indeed most perfect, and so there cannot be a
demonstration more perfect than it is; but a demonstration that would be
made of propositions that are essential and universal would be more
perfect than one that is made only from propositions that are essential;
therefore [a most powerful demonstration must be composed of
propositions that are both essential and universal]. From this it folIows
that both premises of a demonstration must be universal and necessary,
D2.12 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRATION 171
and this on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate. 16 From
this it results that mathematical demonstrations, which for the most part
have one premise that is common, are not perfect. 17 And if they are said
to be perfect, this is because of their highest degree of certitude, since they
abstract from matter, which lis] the cause of uncertainty l8; or else it is
because of the preeminent method they follow.
[9] Note here: apart from having both premises universal propositions,
most powerful demonstration also requires that both premises be proper.
This is obvious, partly from the foregoing, partly because most powerful
demonstration proceeds from the definition 19 of the subject or from the
definition of the property; but it cannot proceed from these unless it is
made from proper premises; therefore [most powerful demonstration also
requires proper propositions in its premises].
[10] 1 say, third and last: demonstration that is true and proper but not
most powerful can be made from propositions that are not universapo
provided they are essential. Proof of the conclusion: in a demonstration
an attribute that belongs to an object by reason of some higher genus can
sometimes be demonstrated, as is apparent in the demonstration, "Every
animal is sensitive; every man is an animal; therefore [every man is
sensitive]." Here sensitivity is demonstrated of man, but this belongs to
man not insofar as he is man but insofar as he is an animal, which pertains
to a higher genus; therefore [a demonstration can be made from
propositions that are essential only]. Yet all are agreed that this is a true
demonstration.
[11] To Averroes's first objection [3a], 1 reply: Aristotle is speaking of
most powerful demonstration.
[12] To the second [3bJ, 1 reply: this applies to most powerful
demonstrations, and we agree on this also.
[13] To the third [3c]: 1 deny that propositions that are not universal
are merely accidental.
[14] To the two objections opposed to the contrary [2a,b] 1 reply:
proving the third conclusion does not militate against the second
conclusion.
[15] From these conclusions it follows that there can be neither
demonstration nor science of individuals,21 because they are uncertain,
indeterminate, changeabJe, and inclusive of many extrinsic accidents,
whereas demonstration must consist of universal and unchangeable
propositions, either negatively or by reason of the connection of the
predicate with the subject, which has truth from all eternity in the divine
172 GALILEO GALILEI D2.12
mind. But there can be demonstration and science of God in the way in
which these can be in us; because God is certain, determinate,
unchangeable, and devoid of all accidents. And if God is singular,22 his
very singularity pertains to his intrinsic definition.
[1] Note, first: demonstration can be taken in two ways: for a syllogism
established from necessary propositions, proper or common; or for a
syllogism constituted from necessary and proper propositions only, in the
way it is taken by Aristot1e in the first book of the Posterior Analytics.
Demonstration taken in the first way, when compared with a proper and
perfect demonstration or with a syllogism taken in the second way, is said
to be topical reasoning by Aristotle 2; when compared with probable
reasoning, on the other hand, it is said to be demonstration from the fact
that it proceeds from necessary propositions.
[2] Note, second: here we are not inquiring into the species of
demonstration as it is a syllogism. In the latter way it can be divided by
reason of quantity into universal and particular, by reason of quality into
affirmative and negative, and by reason of mode of inference into
ostensive and reducing to the impossible. Here we are seeking species of
demonstration taken in the second way3 and insofar as it is an instrument
of scientific knowing.
[3] Note, third: the species of demonstration that makes us know the
cause of any effect as it is from Îts very nature also makes us know the
existence of the effect, for we cannot know the cause of any effect unless
we know the existence of that effect at the same time. From this it is
apparent that A verroes 4 divides the species of demonstration erroneously
on the basis that one species makes us know the cause of an effect, another
the cause and existence of the effect.
[4] It is certain, first, that demonstration to the impossible is not true
and perfect demonstration, because it proceeds from false premises and
denies both premises in the process of questioning. It is certain, second,
contrary to certain moderns whose mentor was Franciscus [Neritonensis], 5
that demonstration of the reasoned fact is true and certain demonstration,
for otherwise Aristot1e would have labored in vain when assigning its
properties, and because demonstration of the reasoned fact generates true
science.
D3.1 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 173
of the reasoned fact. To that particular text 1 reply: this is not to the point,
for Aristotle teaches in the second book of the Posterior Analytics42 that
there are four kinds of cause, some of which are intrinsic, some extrinsic,
some convertible, others not; and true demonstration can be made from
alI of them. To the two arguments [7d, e], the reply is obvious from the
foregoing.
demonstration of the fact one either begs the question 5 or proves nothing
with necessity. This opinion was rejected by us in the first question.
[3] The third opinion is that of many moderns, whose leader was [Ugo
Senensis],6 who were opposed to the regress because a demonstration of
the fact achieves everything offered by a demonstration of the reasoned
fact. To the contrary: demonstration of the reasoned fact is most perfect
and differs essentially from demonstration of the fact; therefore
demonstration of the fact cannot offer the same result as demonstration
of the reasoned fact.
[4] The fourth opinion is that of Franciscus Neritonensis, 7 whom many
follow, who denied a second progression B in demonstration. For, seeing
that there are two progressions in it, one from an effect and the other from
a cause, he admitted the first but denied the second, because in the second
progression, since we proceed from what is less known to us, we cannot
infer a conc1usion from necessary premises. To the contrary: as Aristotle
teaches in the second book of the Prior A nalytics, 9 every syllogism must
proceed from things more known to us; therefore, either Neritonensis's'°
argument is invalid Of the second progression must be admitted. Second:
this opinion does away with demonstration of the reasoned fact, contrary
to Aristotle and to common opinion.
[5] The fifth opinion is Aristotle's, 11 as above, denying that there can
be a perfect circ1e in demonstration and yet admitting an imperfect one.
This opinion we regard as true. For its understanding:
[6] Note, first: two things are required for demonstration. First, that
the proving part and the part proved 12 must be connected with each other,
for otherwise one cannot make a necessary inference from the one to the
other. Second: that the proving part, as more known, should come first in
the demonstration.
[7] Note, second: cause and effect can be taken in three ways: one way,
under the formal relationship of cause and effect;13 in a second way, as
they are disparate things; 14 and in a third way, as the cause is necessarily
connected with the effect. 15
[8] These two notations presupposed, 1 say, first: if cause and effect are
taken in the first way, there cannot be a demonstrative regress. Proof of
the conc1usion: demonstrat ion must proceed from what is more known;
but correlatives are so interdependent that one cannot be more known
than the other; 16 therefore [there cannot be a demonstrative regress if
cause and effect are taken as formally related to each other].
[9] 1 say, second: if cause and effect are taken in the second way, there
182 GALILEO GALILEI D3.3
second progression 26 wherein the cause gives the proper reason for the
effect? I reply, with St. Thomas: its existence can be proved through
demonstration of the reasoned fact, though this is not absolute and simply
perfect existence.
[13] You ask, second: in what sciences do we think such circularity is
useful? I reply: the demonstrative progression is useful for the perfecting
of all the sciences/ 7 but it is most frequently used in physics because for
the most part physical causes are unknown to us. In mathematics it has
almost no use, because in such disciplines causes are more known both
with respect to nature and with respect to us.
[14] You ask, third: what are the conditions for the demonstrative
regress 28 ? I reply: these are [six in number. First:]29 that there be two
progressions of demonstration in it,30 one from effect to cause, the other
from cause to effect. Second: that we begin with demonstration of the
fact, as Aristotle teaches, for otherwise demonstration of the fact would
be pointless, since one who knows the proper reason for the effect also
knows its existence, as we have explained. 31 Third: that the effect be more
known to us, as Aristotle teaches and as is obvious to reason, for
otherwise we could not formulate a demonstration of the fact. Fourth:
that having made the first progression we do not begin the second
progres sion immediately, but wait until we come to have formal
knowledge of the cause we first know only materially. 32 The reason:
because we cannot formulate a demonstration of the reasoned fact if we
do not have prior formal knowledge of the cause. You object: therefore
it would follow that demonstration of the reasoned fact would be made to
no purpose, because it is made only that we may have formal knowledge
of the cause. 33 I deny the inference: because, granted that one who has
formal knowledge of the cause 34 also has virtual knowledge of the reason
why the property inheres in the subject, one does not understand it
actually unless one effects a true demonstration. And from this it follows
that the regress is circular in an improper sense, since in it one progresses
from an effect to material knowledge of the cause, and then from formal
knowledge of the cause 35 to the proper reason for the effect. Fifth
condition: that it be made in convertible terms, because if the effect were
broader in scope than the cause, this would impede the first [progres-
sion]. 36 Hence the following is not valid: there is light, therefore the sun.
If, on the other hand, the cause were broader in scope than the effect, this
would impede the second progression, as is obvious. For, although it is
valid to argue: something breathes, therefore it has a soul, one cannot do
184 GALILEO GALILEI D3.3
1 The tit le of the treatise is not set off on a separate line, though Galileo begins his exposition
with the words Tractatio de demonstratione, obviously intended to serve as a title but
becoming instead the subject of his first sentence.
2 quite judiciously [ ...}: Lat. sapientissime, followed by a blank space of a third of a line.
The space may be traceable to Galileo's having had difficulty reading the exemplar from
which he worked; alternatively, he may have read it correctly but left ro om for a more
precise reference to be filled in later. Vallius's version of 1622 has in principio primi /ibri at
the ellipsis, i.e., "at the beginning of the first book," which would be a plausible reading
[VL2: 188]. In the notes of Vitelleschi, who taught the logic course at the Collegio in 1589
(o ne year after Vallius), "texts 5, 6, and 8 of the first book" are cited in a similar reference
[Lat. Ed. 175]; perhaps this is what Galileo was seeking to put in the space left blank in his
manuscript.
3 about which we will have much to say in the following treatise: a clear reference to a
Treatise on Science and thus an indication that, at the time he was writing this, Galileo
planned to appropriate from Vallius's notes an additional treatise on that subject. No such
treatise is now extant, and whether or not Galileo persevered in his intention remains
problematica!. In either event, however, he must have read through Vallius's treatise on
science and decided that it too was worth preserving among his notes. Since throughout the
manuscript on which we are commenting Galileo evidences good knowledge of Jesuit
teachings on science, the missing treatise is probably the source on which he drew. Much of
the material presented in Secs. 3.1 through 3.7 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proofis
summarized from Carbone's plagiarization of the treatise in his Introductio in universam
philosophiam; for details, see the Introduction to the translation above.
4 First Disputation: Here Galileo simply wrote Disputatio prima and then, on the same line,
began the first question without indicating the title of the disputation as a whole. Actually
the disputation, as revealed in the description given in the prologue, is made up of two
questions, the first on the definition of demonstration and the second on its importance
(praestantia) when compared with another instrument of knowing, namely, definition.
5 many species of demonstration: for previous mentions of the various kinds of
demonstration, see F2.3.2 n. 6, F2.3.4 n. 9, F3.5 n. 2 and F4.1.3 n. 6; a fuller discussion of
the different types will be found in D3.1 and its accompanying notes. See also Secs. 4.4a and
4.9a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
01.1 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 185
6 ostensive demonstration: Lat. demonstratio ostensiva, a new type that has not been noted
previously. It proves a conclusion in a positive way, showing why something is the case
rather than arguing indirect1y by eliminating other possibilities. It may be viewed as a quasi-
genus that includes ali the other types except demonstration to the impossible (or to the
absurd); the latter was commonly regarded as imperfect (F2.3.2) and thus was not of major
interest for determining the nature of demonstration.
7 true and proper principles: see F2.1.1 n. 5.
9 universal and particular, affirmative and negative: this division is mentioned later in
process by which one discerns how a conclusion follows from one or more propositions, thus
an argumentation; see D3.1.2.
11 an instrument of scientific knowing: Lat. instrumentum sciendi, a broader category than
discourse, embracing ali acts of the mind whereby one knows or comes to new knowledge
that is true and certain. The various instruments are enumerated and discussed in detail in
the following question (D1.2). Vallius apparently composed an entire treatise on
instruments of knowing, which was appropriated by Carbone and thus is preserved in the
Additamenta of 1597; see Sec. 4.4c of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
12 the possible intellect: Lat. intellectus possibilis, the part of the human intellect in which
concepts are formed when actuated by an appropriate stimulus deriving from the agent or
"acting" intellect, the intellectus agens. Galileo's use of intellection (intellectio) here thus
refers to the formation of concepts, the beginning of rational knowledge. See D1.2.2 n. 4,
D1.2.6 n. 12; for a fuller account ofthe theory of knowledge on which this is based, see Secs.
2.1-2.3 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
13 actual science... habitual science: Lat. actualis ... habitualis, a distinction that figures
prominently in Jesuit treatises on science. Actual science designates the act of knowing that
results from the intellectual grasp of a single demonstrative syllogism; habitual science, on
the other hand, designates the habit of mind that results from repeated acts of this kind or
the body of knowledge built up from them. A total science such as physics or metaphysics
would be an example of habitual science, as would the partial sciences associated with them.
See Sec. 3.2 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
14 syllogism producing science: Lat. syllogismus faciens scire, where scire means to know
fali under a genus without regard to the formalities that differentiate them, whereas formal
species would be those distinguished by their own proper differentiae.
16 instrumentally ... dispositively: in the sense that, although the intellect is the proper cause
that produces science, the demonstrative syllogism is either its instrument or a necessary
condition for its doing so.
17 perfect science: Lat. perfecta scientia, as opposed to the imperfect science that results
excellent. The opposite conclusion, namely, that knowledge of the premises is superior to
knowledge of the conclusion, is defended in the following question, Dl.2.
19 second definition: with regard to the brevity of the explanation given here for the second
186 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D1.1
definition, it should be noted that each part of the definition is examined with care and in
considerable detail in the second disputat ion of this treatise, D2, as follows:
20 "of true premises": see D2.1.
23 "from antecedents and causes of the conclusion": see D2.2. Additional elaborations
relating to the self-evidence, necessity, and the properties of the propositions that compose
a strict demonstration are provided in D2.7 through D2.12.
4 intel/ectual light: Lat. lumen intel/ectuale, the light deriving from the agent intellect,
which, in a Thomistic theory of knowledge, illuminates the phantasm and yields the
intelligible species that, when impressed on the possible intellect, produces the concept. See
DI.1.2 n. 10 and D3.1.l7 n. 38; also Sec. 2.la of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
5 mediately ... immediate/y: for this couple Vallius-Carbone substitute "remotely ...
proximate\y" [CA24r); the sense is that division and method aid in acquiring knowledge but
do not actually supply it; other instruments supply knowledge directly, either imperfectly,
i.e., without certitude or evidence (though they prove useful for discovering principles, or
when demonstrations are unattainable), or perfectly, i.e., with certitude and evidence.
6 proposition: treated more fully in paragraph [4) below.
7 method: Lat. methodus, a term not explained by Galileo in the notes that are extant.
Vallius treats it in his commentary on the second book of the Posterior Analytics, in his
disputation on definition. For him, method is a procedure for ordering a discipline or a
science so that each consideration of its subject matter has its proper place; understood in
this way it is an instrument of scientific knowing distinct from alI others. Following Galen,
Vallius notes, method has three species, that of composition, that of division, and that of
resolution [VL2: 395). See Secs. 1.3 and 2.6 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
8 resolution and composition: the process whereby a conclusion, as an effect, is "resolved"
or analyzed back to the cause that produces it by aposteriori reasoning (the method of
resolution), and then is "composed" or synthesized with the cause to establish the same
conclusion by a priori reasoning (the method of composition). This twofold process, known
among Paduan Aristotelians as the demonstrative regress, is explained and defended at
length by Galileo in D3.3. See Secs. 1.3,2.7, and 4.9 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and
Prooj.
9 [definition}: Galileo wrote "division" here, obviously a slip of the pen, as is discernible
mind by which one can arrange the parts of a discipline so as to proceed from the more
known to the less known and thus can facilitate its being learned by others [VL2: 395-396).
D1.2 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 187
Very similar to method, order is mentioned here as the genus under which method is
contained; thus one can also speak of an order of resolution and an order of composition
[ibid.]. See Sec. 2.6 of Gali/eo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
II by the naturallight: Lat. lumine naturali, that is, by the light of the intellect, according
to the theory of knowledge that !ies behind MS 27. See Secs. 2.1-2.3 of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
12 intrinsic or extrinsic causes: intrinsic causes are internal to the entities they cause, and
thus formal causes and material causes are dassified as intrinsic; extrinsic causes, on the
other hand, are external to the entities they cause, and so efficient causes and final causes are
cIassified as extrinsic; the distinction is employed at Dl.2.25, Dl.2.34, D2.8.4, D2.!O.6,
D3.l.14, D3.l.18. See also D2.2.4 and Sec. 4.5 of Gali/eo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
13 operations of the intel/ect: Lat. operationes intel/ectus, three in number and thus spoken
of in scholastic treatises as the three acts of the mind. The first operation is that of simple
apprehension, the grasping of concepts, as when one discerns immediately the meanings of
terms; the second is composing or dividing, as when one uses concepts to form a judgment,
expressed as a positive or negative proposition; and the third is reasoning or discourse, as
when one arranges propositions in the form of a syllogism to arrive at a previously unknown
conclusion. See Sec. 2.2 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
14 intel/igences: that is, intellectual substances or angels. They attain knowledge directly or
intuitively, without need of discourse; in this they are different from rational beings or
humans, who reason their way to new conclusions. See F3.1.16 n. 41; also Secs. 2.7a and
3.1b of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
15 constitutive of a thing: in the sense of being part of its definition; man is defined as a
a cryptic expression on which light is shed by Vallius-Carbone. They divide the objection
into two parts, the first arguing that the superior instrument is concerned with the superior
object, the second that the superior instrument makes the user know more things and helps
in more ways, which would be equivalent to its having a more extensive object [CA28vb-
29ra; Lat. Ed. 189]. See D1.2.33 n. 3l.
17 quiddity: essence or definition, the answer to the question "What is it?" (quid sit); see
F3.1.4 n. 16.
18 the "what it is": Lat. ipsum quod quid est, another way of referring to the essence or
definition, actually a more literal translation of the expression used in text 24 of the original
Greek [76b6]; for similar translations, see F3.6 n. 2 and F3.6.3 n. 7.
19 as a middle term, not as an instrument of knowing: Galileo does not explain this
possibly Angelus Thius and Eustratius, identified by Vallius in a similar context [VL2: 407].
21 in itself and in its nature, or with respect to us: Lat. secundum se et suam naturam, vei
problem posed in the titIe to the question, but Vallius-Carbone make explicit that the precise
difficulty they are addressing is that posed by the third opinion. They then introduce this and
188 NOTES ANO COMMENTARY D1.2
the other notations corresponding to Galileo's paragraphs [17] and [18] with the remark that
their solution to it will require a number of notations [Lat. Ed. 191].
Z3 without movement ... involves movement: Lat. sine motu ... coniuncta cum motu. The
movement referred to here is that of the intellect from premises to conclusion in the process
of demonstration.
24 correlatives: Lat. relativa; see 03.3.8 n. 16.
25 something simple: Lat. quid simplex, simple in the sense that an essence or definition is
grasped directly in the first act of the mind and does not require composing and dividing, as
does the second act, or discourse from premises to conclusion, as does the third. Further
light on the conclusion stated in this paragraph and on the arguments given in its support is
given below in paragraph [37]. See Sec. 2.2 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proo/.
2. procreated to attain beatitude: the argument here presupposes that one can de fine man
using alI four causes, as follows: man is a being created by God and procreated by parents
(efficient cause), composed of an animal body (material cause) and a rational soul (formal
cause), to attain beat it ude in heaven (final cause). Since the final cause is the cause of causes,
and causes stand to each other in a definite hierarchy, with final, efficient, formal, and
material being each superior to that following it, it would seem that one can demonstrate
man's nature from his final cause.
27 from extrinsic causes: that is, from the efficient cause (procreated) and the final cause (to
reading makes sense, for movement takes time and thus to grasp something without
movement would be equivalent to grasping it without delay. His reading has been emended
here, however, to agree with his previous usage in 01.2.18.
29 {barely}: Lat. vix. Galileo apparentIy had difficulty reading the exemplar from which he
worked, first writing vix, then crossing it out and writing bix (which is meaningless) on the
same line after it. ValIius-Carbone preserve the correct spelling [CA30rb].
30 primary analogate ... analogy of proportion and also of attribution: a terminology
comparison with that of Vallius-Carbone [CA31ra, Lat. Ed. 199], which translates as
D1.2 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRATION 189
follows: "We concede that [a definition], as it is put in a demonstration, is a part and on that
account is inferior, bUl the problem here is not about definition as it is considered in this
way. Thal it is noI put [in demonstration] as an instrument of knowing, as is maintained in
the objection, is obvious." Note that Galileo, in his paragraph beginning "You say:"
immediately following his fifth objection (D1.2.13), had already explained, and thus made
obvious, why it is that definition is not pUI in demonstration as an instrument of knowing;
Vallius-Carbone followed the same procedure in their parallel account.
34 To the sixth: there is no sixth objection in Galileo's text, which should have been given
immediately after paragraph [12] above. As pointed out in the Lat. Ed. 200, what Galileo
is doing here is actually continuing the response that should have been given to the fifth
objection, which he possibly realized he had shortened too much. To see this, ali one need
do is insert a "For" before the expression "definition as it occurs in demonstration" in
Galileo's reply and then add his entire response to the response given by Vallius-Carbone
and cited in the previous comment. This addition clarifies completely the otherwise cryptic
response to the fifth difficulty. Why Galileo inserted "To the sixth" here is not clear, since
he had only formulated five objections in paragraphs [8] through [12]. From the fact that
Vallius-Carbone do record a sixth objection it seems probable that there was a sixth reply in
Galileo's exemplar, and he inadvertently conflated this with what should have been the reply
to his fifth objection.
35 You say: The point of this additional argument is not cJear, since it is not directly related
to the material preceding it, nor does it seem to be a part of the missing sixth objection as
this can be discerned from the material preserved by Vallius-Carbone. Light is shed on it,
however, by the parallel passage in Vallius-Carbone [CA31rb, Lat. Ed. 200-201], who
propose it as a further clarification of Galileo's second conclusion and the arguments
offered in its support in paragraph [22]. Their observation translates as follows: "But a
scruple here remains against what we said in the response to a difficulty made against the
second concJusion, where we taught that a definition depends only instrumentally on the
syllogism whereby the definition is investigated." They continue on, in terms similar to
Galileo's: "For an instrument, once it is acquired or when the thing for whose doing it was
needed has been done, is no longer necessary, as is apparent by induction: for a pen is no
longer needed when letters are written. But the syllogism wherein the definition was found
is always necessary, at least virtually, if we are to be said to know the quiddity with certitude.
Therefore the definition does not depend on the aforesaid syllogism only instrumentally but
also essentially, just as the conclusion depends on the premises."
36 1 reply: Galileo's reply here parallels the slightly fuller response in Vallius-Carbone
[CA31rb, Lat. Ed. 201], which translates as follows: "Here the scruple is removed as
follows: the major proposition is true of material instruments, but not of rational and
intellectual ones. The reason for the disparity is that, for anyone to be said to know
something perfectly it is necessary for him to know that he knows, and this cannot occur
unless knowledge of the instrument of knowing remain at least virtually. An example may
be taken from one who knows a thing certainly through some particular demonstration: he
would not be said to know perfectly if he were not to possess, at least virtually, the teaching
on demonstration in general, which is an instrument of knowing." Otherwise the teaching
is the same in both versions. Which treatment duplicates more faithfully the original
exemplar, presumably Vallius's lecture notes of 1588, is difficult to say. Since Carbone was
known for his pedagogic al skills, and Vallius complained about his rearranging the materials
190 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y D1.2
of the lecture notes, it is quite possible that Galileo's version reflects obscurities that were
present in the original and were later removed by Carbone; if so, Galileo's version would
follow more closely Vallius's notes.
being, usually expressed in the axiom ens et verum convertuntur; on this account it is also
referred to as ontological, or entitative, ar transcendental truth.
6 of reason: Lat. rationis. Truth of reason is truth in the ordinary sense, as when applied to
truth and to complex truth as formal truth; in his Logica [VL2: 222] Vallius speaks of the
first as passive truth, the second as active truth. See Sec. 2.2b of Galileo's Logic of Discovery
and ProoI.
8 first operation ... second and third operation: see D1.2.6 n. 13 and Sec. 2.2 of Galileo's
I l can be inferred... cannot be known scientifically: Lat. posse inferri, non tamen sciri, that
virtue of the form of argument, whereas scientific knowing results from its matter; thus the
premises must not only be arranged in proper form but they must also contain true matter
[VL2: 222-223]. See Sec. 2.7 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and ProoI.
13 ostensive demonstration: see Dl.l.l n. 5.
16 non-complex: Lat. incomplexa, the same as simple truth, equated by Vallius in his Logica
11 real being: Lat. ens reale, that is, being that is predicamental and knowable, and so truly
being, for only this can be truly and properly grasped in a scientific way. It is opposed to
rational being, mentioned in paragraph [8] and in the following note.
,. of rational being: Lat. de ente rationis. Here Galileo implies that logic, whose object is
rational being, cannot be a science; in F3.1.11 he qualifies this by noting that it suffices for
the objects of rational sciences to have an "objective existence" in the mind as opposed to
a real existence outside the mind. See F3.1.11 n. 33. and Sec. 2.3 of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
,. a rose {in winter}: Lat. rosa in hieme. In abbreviating his material Galileo omitted the in
hieme, which was undoubtedly in his source and is translated here in brackets; it is preserved
in Vallius's Logica, VL2: 223.
20 {to be in the thingJ: in Galileo's manuscript there is a lacuna after the words "to be
known" (cognoscl) , a possible indication that Galileo had difficulty reading his exemplar
and so left a space to be filled in later. The words omitted were rei inesse, as can be seen in
Lorinus's exposition of Cajetan's teaching [LL464; Lat. Ed. 207]; they are translated here
in the bracketed expression.
1 from premises that arefirst and prior: Lat. ex primis et prioribus, literally "from firsts and
nothing has preceded the premises, whereas "prior" means only that something comes after
them regardless of whether or not anything has gone before.
3 more known ... with respect to nature ... to us: see F4.2 for background; also 02.3.8 and
science that has him as its object should be the most perfect science.
5 there are no causes in him: in the sense that God is the First Uncaused Cause, causative of
ali other things but not caused in any way himself. Still, causes can be said to be in God, as
explained in paragraphs [2] and [6] below.
• Note,first: causes in being: this notation is formulated to prepare the answer to the second
difficulty formulated in paragraph Il] concerning the existence of causes in God. In his
Logica Vallius explains that the distinction between causes in being (in essendo) and causes
in knowing (in cognoscendo) originated with Themistius, but that causes in being were
further developed by the Thomistic commentator, Thomas de Vio Cajetan, to include
virtual causes as well as those that are real and formal [VL2: 240].
1 Others are imperfect: imperfect causes, here opposed to those that are true and proper and
in paragraph [7] to those that are proper and perfect, are also known as virtual and
verisimilar causes; see paragraphs [3] and [7], also F2.3.3 n. 7.
• from ali species of cause: Lorinus gives a full citation of authorities in support of this
conclusion, including Alexander of Aphrodisias, Averroes, Albert the Great, St. Thomas,
Walter Burley, Paul of Venice, and Agostino Nifo [LL490].
192 NOTES ANO COMMENTAR Y D2.2
9 formal causes ... are more intrinsic to the thing: Galileo's explanation here is somewhat
cryptic. A fuller elaboration is given by Vallius in a passage that translates as follows: "Of
formal cause in this sense it seems that Aristotle was properly speaking in the text where,
giving an example of the formal cause, he gives a definition of a triangle, of a right angle,
etc., through the material cause; he also gives other examples using the efficient and final
cause through which a thing is defined. Although he does give these examples, the true
formal cause is not excluded [by them). For we can demonstrate through ali kinds of cause,
and this will produce true scientific knowing, because we will know that on account of which
the thing is, and that this is its cause, etc. And generally speaking, whenever we demonstrate
through any cause that enters into the definition we can be said to demonstrate through the
formal cause, insofar as the definition is reduci bIe to the formal cause and thus includes ali
those particular causes that make up the definition. For in this way the same entity
considered under different formalities can be said to be the efficient, or the final, or the
material cause, and at the same time the formal cause" [VL2: 245).
10 from a supposition: Lat. ex suppositione. Galileo here presupposes knowledge of this
expression, which takes on considerable importance in view of his later uses of it when
explaining his own scientific methodology. In his later version of Galileo's likely exemplar,
Vallius traces the origin of the expression to St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on
Aristotle's Physics (Bk. 2, lect. 15), where he explains the different types of necessity
associated with demonstrations from formal and material causality [VL2: 244). Vallius's
exposition is translated in Sec. 4.2b of Ga/ileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof, which may
be consulted for fuller details.
II first principles of mathematics: for example, that a whole is greater than any of its parts,
or that when equals are added to equals the results are equal.
12 higher kind of knowledge: as opposed to science, the higher kind of knowledge of God
referred to here would seem to be wisdom or theology, which investigates aII things in terms
of their first and ultimate causes.
13 virtual causes {arel: for the "are" here Galileo unaccountable wrote "in," and thus the
15 a definition implicitly involves formal causes: see Vallius 's explanation of this statement
in n. 9 above.
16 either actually or virtually: although the ability to reason is not actually the cause of
risibility, being able to reason nonetheless enables one to wonder and in this sense can be said
to be the proximate, though virtual, cause of risibility. See the fuller analysis of the syllogism
discussed in this paragraph in Sec. 2.7a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
17 only those grades of definition: that is, "rational" and "animal" and these alone, as
opposed to taking "rational" to include the virtus, or ability, to be also "discursive" and
"wondering." See 02.11.5 and the comment in its note (n. 13).
3 of these types: that is, propositions that are first to a subject or first to a conclusion,
examples of which are cited in paragraph [1], namely, "Man is risible" and "Man is a
rational animal." The demonstration a priori of man's risibility from his rationality is given
in D2.2.8, while the demonstration a priori of man's rationality from his ordination to
beatitude is given below in paragraph [4].
4 can be demonstrated in an improper sense: that is, by an argument of the following type:
"Contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time: but some men are not
irrational; therefore ali men are rational." This is not a proper demonstration in the sense
that it does not give a cause or reason for man's being rational, but merely manifests it by
negating the contradictory and applying the principle of the excluded middle.
5 from certain of his properties: that is, from his risibility, his being teachable, his being
grammatical, his being mathematical, his capacity for responsible moral behavior, etc.
• procreated for beatitude: see DI.2.25 n. 26 and n. 3 above.
7 ''from the nature of the thing": a literal translation of the Latin, ex natura rei. This
distinction was much used by Scotists and served to differentiate them from Thomists such
as Cajetan; it was also adopted by the Jesuit theologian, Francesco Suarez, which perhaps
explains its use by Vallius in reply to Cajetan's argument. Thomists distinguished a real
distinction from a rational distinction or distinction of reason, and then further
differentiated each of these into two subtypes: the real distinction they divided into the
absolute distinction (that of one thing from another, res a re) and the modal distinction (that
of a thing from its mode, res a moda eius); the rational distinction they divided into the
greater, the distinction of reason with a foundation in reality (that of reason reasoned about,
rationis ratiocinatae), and the lesser, the distinction of reason without a foundation in reality
(that of reason reasoning, rationis ratiocinantis). Suarez named the distinction favored by
Scotus, the formal distinction from the nature of the thing (distinctio formalis ex natura rei),
the "intermediate distinction," that is, a distinction midway between the Thomists' modal
distinction and their greater distinction of reason, the distinction of reason reasoned about.
The point of the distinction ex natura rei, unimportant for understanding Galileo, gives
some appreciation for why Scotus carne to be known as "the Subtle Doctor" within
scholasticism. A fuller discussion of the problem, with appropriate references, is to be found
in Vallius [VL2: 229-232].
8 this begs the question: Galileo writes this in the infinitive form (peti principium). His
not substance," "Quantity is not relation," etc. Since the categories are the supreme genera
of being, no middle term is available to come between them, and thus the negation of their
identity must be immediate.
10 one differentia is denied of another: for example, "Rational is not irrational," where the
two differentiae would be applied within the genus "animal." or "Discrete is not
continuous," where the differentiae would be applied within the genus "quantity," for
reasons similar to that given in the previous note.
II divides immediate propositions otherwise: that is, on the basis of immediacy of assent to
them rather than on the immediacy of their terms - stressing "with respect to us" rather than
"with respect to nature," as in D2.3.8.
12 Axioms... Positions ... suppositions: Lat. dignitates... positiones... suppositiones.
Because of the importance of these expressions for an understanding of Galileo's logical
194 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D2.3
methodology, a translation of Vallius's parallel exposition of them [VL2: 218) has been
given in Sec. 4.2a of Ga/ileo 's Logic of Discovery and Proof, which should be consulted for
fuller details.
IJ {terms} or definitions: Here Galileo wrote "principles or definitions," which is
meaningless in this context; the correct expression, following Vallius as cited in the previous
note, has "terms" instead of "principles," and thus "terms" is indicated here in braces.
14 seif-evident: Lat. per se nota, known on its own terms.
15 from the nature of the thing: a repetition of the expression in paragraph [5), but this time
propositions.
2 most powerful: Lat. potissima, similarly defined at F4.1.3. See also D2.12 and D3.1.
4 no less characteristic: Lat. non minus intrinsecum, that is, no less pertaining to the nature
or definition of demonstration.
5 should suffice: Lat. suffieiet; an objection apparently directed against the plural form, ex
immediatis, and thus implying that only one of the premises (unica tantum) need be
immediate. In addition to the two objections rai sed here, [a) and [bJ, Vallius offers a third
and more serious difficulty based on the teachings of Philoponus, St. Thomas, Apollinaris,
Nifo, and others, who hold that true demonstrations can be made from mediate premises,
against Averroes, who maintained that they must always be made from immediates. Vallius
notes that the use of mediate premises is especially characteristic of the mathematical
sciences, "for they prove a first conclusion in a first demonstration and assume it as a
premise in a second demonstration, and the second conclusion as a premise in the third, and
so on, and yet in mathematics these are true demonstrations" [VL2: 235-236).
6 in some way: Lat. a/iquo modo, an important qualification, very much needed if one is to
reply to the additional objection noted in the previous comment. The qualification is further
elaborated in paragraph [4) below.
7 subalternated science ... proved in its Isubalternating} science: Lat. seientia
subaltern ata ...probata in subalternante. Here Galileo made an error, repeating subalternata
at the second occurrence rather than writing the correct form, subalternante.
Subalternation, as applied to sciences, is here understood to mean the subordination of one
science to another by reason of its dependence on the other for its principles; the
subalternating science, in such a case, is the one that supplies the principles on which
demonstrations are based, whereas the subalternated science is the one that assumes these
principles without proof and uses them in its demonstrations. Mathematical physics would
be an example of a subalternated science, since it uses principles provided by mathematics
(its subalternating science) to demonstrate conclusions in the realm of physics. Fuller details
on the subalternation of the sciences are given in Secs. 3.3c and 3.4 of Ga/ileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
D2.4 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 195
the sense of immediate has been relaxed to include mediate premises, provided that the Iauer
can be resolved to immediates. For similar uses of the terms virtute and virtualiter, see
F2.3.3 n. 7 and D2.2.7.
13 demonstration in general, taken analogically: Lat. demonstratio in commune sumpta
to the middle term or the subject. In the two examples that follow the first makes an addition
next to the subject (animal discursivum, "discursive animal," to homo, "man") whereas the
second makes an addition next to the middle term (quoad animal rationale, "as a rational
animal," to admirativum, "capable of wonder"). See Sec. 2.7a of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
15 Every being capable of wonder is risible: here Galileo first wrote "Every risible being is
capable of wonder," and then interchanged the subject and the predicate in his final
redaction.
16 through the {subject's} definition: Lat. per definitionem illius, literally "through the
former's definition," if one were to follow the convention of translating hic and ilie, and
their inflected forms, as "Iatter" and "former" respectively. We here emend Galileo's illius
to huius, as required for sense.
196 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y D2.5
1 [Fifth Questionj: neither an ordin al number nor the customary abbreviation for
"question" are given in the manuscript, which begins immediately with the centered title: An
omnia principia immediata per se nota ingrediantur quamcumque demonstrationem?
2 axioms: Lat. dignitates.
3 foreknown to be true: Lat. praecognoscendum quia vera sint; see F2.1, F2.2, and F2.3.
6 "Every who/e is greater than ils part": that is, a principle that is true from the meaning of
its terms, and that is common to, or has application in, different sciences, such as arithmetic,
geometry, and physics.
7 proper, immediate, etc.: that is, principles that are first and immediate in a particular
above.
, common to aII the sciences: that is, principles that are regulative of ali thinking and thus
are not restricted to a particular subject matter.
10 restricted to some determinate subject malter: although regulative of ali thinking,
principles such as that stated in paragraph [4] can be so formulated that they apply only, say,
to numbers, as in "Every sum of positive whole numbers is greater than the positive whole
numbers being summed."
11 mathematics: where it might read "A number cannot be even and odd (i.e., not even) at
the same time." Lorinus makes the comment that the foregoing distinctions are made mainly
because of Aristotle's terminology in text 24 (Bk. 1, ch. 10, 76a32-b13), where ali of his
examples are taken from mathematics [LL479-480].
12 an imperfect demonstration: for example, a demonstration that establishes a truth by
longer than another by supposing that the first line is either longer than the second or it is
not, and then by showing that one or the other of the alternatives leads to an impossibility
and on this account must be false. In virtue of this reasoning, one is forced to condude that
the remaining alternative is true. The proof then requires that the principle stating that one
of two contradictories must be true, as formulated in paragraph [5], enter actually into the
demonstration. See D2.3.4 n. 4; also Sec. 3.4 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
" such axioms: that is, those that are immediately self evident, the subject of the first
conclusion, paragraph [6] above.
16 any demonstration: in view of paragraph [6], the sense would seem to require "any proper
nostrae. The distinction parallels that between "order of being" and "order of knowing";
see F2.3.4 n. 8. Vallius makes a similar distinction, though he expresses it in the form of an
D2.5 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRA TroN 197
objection: "You say: almost all mathematical conclusions depend on such universal
principles. 1 reply: this is incidentally and with respect to us, and therefore we do not deny
that knowledge of these principles is sometimes required; we deny only tha! they are always
required" [VL2: 238-239).
18 an {imperfect} demonstration: Galileo apparently made a copying error here, writing
observation at F2.3.4 n. 9.
20 Here one may inquire: as noted in the Latin Edition, 233, Galileo effectively begins a new
question here, one with counterparts in both Lorinus and Vallius. Lorinus poses the
question as follows: "Is it necessary to know all causes and to make resolution to the first
in any genus?" [LL490). Vallius, on the other hand, addresses the problem without putting
it in the form of a question: "Chapter 8. It is shown that each demonstration is not to be
resolved to first principles that are most common" [VL2: 239). It is possible that the addition
of this question was responsible for Galileo's losing track of his questions in this
disputation, for the next three questions remain unnumbered in his manuscript and the title
of one question [D2.8) is omitted entirely. See the prologue to Sec. 4.7 of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof; also D2.8 n. 1 below.
21 resolved to first principles: Lat. resolvenda usque ad prima principia. Galileo does not
make clear what kind of first principles are intended here, those that are first in any genus,
as Lorinus formulates the question, or those that are most common, as stated by Vallius. In
his conclusions, however, he takes account of both. It is noteworthy that this is one of the
few references in these questions to resolution, a term in Renaissance Aristotelianism usually
coupled with composition, as in D1.2.3 n. 8.
22 in an unqualified way ... in a determinate genus: Lat. vei simpliciter et absolute, vei
secundum quid et in determinato genere. Galileo was probably abbreviating heavily at this
point, for he simply makes the distinction without giving any indication of how it is to be
applied in what follows. Lorinus and Vallius use the distinction in their replies to the
questions cited in n. 20 above. But see nn. 23-26 below.
23 1 say, first: apparently this conclusion relates to the first branch of the distinction made
omitted the second conclusion as stated and later had to insert it in the margin of his
manuscript. It obviously relates to the second branch of the distinction made in paragraph
[11), Le., to scientific knowledge in a qualified way and in a determinate genus.
25 Proof of the conc/usion: this sentence answers the question posed by Lorinus (see n. 20
20 abovel, for "first principles that are self evident" would be most common and most
knowable for us.
198 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y D2.6
D2.6: Is demonstration made from premises that are more known? For
background, see Secs. 2.6-8 and 4. 7 of GaliIeo's Logic of Discovery
and Proof, for applications, Sec. 6.2b-c
1 [Sixth Question]: This question, like the previous one, is unnumbered by Galileo; the
numeration supplied here establishes continuity to D2.1O, where Galileo resumes his
numbering of the questions.
2 from premises that are more known: Lat. ex notioribus, referring to the premises, as is
4 better and more perfect than: Lat. maior et perfectior, literaIly "greater and more perfect
than." The sense of "greater than" (maior) is "more evident than" or "superior to," as
becomes cIear in Galileo' s reply.
5 with respect to nature ... with respect to us: Lat. secundum naturam .. .secundum nos, a
Confused knowledge is knowledge that contains only a few distinguishing notes and thus is
applicable to many things of different kinds; thus "animal" is a confused concept because
it appIies indifferently, i.e., confusedly, to many species of animal, whereas "squirrel" is
distinct because it applies cIearly and unambiguously to the squirrel species.
7 universa/s ... in the order of causality ... in the order of predication: Lat. universalia ... in
causando ... in praedicando. A universal cause would be one that is capable of producing a
wide range of effects, as does the sun, for example, with respect to earth; other examples
would be the first mover and protomatter, mentioned by Galileo in D3.2.3. A universal
predicate would be one that can be predicated of a wide range of subjects, as "being," which
appIies to everything that exists, has existed, or can exist in any way whatever.
8 These distinctions understood: that is, the distinctions just made in paragraph [2]. Galileo
is not cIear, however, on the way in which the two sets of distinctions are here being applied.
Fortunately a parallei passage is available in Lorinus that casts Iight on GaIiIeo's intended
meaning: "These distinctions understood, 1 reply first that a universal in the order of
causality, especiaIly if it is a cause that is very common, would usuaIly be more known
because it is farther from the senses ... Second, 1 reply that singulars properly speaking and
individuals absolutely speaking are more known to us than universals ... From these
concIusions it wiII be easy to reconcile these two texts: for in the first book of the Physics
Aristotle is speaking of universals that are more or less extensive in the order of predication,
and which at the same time are universals in the order of causality and so are grasped in
confused knowledge ... In the first book of the Posterior Ana/ytics, on the other hand, he
speaks of the same universals grasped with distinct knowledge, since from their distinct
grasp one comes to distinct knowledge of the conc1usion" [LL482]. See Lat. Ed. 240.
9 Posterior Ana/ytics, text 5: i.e, in part of the text, at 7Ib30-72a6.
10 [in the order of predicat ion]: a qualification omitted by Galileo and here supplied for
12 {andl: in place of "and" (et) here Galileo wrote "this" (hoc), obviously a /apsus ca/ami.
13 {indeedl: in place of "indeed" (quidem) here Galileo wrote a word meaningless in this
context (quid), apparentIy forgetting to add the -em that is required for sense.
D2.6 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 199
14 [to usi: another omis sion that must be supplied for sense.
15 demonstrations of this kind are not most powerful: usually mathematical demonstrations
employ such common principles that they are incapable of proving properties that are
commensurateiy universal with their subjects and thus do not fulfill the strict requirements
for most powerful demonstration; see also D2.l2.8 n. 17.
16 Concern ing the second query: Lat. Circa secundum, the reference being to the second half
of the question in the title. The matter treated here has considerable affinity with that
discussed in D1.2, which may be consulted for background.
t7 a natural cause that is not impeded: a principle similar to that already used in F4.1.9,
nameiy, "every natural cause that is sufficient to produce its effect does so necessarily as
soon as the requisite conditions are provided." The "requisite conditions" referred to here
would seem to include the removal of impediments to the causal action; for the importance
of this teaching in Galileo's methodology, see F3.1.9 n. 27.
18 if each [degree of] knowledge were gradual/y decreased: Lat. si paulatim minuatur
utraque cognitio: the "caiculatory" expres sion gradus cognitionis is not used here, but that
it is intended is clear from the reply in paragraph [16] below, where it is made explicit.
19 is superior: the Lat. for "superior" here is nobilior, Iiterally, more noble.
23 fis called]: Lat. vocatur, omitted by Galileo and here supplied in brackets.
25 "that on account ... more so itse/j": Lat. propter quod unumquodque tale et il/ud magis,
so closely related to rationality that one grasps its cause almost as soon as one understands
what it is. In most cases where the demonstrative regress is employed, say, in the natural
sciences, causes are hidden and a more extensive search or regress is required to discover
them, as explained in D3.3. Even in the case of risibility, however, there are technical
problems relating to its immediate cause, as touched on in D2.2.11 n. 16, D2.3.3 n. 3, and
D2.4.6 n. 14. See Sec. 2.7a of Ga/i/eo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
27 conclusion ... principles: the teaching here is obviously related to the theses advanced in
teaching in D1.1.2, where the intellect it self is identified as the efficient cause of
demonstrative knowledge.
29 the major premise: that is, "a natural cause that is not impeded produces an effect equal
cause. In human generation man, in the sense of human parents, would be said to be the
200 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D2.6
univocal cause of man, in the sense of human offspring, whereas the sun, as also exercising
causality in man's generation, would be regarded as his equivocal cause. Galileo uses this
terminology in his Tractatus de elementis [GG1: 128, 165], where he also identifies the
heavens as "a universal and equivocal cause" of sublunary events.
1 Question [Seven]: Galileo wrote the word "Question" before the title, but left a space for
the number, apparently intending to fill it in later. The "Seven" is added here to provide
continuity to D2.1O, where Galileo resumes his own numbering of the questions.
Z from propositions that are necessary and said of every instance: Lat. ex propositionibus
necessariis et de omni. The de omni here translates literally as "of ali" or "said of ali," but
among Aristotelian scholars it is usually translated as "said of every instance" to avoid
difficulties that arise from the other types of universal predication considered in this
question.
3 unqualified: Lat. simpliciter, with the connotation of being divine and uncreated. In a
parallel passage Lorinus defines it as "what cannot be impeded in any way and consists in
an actual existence that applies to God alone" [LL522].
4 natural: Lat. naturalis. In the same passage cited in n. 3 Lorinus refers to this necessity,
which he says can be impeded by God, as created and natural (creata et naturalis).
5 according to the ordinary law of God: Lat. secundum ordinariam Dei legem, also referred
that the element water, as a whole, necessarily is in its natural place between that of the
elements earth and air, also considered as wholes, but a part of water, saya raindrop, need
not necessarily be in that place but can be in air before falling back to its natural place.
• having an intrinsic order to each other... an extrinsic order to each other: Lat. habentia
intrinsecum ordinem inter se... extrinsecum ordinem inter se. An "intrinsic order" may
alternatively be termed an "essential order" or a "necessary connection," whereas an
"extrinsic order" may be termed an "accidental order" or a "contingent connection," as
becomes clear in the subsequent development of the question.
• non-complex and complex: Lat. incomplexa et complexa. For example, God's existence is
necessary with a non-complex necessity, whereas the existence of a rose or an eclipse is
necessary with a complex necessity, that is, on the supposition of there being places and
times at which conditions are propitious to necessitate their existence, which requires a
proposition being formed by the intellect for its very assertion.
10 posterioristic statement: Lat. dictum posterioristicum. In paragraph [3] below Galileo
equates this with the dictum per se or the propositio per se [see n. 14]. The expression
D2.7 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 201
propositio per se is translated in what follows as "essential proposition," thus equating per
se with essential, as opposed to per accidens or accidental. Posterioristic statements
therefore involve subjects and predicates that have an intrinsic order to each other, as
explained in n. 8 above.
11 according toform ... according to matler: Lat. secundumformam ... secundum materiam.
On the basis of this distinction the scholastics differentiated formal logic from material
logic, the first being based on the Prior Analytics and the second on the Posterior Analytics.
See Sec. 2.7 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
12 "God is unchangeable": there is no plurality of subjects here, since the subject is singular;
there are no inferiors that can be subsumed under God and to which the predication can be
applied universally.
13 the commensurate or universal statement: Lat. secundum quod ipsum seu universale. The
expres sion secundum quod ipsum is the more or less literal Latin translation of the Greek
expres sion kath auto at Bk. 1, ch. 4, of the Posterior Analytics (73b25), which is difficult to
render into English; "precisely as such" captures some of the sense, but because of its
connotations of universality it is usually translated as "commensurate" or
"commensurately" universal.
14 every proposition that is essentia/: Lat. omnis propositio per se. Note that here Galileo
the query, but the sense of the question requires it, since the effect's being contingent might
call into doubt the necessity of the demonstration.
18 the ability to be eclipsed: Lat. eclipsibilitas, eclipsability.
19 mathematicians [demonstrate] eclipses: in writing this Galileo left out the word for
of the earth between the sun and the moon, and since the earth is "true and real" this would
be a good indication that the lunar eclipse it causes is itself real; see D2.8.4 n. 14. In his
Logica Vallius formulates a similar query but answers it differently: "If someone were to
object that an eclipse of the sun and the moon is demonstrated and that this is not always
taking place, 1 reply, with text 65, that the eclipse is demonstrated insofar as it does always
exist, namely, in relation to its proper causes" [VL2: 283]. (Text 65, in Vallius's
enumeration, corresponds to text 22 in Galileo's, specifically, the passage at 75b33-37 in Bk.
1, ch. 8, of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.)
l i said of every instance is threefold: Galileo's explanation of this statement is somewhat
cryptic and gives no examples; additionallight can be shed on it from the following parallel
202 NOTES ANO COMMENTARY D2.7
text in Vallius. "In the 'said of every instance' of which we are speaking we can assign three
degrees. The first is in a certain way principal and should be said to be such absolutely and
in an unqualified way: this 'said of every instance' is when the predicate is in each and every
subject always, at ali times and for ali subjects, as when we say 'Man is an animal' or 'Man
is rational' or anything similar. The second grade, less perfect, is when the predicate is
always present at whatever time it is supposed to be there; of this kind are practically ali
astronomical propositions, as that the moon is being eclipsed, that Saturn is in conjunction
with Venus, and others of this kind. The third is when the predicate can be truly present,
and, if impediments that rarely occur are taken away, is always present; of this kind are
practically ali meteorological propositions, as that it will rain or snow at such and such a
time, for although this takes place almost always it can nonetheless at some time be
impeded" [VL2: 255]. Vallius's examples for these three grades illustrate the three kinds of
"said of every instance" mentioned by Galileo.
22 Demonstrations can be made from ali three of these: Galileo does not explain here how
these demonstrations can be formulated, but in the second and third types the
demonstration would have to be made ex suppositione, nameiy, supposing the proper times
and places, or supposing that impediments that might prevent the occurrence from taking
place have been removed. See F3.1.7 n. 22, D2.2.5 n. 10, and 02.4.2 n. 8; also Sec. 4.2 of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
1 {Eighth Question ... contained under them?J: enclosed in brackets to indicate that these
words have been supplied by the editor. This entire title and its numbering as a question are
missing in Galileo's manuscript. Apparently he started a new question here without realizing
it, possibly thinking that he was continuing to reply to the "and how?" query in the second
part of the previous question, 02.7. Such a lapsus mentis is difficult to explain. It may be
that the title of the question was missing in the exemplar from which he worked; instances
of this are found in some lecture notes at the Collegio Romano, where the copyist has left
a space for a title to be lettered in later in another hand. If this were the case, then Galileo
might have closed up the interval to save space in his own copy, not being aware when so
doing that he was merging two questions into one.
The evidence that a new question is being begun and that a new ti tie must be inserted here
is twofold. First are the expressions "Concerning the first query" and "Concerning the
second query," with which the first two paragraphs begin; these respond to two questions
that appear nowhere in the foregoing matter. Since they have nothing to do with the "and
how?" query with which the title to 02.7 ends, one must search elsewhere for the missing
questions. Fortunately they are similar to questions rai sed in Jesuit logic notes at this point,
particularly in Lorinus [LL495] and in Vallius [VL2: 255], from which the inserted title has
been reconstructed; for details, see Lat. Ed. 249-252. The second piece of evidence is
Galileo's difficulty in numbering the questions in this second disputation of the treatise on
demonstration. A similar problem with numbering has already been seen in the third
disputation of the treatise on foreknowledge, where Galileo went directly from F3.2 to F3.4,
D2.8 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRATION 203
omitting F3.3 in his enumeration (see F3.4 n. 1). Here the problem is more serious, for the
numbering of the questions between D2.4 and D2.1 Ois left unresolved by Galileo. He c1early
did leave room for five questions, but only four of these are formulated explicitly. Possibly
he was thrown off by D2.6 being a twofold question and thus did not search further into the
difficuity. Actually the missing question was glossed over in what he may have thought was
a fuller answer to D2.7, for it is c1early answered here in D2.8.
2 modes of speaking essentially: Lat. modus dicendi per se, again rendering per se as
4 in and by itself: Lat. per se, usually translated "essentially" in this question and here
having the same connotation but rendered differently to make the thought more
explicit.
5 ultimate genus ... ultimate differentia: that is, the genus and the differentia c10sest to the
atomic species, as opposed to a genus and a differentia that are remote from it.
6 You say, on behalf of Scotus: aII of the objections in this paragraph are based on Scotistic
teaching, generally as formulated by Antonius Trombetta; the replies are the standard
Thomistic responses to Scotus's emendations. Fuller details are furnished by Lorinus
[LL502) and Vallius [VL2: 257).
7 [identical]: omitted by Galileo and here supplied for sense.
to every instance and solely and at ali times: Lat. omni, soli, et semper.
"Man becomes gray haired": note that here and in the first sentence of this paragraph
Galileo puts this proposition in the second mode of speaking essentially, while admitting
that it belongs there "Iess perfectly" than the other examples. Lorinus, on the other hand,
rejects it from this mode because of its temporally restricted character [LL507).
14 an extrinsic cause: on Galileo's use of this expression, see DI.2.5 n. 12.
15 but the subiect also: in his revised version Vallius offers a fuller explanation of why the
subject must be included: " ... the moon is placed in the definition of the eclipse because,
although the eclipse depends on a cause that is extrinsic to the subject, nonetheless there is
some causality in the moon itself, namely, because the moon does not have its light from
itself, for if there were light in the moon from within as there is in the sun or any other star,
the moon would not properly be eclipsed but would always retain its own intrinsic light"
[VL2: 262).
16 1 reply in the affirmative: Galileo added the word "first" after "{ reply," suggesting that
he may have had more than one reason but then failed to include any additional arguments
in his response.
17 indirect and unnatural: Lat. indirectae et innaturales, that is, opposed to our natural way
of speaking.
18 [are]: omitted by Galileo and supplied for sense.
substance with all its attributes and accidental modifications; "second substance" refers to
substance taken as a category and as a universal, precision being made from its individual
existence. Apparently this conclusion was disputed among commentators, with Philoponus,
204 NOTES ANO COMMENTARY 02.8
Thomas Aquinas. Walter Burley. and Paul of Venice holding for the affirmative and
Themistius and Grosseteste for the negative.
20 Grosseteste: Lat. Lincolniensis or Linconiensis. the scholastic way of referring to Robert
above.
23 aII four causes: that is. the final. efficient. formal. and material cause. Not all
Aristotelians were agreed on this point. as Lorinus points out in his commentary: "What
genus of cause this mode involves is very much in doubt. Averroes thinks it contains only the
efficient cause. Paul of Venice the efficient and final. but especially the final •... Giles [of
Rome] these two also. but especially the efficient ... Yet others expressly state that all [four]
kinds of cause are included in this mode. and St. Thomas definitely favors their view"
[LL51O].
24 You ask. jirst: Lorinus raises the same query but he identifies it as a notation that is
directed against Cajetan and Paul of Venice: "It should be noted that a cause as it respects
an effect is put in the fourth mode not only as it respects it in potency. which is Cajetan's
opinion .... nor only as it respects it in act. as holds Paul of Venice. but in both ways"
[LL5ll].
25 ofthroat-cutting: Lat. de iugulatione; Aristode cites this in Bk. 1. ch. 4 [73bI5-17], as an
example of an efficient cause that functions essentially. and not merely accidentally. to bring
about the actual death of an animal.
26 a cause as it respects an ejject in act is contingent: see the related discussion in 02.7.5-6
who wrote an exposition of the first book of the Posterior Analytics. published at Venice in
1493 and 1497 and again at Cremona in 1581.
29 not the two of predicating: Galileo experienced some difficulty here. for he first wrote
"two of causing." then deleted the "of causing" and wrote "of predicating" instead.
30 the two modes {of predicating}: the confusion noted in the previous sentence shows up
here again. for Galileo's manuscript has "two modes of causing" here. which is corrected
and here shown in braces.
02.9: What are the rules for propositions in the first and second
modes? For background, see Secs. 4.3 and 4.8 of Galileo's Logic of
Oiscovery and Proof, for an application, Sec. 5.1
1 [Ninth Question}: omitted by Galileo and inserted here to maintain continuity to the
02.8.
3 two modes of predicating: Lat. duo praedicandi modi. understood in the sense of modes
of predicating essentially. modi praedicandi per se. an expres sion with narrower
D2.9 TREA TISE ON OEMONSTRATION 205
signification than the modi dicendi per se treated in the previous question, as explained in
what follows.
4 a natural necessity: on the various types of necessity, see the discussion in 02.7.1 and its
accompanying notes.
, a contingent subject: that is, Peter, an individual or singular substance who comes to be
and passes away. If the subiect were "Man," on the other hand, the proposition would be
in the second mode, as stated in 02.8.2.
6 the word "is": a similar precision concerning the use of "is" as a logical copula or as a
synonym for "exists" in its ontological sense has been made in F3.5.3 and F3.5.5 and in
notes 8 and 11 of that question.
7 said of every instance: Lat. de dicto de omni, as in 02.7 n. 2.
8 reducible: simply by interchanging the subiect and the predicate in the respective
propositions. Lorinus notes that this rule is directed against Caietan, as is the discussion of
non-natural propositions in 02.8.5 [LL499].
9 "A body is in place essentially": Lat. corpus est per se in loco, translating per se with
"essentially" as heretofore.
10 true and perfect definition of the subject: Lat. vera perfectaque definitio subiecti,
presumably because such a definition can only be given of a real existent, and neither a
vacuum nor a chimera satisfy this requirement.
11 Aristotle proves: that is, with the arguments he offers in Bk. 2, ch. 4, 286b10-287b22,
concluding to the sphericity of the heavens, and those in Bk. 2, ch. 14, 297a8-298a20,
concluding to the sphericity of the earth.
12 are not true and perfect demonstrations: Lorinus offers a similar evaluat ion of such
arguments: "1 reply: these should rather be called necessary arguments than true
demonstrations, or as Alfarabi says, following Averroes in comment 41, they can be spoken
of as somewhat imperfect demonstrations, for in perfect demonstrations the predicate
should be convertible with the subiect" [LL509]. Later he adds: "There are many such
demonstrations, both among physicists and among mathematicians, as when they show that
the earth is round; for roundness is a more extensive term than earth but less extensive than
element when that is taken in its entire scope" [LL519]. See also 02.12 n. 2.
13 that is improper: understanding property in the strict sense, in the sense of said of every
instance and essential, since some earth, for example, is patently not round.
14 two modes of predicating essentially: Lat. duo modi praedicandi per se.
t, there are five predicables: Lat. quinque sunt praedicabilia. In scholastic thought the
predicables are the fi ve ways of classifying universals that are used in predicating, namely,
genus, difference, species, property and accident; they differ from the ten Aristotelian
categories or praedicamenta, which, though used in predicating, also designate modes of
being as ontological categories. For the different ways the predicables are seen to predicate,
see nn. 18-21 below.
16 mode of predicating accidentally: Lat. modus praedicandi per accidens.
.. in quiddity: Lat. in quid, that is, the way in which a genus is predicated of a subiect, as
in "Man is an animal."
19 in quiddity of a qualitative kind: Lat. in quale quid, that is, the way in which a differentia
contracts a genus to a particular species, as in "Man is rational," or the way in which the
species itself is predicated of a subiect, as in "Man is a rational animal."
206 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D2.9
20 in quality convertibly: Lat. in quale convertibiliter, the way in which a true property is
1 Tenth Question: with this question Galileo resumes his numbering of the questions in the
lacking in the parallel expositions, is not explained by Galileo. Judging from the terminology
employed in the various conclusions, however, one may surmise that the first, "with respect
to the terms," prepares the way for the second conciusion; the second, "with respect to the
cause," for the third conclusion; and the third, "with respect to predication," for the first
conclusion.
6 that make use of essential predication: Lat. habentibus praedicationem per se, another
complexes such as substances, to which the third mode properly applies; see D2.8.6.
9 formal cause ... efficient cause: for a discussion of these types of causality and how they
serve in a demonstration, see the excerpt from Vallius's Logica translated in D2.2.4 n. 9.
10 include only extrinsic causes: Lorinus identifies this as an Averroist objection:
"Averroists say that only extrinsic causes pertain to the fourth mode, and they do not enter
into a demonstration unless perhaps they are convertible; Balduinus disagrees with them,
02.11 TREA TISE ON OEMONSTRA TION 207
comment 35. But since they are convertible, they bring to the demonstration the aspect
(ratio) of a formal cause, Zabarella, Bk. 2, On necessary propositions, ch. 14" [LL516].
II theyalso contain intrinsic causes: an example that illustrates this is the demonstration of
a lunar eclipse through the interposition of the earth between the sun and the moon. In this
case the earth is an extrinsic cause of the eclipse, but the moon also exercises causality as an
intrinsic cause, as explained in 02.8.4 n. 14. See 01.2.5 n. 12; also Sec. 3.4c n. 21 of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
12 text 10: Bk. 1, ch. 4, 73bI7-26.
1 a universal predicat ion: Lat. praedicatum universale, literally, "universal predicate," but
taken in the sense of a predicate used to form a proposition, so as to cohere with the second
part of the query.
2 said of every instance, essential, and commensurate: Lat. de omni, per se, et secundum
quod ipsum, that is, at text II of ch. 4, 73b27. See 02.7 n. 2 and 02.7.3 nn. 13-14.
3 as we have explained above: in 02.7.3.
5 what belongs to an adequate subject: Lat. convenit adaequato subiecto, with "adequate"
here meaning a subject that is adequated to, or has the same extension as, the predicate. See
02.7.4 n. 16; also Sec. 4.3a of Galileo 's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
6 universal or commensurate: Lat. universale seu secundum quod ipsum.
II of a primary subject: Lat. de subiecto prim o , that is, a subject that is first and adequate,
as in 02.7.4.
12 many authors ha ve many opinions: Lat. multi multa dicunt. In his Logica Vallius lists
four different schools of thought on the problem, as follows. The first is attributed by
Averroes to Alfarabi and Avempace, holding that there are three kinds of universal
predicate (eL 02.12.3); the second holds for two kinds, attributed to Albert and St. Thomas
and including also Themistius; the third holds for one universal according to form
(secundum formam) and another according to matter (secundum materiam), attributed to
Paul of Venice, Apollinaris, and other Latins; and the fourth again holds for three types,
though different from those of the first opinion, attributed to Averroes [VL2: 277].
13 there are many and various grades: Lat. varios et multiptices esse gradus. Gradus may
also be translated as "step," "stage," or "degree," but in this case "grade" seems the more
appropriate.
14 and so on: Vallius adds only risibility to this enumeration [VL2: 277-278], but others
208 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D2.11
16 in thefirst mode: that is, in the first mode of speaking essentially, as in D2.8.2.
seu secundum quod ipsum, here applying the notion of "commensurate universal" not only
to the predicate but ta the proposition of which it is a part.
18 belong to the object precisely as such: Lat. conveniunt rei prouttatis est.
1 Last Question: Lat. Quaestio ultima, the twelfth question in this disputation.
2 perfect demonstration: Lat. demonstratio perfecta.
3 made from propositions that are essential, universal, and proper: Lat. ex propositionibus
per se, universalibus, et propriis, with universalibus being understood in the sense of
commensurately universal propositions, as explained in D2.11.
4 accidental kinds of being: Lat. entia per accidens.
6 from proper propositions that are not primary, etc.: Lat. ex propriis non primis ... ex
per accidens, but in place of ex here Galileo unaccountably wrote et, here corrected and thus
enclosed in braces.
8 from a true and proper cause: Lat. per veram propriamque causam.
, by induction: Lat. inductione, that is, by going through the various kinds of cause -
intrinsic (formal and material) as well as extrinsic (final and efficient) - and verifying that
explanations through ali of them involve essential propositions. See Sec. 4.6b of Galileo's
Logic of Discovery and Proof.
10 beyond the intention of the agent, or happening rarely: Lat. praeter intentionem agentis,
raro contingere. Usually the first type will involve impediments or unforeseen events, and
these "can fali under a science" provided the appropriate suppositions are made,
particularly with demonstrations formulated ex suppositione finis. Rare events such as an
eclipse or a rainbow or a conjunction of planets can be handled similarly, on the supposition
of the appropriate positions, times, and causa! factors being otherwise present. See F3.1. 7
n. 22, D2.2.5 n. 10, D2.4.2 n. 8, and D2.7.7 n. 22; also Sec. 4.2 of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Prooj.
I I the demonstration by which Aristotle proves that the earth is at rest is not a true
demonstration: that is, the argument elaborated in De caelo, Bk. 2, ch. 14, 296a24-297a8.
One can only wonder whether this early statement by Galileo could have had any influence
on his many later attempts to demonstrate the earth's motion.
12 accidents: Lat. accidentia, meaning by this praedicamental accidents in the nine
categories of being that may have some necessary connection with their subjects, and not
D3.1 TREATISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 209
predicable accidents that lack such a connection; see D2.9.7 nn. 14-16, D2.9.9 nn. 18-21.
13 universal: again understanding this as comm_ensurately universal.
15 in thefollowing demonstration: the point of the example is that, while it is essential to the
various species of animal to sense and to move locally, the peculiar ways in which they sense
and so move are proper to each species, and thus one cannot demonstrate commensurately
universal properties of the appropriate kind by repeatedly invoking the same middle term.
16 and this on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate: that is, the subject
must be the unique subject in which the predicate may be found, and the predicate must be
a strict property that can be predicated uniquely of that subject.
17 mathematical demonstrations ... are not perfect: In his Logica Vallius elaborates on this
point, noting that mathematicians do not generally invoke true causes, and citing Euclid's
famous proof of the sum of the interior angles of a triangle, which he says is made through
the use of a construction and not directly from the nature of a triangle. He also mentions
their frequent use of demonstrations to the impossible, and the fact that they use common
principles from which they deduce many conclusions without being able ta furnish a proper
explanation for each [VL2: 285-286]. See D2.5.8 n. 14 and D2.6.5 n. 15.
1. which fis] the cause of uncertainty: Lat. quae causa incertitudinis est. In writing this
Galileo unaccountable left out the "is" (est), here shown in brackets. Matter is the cause of
uncertainty because it frequently is the source of defects or imperfections that impede the
operation of natural causes. See F4.1.9 and D2.6.6 n. 17.
19 most powerful demonstration proceeds ...jrom the definition, etc.: on the c10se
connection between definition and most powerful demonstration, note the many references
to their interrelationships in D1.2, e.g., in paragraphs [18], [26], and [29].
20 not universal: again in the sense of not being commensurately universal.
" God is singular: note the analysis of the compara bie statement, "God is unchangeable,"
in D2. 7.2 (at n. 12).
species in the strict sense of kinds or types contained under the genus of demonstration.
2 is said to be topical reasoning by Aristotle: probably a reference to Bk. 1, ch. 1, of the
Topics, IOOa30, where Aristotle says that reasoning based on common principles (endoxa)
is dialectical ar topi cal. Larinus's parallel statement here is a bit c1earer than Galileo's and
translates as follows: "Demonstration is sometimes taken broadly for aII necessary
reasoning, as it is probably taken in the first book of the Topics, chapter 1, when he
[Aristotle] divides syllogisms into necessary, topical, and sophistic. At other times it is taken
more strictly for reasoning made from necessary and proper premises, for which reason in
the first book of the Posterior Analytics, text 30 [i.e., ch. 13, 78a23-25], reasoning based on
210 NOTES AND COMMENTARY D3.1
common principles, although sometimes necessary, is said to be logical reasoning ... It is said
to be logical or even topical reasoning when compared with demonstration that proceeds
from necessary and proper principles, whereas it is said to be demonstration when compared
with a syllogism made only from probable or apparent principles" [LL524].
3 taken in the second way: probably a reference to the second of the two ways noted in
paragraph [1], that is, as a reasoning process based on necessary and proper principles, and
so, as Lorinus puts it, as it is "a perfect instrument of scientific knowing" [LL524].
4 Averroes: as explained in paragraph [7] below.
• Franciscus [Neritonensis]: Galileo seems to have had difficulty reading his exemplar here,
for he left a space after Franciscus, apparently to be filled in later. Lorinus gives the correct
reading: " ... the opinion of Franciscus Neritonensis, as Balduinus refers to it in q. 70, that
demonstration of the reasoned fact is not true demonstration but only demonstration of the
fact" [LL532].
6 cited by A verroes in many places: Lorinus again fills in the missing information, "in
" propositions that are indirect and un natural: see D2.8.5 n. 16.
12 "Every risible [being] is a rational animal": Lat. omne risibile est animal rationale. The
word "being," shown in brackets, is inserted to make sense in English; when omitted, as it
is in the Latin, the sentence becomes literally "Every risible is a rational animal," an
unnatural way of speaking.
13 it begs the question: Lat. petitur principium; again see F3.5.3 n. 7.
14 must be known essential/y and not through the senses: Lat. per se, non per sensum,
cognoscenda est.
l' of others: In his Logica Lorinus also names Antonius Scotius, Tomitanus, Alexander
Piccolomineus, Marcus Antonius Ermia, Melioratus, and "almost ali Averroists" [LL524].
16 from texts 5 to 30: that is, chapter 2 through chapter 12.
complexum; for example, man's rationality or his risibility are reducible to the propositions
"Man is rational" or "Man is risible," both of which are complex entities because composed
of a subject and a predicate.
23 ofThomas, etc.: Lorinus expands the list to include Albert the Great, Robert Grosseteste,
and Apollinaris among the Latins, and Alexander of Aphrodisias (according to Augustinus
Niphus) among the Greeks [LL531]. Vallius adds to these Giles of Rome, John of Jandun,
and Zabarella [VL2: 314].
24 text 30: that is, in chapter 13 of Book 1.
2. Alexander: Here Vallius adds Themistius and Philoponus on the first book of the
D3.1 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRATION 211
singulars and not on propositions that are universal, it lacks what is required for knowing
scientifically.
21 by the very way it works: Lat. quantum in se est, literally, "as much as it is in itself," an
expres sion used by Descartes and Newton to characterize a body's inertial tendency to
per severe in straight-line motion, in their context translated "as much as in it lies."
28 a thing is related to being as it is to knowing: Lat. res ita se habeat ad esse quoad cognosci,
a realist principle frequently invoked in these notes; see F3.1.4, F4.2.3, DI.I.1I, D2.2. 7,
D2.2.9, and D2.5.12.
29 in the sixth book of the Topics: in chapter 4, 14Ia26-b2.
30 from true causes ... intrinsic or extrinsic: Lat. ex veris causis ... intrinsecae vei extrinsecae.
Vallius here replies to an objection against the propriety of using extrinsic causes with the
following comment: "The most this argument establishes is that this type of demonstration
[i.e., the type made from extrinsic causes] is not as perfect as one that demonstrates an
intrinsic property that depends on the nature and quiddity of the subject as on an adequate
and total cause, and this we readily concede. For these extrinsic properties depend both on
the nature of the subject and on an extrinsic cause, and therefore they are not always found
with the subject as are intrinsic properties, but only when the extrinsic cause is present"
[VL2: 333].
31 in thefirst book ofthe Posterior Analytics: probably in chapter 11, where demonstrat ion
this expres sion is to be understood is the burden of the question on the demonstrative
regress, D3.3.
33 we beg the question: Lat. peti principium; see F3.5.3 n. 7.
34 a topical or proba bie syllogism: Lat. syllogismus topicus vei probabilis; see paragraph [1]
and n. 2 above.
35 against the ancients: Lat. contra veteres; their identity is not known, but possibly they
demonstrativum acquiri perfectam scientiam a nobis. The emphasis here should be on the
word "perfect," as seen in the following note, for Galileo is willing to admit that some
circularity is involved in the use of demonstration of the fact, which is "imperfect" when
compared with demonstration of the reasoned fact, as admitted in paragraph [16] below.
37 Supply "perfect. " .. and one begs the question: Lat. Subintellige perfectum, et peteretur
primum principium. That is, if the expression "perfect science" were not in the previous
sentence there would be no begging of the question; when it is put there, there is.
38 by experience ... by induction ... by the light of the intellect: Lat. experientia ... induc-
tione ... lumine intellectus; here following the commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas on the
second book of the Posterior Analytics, chapter 19. Note that, despite his earlier references
to the 1imitations of inductive reasoning in paragraphs [6] and [10], Galileo is here
maintaining that the human intellect has the capability of arriving at true and certain
propositions by the process of induction. This is why he lists the "intellectuallight" (lumen
intellectuale) among the instruments of knowing in DI.2.2. See Secs. 2.1, 2.2, and 4.6 of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof.
212 NOTES AND COMMENTAR Y D3.1
39 otherwise nature would have looked unkindly ... proper conditions and necessary
properties: Lat. alias natura male huic universalitati prospexisset, quippe quae rebus suas
conditiones et proprietates necessarias non dedisset. The sentence is difficult to translate,
but the sense is that nature would make herself unintelligible to man if the human intellect
were not able to discern necessary connections and understand the conditions under which
they obtain in the order of nature.
40 from text 5 to 30: Bk. 1, chs. 2 to 12.
41 understood [of] most powerful demonstration: in writing this Galileo left out the "of"
D3.2: How are demonstrations of the reasoned fact and of the fact
similar and dissimilar? For background, see Secs. 4.4 and 4.9 of
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof, for an application, Sec. 5.1
D1.2.29 n. 30 and D2.4.5 n. 13. Vallius has a fuller explanation in his Logica:
" ... demonstration of the fact, from an effect, is less perfect than demonstraton of the
reasoned fact, and thus it is not demonstration as properly as is demonstration of the
reasoned fact; rather the formality (ratio) of demonstration is found in them analogically
and not univocally, and for this reason demonstration in general (demonstratio in commum)
is not truly and properly a genus for them under the aspect being considered" [VL2: 307].
4 text 30: ch. 13.
posteriori.
11 "conjectural": Lat. coniecturalis.
12 "a wolf does not reason": Galileo's example here seems to be defective, for many people
would regard the ability to reason as the proximate cause (and not a remote cause) of a sense
of wonder. Yet his example is consistent with the syllogism given in Vallius-Carbone's
Additamenta [lvb-2ra], where, as is analyzed in Sec. 2.7a of Galileo's Logic of Discovery
and Proof, they introduce two middle terms between being rational (i.e., being able "to
reason") and being capable of wonder (i.e., having "a sense of wonder"), namely, being
"capable of discourse" and being "able to recognize an effect before a cause." In this
context Aristotle's own example of a remote cause would have been better: "A wall is not
an animal; therefore it does not breathe" (78bI5-27). Since not ali animals breathe, being
an animal is only a remote cause of breathing - having lungs, on the other hand, is the
proximate cause. Galileo himself makes use of this example in D3.3.14.
13 there is smoke, therefore fire: apparently Galileo takes smoke to be a proper effect or a
03.3 TREA TISE ON DEMONSTRA TION 213
necessary sign of fire and so convertible with it. Lorinus rejects that particular connection:
"From smoke one cannot infer the existence of fire by a true demonstration, for not ali
smoke is effected by fire" [LL552).
14 heating occurs, therefore there isfire: it is not clear here whether Galileo is proposing this
chs. 1-3.
18 are most useful in the sciences: Lat. in scientiis esse utilissimas, meaning by this the
natural sciences, those concerned with the world of nature, where things are most known
with respect to nature and not most known to us. See D3.3.13.
demonstrationem quia; an expres sion whose sense is obscure but was probably intended to
mean that they took demonstration of the fact [rom its mediating role in supplying terms
from which the demonstration of the reasoned fact could be formulated and thus made the
regress itself impossible.
5 one ... begged the question: Lat. petitur principium. See D3.1.5-6 and D3.1.15; also
D3.2.5-6.
6 [Ugo Senensis]: this name was omitted by Galileo and a space left for it, presumably to be
filled in later. The name is correctly given in Lorinus's notes of his lectures on logic given at
the Collegio Romano in 1584 and again in the revised version of Vallius's course [Lat. Ed.
292; VL2: 346).
7 Neritonensis: written incorrectly by Galileo as Eritonensis; possibly he misread the "N" as
an "H" and dropped it, as was his custom when copying Latin words that begin with "h."
8 second progression: Lat. secundus progressus, literally "second progress" but translated
as "second progression" to agree with Galileo's use of duae progressiones in paragraph [14)
below.
9 in the second book ofthe Prior Analytics: ch. 16, 64b32-22, as also cited at D3.1.5.
11 Aristotle's: Lorinus gives a much fuller citation of authorities for this position, ineluding
12 the proving part and the part proved: Lat. id quod probat et id quod probatur.
13 under the formal relationship of cause and effect: Lat. sub relatione formali causae et
effectus.
14 as they are disparate things: Lat. quatenus sunt res disparatae.
15 as the cause is necessarily connected with the effect: Lat. quatenus causa necessario est
relativa ita se habent inter se, ut unum non sit notius altera. That cause and effect are
correlatives has previously been stated in F2.3.1; the principle itself has already been
invoked implicitly in DI.2.22.
17 there is no circularity: Lat. non dari circulum.
taking progressus in the sense of processus, that is, a reasoning procedure that could include
both the forward and the backward (or regressive) motions found in the demonstrative
regress. This is the sense in which the term is used by Zabarella and Lorinus; see Lat. Ed.
294-296.
19 for the more perfect development of the sciences: Lat. prapter perfectiorem scientiarum
inventus, taking inventus to mean development by way of discovery (as in the via
inventionis, thus as opposed to the via doctrinae, by way of doctrine or teaching). See Sec.
2.8 of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Praoj.
20 in the {third} way: reading Galileo's secunda as tertio, another mentallapse on his part,
manuscript, though space has been left for them; the reading is conjectured, as in the
preceding note.
24 perfect circularity: Lat. circulus perfectus.
25 there is no progression to the same numerical term: Lat. non fit progressus ad idem
numero.
26 in the second progression: Lat. in secunda pragressu.
27 for the perfecting of ali the sciences: Lat. perfectioni omnium scientiarum, understanding
"perfecting" as in n. 19 above.
28 the conditions for the demonstrative regress: Lat. conditiones regressus demonstrativi.
For a detailed comparison of the conditions given by Galileo with those enumerated by
Zabarella, Lorinus, and Vallius, see Lat. Ed. 298-302.
29 [six in number. First]: these words are missing in Galileo's manuscript but a space was left
for them, apparently to be filled in later; the reading supplied here is conjectured.
30 that there be two progressions of demonstration in it: Lat. ut in illo fiant duo
progressiones demonstrationis.
31 as we have explained: i.e., in paragraph [12] above.
32 wait until we come to have formal knowledge of the cause we first knew only materially:
opposition between confuse and distincte in similar contexts. For the textual evidence that
supports a gradual evolution of this terminology from Zabarella to Galileo via the logic
notes of Lorinus and Vallius, see Lat. Ed. 299-301; also Sec. 4.9c of Galileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof. Either terminology may be illustrated using as an example the
unraveling of a fictional murder mystery. Not infrequently the murderer comes to be known
early on, say, from the circumstances of the plot, but he is not known at the time precisely
as the murderer. In Galileo's terms he at first is known only materialiter, i.e., as a person,
but not as the killer. Then, as the plot unfolds, he comes to be recognized as the one who
actually committed the crime, and therefore formaliter as the murderer. (In Zabarella's
terms he at first is known only "confusedly," and then later "distinctly," as the perpetrator.)
The transition from one stage to the other usually takes time, during which one considers
various possibilities, then excludes those less likely, and so on, ali of which requires what
Zabarella calls the work of the intellect (negotiatio intellectus or labor mentis). See Sec. 4.9b
of Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Prooj.
33 that we may ha ve formal knowledge of the cause: Lat. ut a nobis cognoscatur causa
causam materialem ... a causa formaliter cognita, taking materialem here as equivalent to
materialiter cognitam, paralleling the formaliter cognita in the second part of the
expression.
36 [progressionJ: Galileo wrote effectum here rather than the progressum that is required for
The bibliography here presented is restricted to the source materials on which Gali/eo's
logical treatises are based, either proximately or remotely. For the convenience of the reader
unacquainted with Greek, medieval, and Renaissance authors, brief biographical sketches
are also included. With regard to the editions cited, generally these are works published prior
to Galileo's writing of MS 27. Those seeking a Iisting of more recent works relating to this
manuscript should consult that provided in our companion volume, GaIileo's Logic of
Discovery and Proof.
216
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER 217
works of Aristotle with such ability that he was widely known as "the Commentator."
Opera Aristotelis cum Averrois commentariis, Venice 1550-1552, 1562-1574, etc.
Avicenna. Arab philosopher, b. Afshana 980, d. Hamadhan 1037, student and interpreter
of Aristotle. Opera philosophica, Venice 1508.
Balduino, Girolamo. Italian philosopher who flourished in the mid-sixteenth century,
taught logic at the University of Padua in 1528. Expositio in Iibrum primum Posteriorum
Aristotelis, Venice 1563; Varii generis in logica quaesita, Venice 1609.
Baliani, Giovanni Battista. Italian mechanician and correspondent of Galileo, b. Genoa
1582, d. there 1666. De motu naturali gravium solidorum, Genoa 1638; De motu naturali
gravium solidorum et Iiquidorum, Genoa 1646.
Barberini, Maffeo (Urban VIII). Florentine cardinal, later pope, b. Florence 1568, d. Rome
1644; studied philosophy at the Collegio Romano, law at the University of Pisa; sided
with Galileo in the dispute at Florence over bodies in water; elected pope in 1623; initiated
proceedings against Galileo following publication of the Dialogo in 1632.
Bellarmine, Robert, St. Jesuit philosopher and theologian, b. Montepulciano 1542, d. Rome
1621; studied at the Collegio Romano, taught there and at Louvain; created cardinal in
1598, played a leading role as a defender of traditional Catholic teaching in the Counter
Reformation.
Benedetti, Giovanni Battista. Mathematician and natural philosopher, b. Venice 1530, d.
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falling bodies. Resolutio omnium Euclidis problematum, Veni ce 1553; Demonstratio
proportionum motuum localium, Venice 1554.
Blancanus, losephus. Jesuit mathematician, b. Bologna 1566, d. Parma 1624; studied under
Clavius at the Collegio Romano, taught at Parma, where Giovanni Battista Riccioli was
in turn his student. De natura mathematicarum scientiarum, Bologna 1615; Apparatus ad
mathematicarum studium, Bologna 1620.
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Athens and Alexandria, planned to translate into Latin alI of Aristotle and Plato to show
the basic agreement in their teachings; his translations of the Categories and
Perihermenias have survived, but that of the Posterior Analytics attributed to him in the
Renaissance is the work of James of Venice (c. 1128). Logica Aristote/is Boethio
interprete, Paris 1540, Venice 1543, 1549, 155/, etc.
Borro, Girolamo. Philosopher and teacher of Galileo, b. Arezzo 1512, d. Perugia 1592;
taught twice at the University of Pisa, 1553-1559 and 1575-1587. Delflusso e reflusso del
mare, Lucca 1561, Florence 1577, 1583; De motu gravium et levium, Florence 1575, 1576;
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Brahe, Tycho. Danish astronomer, b. Knudstrup 1546, d. Prague 1601; proposed a system
of the universe that reconciled the conflicting claims of Ptolemy and Copernicus; made
accurate observations of Mars, on the basis of which Kepler determined the basic laws of
planetary motion in 1609 and 1619.
Buonamici, Francesco. Aristotelian philosopher and teacher of Galileo, b. Florence 1533, d.
Pisa 1603; taught at the University of Pisa from 1565 to 1603; many of Galileo's invectives
against the Aristotelians of the day seem directed against his teachings, preserved in his
De motu, Florence 1591.
Buridan, John. Medieval philosopher, b. Bethune, d. after 1358; taught for about 50 years
at the University of Paris, where he served as rector, 1328-1340; wrote commentaries on
218 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER
the Isagoge of Porphyry and on Aristotle's logical works. Compendium logicae, Venice
1499.
Burley, Walter. Philosopher and theologian, b. England c. 1275, d. c. 1345; studied at
Oxford and Paris and wrote extensively on logic and natural philosophy. Scriptum super
artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Venice c. 1478, 1497; Scriptum super libros
Posteriorum Aristotelis, Oxford 1517; Venice 1521.
Cajetan, Thomas de Vio. Dominican philosopher and theologian, b. Gaeta 1468, d. Rome
1534; taught at the Universities of Padua and Pavia, regarded as the foremost
commentator on the writings of Thomas Aquinas. In Praedicabilia Porphyrii,
Praedicamenta, Postpraedicamenta, et libros Posteriorum Aristotelis commentaria,
Lyons 1572, 1579.
Capreolus, John. Dominican philosopher and theologian, b. Rodez c. 1380, d. there 1444;
studied and taught at the University of Paris, defending the teaching of Thomas Aquinas
against Scotus, Ockham, and other theologians. Libri defensionum theologiae divi
Thomae de Aquino, Venice 1483, 1514, 1519, 1589.
Carbone, Ludovico. Logician and rhetorician, b. Costacciaro, d. Venice 1597; studied
under the Jesuits at the Collegio Romano, from whom he appropriated much of his
material; taught at the University of Perugia. Introductio To/eti in dialecticam
Aristotelis, additis prae/udiis, Venice 1588; Introductio in logicam una cum catalogo
auctorum qui de logica scripserunt, Venice 1597; Additamenta ad commentum Francisci
To/eti in /ogicam Aristotefis: Prae/udia in fibros priores ana/yticos; Tractatio de
syl/ogismo; De instrumentis sciendi; De praecognitionibus et praecognitis, Venice 1597,
1617, 1688; Introductio in universam philosophiam, Venice 1599.
Carcavi, Pierre. French diplomat, b. Lyons c. 1600, d. Paris 1684; a colleague of the
mathematician Pierre Fermat at Toulouse, he was later put in charge of the royallibrary
at Paris, became one of the first members of the Academy of Sciences there in 1666.
Castelli, Benedetto. Benedictine monk and mathematician, b. Brescia 1578, d. Rome 1643;
studied with Galileo at Padua, later taught at Pisa and at Rome, where his students
included Bonaventura Cavalieri and Evangelista Torricelli; defended Galileo's teachings
on floating bodies. Delia misura de/l'acque correnti, Rome 1628, 1639; Bologna 1660.
Cavalieri, Bonaventura. Jesuati priest and mathematician, b. Milan c. 1598, d. Bologna
1647; studied under Castelli at Pisa, who introduced him to Galileo, whom he likewise
regarded as his teacher and to whom he wrote some 112letters. Geometria indivisibilibus
continuorum nova quadam ratione promota, Bologna 1635, 1653.
Clavius, Christopher. Jesuit mathematician, b. Bamberg 1537, d. Rome 1612; studied at
Coimbra, taught mathematics at the Collegio Romano from 1565 to his death, during
which time his preeminence in mathematics and astronomy was recognized throughout
Europe. In Sphaeram Ioannis de Sacro Bosco commentarius, Rome 1570, 1581, 1585,
etc.; Euc/idis Elementorum, Rome 1589.
Commandino, Federico. Mathematician, translator, editor, b. Urbino 1509, d. there 1575;
edited many Greek mathematical works, prepared Latin translations of, and
commentaries on, Euclid and Archimedes. Liber de centro gravitatis, Bologna 1565.
ConciIiator (Pietro d' Abano). Paduan philosopher and physician, b. Abano 1257, d. Padua
c. 1315; his major preoccupation was the reconciliation of medicine with philosophy.
Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et praecipue medicorum, Mantua 1472,
Venice 1520.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER 219
1641; a member ofthe Clerks Regular Minor and later General ofthe Order, he served on
diplomatic missions for the papacy, was made bishop of Teano in 1627; corresponded
with Galileo on the "wheel of Aristotle" and problems relating to the structure of the
continuum. In Aristotefis mechanicas commentarii, Rome 1627.
Guiducci, Mario. Assistant to Galileo, b. Florence 1585, d. there 1646; studied at the
Collegio Romano and at Pisa under Castelli, who introduced him to Galileo; elected
consul of the Florentine Academy, 1618; became a member of the Accademia dei Lincei
in 1625; published, with Galileo, the Discorso delle comete, Florence 1619, which initiated
the controversy with Grassi.
Ingoli, Francesco. Lawyer and priest, b. Ravenna 1578, d. Rome 1649; studied law at
Padua, where he probably knew Galileo; after ordination served as first secretary of the
Propaganda Fidei, founded its famed printing press.
John of Jandun. Averroist commentator on the works of Aristotle, b. Jandun c. 1275, d.
Todi 1328. Quaestiones in XII fibros metaphysicorum, Veni ce 1525, 1553, 1560;
Quaestiones in libros de anima, Veni ce 1473, 1561.
Jones, Robertus. English Jesuit, b. 1564, d. 1615; studied and taught at the Collegio
Romano, offering the logic course there in 1591-1592. Organum Aristotefis a Roperto
Jones explicatum, Rome, Biblioteca Casanatense, Cod. 3611 (1592).
Kepler, Johann. German mathematician and astronomer, b. Weil der Stadt 1571, d.
Regensburg 1630; studied at Tiibingen under Michael Maestlin and one of the first to
propagate Copernicus's teachings; worked with Brahe in Prague; had a brief
correspondence with Galileo, who mostly ignored his discoveries in planetary astronomy.
Dissertatio cum Nuncio Sidereo, Prague 1610.
Liceti, Fortunio. Italian philosopher and theologian, b. Rapallo 1577, d. Padua 1657; friend
and correspondent of Galileo, studied under Pendasio at the University of Bologna,
professor of logic and natural philosophy at the University of Pisa, 1600-1609, then at
Padua, 1609-1636, then at Bologna, 1637-1645, and finally professor of medicine at
Padua, 1645-1657.
Lorinus, Ioannes. French Jesuit, b. Avignon 1559, d. Dole 1635; professor of philosophy
and Scripture at J esuit colleges in Rome, Paris, and Milan; taught logic at the Collegio
Romano in 1585-1586, later a censor librorum for the Jesuit order. Ioannis Lorini
Societatis Iesu Logica, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Urb. Lat.
1471 (1584); In universam Aristotelis fogicam, Commentarii cum annexis disputationibus
Romae ab eodem olim praefecti, Cologne 1620.
Melioratus, Remigius. Italian philosopher, b. Borgo San Sepulchro, d. Pisa 1554; taught
philosophy at the University of Padua, 1536-1543, then logic and philosophy at the
University of Pisa, 1543-1554. Expositio in commentum II Averrois libri primi
Posteriorum, Quaestio de medio demonstrationis, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica
Vaticana, Cod. Urb. Lat. 1455; De demonstrationis medio termino, Lucca 1554.
Mirandulanus, Antonius Bernardi. Italian philosopher and priest, later bishop, b.
Mirandola 1502, d. Bologna 1565; studied under Pomponazzi and Buccaferrea at the
University of Bologna, where he was later professor of logic and philosophy; bishop of
Caserta, 1552-1554. Institutio in universam fogicam, nempe in fibros Perihermiensis,
Priora, et Posteriora Anafytica; in eandem commentarius, Basel 1549, Rome 1562.
Monte, Guidobaldo de!. Friend and correspondent of Galileo, b. Pesaro 1545, d. Urbino
1607; studied mathematics at Padua and then under Commandino at Urbino, 1572-1575.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER 221
Galileo's The Assayerof 1623; made Master ofthe Sacred Palace in 1629; handled details
of censorship for the Dialogo of 1632.
Ricci, Ostilio. Mathematician and engineer, b. Fermo 1540, d. Florence 1603; studied
mathematics under Tartaglia, taught Galileo privately at Pisa; active in the Academy of
Design at Florence; supervised fortifications and hydraulic works; was mathematician to
the Grand Duke of Tuseany at his death.
Rocco, Antonio. Philosopher and rhetorician, b. Aquila 1586, d. Venice 1562; studied
philosophy at the Collegio Romano, then at Perugia, then at Padua under Cremonini;
taught privately at Veniee. Published a critique of Galileo's Dialogo entitled Esercitatione
ji/osojiche, Venice 1633, later annotated by Galileo.
Rugerius, Ludovicus. Jesuit philosopher, b. Florence, taught philosophy at the Collegio
Romano 1589-1592, offering the logie course in 1589-1590 and the physics course in
1590-1591. Commentarium et quaestionum in Aristotefis logicam, 1589, Bamberg,
Staatsbibliothek, Cod. Msc. Class. 62.1-2; In octo fibros Physicorum, 1590, ibid. 62.2-3;
In quatuor fibros De caelo et mundo, In duos libros De generatione et corruptione, In
quatuor libros Meteorologicos, 1591, ibid. 62.4-5.
Scheiner, Christopher. Jesuit mathematician and astronomer, b. Swabia 1573, d. Niesse
1650; studied at Ingolstadt and taught mathematies there, 1610-1616; engaged in
prolonged controversy with Galileo over the priority of discovery of sunspots and their
nature. Tres epistolas de macufis solaribus, Augsburg 1612; Rosa ursina, Bracciano 1630.
Scotus, John Duns. Franciscan philosopher and theologian, b. Duns, Scotland, c. 1266, d.
Cologne 1308; studied at Oxford and Paris and later taught at both universities; the most
influential of the Franciscan doctors. Many of the works attributed to him in the Opera
omnia (Lyons 1639, Paris 1891-1895) are not authentie, incJuding the Quaestiones utiles
super fibros priorum analyticorum et posteriorum analyticorum, Venice 1512, 1520,
possibly the works of Marsilius of Inghen.
Simplicius. Neoplatonist commentator on Aristotle, b. Cilicia, c. 500, d. after 1533; studied
at Alexandria under Ammonius Hermeus, attempted systematically to reeoncile
Aristotle's teachings with those of Plato. Commentationes in praedicamenta Aristotefis,
Venice 1550.
Soarez, Cipriano. Jesuit rhetorician, b. Oeana 1524, d. Palencia 1593; taught humanities
and Scripture in J esuit colleges, rector at Braga and Evora; his writings on rhetorie were
edited and enhanced by Ludovieo Carbone. De arte rhetorica libri tres ex Aristotele,
Cicerone, et Quintiliano deprompti, Coimbra 1560, 1562, 1575, etc.; Rome 1580; Venice
1588, 1590, etc.
Soto, Domingo de. Dominican philosopher and theologian, b. Segovia 1495, d. Salam anca
1560; studied at the University of A1cala and the University of Paris, taught at A1cala and
then at Salamanca. Summulae, Burgos 1529, Salamanca 1543, 1547, 1554, 1568, 1571,
1582; In dialecticam Aristotelis, Isagoge Porphyrii, Aristotelis Categoriae, De
demonstratione, Salamanca 1553, 1574, 1583; Venice 1583, 1587.
Suarez, Francisco. Jesuit philosopher and theologian, b. Granada 1548, d. Lisbon 1617;
studied at the University of Salamanca, taught theology in Spain and Portugal and at the
Collegio Romano from 1580 to 1585. Compendium logicae universae, Paris, Bibliotheque
nationale, Cod. Lat. 6775 (1585).
Tartaglia, Niccolo. Renaissanee mathematician, b. Brescia c. 1500, d. Venice 1557; largely
self taught, discovered a method of solving eubie equations; pioneered in artillery science;
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER 223
translated Euclid and Archimedes into Italian, edited the De ponderositate of J ordanus
de Nemore. La nova scientia, Venice 1537; Quaesiti et inventi diverse, Venice 1546.
Themistius. Peripatetic philosopher and scholar, b. Paphlagonia 317, d. Constantinople c.
388; paraphrased many works of Aristotle to make them available to a wide audience.
Opera omnia, Venice 1530, 1534; Paraphrasis in Posteriora Analytica Aristotelis, Treviso
1481.
Thius, Angelus. Logician and philosopher, fi. c. 1547. Quaesitum et praecognitiones libri
Praedicamentorum Porhyriique, Padua 1547.
Thomas Aquinas, St. Dominican philosopher and theologian, b. Roccasecca c. 1225, d.
Fossanuova 1274; studied at Naples, Paris, and Cologne, taught at Paris and elsewhere;
explained the teachings of Aristotle with such clarity and insight that he became known
as "the Expositor." In Aristotelis librum Perihermenias et Posteriorum Analyticorum
expositio, Venice 1477, 1495, 1496; Paris 1534, etc.
Toletus, Franciscus. Jesuit philosopher and theologian, b. Cordova 1532, d. Rome 1596;
studied at Salamanca under Domingo de Soto, taught philosophy at the Collegio
Romano, 1559-15; made cardinal, 1593. Introductio in dialecticam Aristotelis, Rome
1561, 1565, 1569; Vienna 1562; Venice 1588; Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in
universam Aristotelis logicam, Rome 1572, Venice 1576, 1581, etc.
Tomitanus, Bernardinus. Logician, philosopher, and physician, b. Padua c. 1517, d. there
1576; studied at the University of Padua, taught logic there. Introductio ad sophisticos
elenchos, Veni ce 1544; Animadversiones aliquot in primum librum posteriorum. In
novem A verrois quaesita demonstrativa argumenta, A verrois graviores sententiae in
primum et secundum libros posteriorum resolutorium, Venice 1562.
Torricelli, Evangelista. Mathematician and physicist, b. Faenza 1608, d. Florence 1647;
studied mathematics with the Jesuits at Faenza and with Castelli in Rome; invented the
barometer, was first to explain atmospheric pressure, continued Galileo's work on
motion. De sphaera, De motu gravium, De dimensione parabolae, ali in Opera
geometrica, Florence 1644.
Trombetta, Antonius. Franciscan philosopher and theologian, b. Padua 1436, d. there
1517; professor of Scotistic metaphysics at the University of Padua, 1476-1511,
adversary of Thomas de Vio Cajetan; later bishop of Urbino. Quaestiones
metaphysicales, Venice 1493, 1502; Sententia in tractatum formalitatum scoticarum,
Venice 1493, etc.
Ugo Senesis. Italian philosopher and physician, b. Siena, d. 1439; expositor of scientific
methodology in the traditions of Aristotle and Galen. Expositio super libros Tegni
Galieni, Venice 1498.
Vallius, Paulus. Jesuit philosopher, b. Rome 1561, d. 1622; professor of philosophy and
theology at the Collegio Romano, teaching logic in 1587-1588; his unpublished notes for
this course were plagiarized by Ludovico Carbone and also appropriated by Galileo.
Logica Pauli Vallii Romani ex Societate Iesu, duobus tomis distincta, Lyons 1622.
Vitelleschi, Mutius. Jesuit philosopher and theologian, b. Rome 1563, d. there 1645; taught
philosophy at the Collegio Romano, 1588-1591, logic in 1588-1589; elected General of
the Society of Jesus, 1615. Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Cod. Lat.
Borgh. 197, Explicationes in Aristotelis logicam lectae anno 1588 in Collegio Romano.
Viviani, Vincenzo. Mathematician, Galileo's first biographer, b. Florence 1622, d. there
1703; studied under Piarist Fathers in Florence, resided with Galileo at Arcetri from 1639
224 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REGISTER
to the latter's death, edited the first edition of his works. De maximis et minimis, Florence
1659.
Xenoerates. Greek philosopher, b. Chalcedon 395, d. Athens 313; studied under Plato at the
Academy, developed his teachings in many writings, none of which has survived, though
reports of them are given by Aristotle and Cicero.
Zabarella, Jaeopo. Aristotelian philosopher, b. Padua 1533, d. there 1589; studied and
taught at the University of Padua, succeeding Tomitanus in the chair of logic, 1564; the
foremost commentator on Aristotle in the sixteenth century; Opera logica, Venice 1578,
Lyons 1587, Base11594, Cologne 1597, Treviso 1604, Frankfurt 1608, Venice 1617, etc.;
In duos Aristotefis fibros posteriores analyticos commentarii, Venice 1582.
Zimara, Mare Antonio. Averroist philosopher and physician, b. S. Pietro in Galatina c.
1475, d. before 1537; studied at the University of Padua, taught there and at the
Universities of Salerno and Naples. Apostillae, Pavia 1520-1521; Contradictiones et
solutiones in dictis Aristotefis et A verrois, Venice 1508, 1516, etc.; Tabula dilucidationum
in dictis Aristotefis et Averrois, Veni ce 1537, 1543, etc.
CONCORDANCE OF ENGLISH AND LATIN
EDITIONS
225
INDEX OF TERMS
analogy, analogically 142, 147, 179, 212 as things depend on causes for
of attribution 136 existing, so also for being known
of proportion 136 142
angels 94, 115-116 things are related to existing as they
aposteriori 95, 96, 98,100,111,119, are to knowing 92, 104, 129, 142,
120 150
a priori 96, 98-100, 111 better than, Lat. nobilior, superior to,
argumentation 130 greater than 129-138, 185, 199
assent 105, 106 end superior to what is ordered to it
certain and evident 128 152
attribute, see property knowledge superior when through a
axiom(s), Lat. dignitas (-tates) 89-90, cause 152
143-145, 193
can enter actually into an imperfect cause(s) 100, 101, 175
demonstration 149 accidental or adventitious 76
common to ali sciences vs. contracted as causes are also priors 140
to particular matter 148 contained under the fourth mode of
do not enter demonstrations directly speaking essentially 162
90, 149 more known only with respect to
examples of: nature 140
contradictories cannot be defined: that whereby one thing is
simultaneously affirmed 148 present in another 162
every whole is greater than its part four kinds: intrinsic and extrinsic,
148 convertible and not 179
what is affirmed of ali is affirmed have an intrinsic relationship to what
of each 148 is caused 162
must be foreknown only habitually 90 imperfect 140, 191
in being 140
begging the question, Lat. petitio intrinsic vs. extrinsic 177, 187, 206-207
principii, petere principium 38, 100, natural 107, 152
119,144,173,174,177,178,181,193 physical 183
being, Lat. ens 159 proper 77, 150
can mean essence, or aptitudinal proximate 142
existence, or actual existence 159 true 72, 78, 141, 142, 166
rational being, Lat. ens rationis 139, and proper 140, 170
191 univocal 154, 199
real being, Lat. ens reale 139, 141 virtual 141, 142, 191
being and knowing, Lat. esse et see also efficient cause, extrinsic
cognoscere: cause, final cause, formal cause,
227
228 INDEX OF TERMS
final cause 128, 129, 141 habitus or habit, Lat. habitus 97,98,
same as an effect 129 117, 118
fire 95,98 heavens, the, Lat. cae/um:
first, Lat. primum: Galileo's treatise on 51-56
first to a subject vs. first to a cause natural circular motion of 170
143 sphericity of 164
see immediate proposition
first mover 91, 93, 111 immediate proposition, Lat. propositio
first principles, Lat. principia prima 107, immediata 143-145
137 Aristotle's division of 145
efficient cause of demonstrative five kinds of 145
science 137 impediment(s), Lat. impedimentum (-a),
first and immediate 87 93, 114,202
first and most universal 89 of the divine will 94, 115
how known 87-88 removed or taken away 71, 78, 93,
firsts, Lat. priores 140, 191 114,202
see demonstration, how made (from to learning 71
firsts) unimpeded natural causes 152, 199
INDEX OF TERMS 231
237
238 INDEX OF NAMES
Also ofinterest:
R.S. -Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (eds.): A Portrait of Twenty-Five Years Boston
Colloquiafor the Philosophy ofScience, 1960-1985.1985 ISBN Pb 90-277-1971-3