Grounded Theory and Grounded Theorizing Pragmatism in Research Practice Bryant Antony 2017 PDF

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Grounded Theory and Grounded Theorizing

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Grounded Theory and Grounded

Theorizing
PRAGMATISM IN RESEARCH PRACTICE
Antony Bryant
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Bryant, Antony, 1953– author.
Title: Grounded theory and grounded theorizing : pragmatism in research
practice / Antony Bryant.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017]
Identifiers: LCCN 2016023441 | ISBN 9780199922604 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Grounded theory. | Social sciences—Research.
Classification: LCC H61.24 .B79 2017 | DDC 300.72—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016023441
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction: Not Another Book on Grounded Theory ix
PART ONE Research and Research Methods

1. Research: Why (Do) Research? 3
2. Research Methods 13
PART TWO The Grounded Theory Method in Practice

3. 1967 And All That 63
4. The Grounded Theory Method: An Overview 83
PART THREE Grounded Theorizing: The Gerunds of the Grounded

Theory Method
5. Coding: Terminology and Clarification 117
6. An Example of Coding and a Coding Exercise 133
7. An Abbreviated Example: Research Pitching 141
8. Process and Procedure: Getting Started and Moving Forward 147
9. Coding Strategies: Tales from the Front Line 175
10. Reflecting and Recording: Memoing and Reflective Research 197
11. Moving On: Later Sampling, Coding, and Analyzing 217
12. Getting to an End-point: Theoretical Saturation 249
13. Abduction—No Longer an Alien Concept 265
PART FOUR Grounded Theory—Themes and Variations

14. A Grounded Theory of Grounded Theory Journal Articles 283
15. Another View of The Grounded Theory Method: Another Way of Modeling 299
16. It’s All in the Big Data: Data, Big Data, and the Grounded Theory Method 317
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17. The Grounded Theory Method and Pragmatism: Instrumental Theorizingâ•… 335

18. Grounded Theory as a Guide to Good Research Practice:
A Method for Enacting Abstraction and Abductionâ•… 353
19. Four Accounts of Grounded Theorizingâ•… 365
20. Charles Darwin: The Survival of the Grounded Theoristâ•… 383
Referencesâ•… 389
Indexâ•… 401
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
You read the pragmatists and all you know is: not Descartes,
not Kant, not Plato. It’s like aspirin. You can’t use aspirin to give
yourself power, you take it to get rid of headaches. In that way,
pragmatism is a philosophical therapy. It helps you stop asking the
unhelpful questions. (Richard Rorty)
My first encounter with the writings of Glaser and Strauss came during my
undergraduate studies in social and political sciences in the 1970s. But the
main point of discussion was their substantive work on dying, with little or
little or no attention to the innovative methodological aspects. In the 1990s,
as a member of various university research committees, I was occasionally
confronted with PhD proposals referring to Grounded Theory, which usually
went on to use this as the justification for an absence of clear research aims
or questions, also a brief or non-existent literature review. On most occasions
my colleagues and I gave short shrift to such submissions, and requested that
the proposal be revised and resubmitted. At one point, however, one of my
own PhD students, Kobus Smit, proposed to use grounded theory, and when
challenged on these issues responded with a clear and cogent account of the
method, justifying his starting point and overall strategy. This prompted me
to undertake a closer scrutiny of the topic and resulted in my paper ‘Re-
grounding grounded theory’. Soon after it appeared I came across the work of
Kathy Charmaz, whose insights and experience of the method far outweigh
mine, and from that date have benefitted enormously from her collaboration
and friendship.
Our collaboration has been marked in particular with the The Sage
Handbook of Grounded Theory which broadened my familiarity with the
method, and gave me the opportunity to work with many of the leading writers
on grounded theory and qualitative methods in general. Prior to the prepara-
tion of that book I participated in a grounded theory event hosted by Barney
Glaser, and later I attended one of his workshops where I was fortunate enough
to see him in action, offering guidance and support to an international range
of grounded theory researchers including doctoral candidates and highly expe-
rienced professional practitioners. I am fairly sure that there will be parts of
the chapters that follow with which he will disagree, but I hope he will also
appreciate my attempt to adhere to Rapoport’s Four Rules, and also to note
the many points on which we do agree and where I express my admiration for vii
viii
viii Acknowledgments
the pioneering work that he and Anselm Strauss, together with Jeanne Quint,
began in the 1960s.
My wife, Griselda Pollock, and I can attest to the ‘grab’ and ‘fit’ of their
early studies with our experience caring for my mother in the last few years of
her life. In the months leading up to her death at the age of 97, through various
stays in hospital and care homes, her awareness was virtually non-existent, but
my wife and I both found comfort in our understanding of what was going
on derived from Barney and Anselm’s insights. In many cases we were several
stages ahead of the medical and nursing staff, and able to cope with develop-
ments accordingly.
In the past twenty years or so I have supervised many PhD students, and
since 2000 a significant number of them have used the grounded theory method
in their research. I am sure they all learned a great deal about the method, but
I know that I have learned even more in guiding and supporting them, in
discussing their work as it progressed, and in gaining deeper insights from
their innovative research strategies. I have drawn on many of their insights and
findings in this book, and am particularly grateful to Andrea Gorra, Premila
Gamage, Transmissia Semiawan, and Stella Walsh for preparing such eloquent
overviews of their experiences. The work of these four, together with that of
Gerhard Drexler and Ibraheem Jodeh, provided a rich source of examples to
illustrate many key points in the chapters that follow.
This book was in preparation for several years, initially in response to
an invitation from Patricia Leavy to contribute a short volume of around five
chapters to a series on qualitative research methods. When I finally submitted
a far longer text to OUP, both she and Abby Gross were fully supportive in
continuing with publication, and Abby and her colleagues have provided guid-
ance and insight as this has progressed. Courtney McCarroll saw through the
initial stages of preparation, and Susan Hannan produced a thorough copy-
edited version. My thanks to all at OUP; any errors or ambiguities that remain
are entirely my responsibility.
Tony Bryant
July 2016
ix
Introduction
NOT ANOTHER BOOK ON GROUNDED THEORY
The twentieth century mathematician and systems theory pioneer. Anatol

Rapoport offered a set of four rules regarding how to write a successful critical
commentary on an opponent’s work.
1. First, he said, you must attempt to re-express your opponent’s position
so clearly, vividly, and fairly that your opponent says “Thanks, I wish
I’d thought of putting it that way.”
2. Then, you should list any points of agreement (especially if they are
not matters of general or widespread agreement),
3. Third, you should mention anything you have learned from your
opponent.
4. Only then are you permitted to say so much as a word of rebuttal or
criticism.1
If you have got this far, or are just idly looking through this book in a shop, or
library, or online, you may well be thinking, “Not another book on grounded
theory!” Indeed, many other potential readers, having had the same thought,
may not have bothered getting even this far. So, why persevere with this partic-
ular book? First of all it needs to be stressed that the various books and articles
on grounded theory do not exist as some disordered, amorphous resource;
there are various patterns and relationships between the various items—
books, articles, Web sites, and the like; in many cases, they were written as
rejoinders or restatements in the light of other sources. The grounded theory
method (GTM) itself first came to researchers’ attention in the 1960s when
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss published their initial detailed grounded
theory study Awareness of Dying (1965), soon followed by the more generic,
methods-oriented book The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967). They
supplemented this with a further, related study Time for Dying (1968). These
three volumes have come to be seen as the core texts for the method and are
referred to throughout this book in abbreviated form as the trilogy, Awareness,
Discovery, and Time.
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x Introduction
Various other grounded theory books followed, including Anguish (Strauss

and Glaser, 1970), Status Passage (Glaser and Strauss, 1971), Theoretical
Sensitivity (Glaser, 1978), and Negotiations (Strauss, 1978). Together with the
initial trilogy, these can be seen as an extended presentation of the founding
ideas of the method, including discussion of and justification for the method
itself (specifically Discovery and Theoretical Sensitivity), as well as profound
and highly important and influential exemplars of substantive grounded theo-
ries (Awareness and Time), and formal grounded theories (Status Passage, and
Negotiations), with Anguish offering a case history, interweaving detailed nar-
rative with a “theoretical commentary.” This astonishingly rich and still evoca-
tive body of work can be thought of as the foundation of GTM, although as
explained later in this book, does not really provide the basis for a tutorial
guide for the methodologically perplexed or inexperienced researcher.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, primarily as a response to demands for
a more student-centered account, the method was the central theme of
Strauss’s solo work, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (1987); his co-
authored book with Julie Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded
Theory Procedures and Techniques (1990); and Glaser’s response to the lat-
ter work, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (1992). It has been argued
that Strauss was persuaded to produce his two titles in response to repeated
requests from students keen to learn more about the method, given that
the initial trilogy and later works were not really aimed at the novice audi-
ence. Strauss incorporated large sections—verbatim—of Glaser’s Theoretical
Sensitivity in Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, so linking it clearly to
the earlier works. But when his book did not quiet or dispel the clamor for
a more detailed account of the method, Strauss joined forces with Corbin to
produce Basics of Qualitative Research. Although there is significant continu-
ity between the two books, Glaser took issue vehemently only with the latter
text, going as far as asking that Strauss withdraw the book from publication
(Glaser, 1992, c hapter 1). In addition, Glaser published a response, Basics
of Grounded Theory Analysis, in which he explicitly distanced himself from
Strauss and Corbin, arguing that the only valid thread from the early works
lay through his own writings. Strauss, who died in 1996, never responded to
Glaser’s criticisms. A second edition of Strauss and Corbin’s book appeared in
1998, with two further editions appearing since, and Glaser has continued to
publish prolifically. The result is two parallel and contending threads tracing
the evolution of the method; one is centred on Glaser’s publications and the
related writings of those who largely follow his ideas, and the other follows
and develops from Strauss and Corbin’s work. The actual nature of the dif-
ferences between the two threads, however, is itself a matter of debate, as is
explained in some of the chapters in this book.
In the 1990s the method continued to evolve in other ways, most nota-
bly with the development of what has been termed Constructivist grounded
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Introduction xi
theory, introduced and articulated in the work of Kathy Charmaz, most nota-
bly in Constructing Grounded Theory (2006 and 2014). As a consequence,
there are now three broad strands of the method, all taking their lead from the
founding trilogy but differing in their methodological and philosophical bases
and orientations. Figure 1 illustrates these three strands, indicating the key
texts explicating each in what some researchers might consider a controversial
or questionable manner. nb: The early writings are labeled “canonical” because
they form the body of work that is universally recognized as the basis of the
method. Glaser’s insistence on claiming the mantle of “Classical Grounded
Theory” implies that he would include his writings as canonical, with those
of the other variants labeled departures from the method itself. This aspect of
grounded theory is discussed at various stages in Parts Two and Three of this
volume.
In what follows I offer an account of the method, largely anchored in
the constructivist camp, but seeking to adhere to Rapoport’s rules while tak-
ing cognizance of alternative orientations. In so doing I have drawn upon
another aspect of Strauss’s intellectual formation—Pragmatism—with the
aim of articulating a view of GTM that draws on the insights and strengths
of all three strands, locating the method as a clear exemplar of good research
practice, and a set of heuristics that promote grounded theorizing of the
Pragmatist kind.2
The topic of Pragmatism is taken up in later chapters, but in the words
of William James it centers on a view of a theory as an instrument “designed
to achieve a purpose—to facilitate action or increase understanding” (James
Strauss & Glaser Charmaz &

Corbin Classical or Bryant 2000
Variants Coding Objectivist Constructivist
and onwards
Paradigm & Pragmatist
Further
Articulations
1990s
Glaser & Strauss

Theoretical Sensitivity, Status Passage, Anguish,
Negotiations
CANONICAL
Glaser, Strauss & Quint
Awareness, Discovery, Time, The Nurse and
the Dying Patient 1960s
FIGURE 1 The Grounded Theory Method: Canonical Basis and Main Variants.
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xii Introduction
1907). Pragmatists treat our concepts and theories as instruments, applying

and judging them in terms of how well they achieve their intended purpose.
As is made clear in this book, this perspective on knowledge, action, and appli-
cation also lies at the heart of GTM; hence my use of the phrase grounded theo-
rizing in the title of this book. Until recently, however, this has been a largely
unacknowledged and poorly articulated aspect of the method.
It should be noted that most current accounts of the method offer expla-
nations of the three variants, often incorporating very different accounts and
perspectives on each of the threads. Such accounts should be judged in terms
of their usefulness and the light they shed on the central issues of the applica-
tion and value of the method itself. The varying ways in which people char-
acterize the different forms of the method can be seen as a microcosm of
differing views concerning the “emergence” of models, theories, and concepts
from the data. Clearly the same data provides the basis for disparate views of
the core concept of what I term grounded theorizing. This is something that
might be disturbing to some investigators, because it appears to permit and
even encourage a free-for-all agenda for research. Yet, as shown in later chap-
ters, adopting a Pragmatist perspective on the method tempers and grounds
GTM against these potentially unruly and chaotic tendencies, leading to its
characterization as a method for enacting abstraction and abduction (see
Chapter 18).
As noted at the beginning of this introduction, the method was initially
developed and articulated in the 1960s, a time of several major upheavals, some
of which laid claim to being revolutionary or world-changing. Universities,
particularly across Europe and the the United States, were the sites of mass pro-
test movements and innovations such as the sit-in, the teach-in, and eventu-
ally the love-in. Within the academies themselves there were other significant
forms of revolt or change, not perhaps as newsworthy but to some extent more
far-reaching and with greater long-term significance. Thus the period from the
late 1950s to the end of the 1960s marked the publication of several important
works, including Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (first published
1959) and Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (1962), and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s The
Social Construction of Reality (1966). The issues that these authors raised are
discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters of this book, but at this stage
it must be noted that, taken together, these works presented a range of chal-
lenges to orthodoxies relating to the nature of knowledge, scientific research,
and distinctions between science and other forms of claims to knowledge,
enquiry, or belief. In many respects the core arguments were not entirely new,
but they did represent novel and extended forms of older arguments, provid-
ing a serious critique to the universality and ubiquity of the scope of reason
and rationalism.
xiii
Introduction xiii
In the midst of these challenges to academic orthodoxy, Anselm Strauss

and Barney Glaser, working in conjunction with Jeanne Quint, published their
three founding texts for the Grounded Theory Method,3 Awareness, Discovery,
and Time. As I argue later in this book, their ideas can and should be located
against these other features of the time, although neither Glaser nor Strauss
ever sought to do so in any explicit fashion. Kuhn’s work is actually referred to
in footnote 15, page 28, of Discovery, where it is linked to the comment, “A the-
ory’s only replacement is a better theory.” The footnote continues, “this is a basic
finding in [Kuhn’s book]… . [W]‌e believe that this applies more to a grounded
theory than a logico-deductive one.” This is a highly ambiguous statement, and
in many senses an incorrect reading of Kuhn’s ideas, but at the time it passed
largely unnoticed. Nevertheless there may well be a case for grounded theories
to be more amenable to change or replacement than logico-deductive ones, but
neither Glaser nor Strauss ever took up this aspect of Kuhn’s work directly.
Looking back it can be seen that some of the upheavals of the period had
an immediate and lasting impact, whereas some had only a momentary place
in the spotlight. Others may not have had any major impact at the time but
have grown in reputation over the years. The grounded theory method (GTM)
certainly has some claim to being in the first category, particularly with the
publication of Discovery, and it has an even stronger claim to the third.
My intention in writing this book is to offer a series of chapters that deal
with the background to the method, details of the techniques it encompasses,
and some examples of how it has been used, drawing on the experiences of
some of my successful and highly accomplished doctoral students who have
used the method as part of their research. Readers will, however, have to be
patient with respect to many issues brought to their attention in the opening
chapters, as in many cases once they have been mentioned later discussion will
have to be postponed to a later section or chapter.
The chapters are presented in four main sections. Part One covers general
research issues and situates GTM against them. Part Two consists of one
chapter that deals with the background to the development of GTM, and
another that offers an overview of the method as a whole. Part Three com-
prises nine chapters that look in detail at what I term grounded theorizing—
that is, what is involved in doing GTM research. Finally, Part Four offers a
series of chapters summarizing the key arguments in this book, and also
taking these further with regard to issues such as “Big Data” (Chapter 16)
and an alternative approach to coding and modeling in GTM (Chapter 17).
There then follows a capstone discussion that draws together the claims
that GTM needs to be understood as a Pragmatist method. This is then
followed by a chapter that presents the ways in which GTM can be seen
as a model of good research practice (Chapter 18).4 Chapter 19 comprises
four verbatim accounts of the use of GTM in PhD research. A brief final
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xiv Introduction
chapter (Chapter 20) examines the ways in which a famous theorist of yore
can now be seen unwittingly to have been a highly effective grounded theorist.
At each stage, a range of different perspectives and audiences will have
been kept in mind: research students, supervisors or promoters, evaluators,
editors, and reviewers—that is, the practitioners, the potential practitioners,
and the gatekeepers. Within the academic community people’s understand-
ing of GTM has been based on what might be best referred to as a “mixed
press.” To some extent this is a result of the widely varying uses of GTM that
can be found in many publications invoking use of the method, where, all
too often, there is little more than a cursory use of “coding” that is sometimes
accompanied by a mantra-like justification. In the light of this kind of repre-
sentation, many reviewers and assessors are highly skeptical when faced with
a proposal or paper reporting GTM-oriented research. Such submissions are
often regarded as under-prepared and lacking in academic rigor and robust-
ness. The result is that many students presenting their dissertation topic and
their intention to make key use of GTM have a great onus placed on them to
justify their approach. In contrast,their colleagues and peers who use other
methods, whether quantitative or qualitative, will not be required to justify
their approach. Fortunately, there is now a burgeoning effort to rectify this
inequity, with books and publications aimed at explaining the intricacies of
GTM to academic gatekeepers, as well as to potential practitioners (see Bryant
2012 and Chapter 18 in this book).
The sequence of the 20 chapters that follow, and their segmentation into
four parts, represents what I consider to be the most coherent manner in
which to present the characterization of grounded theorizing as Pragmatism
in research practice. They begin with engaging with general issues about
research before moving on to an account of GTM in general, and only then
offering detailed discussions and examples of the method-in-use; finally pre-
senting chapters that reiterate and develop key themes, including one specifi-
cally focusing on Pragmatism and GTM.
Not all readers will wish to or need to follow this sequence; instead, they
will dip in and out of the text or focus on specific chapters. Furthermore some
aspects of my position can only be articulated in later chapters, requiring that
readers take certain points on trust until they can be developed in an explicit
manner. Reviewers of selected chapters in draft form have confirmed this: In
some cases they pointed out that novice readers might be best served by early
presentation of examples of GTM in use, prior to the chapters concerned with
the background to the method. In contrast, readers with more experience in
the method, but reading the book to gain a different perspective on GTM,
might want the Pragmatist aspects to be dealt with early on.
There is no way of reconciling these different standpoints and orienta-
tions, but I can indicate ways in which different readerships might approach
the chapters that follow. These are only suggestions, and readers will have to
decide on their own route through the text.
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Introduction xv
I assume that anyone reading this far already has some understanding of
research methods in general, but perhaps with only the vaguest idea about
GTM and a keen desire to learn more. Such readers might wish to jump
straight to Chapter 4 and then proceed through the chapters in Part Three for
examples of the method and detailed discussions of key features. Alternatively,
they could start with the example and exercises in Chapter 6, followed by the
further example in Chapter 7, and then go back to the overview presented in
Chapter 4, before reading the rest of Part Three. As I suggest at several points
in these chapters, however, readers should also refer to other GTM texts, par-
ticularly Charmaz’s Constructing Grounded Theory (2006 & 2014), to supple-
ment their understanding of the method.
The material in Part One covers topics that are addressed in many texts
and edited collections on research, several of which are referred to in those
chapters. In my experience with research students, however, they often gain a
great deal from engaging with these discussions from different angles, and in
Chapters 1 and 2 I seek to do this in a distinctive fashion, supplementing the
standard “textbooks” and collections. The discussion goes further, however, in
linking the key ideas about research methods to GTM and providing the basis
for the later chapters on the method itself.
Researchers with a fairly firm understanding of GTM, perhaps consid-
ering their final doctoral submission or a journal paper, should pay partic-
ular attention to Chapters 14, 17, and 18. Similarly, PhD examiners, as well
as journal editors and reviewers, should turn to Chapter 18, particularly the
summary tables. The section in Chapter 4 under the heading TheAccidents
and Essences of GTM, and Chapter 18 itself should provide useful guides to
GTM researchers at PhD level and beyond in pre-empting some of the misun-
derstandings and misapprehensions that unfortunately are prevalent among
evaluators, examiners, and reviewers.
Everyone interested in GTM should read Chapters 19 and 20. Chapter 19
is particularly important for doctoral researchers, as the four accounts provide
answers to many of the typical questions that students raise when first consid-
ering adoption of GTM, and later as their research develops. Chapter 20 might
seem quirky, but it should elicit a range of responses from readers, including
a spur to read or reread other sources on GTM, including papers detailing
GTM-oriented research findings and analyses.
A Note on Terminology
It has already been pointed out that the term grounded theory is something of
a misnomer if applied to the method as opposed to the outcome; hence my
preference for grounded theory method and the acronym GTM.
A further issue arises in discussing GTM in use. There are numerous exam-
ples of research publications that claim use of GTM in a highly questionable
xvi
xvi Introduction
manner. Nevertheless it is important to avoid any attempt to impose a tight

methodological orthodoxy on GTM which, after all, was developed as a flex-
ible alternative to counter prevailing orthodoxies and associated constraints in
social science research in the 1960s. As the later chapters illustrate, there are
many ways in which GTM can be and has been used imaginatively to good
effect, while retaining core features of the method. Consequently I have cho-
sen to coin the term GTM-oriented research to incorporate these features of
GTM-in-use.
Prior to a consideration of GTM in detail, it is worth taking some time
to consider a number of fundamental issues such as “What is research?”
and “What is a research method?” Such considerations will provide a con-
text against which GTM can be understood while its chief characteristics
and innovative features are being brought to the fore. The first two chapters
then offer an opportunity to relate the later discussion to the burgeoning and
very rich literature on research methods in general and qualitative research in
particular.
Key Points
¤ Rapoport’s four rules for a successful critical commentary—I leave it

to readers to determine the extent to which I have managed to adhere
to these rules in the chapters that follow.
¤ Grounded theory method—GTM

¤ Three progenitors of GTM—Glaser, Strauss, Quint
¤ Canonical texts for GTM—underlie all the major variants; the
appendices to Awareness, Time, and Status Passage are key sources for
the method as a whole.
¤ Three key variants—plus other articulations
¤ GTM-oriented research
¤ Characteristics of GTM in the light of challenges to the basis of
knowledge claims 1960s onward
Notes
1. I have not been able to locate the original source, but Daniel Dennett has used it
in recent years and so it is now linked to his work, although always clearly attributed to
Rapoport— see for instance http://schoolofthinking.org/2013/06/daniel-dennetts-seven-
tools-for-thinking/ nb: All URLs were checked in mid-April 2015.
2. This phrase echoes the title of the famous film Close Encounters of the Third Kind.
You may also have noted earlier use of the phrase “guide for the methodologically per-
plexed,” which echoes Moses Maimonides Guide for the Perplexed. Examples in a similar
vein occur throughout this book—for instance in endnote 4!
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Introduction xvii
3. Although the term grounded theory has the most currency, the more appropriate
term is the Grounded Theory Method (GTM), the term used throughout this book where
reference is to the method as opposed to the anticipated output—that is, a grounded theory.
4. As mentioned in endnote 2, here is another play on an established term; the original
phrase is to be found in Thomas the Tank Engine—A Very Useful Engine. http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Thomas_the_Tank_Engine
xviii
1
PART ONE
Research and Research Methods
When my son was at primary school he was always given homework to do,
and the deal was that it had to be done before he could go out and play, or
watch TV, or suchlike. One day he came home and announced that he had
no homework that day and so he could go and amuse himself without delay.
I asked him what the teacher had actually said at the end of class, and, as it
turned out, she had told the class that because they had exams in the next few
days there was no homework, but they should “do some revision.” So I asked
him if he knew what revision was. He told me he had no idea what it was, but
it wasn’t homework!
In a similar fashion students embarking on research projects, whether as
part of their undergraduate studies or for postgraduate qualifications, are con-
fronted with the prospect of doing something whose meaning might seem
“obvious,” but which is actually complex and often misunderstood. When
I moved from an undergraduate course to start my PhD, it was assumed that
students knew what was meant by “research,” and there were few if any texts or
courses on research methods. This state of affairs has since changed, and stu-
dents are offered courses and texts on a wide variety of research topics. Many
books devoted to specific methods or techniques assume that readers will have
encountered introductory discussions on the nature of research. In this book
I have chosen to offer two introductory chapters, one of which (Chapter 1)
discusses the nature of research itself and another that offers a framework
for discussing and assessing methods. This latter chapter—Chapter 2—also
encompasses a consideration of two topics that continue to perplex doctoral
students: epistemology and ontology.
2
3
Research
WHY (DO) RESEARCH?
It is assumed that people know about research: what it involves and how it is to

be carried out. After all, research is a widely used term, both within specialized
contexts and in more general and less specialized areas of study. For students
embarking on a research degree it might be thought that there is, or ought to
be, some well-regarded and consensual understanding of the term, yet in the
course of many years of teaching, it has become apparent to me that, like many
other common terms—for example, time, space, or quality—everyone knows
what research means, until someone asks for a definition or a clear description.
Suddenly, the complexities of the concept obstruct attempts to express one’s
ideas clearly and cogently. Just asking for a definition of the word research is
itself ambiguous, as one might be referring to a verb or a noun; respectively, to
a process or a product.
The noun form itself can also be both the object and the subject of a sen-
tence. For example in the sentence “[Barney] Glaser and [Anselm] Strauss
undertook their research partly as a result of their own recent family bereave-
ments,” research is the object. Whereas the word is the subject in the sentence
“Research has shown that many journal editors have an antipathy towards
submissions that report the use of GTM [grounded theory method].” As is
explained at greater length in Chapter 8, this latter form seemingly attributes
agency to the term research, which can be highly misleading. In the example
given, it is reasonable to infer that the word research is shorthand for a phrase
along the lines of “the research that was carried out”—that is, attributing
agency to the people who carried out the research. But for GTM, invocation
of phrases such as “the theory emerges from the data” implies that the action
emanates from and somehow resides in the theory and the data rather than
with the researcher. In some cases these issues are related primarily to the style
of writing, but it is important that some care be taken if there is any danger of
introducing ambiguity or a risk of misleading the reader.
3
4
4 Research and Research Methods
In recent years there has been in many ways a welcome plethora of acces-
sible and well-articulated books on research and research methods, includ-
ing excellent overviews such as that by Loraine Blaxter and colleagues (2006).
There are also many edited collections of articles by researchers and other
contributors with methodological expertise—for example, Norman Denzin
and Yvonna Lincoln’s Handbook of Qualitative Research (2005). Many of these
volumes open with general reflections on the nature of research, different types
of research, and discussion of what constitutes “doing research” for everyone
from undergraduates through to doctoral students and senior researchers. So
at this point, before reading any further, you might want to take a moment to
respond to the question: “What is research?” (nb: I would not recommend that
you spend too much time at this stage on similar considerations of time, space,
or quality. Of the three time is certainly the most challenging. Some people
might claim that space can be defined as “the final frontier,” but that would
only satisfy fans of the original, classic series of Star Trek.)1
Here are some examples of the ways in which research is discussed in well-
regarded and widely used texts on research methods. Easterby-Smith et al.,
in their book Management Research (2012) do not actually define research,
but they make the point that it is not something done only by experts. “Most
people spend a lot of time trying to make sense of everyday experiences …”
(p. 3). Robson, in Real World Research (2002), notes that the term has negative
connotations; “research … puts people off … another word for enquiry …”
(2002, p. xv). Blaxter et al., in their book How to Research, interestingly do not
include an item in their index for the term, but on page 63 they provide an
illustrative box titled “Research families, approaches and techniques.”2 Phillips
and Pugh, in How to Get a PhD, devote a whole chapter (Chapter 5, p. 46 et
seq., 3rd edition, 2000) to the topic, explaining that research certainly involves
“finding out about something you don’t know.” But they immediately point
out that this is both too wide and too narrow a characterization. It is too wide
in the sense that if, for instance, you don’t know the time of the next train to
London, finding out about this would hardly qualify as research. In contrast, it
is also too narrow because research also includes “finding that you don’t know
something.” So the authors try to distinguish between intelligence gathering
(“what” questions) and research (“why” questions).
Many key texts do not define or even try to characterize research, per-
haps assuming that readers already have a fairly good idea of what is involved.
David Silverman, an authority on research methods, as demonstrated by
extensive authorship and editorship of numerous key texts and resources over
many years, exemplifies this. No doubt, and with some justification, he would
argue that anyone seeking out books such as his Interpreting Qualitative Data
(5th edition, 2015) or Qualitative Research (3rd edition, 2011) already has
some idea of what is involved in doing research. But that does not help cast any
light on the present discussion.
5
Research 5
It is worth noting at this point that most, but not all, titles relating to quan-
titative research employ the term “quantitative methods” rather than “quan-
titative research,” thereby avoiding this issue—something that will be taken
further in the later discussion on methods and tools in Chapter 2. A quick
search using Google books resulted in around 5 million hits for both “quanti-
tative methods” and “quantitative research,” but most of the items in the latter
list contained the term “method” rather than “research” in their titles.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that research involves
enquiring, gathering of data or information, and taking specialized approaches
to analyzing what has been gathered. Using a very wide understanding of the
term, it might be argued that to some extent everyone is “doing research,” but
taken at face value this is not really very useful or enlightening. Monsieur
Jourdain, in Molière’s Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme,3 was delighted to discover
that he had been talking prose for his entire life. Perhaps his false flatterer,
Dorante, could similarly have persuaded him that he had also been engaged in
research. If that is all there is to it, however, what is the point of all the learned
tomes on research methods, tools, practices, and the like?
Research must be more than a generic form of enquiry; there must be
something more robust and formal about the activity. Donna Mertens offers a
succinct and clear statement to this effect in her text on educational and psy-
chological research (2010):
Research is one of many different ways of knowing or understanding. It is
different from other ways of knowing, such as insight, divine inspiration,
and acceptance of authoritative dictates, in that it is a process of system-
atic inquiry that is designed to collect, analyze, interpret, and use data.
Research is conducted for a variety of reasons, including to understand,
describe, predict, or control an educational or psychological phenomenon
or to empower individuals in such contexts. (p. 2)
Note the term systematic and the verb forms referring to the actions carried
out by researchers; these echo the ones used in the previous paragraph—e.g.
enquiring, gathering, analyzing.
If you took the time earlier to respond to the question “What is research?”
perhaps you included ideas along the lines of collection of evidence or data,
critical analysis, review of literature, dissemination and publication, engage-
ment with peers and others; also quality criteria such as reliability, credibil-
ity, replicability, and relevance. In this sense “doing research” comes to be
seen as involving a series of inter-linked activities, with inputs, outputs, and
constraints. Enquiry is certainly involved, but so too are motivation, critical
insight, interpretation, and other activities that require skill, expertise, and
experience. Texts on research methods indicate the sorts of skills that are
required, and we shall see later in Chapter 4 that the grounded theory method
(GTM) places these skills at center stage in the form of theoretical sensitivity,
6
as well as various forms of coding, theoretical saturation, and the like. In so

doing GTM immediately raises the idea that consideration of research activi-
ties cannot simply be seen in an abstract and immaterial sense but must relate
to the development of research skills by researchers themselves. This aspect
is all too often obscured when these topics are discussed with disembodied
terms and/or passive locutions. For instance, phrases such as “the research was
carried out,” “a number of questions were posed,” “the following results were
obtained,” all evade the issue of who actually did the research, posed the ques-
tions, and obtained the results. This is unhelpful and misleading, giving the
impression that the person or persons carrying out the research are somehow
unimportant or at least interchangeable with other researchers.
Given that many texts assume that the reader knows something of what
research involves and means, their authors move on to a consideration of
the different types or forms of research. This involves partitioning “research”
into subcategories based on various criteria. In some cases these criteria are
centered on the aim or topic of the research—pure, applied, emancipatory,
policy-based, and so on. In other cases the key aspect of research refers to the
approach to be taken, starting with the top-level distinction between quantita-
tive and qualitative approaches.
The qualitative/quantitative distinction aligns research in terms of the
main form of the data and subsequent modes of analysis and manipulation,
while criteria such as pure, applied, emancipatory relate to the over-arching
aim of the research. These different alignments are not mutually exclusive,
and so applied research might be qualitative or quantitative, or both. In recent
times it has not been uncommon to find that writers refer to the distinction
between hypothesis-oriented research and non-hypothesis-oriented research,
a result of Glaser and Strauss’s pioneering work, which offered the latter alter-
native as a valid and systematic option.
The outcome of all of this is that researchers need to have some aware-
ness of the different ways in which the idea of research—in terms of both the
verb and the noun forms—that is, process and product—can be subdivided
and classified, perhaps necessitating each research project to be characterized
in some manner aligning with these sorts of issues. But exactly how this is
decided and explicated will depend on the background to the project and the
audience being addressed. What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that
there is no single, coherent way in which the research domain can be classified
and subdivided; each attempt to do so will, in some manner, depend on the
idiosyncrasies of the classifier, the motivations behind such classification, as
well as the nature of the research activity itself.
Researchers must also be clear that the terms qualitative research and
quantitative research refer to the methods used, and not necessarily to the
data. Those investigators using qualitative methods may still use quantitative
data, and those using quantitative methods may use qualitative data. The latter
7
Research 7
group will certainly incorporate non-quantifiable assumptions and reason-

ing, which themselves can become the source of major controversies. Anyone
doubting this need look no further than the work and the website of Ben
Goldacre, who offers numerous examples of “Bad Science.”4 Admittedly, many
of his examples emanate from journalists and politicians; groups of people who
have a tendency to exhibit a poor or nonexistent understanding of numeracy
and statistics. But many other of Goldacre’s examples relate to issues found in
and around academic research domains, with neuroscience being a favorite
(Goldacre, 2009). Conversely, researchers using qualitative methods are often
found wanting in their use of basic mathematical concepts; for instance, using
the term average without understanding the distinctions between mean, mode,
and median. (Note to readers: make sure you are aware of these distinctions
before reading any further!)
It must be understood that qualitative research can and should make use
of quantitative data, indicating and discussing various interpretations and
ramifications of such data. Also, researchers using quantitative approaches
need to recognize and understand a range of issues around such research,
including the nature and quality of the data used, robustness of sampling, test-
ing, significance, and eventual interpretation of the results, even if they are
calculated to several significant figures. (I have yet to see any research reports
consisting solely of quantitative findings—there is always considerable textual
explanation and explication, adding further complexities of potential ambigu-
ity and differing interpretations.)
Another key issue with regard to research relates to the various forms of
evaluation and scrutiny that need to be undertaken as part of the process of
doing research—a key factor that differentiates research from mere enquiry.
No one is his or her own best critic, so the image of the lone researcher is only
a very small part of the picture of the research process: at best, only a partial
and unilluminating one; at worst, a downright misleading representation. It
is far better to understand the process as involving a research community of
practice or several overlapping communities of practices (plural in both cases)
constantly interacting in various forms of dialogue, including conferences,
seminars, peer review, and the like. This idea undermines limited conceptions
of research that focus only on a project or an outcome. Researchers always
have to encounter forms of evaluation and scrutiny. At the outset these will
include submission of proposals to review boards or funding committees, as
well as discussions with teachers and supervisors. Later in the process, there
will be various interim checkpoints, progress indicators, upgrade reviews, and
the like. Eventually there will be examinations, peer review and, possibly, sub-
mission for review and later publication. All of these procedures are part of
the research process, and many research methods fail to address some of these
important aspects of enquiry, or they explicitly focus only on some selected
facets. The grounded theory method, to the credit of its progenitors and later
8
authors, has a good deal to offer with regard to most, if not all of these aspects
of study, as discussed in the chapters that follow. Moreover, the method itself
must be seen as offering a series of important challenges to taken-for-granted
tenets of research practice as they existed in the United States and elsewhere
in the 1960s.
Barney Glaser has stressed the importance of publication for researchers,
and he has done so consistently since his early research in the 1960s, when
access to publication was restricted to the printed page—journals or books. He
has a long-established record of publication and self-publication, particularly
in the form of his Sociology Press,5 which he started in the 1970s. With the
advent of the Internet, blogs, Web pages, and the like offer far more possibili-
ties for dissemination and self-publication. The massive extent and continued
growth of such opportunities has a major downside, however, as it militates
against any individual publication’s gaining attention in a sea of contending
materials and sources. Anyone and everyone can now put research reports on
personal Web pages, but will anyone read them or take notice?
At this point, you might wish to return to, and revise, earlier attempts to
respond to the challenge of answering the question: “What is research?” My
view is that this is a question that should be side-stepped, and replaced by ask-
ing instead, “What is involved in doing research?”6 This immediately raises the
issues of the processes and activities involved, including the necessity for dis-
semination and dialogue in some form of research community, without which
investigation of a topic amounts to no more than a pastime or hobby. If some-
one undertakes even a detailed and rigorous investigation of a topic, it cannot
be considered a full-fledged research activity until it has been disseminated
among those most capable of evaluating the findings and outcomes, offering
critiques and relevant insights.
A Note on Quantitative versus Qualitative Research
“Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that
can be counted counts.” (a sign in Albert Einstein’s office at Princeton
University)
Glaser and Strauss, in developing GTM, set out to challenge the prevail-
ing orthodoxy in many ways, seeking to undermine the view that qualita-
tive research is inferior to quantitative research, with the former seen at best
merely as a preparatory step toward the “real work” of quantitative research.
The grounded theory method was designed to offer a rigorous basis for doing
qualitative research, putting it on a par with quantitative approaches. Glaser
and Strauss saw the field of social sciences in the United States in the 1950s and
1960s as characterized by this hierarchy of approaches; a stance encapsulated
9
Research 9
in the maxim, “If you cannot measure it, you cannot (control) improve it.” In
some fields this view still predominates, so that for many researchers and—
perhaps more important—for many disciplinary and research domain gate-
keepers, valid research ought to be quantitative. The saying is attributed to
Lord Kelvin (Sir William Thomson, the first Baron Kelvin). A more extended
version runs as follows:
In physical science the first essential step in the direction of learning any
subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable meth-
ods for measuring some quality connected with it. I often say that when
you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers,
you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you
cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatis-
factory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely
in your thoughts advanced to the state of Science, whatever the matter
may be. [Popular Lectures and Addresses {PLA}, vol. 1, “Electrical Units of
Measurement,” 1883-05-03] available at http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/quotes.
Kelvin/Thomson was a physicist and engineer of renown, and his work
included the calculation of absolute zero.7 Kelvin also argued, however, that
“radio has no future” and “X-rays will prove to be a hoax,” while he warned
the Niagara Falls Power Company that it should “avoid the gigantic mistake of
alternating current,” and stated in his address to the British Association for the
Advancement of Science in 1900, that “There is nothing new to be discovered
in physics now, All that remains is more and more precise measurement.” (The
attribution of this last statement to Kelvin is disputed, because the original
source cannot be confirmed.) So much for Lord Kelvin’s prognostications!
Researchers have regularly made the mistake of measuring what can be
measured, rather than attending to an investigation of the key issues—whether
or not they are amenable to simple, or not-so-simple, quantification. Glaser
and Strauss could have counted the number of patients who died in the various
hospital wards they investigated; they could also have looked at the number
of days or hours that elapsed between admission to the hospital, the various
stages of the deteriorating condition of patients, and their eventual demise.
This data might have produced some meaningful outcomes, but the concepts
of “awareness” and “time” would not have emanated from such studies. Their
qualitative and conceptual work has had enormous practical significance
for the care of the terminally ill, undermining any argument that qualitative
research results merely in impressionistic, vague, and inconsequential out-
comes. In many respects, however, the practical application of their early work
owed a great deal to Jeanne Quint.
Kelvin’s longer quotation cited above expresses the view that nonquantita-
tive studies are “at best” a preliminary to true knowledge, which must always
be quantitative, but the results of the burgeoning of qualitative research that
10
has developed at least since the 1960s indicate something very different. The
outcomes of qualitative research can be poor, ill-defined, lacking in rigor, and
of little practical use; but so too can the outcomes of quantitative research.
Many papers replete with statistical results to several places of decimals, in
even the most prestigious journals, elicit nothing more than a “so what?”
response. Thanks to the efforts of Glaser and Strauss—as well as many others
who have contributed to innovation in research practice in many disciplines—
qualitative research can be carried out in accord with clear and coherent crite-
ria, laying a foundation for rigorous claims to knowledge and conceptual and
theoretical innovation. The writings of Denzin and Lincoln (2005), Silverman
(2011, 2015), and Uwe Flick (2014), among many others, attest to this. This is
not in any way meant to invert the position and claim that qualitative research
is superior to quantitative research, but it is important that people realize that
different approaches to the process of doing research offer different outcomes
and may be used for different purposes, many of which can be highly practical
and effective.
The grounded theory method has had something of a “bad press” among
certain groups of research authorities. There are various issues and weaknesses
in the ways in which some researchers have sought to use the method or claim
its use in their publications. But it is unfair to use these findings to demean all
and any GTM-based research. Because such criticisms and failings are all too
common across all research approaches, it would seem to be better to argue
that the level of concern regarding quantitative research is too low, rather than
that the concern with qualitative research is too high. Goldacre has done much
to expose the misuse of statistical research (2008), and there is now consider-
able evidence of questionable practices with regard to publication of medical
research and deliberate misreporting or even suppression of some “inconve-
nient” findings (e.g., Bad Pharma, Goldacre, 2013); but this should never be
taken to imply that all research of this kind should fall under suspicion.
Research has to be understood as a social activity—doing research—with
constant reminders that it is almost always something done by more than
just one investigator. Researchers get involved in certain subjects or topics
for a variety of reasons, and the process in which they engage proceeds as a
social activity; including grant applications and funding, hierarchies, mentor-
ing, appeal to authorities, publication, and dissemination. (This last aspect is
stressed as the basis for the ability of research findings to be replicated, corrob-
orated, or questioned. But in terms of “getting published,” there is little or no
kudos awarded for replicating other people’s results. Therefore, many research
findings are not, perhaps, as strong as might appear at first sight, and they may
even be incorrect or invalid.) This activity, or series of related activities, leads
to a strong focus not only on the outcomes of a research project but also on the
methods employed to arrive at those outcomes. And it is to this topic that we
turn in Chapter 2.
11
Research 11
Key Points
¤ Definitions of research (noun and verb) and the idea of doing research
¤ Different ways of differentiating between types of research
¤ Limitations of Lord Kelvin’s statement regarding measurement and
control—the sign in Albert Einstein’s Princeton office
¤ Qualitative and quantitative methods—and the necessity for
researchers to gain familiarity with aspects of both regardless of which
approach they choose
¤ Qualitative researchers need to understand some basic quantitative

concepts and also how to use quantitative data
¤ Quantitative researchers need to understand limitations of quantitative

analysis and inevitability of insight and interpretation
¤ Grounded theory method, like all other methods, should be judged

by its strongest and most notable published examples. Poor examples
abound for all methods, but they should not be taken as fair reflections
of those methods, only of the research itself.
Notes
1. In the light of a reference to Star Trek, Glaser’s claim to “Classic GTM” suggests the
question of whether Glaser played Spock to Strauss’s Captain Kirk—or vice-versa! And per-
haps there are parallels between later versions of the series and later developments within
and around GTM?
2. They also offer a whole host of other riches, including numerous boxes and lists of
key points such as “20 forms of procrastination,” immediately followed by 20 suggestions
for overcoming procrastination! (Boxes 8.1 and 8.2, pp.229–230 3rd edition, 2006).
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Le_Bourgeois_gentilhomme
4. http://www.badscience.net/
5. http://www.sociologypress.com/
6. I could have used the term researching, but prefer the phrase doing research.
7. Temperatures based on absolute zero are measured in degrees Kelvin; 0 degrees
Kelvin equates to minus 273.15 degrees centigrade/celsius.
12
13
Research Methods
Though this be madness yet there is method in it (Shakespeare,

Hamlet)
Background
As explained in Chapter 1, the term grounded theory is actually a misnomer.

First and foremost it refers to a method of carrying out research, so my pre-
ferred term is the grounded theory method or GTM. The method itself was
first demonstrated to a wider audience with the publication of Glaser and
Strauss’s 1965 monograph Awareness of Dying (hereinafter cited as Awareness),
although some papers had already appeared, for instance “Social Loss of
Dying Patients” (1964), “Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction” (1964),
and “Temporal Aspects of Dying as a Non-scheduled Status Passage” (1965).
These authors also wrote an early paper on the method, but in it they used
the term substantive theory as opposed to grounded theory: “The Discovery
of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative Research”
(1965). Awareness included an appendix titled “Methods of Collection and
Analysis of Data,” which sketched the characteristics of GTM, although it was
far from a detailed account aimed at the research novice, nor was it intended
to be. Time for Dying (1968) (hereinafter cited as Time) also offered a chapter
on the method.1
As explained later in this chapter, GTM was highly innovative and chal-
lenging to the research orthodoxy of the time, and in that regard, it retains
something of its radical and unsettling character even 50 years after its incep-
tion (which perhaps says at least as much about research orthodoxy as it does
about GTM2). Although it is difficult to date with any accuracy, the present
concern for methods has proliferated from at least the 1980s onward, as evi-
denced in the growth of the methodological literature as well as the increasing
importance placed on the methodological justification required in research
applications and research papers. In many respects the focus on methods is to
be welcomed because it requires researchers to make their methods explicit
13
14
for those evaluating or reading about their findings. Thus the process of actu-
ally doing research is made more visible, providing guidance and exemplars
for other investigators, as well as forming a basis for understanding and eval-
uating research outcomes. This can sometimes prove to be burdensome for
researchers, however, and it may mislead readers if methodological claims are
poorly expressed or are based on misconceptions or unfounded assertions—
something that has proved to be irksome with regard to GTM, although it is at
least as widespread across all other methods.
Even if methodological claims are clearly and cogently expressed, however,
it is important that anyone evaluating or studying such accounts is aware of
the criteria by which methodological adequacies might be judged. If qualitative
methods are deemed second-rate or merely preparatory to quantitative ones,
criteria for methodological adequacy will largely be those relating to quanti-
tative methods—e.g. sample size and nature of sample, reliability and appro-
priateness of measures and forms of analysis employed, significance levels,
and replicability. In this regard, then, non-quantitative methods will always be
deemed inadequate or incomplete, for the most part relying on small samples,
descriptive or narrative presentation, and discursive evaluation, among other
factors. Does this mean that qualitative research should be judged by criteria
wholly different from those applied to quantitative research? If so, what should
those criteria be, and how might they relate to the criteria established for evalu-
ating other forms of research? Surely all research should, to some extent, be
judged by identical criteria, but if that is the case what should the nature of such
criteria be, and how will they be applied to the various methods? All research
methods should afford a basis for rigorous and systematic investigation, but for
any specific method there will be far more detailed criteria linked to the par-
ticular aspects of that method. In the discussion that follows, these issues will
be presented both in generic terms and then with regard to GTM in particular.
In Chapter 1 I noted that there is no single, coherent, and widely accepted
manner of categorizing different types of research, although there are some
fairly high-level distinctions that have garnered a broad consensus. Yet at more
detailed levels, this agreement quickly dissipates. A similar case can be made
with regard to methodological criteria, there being some general agreement on
features such as rigor, reliability or dependability, robustness, and the like, that
apply to the methods themselves. Other criteria, such as credibility, transfer-
ability, and confirmability, relate more to the outcomes of research. Applying
each and every one of these criteria to a specific method is problematic, as is
seeking to draw a comparison between how different methods measure up
against these criteria.
Quantitative methods appear to some investigators to be more reliable
and rigorous than nonquantitative methods because some of the findings
can be expressed in exact numbers, or at least as statistical probabilities. Such
confidence can be misplaced, however, as noted in Chapter 1. The numbers
15
Research Methods 15
themselves will and must always be supplemented by some form of discur-

sive explanation, which itself will be open to (mis)interpretation and discus-
sion. As shown later in C hapters 3 and 4 Glaser and Strauss were keen to
establish a similar status for GTM as was readily claimed by other methods
in the social sciences—an ambition that was ambiguous as they sought both
adherence to the same criteria as applied to existing hypothesis-based, quan-
titative approaches, while simultaneously making a strong case for criteria of
research quality that they deemed to be unique to GTM. This conundrum can
be resolved with a deeper understanding of the Pragmatist roots of GTM. The
full explanation of this foundation is presented later, in Chapter 17.
TERMINOLOGY
At this point it is worth paying some attention to the terms used in discussions
concerned with research methods. In their book How to Research, Loraine
Blaxter and colleagues. (2006) offer a three-tiered overview of research meth-
odology, with two families at the top, followed by four approaches succeeded
by four techniques. They are at pains to point out that these categories all
map across each other, so that one of the techniques may be used in several
approaches and claimed by any of the family types. They also offer a compari-
son between the qualitative and quantitative paradigms of research, but their
fieldwork/deskwork distinction is far less contentious than the qualitative/
quantitative one (p. 65). Bryman (2004) refers to two strategies, qualitative and
quantitative; while Denscombe (2007) uses the same term, but refers to eight
strategies, three methods, and introduces the qualitative/quantitative distinc-
tion at the level of analysis (see Table 2.1).
From this brief look at several methodologies, it becomes clear that it
is easy to get confused by the way in which terms such as strategy, method,
approach, tool, and technique abound in the literature. In some cases the same
TABLE 2.1
Different ways of cutting the “research” cake
Blaxter et al Bryman Denscombe
chapter 3—pages 63–65 chapter 1—page 20
Two Families—qualitative Two Strategies—qualitative and Three aspects

or quantitative; quantitative Strategies—including surveys,
deskwork or fieldwork Quantitative—deductive, testing case studies, experiments,
Four Approaches—action theory, incorporating sampling, ethnography, phenomenology,
research, case studies, interviewing, questionnaires grounded theory, mixed
experiments, surveys methods, action research
Qualitative—inductive,
Four Techniques— constructivist, interpretivist, Methods of Social Research—
documents, interviews, incorporating ethnography, questionnaires, interviews,
observation, participatory observation, observation, documents
questionnaires interviewing, language, and Analysis—quantitative, qualitative
documents
16
word means different things, and in others different words refer to the same
aspect of research. In a single article or book both of these forms of confusion
can occur. Thus an author may well use the terms method and approach as
synonyms—for example, referring to the grounded theory method and the
grounded theory approach—but later using method to mean two different
things—for example, the grounded theory method and the interview method.
In some cases this confusion can be avoided, but in other instances it is more
difficult to clarify terminology. Unfortunately, such confusion abounds in
all texts on research methods—including this one. For the purposes of this
discussion, the following distinctions and use of terms will be adhered to as
far as possible, but readers should note the warning implicit in the preceding
sentence!
Methodology
Technically speaking, words using the suffix “-ology” refer to the study of a
topic; e.g. biology, pathology, geology. Unfortunately current use of the term
methodology is not consistent with this, and many authors use the term syn-
onymously with method. In contrast, some authors have argued that a method-
ology, as distinct from a method, includes explicit justification for the approach
or method being used: the underlying philosophy serving to justify the basis
of the method in general as well as its use. This distinction is not entirely con-
vincing, as many methods imply a philosophy of some sort, even if this is not
made explicit. As a consequence, the term “methodology” will be avoided in
the remainder of this discussion, but readers should be aware that when they
come across the term they should take care to establish the way it has been
used. (Some examples are given later, in Chapter 14, where I analyze a variety
of publications that invoke GTM, with some referring to the grounded theory
methodology, as well as to symbolic interactionist methodology.) Strauss and
Corbin use the term methodology, defining it as “A way of thinking about and
studying social reality” (1998, p. 3 and 2008, p. 1). They then define methods as
“techniques and procedures for gathering and analyzing data.”
Approach
Approach is a generic term sometimes used in formal research proposals and
funding bids, usually in the sense of claiming to undertake a research proj-
ect covering wide-ranging research activities—for example, a quantitative
approach, or a participatory approach. Researchers are sometimes required to
discuss and clarify their orientation with regard to issues such as epistemol-
ogy and ontology, making use of terms such as a (neo)positivist or constructiv-
ist approach to their work (see the later discussion in this chapter, and the
summary in Table 2.6). In some cases use of the term approach occurs as a
preamble, with the researcher(s) moving on from this to outline their research
strategy in more detail.
17
Research Methods 17
Strategy
Although potentially synonymous with approach, the term strategy is more
oriented toward articulation of the reasoning behind a researcher’s choice
of method(s), and the application of method(s) in the research itself. As a
consequence, such articulations or discussions should include characteriza-
tion of the project in terms of the detailed processes and principles that have
been selected or are under consideration. Such discussions will initially be
offered as plans and projections for future work, and can provide the basis for
evaluating the project at a later date—when it has been completed, partially
completed, or abandoned. Strategies will usually involve several methods,
and so they should also indicate the ways in which these combinations are
envisaged to be employed. Note that, on the one hand, Strauss and Corbin, in
their Basics of Qualitative Research (1990, 1998), offer a definition of methods
(plural), implying exactly this aspect of strategy. On the other hand, Glaser
and Strauss’s subtitle for Discovery is Strategies for Qualitative Research, which
places method at a higher level than strategy; so perhaps here the term strate-
gies is more akin to the idea of techniques as defined under that heading, below.
At present discussing mixed methods, is in vogue, but this term can be an
awkward and misleading one. I would argue that it seems to detract from recogni-
tion that virtually all research involves a combination of methods, tools, and tech-
niques; there are few if any examples of a pure application of any single method,
because methods usually falter at the first contact with the research setting.3 For
this reason, researchers should be encouraged to discuss and articulate their strat-
egies; that is, how they assembled and developed their research using different
choices, selecting some options and rejecting others, as well as how these choices
may have changed and developed along the way. Research involves overarching
aims and objectives, and in the aftermath of Glaser and Strauss’s pioneering work,
we must recognize that full articulation of these aims and objectives may only
come about as a result of doing some research in the first place. As I noted in
Chapter 1 in regard to the use of the term GTM-oriented research, another term,
methods in use, might be more appropriate than research method if the latter is
thought to refer to some paradigmatic textbook example. The term mixed meth-
ods applies most readily to cases where different methods are expressly used for
the purposes of triangulation (see Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011).
Method
Best understood as a distinctive and clearly articulated research approach,
method is sometimes confused with terms such as tool or technique—which
seem to be what Strauss and Corbin meant by the term. Texts on quantitative
methods often include a series of chapters on ways of analyzing quantitative
data, whereas other texts detail strategies for collecting the data, sampling, and
so on. The term itself is discussed at far greater length below, under the head-
ing A Framework for Thinking About Methods.
18
Burns (2000) offers a fairly orthodox account in his book Introduction

to Research Methods, defining research as “a systematic investigation to find
answers to a problem” (p. 3). He draws a sharp distinction between “the sci-
entific method” and the “naturalistic approach”; the former being concerned
with control, operational definitions, replication, and hypothesis testing, the
latter focusing on subjective experience. Burns also uses the terms nomothetic
and idiographic to refer, respectively, to these two strategies, the former being
concerned with the development of general, law-like statements, the latter
centered on individual studies.
A different approach can be found in a text titled Doing Quantitative
Research in the Social Sciences (Black, 1999). Here Black uses the term research
design, comprising measurement, collecting factual data, evaluating data qual-
ity, and turning data into information using statistics. Needless to say, this is an
important aspect of research, and an issue such as data quality is important for
all forms of research. But the domain of research extends beyond these aspects
of design, and any approach may only cover a subset of Black’s terms, as shown
later in the discussion of the scope or periphery of a method.
Technique
A technique is a well-delineated set of one or more activities. In research,
techniques will be common to many different approaches, strategies, and
methods—for example, interviewing, document analysis, and coding, among
others. Yet there will be key variations in use and centrality of a technique
depending on the method within which it is used—for example, sampling and
coding as part of GTM are highly distinctive, although several other meth-
ods have taken up the insights and good practices embodied in GTM—for
example, in the use of GTM-like coding in methods such as IPA (interpreta-
tive phenomenological analysis—see Smith et al., 2009).
Tool
Increasingly, researchers make use of a wide variety of tools, mostly computer-
based. Applications for analyzing quantitative datahave been around for a long
time, but now there is a growing number of tools for qualitative data analy-
sis, such as NVivo and MAXQDA; collectively termed CAQDAS—Computer
Assisted Qualititave Data AnalysiS. (See Silver and Lewins, 2014 for a detailed
account of various options.) As is the case with all tools, there are those who
regard these computer applications as de-skilling the process and introducing
surreptitious constraints, whereas other investigators argue that such advances
bring new possibilities to the research process. Glaser has expressed his disap-
proval of the various software tools for coding in GTM, and to an extent he is
correct if use of such facilities is at the expense of the researcher’s own insights
and skills. More critical, however, is that researchers have to understand that
tools are themselves constructs, and thus embody techniques and methods
19
Research Methods 19
in specific ways. Some tools may well offer considerable flexibility, affording
researchers a good deal of scope to fit the tool to their strategy rather than the
converse. On the other hand many of my PhD students find software tools far
too unwieldy and have opted for simpler and ultimately more effective “tools”;
for instance sticky notes and a large wall! (See Part Three of this book for more
detailed accounts.)
Model
A model is an abstraction that focuses on an aspect of research. Some mod-
els are developed using precise notations and rules, but even in such cases
researchers should always bear in mind George Box’s dictum: “All models are
wrong, but some are useful.” A grounded theory is a model, and takes account
of Box’s formulation with the concepts of a substantive grounded theory and
a formal grounded theory—see Chapter 4 for a more extended discussion of
these terms.
Table 2.2 summarizes the discussion of the terms used so far with refer-
ence to GTM—if some of the details in the right-hand column are not familiar,
they should be once the reader has made progress through later chapters of
this book.
TABLE 2.2
GTM in terms of methodology, method, tool, technique, model: (Details on these are
presented in the chapters in Part Three)
Methodology Texts such as Awareness, Discovery, and Time were not only exemplars of the
grounded theory method in use, they also served as sources for articulating the
methodology—i.e., the rationale behind the method. This is explained in more
detail in Part Two of this book, where the context from which GTM “emerged” is
described.
Status Passage is the only example of a Formal grounded theory [FGT] that was
produced by Glaser and Strauss in concert.
Method GTM was defined by Glaser and Strauss as a method encompassing “Strategies
for Qualitative Research.” Perhaps the term strategies should be understood as
techniques in the sense used in this chapter.
GTM offers a specific combination and implementation of coding, conceptualizing,
abstracting, and theorizing.
Iteration around data gathering and analysis—coding-cum-analysis
Techniques Coding—initial/open, focused, theoretical
Sampling—purposive/convenience, theoretical
Memo-making
Theoretical sorting and theoretical saturation
Tools Coding notes
Memos
Diagrams
Sticky notes
Color visualizations
Software
Models Codes, categories, and concepts
Grounded theories—Substantive and Formal
Hypotheses—as an outcome of the research
20
A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT METHODS
In the 1980s and 1990s I worked for a time as a software developer and later
taught courses on software development methods. This served as the basis for
the development of my framework for methods. 4 Modern electronic computers
appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, finally becoming commercially usable in the
early 1950s with the construction of LEO5 in the UK in 1951 (Ferry 2010), fol-
lowed by commercial production of computer hardware later that decade. The
software that ran on these machines was developed by small teams of people
most often working in an ad hoc fashion. As computer-based systems became
more complex, expensive, and time- consuming, people began to develop
guidelines and principles of good practice (termed “methods” or “methodolo-
gies”), both in terms of addressing and guiding the processes of teams working
together to build increasingly complex and wide-ranging systems, and devel-
oping the product itself. Gradually a number of development methods were
articulated and gained a wide measure of implementation. Some of them were
linked to named suppliers (proprietary methods); others were published, widely
disseminated, and offered for use more generally in the hope that some standard
practices would emerge (open or non-proprietary methods). By the 1980s both
forms flourished and became almost overwhelming in number and explanatory
detail, with some estimates putting the number of methods on offer in the hun-
dreds. In many cases the differences between methods were trivial. But there
were also more substantive distinctions; one method was seen as more appro-
priate for one type of system than for others, and vice-versa.
One of the key initial impulses behind the development and promulgation
of such methods was the recognition that there needed to be some form of
continuity and standardization in the development of these increasingly large
and complex computer-based systems (hereinafter referred to as information
systems, since that is what they were and are), thereby ensuring a measure
of rigor, reliability, dependability, and robustness to the systems themselves.
Moreover the development process, as well as the working system, had to be
open to inspection with regard to various quality criteria; the system not only
had to operate correctly, it had to do so in a manner that made it usable by
some specified target groups of users, as well as amenable to enhancement at
later dates by technically qualified system developers.
Early development methods were highly prescriptive, which was under-
standable given that large numbers of inexperienced people were being
recruited to satisfy the new and growing demand for information systems
developers. There was a significant turnover of staff, with many of those
employed at the start of a development project leaving to take up new, and
usually more remunerative, opportunities midway through the process. Only
with some generally understood and coherent method in place could new
people, with familiarity of these widely disseminated approaches, be readily
taken on without severely delaying the project as a whole.
21
Research Methods 21
Over time the plethora of methods dissipated, with general acceptance of

a fairly small number of distinct approaches taking center stage. This change
was accompanied by recognition that slavish adherence to prescriptive meth-
ods had severe disadvantages, and a more flexible orientation was better suited
to an increasingly mature group of systems practitioners. There still needed
to be safeguards against falling back into the chaotic ad hoc situation of the
past. When writing about or teaching these methods I developed a framework
of terms—ten in all, grouped as five pairs—which continued to prove useful
when adapted and applied to research methods as will, I hope, now be demon-
strated both in general terms and with reference to GTM.
Preconceptions and Perceptions
Both preconceptions and perceptions refer to assumed but unstated aspects

of methods. Thus quantitative methods are based on the preconception that
the appropriate forms of measurement and analysis apply and the perception
that quantitative data can be sampled and accrued, leading to meaningful out-
comes. Lord Kelvin’s statement, quoted in Chapter 1, encapsulates both: “If
you cannot measure it, you cannot (control) improve it.” Methods that center
on document analysis or oral histories, however, take different starting points
with regard to the nature of the appropriate data, sampling, and analysis tech-
niques. It is not always possible or even desirable to dwell at any, or any great,
length on these aspects of a method in reporting on a research project; but it
is important to recognize that they are important but often ignored aspects of
a method and may well lead other investigators to query both the process and
the outcome of the research itself.
It is precisely these taken-for-granted assumptions that need to be aired
and challenged, not necessarily in order to jettison them, but certainly to
ensure that they bear close scrutiny. Glaser and Strauss certainly did this with
regard to what they saw as the orthodoxy of their time, but in doing so they
necessarily introduced a new set of assumptions.
With regard to GTM, the early writings of Glaser and Strauss emanated
from a perception that existing research strategies were reflections of the aca-
demic hierarchy. In the stark terms they used, “theoretical capitalists” served
by the exploited research “proletariat” of those on the lower rungs of the aca-
demic ladder. Glaser and Strauss saw this state of affairs as a barrier to the
development of new ideas and concepts, particularly with regard to doctoral
and other, less-experienced or lower-status researchers.
To an extent Glaser and Strauss located this criticism against the back-
ground of the ideas of Herbert Blumer and the Chicago School critique of
grand theorizing and the importance of “sensitizing concepts” (see Chapter 3).
To some extent this idea is a motivating one in the development of GTM,
22
classing it as a “perception,” and perhaps as an example of one way in which

insights come to be developed. Whether or not the perceptions of Glaser and
Strauss were accurate is not really important; far more crucial is the point
that their perceptions motivated them to offer such an innovative alterna-
tive. Motivations are not to be ignored when it comes to discussions of the
rationales for people undertaking research projects, as explained in Chapter 8.
Thus one important perception of GTM—regardless of any perceptions that
Glaser or Strauss, singly or in concert, may have had at the time or in the ensu-
ing years—is that there is an alternative to hypothesis-based research which
can be taken up by novice and experienced researchers alike.
The issue of preconceptions is more complex, because one of the precepts
of GTM is often stated in terms that imply that researchers should shed all
their preconceptions prior to initiating their grounded research, although
footnote 3 on page 3 of their book The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies
for Qualitative Research. states that researchers do not enter the field “as a
tabula rasa,” but this notion is obscured or forgotten in the book itself. What
I have termed the GTM mantra encompasses the view of preconception with
phrases such as the following:
The first step in gaining theoretical sensitivity is to enter the research set-
ting with as few predetermined ideas as possible—especially logically
deducted (sic), a prior (sic) hypotheses. In this posture, the analyst is able
to remain sensitive to the data by being able to record events and detect
happenings without first having them filtered through and squared with
pre-existing hypotheses and biases. (Glaser, 1978, pp. 2–3)
A researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in mind
(unless his or her purpose is to elaborate and extend existing theory).
Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory
to emerge from the data. (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 12)
So the idea of entering into research without preconceptions is common to
both Glaser and Strauss in their separate writings, and Glaser (see Chapter 8)
continues to insist on this aspect. Unfortunately human cognition just does
not work in this manner, although this has not prevented researchers, includ-
ing some of my own PhD students, from incorporating similar statements
into their work. So with regard to GTM we have the situation where at least
some subset of assumptions is all too clearly stated, with an unfortunate
lack of regard for the complexities and paradoxes of the statements them-
selves; whereas other aspects are not sufficiently explicit, or are relegated to
footnotes. Like many others, this is a criticism that is certainly not limited
to writings on GTM; it applies to all discussions of research, including the
present one.
23
Research Methods 23
A preconception of concern with regard to GTM involves the issue of

“data,” a central aspect of the method. The term itself is the Latin word for
“given”—singular datum, plural data. One of the criticisms of the ways in
which GTM was first articulated by Glaser and Strauss centers on the way in
which the term data is used; captured in phrases along the lines of “it is all
in the data.” But, as discussed later, in Chapter 8, the term itself is redolent
with a whole series of ramifications that complicate this seemingly straight-
forward assumption. Glaser has always, quite correctly, maintained that “All
is data.” But this has been understood to mean that “data is all”; which is at
best an over-simplification, and at worst downright misleading, doing a severe
disservice to people’s understanding and acceptance of the method itself. The
view of data as ready-to-hand, literally “given,” and something “out there” to be
grabbed or gathered in some neutral manner leads to related preconceptions
and misconceptions concerning the “emergence” of theories, and the role of
induction—again, readers will have to be patient and wait for further detailed
discussion of these issues in Chapters 8 and 13.
A more contentious aspect of GTM needs to be considered as part of this
discussion of preconceptions and perceptions, because many people writing
about and using the method claim that a key and foundational aspect of GTM
is to be found in Symbolic Interactionism [SI]. Writers such as Adele Clarke
have claimed that GTM-cum-SI represents a “theory/methods package.” In the
discussion on a wide range of GTM publications in Chapter 14, there are sev-
eral examples of writers making this very strong claim, as well as others who
offer a weaker one, pointing out that what the two have in common is a focus
on meaning: SI taking as the starting point of any investigation the meanings
that social actors employ and develop, GTM offering a method for researchers
keen to understand and explicate the ways in which actors’ meanings can be
conceptualized and analyzed as the basis for theoretical statements highlight-
ing social processes.
Glaser has strongly disputed this view, particularly as expressed by Clarke. He
argues along the lines that GTM can make use of all forms of data, of which “SI
type data and its perspective” is only one example. His article in Grounded Theory
Review (Glaser, 2005) expands on this point, although it is not really clear why
he centers it on types of data. To an extent, his position in this article can be seen
as stemming more from proprietary issues relating to GTM rather than from a
concern about its philosophical underpinnings. Glaser is, however, correct to note
that SI is not an inevitable part of the GTM package, but a good deal of his argu-
ment is seemingly motivated more with distancing his view of GTM from recent
constructivist developments of the method than with the role of SI itself.
Clarke and others base their arguments both on the substantive aspect—
SI and GTM center on actors’ meanings—and on the intellectual formation
of Strauss himself. Strauss was heavily influenced by the work of G. H. Mead
24
and others associated with the Chicago School of Sociology, a redoubt of SI

articulations and research outputs. Blumer, who coined the term Symbolic
Interactionism, is extensively referenced in The Discovery of Grounded Theory:
Strategies for Qualitative Research. The influence is also evident in Strauss’s writ-
ings outside the topic of GTM, notably Mirrors and Masks. This book, published
in 1959, helped to establish Strauss’s reputation as a social theorist, particularly
in Germany. Although in the United States it was eclipsed by Erving Goffman’s
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, published in the same year. What both
Strauss and Goffman held in common, based on their shared background in
the Chicago School of Sociology, was the view that social research was “Not
then, men and their moments. Rather, moments and their men” (Goffman, in
the introduction to his 1967 Interaction Ritual—and we would now include
women as well as men6). The need is to focus on meanings in their settings, and
the view that GTM can be and should be seen as a method prioritizing analysis
that incorporates the meanings and interpretations of social actors in the situ-
ations being studied. What neither Strauss nor Glaser made clear in their writ-
ings, separately or in concert, was that this orientation needs to be extended to
embrace the process of enquiry and research itself—which, as discussed in more
detail in various sections throughout this book is the basis of the constructivist
articulation of GTM.
In the third edition of Basics of Qualitative Research (Corbin and Strauss,
2008, pp. 6–8), Corbin lists 16 “assumptions” that were prepared for the earlier
editions of the book but that were omitted by the publisher. These relate in
large part to the concepts of action and interaction, rather than to the method
itself, but readers might wish to examine the assumptions for themselves,
given the points raised here.
Purpose and Periphery
These aspects of research methods refer to the understanding that investiga-

tors have with regard to their choice of method—the purpose that the method
is designed to achieve, and the features of the research process that are encom-
passed by the method. Research methods should be, at least in part, designed
and developed in ways that assist researchers in achieving some purpose or
set of objectives. Thus action research methods are designed to lead primar-
ily to improvements in the research setting, usually a social or community
context, with other, more traditional research outcomes, such as publication,
peer-review, and the like, seen as secondary.
The periphery, or scope, of a method is sometimes a matter requiring
clarification rather than something obvious and inherent in the method itself.
For instance, researchers using a case study method usually have to explain
what their understanding and implementation of the method involves; the
25
Research Methods 25
nature and number of cases, the nature and range of the research activities
involved, and so on. Delineating these features can also highlight the extent to
which the selected method comprises various techniques and tools, as many
techniques and tools are common to several different methods and types of
method, whereas most methods use a distinctive combination of techniques
and tools. Some of these techniques and tools may well be uniquely associated
with the method itself, but others will be generic, although their incorporation
may be tailored to the method-in-use and the research itself. Thus researchers
claiming use of “the case study method” would have to explain which tools
and techniques they were planning to use, and whether or not their study was
going to be largely reliant on a qualitative or quantitative approach, indicating
the likely balance between the two types of study.
The grounded theory method plainly is oriented toward qualitative
research. The subtitle of Glaser and Strauss’s Discovery of Grounded Theory
is Strategies for Qualitative Research. Similarly, the title and subtitle of Kathy
Charmaz’s book Constructing Grounded Theory is A Practical Guide Through
Qualitative Analysis. Both publications stress that GTM is a method of qual-
itative analysis, but this does not preclude the possibility that such analysis
will take into account quantitative data. Glaser’s dictum “All is data” can and
should be taken to justify the use of all and any forms of data—qualitative and
quantitative—including interviews, observations, statistical data, documents,
sound and video recordings, existing literature, and all manner of resources,
digitized or non-digitized.
In 2008 Glaser published Doing Quantitative Grounded Theory, which
might appear to undermine the argument made in the preceding paragraph
as he refers explicitly to quantitative GT. Yet his central proposition is that the
GTM researcher should not shy away from “the rich meanings to be found and
grounded in secondary quantitative measurement” (p. 89)—that is, grounded
theories can be generated from application of GTM to quantitative data,
including that collected by others in previous research exercises. This is still
within the realm of a qualitative approach, given its anchoring in “rich mean-
ings” as opposed to statistical and probabilistic reasoning. In an earlier paper
that takes up his theme of demarcating his view of GTM from other methods,
and particularly from what he terms “qualitative data analysis” (QDA), Glaser
seems to imply that only GTM makes use of all these forms of data, arguing
that using other qualitative methods “only qualitative analysis is done, which is
ok for QDA, but not for GT. Gounded theory uses all as data, quantitative and
qualitative” (Glaser 2008, emphasis added). I may have misinterpreted Glaser
on this point, but he does appear to confuse the issue of the type of analy-
sis with the type of data. The grounded theory method is not a quantitative
method. If, on the one hand, Glaser is arguing that only GTM uses all forms
of data—qualitative, quantitative, and so on—this is erroneous. On the other
26
hand, if he is arguing that GTM can make use of all and any form in a specific
manner, then he is correct.
A further issue relating both to purpose and periphery of GTM is that
concerning the claim that GTM should be used when there is little or no sig-
nificant research in an area or topic. Although many GTM research papers
state this claim at the outset, it is increasingly difficult to uphold. Rather
than seeing it as an issue that might preclude the use of GTM, it is perhaps
time to revise this accidental facet of the purpose and periphery/scope of the
method.7 This aspect of the method can best be understood historically, and
was probably worth stating in the 1960s, given Glaser and Strauss’s claim that
the predominant mode, particularly of doctoral research, was to find an area
in which there was already a good deal of published work that could be used
as a resource serving as the basis for deduction/derivation of hypotheses. With
the expansion of higher education and research outputs since the 1960s, plus
the emergence of the Internet, it is far harder to provide convincing evidence
for there being a dearth or complete absence of research in any topic. Many
GTM papers include assertions to this effect, but they are rarely substantiated,
for the good reason that proving a negative is always problematic if not impos-
sible. Given the exhortation that researchers should not engage in a literature
review until the latter stages of their research, there is always the danger that
the claim of a dearth of research into a given subject may arise from a lack of
familiarity with the literature.
Users and other proponents of GTM are on far stronger ground if they can
justify a claim to some far more limited but substantive aspect of innovation
or insight in their work. Consequently some researchers report on existing
work, but then stress the novelty or novel aspects of their approach, couched
in far more constrained terms than merely arguing that the topic itself has not
been researched. The grounded theory method itself, with its method-specific
distinction between substantive and formal theories, provides a basis for such
constrained yet persuasive claims—i.e. the resulting substantive grounded
theory does provide unique insight into the singular research setting, and it
may at some later stage form the foundation for a formal grounded theory,
with wider ramifications both practical and conceptual. Alternatively, the sub-
stantive account may throw further light upon or provide the basis for revi-
sion of existing work and research findings, as well as having import for the
practices involved.
With regard to purpose, researchers should expect to be able to respond
to challenges such as “Why did you use GTM?” or “Why did you use it in this
manner?” Much as researchers using any method or combination of meth-
ods should anticipate and be capable of answering such questions, for GTM,
Glaser and Strauss were always eager to stress the process-oriented character
of the method, its purpose being to explicate “what is going on” in certain
situations, with the aim of bringing those activities to people’s attention so
27
Research Methods 27
that their effectiveness and performance might be enhanced and their under-
standing increased: something that should apply to GTM itself. The method
was always meant to have ramifications for practice and social action, and as
shown later, what at first sight might be seen as ambiguous and amorphous
quality criteria, such as “fit,” and “grab,” are in fact important indications of
this practice-oriented aspect of GTM.
Finally, on the issue of periphery, it must be understood that GTM does
not amount purely and simply to coding. One of the reasons for some peo-
ple’s skepticism with regard to GTM is the number of papers where use of
the method is claimed, but where this involves nothing more than iterative
coding-cum-analysis8 that marks out GTM from other methods; in many such
instances the extent of the coding itself is no more than cursory. What follows
is a consideration of the actual process and procedures encompassed by GTM.
Process and Procedures
Research methods ought to offer investigators a framework and guide for doing
their research, including how to get started, how to manage and sequence
their research activities, and how to ensure good quality outcomes—that is,
the processes and procedures involved in moving from a proposal or plan to a
research outcome. In the case of GTM one of the key and distinctive starting
points is what is not needed at the outset. There is no need for any hypoth-
eses or detailed research question(s). Although this is a critical and notable
aspect of the method, it has also proved to be a perpetually troubling one. It
appears to give researchers license to sidestep the usual and widely expected
features of research proposals and initial preparation. Glaser and Strauss tar-
geted and challenged the gatekeepers of the research domain in the 1960s, but
it is quite understandable that those charged with evaluating people’s research
ideas will expect some indication of the central issues and concerns driving a
project, even at its inception. For many people in such positions these facets
of research necessarily require clear exposition of an overarching aim, a sub-
sidiary set of objectives and/or distinct research questions, often in the form
of a hypothesis or set of hypotheses. In the light of Glaser and Strauss’s work,
however, there is now a well-established alternative starting point, although
one that is not universally understood or accepted.9
Einstein stated, “If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be
called research, would it?” So it should always be borne in mind that having
too firm an idea at the outset of the research process may actually inhibit or
undermine the purpose of the activity itself—exactly the point that Glaser and
Strauss were at pains to stress with their call for researchers to keep an open
mind. Still, when researchers offer their proposals for scrutiny and evalua-
tion they must do so with the understanding that such documents need to be
28
persuasive for their audience, or for a range of different audiences—funding

bodies, policy groups, academic peers, PhD committees, and the like. With
regard to postgraduate students their proposal is usually linked to some com-
mittee or review panel—in many countries the relevant Research Committee,
or, in the United States, the Institutional Review Board [IRB], whose members
need to be persuaded that the proposed activities will, in time, lead to some
contribution to knowledge. In many disciplines the accepted practice is that
the proposal is best presented in the form of a hypothesis or a set of related
hypotheses. There is, however, a growing but not sufficiently widespread real-
ization that feasible alternatives are on offer, for instance outlining a generic
issue or environment to be investigated in order to gain an understanding that
will guide the researcher(s) in subsequent activities. In some cases such alter-
natives may include different forms of research policies and outputs, as will be
discussed in the next section, under the heading Products and Presentation.
In attending to the concerns centering on process and procedure, it is
important to stress that all characterizations of these research elements have
to be seen as heuristics, guidelines or rules-of thumb, rather than as prescrip-
tions or sets of instructions to be followed to the letter. Although the large
and increasing number of resources devoted to research methods are in many
ways a welcome sign, they can also lead to methodological statements—both
in research proposals and published papers—that mimic generic statements
in the methods texts themselves, rather than addressing issues anticipated or
encountered by the researchers as they actually employ the methods. This dis-
tinction can be thought of as similar to the difference between the details in
a recipe book, including the glossy photos of the finished product, and the
actual dish when it is prepared and served. The recipe can be taken as a strict
set of instructions to be followed to the letter, or as a guide from which one
departs either by choice (I prefer less spice and more of some other ingredi-
ent) or necessity (I haven’t got any of that ingredient to hand); in any case the
finished dish will rarely look quite like it does in the photos.
Profound and persuasive methodological statements often take the form
of “this is what the books say” , , , but “this is why I/we did it differently.”
Published papers and more extended accounts of research, given that they
report on the outcome of the process itself, should offer clear indications of
what took place; how and why the research process departed both from the
textbook idea of the method(s) and techniques employed, and from the initial
research plans. Research accounts that appear to have gone entirely according
to plan and that align neatly with the stated methodological strategy should be
treated with some level of suspicion.
For GTM the overall process is one that should be approached with an
open mind by a researcher or team of researchers raising generic questions.
Then, through examination of the data, in whatever form, the aim should be
to develop increasingly powerful abstractions that can encapsulate significant
29
Research Methods 29
aspects of the detailed data—perhaps necessitating disregarding some aspects

of the process in favor of a decision to concentrate on a specific focus. This
is sometimes invoked as part of the GTM mantra in the form of statements
asserting that the research was not guided by prior concepts or hypotheses
or by clearly articulated research questions, but in practice this is difficult or
impossible to justify. In contrast, GTM rightly lays stress on researchers carry-
ing out their studies and analyses with an open mind, prepared to be surprised
by what they find; again something that should be common to all forms of
research. (Chapter 18 deals with the ways in which GTM can be seen as a
model for good research practice as a whole.)
One persistently troubling aspect of GTM has been the role of the litera-
ture review. Glaser and Strauss were keen in dissuading postgraduate students
from spending extensive effort engaging with the literature in their area of
interest as an early phase of the work. This was so, in large part because they
saw the literature review as the standard prelude to what they characterized as
an exercise in verification—that is, sifting through the works of the “grand the-
orists” in order to derive hypotheses that could be tested to see if they held up
against some set of observations. Instead, these proponents of GTM advocated
a starting point devoid as far as possible from engagement with the literature,
since knowledge of other research might influence the researcher’s engage-
ment with the data; for Glaser and Strauss, the latter form of engagement was
to take primacy over study of the literature and extant research.
There have always been problems with this admonition at several levels,
and it arises as an issue for anyone seeking to use GTM. In the first place, it
seems to ignore or preclude the possibility that someone will be motivated
to undertake research as a result of familiarity with the concerns and the lit-
erature on a particular topic, driven by an urge to investigate some aspects
more thoroughly. This is paradoxical given that Glaser and Strauss were keen
to offer postgraduates a route into theory development. After all, in many
instances people move from their undergraduate studies through to postgrad-
uate ones, developing and refining their ideas based precisely on a familiarity
with the domain; or as a result of practical and professional experience. The
issue of the motivations and rationales underlying research are discussed in
Chapter 8. Moreover, if someone is keen to undertake research on a particular
topic, with the anticipation of contributing new insights and novel concepts,
it is incumbent on that researcher to gain some understanding of any relevant
work that currently exists. As Wiener argues in her chapter in The Handbook
of Grounded Theory,
… none of us was comfortable with the dictum that the literature in the
substantive area under study should not be reviewed until data have been
collected and analysis and theory generation started… . On the contrary,
since the development of medical technology was a growing phenomenon,
30
both the academic and the popular press were replete with articles that
were useful to us from the very beginning of our research. If anything, the
challenge was in keeping current. Unquestionably, these articles widened
our horizons and enriched our interviews. (Wiener, 2007, pp. 298–9)
In submissions to research committees and funding bodies, for instance, pro-
posals are understandably expected to include explanations that incorporate
in some detail how the planned research relates to existing work and literature,
so the process and procedures of GTM must be able to encompass this. Glaser
continues to stress keeping away from the literature, simultaneously encourag-
ing researchers to read widely, but to do so precisely in areas not centrally con-
cerned with their research; advice that may well be difficult to follow, given the
way in which GTM encourages researchers not to characterize their research
too precisely at the earliest stages. Whatever the researcher’s focus, he or she
might inadvertently engage with various sources that later prove central to the
research.
In practice, as illustrated in some of the examples in Chapter 4, there is a
distinctive way in which GTM should be used to offer guidance to researchers
in engaging with the literature. This involves a distinction between a review of
the literature in the early stages of a research project, building on the experi-
ence and past work of the researchers themselves, and a return to the litera-
ture in the later stages of the project, which amounts to taking the substantive
grounded theory to the literature. The former process is best thought of as
familiarization and orientation, ensuring that the proposed research, however
widely defined and flexibly specified, holds out the prospect of a meaningful
contribution. The latter procedure offers the basis for a comparison of the con-
ceptual findings—the substantive grounded theory—with relevant work in the
literature reporting on previous or extant research, interwoven with theoreti-
cal coding (see Chapter 12).
The procedures of GTM can be characterized as comprising iterative moves
between data gathering and analysis—coding-cum-analysis—before moving
to more focused strategies for conceptualization and modeling or theory build-
ing. The process aspects refer to concerns such as “what is the starting point for
the research?” and “What is the sequence that then follows?” The divergence
between Glaser and Strauss in their later writings can be understood to ema-
nate from aspects of the processes and procedures, although with significant
common ground between the two positions with regard to the other aspects of
the research, although Glaser would probably argue otherwise.
Table 2.3 applies the 5x(P+P) model to GTM as a whole, and Table 2.4
indicates further details of the Process and Procedures, and also how Glaser’s
and Strauss’s divergent views of the method might be related to these two spe-
cific aspects. Different writers on GTM offer varying accounts of the nature
and differences between variants of the method, particularly those separating
31
Research Methods 31
TABLE 2.3
The 5x(P+P) model applied to grounded theory method
Perceptions and No preconceptions (Chapter 8)
Preconceptions Avoidance of Grand Theories and Grand Theorists
Avoidance of mindless empiricism (S. Hook and others) Chapter 3
Data and emergence (metaphors)
Generating new theories more important than verifying existing ones
No existing research
Purpose and Periphery Theorizing—producing theories of the middle-range: substantive GTs
and formal GTs (Chapters 3 & 4)
Developing new insights—not testing existing ones
Aim to explicate Basic Social and Social Psychological Processes—
BSPs and BSSPs
Postulate core categories
Fit, grab, work, modifiability
Process and Procedures Process Procedures
(See Table 2.4 for Where do I/we start? Data gathering
further details) What happens next? Sampling—purposive
Also Chapters 8–12 Open mind NOT empty head and/or convenience
Use of coding paradigm or theoretical Sampling—theoretical
coding families or other models Coding-cum-analyzing
Initial engagement with the literature Iterating and focusing
Return to the literature Memoing
When do I/we stop—saturation? Theoretical saturation
Theoretical sorting
Theoretical coding
Products and Codes, concepts, categories (Chapter 5)
Presentation Models, theories—substantive and formal
Memos
Diagrams
Publications
Pragmatics and Access to research setting
Personnel Dialogue with peers, advisors, mentors, collaborators
Team working—e.g., Quint, Strauss, and Glaser
Focus groups, interviews—various synchronous and asynchronous
interactions
Use of software
Coding workshops
Glaser from Strauss. In many cases these are partial or misleading. Some of the
issues they raise are taken up in later sections of this chapter and Chapter 11.
The tabular summary in Table 2.3 is not meant to be the last word on these
issues, and some details relate to aspects that will only be addressed in the
chapters that follow; but at this stage it is important to offer some initial guid-
ance through what might otherwise appear to be a confused and confusing
range of ideas about the process and procedures of GTM. Again, this is to
reiterate a point made in my chapter with Kathy Charmaz in The Handbook
of Grounded Theory on the paradoxes and perplexities of GTM (Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007c), where we argue that statements to the effect that GTM is
simple and straightforward are highly misleading. If that truly were the case,
then there would be little need for the vast number of books and articles about
the method.
32
Later chapters in this volume will make use of examples drawn from PhD
students giving accounts of how they used GTM and from an analysis of sev-
eral published accounts that refer to the use of GTM. Taken together, these
examples will offer readers a range of ideas and intimations of the procedural
aspects of GTM; some of them conflict with each other and with some of the
TABLE 2.4
GTM Proces and Procedures
Process & Procedures Comments
Open-ended and iterative between data This iterative aspect is common to all variants
gathering and preliminary analysis of GTM, although the terminology may vary—
Where do I start? e.g., line-by-line coding, word-by-word coding,
What happens next? or coding by incident
Various stages of coding, moving from initial, Can be encapsulated by the generic term
through intermediate, to more refined levels coding-cum-analysis
Initial coding followed by refinement of codes, Different models of coding later
resulting in concepts, categories, models develop: Strauss and Corbin’s Coding
The initial model of GTM—as specified in Paradigm, Glaser’s Theoretical Coding
Discovery and the appendix to Awareness— Families.
refers to stages of coding. These are made Theoretical Coding—referred to by both Glaser
more explicit in later works such as Basics and Charmaz, but not by Strauss and Corbin.
of Qualitative Research and Theoretical Different uses of terms such as concept and
Sensitivity category; and relationships between codes,
concepts, categories, etc.
Sampling—initially purposive and perhaps Common view across all GTM variants is that
convenience sampling; followed by theoretical sampling is carried out for the purpose
sampling of conceptual development and not for
Interviewing statistical sampling of a population.
Document analysis Later stages include the aim of saturating
Use of literature as data categories and concepts.
Focus group discussions
Use of Web-based sources
Memoing—key process of GTM, although not Developed from ideas about field notes in
given a central role in early texts. ethnographic research—Schatzman
Memos developed contemporaneously. Glaser—memos are private
Development of memos from initial jottings and See Chapter 10, where memoing is explained
ideas, to later stages where they may center as a form of Reflective Practice—Schön’s
on key findings and potential theoretical distinction between the “expert” and the
outcomes “reflective practitioner” parallels Glaser
Understated ways in which memos are the basis and Strauss’s contrast between the
and the outcome of collaborative research— “verificationists” and those practicing GTM.
not referred to in GTM canonical texts
(produced by two or three key researchers)
Theoretical coding The term is referred to by Strauss and Corbin
Employing existing models or constructs such in their 1994 chapter—but not in Basics of
as Glaser’s Coding Families or other aspects Qualitative Research
of the literature. Central to Glaser’s account, although Charmaz
To some extent this is at the heart of Glaser’s correctly points to the critical ambiguity
criticism of Strauss and Corbin, but in between “application” and “emergence”—
practice many GTM researchers seem to see Chapter 11
be able to develop their models without
recourse to either Glaser’s or Strauss and
Corbin’s constructs—see Chapter 11, where
the procedure of returning to the literature is
discussed.
(continued)
33
Research Methods 33
TABLE 2.4
Continued
Process & Procedures Comments
Theoretical saturation A common issue for all variants of GTM. It is

Aiming to reach a stage at which the core important that researchers offer convincing
category or categories is/are deemed to arguments for claiming theoretical saturation.
integrate the data—i.e., where further data Also, that evaluators recognize that this
will not lead to the identification of additional is a strength of GTM, something that
aspects of the existing categories (see should be taken up by other methods—see
Chapter 12). Chapters 12 and 18
Theoretical sampling continues until the
researcher(s) can demonstrate that this stage
has been reached—usually on the basis that
the data from the latter stages add support
to the earlier conceptualizations, but without
requiring further categories or concepts.
Theoretical sorting Glaser’s consistent stress on need for
Presentation of results publication—extensive range of GTM
Sorting memos—can now be done using research now available
electronic memos. Glaser and Charmaz see
it as a potential key to preparation of work for
publication
canonical and later GTM texts. Readers may find this discomfiting, but they
should recognize this as one of the complexities of doing research, and at least
once armed with this knowledge they will have a basis from which to decide
on how best to approach their research, develop and articulate their strategy,
and so avoid being “forced” in any one direction. To be able to do this, it is crit-
ical that researchers not read and rely on only one source or a closely related
set of sources.
Products and Presentation
Glaser has always quite rightly stressed the importance of publication as a

key aspect of research, but what are the other expected outcomes of research
in general, and GTM in particular? These can be considered under the twin
headings of products and presentation.
In many cases the products of a research project are specific to the approach
that has been employed. For instance, quantitative approaches will be expected
to produce outcomes in terms of statistical results related to the hypotheses
stated at the outset. In other forms of research the products may comprise
frameworks or models of various sorts, in addition to brief or extended writ-
ten accounts. Doctoral dissertations usually take the form of extended writ-
ten accounts regardless of the approach used—quantitative or qualitative or
some combination of the two. But in some instances work toward the PhD can
center on other forms of product or artifact, such as a technical specification,
34
design, artistic installation or performance, or a prototype. Even then, how-

ever, there will be the expectation of a written account explaining the underly-
ing rationale and process of production, as well as the method(s) or approaches
employed, situating the outcome against existing practices, findings, and the
relevant literature.
With regard to GTM, there is an expectation that a theory or model will be
one of the research products, but that, along the way, a range of other products
will be developed, including various types of codes and evidence of coding,
as well as memos with increasing levels of conceptual detail and explanation.
(Details of coding are given in the chapters in Part Three.) Again, it is impor-
tant to stress that the method involves far more than just coding, although
coding in a very distinct form is a key feature of GTM. Memos are also a criti-
cal product, and although this feature may not have been as evident in some
of the initial GTM writings, the importance of memos has been stressed for
many years. Glaser has argued that researchers should develop their memos
in such a way that when it comes time to write papers and reports that work
can be based on the researcher’s sorted memos, an activity that Glaser terms
theoretical sorting (see Glaser, 1978, chapter 7), and that Charmaz refers to as
a central activity (2014).
Increasingly, researchers use diagrams in addition to textual accounts of
their work and findings, but it is important to understand that although a pic-
ture can be worth a thousand words, in some cases an inappropriate or ambigu-
ous graphic can obscure or undermine a thousand words. Researchers often
shorten or conclude their argument or narrative and simply refer to a diagram
or figure, leaving the reader to interpret what is presented.10 In some cases this
is adequate, but all too often it fails to afford the explanation and understanding
intended by the author. It is far better practice to ensure that any diagrammatic
representation is not left without explanation, so that the reader has too much
to do trying to understand its importance and relevance. I have frequently
found myself saying to a student something along the lines of “tell me what
this diagram actually means, and what purpose it serves.” This is not to say that
diagrams should be avoided or dispensed with, they can be very useful in sum-
marizing or reiterating key aspects of a concept or construct, and can later act
as prompts or reminders of what has gone before. They must be seen as devices
that can complement rather than replace clear textual explanations and reason-
ing. In Chapters 8–12 I provide examples of the work of several of my students,
including diagrams that were developed and later refined during the course of
their research, giving readers the opportunity to understand at a glance some of
the key changes and enhancements that were made.
A further word on products: In addition to those specified or recom-
mended as part of the method or approach, there are also other products that
are mandated or recommended at an institutional level. These may include
ethical clearance and risk assessments and other legal or formal requirements,
some of which may be problematic for some GTM projects where the initial
35
Research Methods 35
aspects are not as detailed as they might be for other research approaches.
Some institutions require full transcripts of interviews and extended details of
other forms of data, so requiring researchers to make recordings of the inter-
views and transcribe them, or at least keep detailed accounts more-or-less
contemporaneously.
Anyone reading Glaser and Strauss’s early texts, Awareness of Dying and
Time for Dying (hereinafter Awareness and Time) will likely be struck by the
elegance of the writing. Here are two key GTM research accounts almost
devoid of verbatim extracts from the data collected by the researchers, written
in a clear and concise manner that presents readers with the findings almost by
stealth. Kearney argues that Glaser and Strauss were “much more comfortable
writing at a distance from data than are authors of current qualitative reports
in the practice disciplines. Much of their narrative was written in a formalizing
or highly abstract style, reflecting the rhetoric of their discipline and era. They
wrote in the present tense. Claims were not delimited to a unique geocultural
or historical setting” (2007).
These early works might be likened to a swan that, to the casual observer,
appears to be a creature elegantly and effortlessly gliding across the water, but
which is actually expending considerable effort frantically paddling beneath
the surface. For a variety of reasons, sometimes associated with the institu-
tional requirements referred to above, GTM research reports and publications
in recent years are almost always punctuated with verbatim extracts, examples
of coding, memos, and so on. Although the original grounded theories on
Awareness and Time were not presented in this manner, there now seems to
be a view that GTM research reports ought to adhere to this sort of format,
although as the examples of my PhD students indicate, this need not necessar-
ily be the case. In fact, there can be considerable variation across PhD theses,
although almost all now make use of diagrams and color representations. The
range of variation, however, does raise the question of the extent to which the
data from a research study needs to be presented and incorporated into pub-
lished or submitted accounts. Consequently researchers need to consider the
issue of “presentation,” taking account of the need for different research reports
and products for different audiences; also, that different journals demand dif-
ferent formats for papers submitted to them for review/publication.
Pragmatics and Personnel
The final pair of terms, pragmatics and personnel11 refers to the issue of how
methods are actually used in practice. This may well be very different from
what is described and advocated in the standard methods texts. One of the
skills of a researcher is the extent to which he or she recognizes and controls
the ways in which the actual practice involved in a research project takes on
a life of its own, leading to developments and departures from the planned
36
process and procedures. This can demand a fine balance between adhering to
the method itself or judging if and when other options need to be considered
and alternatives employed. I term this critical and crucial skill methodologi-
cal sensitivity, pairing it with theoretical sensitivity, a central aspect of GTM
that was articulated by Glaser in his book of the same name, although it first
appeared in Glaser and Strauss’s Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967, pp. 46–
47; hereinafter Discovery).
Methodological sensitivity might be defined as the skill or aptitude required
by researchers in selecting, combining, and employing methods, techniques,
and tools in actual research situations. Researchers can and need to develop
this skill as a result of a combination of guidance from and working with other
researchers; insightful study of available research methods, techniques, and
tools; and learning from their own experience. An understanding of the dif-
ferent aspects of methods, for instance as offered in the 5x(P+P) framework,
as well as recognition of the issues involved in moving from method-in-text-
book to method-in-use, is paramount for development of this critical aspect
of doing research.
Again, the point can be made with reference to the methods that were
developed for computer-based information systems from the 1970s onward.
As has already been stated, these early information system development meth-
ods were usually highly prescriptive, and part of their attraction was precisely
the contrast they offered to the chaotic nature of development projects at the
time. They offered a solution to the problems of trying to manage large-scale
and complex projects, because those methods channeled developers’ attention
to the minutiae of the processes and procedures, as well as the relationships
and dependencies between them. This focus required that all processes and
procedures were clearly stated—to the point of exhaustive—and exhausting—
details. As a consequence, all personnel involved in the project could under-
stand what was required of them and other members of the team. But this
came at a cost as these development projects themselves were something of a
pioneering activity, with each project requiring unique or highly context-spe-
cific skills and solutions—in fact resembling the development of a substantive
grounded theory (SGT). So strict adherence to the details prescribed in the
methods manuals was inappropriate, as following the method was not guar-
anteed to produce an effective and workable system; on the contrary, it could
be a recipe for disaster.
By the 1980s and early 1990s detailed methods manuals, with seemingly
mandatory processes activities and procedures, were gradually replaced by
newer versions or alternative methods that were far more malleable. These
stressed that the methods, as specified in the detailed manuals, were best
seen as resources from which the most appropriate aspects could be selected
and implemented when required; that process required skill, experience, and
37
Research Methods 37
sensitivity to the actual setting. In recent years this has grown into a fully artic-
ulated Agile approach to software development, with its own manifesto.12
There are clear and instructive parallels between GTM and current IS
development practices predominantly based on an approach that stresses iter-
ative and agile development. Both methods distance themselves from fixed
stages or phases, stressing the contingent and flexible nature of their respective
endeavors; both stress iteration around gaining familiarity or data gathering
and analysis; and both focus on the interactions taking place and encourage
the researcher/analyst to continue the iterations until some sort of “saturation”
is reached.13 Furthermore, both stress the role of the researcher/analyst and
the nature of some form of “sensitivity”—theoretical or analytical. It is not
surprising that there is a remarkable resonance between the core principles of
GTM and the Agile Manifesto, as illustrated in Table 2.5.
This does not resolve the problem of achieving balance between a man-
ageable well-structured approach and a responsive ad hoc one. There is still a
requirement for practitioners with a range of technical, social, and managerial
skills, as well as context-specific insights and sensitivities. In some cases orga-
nizations that have moved to the use of Agile methods are later found to have
frozen their implementation into a new form of stasis.
TABLE 2.5
The Agile Manifesto and Key Features of GTM
Extracts from the Agile Manifesto GTM
Individuals and interactions as opposed Strauss in particular was concerned with theories of
to processes and tools “action” throughout his work (Strauss, 1993).
Glaser has always stressed the “doing” aspects
of social enquiry—concept of “gerund” GTM
(Glaser, 1996).
Charmaz—stress on process.
Working software opposed to Grounded theories are judged in terms of whether they
comprehensive documentation “work,” “fit,” and have “grab”—see below.
Glaser’s concern to avoid “worrisome accuracy.”
Customer collaboration as opposed to All forms of GTM demand engagement with the social
contract negotiation actors in the research context—some stress
the necessity of taking the findings back to the
participants for confirmation and enhancement. (See
below and Turner 1983)
Responding to change as opposed to The rationale for GTM is that research involves
following a plan investigating a setting, developing concepts and
categories, but being open to change and develop
these as analysis and data-gathering progress in
tandem—the term Glaser uses is modifiability.
… while there is value in the italicized GTM was developed as an alternative to other research
items … we value the items in bold approaches—a preferred one as far as Glaser
more and Strauss were concerned; but not claiming a
monopoly.
38
For research methods, a similar set of skills and sensitivities is required,

including balancing the two demands of methodological adherence or coher-
ence and flexible adaptation and sensitivity to the unique nature of the research
itself. The tension between these demands should be evident in the discussion
of “method(s)” in any research publication. The suspicions of readers should
be aroused if everything seems to have gone according to plan and “by the
book.” In practice, research projects involve trade-offs and concessions; this is
what is involved in the 5x(P+P) framework under the heading Pragmatics and
Personnel. It is further evidenced and discussed in later chapters in Part Three,
and in the accounts of GTM-in-use in Chapter 19.
In Chapter 13, in discussing abduction, reference is made to a model
charting the route of a researcher from “novice” to “expert” in the acquisition
of general and specialized skills derived by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988). The
route starts with the role of novice, a beginner, reliant on learning and obey-
ing strict rules, and moves to higher levels of expertise, eventually leading to
practice and proficiency that encompasses an appreciation of contextual pres-
sures, the role of intuition and reinterpretation of experience, and ability to
cope with the inevitable ambiguity arising from application of systems of rules
in a wide variety of complex circumstances. With regard to research methods
in general and GTM in particular, it is important to understand that similar
considerations apply: the early stage researcher cannot be expected to be able
to move quickly and easily to proficiency and effective practice in any method.
The grounded theory method is aimed at the early stage researcher, but even
those who were fortunate enough to study with Glaser, Strauss, and other early
adopters of and experts in the method have always stressed the importance of
high quality mentoring, without which PhD students and others at the novice
stage can find themselves floundering. In Part Three of this book extracts from
the work of some of my PhD students indicate the ways in which each of them,
in his or her own way, developed methodological expertise through the years
of their doctoral research.The four accounts in Chapter 19 take this illustration
further. In terms of consideration of personnel, it is important to stress that
theorizing is a skill that certainly needs to be encouraged in researchers at all
levels; nevertheless, like all skills, acquiring it takes persistence, practice, and
self-critical insight to move to higher and ever more effective levels of compe-
tence and proficiency.
With regard to personnel, it is also important repeatedly to remind stu-
dents and accomplished investigators that research is a human and social
activity. This is obscured by the way in which methods are described and
research publications themselves are couched in impersonal terms. The single
researcher is the exception rather than the norm; even lone doctoral students
have advisors and peers with whom they interact. Moreover most non-doctoral
research involves teams whose members interact with one another throughout
the various stages of a study and across the gamut of research activities. Many
39
Research Methods 39
research texts and some GTM texts in particular fail to explore and explain
this aspect of doing research. Glaser and Strauss did, by implication, raise
issues such as the institutional setting and the hierarchies involved in doctoral
research in the United States in the 1960s; hence their description of “theo-
retical capitalists and proletarian testers” and the “verificational” expectations
of the academic gatekeepers. But publications by Strauss and Corbin and by
Glaser use terms that lead readers away from consideration and understand-
ing of the social aspects of doing research. Given that the initial GTM research
was a team effort—Glaser, Quint, and Strauss—this is a strange and unfortu-
nate omission.
A concern with both the pragmatics and the personnel aspects of methods
should ensure that issues such as teamwork, coping with institutional settings
and constraints, reflexivity, and reflection are brought to the fore, both in the
actual doing of research, and in its planning and reporting. As explained in
more detail in Chapter 18, which considers GTM as a model of good research
practice, GTM actually embodies many of these aspects, often in an under-
stated or tangential manner; for example, memo-making is an inescapable
and effective instrument for reflexivity, but it is not always described in terms
that take account of this aspect. At the same time, the relevance of research to
practice comes out strongly in GTM, particularly in the areas of healthcare
and education.
Key Points
¤ Different ways of categorizing types of research and use of terms such

as approach, technique, method, and strategy
¤ Terminological confusion—the same term being used to mean

different things across various texts and different terms being used to
mean the same thing
¤ My proposed clarification—methodology, method, model, tool,
technique
¤ Further explanation of the components of a method—5x(P+P)
¤ Use of 5x(P+P) to describe GTM
¤ Parallels between GTM and the Agile Manifesto
Exercises
1. Try to apply the 5x(P+P) model to a method with which you

have some familiarity. This may be one method, or it may be the
method(s)/approach you propose to use, or have used, in your
research, which may comprise more than one textbook method.
40
2. Once you have done this consider whether or not it has helped in
your analysis and understanding of the method.
¤ How easy was it to accomplish?
¤ What were the hardest issues, and the easiest ones to elucidate?
¤ Are these likely to be the same for all methods?
3. Alternatively, try to use the 5x(P+P) model to prompt you to clarify
your own methodological issues.
¤ What are your own preconceptions/perceptions?
¤ What are your own plans for process and procedures—do
they differ from the textbook accounts that you have found?
(nb: Charmaz offers a useful section on bringing out one’s
preconceptions—2014, pp. 158–160).
¤ Have you considered issues of products and presentation of
your research; including those likely to be produced at different
stages of your work and for different audiences?
¤ Have you planned for any contingencies regarding the

pragmatics of your research?
¤ Once you have read the section in Chapter 13 on the Dreyfus’
model consider how you might rank yourself against their
five levels in terms of your own proficiency as a researcher
in general, and with regard to the use of GTM and/or other
research methods in particular.
GETTING HUNG UP ON METHODS AND PARADIGMS—THE “E” WORD

AND THE “O” WORD
Recent decades have marked a stress on methods for researchers both at the
initial stages of their work and when they publish their findings. In many if not
all disciplines, research publications—research proposals, funding bids, PhD
theses, and journal papers—are expected to incorporate the issue of methods
or methodology in the sense in which these terms were discussed in the earlier
sections of this chapter. In some cases this description of the methodology can
be relatively straightforward if the research project centers on a hypothesis or
set of related hypotheses, and if it largely involves quantitative data and appli-
cation of statistical methods. In many regards this demand for methodologi-
cal articulation is a welcome development as it ensures that to a large extent
research outcomes do not appear as if by magic, but can be clearly linked to
an account of the actual process and procedures that were undertaken: the
pragmatics, “warts and all.” The research can then be judged in terms not only
of the outcomes, but also, critically, with regard to the systematic nature and
rigor of the process and procedures.
Researchers, including PhD candidates, can feel a great deal of stress
from the imposition of such expectations, leading them to resort to extended
41
Research Methods 41
discussions on all manner of topics under this heading. In some cases this
is a result of the perceived expectations of supervisors or examiners, with
researchers feeling that they will have to contend with a whole host of method-
ological issues emanating from concerns around the nature of “research para-
digms” and Epistemological and Ontological discussions, as well as having to
detail their own research approach. The result is that thesis chapters devoted to
research methods or the Methods sections in journal articles can encompass
a confused and confusing mix of general methodological concerns as well as
the minutiae of the research project under discussion—that is, a bird’s-eye-
view of methods mixed with a blow-by-blow account of the research activities
themselves (note the mixed metaphors). It prove to be important for research-
ers to have encountered these issues rather than taking one approach or group
of approaches for granted, but there is little point in rehashing sections from
textbooks on methods, particularly if this is at the expense of offering clear
and cogent accounts of how the research was actually accomplished. Assessors
and evaluators of research proposals should primarily be interested in the
approach that the researcher(s) plan for the project, and those reading the
reports of completed projects should expect a frank and honest overview of
what actually occurred. In some cases this may require a brief account of the
method in fairly large-scale terms, for instance if it is novel or unfamiliar to
those in the domain of expertise. This can certainly be the case with regard to
GTM, even though the method has been widely used at least since the 1980s,
something of a critical failing on the part of many of the “gatekeepers of the
research academy.”
There are two pitfalls in seeking to offer accounts of general methodologi-
cal issues. On the one hand, there is always the risk that such discussions will
be judged as poorly conceived or ill-considered, which may reflect negatively
on the actual approach used in the research. If the discussion of methods in
general is seen as weak, then there will be the supposition or suspicion that
these failings will be carried through to the understanding and application
of those methods in practice. On the other hand, even the most coherent and
accessible discussion may have no actual bearing on the research itself, if the
research itself is poorly conceived and implemented. Yet given that there is
an expectation that researchers will provide their thoughts on research para-
digms in their work, particularly in PhD theses, it is appropriate to provide
some guidance in selecting the key issues involved and how those topics might
be addressed in an appropriate manner. As a consequence, the discussion that
follows is not meant in any way to be a definitive guide to what can be deeply
puzzling and perplexing concepts and debates. Rather, bearing in mind the
readership for a book on research methods, several key issues are raised in
a manner that I hope offers a useful guide that has “grab” and “fit” and that
“works” for researchers responding to current demands to clarify and justify
their stance on aspects of study such as epistemology and ontology.
42
When researchers seek to encapsulate and characterize their ideas about

these complex issues, they often note theire adherence to one or other research
paradigm. The term research paradigm is now commonplace in the literature,
and it has proved helpful in beginning to distinguish between different views of
research, knowledge, and truth. Denzin and Lincoln, in the second edition of
their key text (2000) on the subject, list seven different candidates for research
paradigms; in the same volume, the essay by Lincoln and Guba (2000) offers
five main paradigms, an increase of one (participatory/cooperative) over their
essay in the first edition. Blaxter et al. (2006) also offer five paradigms, but not
the same ones given by Lincoln and Guba—see Table 2.6: another example of
different authors offering different ways of dividing the research domain.
Rather than trying to engage with all these different views and definitions,
I prefer a far simpler and starker distinction between the view that knowledge
is discovered and the view that it is made or constructed; a distinction used
to great effect by Richard Rorty (see below). In the terms other authors use,
this is broadly the distinction between positivism and constructivism.14 Yet
whichever classification one prefers, they all lead directly and ineluctably into
engagement with the E and O words; epistemology and ontology. These are
extremely troubling and troublesome terms for philosophers, so it should not
be a surprise that doctoral students, writing their methods chapters, find them
perplexing and confusing. In my class lectures I always warn my students that
TABLE 2.6
Research Paradigms
Denzin and Interpretive Positivist/postpositivist
Lincoln paradigms Constructivist
Feminist
Ethnic
Marxist
Cultural studies
Queer theory
Lincoln and Paradigms Positivism
Guba Postpositivism
Critical theory et al.
Constructivism
Participatory
Blaxter Social Positivism
research Postpositivism
paradigms Interpretivism
Critical
Postmodern
Bryant (after Paradigms Truth is discovered—generally Positivist, also Realist
Rorty, John ¤ Criteria of correspondence to reality, prediction, verifiability/
Dewey) falsifiability
Truth is constructed—Constructivist, Interpretivist
¤ Criteria of coherence, sense making,
Pragmatist—truth is constructed; but this also applies to this
statement itself (see Chapter 17)—Liberal Ironist (Rorty)
¤ Criteria of relevance, usefulness, instrumentalism (Dewey)
43
Research Methods 43
if they assume that the result of gaining more knowledge of a topic will reduce
ambiguity and uncertainty, then learning more about different views of the E
and O words will confound this assumption.
In simple terms, epistemology is the study of how we know, and ontol-
ogy is the study of what exists. The definition of epistemology in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy15 is as follows
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified
belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the
following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions
of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are
its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer
questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification?
What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external
to one’s own mind? Understood more broadly, epistemology is about issues
having to do with the creation and dissemination of knowledge in particular
areas of inquiry. (emphasis added)
Ontology refers to the study of the nature of being or reality, and this usu-
ally amounts to postulating what “things” exist and how they can be grouped
into categories; how those categories can then be related to each other, includ-
ing issues such as naming, classification/taxonomy, and so on. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives the following introduction to the term:
As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Some con-
test this formulation of what ontology is, so it’s only a first approxima-
tion. Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology: the
question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of
universals, etc. These are all problems in ontology in the sense that they
deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists …
we have at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of ontol-
ogy: first, say what there is, what exists … secondly, say what the most
general features and relations of these things are. (emphasis added)
With regard to clarifying ideas about research, one problem that arises early
on is why is the issue of how we know different from what exists? Surely we
cannot discuss what exists unless we have some idea about how we know
something? And we can only know something if we have some idea about
what exists. Or perhaps how we know things is actually quite simple; it is based
on observation and data. But as the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia (SEP)
goes on to state:
How we can find out what there is isn’t an easy question to answer. It
seems simple enough for regular objects that we can perceive with our
eyes, like my house keys, but how should we decide it for such things as,
say, numbers or properties?
44
So at issue there is the nature of aspects of our lives such as beauty, justice,
the square root of 2 (√2) and the square root of –1 (√–1 or i); two highly
contentious abstractions, one irrational number and one imaginary num-
ber. Also, we clearly know about things that do not exist, for instance, the
tooth fairy, unicorns, and Father Christmas, and perhaps more conten-
tious ones such as Bigfoot, the Loch Ness monster, and extra-terrestrial
beings.
If the development of knowledge equates in some way to providing
increasingly more accurate representations of what exists, then some of these
issues disappear; but unfortunately this metaphor of what Richard Rorty
terms The Mirror of Nature (1981) is not only false but also highly mislead-
ing. Research does not amount to a cumulative effort, whereby we gradually
achieve ever better forms of understanding and intellectual achievement as we
perfect a more accurate representation of reality. Concerns about the nature
of reality and our understanding of it are more complex than might at first
appear. They have been the focus of attention at least since Plato introduced
his “allegory of the cave,” designed to invoke the argument that, for most of us,
what we see is merely the superficial or chimerical rather than the true, deep
aspects of reality.
Plato’s allegory takes the form of a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon,
in which the former describes a group of people who are confined in a cave,
chained up so that they can only stare at the blank wall that forms the back of
the cave. All they can see of what is behind them, and outside the cave, are the
shadows of anything that passes in front of the fire that burns outside. They do
not understand that this is the case, but rather mistake the shadows for reality.
For Socrates (Plato) this is the way in which most of us experience the external
world, and it is only the philosopher who manages to get free from the shack-
les, turns around, and experiences reality; realizing that what the others see
are simply the shadows on the wall. The philosopher moves beyond superficial
appearances, gaining insight into the true forms or essence of reality, although
this takes more effort than turning around from the shadows to look outside
the cave and beyond the flames.
And now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners
are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is
liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round
and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare
will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his
former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying
to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he
is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real
existence, he has a clearer vision,—what will be his reply? And you may
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Research Methods 45
further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass
and requiring him to name them,—will he not be perplexed? Will he not
fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects
which are now shown to him? (Plato, n.d., emphasis added)
Introducing this sort of distinction between appearance and essence opens a
rift between what is seen and what is understood as a result of that seeing. It
also opens up the possibility that we are all deluded in a similar fashion. If it is
possible for some people to be led astray by what appears in front of their eyes,
then might this be the case for all of us? Why are “philosophers” or any other
group a special case; how can such people be sure of the superiority of their
knowledge, and how can they convince others of their special abilities and
insights? Characterizing perception in this way unleashes a form of doubt and
questioning that cannot be brought to a halt at the feet of supposedly superior
Platonic philosophers. All knowledge claims can be challenged on the same
basis; mistaking shadows for reality.
Rorty (1989) offers a solution to this paradox—one that many find uncom-
fortable or unacceptable—in his use of the term ironist.
I use “ironist” to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency
of his or her own most central beliefs and desires—someone sufficiently
historicist and nominalist16 to have abandoned the idea that those central
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and
chance. (Rorty, 1989, p. xv)
This resonates with Box’s dictum about models, so a methodological ironist
will be one who understands that choosing between the differing paradigms—
however many are on offer—is a matter of contingency rather than certainty,
and that moving from the philosophical ramifications of any paradigm to the
application of methods is similarly something affected by “the reach of time
and chance.” All methods are subject to this movement, and with regard to
GTM it is explained in Chapter 4, where the Aristotelian terms “accidents”
and “essences” are used to distinguish between different characteristics of the
method.
The overall impact of these sorts of argument—that there are some aspects
of reality that are not open to simple observation but that require deeper insight
and understanding—undermines the idea of observation as something fairly
simple, direct, and straightforward. One response to this, emanating from
advances in the physical sciences in the nineteenth century, was the view that
our knowledge of the world should be based on our sensory perceptions and
experiences, and readers might care to refer to the SEP entries on positivism,
realism, and empiricism for further elucidation—or perhaps greater confusion.
August Comte, a French philosopher writing in the first half of the nineteenth
46
century, argued that with the development of modern science we were moving
into the age of Positivism, having previously relied first on religious or theo-
logical and then metaphysical forms of understanding and knowledge.
… in its development, humanity passes through three successive stages: the
theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The first is the necessary
starting point for the human mind; the last, its normal state; the second
is but a transitory stage that makes possible the passage from the first to
the last. In the theological stage, the human mind, in its search for the
primary and final causes of phenomena, explains the apparent anomalies
in the universe as interventions of supernatural agents. The second stage
is only a simple modification of the first: the questions remain the same,
but in the answers supernatural agents are replaced by abstract entities. In
the positive state, the mind stops looking for causes of phenomena, and
limits itself strictly to laws governing them; likewise, absolute notions are
replaced by relative ones. Moreover, if one considers material develop-
ment, the theological stage may also be called military, and the positive
stage industrial; the metaphysical stage corresponds to a supremacy of the
lawyers and jurists. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comte/.
By the nineteenth century there was a large and growing body of laws of the
physical world based on the work of such pioneering thinkers as Galileo and
Newton, which taken together offered significant advances in people’s under-
standing of how the world worked and how new devices and mechanisms
could be developed and deployed. Comte saw no reason why the accomplish-
ments that enabled us to operate more effectively and incisively in the physical
world would not, in time, be extended to the social world—prior to coining
the term positivism he had used the term social physics.
Comte’s term was taken up and extended by a group of twentieth century
philosophers known as the Vienna Circle as they held meetings in the Cafe
Central in that city. Under the heading of Logical Positivism they held that the
only meaningful statements about the world were those couched in scientific
language, which by definition could be verified empirically—an alternative
term for this position is Logical Empiricism. In its starkest forms this included
the view that there was a clear distinction between scientific and nonscien-
tific statements about the world, with the former being qualitatively different
from and significantly superior to the latter. Although not all positivists sub-
scribed to this extreme position, what many held in common was the exis-
tence of a hierarchical distinction between scientific and nonscientific claims
to knowledge, and that scientific knowledge, developed through accretion of
observations and experimental outcomes that provided the basis for general
laws, derived from analysis of the data afforded from these results. Taken to
extremes, the position of logical positivism implies that anything that is not
“scientific” is not only inferior to scientific knowledge but is meaningless.17
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Research Methods 47
To a large extent most if not all practicing scientists, across the natural
and social sciences, probably undertook their research oblivious of the debates
between the logical positivists/empiricists and their critics. It is likely that, if
pressed to explain their approach, they would have offered something akin to
the Comtean view. But, by the 1960s, these issues were being brought to the
attention of an audience beyond the confines of academic philosophers, ini-
tially with publication of Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959),
followed by Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
Popper’s work, based on his research in Austria in the 1930s but updated and
re-worked for the English-language version in the 1950s, developed from his
critique of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. He is sometimes viewed
as a member of that group, but although he interacted with some of its mem-
bers in the 1920s and 1930s, he did so as a critic of many of its central tenets.
The basis of Popper’s criticisms centered on the distinction he developed
between the logic of scientific discovery and the logic of justification. The
approach of the logical positivists with regard to scientific discovery was that
it arose by a process of induction, whereby analysis of a large number of results
and observations provided the basis for articulating law-like statements. In
simple terms, if it is observed that whenever one sees a swan it is always white,
then by induction—moving from the individual to the general—it can be
claimed that all swans are white. But the problem of making this leap from the
individual to the general is that it may be based on an unbalanced sample of
events and observations, and it also implies that we can make claims about the
future based on observations from the past—that is, all swans I see next week
will be white.
The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the sup-
port or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer,
in Hume’s words, that “instances of which we have had no experience
resemble those of which we have had experience.” (Hume’s Treatise on
Human Nature, quoted in SEP article on Induction)
The process of induction, together with that of deduction and abduction is dis-
cussed further in Chapter 13, but at this juncture the point to be made is that
Popper argued that this was not the way in which scientific knowledge—or
even knowledge in general—actually comes about. Rather, the logic of dis-
covery, as opposed to the logic of justification, is centered on making conjec-
tures or claims about the world, and these could just as readily be based on a
momentary insight, gut feeling, or recall of a dream, as they could be derived
from extensive experimentation or observation.18 In this regard Popper dis-
tanced himself from the Logical Positivists, and did so even further by claim-
ing that observation itself was problematic if it was assumed to be the initial
step in the formation of theories. Scientific knowledge could not be based
on claims centered solely on observations because the observations were
48
themselves “theory-laden,” influenced by the theoretical positions from which

they emanated or which they were meant to justify. For Popper there was no
one methodology inherent in and unique to scientific discovery, it was one
form of problem solving and knowledge claiming; and these were activities
that are intrinsic to human existence.
What concerned Popper was the demarcation between science and what
he termed non-science; a distinction based not on the method of discovery
but rather on the logic of justification. For Popper, scientific theories were dis-
tinct from other knowledge claims in being falsifiable; these claims to knowl-
edge were constrained, offering a basis for predictions or deductions as well
as constraints or prohibitions. That is, these claims lay out potential reasons
for knowledge claims to be shown to be false if certain events or observations
occur or failed to occur. Popper accordingly repudiates induction and rejects
the view that it is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and
inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain
evidence in favor of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such
corroboration, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive
result of a genuinely “risky” prediction, which might conceivably have been
false. Thus, a theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event.
Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute
or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory.
(SEP entry on Popper http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/).
Popper’s position derives from his argument that there is a “logical asym-
metry” between proof and disproof, or in his terms between verification and
falsification. For Popper it is impossible to verify a proposition; at best, such
statements can only be corroborated if they survive attempts to undermine
them. A single counter-instance can falsify such statements.
Popper’s concerns arose from his familiarity with several of the theoretical
innovations that developed in the late nineteenth century and the early decades
of the twentieth century; Einstein’s theories of relativity, Freud’s psychoanal-
ysis, Adler’s individual psychology, and Marx’s theory of historical develop-
ment. Popper was familiar with all of these developments; he had worked with
Adler and been made aware of Einstein’s work through various colleagues. He
reported in Conjectures and Refutations (1963) that he and his fellow students
had felt “thrilled with the result of Eddington’s eclipse observations, which in
1919 brought the first important confirmation of Einstein’s theory of gravita-
tion. It was a great experience for us, and one which had a lasting influence on
my intellectual development.” In contrast, he felt increasing concern about the
scientific status of the other three theories.
My problem perhaps first took the simple form, “What is wrong with
Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so
different from physical theories, from Newton’s theory, and especially
from the theory of relativity?” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/)
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Research Methods 49
He explained that he was not concerned about the truth of any of the four
theories, nor was it a case of the mathematical exactitude of relativity in con-
trast to the more diffuse claims of the other three. “Thus what worried me was
neither the problem of truth, at that stage at least, nor the problem of exactness
or measurability. It was rather that I felt that these other three theories, though
posing as science, had in fact more in common with primitive myths than with
science; that they resembled astrology rather than astronomy.”
Popper gradually came to the conclusion that the problem arose from the
explanatory power emanating from different theories. Those of Marx, Freud,
and Adler appeared “to be able to explain practically everything that happened
within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to
have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, open your eyes to
a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated” (emphasis added). Echoing
Comte, perhaps unwittingly, Popper located these three theories against the
first stage of Comte’s model of intellectual progress: Myth.
More critically, he was arguing that the intellectual proof of a theory can-
not be based on verification because it is far too easy to see confirmation if
that is all one is looking for. “Once your eyes were thus opened you saw con-
firmed instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory.
Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and
unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth.”
This argument emanates from exactly the same disquiet that concerned Glaser
and Strauss in their early work. Popper’s criticism is couched in terms of belief
and revelation; terms more usually associated with faith and religion. This was
deliberate as he wanted to demarcate scientific knowledge claims from all other
claims, with a clear delineation between science and non-science, the theories
of Marx, Freud, and Adler being labelled “pseudo-scientific” as they claimed
scientific status but were not worthy of it as far as Pooper was concerned.
A scientific theory for Popper was not one with wide or even universal
explanatory power. On the contrary, if such proved to be its remit, then this
made such claims highly dubious. “I could not think of any human behavior
which could not be interpreted in terms of either theory (Freud’s or Adler’s).
It was precisely this fact—that they always fitted, that they were always
confirmed—which in the eyes of their admirers constituted the strongest argu-
ment in favor of these theories. It began to dawn on me that this apparent
strength was in fact their weakness.”
For Popper this was precisely the strength of Einstein’s theory, with its
concomitant prediction of gravitational lensing, which had only recently been
upheld by Eddington’s experiments (see Farooq, 2011). For Popper, the predic-
tion itself was “risky” because it stated not only what should be observed but
also what should not be observed. For example, if Eddington’s experiments had
not produced results in line with the predicted ones this would have under-
mined the theory itself. The outcome was Popper’s formulation of the basis for
scientific knowledge claims.
50
It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every

theory—if we look for confirmations.
Every “good” scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things
to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-
scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think)
but a vice.
One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific sta-
tus of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. (http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/popper/, emphasis added)
The influence of Popper’s arguments on practicing scientists, as expressed
in his two key works The Logic of Scientific Discovery and Conjectures and
Refutations, cannot be overestimated. The concept of falsifiability became
commonplace among scientists when presenting their ideas or writing about
their life and work; something that is still the case many decades later. Popper’s
ideas were accessible to non-philosophers, and clearly struck a chord with
researchers and others keen on demonstrating the distinction between scien-
tific endeavors and nonscientific ones.
There were, however, a number of key weaknesses in Popper’s position.
With regard to falsifiability and the experiment to test gravitational lensing,
Einstein was asked what his reaction would have been had his theory not been
corroborated by Eddington’s experiments. His reply, “I would feel sorry for
the good Lord. The theory is correct.” This statement undermines Popper’s use
of this example, although his view of falsification was more complex, and he
did allow for the possibility that an apparently falsifying test of a theory might
itself be fallacious, and so the theory in question could still be used as the basis
for further tests rather than merely jettisoned.
A more serious issue arose with his introduction of the idea that observa-
tions were “theory-laden,” undermining the idea of generalizing from repeated
observations to law-like generalizations and theoretical statements—in other
words “inductive” inference. If this is the case with respect to the initial obser-
vations in the development of a theory, why does it not also apply to subse-
quent tests of theories or conjectures that rely on observations? Admittedly
Popper was aware of such issues, hence his point about Adler’s seeing any “evi-
dence” as corroborating his approach; also, Popper’s stress on risky predictions.
Researchers should always bear this in mind, and if they find that their results
corroborate and uphold their hypotheses or initial ideas, this should lead to a
raised level of suspicion and deeper investigation rather than complacency and
satisfaction. But if there is always the possibility of what has been termed “con-
firmation bias” (i.e., finding confirmation of one’s pre-existing ideas/beliefs),
following Popper, there might now be something we can term “falsification
bias”—that is, favoring knowledge claims and theoretical statements from
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Research Methods 51
which falsification strategies and critical experiments can be derived in a fairly

straightforward manner, rather than those for which this would be a complex
issue. It may well be the case that Popper and others could not conceive of ways
in which the work of Marx or Freud could be used to derive critical claims that
could be tested in some manner, whereas this seemed far easier to do with
Einstein’s work; but that may be due, in part, to the difficulties—both practical
and ethical—in producing experimental evidence in the social world.
A few years after Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery appeared in
English Thomas Kuhn published his work on The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, part of a series of monographs under the general title The
International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science. This can now be seen as highly
ironic as science would never be unified in quite the same way again in the
wake of its publication. In fact, Kuhn’s book aroused sufficient controversy in
the scientific arena, and among historians and philosophers of science, that
in 1969 a second edition was published, including an extended “Postscript”
taking issue with the plethora of comments and critiques the first edition had
provoked.19
In essence, Kuhn’s argument centered on the ways in which scientists “do
science” in the normal run of things, normal being the operative word. Kuhn
coined the term normal science, defining it as the activities undertaken by sci-
entists in a field where research could be “firmly based upon one or more past
scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific commu-
nity acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for further practice”
(Kuhn, 1969, p. 10). These achievements had to have some basic attraction that
ensured that a group of scientists felt sufficiently drawn toward them, and they
also had to leave open a sufficient range of issues for further research—such
research being based on what Kuhn termed puzzles. Thus, for Kuhn, most sci-
entific research was concerned with puzzle-solving, a deliberately demeaning
term. Kuhn’s term for such an environment of existing, widely acknowledged,
and unquestioningly accepted achievements, incorporating puzzle-solving
activities, was a paradigm; a source of much misunderstanding since that date,
partially as an effect of the many ways in which he used and developed the
term in his book.
In some of his later writings Kuhn argued that he should have placed more
stress on the social activities of scientists, rather than focusing on the nature
of “science” itself; that is, he felt that his emphasis should have been on the
social processes involved rather than on the abstract concept (i.e., doing sci-
ence rather than “science.”) In much the same way I wish to stress the actual
processes of doing research, rather than wrestling with the idea of research as
an abstraction. Clear parallels can also be drawn between Kuhn’s characteriza-
tion of science in practice and Glaser and Strauss’s view of the social science
orthodoxy in the United States in the 1960s. For Glaser and Strauss, “normal”
social science was essentially puzzle solving in the sense that researchers were
52
largely being prompted into deriving research ideas from what can be seen in
Kuhn’s terms as the principal paradigms of the time—the grand theories of
the grand theorists. Their “proletarian testers” were the puzzle solvers whose
efforts were largely encompassed by what Glaser and Strauss disparagingly
termed verification. But although in this regard Kuhn might be seen as an ally
of Glaser and Strauss, when it comes to the concept of “data” his ideas prove
far more problematic to the early GTM writings and to Glaser’s position in
general.
Kuhn built his conception of paradigm change on the foundations con-
structed by Ludwik Fleck (1935/1979), who remained largely unnoticed until
long after Kuhn had become an icon in the philosophy and history of sci-
ence, although Kuhn specifically mentions him in his book. Using the example
of how syphilis became identified as a disease with possible potential treat-
ment, Fleck argued that “facts” arose from what he called thought collectives,
or groups of scientists who shared a language, set of principles, and way of
thinking about the scientific problems that they encountered. Thus, for Fleck,
facts did not exist independently in an external reality separate from scien-
tific observers; instead, they were constructed by scientists. Writing at the same
time as Popper, although neither seems to have had any knowledge of the
other, Fleck was arguing along similar lines with regard to the ways in which
researchers could easily be lured into conclusions based on confirmations or
corroborations that were largely in the eyes of the beholders. In contrast to
Popper, however, Fleck claimed that this was common to all forms of knowl-
edge claim—scientific or nonscientific.
Popper’s main focus was on the demarcation between science and non-
science, and on science as a concept, whereas Fleck was far more concerned
with science as a social activity: With regard to scientific thought one had to
recognize the importance of social and historical factors that were involved in
development and acceptance of knowledge claims and research projects. These
developments did not happen by accident or because an individual or group
made certain discoveries or put forward new ideas and models.
In this process there is nothing necessary; various accidental circum-
stances decide which ideas become a basis for investigation and are dis-
seminated within a collective; which meetings between scientists happen;
which research projects acquire social support; which experiments are
conducted first etc. Fleck claims that if e.g. Sigle’s idea of protozoa-like
structures as the causative agent of syphilis had acquired sufficient sup-
port, we would have reached a harmonious system of knowledge differ-
ent from the current one. The scope of the name “syphilis” would have
been somewhat different than it is today, just like the methods of research
and therapy would. But when a certain thought style develops and domi-
nates researchers’ minds, alternative ways of development become closed.
Summing up this idea Fleck claims that most—and maybe even the
53
Research Methods 53
whole—content of scientific knowledge is conditioned by historical, psy-

chological and sociological factors and one has to consider them when
attempting to explain that content (1935a, II.1). (SEP entry on Fleck)
This is not to suggest that such thought styles or collective cognitions hap-
pen by chance or misunderstanding. On the contrary, they can only develop
if there is a necessary institutional basis—including some but not all of the
following; an identified discipline, an established body or bodies that award
recognition and sustain recognized publications and meetings, acknowledged
experts and bodies of knowledge, training and degree schemes and curricula,
key texts and textbooks. Fleck sums this up as follows:-
(…) a judgment about the existence or non-existence of a phenomenon
belongs, in a democratic collective, to a numerous council, not to an indi-
vidual. The textbook changes the subjective judgment of an author into
a proven fact. It will be united with the entire system of science, it will
henceforward be recognized and taught, it will become a foundation of
further facts and the guiding principle of what will be seen and applied
(1936, VI). (SEP entry on Fleck)
Researchers have not yet fully mined the implications of Fleck’s brilliant con-
tribution, as Löwy has pointed out (1988, 1990). Kuhn’s analysis, in contrast,
captured the imagination not only of historians and philosophers of science
but also the wider academic population, as well as many practicing scientists
who took exception to his notion of science as puzzle solving. One outcome of
Kuhn’s argument was that many historians and philosophers of science (and
many others) came to understand science as a collective activity centered on
traditions, authorities, institutions, networks, and community solidarity at
least as much as on some unquenchable thirst for truth and knowledge. More
critically, Kuhn laid out an argument that stressed the ways in which science as
a communal activity actually could be seen to work against innovative think-
ing, as “normal science often suppresses fundamental novelties because they
are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.” This suppression or inhi-
bition was not merely a social and institutional phenomenon, with author-
itative figures freezing out those who sought to challenge the paradigmatic
orthodoxy, although this was and continues to be an important aspect of the
institutionalization of science. In its starkest form, Kuhn’s position amounted
to arguing that scientists viewed the world through the prevailing paradigm
of their discipline; it acted as a cognitive lens or filter. Those who were outside
the discipline, or who challenged the paradigm in some way, did so because
they saw things differently or saw different things. So in effect Kuhn was taking
Popper’s accusations against Marxists, Freudians, and Adlerians—and many
other pseudo-scientists—and leveling this charge against scientists, pseudo-
scientists, and religious believers alike.
54
Many social scientists enthusiastically adopted Kuhn’s ideas, sometimes

in ways with which Kuhn himself disagreed. Some saw Kuhn’s work as under-
mining the orthodox view of what constituted science and scientific practice,
simultaneously demolishing the science/nonscience distinction. Claims to
“being scientific” no longer amounted to anything special: science was a form
of belief, resting on assumptions and traditions not unlike other belief systems.
More critically, and more pertinently for our purposes, Kuhn’s work fed into
the growing critique of positivism, including the possibility of neutral obser-
vation and collection of data, and so further undermined the scientific ortho-
doxy with its view of what constituted “proper science,” “scientific method,”
and where and whether the distinction between science and nonscience could
be clearly drawn. Ultimately this path can lead to a relativist free-for-all,
although as is argued later in Chapter 17, this is not necessarily the case.
Kuhn demonstrated key aspects of his argument using examples from
Joseph Priestley’s work published in the late eighteenth century. In the United
Kingdom and most of the English-speaking world this is usually referred to
as Priestley’s discovery of oxygen. Prior to his work it was thought that burn-
ing various substances in air caused them to gain weight as a result of their
combining with something called phlogiston. Similarly, some substances were
combustible but lost weight, the argument being that they lost their phlogiston
and burned only as long as the air around them could absorb the phlogiston
being given off. Priestley experimented on mercuric oxide and found that it
lost weight and gave off something that was able to ignite a glowing splint,
made flames burn more intensely, and allowed a mouse to live four times lon-
ger than it would if kept in a similar container of air. Priestley claimed to have
demonstrated the existence of de-phlogisticated air—that is, air that contained
so little phlogiston that it could absorb far more during burning of phlogisti-
cated substances.
Priestley’s experiments were widely reported and repeated by Antoine
Lavoisier. However, Lavoisier postulated that the reason for the findings was
that air itself contained a substance that was capable of sustaining combustion,
and was also involved in the formation of acidic-tasting substances. He called
that substance oxygen, deriving this term from the Greek for “acid-former.”
He also argued that another constituent of air was something that combined
with oxygen to form water, and he named this hydrogen—“water-former.”
More important, however, is that Priestley never accepted Lavoisier’s explana-
tion and claimed that his postulate of “de-phlogisticated air” was the correct
explanation.
Kuhn argued that the reason the two scientists reached such divergent con-
clusions based on what were broadly similar if not identical sets of observations
was that each was working within a different paradigm. The word itself dates
back to the fourteenth or fifteenth century, and originally meant an example or
model (deriving from the Greek, the prefix “beside” [παρά, para] and “show”
55
Research Methods 55
[δειγμα, deiknunai]. But following publication of Kuhn’s book, the term took
on a whole raft of new meanings, and it also introduced the term paradigm
shift. Various critics pointed out that there were numerous meanings of the
term in Kuhn’s book, but essentially the idea was that scientists worked within
a paradigm, that is, a thought collective or thought style, as Fleck had argued.
Thus for Priestley, what he observed during his experiments was the result of
de-phlogisticated air; whereas for Lavoisier, it was the reaction between the
oxygen in the air and the substance being burned. Each one understood the
process of combustion, but in entirely different ways. Priestley could hardly
be seen as having “discovered” oxygen, because he refused to believe anything
of the sort; and Lavoisier could not easily claim primacy, as he was repeating
Priestley’s earlier work. (Others have pointed out that Carl Wilhelm Scheele
carried out experiments similar to that of Priestley in 1772, two years prior to
Priestley’s, but he failed to publish his findings for some time, and so Priestley’s
results were reported first. This reinforces the point made earlier about research
involving dissemination as well as producing actual results.)
Whatever the various intricacies and details of the Priestley-Lavoisier
experiments, the point that Kuhn was keen to stress was that observation and
experiment are not neutral activities; they take place within a context that is
influential in the production and promulgation of explanations. He made a
similar point with regard to the shift from an earth-centered view to a sun-
centered view of the universe.
Kuhn’s book provoked a furor because it seemed to imply that science was
for the most part a fairly mundane set of activities, puzzle solving, occasion-
ally punctuated by significant upheavals, scientific revolutions that resulted in
a changed view of the world—a paradigm shift. Such changes, however, were
not seen primarily or necessarily as leading to progress and improvement in
our understanding of the world. Scientific revolutions produced changes
in the dominant paradigm, but that was no guarantee that the new model
was in some definitive sense better than the preceding one. Nevertheless, new
paradigms will usually resolve the unsolved or unsolvable puzzles from the
preceding paradigm.
The outcome of the work of both Popper and Kuhn work is that terms
such as science, being scientific, data, observation, and objectivity are now seen
at the very least as controversial and questionable. For this reason researchers
need to demonstrate some awareness of these issues, although a disarming
number of scientists and institutional gatekeepers appear not to be aware of
these decades-old debates. These controversies, however, did not only emanate
from the work of Kuhn, but were also central to discussions among sociolo-
gists at the same time. The second edition of Kuhn’s work appeared in 1969,
just a few years after the appearance of the provocatively titled The Social
Construction of Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann; a year later
Harold Garfinkel published Studies in Ethnomethodology.20 These two books
56
seriously challenged conventional positivistic epistemologies because they

explicitly argued that people constructed their realities through their ordinary
actions. Thus by the 1970s the scene was set for epistemological debates to
center on positivism versus constructivism, and the distinctiveness, if any, of
scientific as opposed to nonscientific claims to knowledge. Consequently cer-
tain core ontological issues could be couched in terms of the extent to which
our concepts and categorizations could be said to be discovered or constructed.
In the wake of these controversies that arose in the 1970s a whole range of
terms have now entered the lexicon of research handbooks and textbooks, the
status of which is exactly that noted by Fleck in the quotation given earlier—
that is, “[T]‌he textbook changes the subjective judgment of an author into a
proven fact … it will henceforward be recognized and taught, it will become
a foundation of further facts and the guiding principle of what will be seen
and applied.” As has already been noted, the standard textbooks in the field of
research methods list different ideas with regard to the number and names of
current research paradigms. As a consequence, researchers may feel obligated
to state their adherence to one or other of these sources and to one of the para-
digms on offer, but in so doing they should understand that they may be leav-
ing themselves open to criticisms based on either their understanding of what
the ramifications of such claims amount to, or the relationship between such
claims and the actual activities undertaken in the research itself—or both.
Although some of the controversies around different forms of GTM
emanate from different epistemological standpoints, this is not to imply
that criticism of a researcher’s opinions on such matters inevitably applies
to the resulting research findings. My own position might be summarized
as Pragmatist-cum-Constructivist, although even this is couched in ironist
terms—that is, it is entirely contingent. Yet I have found myself critical of some
research undertaken by others who follow a broadly similar line and admiring
of some who clearly state their opposition to this view. In writing about GTM,
however, it is important to note that Glaser and Strauss failed to take any cog-
nizance of these matters in their GTM writings; neither in concert in the 1960s
and 1970s nor in their individual publications in the 1980s and beyond. This is
a critical oversight given the central place of concepts such as data, discovery,
and induction for GTM itself, as discussed in Chapter 4. For present purposes,
it is worth stressing that purity of method is no guarantee of value in research
findings, or as Rorty has argued:-
Nothing is to be gained for an understanding of human knowledge by
running together vocabularies in which we describe the causal anteced-
ents of knowledge with those in which we offer justification of our claims
to knowledge. (Richard Rorty, Dewey’s Metaphysics)
In other words, adherence to a method is no substitute for effective insight.
In Part Two the ideas discussed in these first chapters will be taken further
57
Research Methods 57
with regard to GTM, including the ways in which Glaser and Strauss failed to
engage with some of the issues of their time, which should now be understood
as both critical and supportive of the method itself.
Key Points
¤ Ideas about Epistemology and Ontology

¤ Logical positivism and Popper’s critique—falsification
¤ Kuhn—Scientific revolutions, paradigms, and paradigm shifts
¤ Fleck—thought collectives; role of key texts
¤ Truth—discovered or constructed
¤ Confirmation bias—“It is the peculiar and perpetual error of the
human understanding to be more moved and excited by affirmatives
than by negatives.”—Francis Bacon
Exercises
1. Look through some research papers or PhD theses; how, if at all, have
they addressed the issue of research paradigms, epistemology, and
ontology? If they have not, can anything about these topics be inferred
from the texts themselves? If they have, how do such statements relate
to the research itself?
2. With regard to your answer(s) to Exercise 1, how might someone
reading your work deal with these same aspects?
Notes
1. Margaret Kearney (2007) notes that Strauss described his first large-scale research
venture, Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions (1964), as “virtually a grounded theory study,
but only implicitly so” (Strauss, 1993: 12)
2. For example in early 2015 one of my current PhD students received a review of his
paper that criticized the submission, stating that “If you want to do empirical research,
you have to start with hypothesis first. Then you should explain the appropriate methods
to validate the correctness of the hypothesis. And then you could explain your research
outline in detail.”
3. The original source for this is from Helmuth von Moltke the Elder—“No battle plan
ever survives contact with the enemy.” Also referred to in Chapter 11.
4. At the end of this section I will suggest that you apply my 5x(P+P) framework to a
method with which you are familiar, so it may be useful to bear this in mind as you read
through the section.
58
5. The system was developed for Lyons Tea Shops, Lyons Electronic Office—LEO
6. Goffman was himself channelling Karl Marx from The 18th Brumaire “Men make
their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted
from the past.” https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/
7. The distinction between the “accidents” and the “essences” of GTM is explained in
Chapter 4.
8. Use of the phrase coding-cum-analysis, i.e. coding with analysis, implies that the
two processes go together in the sense that one follows the other in an iterative fashion—
coding, then analysis, then further coding, and so on. Also the phrase evokes the idea that
the two processes are simultaneous, so that while one is coding one is also analyzing, and
vice-versa.
9. Endnote 2 attests to this, and readers may well have encountered similar responses
to their proposals, submissions and other outputs.
10. I have taken great care to ensure that this does not apply to the diagrams and other
figures used in this book, but ultimately that judgment must be left to the reader.
11. The term pragmatics is used here to encompass the practicalities of using a method.
It should not be confused with Pragmatism, which refers to the philosophical position asso-
ciated with Dewey, James, Peirce, and other philosophers, as is explained in later chapters.
12. Agile Manifesto—http://www.agilemanifesto.org/
13. Theoretical saturation is dealt with in Chapter 12, with an example and a summary
in Boxes 12.1 and 12.2 respectively.
14. I find other terms misleading or unhelpful: Post-positivism seems to be applied to
positions that are still positivist, so at best the term should be neo-positivism—neo meaning
“new,” as opposed to “post” which implies some sort of distancing. While use of the term
“critical” implies that the other options lack a critical aspect.
15. A very useful and important resource; well worth supporting http://plato.stanford.edu/
16. Again the SEP entries for nominalism and historicism offer excellent accounts of
the terms
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/
17. The SEP article on The Vienna Circle clarifies the many ways in which the term
meaningless was applied http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle
18. The most famous example of this relates to the German chemist, August Kekule,
who reportedly resolved the issue of the structure of the benzene molecule—a ring
structure—when recalling his dream of a snake devouring its own tail. Needless to say some
historians have cast doubt on this tale, but this does not undermine the realization that
ideas and insights can arise in the most unexpected manner.
19. This discussion of Kuhn is partly derived from the editors’ introduction to The
Handbook of Grounded Theory, 2007, q.v.)
20. Most of the material had appeared in the preceding years as research papers, but
having them in book form brought them greater attention. His approach gave rise to two
related methodologies: ethnomethodology, and conversational analysis. Both challenged
positivistic methodological practices of the day and conceptions of scientific theorizing.
Ironically, 40 years later, many social scientists view conversational analysis as the most
positivist of the qualitative methodologies.
59
PART TWO
The Grounded Theory Method in Practice
In the chapters that follow in Parts 2 and 3 the main aspects of the grounded
theory method (GTM) are discussed in detail, making extensive use of the work
submitted by several of my students for their PhDs. The application of GTM
across their theses varies in many respects, exemplifying the different ways in
which the method can be used to arrive at conceptual models and theories that
have fit, grab, and utility in the areas from which they have been derived, and
possibly even beyond these confines. These chapters necessitate reference to the
historical background leading up to the appearance of the GTM, and the ways
in which the method has developed since the 1960s. This involves taking issue
with some of the conventional wisdom associated with GTM, but doing so with
a balance between Rapoport’s rules referred to in the Introduction to this book,
and J. K. Galbraith’s use of the term with its mildly derogatory overtones.
Because familiarity is such an important test of acceptability, the accept-
able ideas have great stability. They are highly predictable. It will be con-
venient to have a name for the ideas which are esteemed at any time
for their acceptability, and it should be a term that emphasized this
predictability. I shall refer to those ideas henceforth as the conventional
wisdom. (Galbraith, 1958, emphasis added)1
Glaser and Strauss can themselves be seen as archetypal challengers of “the
conventional wisdom” relating to research in the 1960s. But in the ensu-
ing years some aspects of GTM have achieved the questionable status of
“acceptability” and “predictability,” and are now appropriate targets for simi-
lar challenges, but with the understanding that the result of such endeavors
contributes to our overall understanding of research practices in general and
GTM in particular.
It should be noted that several of my PhD students did not set out to
use GTM from the start of their doctoral work but came across it later and
opted to implement it for various reasons; whereas others used the method in
60
60 The Grounded Theory Method in Practice
conjunction with other methods. These differing rationales and strategies will
become apparent as this section unfolds and will be dealt with more fully in
Part Three, but for now it should be noted that, taken together, the chapters
that comprise Part 2 aim to offer a firm and coherent justification for arguing
that one of the strengths of GTM is its flexibility, which is demonstrated in
practice by the different ways in which it has been taken up and served the
purpose for effective conceptualization and generation of theories.
As already intimated in Chapter 2, it is futile to insist on strict adher-
ence to one method or strategy, and particularly so in the case of GTM, which
places such importance on flexibility and contingency— admittedly usu-
ally with regard to grounded theories themselves rather than the method.
But as Charmaz has pointed out Glaser and Strauss from the outset invited
their readers to use grounded theory strategies flexibly, and in their own way
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 9). Strauss and Corbin clearly expressed this in their chap-
ter in the first edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research in 1994. This is
not to open the way for a GTM free-for-all, but it is critical for researchers to
understand that methodological statements need to be presented, treated, and
understood as heuristics and not algorithms—that is, as guidelines rather than
strictures and prescriptions.
In any case the possible outcomes of a free-for-all should not be regarded
as any more problematic than those that can result from slavish adherence to
one view of a method. In fact, it is important to recognize and counteract the
inevitability of such developments, and the Strauss and Corbin chapter in 1994
clearly implies that Strauss himself was well aware of the ways in which the
lessons of the initial trilogy and subsequent GTM texts were being misunder-
stood and misapplied. In some cases such misunderstandings were a result of
imbalances in the texts themselves, but they were also a result of unreflective
or mechanistic interpretations of the subtleties of GTM itself.
Authors and researchers offering extended methodological accounts—
including this one—need to understand that such ventures are inherently
risky, because they will inevitably lead to misunderstandings, revisions,
enhancements, and applications across a range that extends from the unthink-
ingly slavish to the ad hoc and superficial. As a consequence, methodological
accounts may well elicit responses from the originators and others that might
be presented as further clarification, but that can also function as boundary
claims regarding the extent to which the various interpretations and imple-
mentations are or are not acceptable.Thus, on the one hand some authors
argue about the extent to which interpretations of GTM fall within or beyond
the confines of the method, whereas on the other hand, others will be keen to
demonstrate that their contributions are valid articulations of the original, or
they will offer clarification, enhancements, or revisions. I would argue that,
GTM like any method, needs to be understood as a developing social practice
which, like a shark, has to keep moving forward if it is to sustain its claim to
61
The Grounded Theory Method in Practice 61
having fit, grab, and utility as a guide for researchers keen to generate innova-
tive and insightful conceptualizations in the form of grounded theories.2
In the chapters that follow I present a brief historical account of the
method and its founders (Chapter 3), before I move on to consider the key
features and characteristics of the method as a whole (Chapter 4). Part Three
offers an exploration of GTM in more detail, including examples drawn from
the literature and also from the work of PhD students, illustrating the ways in
which GTM-oriented research is undertaken in practice.
Different authors have taken differing stances in presenting the details of
GTM. In the first edition of her book, Kathy Charmaz had chapters on gather-
ing rich data, coding, and memo-writing, as well as ones on writing and reflect-
ing. In the second edition those chapters were supplemented with chapters on
interviewing, Symbolic Interactionism and GTM, and later aspects of coding
(Charmaz, 2006 and 2014). The second edition of Basics of Qualitative Research
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) offered a section on “Coding Procedures,” includ-
ing chapters on “Open coding,” “Axial Coding,” and “Coding for Process.” The
third edition (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) uses a completely different structure
of 15 chapters, none of which incorporates the term “coding” in its title. There
are now numerous books on GTM, some of which appear in the References in
this text, and in adding to this number with this book I have deliberately opted
for a strategy that complements, rather than mimics or reiterates, Charmaz’s
account. For instance, rather than discussing the ways in which GTM inter-
viewing might be planned and undertaken, I refer readers to the excellent
chapter in the new edition of her book (Charmaz 2014). The opening of Part
Three in this book explains my strategy in more detail, specifically, the ways in
which it is organized around the central theme of doing grounded theorizing,
a research process that revolves around the core processes of abstracting, con-
ceptualizing, patterning and configuring, and abductive reasoning.
Notes
1. In many senses this anticipates some aspects of Kuhn’s concept of a paradigm.
2. Quote from Annie Hall (Woody Allen) “A relationship, I think, is like a shark. You
know? It has to constantly move forward or it dies. And I think what we’ve got on our hands
is a dead shark.” Similarly, with regard to GTM, we need to avoid having a “dead method”
on our hands.
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63
1967 And All That
“GTM is an abductive, Pragmatist method, I just didn’t tell

Barney!”
Glaser and Strauss began work together in the 1960s, leading in 1967 to the
publication of The Discovery of Grounded Theory; hence the chapter title 1967
and All That.”1 Strauss’s intellectual development derived from his experi-
ence in the first part of the twentieth century as part of the Chicago School
of Sociology, an orientation that is characterized by attention to the meanings
and motivations of social actors.2 Key figures associated with this tradition
include G. H. Mead, Robert Park, and Herbert Blumer. Blumer is known for
the concept of Symbolic Interaction or Symbolic Interactionism [SI], a term he
coined in the 1930s. In his later work he characterized SI as resting on
three simple premises: 1) that human beings act towards things on the
basis of the meanings that they have for them— including physical
objects, activities and encounters with other human beings, institutions
and other collectivities, and concepts and ideals; 2) that the meaning of
such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one
has with one’s fellows; 3) these meanings are handled in, and modified
through, an interpretative process used by the person dealing with [these]
encounters. (Blumer, SI, 1969, p. 2)
Glaser, on the other hand, had undertaken his postgraduate work at Columbia
University, in New York, working under the nominal guidance of Paul
Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton. Lazarsfeld was a highly influential figure
in American sociology at the time, making key contributions to teaching and
implementing empirical methods in social research. In his native Austria he
had led the team behind the detailed study of the town of Marienthal, pub-
lished as a “sociography of an unemployed community” in the 1930s (Jahoda
et al, 1932). This large-scale and participative study of the effects of unemploy-
ment on a small Austrian community became a classic of sociological research,
and it led to Lazarsfeld’s being invited to the United States on a fellowship in
the mid-1930s. With the rise of the Third Reich, he never returned to Austria,
63
64
and at Columbia he established the Bureau of Applied Social Research, which

was described as setting the agenda for US social science research in the 1950s
and 1960s.
The Marienthal study was derived from extensive data gathered by a large
team of researchers over more than 100 working days. The documentation was
said to have weighed around 30 kg. This was analyzed, initially using coding
frames that had been prepared prior to the data gathering itself. But one of the
key features of the publications developed from this study was their literary
and narrative tone. This derived from the extensive time spent by the research
team in Marienthal itself, where they had acted not merely as disinterested
researchers but as active—but temporary—members of the community.3
Strauss, born in 1916, was the older of the two by 14 years, and also
the more established as an academic sociologist and researcher. Prior to the
appearance of the founding trilogy of GTM (Awareness, Discovery, and Time),
he had already published a key Symbolic Interactionist oriented text, Mirrors
and Masks, in 1959. This book appeared in the same year as his colleague
Erving Goffman’s Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. In the United States
and the United Kingdom Mirrors and Masks was largely eclipsed by Goffman’s
work, although in the German-speaking world it was very much the core text
that articulated what has been called the dramaturgical and symbolic interac-
tionist trend in sociological analysis.
In 1960 Strauss moved to the School of Nursing at the University of
California, San Francisco (UCSF), establishing the Department of Social
and Behavioral Sciences. This also marked the start of his collaboration with
Glaser. Each had recently suffered a close family bereavement; Strauss’s mother
and Glaser’s father—hence the dedicatees referred to in Awareness.4 This adds
poignancy to their work on dying. It also exemplifies a characteristic of many
GTM projects, namely the way in which GTM researchers develop their stud-
ies based on their own personal experiences or backgrounds. This might seem
to be a problem for a research project, because many of the authoritative texts
suggest that research should be dispassionate. But in practice research is car-
ried out for a number of reasons, which may include the necessity to earn a
living and gain funding, to be linked to one’s employment, or to develop from
a deeply felt commitment, or all three. Research can be dispassionate as long
as it is done in a robust and systematic manner, and it may actually be carried
out with clearer insight if driven by acknowledged motivations and concerns.
In any case, whatever the impact of such motivations, a great deal of pub-
lished GTM research has been marked by personal involvement, usually to
good effect. This originates with Awareness and Time and continues into the
present, as exemplified by many of the chapters in The Handbook of Grounded
Theory (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007a).
In their early, pioneering work, Strauss and Glaser were joined by Jeanne
Quint, a professionally qualified nurse. Her role in the early studies has been
65
1967 And All That 65
largely neglected, and following publication of Awareness and Discovery she

appears to have had little or no further involvement with Glaser and Strauss’s
research activities. Her “almost daily invaluable support” over the 6-year
period of the research is mentioned in the acknowledgments to Awareness.
Glaser and Strauss refer to four publications emanating from their research
project, including Awareness, together with “a forthcoming publication on
the trajectory of the dying patient” (Time), and also Quint’s The Nurse and
the Dying Patient (1967).5 The actual role played by Quint in these early
studies is unclear, although Phyllis Stern (2012), in her obituary of Jeanne
Quint Benoliel, argues that “[W]‌hen Glaser and Strauss treated her data as
their own, she beat them to the punch by publishing first” (emphasis added).
Whatever the case may be, in 1970 she joined the staff of the University of
Washington School of Nursing, where she played a key part in the ensuing
decades as a pioneer in care of the terminally ill and in the development of
nursing education, including postgraduate and doctoral studies, as the fol-
lowing extract indicates.
Jeanne was the first registered nurse to be president of the International
Work Group on Death, Dying and Bereavement. She helped to create and
organize a number of international thanatology organizations and is rec-
ognized as one of the founders in the field of palliative and hospice care.
To say that Jeanne Quint Benoliel is a “living legend” is an understate-
ment. She has transformed the field of care for dying people. She was the
first to bring the family into care for the dying. Her research, joined with
Ruth McCorkel’s, continued to focus on system distress, enforced social
dependency, and health outcomes for patients and the families. Taken
together, Jean’s contributions have helped shape the field of palliative care
and hospice care. She has made legendary contributions to nursing that
bring honor to the discipline. (WSNA, 2004)
In Discovery Glaser and Strauss located their respective intellectual forma-
tions within two distinct schools of social research; Glaser in the Columbia
tradition of Lazarsfeld and Merton, and Strauss in the Chicago tradition of
Blumer and Mead. They made mention of the “embarrassingly noticeable
gap between highly abstract theory and the multitude of miniscule substan-
tive studies so characteristic of current sociology” (p. 97). They noted that
Blumer had already pointed this out in the 1940s, although the “gap is as
wide today as it was in 1941 … and in 1949, when Merton optimistically
suggested a solution” (p. vii). The cryptic reference to Merton is expanded
in a footnote on page 2 of Discovery, where he is credited with discussing
the “theoretic functions of research” and referring to the topic of serendipity.
Glaser and Strauss, however, contended that ultimately Merton is concerned
with “grounded modifying of theory, not grounded generating of theory”
(emphasis added).
66
Merton occupies an anomalous position in the sociological landscape

sketched by Glaser and Strauss in Discovery. He is credited with recogniz-
ing the gap first articulated by Blumer, and even offering a solution to bridge
it. Moreover his concept of “theories of the middle-range” is referred to in
their discussion of the two possible products of “comparative analysis”; both
substantive and formal grounded theories … can be considered as “middle-
range.” That is, they fall between the “minor working hypotheses of everyday
life” and the “all-inclusive grand theories” (pp. 32–33).
On the other hand his work on anomie was referred to as a “classic exam-
ple of logically deduced theory” (p. 4), and a footnote on page 8 pointed out
that in his discussion of codification he suggests that “the irrelevant richness of
connotation” should be omitted; whereas Glaser and Strauss demanded that
such richness of information be fully incorporated; indeed, it is central to their
method.
To reiterate the point made previously, Discovery was written at least in
part as a manifesto for the new method. As such there is a good deal of space
devoted to characterizing the different forms of social research extant at the
time, and the distinctiveness of the new method in contrast to these orthodox-
ies. To begin with, Glaser and Strauss point to writers such as C. Wright Mills,
who was singled out as exhibiting “little theoretical control” in his work (p. 5).
This term is ambiguous, but some clarification is offered in the ensuing clause—
“though he claimed that data disciplined his theory.” For Glaser and Strauss,
theoretical control came from disciplined attention to the data. Consequently
Mills’s uncontrolled work was contrasted with the grounded approach exempli-
fied in the classic Chicago School study of male medical students, Boys in White
(Becker et al., 1961—Strauss being one of the co-authors), which is “derived
from the data and then illustrated by characteristic examples of data” (p. 5).
Glaser and Strauss recognized the existence of grand theories in the social
sciences, such as those of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Cooley, Veblen,
Mead, and Park, all of whom are mentioned (p. 10). They did not disparage
this work, but on the contrary singled out Weber’s work on bureaucracy and
Durkheim’s on suicide as good examples of theoretical studies founded on
close analysis of the data. They did, however, take issue with the way in which
this body of work had come to be regarded, with these great men (and they
were all men) and their ideas seen as having “charismatic finality”—precluding
any new insights other than modifying or reformulating their work. Talcott
Parsons and Robert K. Merton were at the time the only living sociologists
who had “seen through this charismatic view of the great men sufficiently to
generate grand theories on their own” (p. 10), but this has led to their work
being added to the pantheon rather than being seen as examples of the ways
in which new theories could be generated by contemporary social researchers.
The result was that US social science research of that era centered on “verifica-
tion” of these theories, many of which had little or no grounding in the data
67
and had been presented to the world without clear exposition of the methods
that had been employed in their production. Thus sociological research con-
sisted for the most part in the derivation of hypotheses from existing theo-
retical resources for the purposes of verification, whereas Glaser and Strauss
sought to persuade researchers to generate their own theoretical statements,
and offered GTM as methodological encouragement to do so. This was no easy
task because, for Glaser and Strauss, the US academic sociological establish-
ment—exemplified by the “Parsonians from Harvard and Mertonians from
Columbia” (p. 95)—consisted largely of playing “theoretical capitalist to the
mass of proletariat testers, [by] training young sociologists to test their teach-
ers’ work but not to imitate it” (pp. 10–11; emphasis in original).
In Discovery, they also took issue with what might be described as “mind-
less empiricism,” a term dating back at least to the 1950s in the article of that
title by Sidney Hook (1952). Although Glaser and Strauss did not use this
exact term, it resonates with their comment singling out Blumer’s “admirable
article, addressing himself to the gap between ungrounded theories and the
countless empirical studies unguided by any theories” (fn, p. 14). Blumer’s tar-
get at the time (1940s) was the vogue for what was termed “operationalism,”
an approach to investigation that was “based on the intuition that we do not
know the meaning of a concept unless we have a method of measurement for
it” (SEP).6 Originally introduced by Bridgman in physics, the concept of oper-
ationalism was taken up by sociologists and psychologists and used to justify
research strategies that aimed at production of measurements through exten-
sive and detailed empirical investigation based on observations or question-
naires. Blumer’s criticism was aimed largely at the use of quantitative methods
in sociology and psychology, where concepts were defined at the outset so
that they could be measured, but either they lacked any clear relationship to
a wider context or such a relationship was ill-founded. As Blumer explained,
I refer to the narrow operationalist position that public opinion consists
of what public opinion polls poll. Here, curiously, the findings resulting
from an operation, or use of an instrument, are regarded as constituting
the object of study instead of being some contributory addition to knowl-
edge of the object of study, The operation ceases to be a guided procedure on
behalf of an object of inquiry; instead the operation determines intrinsically
its own objective… . All that I wish to note is that the results of narrow
operationalism, as above specified, merely leave or raise the question of
what the results mean. Not having a conceptual point of reference the results
are merely disparate findings. It is logically possible, of course, to use such
findings to develop a conceptualization. (Blumer, 1948, p. 543 emphasis
added)
Glaser and Strauss, while applauding Blumer’s critique, noted that he was too
concerned with remedying the lack and evasion of verification of such claims,
68
rather than with the generation of new ones grounded in close engagement
with the data. Blumer’s criticisms were also directed at the ways in which
operationalist and other positivist forms of social research were open to the
accusation that they set out to discover what had already been decided at
the outset. Thus in his critique of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki’s
highly influential study of The Polish Peasant, Blumer noted that a good deal of
the findings were “foreshadowed in the previous writings of Thomas” (p. 13).
Admonitions like this go some way to explain Glaser and Strauss’s warnings
against researchers’ paying too much attention to the extant literature in the
early stages of their research projects, although as will be seen this is not really
a feasible option for most researchers, and it should be regarded now as one of
the “accidents” of GTM (see Chapter 4).
Blumer’s solution to this reliance on the literature was encapsulated in
his term “sensitizing concept,” which he contrasted with “definitive concept.”
Whereas the latter can be couched in precise terms at the outset, in the form of
a clear definition or benchmark, the former “lacks such specification of attri-
butes or bench marks and consequently it does not enable the user to move
directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a gen-
eral sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances” (Blumer,
1954, emphasis added). In line with the distinction between guidelines/heuris-
tics and algorithms made in Chapter 2, Blumer offers the following contrast:
Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensi-
tizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look. The hun-
dreds of our concepts—like culture, institutions, social structure, mores,
and personality—are not definitive concepts but are sensitizing in nature.
They lack precise reference and have no bench marks which allow a clean-
cut identification of a specific instance and of its content. Instead, they rest
on a general sense of what is relevant. (Blumer 1954, p. 7)
In distancing themselves from the orthodoxies of the time, Glaser and Strauss
stressed the necessity for researchers to avoid employing anything resem-
bling the definitive concepts referred to by Blumer, largely derived from
Parsons, Merton, and the others previously named. Researchers needed to
avoid forms of research aimed at verifying existing theories. Instead, Glaser
and Strauss offered a method that emanated from a position resembling
Blumer’s sensitizing concepts. So although some GTM-oriented researchers
and writers on the method invoke the idea of completely shedding one’s pre-
conceptions, this is not exactly what was advocated throughout Discovery,
where an early footnote states: “Of course, the researcher does not approach
reality as a tabula rasa. He must have a perspective that will help him see rel-
evant data and abstract significant categories from his scrutiny of the data”
(fn 3, p. 3). This caveat, however, was neither developed nor heeded in the
rest of the book.
69
In Awareness in a footnote on page 4 Glaser and Strauss point out that

the realization about the failure of standard training of medical students to
include how to interact with dying patients and their relatives was “the result
of a secondary analysis of field-notes from a study of Kansas Medical School
published as Boys in White” (Becker et al. 1961). In other words, the later
analysis of this data, presumably by Strauss now working independently of
his co-authors, brought to light this previously unrecognized issue. It certainly
did not simply emerge from the data. In hindsight it was unfortunate that
these observations were relegated to footnotes, rather than being attended to
in greater detail in the text itself, as they certainly counter some of the claims
made about GTM, often derived from the same texts.
The early GTM writings can be seen as the outcome of Glaser and Strauss’s
bringing together their respective traditions, but with each of them offering a
highly nuanced approach based on critical reflection of their own formation
and the debates within US sociology at the time. Strauss was imbued with the
influence of the Chicago School, although he clearly saw the necessity of mov-
ing on from detailed ethnographic studies to the generation of new theories.
Glaser was far less influenced by “the Mertonians of Columbia,” although, in
different ways, both Merton and Lazarsfeld were important in his intellectual
formation. In his recent writings he has stated that the key influence at this
early stage was a fellow graduate student only a few years his senior, Hans
Zetterberg (see Holton 2011). But Glaser seems to have ploughed his own fur-
row from the start of his graduate career, even before joining Strauss.
In addition to its methodological impact, Glaser and Strauss’s early work
in concert with Quint had immediate practical consequences in the develop-
ment of innovative nursing practices, in particular in the care of the dying.
Strauss, in his role at UCSF, can be seen as a pioneer in the emerging field
of medical sociology. All of these influences explain the initial and continu-
ing trend for GTM-oriented research in medical, health care, and palliative
settings.
The approach itself was initially termed “Substantive Theory,” and an
early article by Glaser and Strauss was titled “The Discovery of Substantive
Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative Research” (Glaser and
Strauss, 1965a). The concept of awareness was explained in an article published
in 1964 “Awareness Contexts and Social Interaction” (Glaser and Strauss,
1964). Quint and Strauss co-authored a paper in the same year “Nursing
Students, Assignments, and Dying Patients,” and all three co-authored “The
Nonaccountability of Terminal Care,” also in 1964.
The founding trilogy for the method itself comprises two detailed accounts
of substantive theories, Awareness and Time, each centring on a different core
category, together with Discovery. These three volumes were supplemented by
Glaser’s Theoretical Sensitivity, Strauss’s Negotiations, and Glaser and Strauss’s
Status Passage: A Formal Theory. So by the 1970s the literature on the method
70
encompassed examples of substantive and formal grounded theories, as well

as several expositions on the method itself. This latter aspect was located not
only in Discovery but also in the methodological appendices and concluding
chapters of the studies in Awareness and Time themselves. Someone wishing to
gain initial familiarity with the method would be well-advised to start with a
close reading of the appendices in Awareness and Dying—and the final chapter
of Status Passage—rather than with Discovery itself.
Chapter 4 offers an overview of the method, but at this point it is worth
indicating some of the key innovations embodied in these early works. As has
already been argued, the overarching motivation for the method was, on the
one hand, to steer the sociological researcher away from both groundless and
mindless empiricism, and, on the other hand, to avoid verification of exist-
ing theories. Hence advocacy of a method that sought to guide researchers in
open-minded generation of new theoretical insights based on close encounters
of the data kind. This included moving away from what Blumer had termed
“definitive concepts,” instead using “sensitizing concepts” that at one extreme
could provide the starting point for research with what amounted to noth-
ing more than a few generic questions along the lines of “What is going on?”
“What is this data about?” and the like. The researcher had to trust that inti-
mate engagement with the data would result in abstractions that would guide
the later stages of the process and provide the basis for developing an inter-
twined set of activities comprising data collection, coding, and analysis.
Glaser and Strauss were keen that the method be taken up by young and
novice researchers, and so the founding of a doctoral program at UCSF pro-
vided them with an opportunity to train a group of sociologists to challenge
“the Parsonians at Harvard and the Mertonians at Columbia.” The method
formed the core of this program, which came into existence in the late 1960s,
after several preparatory years following Strauss’s move to UCSF at the behest
of Helen Nahm, Dean of Nursing Studies. (Time for Dying is dedicated to
“Helen Nahm, colleague and good friend.”)
The initial researchers and the first generation of students included
Barney Glaser, Virginia Olesen, Julie Corbin, Phyllis Stern, Adele Clarke,
Kathy Charmaz, and Carolyn Wiener, among many others. These key figures
contributed to the dissemination of GTM, and they have continued to do so
in the United States and elsewhere, through their own researching, teaching,
and publishing. Strauss himself, through his teaching across the United States
and in Germany, was the primary figure in dissemination of the method in the
period from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Glaser on the other hand moved out
of full-time academic work, although he has continued to write and research
extensively, while offering support to a large number of GTM researchers. (The
Web site of The Grounded Theory Institute, founded by Glaser in 1999, attests
to this, with an extensive list of publications, seminars, and details of success-
ful PhDs, complemented by The Grounded Theory Review.)
71
Virginia Olesen has described the UCSF program as “the mouse that
roared,” given the enormous impact of what was a small and select group of
students and researchers:
These contributions include legitimizing the concept of nursing
research, establishing today’s most prominent qualitative research
methodology and informing the most significant public discussions
about health and health care in the past half century, from women’s
health and health disparities to aging and the impact of science and
technology. (Quoted in Schwartz, 2014, which offers a detailed account
of the program at UCSF)
From the 1970s to the late 1980s GTM became associated mostly with Strauss’s
writings and teaching, both in the United States and in Europe, especially
Germany. Strauss had found himself constantly being asked by students in
his audience for elucidation of the principles behind the method; publication
of Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (Strauss, 1987) was the response,
based largely on his lecture notes and also incorporating large sections of
Glaser’s Theoretical Sensitivity verbatim.7 These demands for information
by PhD students were not surprising given that the method as outlined and
exemplified in the founding texts seemed to rest upon a great deal of faith that
this open-ended approach at the start of a research project would prove to be
a productive strategy, and one that would meet the approval of those in more
senior positions. Prospective PhD students, in the early stages of a research
career, would understandably have been wary of both aspects.
Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists was followed by Basics of
Qualitative Research, co-authored with Julie Corbin (Strauss and Corbin,
1990), again at the behest of students and researchers keen to know more
about the method. So by the late 1980s and early 1990s GTM was associated
for many investigators with Strauss’s writings, rather than the earlier works. In
the meantime, Glaser had set up his own imprint The Sociology Press, publish-
ing Anguish in 1970, and Theoretical Sensitivity in 1978; thereafter producing
numerous books on GTM, as well as The Grounded Theory Review.
When Strauss and Corbin’s Basics of Qualitative Research appeared in 1990
it drew a vehement response from Glaser, leading to his publication of Basics
of Grounded Theory, publicly distancing himself from the views expressed by
Strauss and Corbin, and claiming that their book represented a move away
from GTM while masquerading as an articulation of the method. In distanc-
ing himself from Strauss and Corbin, Glaser was staking a claim as the true
protagonist, propagator, and proprietor of the method—his c hapter 17 is titled
“Intellectual Property.” He castigated Strauss for the “immoral undermining”
(p. 121) of GTM, arguing that Strauss was never really in tune with GTM
proper—never having moved from what Glaser termed the method of “full
conceptual description.” The years since 1992 have marked Glaser’s increasing
72
claims to be the sole originator of GTM and the guardian of the method in its
“classic” embodiment, significantly distanced from all efforts at what he refers
to as “remodeling.” Nevertheless, GTM is indelibly linked with the names of
both Glaser and Strauss, and it is noteworthy that Strauss, who died in 1996,
never responded to Glaser’s accusations, although the chapter on grounded
theory published in the first edition of Denzin and Lincoln’s The Handbook
of Qualitative Research includes a footnote designated “AUTHORS’ NOTE”
that might be understood to refer obliquely to Glaser’s account (Strauss and
Corbin, 1994):
AUTHORS’ NOTE: This summary statement represents the authors’
views as participants in, contributors to, and observers of grounded theo-
ry’s evolution. Others who have been part of this intellectual movement will
differ in their views of some points made here and the relative importance we
give them. (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p. 273, emphasis added)
Reading some of the accounts of researchers who worked or studied with
Strauss from the 1970s onward, it seems as if his intellectual motivations
and conceptual reach went so far beyond the method itself that he quite pos-
sibly never considered Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists or Basics of
Qualitative Research as anything other than further expositions of the early
statements produced in concert with Glaser. So it may well be that, working
from his Pragmatist background, Strauss was trying to see how a range of
different research strategies might work in the never-ending process of con-
ceptualization. One consequence of this thinking may have been to present
what he saw as clarifications or extensions of GTM, that others saw as con-
tradicting or undermining the original statements.8 Although Strauss died
in 1996, the 2nd edition of Basics of Qualitative Research appeared in 1998.
(A 3rd edition—with the authors listed as Corbin and Strauss—appeared
in 2008, with some key revisions, a completely different structure, and also
incorporating some material written for the earlier editions but omitted by
the publisher.)
By the late 1990s researchers wishing to implement and write about GTM
had to contend with the divergence between the two originators. For a time
in the 1990s it was possible to read research papers that paid no heed to this
divergence but assumed that there was a straightforward continuity from
Awareness and Discovery through to Strauss and Corbin, also passing through
Glaser’s solo writings from the 1970s and 1980s (Smit and Bryant, 2000). This
tendency to ignore the differences between the originators is still evident in a
few research publications from more recent years; in general, however, anyone
writing about a GTM-oriented research project knows that it is necessary at
least to make mention of the divergence and to offer some justification for the
way in which the method was implemented. This is unfortunate as it is the basis
for confusion and misunderstanding both on the part of the writers and the
73
readers. Clarification is not always provided by those writing about the method
itself. From the beginning, efforts to distinguish GTM from other research
methods have incorporated what have become increasingly unhelpful and
ambiguous characterizations; using seemingly neutral terms but with negative
connotations. For instance “mere description,” “full conceptual description,” or
“qualitative data analysis” [QDA] are all terms coined or used by Glaser when
contrasting GTM with other approaches, especially those that he describes as
attempts to “remodel the method.”9 The result is that far too many publica-
tions offer cryptic invocation of terms such as these rather than more reasoned
explanations of the differences between varying accounts and interpretations of
the method, as well as comparisons with other methods that are clearly distinct.
(See Chapter 14, where this is referred to this as methodological positioning.)
During the 1990s there were several key developments of the method apart
from those directly emanating from Glaser’s vehement response to Strauss and
Corbin’s Basics of Qualitative Research. As interest and understanding of the
value of qualitative methods increased among researchers, the literature devel-
oped accordingly, providing further evidence of Ludwik Fleck’s ideas about
“thought collectives” (see Chapter 2). One of the landmark publications was
Denzin and Lincoln’s The Handbook of Qualitative Research in 1994. In the
first edition the chapter on GTM was provided by Strauss and Corbin, and
was clearly written in the aftermath of Glaser’s attack on Basics of Qualitative
Research. The authors noted that it had taken more than 20 years for American
sociologists to appreciate the “strong rationale” for qualitative research that
lies at the heart of Discovery; a process that might still be thought of as incom-
plete some 50 years after the earliest GTM publications.
The situation by the early 1990s was that GTM had now “diffused” through
the practices of academic research, and although this was to be welcomed, it
also carried the risks of being fashionable—and hence likely to be taken up
because it was “in vogue,” and would later be seen as old-hat. In far too many
cases researchers were claiming use of GTM but failing to accomplish more
than a fairly mundane level of coding, certainly not moving on to theoreti-
cal coding, and subsequently to generating theoretical statements. The phrase
“where is the theory in grounded theory” was invoked in methodological
critiques or texts, and to some extent it still echoes in current discussions of
methods. In their chapter of The Handbook Strauss and Corbin were at pains to
distinguish GTM from other forms of research, singling out Clifford Geertz’s
concept of “thick description,” which they saw as an example of a research
narrative that did not move from the descriptive level to the more abstract and
complex level of “conceptual density”—that is, the place where core concepts
were derived from the data, affording the basis for clear articulation of the
relationships between concepts and the generation of new theoretical insights.
The Strauss-Corbin chapter remains an interesting historical account of
the method 25 years or so after its first appearance, and it should be read as
74
an effort to clarify some of the initial ideas, restate the key innovations, and
outline the authors’ views of what the future might hold. Thus it was admitted
that Discovery “over-played” the role of induction in the method, and that this
had been misunderstood by both critics and users. Certainly induction was a
key aspect, but it had to be supplemented with other factors; also there needed
to be recognition of the “potential role of extant (grounded) theories and the
unquestionable fact (and advantage) that trained researchers are theoretically
sensitized” (1994, p. 277). Strauss and Corbin were keen to claim that after
25 years a significant body of grounded theories existed, and included what for
instance Diane Vaughan advocated as theoretical elaboration, “taking off from
extant theories and developing them further in conjunction with qualitative
case analysis” (p. 282).
Strauss and Corbin also stressed that Discovery had “redefined the usual
scientific canons for the purposes of studying human behavior” (p. 274), and
that the method offered a new rationale for research, drawing attention to dif-
fering “criteria of judgment … based … on the detailed elements of the actual
strategies used for collecting, coding, analyzing, and presenting data when
generating theory” (p. 274, quoting from Discovery, p. 224). This overview of
a quarter of a century of GTM stressed its innovative features, but it also drew
attention to the ways in which research had changed in that time, as well as
to the ways in which GTM-oriented researchers had developed the method.
In one of the later sections of the Strauss-Corbin chapter, reference is
made to the influence of John Dewey and Mead on the method with regard to
the Pragmatist concept of truth being “enacted.” This was not, however, taken
any further, but was followed by a discussion of the ways in which interpreta-
tion and “multiple perspectives” are viewed, including the observation that “in
all modes of qualitative research the interplay between the researcher and the
actors studied—if the research is intensive—is likely to result in some degree of
reciprocal shaping” (p. 280, emphasis added). Yet again, however, this ambig-
uous phrase is left tantalizingly undeveloped. Their chapter concluded with
some observations on what might happen to the method (or methodology in
their terms) in the future, concluding with the highly perceptive point that:
Yet, no inventor has permanent possession of the invention—certainly not
even its name—and furthermore we would not wish to do so. No doubt
we will always prefer the later versions of grounded theory that are closest
to or elaborate our own, but a child once launched is very much subject to
a combination of its origins and the evolving contingencies of life. Can it
be otherwise with a methodology? (p. 283)
So by the early 1990s there were intimations of how GTM was already devel-
oping above and beyond the intentions of the method’s progenitors. This was
something that Strauss at least did not find too disconcerting, although he
clearly understood that there was a delicate balance between people taking
75
up the method and then adapting and extending it in a fruitful and profound
manner, and those using GTM as a methodological veneer that might hide
weak and piecemeal research practices. This is not anything unique to GTM,
it applies to all methods, and examples can readily be found in publications
reporting the detailed statistical results of quantitative research that wittingly
or unwittingly is based on ill-conceived or ambiguous foundations.
By the time the 2nd edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research
appeared in 2000 the situation had changed, with the contributions of some
of those named in Strauss and Corbin’s chapter having in effect developed the
method along some of the lines intimated in their chapter in the first edition—
in particular in the work of Kathy Charmaz, author of the chapter on GTM in
the 2nd edition (see below).
What neither Glaser nor Strauss, however, had offered in their writings to
this point was any indication of the ways in which GTM could be discussed
against the background of the many other challenges to academic and intel-
lectual orthodoxies that arose from the 1960s onward. This was puzzling in
the case of Strauss given his background in Chicago School Pragmatism (see
Bryant, 2009). There are references to Pragmatism and post-modernism in
some of Strauss’s GTM writings, including the chapter in the 1st edition of
The Handbook of Qualitative Research, but they are brief allusions, and fairly
cryptic.
This left a thorny problem for those proposing to use GTM in their
research. Many PhD students found themselves at a severe disadvantage when
confronted by comments from research committee members who raised issues
such as (1) how could they conduct research unguided by hypotheses or clear
research questions, (2) what was meant by an inductive approach developing
from a position with no preconceptions, and (3) what was involved in coding
data from which a theory would emerge. Interestingly Basics of Qualitative
Research included an important chapter at the end that listed a number of
questions from students, but none of these referred to aspects of the method
that really do need to be clarified for the evaluators and gatekeepers (see
Chapter 18).
In his later writing on GTM, Strauss readily admitted that in parts of their
early works he and Glaser were primarily concerned about distinguishing
their method from the existing ones, and so perhaps over-emphasized features
of GTM, such as induction and analysis of the data, at the expense of other key
issues, such as the role of researchers and their interpretations of the data. But
bringing greater focus to the other key issues would not have provided a sub-
stantive basis from which to engage with members of a research committee.10
There is, however, another tension inherent in Glaser and Strauss’s early
writings, which certainly embodied significant innovations in the process of
sociological research, but at the same time also offered severe criticisms of
existing methods and the institutional arrangements within which they were
76
embodied: The “Parsonians and Mertonians” were not regarded in a favorable

light. Yet Glaser and Strauss were not arguing for the complete dismantling of
existing arrangements. On the contrary, they were seeking to provide the basis
for understanding that GTM was a valid alternative to other research methods,
and so should be included as part of standard academic training and practice.
Their critique was not aimed at academic social research as a whole, but sought
to enrich it by incorporating the new method of GTM, with its concomitant
innovations in terms of rationale, relationship to the data and research envi-
ronment, and the ultimate aim of theoretical control and theory generation.
In so doing Glaser and Strauss can be seen as playing the Parsonians and
Mertonians—and others—at their own game. Parsons and Merton had gener-
ated theory, rather than verifying existing theories, and this was something to be
encouraged for all researchers, especially those in the early stages of their career
who may well be in the best position to offer innovative insights. The result of
this focus on the existing institutional arrangements for research and academic
standing was that Glaser and Strauss ignored other contemporary challenges to
issues around knowledge, understanding, and theorizing that emanated from
the work of Thomas Kuhn, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, and others
of their ilk. Table 3.1 offers a summary account of 1960s GTM using the terms
introduced in the 5x(P+P) framework in Chapter 2.
But if neither Strauss nor Glaser sought to respond to these issues, other
investigators certainly were ready to do so. In addition to Glaser’s very pub-
lic and bitter response to Strauss and Corbin’s work, the 1990s also saw the
emergence of the constructivist turn in GTM, which did offer an essential
engagement with these issues. This was essential, because, without such an
enhancement of the method, GTM-oriented researchers were left exposed to
critiques both from “orthodox” researchers, who could not see the rationale
for proposals lacking in initial hypotheses and engagement with the literature,
and those with some affinity for interpretative or constructivist views, who
could not understand the ways in which concepts such as “data” or “emer-
gence” were so under-developed or misconstrued.
The constructivist11 turn is associated with the work of Kathy Charmaz, one
of the original participants in the UCSF Doctoral Program. The 2nd edition of
The Handbook of Qualitative Research, which appeared in 2000, included the
chapter on GTM by Charmaz (2000 also Charmaz, 2007) in which she offered
a distinction contrasting Glaser’s “objectivist”—that is, positivist—position
with her constructivist stance. The basic differences are given in Table 4.2, and
essentially echo the distinctions between positivism (truth is discovered) and
interpretivism/constructivism (truth is made or constructed) referred to in
Chapter 2; a distinction further underlined in Charmaz’s book, Constructing
Grounded Theory, as opposed to Discovery of Grounded Theory.
Quite coincidentally, at around the same time I had taken up a similar
position (Bryant, 2002), although I had nowhere near the experience and
expertise with the method that Charmaz had. My earliest encounter with the
77
TABLE 3.1
Applying the 5x(P+P) framework to GTM, 1960s-style
Perceptions & 1960s orthodoxy in the US social sciences was oriented around derivation of
Preconceptions research hypotheses from “Grand Theories,” which in turn promulgated a
verificationist agenda for research, particularly PhD research.
The grounded theory method (GTM) is seen as distinct from countless
empirical studies unguided by any theories.
Alternative approach could be promoted as emanating from a data-driven
origin, leading to constrained but grounded conceptualizations or theories.
Issues around “data,” “emergence,” and the active role of the researcher were
largely ignored or evaded, apart from a few cryptic or cursory footnotes
GTM is presented as a detailed and robust challenge to the prevailing
orthodoxy, offering a range of “Strategies for Qualitative Research”—the
subtitle of Discovery.
Some assumptions are made regarding the qualitative approach,
because “crucial elements of sociological theory are often found best
with a qualitative method, that is, from data on structural conditions,
consequences, deviances, norms, processes, patterns, and systems.”
Personal experiences of bereavement for both Strauss and Glaser
Purpose & The purpose of GTM-oriented research was to provide usable and useful
Periphery conceptualizations; limited in scope (substantive theories), but with
substantive power within the specified contexts (“fit,” “grab,” “work”).
These constrained conceptualizations could be extended to a wider range of
contexts, claiming the status of formal theories; for instance Glaser and
Strauss’s work Status Passage: A Formal Theory derived from their earlier
substantive theory expounded in Time for Dying.
Status Passage concluded with a chapter on “Generating Formal Theory” where
it was noted that the distinction between substantive and formal theories
was one “of degree,” and that both were middle-range theories falling
between “minor working hypotheses of everyday life and the all-inclusive
grand theories” (p. 178—emphasis in original)
GTM focused on contexts of social interaction, where social processes were
enacted.
Process & Key characteristics of the GTM research process included disavowal of exact
Procedures or detailed research questions and objectives at the outset, deferral of in-
depth review of the literature, continual engagement with the data, iterations
between data gathering and analysis, constant comparison, moves through
different forms of sampling—initially purposive and convenient, thereafter
more focused and selective.
GTM procedures included data gathering from observations and interviews,
derivation of codes from the data, different stages of coding to arrive at
focused and more highly conceptualized categories, moves from initial data
gathering and analysis to later stages guided by constant comparison and
memo-writing aimed at achieving theoretical saturation.
Products & Core products of GTM include—notes from interviews and observations,
Presentation memos, codes at different levels of abstraction, a core category, and
accompanying details in terms of properties and relationships.
Presentation takes the form of coding results, memos at various stages,
publication for presentation and discussion, hypotheses for further
research, substantive theory, and later formal theory.
Methodological appendices were included in Awareness, Time, and Status
Passage, also in Anguish. Target readership—colleagues and also novice
researchers.
Pragmatics & Issues around access to research context largely ignored the role of Jeanne
Personnel Quint as a professional nurse.
Recording of data—notes, transcripts, field-notes.
Distinction between social actors as participants, and researchers
implementing GTM—only sociologists capable of generating sociological
theories
Get one’s readers “caught up” in the description—provide a convincing
account not a rigorously tested one (Awareness, p. 290)
Noteworthy that these early examples of GTM in practice were presented
in the form of extended narrative accounts, with little by way of verbatim
extracts from the data, nor any diagrammatic outputs.
78
work of Glaser and Strauss had come in my undergraduate studies in sociol-

ogy in the 1970s, where mention was made of their work on death and dying,
but without any reference to the methodological aspects that were such an
important feature. In the 1990s I encountered their work in its methodological
form as a member of research committees tasked with assessing research pro-
posals from various disciplines across the university. In many cases proposals
that referred to GTM were considered lacking in detail, because they failed to
articulate clear research questions, and offered at best only scant evidence of
considered and critical engagement with the literature. In response to such
challenges, several students changed their proposals, but a few responded in
detail with explanations regarding these unusual characteristics. Then, when
one of my own PhD students opted for this approach, I was forced to confront
this issue as his supervisor and re-engage with Glaser and Strauss’s work.
Following my student’s prompting, I came to understand the key features
of the method and the ways in which it afforded a robust basis for qualitative
enquiry in a realistic and feasible manner. But I was also aware of the prob-
lematic way in which the relationship between the researcher and the research
context was described, for instance—in particular the simplistic fashion in
which “data” was regarded, and that the metaphor of “emergence” was taken
so literally.
As explained in Chapter 2, in the 1960s and 1970s, after publication of
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, questions about the nature of
knowledge and science, and epistemology in general, became the focus of
extended debate in the social sciences and humanities: questions that had been
at the center of philosophical debate for many centuries. The grounded theory
method had been articulated at around the same period, and with an agenda
that certainly did not include discussion of epistemological issues. But if a fail-
ure to engage with these issues was understandable in the 1960s and early
1970s, a continued avoidance of them was far more difficult to comprehend
by the 1990s.
The role of the researcher was of concern given the way in which the
phrase “allowing the theory to emerge from the data” was treated by many
GTM researchers in their publications, becoming part of what I later termed
the GTM mantra. In replying to the critical reviews that his work received
on its initial publication, Kuhn stressed that his focus should have been
more clearly placed on the way in which science and knowledge claims in
general were social processes and not disembodied concepts. His argument
that all knowledge was dependent on the paradigms through which people
apprehended and comprehended the world—developing Fleck’s ideas—reso-
nated with the seemingly bizarre explanations offered by physicists in their
work on the quantum world. The electron that can be in two places at once,12
Schrödinger’s cat,13 and other derivations from quantum theory, all attested
to the way in which the observer is an active participant in any investigative
79
setting; simply by being there14 has an effect. If this is a necessary aspect of any
explanation for phenomena in the physical world, how much more so must it
be for the social world? Despite Glaser and Strauss’s disparaging comments on
the work of Geertz, the latter had written with great impact on the topic of the
ways in which observation and participation were enacted in ethnographic
research. (See his narrative about the Balinese Cockfight, Geertz, 1973.) There
were glimpses of these issues in some of the early GTM works, but as already
noted, many of them were relegated to footnotes rather than treated as central
issues to be resolved. The result was that by the 1990s there were numerous
examples of GTM-oriented research papers that made epistemological claims
that were at best misguided and at worst simplistic and crude; in either case
they were hostages to fortune for any critical analysis. Overall GTM was seen
as an interesting methodological diversion, but one that suffered from ineluc-
table methodological and epistemological weaknesses.
At the same time there was also a developing trend from within GTM that
sought to re-ground the method. Charmaz was the key figure in this regard,
with her chapter in the 2nd edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research
(2000) being one landmark, and the publication of Constructing Grounded
Theory (2006) another. Quite independently, and largely because I had not fol-
lowed the debates and developments around Glaser and Strauss’s work since
the 1970s, I outlined a position that resonated with that put forth by Charmaz
in my article calling for a re-grounding of GTM (Bryant, 2002). Despite my
many misgivings regarding the outdated positivist features of the central GTM
texts, I was careful to underline the ways in which the method offered valuable
insights and contributions to ideas about how research could and should be
carried out. My concerns in contributing to this task did lead me to be over-
critical of some aspects, such as the ideas of “fit” and “grab,” which I saw as
inherently vague and unhelpful to early-career researchers such as PhD stu-
dents. I had failed to recognize that these “sensitizing concepts” have strength
and value precisely because they capture the necessary paradoxes of research
and align with the Pragmatist position on theories and knowledge. Only later
did I come across Charmaz’s Handbook chapter, which offered similar ideas,
although in a far more knowledgeable and accommodating manner.
Our later collaboration led to The Handbook of Grounded Theory, for
which we managed to elicit contributions from Glaser, as well as some of those
who had studied at UCSF in the earliest days of the Doctoral Program. We also
tapped into the German-speaking tradition of GTM, which had been primar-
ily influenced by Strauss and his German students, and where the Pragmatist
influence was far more evident and influential. Strauss’s statement in his last
book about Pragmatism being a “thin red line” running throughout his work,
made far more sense in the context of GTM when viewed from this per-
spective, although its absence from his GTM writings remains a puzzle (see
Bryant, 2009).
80
In a 1994 interview (Legewie et al., 2004) Strauss mentioned the influence

of many figures in his intellectual formation, including Robert Park, Everett
Hughes, and Herbert Blumer. In the introduction to Qualitative Analysis
for Social Scientists (1987), he referred to the “general thrust of American
Pragmatism,” principally Dewey, but also C. S. Peirce and Mead. So the case can
be made that Pragmatism was a core feature of Strauss’s intellectual formation;
although the way in which this was an influence needs to be articulated. He was
always keen to stress that American Pragmatism was a central component in
his intellectual formation. According to Jorg Strübing (personal communica-
tion 2009), Strauss was introduced to the work of Dewey and James by Floyd
House, his teacher while he was an undergraduate at the University of Virginia
between 1935 and 1939. Later as he developed his interests in both psychology
and sociology, Strauss used ideas from Dewey and Mead as his own work on
action, structure and process developed. Dewey and Peirce are mentioned in
Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, and the first two editions of Basics of
Qualitative Research open with a quote from Dewey’s Art as Experience. In his
final book, Continual Permutations of Action, Strauss makes extensive reference
to Pragmatism in the introduction, where he charts his own intellectual devel-
opment, oriented around the work of Dewey understood through the teaching
of Mead and later developments of the Chicago School (see Chapter 17).
Perhaps Strauss never dwelled on the topic of Pragmatism in conversations
with Glaser, given their differing backgrounds and intellectual formations. It
may also have been the case that given the innovative and challenging nature
of GTM in its initial formation around Discovery, it was far more important to
stress its distinctiveness rather than any intellectual continuities or derivations.
Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists has two references to Pragmatism,
both very brief, although the second one refers to “American Pragmatists
(especially Dewey and Peirce) whose thinking pervades the grounded theory
approach” (p. 110, emphasis added). So, clearly Strauss recognized the close
affinities between Pragmatism and GTM, but perhaps he did not disclose this
to Glaser for some reason. The situation might have been similar to that of
Cream, the 1970s rock trio of Jack Bruce, Ginger Baker, and Eric Clapton.
Clapton was the foremost blues guitarist of his generation, but Bruce (a folk
and jazz guitarist among other things) and Baker (the supreme jazz drummer)
did not consider Cream to be a blues band.
In later years, Bruce half jokingly said “Cream was a jazz band, we just
didn’t tell Eric!” http://deadessays.blogspot.co.uk/2010/03/cream-and-
dead.html
What should be clear by now is that the Pragmatist thread was pervasive in
GTM—albeit as part of a Strange Brew,15 one whose presence and ramifications
need to be brought to the fore. This will be done throughout the remaining
81
chapters, and particularly in Part Four. The next chapter, however, centres on
a more detailed view of GTM itself.
Key Points
¤ Intellectual backgrounds of Strauss (Chicago School) and Glaser

(Columbia)
¤ Important role of Jeanne Quint—later Quint-Benoliel
¤ GTM—steering between mindless empiricism and verification of
grand theories
¤ Doctoral Program at UCSF
¤ Solo writings of Strauss and Glaser and their aftermath
¤ Constructivist GTM—Kathy Charmaz
¤ Chapters on GTM in 1st and 2nd editions of The Handbook of
Qualitative Research
¤ Unstated or under-stated influence of Pragmatism
Notes
1. The title is taken from W. C. Sellar and R. J. Yeatman’s classic parody 1066 and All
That: A Memorable History of England, comprising all the parts you can remember, including
103 Good Things, 5 Bad Kings and 2 Genuine Dates (1930). In Chapter 18 I offer a summary
of GTM along similar lines.
2. The epigraph at the beginning of this chapter is not an actual quote-I have con-
cocted it; but its relevance should become clear to readers by the end of the chapter.
3. A very clear and succinct summary can be found at http://agso.uni-graz.at/marien-
thal/e/study/00.htm
4. Walter A. Glaser and Minnie Rothschild Strauss.
5. The title is given in Awareness as The Nurse Student and the Dying Patient.
6. This resonates with Kelvin’s maxim referred to in Chapter 1 under the heading
A Note on Quantitative versus Qualitative Research.
7. Strauss specifically thanks Glaser “for permission to quote extensively in Chapter 1
from his [Glaser’s] Theoretical Sensitivity (1978). The second half of that chapter is essen-
tially his except for some amplification.” (xiv).
8. It is interesting to note that many of the ideas that were the targets of Glaser’s criti-
cism of Basics of Qualitative Research made their first appearance in the earlier Qualitative
Analysis for Social Scientists—for example, axial coding and also the various sections on
“rules of thumb” that conclude many of the chapters. Glaser did not seem to have taken
exception to the earlier book, published in 1987, but only to the later one in 1990.
9. QDA (qualitative data analysis) has now been adopted as a generic and neutral term
among researchers writing about qualitative research—see for instance Miles et al., 2014.
82
10. Suggestions for avoiding these issues and for responses to such questions and criti-
cisms can be found in Chapter 18.
11. I have used the term constructivist as opposed to constructionist—they can be seen
as synonymous.
12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double-slit_experiment
13. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schrodinger’s_cat
14. The film Being There concerns Chance the Gardener, a simple-minded man who
others mistake for a genius; imbuing his clichéd remarks with an unwarranted profundity—
i.e. the observers invent the character. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0078841/
15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_Brew_%28song%29
83
The Grounded Theory Method

AN OVERVIEW
… a substantive grounded theory “is often of great practical use

long before the theory is tested with great rigor” (Glaser and Strauss,
Awareness)
Given the existence of several variants, I have argued (Bryant and Charmaz,
2007b) that GTM is best thought of as a family of methods, 1 although the met-
aphor of a family can arouse a mixed set of sentiments, closeness and kinship
on the one hand, dysfunction and divisiveness on the other.2 In his novel Anna
Karenina Leo Tolstoy noted that “All happy families are alike; each unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way.” Rather than dwell on whether or not GTM
is a happy family or an unhappy one, the metaphor is intended to draw upon
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblances,” whereby
we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and cries-
crossing (sic; criss-crossing): sometimes overall similarities. I can think
of no better expression to characterize these similarities than family
resemblances; for the various resemblances between members of a fam-
ily: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and
cries-cross (sic; criss-cross) in the same way. (Wittgenstein, extract from
Aphorisms 66 & 67, emphasis in original –http://users.rcn.com/athbone/
lw65-69c.htm)
A close reading of this section of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
indicates that he was advocating something akin to the method of constant
comparison, and he uses a phrase that by complete coincidence also appears
in the works of Glaser and Strauss.
66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is
common to them all? –Don’t say: “There must be something common, or
they would not be called ‘games’ ”-but look and see whether there is any-
thing common to all. –For if you look at them you will not see something
83
84
that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of

them at that. To repeat: don’t think, but look! (emphasis added)
So in a similar fashion a discussion of GTM can be oriented around clarifying
the relationships and derivations between different generations and offspring
of the method from its initial appearance in the mid-1960s to the present;
tracing and stressing a whole series of “similarities, relationships.” These early
statements were further developed as part of the Doctoral Program at UCSF.
Given that this group of researchers and first generation of students included
Barney Glaser, Virginia Olesen, Julie Corbin, Phyllis Stern, Adele Clarke,
Kathy Charmaz, and Carolyn Wiener, among many others, it is not surpris-
ing that articulations and examples of the method-in-use flourished in this
period. Taken together, they attest to the vibrancy and vitality that the method
engendered among the research community, or at least among a very definite,
talented, and articulate subgroup within that community. A paucity of such
developments would have indicated that Glaser and Strauss’s manifesto had
fallen on deaf ears or was ill-founded. These key figures in the development
of qualitative research in the United States contributed to the dissemination
of GTM, and they have continued to do so in the United States and elsewhere,
through their own researching, teaching and publishing. Strauss himself,
through his teaching across the United States and in Germany, was the pri-
mary figure in dissemination of the method from the 1970s to the early 1990s.
Glaser on the other hand moved out of full-time academic work, although he
has continued to write and research extensively, as well as offer support to a
large number of GTM researchers. Evidence for this work can be readily found
on the Web site of The Grounded Theory Institute, which Glaser founded in
1999, with details of publications, seminars, and successful PhDs.
The method certainly developed from its origins in the founding texts,
both at the hands of Strauss and Glaser in their separate works, and in other
articulations. Strauss and Corbin’s chapter in the first edition of The Handbook
of Qualitative Research remarks on this, and it was surely something to be
expected for a method that moved from a small niche in one of the schools
of the University of California to become the most widely invoked method
among qualitative researchers, and a driving force for qualitative methods as
a whole. Publication of further expositions of the method by its founders and
others was prompted in large part by demands for clarification and exposition
by researchers themselves; particularly doctoral researchers. To some extent
these later works can be seen by some as adding further detail to the earlier
statements, but by others as revising, “remodeling,” or undermining what went
beforehand. For some methods such additions have, for the most part, been
welcomed—seen as adding to the usefulness, applicability, and credibility of
the method. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, methods, like sharks, have to keep
moving forward or they will die—a sentiment that I used in a presentation
85
The Grounded Theory Method Overview 85
given at one of Glaser’s seminars in 2005, and later as a theme in the chap-
ter that Kathy Charmaz and I contributed to The Handbook of Methodological
Innovation (2011).
It is ironic that a method that emanated from a motivation to provide
novice researchers with a flexible and open approach to research has become
the subject of claims regarding classic forms, orthodoxy, remodeling, intel-
lectual property, and even jargonizing. Ever since his very public break with
Strauss in 1992, Glaser has claimed the mantle of “classic” GTM, characteriz-
ing any other articulations as “remodeled” GTM, or not GTM at all, but rather
examples of Full Conceptual Description or, more commonly, Qualitative Data
Analysis (QDA); a term he uses with some degree of disdain or opprobrium.
In fact, from the outset Glaser and Strauss were keen to introduce or employ
terms for approaches that they saw as likely to be confused with GTM but from
which their method should be distinguished, and this trend has continued
to the present. Thus in Discovery Glaser and Strauss refer to “[D]‌escription,
ethnography, fact-finding, verification (call them what you will) [which] …
cannot generate sociological theory.” This comment was supplemented with
an extended discussion (pp. 119–158), offering examples of what might at first
sight appear to be comparable approaches, but which for various reasons are
seen as distinct from GTM; yet in some senses, they lead up to GTM. The final
example they refer to is from one of Strauss’s earlier books written together
with colleagues, but not Glaser (Strauss et al., 1964).
My earlier discussion of the chapter contributed by Strauss and Corbin to
the first edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research indicated that, some
25 years after publication of Discovery, Strauss was fairly relaxed about the
directions that the method was taking, although he and Corbin took care to
ensure that the distinctive nature of the method continued to be recognized
and stressed.
In some cases clarifying the distinctions between different but related
methods is a useful and sometimes necessary exercise, and the extended
discussion of examples drawn from mainstream sociological analyses of the
1960s in Discovery should be seen as a template for such endeavors. But one
needs to read such statements carefully, understanding the extent to which the
discussions are intended as clarifications rather than as disparagements, seen
consequently as offering systematic and coherent, as well as reflective, insights
both into GTM as well as alternatives and variations.
As things stand, there are now three clear variants of GTM, in the sense
that can be derived from Ludwik Fleck’s observation—paraphrased as follows
The [methods] textbook changes the subjective judgment of an author
into a proven fact. … it will henceforward be recognized and taught, it
will become a foundation of further facts and the guiding principle of
what will be seen and applied. (1936, VI)
86
Table 4.1 illustrates this certainty, indicating the “textbooks” and some of the
other sources central to the three variants.
Research papers and books that report on GTM-oriented research or that
offer outlines and guidance for the use of the method tend to refer to a range
of “textbooks,” including the canonical books from the 1960s and 1970s3,
TABLE 4.1
Key texts on the grounded theory method (GTM) and the three main variants
Glaser and Awareness Canonical—widely referred to in the literature as
Strauss Discovery authoritative. Although in some cases such references
1967 Time fail to indicate any profound familiarity with the texts
themselves.
Glaser and Status Passage Canonical—Referred to as a key example of formal grounded
Strauss theory (FGT).
1971 The final chapter provides an initial source of ideas
and characteristics relating to developing and establishing
FGT.
Glaser 1978 Theoretical Ambiguous authoritative status—Glaser refers to it for some
Sensitivity aspects of his “classical” variant, but in some regards it
can be seen as a basis for the later development of the
constructivist variant.
One of the most succinct discussions of the term theoretical
sensitivity itself can be found in Strauss and Corbin’s
book. In the first edition the section is titled Theoretical
Sensitivity, in the second edition the term is completely
absent, and the section is headed “Sensitivity and
Objectivity.”
Strauss 1987 Qualitative An important milestone in the late 1980s but now largely
Analysis for ignored or forgotten.
Social
Scientists
Strauss Basics of Key text for the Strauss and Corbin variant—particularly the
and Corbin Qualitative first and second editions (1990 and 1998).
1990 and Research The third edition (2008)—Corbin and Strauss—is in many
1998, respects a fundamentally different statement on GTM;
2008 some parts are updated; others included from the earlier
editions, also incorporated, sections written for the 1998
edition but omitted by the publishers at the time.
Judging from the recent literature on GTM, the 1990 and
1998 editions retain their authoritative status, despite the
appearance of the third edition,
Denzin and The Handbook The chapter on GTM in the first edition—Strauss and
Lincoln of Qualitative Corbin—is largely ignored, but as I showed in Chapter 3 it
1994, Research is an important statement about the method 25 years or
2000 so after its first appearance.
The chapter by Charmaz in the second edition is equally
important as a succinct account of Constructivist GTM,
contrasting it with Objectivist GTM.
Charmaz Constructing The key text for Constructivist GTM—both the first and
2006, Grounded second editions.
2014 Theory
Bryant and The Handbook A key collection of GTM materials and resources—with
Charmaz of Grounded contributions from many of those associated with the
(eds) 2007 Theory method from its earliest stages as well as those working
in different contexts and looking at the method from
different perspectives.
87
plus those from many other authors across differing GTM viewpoints. The
issue is the extent to which any of these sources, explicitly or implicitly, have
been used as providing “guiding principles” in the sense that Fleck implies. In
Chapter 14, which offers an analysis of some GTM-type papers, the phenom-
enon of guiding principles is exemplified and termed methodological position-
ing. But for present purposes it needs to be noted that when reading a GTM
paper or book (including this one) the reader should be aware of the ways in
which the views of the author(s) are demonstrated. In some cases this aspect
of the work is perfectly evident, as shown in Chapter 6, which uses an exam-
ple in which the title of the paper includes the phrase “working with classical
grounded theory”—referring to Glaser’s work as central and guiding. But in
other cases the methodological positioning (see Chapter 14) is far less obvious.
As I have argued elsewhere (Bryant, 2009) GTM-type claims made by
researchers are far less important than the outcome of their research. A good
deal of heat as well as light has emanated from discussion of these distinc-
tions by those staking claims to one form of research or another. All three
forms, however, derive from the canonical texts from the 1960s and 1970s.
Researchers need to have some awareness of the distinctive views when search-
ing out and studying GTM-oriented publications, but they should not feel that
they have to express a preference or adherence to one form or another. Use of
research methods is not a case of taking sides, rather one of whatever works.
In any case, although they are seen as contending and antagonistic divi-
sions, the divergences should be seen as marking the maturation and develop-
ment of the method, a characteristic of many methods and techniques both
qualitative and quantitative—something that Strauss and Corbin pointed out
in their Handbook chapter. Action Research, for instance, now exists in many
forms and variations, generally without any acrimony between adherents of
the different forms (see Bradbury, 2015). Nevertheless, acknowledgment of
such differences, whether acrimonious or not, raises the issue of when a varia-
tion in articulation and/or use of GTM ceases to be GTM at all. So perhaps
it is understandable that Glaser, in his capacity as one of the originators of
the method, wants people to understand where the boundaries need to be
drawn between GTM and other approaches. One might, however, ask why
boundary disputes should be of any concern with regard to research methods
as long as such methodological developments and innovations lead to useful
and insightful outcomes? After all, two of the key criteria for GTM research
are that it should lead to outcomes that are useful and modifiable; which surely
should also be applicable to the method itself.
This chapter offers a view of the key characteristics of GTM, indicating the
ways in which they afford a basis from which a range of “family resemblances”
have developed. This view precludes any effort to ground some aspects of
this methodological terrain as the one, true form of GTM; rather, it seeks to
provide one perspective on the method, clarifying some of the many variants
88
and enhancements. Glaser and Strauss were rightly at pains to point out that
research requires “theoretical sensitivity,” developing and applying insightful
discrimination to the investigation. The same skills also need to be elicited and
honed in choosing and implementing various research methods; methodologi-
cal sensitivity. Many of my PhD students have developed this in a sophisticated
fashion during the course of their research, and they have demonstrated this in
their writing. Here, as an example, is the characterization offered by one stu-
dent who manages to refer to Glaser and Strauss, Glaser, Strauss, and Corbin,
and Charmaz in the course of presenting a succinct and elegant summary of a
top-level view of GTM:
GTM is a general methodology for building theories that are grounded
on systematically gathered and analysed data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
According to Glaser (1978), GTM requires an understanding of related
theory and empirical work in order to enhance theoretical sensitiv-
ity. Also, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 24) define GTM as “a qualitative
research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an
inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon.” According to
Charmaz (2008, p. 82), GTM is “a comparative and interactive method.”
So, the researcher creates theoretical categories that are directly grounded
on his/her data. GTM offers the researcher a flexible set of inductive strat-
egies for collecting and analysing qualitative data. These methods empha-
sise building inductive theories through data analysis (Charmaz, 2008, p.
82). [Jodeh]
Strauss and Corbin argued that “a child once launched is very much subject to
a combination of its origins and the evolving contingencies of life. Can it be
otherwise with a methodology?” But despite the variations between the writ-
ings of Glaser, Strauss and Corbin, Charmaz, and others, it is important not to
lose sight of the “Grand Strategy” of GTM: generating new theories from the
data. This involves a process whereby abstractions are built up incrementally
from detailed analysis of data, resulting in one or more concepts that integrate
aspects of the environment from which they are derived.
Many students offered their understanding of the key aspects of GTM,
usually drawing on a variety of sources and quoting from what they see as
key texts. One student whose PhD I examined expressed his understanding of
the method, citing a range of sources, and quoting Charmaz’s list of the core
features of the method:
In accordance with grounded theory, an empirical study always precedes
an extensive literature review in order to avoid seeing empirical data
“through the lens of earlier ideas” (Charmaz, 2006: 165). Other compo-
nents of grounded theory practice are also applied in this study (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; summarised in Charmaz,
2006: 6–7):
89
Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis;

¤
¤ Constructing analytical codes and categories from data, not from
preconceived logically deducted hypotheses. In contrast to the
type of hypotheses that are used to test already existing theories,
the grounded theorist produces hypotheses from empirical data
that can be tested by others;
¤ Using the constant comparative method, which involves making
comparisons during each stage of the analysis;
Advancing theory development during each step of data
¤
collection and analysis;
¤ Memo-writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties,
define relationship between categories and identified gaps;
Sampling aimed toward theory construction, not for population
¤
representativeness.
Another student—Gerhard Drexler—prepared a diagrammatic overview of
the method-in-use in his PhD, given here as Figure 4.1.
In further chapters I allude to similar statements and visual representa-
tions by doctoral students, in many cases extracted from the chapters discuss-
ing their overall strategy and method. Summaries like this require further
exposition, which is what the remainder of this chapter offers, starting with a
characterization of GTM that Kathy Charmaz and I used in our chapter in The
Handbook of Grounded Theory.
Grounded Theory comprises a systematic, inductive and comparative
approach for conducting inquiry for the purpose of constructing theory.
Digital
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FIGURE 4.1 The research process in practice. Taken from PhD Thesis of G Drexler
90
The method is designed to encourage researchers in [maintaining] per-

sistent interaction with their data, while remaining constantly involved
with their emerging analyses. Data collection and analysis proceed simul-
taneously and each informs and streamlines the other. Grounded theory
builds empirical checks into the analytic process and leads researchers
to examine all possible theoretical explanations for their empirical find-
ings. The iterative process of moving back and forth between empirical
data and emerging analysis makes the collected data progressively more
focused and the analysis successively more theoretical. (Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007b)
This is a deliberately extended and fairly complex characterization, and so the
key aspects are now taken up individually.
Systematic, Inductive, and Comparative
One of the key concerns of Glaser and Strauss was to stress that GTM was a
systematic method, providing a coherent basis to counter the widely held view
that qualitative research was an inferior form of investigation and analysis in
contrast to quantitative research. This is not meant to imply that qualitative
research had been an unsystematic endeavor prior to 1967. Strauss, steeped
as he was in the tradition of the Chicago School of Sociology would never
have thought of qualitative research as an inferior form. Yet with the publica-
tion of Discovery, Glaser and Strauss deliberately set out to counter those who
contended that qualitative research was inherently incoherent, impressionis-
tic, descriptive; perhaps at best a useful preparatory phase for real—that is,
quantitative—research.
In the light of the later split between Glaser and Strauss, the idea that
GTM is “systematic” might be seen as paradoxical if the term is taken to
mean recipe-like or mechanistic. But this is to confuse the idea of a system-
atic method with one that is mechanical or systematized. The latter terms cer-
tainly involve the image of a method that is reduced to a set of machine-like,
mindless operations, something along the lines of an algorithm or set of rules
adhered to mindlessly. In contrast, the term systematic suggests an approach
to research that is most certainly not ad hoc, but on the contrary is guided by
well-founded activities that have been clearly articulated in the form of a set
of heuristics or rules-of-thumb. There is guidance involved, but in all cases
adoption of the guidance has to take account of context and will demand the
insights of the researcher(s). Glaser’s misgivings regarding the work of Strauss
and Corbin might be understood in part as emanating from his concern that
the systematic character of GTM was moving toward a more mechanistic one,
thus undermining the intent and core of GTM as a flexible, data-oriented
approach. Yet it must be understood that the books on GTM that Strauss
91
published in the early 1990s were clearly responding to the demands from
students for further clarification of the process and procedures of the method,
given that the founding trilogy offered some excellent examples of GTM, but
were rather sparse or abbreviated in terms of detailed general principles. As is
now widely recognized, Discovery is best seen as a form of manifesto aimed at
Glaser and Strauss’s academic peers, and not as a handbook or guide for practi-
tioners. Awareness and Time each ended with a methodological appendix, but
these are rarely cited in the literature. Unfortunately, it is the case that attempts
at clarification and exposition, such as Strauss’s and Strauss and Corbin’s, can
too easily be misinterpreted and taken in a far more literal almost algorithmic
manner than might have been intended. This provides perhaps one explana-
tion, or a partial explanation, for the tone and tenor of the first two editions
of Strauss and Corbin’s book. (The third edition, dating from 2008, goes some
way toward correcting this tone.) Strauss clearly recognized the danger of such
slavish or algorithmic interpretations in the chapter he and Corbin contrib-
uted to the first edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research, discussed at
some length in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2 I pointed out that there is a general tendency for methods
to move from being regarded as rules-of-thumb to being viewed as manda-
tory, as rules that must be slavishly adhered to. This was evident for computer-
systems development methods in the 1980s and 1990s, where practitioners
found comfort from strict adherence to what appeared to be tried-and-tested
practices. Moreover clients, customers, and managers of such projects contrib-
uted to these pressures, transforming methods into mandatory expectations.
When entering unknown territory it seems safer to stick to the path that has
been trodden by others, rather than wandering into the uncharted wilderness.
This does not only apply to researchers, in a similar fashion the gatekeepers of
the research academy need to ensure that they do not mimic these pressures to
transform methods from tools to be fashioned and revised for use into man-
datory requirements and prescriptions. As argued in Chapter 2, on research
methods in general, one of the key challenges in writing about methods is
finding the balance between guidance and prescription: a balance that has to
be matched in some manner by the researchers themselves, steering between
avoidance of blind adherence to detailed methodological precepts or princi-
ples and a completely ad hoc and unsystematic approach. Novice researchers
and those who perhaps lack confidence in some aspects of research practice
can all too easily, and understandably, resort to following what it says in the
textbook, disregarding or evading the complexities of the research itself.
Charmaz in her writings, particularly in the 2nd edition of Constructing.
stresses the ways in which GTM can be, and must be seen as systematic.
Similarly, Glaser in his writings since the 1990s, has endeavored to clarify,
restate, and articulate what he sees as the main precepts of the method, incorpo-
rating key and core claims to the robustness and reliability of research findings
92
obtained using this approach. Long experience with research students, and
other researchers developing their work above and beyond the doctoral level,
has all too often demonstrated the phenomenon whereby a researcher’s initial
trepidation at using a method can all too easily transform into an unthinking
adherence to it. So it is important that a research method offers an approach
that is “systematic,” or rather that can readily be understood and implemented
systematically. But there is always the danger of its being used in a mecha-
nistic and algorithmic manner. In many respects the fault for this usually lies
with the researcher, but it is also something that must be recognized by those
teaching and writing about research methods. Strauss undoubtedly thought of
his later GTM writings as offering helpful expositions to researchers in their
plans to use GTM, but in so doing he was inevitably providing new sources
that could be taken up and interpreted in a whole variety of ways and seen by
some as moving away from the earlier GTM statements. Such new statements
could also be compared and contrasted with the earlier ones, leading to argu-
ments regarding which statements were the most authentic, even if they were
all meant to offer an exposition of the same topic. This paradox is not limited
to Strauss’s writings, it also applies to Glaser’s, and indeed to anyone writing
about the same topic at different times and dealing with different issues. It
is a phenomenon exemplified by the well-told tale of the blind men and the
elephant,4 and it applies to the writings on GTM in general, as well as to the
range of writings by any one person or group of methods advocates. The key is
for researchers to grasp the complexities of GTM, and to understand that no
single source or related group of sources can cover them all, in part because
any nontrivial implementation will itself lead to an encounter with novel expe-
riences demanding methodological and theoretical sensitivity.
GTM method is a comparative method, an alternative name for GTM
being “the method of constant comparison.” Glaser and Strauss define this as
comprising four stages:
We shall describe in four stages the constant comparative method: (1) com-
paring incidents applicable to each category, (2) integrating categories
and their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the the-
ory. Although this method of generating theory is a continuously grow-
ing process—each stage after a time is transformed into the next—earlier
stages do remain in operation simultaneously throughout the analysis
and each provides continuous development to its successive stage until
the analysis is terminated. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p105) nb: This
chapter was originally published by Glaser in 1965 in Social Problems 12
(1965):436-445 now available at http://groundedtheoryreview.com/2008/
11/29/the-constant-comparative-method-of-qualitative-analysis-1/
Chapter V of Discovery, essentially a reprint of an earlier paper of Glaser’s
(1965), contrasts the new method with three other possible approaches, illus-
trating how GTM takes one or more aspects from each but combines them all
93
into a single distinctive method. It should be noted that the term itself—con-
stant comparative method/method of constant comparison—has now taken
on something of a life of its own. Boeije (2002) discusses “the constant com-
parative method” [CCM] against the background of GTM, but as a distinct
method. While the paper by Fram (2013), for example, illustrates the way in
which what she terms “the constant comparison analysis method” [CCA] has
been taken up outside of GTM, which means that it has now become some-
thing more akin to a technique in the sense that term is discussed in Chapter 2,
under the subheading Technique.
A further example can be found in a report posted at a Web site for NVivo
training, under the heading “Defining The Constant Comparative Method.”
Note how the extract from that report refers to Glaser and Strauss but also to
other subsequent authors writing outside GTM.
The methodology adopted by this study is based on the constant com-
parative method according to Maykut and Morehouse (1994) who draw
on the work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Lincoln and Guba (1985)
in their development of this methodological framework. As Maykut and
Morehouse (1994) point out: “words are the way that most people come
to understand their situations; we create our world with words; we explain
ourselves with words; we defend and hide ourselves with words”. Thus, in
qualitative data analysis and presentation: “the task of the researcher is to
find patterns within those words and to present those patterns for others
to inspect while at the same time staying as close to the construction of the
world as the participants originally experienced it (p. 18)….5
The explanation offered goes on to describe the process of constant compari-
son. Again, the description is clearly derived from GTM, but it also takes on
a wider remit.
The constant comparative method involves breaking down the data into
discrete “incidents” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) or “units” (Lincoln and
Guba, 1985) and coding them to categories… . Categories undergo con-
tent and definition changes as units and incidents are compared and cat-
egorised, and as understandings of the properties of categories and the
relationships between categories are developed and refined over the course
of the analytical process. As Taylor and Bogdan (1984) summarise: “in the
constant comparative method the researcher simultaneously codes and
analyses data in order to develop concepts; by continually comparing spe-
cific incidents in the data, the researcher refines these concepts, identifies
their properties, explores their relationships to one another, and integrates
them into a coherent explanatory model.” (p. 126)
The principle of constant comparison, however, was a key innovation intro-
duced in GTM by Glaser and Strauss, as Chapter V of Discovery makes clear. It
lies at the heart of the iterative approach between data gathering and analysis
94
that was unique to GTM. As GTM researchers gather data, code for incidents,
and compare and contrast their findings against one another they are system-
atically developing rigorous and thorough foundations for their later concepts
and theories.
Constant comparison is clearly a central aspect of GTM, and it applies
throughout the process of GTM-oriented research. It is, however, no longer
unique to GTM, although the way it is integrated into the overall method is
unique to GTM, which also involves other key procedures and processes.
The issue of the extent to which GTM can be understood as an inductive
method is more questionable. It has already been pointed out in Chapter 3
that Strauss admitted that the issue of induction had been “over-played” in
Discovery (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).6 This arose in large part because the
agenda for Glaser and Strauss at the time was to draw a sharp distinction
between what they described as the deductive approach prevalent at the time
and their approach, which necessarily invoked gathering data prior to the
articulation of hypotheses, theoretical pronouncements, and so on.
Chapter V of Discovery refers to induction but primarily to distinguish
between “analytic induction” and the method of constant comparison, which
is the central topic of that chapter.7 The account offered is opaque, and the
characterization of analytic induction does not align readily with more com-
monly understood uses of the term.
Analytic induction has been concerned with generating and proving an inte-
grated, limited, precise, universally applicable theory of causes accounting
for a specific behavior (e.g., drug addiction, embezzlement). … [I]‌t tests a
limited number of hypotheses with all available data, consisting of num-
bers of clearly defined and carefully selected cases of phenomena . …
[T]he theory is generated by the reformation of hypotheses and redefi-
nition of the phenomena forced by constantly confronting the theory
with negative cases, cases which do not confirm the current formulation.
(emphasis added)
In contrast to analytic induction, the constant comparative method is
concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally
testing) many categories, properties, and hypotheses about general problems
(e.g., the distribution of services according to the social value of clients).
Some of these properties may be causes, as in analytic induction, but
unlike analytic induction, others are conditions, consequences, dimen-
sions, types, processes, etc. … the constant comparisons required by both
methods differ in breadth of purpose, extent of comparing, and what data
and ideas are compared. (emphasis added)
A close reading of Discovery reveals only a limited number of uses of the term
induction or inductive. The extended extract above encompasses all uses of
“induction,” and “inductive” is used in a few additional places, but only as an
assertion—for example in the extract that follows.
95
In comparing incidents, the analyst learns to see his categories in terms of

both their internal development and their changing relations to other cat-
egories. For example, as the nurse learns more about the patient, her cal-
culations of social loss change; and these recalculations change her social
loss stories, her loss rationales and her care of the patient.
This is an inductive method of theory development. (p. 114)
All that can be inferred from this is that the model of induction that Glaser
and Strauss wished to invoke in their method is akin to the relatively straight-
forward one offered by the definition to be found in the Oxford English
Dictionary, as quoted in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP).
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED Online) defines “induction,” in the
sense relevant here, as follows:
7. The process of inferring a general law or principle from the obser-
vation of particular instances (opposed to deduction n., q.v.)
That induction is opposed to deduction is not quite right, and the
rest of the definition is outdated and too narrow: much of what contem-
porary epistemology, logic, and the philosophy of science count as induc-
tion infers neither from observation nor particulars and does not lead to
general laws or principles.8
The SEP entry goes on to explain the various ways in which our understand-
ing of induction has changed since the 1950s. So it is not too surprising that
Glaser and Strauss got no further than the OED sense of the term. The prob-
lem, however, is that the use of the term in GTM writings has in far too many
cases remained mired in the over-played and poorly conceived sense implied
by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s. Strauss clearly recognized this, and, build-
ing on his Pragmatist background, moved from a view of GTM as inductive
to one that placed far more stress on the abductive nature of GTM reasoning.
Ironically, in recent years, and in no small way owing to Strauss and his adher-
ents in Germany, the concept of abduction as a distinct form of reasoning has
gained a far wider understanding. Charmaz notes that as early as 1969 Strauss
described GTM as “an abductive method” (2014, pp. 200–203), although the
relevance of this was not translated into extended discussion in his later writ-
ings. The issue of abduction is dealt with in Chapter 13, but for now I note
that GTM-oriented researchers do need to gain some level of understanding
of the debates around induction, deduction, and abduction. Clearly it is unre-
alistic to expect GTM-oriented researchers to make headway in dealing with
induction when philosophers themselves fail to agree on many key aspects
of the issue. Yet they should at least aim to understand and describe the uses,
strengths, and limitations of these various forms of reasoning and the relation-
ships and dependencies between them. Far too many texts on GTM make the
claim that it is “an inductive method,” but few if any actually go on to substan-
tiate this claim, let alone demonstrate familiarity with critiques of the term.
96
This is unfortunate as it feeds into the credibility gap that surrounds GTM, so
simple statements along the lines of “GTM is an inductive” method, will either
be seen as misplaced, unsubstantiated, or ill-conceived—possibly all three.
In a later part of this chapter the essences and the accidents of GTM are
described, and use of the term induction is firmly placed in the latter category.
Researchers might be well advised to avoid the term entirely, or if not, then at
least to pay some attention to the issues that surround the concept, and the
ways in which GTM combines inductive reasoning with abductive reasoning.
If they do choose the latter strategy they should prepare to be confronted with
questions like “What do you mean by induction?” and “What are the problems
of, and alternatives to, an inductive method?”
Persistent Interaction; Constant Involvement; Iterative
The three terms discussed in this section are closely related, and arise from the
sense in which GTM has always been centered on persistent interaction with
the data. This lies at the base of the process of constant comparison. The idea is
that conceptual development occurs through a process of comparison between
a range of different research artifacts at varying stages of the research process
itself. Thus comparisons need to be made between statements, findings, charac-
terizations of incidents, and codes, one against one another, as is explained and
exemplified in Part Three. This comparative process relates to the iterative aspect
of the method, whereby data collection and analysis are inter-linked, in contrast
to many other qualitative and quantitative approaches where analysis only starts
once the data-collection phase has been completed. The researcher engages in
persistent interaction with data and analysis, identifying patterns or higher level
abstractions as a result of prolonged immersion in, and engagement with, the
data. These patterns of higher level abstractions take the form of categories or
classes, so that a number of instances—incidents, examples, or such like—are
grouped together because they have some property in common. This is the pro-
cess of categorization in GTM, which is discussed further in Chapter 5.
The iterative aspect of GTM is central and critical to the method, and it
needs to be understood together with the concept of abduction; otherwise
simply iterating around data gathering and coding will not necessarily lead to
higher level concepts and categories. Consequently GTM involves other key
features and strengths in addition to the engagement with data, such as indi-
cating the moves from initial sampling to later more focused and theoretically
guided forms, followed by more focused coding and sampling until saturation
can be demonstrated.
Part Three offers more detailed discussion of these aspects, but for pres-
ent purposes the reader needs to understand that the process of iteration can
be envisaged as a spiral that moves simultaneously in two directions: inward
toward the origin as large numbers of codes are reduced successively to a small
97
Codes, Categories, Concepts—Increasing levels of abstraction

Increasing
C
C levels of
Concepts C C abstraction
C
Categories
C C
C C
C C
C Codes C
C CC
C
C C CC
C C
C
See Chapter 5 for
clarification of
terminology: codes,
concepts, categories
FIGURE 4.2 The spiral model of abstraction.
number of core concepts and upward toward a single core category or perhaps
a set of two or three core categories capable of integrating significant aspects of
the investigation as a result of their explanatory power. Figure 4.2 illustrates this
in general terms, across the main stages of GTM from initial coding to eventual
identification of a core category or concept.
The numerous codes at the lowest level of the spiral are analysed using con-
stant comparison. Some or all of them are then clustered by the researcher(s) into a
smaller number of groups of focused codes or categories, as is explained in Chapters
5, 6 and 9. These higher level codes should offer a greater degree of abstraction
and conceptualization than the initial open codes, integrating key aspects of the
lower level ones, while building on and enhancing their overall conceptual and
explanatory power (see Chapter 5 and the examples described in Chapters 7 and
14). These higher level codes can then be used as the basis for theoretical sampling,
and the product of this should be a further refinement of these codes into what I
term categories. (The terminology is explained in detail in Chapter 5.) These pro-
vide the basis for further theoretical sampling and analysis, resulting in one or two
core concepts, the articulation of which is termed a substantive grounded theory.
Constructing Theory
The objective of the method is to generate and develop more refined concepts
and theories, rather than reinforcing or clarifying existing ones. Moreover the
theoretical statements that develop from use of GTM do not claim the status
of grand or overarching theories, but rather are initially offered as substantive
98
ones, a term that has a very precise meaning in grounded theory writing—
that is, substantive theories are statements that draw upon, and have theoreti-
cal power constrained by a specified context. This is in contrast with a formal
grounded theory.
Substantive theory: a theoretical interpretation or explanation of a delim-
ited problem in a particular area, such as family relationships, formal
organizations, or education… . [one that] not only provides a stimulus to
a “good idea,” but it also gives an initial direction in developing relevant
categories and properties and possible modes of integration [theoretical
codes]. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 79)
By substantive theory we mean theory developed for a substantive or
empirical area of sociological inquiry, such as patient care, geriatric life
styles etc… . By formal theory we mean theory developed for a formal or
conceptual area of sociological study such as status passage, stigma, devi-
ant behavior, etc. (Glaser and Strauss)
In this sense these two forms of grounded theory can be understood in the
terms put forward by Dewey (see Chapter 17), they are tools to be assessed for
their utility in certain situations not claims to universal validity, absolute truth,
and veracity; assessed initially against the background from which they have
been derived. Glaser and Strauss discuss this process of evaluation in terms of
what might at first sight appear to be nebulous concepts such as “fit,” “grab,”
and “work.” The products of GTM-oriented research should be judged not in
terms of correspondence to reality but with regard to whether they are use-
ful in serving certain purposes and practices. A grounded theory should “fit”
with the setting from which it has been derived, being clearly developed from
the data. It should have “grab” and “work” in the sense of indicating how the
theory can lead to enhanced practice and understanding of the participants.
This was clearly the case with two elements of the Glaser and Strauss trilogy,
Awareness and Time. In addition, a grounded theory should be “modifiable” in
the light of further findings –see below in Table 4.4. These processes, together
with clear exposition of constant comparison, are the basis for producing a
good grounded theory, and the results should be evaluated accordingly, as
explained in Chapter 18.
In my article on Strauss (Bryant, 2009) I pointed out that the meaning of
the term theory is itself fraught with ambiguity and ambivalence. For some
the term is an accolade, so citations for Nobel prizes mention that the winners
have made major contributions to one or another theory, or have developed
a new one. In contrast, anyone wishing to disparage something might use the
term in precisely the opposite sense, hence those arguing in favor of Intelligent
Design refer to the work of Charles Darwin or the concept of evolution in
general as only a theory. So in one sense theory implies something along the
99
lines of mere conjecture or supposition, but in another sense it implies some-

thing with enhanced status, attained only after exhaustive efforts to test and
challenge it. This latter meaning is certainly what Glaser and Strauss had in
mind in arguing for theories to be grounded. Nevertheless, when a grounded
theory is first developed it can hardly claim this status; this can only come with
time and the attention of others. The final paragraph of Awareness includes the
point that a substantive grounded theory “is often of great practical use long
before the theory is tested with great rigor” (p. 293, emphasis added). This claim
resonates with the Pragmatist view of a theory as a tool to be judged primarily
by its “usefulness” rather than its inherent “truthfulness,” which is a far more
uncertain and elusive aspect.
The grounded theory method should, obviously, lead to the development of
grounded theories, although these may also be termed models or frameworks or
conceptual schemas. This aspect of GTM is sometimes forgotten or obscured by
researchers themselves when reporting their findings. So critiques of the method
often pose the question “Where is the theory in grounded theory research?”
Coding and Sampling
In GTM the initial data gathering should be performed within a specific con-
text, but with a wide remit. This approach might sound inchoate and prob-
lematic, but in many instances it proves an effective starting point, offering
researchers the possibility of fairly unconstrained investigation of the domain
from the outset of their research. For instance, in Glaser and Strauss’s initial
work, they cast their net across a wide spectrum of people and actions in the
hospital setting in which they carried out their research.
Once some initial data has been gathered, it can be analyzed and config-
ured using the technique of open coding. Unlike earlier forms of coding, which
involved application of previously prepared coding structures to the data,
GTM incorporates close investigation of the data from which potential codes
can be derived. This process is explained in detail in Part Three. It is important
to stress that GTM does not involve starting from a clear and precise research
question. In fact it explicitly eschews this in favor of a far more flexible stance
on the part of the researcher(s), who should be ready to be taken by surprise
as the analysis develops from this initial phase. The grounded theory method
involves an open approach to the research context, especially during the early
stages. Rather than posing exact questions and objectives, Glaser and Strauss
suggested a series of generic questions to guide the researchers, such as:
¤ What is this data about?
¤ What is this data a study of?
¤ What is going on?
¤ What are people doing?
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¤ What are people saying?

¤ What do these actions and statements take for granted?
Later writers, like Kathy Charmaz, added to this list to include questions that
should sensitize researchers to the range of different participants’ viewpoints,
issues of power and control, structure, and context, and the ways in which
changes come about in the setting under investigation.
¤ From whose point of view is a given process fundamental? From
whose is it marginal?
¤ How do the observed social processes emerge? How do
participants’ actions construct them?
¤ Who exerts control over these processes? Under what conditions?
¤ What meanings do different participants attribute to the process?
How do they talk about it? What do they emphasize? What do they
leave out?
¤ How and when do their meanings and actions concerning the
process change? (Charmaz, 2006, p. 20)
Although it is now apparent that there are distinct and apparently divergent
approaches to coding strategies, there is a common thread running through
this diversity. Namely a move from a fairly large number of initial codes
derived from close interrogation of the data to a more limited set of terms that
suggest the core characteristics of the larger set of terms, or at least a partial set
of these terms. This development can be understood to comprise moving from
a fairly low level of abstraction to increasingly higher ones, as indicated in the
spiral in Figure 4.2. I offer a more detailed discussion of this process in Part
Three, where I use examples from the work of recent PhD students.
Initial codes are used to guide later stages of data gathering; thus there
is a gradual development in the targeting and focus of data gathering once
analysis is underway. So whereas the initial coding may be fairly nebulous and
unconstrained, later stages of research become more anchored in and directed
by the developing analysis. As a consequence, there is a change in the form
of sampling involved in GTM research. During the early stages of research,
GTM researchers who conduct interviews tend to choose research partici-
pants who have had relevant experience or participation in the context of the
study; this approach is termed purposive sampling. But once some initial anal-
ysis has been accomplished the process becomes more focused and the early
results should provide the basis for identifying sources of further data—people
and/or other sources—which in GTM is referred to as theoretical sampling,
… a type of grounded theory sampling in which the researcher aims to
develop the properties of his or her developing categories or theory, not
to sample of randomly selected populations or to sample representative
distributions of a particular population. When engaging in theoretical
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sampling, the researcher seeks people, events, or information to illumi-

nate and define the boundaries and relevance of the categories. Because
the purpose of theoretical sampling is to sample to develop the theoretical
categories, conducting it can take the researcher across substantive areas.
(Bryant and Charmaz, 2007a, p. 611)
Throughout the entire process GTM-oriented researchers should be keeping
a constant and contemporaneous record of their ideas and insights in the
form of memos. This aspect of the work is dealt with in more detail in Part
Three. It is an essential part of the method, and provides a basis not only for
keeping a record of people’s thinking as the study proceeds, it can also form
a platform for later publications and other forms of dissemination.
Empirical Checks
The move from the initial stages of the research to the eventual articulation
of a theoretical core involves an amalgamation or derivation of codes into a
single core category, or sometimes two or three such central categories. This
development needs to be closely linked to the data and explained and justi-
fied clearly in any research reports. Care must be taken on the one hand to
avoid re-describing the context without any enhanced levels of abstraction
and conceptualization or, on the other hand, consciously or unconsciously
imposing concepts that are in no way associated with the context. This is an
aspect of GTM that is common to all forms of research, yet often it is one
that is ignored or obscured. It is also a component of theoretical sensitivity,
although the balance between “re-description” and unwarranted conceptu-
alization is far simpler to state in general terms than it is to effect in practice.
Further discussion of this issue is offered in Chapter 13, on abduction, and
in Chapter 18.
The empirical checks that are part of GTM emanate from the research
setting, so this is not akin to the forms of verification against which Glaser and
Strauss took issue. These checks are sometimes seen as a weakness in GTM
because the same data used in the generation of a theory is later used to check
it. But this is to misunderstand the nature of a grounded theory, particularly
a substantive one. The theoretical statements themselves are derived after
thorough constant comparison across the data. The theories themselves can
then only be validated initially against the context and data from which they
have been derived, specifically in terms of their “fit” and “grab” or relevance.
Concerns about wider applicability and relevance only come into focus once
this initial and crucial evaluation has been accomplished.
The terms validation and verification are often used synonymously, which
for GTM leads to a critical misunderstanding. The terms themselves are used
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TABLE 4.2
Validation and verification
Validation Verification
Refers to intelligibility and usability Refers to aspects such as conformity to standards and
of theoretical outcomes by those legal requirements, and other forms of “conventional
involved in the contexts from which wisdom” in John Kenneth Galbraith’s sense of the term.
the insights have been derived.
Issues such as “fit,” “grab,” and Glaser and Strauss saw verification as a limited basis for
“usability” are of primary concern. developing theoretical insights and innovations as it
was based on research aimed primarily at conforming
to existing grand theories in social science.
more generically with regard to ways of determining the quality of a prod-

uct or a service. In such circumstances the distinction between validation
and verification is clearly delineated as follows; validation is a process that
involves going back to the stakeholders, participants, and research subjects,
and gaining confirmation that the outcome is suitable and acceptable; verifica-
tion involves recourse to a wider set of issues, such as conformance to stan-
dards, legal requirements, and so on. By extension, grounded theories can be
validated precisely in the sense described by Barry Turner, who characterized
GTM as “an approach to qualitative data [that] promotes the development of
theoretical accounts which conform closely to the situations being observed, so
that the theory is likely to be intelligible to and usable by those in the situations
observed, and is open to comment and correction by them” (1983, empha-
sis added). The idea of close conformity to the situation is precisely what is
meant by validation, and this is taken further in GTM with reference to “fit”
and “work”—akin to the phrase “fit for purpose” when assessing the quality
of a product or service. Again this resonates with the Pragmatist view of a
theory or model, which places primary and even sole importance on its use,
and not on its correspondence to universal truth and applicability. Note also
that Turner refers to the likelihood that a grounded theory will be intelligible
and usable to those involved in the situation under investigation, which is not
to say that the theory will be understood, taken up, and used in future practice.
It may well evoke negative reactions or downright rejection (see Table 4.2).
“All Possible Theoretical Explanations”
The statement that GTM “leads researchers to examine all possible theoretical
explanations for their empirical findings” may at first glance seem bizarre, because
by some accounts the grounded theory is meant to “emerge from the data.” The
discussion on induction earlier in this chapter indicates that the path from a set of
data to a conceptual explanation or theory is far from straightforward. In fact it is
never just inductive, because for any set of data there will always be more than one
103
possible explanation, although there may be one that stands out based on its parsi-
mony (Occam’s razor9) or elegance or potential explanatory power; or some com-
bination of these. It is incumbent on GTM researchers to maintain their stance
of openness as they examine the data and develop their concepts and categories.
Rather than being a problem for GTM, this is actually a key rationale and basis
for the method if it is understood that, far from being inductive, GTM is actually
an abductive method, as Strauss intimated to Charmaz in the 1960s. This idea is
examined in more detail in Chapter 13, and a later illustration is given in Part Four.
The Accidents and Essences of GTM
Part Three offers a series of chapters that develop the main characteristics of
GTM discussed so far, plus some that have not been mentioned or that have
only been given a passing reference in this book. Thus topics such as coding,
memos and memo-making, and theoretical saturation are included. These are
all crucial aspects of the method, and it is important to distinguish these essen-
tial aspects from those that are accidental.
Aristotle is credited with raising the distinction between the essential and
the accidental characteristics of an entity. The SEP entry on this distinction
offers the following summation: “The distinction between essential versus acci-
dental properties has been characterized in various ways, but it is currently
most commonly understood in modal terms: an essential property of an object
is a property that it must have while an accidental property of an object is one
that it happens to have but that it could lack.”
F. P. Brooks (1987) used these terms in his landmark paper on software
engineering in the 1980s, distinguishing between two types of difficulty
encountered in software development at that time; respectively the “essence(s) –
the difficulties inherent in the nature of software –and accidents –those dif-
ficulties that today attend its production but that are not inherent” (emphasis
added).10 So for Brooks, “accidental” aspects are usually the result of the his-
torical period, and they may, in time, be overcome, unlike the indelible and
ineluctable “essential” ones. In a similar fashion, it is both possible and useful
to distinguish between the accidents and essences of GTM, many of the former
arising from the historical era from which the method emerged.
The essences have been covered in large part in this chapter in the discus-
sion of the various aspects encompassed by the quotation from The Handbook
of Grounded Theory. There have also been hints at the accidents, but it is now
important to spell these out, together with their ramifications, which in many
cases should be helpful to researchers both in presenting their proposals prior
to their investigations and in publishing accounts of their work.
The first accidental aspect of GTM refers to the method being seen as
inductive. As pointed out above, under the heading Systematic, Inductive,
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Comparative, the concepts of induction and inductive reasoning are fraught

with difficulties that continue to exercise some of the finest philosophical
minds. GTM-oriented researchers can avoid this issue if they omit any refer-
ence to induction and instead stress the essential characteristic of GTM, which
relates to the persistent interaction with the data, starting from a set of open-
ended questions rather than detailed hypotheses and targets for verification.
This does not in any way detract from the method as Strauss himself thought
that use of the idea of induction was over-played in the earliest GTM texts.
The second accidental aspect of GTM is the injunction against engagement
with the literature at the outset of the research. As some of the initial doctoral
students at UCSF pointed out, even in the 1960s this was paradoxical advice.
Students would advance ideas that prompted responses from Strauss or Glaser
where one or the other would point out similarities with work already pub-
lished. The rationale underlying this guidance was to move doctoral research-
ers away from close study of existing grand texts to a more open-ended and
open-minded view of the subject terrain, encouraging them to plunge into
their research far more readily and with less trepidation. This aspect of the
method is now readily understood, and so admonitions to ignore the relevant
literature must be seen as far too blunt and misguided for doctoral or other
researchers, who need to demonstrate familiarity with the existing literature as
a basis for justifying the innovative potential of their proposed research. GTM
does, however, require a variation on the usual engagement with the literature,
precisely because of the distinctive strategy of GTM-oriented research—an
initial discussion of the literature will need to be supplemented at a later stage
by a return to the literature once the conceptual model has been developed
from the data; this constitutes a key component of theoretical coding.
Related to the issue of engagement with the literature, a further acci-
dent concerns the initial stance of the researcher(s) planning to use GTM.
According to many GTM texts, when embarking on a GTM-oriented investi-
gation the researcher should shed all preconceptions and avoid engaging with
the relevant literature. As argued in Chapter 5, shedding all preconceptions is
not feasible, even if it were thought to be desirable. In Discovery, Glaser and
Strauss did refer to the work of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, and
Clifford Geertz as examples of research findings that appeared to owe a good
deal to the ideas with which the researchers approached their investigations.
But this is not the same as trying to claim that one can begin research without
any preconceptions; on the contrary it is often preconceptions that prove help-
ful in guiding and sensitizing the researcher to the research issue in the first
place. The key is to try to articulate and raise awareness of one’s preconcep-
tions as far as possible; but also to encourage engagement with others and add
their ideas and perspectives, so that alternative viewpoints can be encountered
and challenged, then either cast aside or accommodated. Statements that aver
that the researcher “entered the research domain without any preconceptions”
will quite understandably be treated with suspicion, if not derision, whereas
105
serious efforts to explain one’s preconceptions, and perhaps how they were
revised as a result of the research itself, will indicate a more considered orien-
tation. This will also involve researchers offering their accounts and insights
relating to the existing literature; an exercise that cannot be avoided at the pro-
posal stage, given that some basis will be expected or even demanded for eval-
uating the potential contribution of the work to the existing domain. In many
cases people are drawn to a topic precisely because they have prior experience
in the field, either as a student or through practice. The skill of the researcher
is to build on that expertise, but always remaining open to the possibility that
such efforts will lead in unexpected directions; indeed, if the initial results
of one’s studies merely reinforce—verify—one’s preconceptions and existing
ideas, then that should be taken as a signal to raise the level of suspicion and
doubt. Researchers should seek, as far as possible, to explicate the ideas that
led them to undertake their research in the first place, leaving others to decide
the extent to which they were influential in the research itself. This will also
allow researchers to explain the ways in which their early ideas required revi-
sion or jettisoning once the research was under way.
A further accidental aspect of GTM relates to statements along the lines
of “GTM was appropriate as there is no existing research in this area.” This
may have had some value in the 1960s, and Glaser and Strauss were at pains to
advocate this aspect in order to guide researchers into new areas rather than
toiling in the conceptual redoubts of the grand theorists. But it is now time
to put such statements aside. Even when they were made in the 1960s–1980s,
these claims were questionable. First, how could embarking on this research
be justified if there had not been an in-depth engagement with the literature?
Second, proving a negative is difficult if not impossible; failing to find relevant
existing research may well be the result of not looking hard enough. Now that
we live in the age of Google, any search on the Web will produce numerous
results, most of which can be discounted: But not all. In any case, use of a
method should not depend on lack of existing research; it should be based on
appropriateness of the method for the situation and matters under consider-
ation. Researchers who perhaps rashly claim that there is no existing research
in their chosen area should expect to be challenged on this matter, and may
well fail to convince their critics and assessors. It is far safer to offer a clear
rationale for the proposed work based on the necessity for further research,
new insights, and the nature of the substantive area itself.
The two final accidents are related to one another: emergence and the
positivist or objectivist stance of the early texts. The metaphor of emergence
implies that somehow the conceptual categories that result from a GTM-ori-
ented study come about by themselves, emerging from the data. It is doubtful
that this is what Glaser and Strauss actually wished to imply, although Glaser’s
continued use of the term might indicate otherwise. Again, a more reasonable
explanation is that from the outset Glaser and Strauss were trying to distance
their method from other approaches that resulted in conclusions being reached
106
prematurely and on the basis of leaps of faith that had little or no grounding
in the data or evidence. The result, however, is that far too many researchers
feel that it is sufficient simply to claim “emergence,” thereby detracting from
their own considerable efforts and insights, as well as stretching the credulity
of their readers and evaluators.
The clearly positivist tone of the early GTM texts, especially Discovery,
has already been referred to. This continued in the later works by Strauss and
Glaser, separately and in concert, through the 1970s and 1980s. To an extent
this is understandable as Glaser and Strauss were keen to make the case for
qualitative research in general, and GTM in particular, as having a scientific
standing equivalent to that enjoyed by quantitative research. But their under-
standing of what was meant by “scientific” must now be recognized as out-
dated and inadequate. A far stronger case can be made, developing Glaser and
Strauss’s initial strategy of aiming to set qualitative research on an equal foot-
ing with quantitative research, that both qualitative and quantitative methods
can be seen to embody “the good, the bad, and the ugly.” The grounded theory
method can be re-grounded and seen as an example of good research practice,
shorn of the accidental aspects that accompanied its appearance but that are
no longer relevant.
In her chapter in the second edition of the Handbook of Qualitative Research
Charmaz made the distinction between “objectivist” and “constructivist”
GTM, clearly placing Glaser’s work in the former category, together with that
of Strauss and Corbin. Certainly there are footnotes and occasional insights to
the contrary in the early joint GTM works, as well as in Strauss and Corbin’s
writings; but the overall tenor is consistently and clearly a positivist one.
For Charmaz the distinctions between the two forms are operative on
three levels; foundational assumptions, objectives, and implications for data
analysis (Charmaz, 2014, p. 236). These are summarized in Table 4.3, derived
from Charmaz.
Charmaz offers an overview of both forms of GTM, and it might have
been inferred from her initial statement in the 2nd edition of The Handbook
of Qualitative Research (2000) that the two could co-exist as distinctive forms
of the method. Glaser’s response, however, allowed no such accommoda-
tion: “Constructivist GT is a misnomer” (Glaser, 2002). His writings since that
time have continued along the same lines. He largely evades the main onto-
logical and epistemological issues, and so investigators who rely entirely on
his writings, together with those who adhere to his position, can be left with
little or no response to those who challenge his position as an “epistemological
fairy-tale.” In the past the problem has been that all forms of GTM have been
tarred with the same brush. But now, given the extensive GTM writings of
authors who have engaged with these issues and offer significant arguments
opposed to such philosophically disingenuous and limited accounts, research-
ers and reviewers must acknowledge the variants on offer regardless of their
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TABLE 4.3
Objectivist and constructivist GTM—after Charmaz (2000)
Objectivist Constructivist
Foundational assumptions Foundational assumptions

Data can be discovered in a manner similar Multiplicity of perspectives
to the discovery of Australia or the Observation and investigation are social
North Pole.* activities undertaken from different
Investigation and observation are independent perspectives and orientations
of specific observers and investigators—who Outcomes are social constructs open to
are largely passive receptors of data. challenge and are provisional
The metaphor of representation is a “mirror to
nature”
Objectives Objectives
“Aims for context-free generalizations “Aims to create theory that has credibility,
Aims to create theory that fits, works, has originality, resonance, and usefulness.”
relevance, and is modifiable (Glaser)”
Implications for data analysis Implications for data analysis
“Views data analysis as an objectivist “Views subjectivities throughout data analysis.”
process.” “Engages in reflexivity throughout the research
“Sees reflexivity as one possible data source.” process.”
“Gives priority to researcher’s analytic “Seeks out and (re)presents participants’ views
categories and voice.” as integral to the analysis.”
*There are problems with all these meanings of the term—Australia was there all the time and was inhabited, so
Captain James Cook is simply credited as the first person from Europe to arrive there; the North Pole was also
already in existence, but until 1908 (Frederick Cook) or 1909 (Robert Peary) no-one had located and visited it.
(The date of the actual “discovery” remains controversial.)
own predilections. A clear understanding of the distinction between the “acci-

dents” and the “essences” of GTM should prove extremely useful in this regard
(see the summary provided in Table 4.4.)
As I pointed out earlier in Chapter 2, it is unrealistic to expect doc-
toral students and more experienced researchers to resolve these complex
philosophical— epistemological and ontological— issues; they continue to
exercise even the most knowledgeable of philosophers. But it is important that
all GTM-oriented researchers—and others—do offer some recognition and
understanding of the debates around “data,” the role of the observer, and the
interpretation of research findings. It must, however, be stressed that the out-
comes of the research should be judged rather than the philosophical stance
of the researchers.
GTM as Key Methodological Innovation
In my article in 2002, written before I had come across any of Charmaz’s

work, I argued that GTM was too important an innovative approach to
be left floundering in the wake of the well-founded criticisms aimed at its
philosophical weaknesses; which I would now regard aimed largely at the
aspects of the method that “accidentally” accompanied its initial appearance.
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TABLE 4.4
Accidents and Essences of GTM
Essences
Coding-cum- This is described in Charmaz’s terms as conducting “data collection and

analysis-cum- analysis simultaneously in an iterative process”
memoing
Substantive and Generating theory is the prime objective of GTM
formal theory Substantive theories—“developed for a substantive or empirical area of
generation sociological inquiry, such as patient care, geriatric life styles etc.”
Formal theories—“theory developed for a formal or conceptual area of
sociological study such as status passage, stigma, deviant behavior, etc.”
In Charmaz’s terms “Emphasize theory construction rather than description or
application of current theories.”
Purposive/ Initial sampling is undertaken with a purpose or target context in mind—and it
convenience may start from a convenience sample.
sampling Later stages will use the provisional codes and categories as guides for
followed by further sampling—termed theoretical sampling.
theoretical
sampling
Theoretical GTM specifies the point at which data gathering can be ended. This is when
saturation the researcher(s) can justify their view that there is sufficient data to
substantiate their model—i.e., that the categories in their model are borne
out by the data and that further data drawn from their research context
adds no further detail to the categories and concepts already articulated.
(See Chapter 12)
Use of the Initially researchers will have to indicate that they have some familiarity with
literature the existing literature—it is a standard expectation of those evaluating
research proposals. The aim is to situate the planned research against
current knowledge rather than using such material for developing
hypotheses.
At later stages of GTM-oriented research, the researcher(s) need to
substantiate their categories and concepts by taking the findings back to
the literature—this is in part what GTM writers refer to as Theoretical Coding
Criteria—“fit,” The criteria for GTM are linked to the way in which substantive grounded
“grab,” “work,” theories need to be validated against the context from which they have been
modifiability derived.
Grab –This is a characteristic of a substantive grounded theory. It relates
to Dewey’s idea of a theory being judged in terms of its usefulness (see
Chapter 17), rather than any abstract principle of veracity. If a grounded
theory has grab this might be demonstrated in the way in which the actors
from the research setting respond when it is explained to them –they will
understand and engage with it, using it in their activities and practices.
Jeanne Quint’s development of innovative nursing practices, referred to in
the opening chapters of this book and particularly in Chapter 3, and the
ways in which these were taken up by colleagues and fellow professionals
are a prime example of this feature.
Fit –This term refers to the need for theoretical insights to adhere to the
substantive context, rather than to the predilections or biases (conscious
or unwitting) of the researcher(s). Glaser offers further thoughts on this
issue in Theoretical Sensitivity (1978) stressing that the categories resulting
from a GTM study should fit the data. How this is accomplished, and the
cogency with which it is demonstrated and argued will depend on the
researcher(s) and the relevant published outputs. It should be thought of as
an overarching aim to be striven towards in any GTM-oriented research.
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Work –This again builds on the idea of a theory as a tool. Tools are useful
within specific contexts or for specific tasks. There are no general purpose
tools, suited to all and every situation and job. The anticipated outcome
of a GTM-oriented research project ought to be a substantive grounded
theory –i.e. one that is of use in the context from which it has been drawn
and within which it has been grounded. Thus any such theory ought to
be able to offer explanations and insights that perhaps previously were
unrecognized or implicit; also providing a basis for consideration of future
actions and directions. If such a substantive theory is then enhanced and
developed to a wider class of contexts it can claim formal status. One of the
earliest examples of this was Strauss’s work on negotiated orders (Strauss,
1978) which extended some of the aspects of the research that led to
Glaser and Strauss’ early writings.
Modifiability –One of Glaser and Strauss’ criticisms of hypothesis-based
research was that far too often by the time a research project had been
completed –passing from derivation and proposal, through investigation, to
eventual proof or disproof –things had moved on and as a consequence the
finding and conclusions proved to be of little or no relevance. Furthermore
the process of conceptual discovery is not to be thought of as a once-and-
for-all activity, but rather as a continuing and continuous dialogue. Thus
grounded theories have to be understood as modifiable, rather than thought
of as fixed, definitive statements for all time.
Openness to This is an essential aspect of all research—but GTM places particular stress
serendipity on it.
Pragmatism This is something of a controversial claim as an “essence” of GTM, but the
current discussion offers considerable substantiation for it. Strauss hints
at it in some places, and some of his students have also developed this
aspect.
This applies in particular to the process of abduction, with GTM characterized
as essentially an abductive method.
A few further points taken from Charmaz’ (2006, 2014) account (plus my comments)
“Analyze actions and processes rather than themes and structure”
¤ As I show in Part Three, Charmaz is particularly keen on this aspect of GTM. I would argue
that, although desirable and useful as a guide for coding, it is not an essential feature from
the very outset.
Use comparative methods.
¤ GTM is termed the “method of constant comparison,” although the term itself has taken on
something of a life of its own, with some researchers using the term—and the technique—
without referring to GTM.
“Draw on data (e.g., narratives and descriptions) in service of developing new conceptual
Categories”
¤ This is a key component in moving from initial codes to later concepts and models or
theories
“Develop inductive abstract analytic categories through systematic data analysis”
¤ I think the term “inductive” is misleading; if it is omitted this certainly sums up an essential
aspect.
Accidents
Induction/ Researchers can refer to the claims that GTM is “inductive”—but need to
inductive point out that this was later recognized by Strauss as “over-played,” and that
approach the use of the term in the early texts was limited and is now regarded as
misleading and largely unhelpful. The key point, still relevant, was to mark
a distinction between GTM and “deductive” approaches—a distinction that
can be made more effectively with regard to GTM’s starting point as opposed
to research approaches that emanate from hypotheses relating to existing
theories.
(continued)
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TABLE 4.4
Continued
Rationale of This was always a difficult claim to substantiate—but more so now in the
no existing age of Google. Researchers should seek to offer some justification for
research the potentially innovative insights to be achieved by their GTM-oriented
research, rather than trying to point to a dearth of specific research.
Emergence The metaphor of emergence is widely used, and in most cases it detracts
from the actual efforts of the researchers themselves. It may appear to be
a highly attractive metaphor, but is best avoided, even by researchers with
positivist or objectivist inclinations.
Delayed literature Not an option, and in most cases researchers are already familiar with the
review literature as a result of immersion in or familiarity with the field; which is
why they are keen to pursue further research.
No A claim that is not really feasible, which Glaser himself admits—see
preconceptions Part Three.
Researchers need to offer an account of their preconceptions and leave
the readers and reviewers to judge the extent to which these guided or
constrained the research itself.
The Lone Even the PhD researcher is, and should be, supported by a team of supervisors
Researcher and colleagues. The initial GTM research was undertaken by a team of three,
and this needs to be recognized more clearly in the GTM literature.
Positivism/ Researchers have to recognize that the early GTM writings were developed
scientism in part with an agenda of advocating a “scientific” basis for qualitative
research—but where the authors’ understanding of what this entailed was
rapidly becoming outdated in the wake of debates (re)-ignited by the work of
Thomas Kuhn and others that followed.
It is now widely understood that there are differing “paradigms” for research—
although the extent to which these can be selected and taken up as guides
to the research process itself is debatable.
Glaser’s response has, unfortunately, been to ignore the issues and state that
GTM is immune from such concerns. The writings of Charmaz and others
have engaged with these issues, and the substance of this work needs
to be taken in to account by GTM researchers whether or not they are in
agreement with it.
Charmaz herself has repeatedly stressed the important and invaluable inno-
vations afforded by GTM, and it is important to restate them at this point in
order to ensure that the balance of Chapters 3 and 4 incorporates all four of
Rapoport’s rules. Otherwise it might seem that rule 4 has come to predomi-
nate: that is, offering rebuttal and criticism. The key innovations of GTM,
based on Charmaz’s account (2014, p. 8) were the challenges to existing ideas
about research:
¤ the “arbitrary divisions between theory and research”;
¤ viewing qualitative studies as preparatory for more rigorous
quantitative work;
¤ viewing qualitative research as less legitimate and non-scientific;
¤ viewing qualitative studies as impressionistic and unsystematic;
¤ separating data collection from its analysis;
111
¤ seeing the only possible outcome of qualitative research as

“descriptive case studies rather than theory development”
Earlier in this chapter I quoted the list of core criteria for GTM provided by
Charmaz in the first edition of Constructing (2006). In the second edition this
has been revised and enhanced, and provides a useful summary of GTM, and
a conclusion to Part Two:
Grounded theorists:
1. Conduct data collection and analysis simultaneously in an iterative
process
2. Analyze actions and processes rather than themes and structure
3. Use comparative methods
4. Draw on data (e.g., narratives and descriptions) in service of
developing new conceptual categories
5. Develop inductive abstract analytic categories through systematic data
analysis
6. Emphasize theory construction rather than description or application
of current theories
7. Engage in theoretical sampling
8. Search for variation in the studied categories or process
9. Pursue developing a category rather than covering a specific empirical
topic. (Charmaz, 2014, p. 15)
Exercise
1. Make notes on each of the above nine aspects of GTM; examine each
one critically and explain why in particular there are some issues with
regard to items 4 and 5.
Key Points
¤ GTM as a family of methods

¤ GTM as flexible and modifiable—although one person’s modification
may be anathema to others
¤ Issues about variants should be concerned with whatever works rather
than about taking sides
¤ Key characteristics of GTM
¤ Substantive grounded theories (SGTs) and formal grounded
theories (FGTs)
¤ Concept of Methodological Sensitivity

112
¤ Distinction between accidents and essences

¤ Difference between validation and verification
Notes
1. Readers keen to be presented with a small-scale example of a grounded theory

should read Chapter 7 before continuing with this chapter.
2. Charmaz uses the metaphor of a “constellation” in the new edition of Constructing
Grounded Theory (2006).
3. Awareness of Dying (1965), The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967), Time for
Dying (1968)
4. http://www.jainworld.com/literature/story25.htm An alternative example can
be found in the scene in the film The Life of Brian where Brian’s followers split into two
sects respectively revering the gourd or the shoe that Brian lost in the chase. http://
montypython.50webs.com/scripts/Life_of_Brian/18.htm
5. http://www.nvivotraining.eu/content/defining-constant-comparative-method—the
references cited in these extracts can be found on the Web site itself.
6. The chapter refers to “we”—i.e., to Glaser and Strauss rather than to Strauss and
Corbin, so Strauss himself must have contributed this observation.
7. See Chapter 17 where a possible explanation for their use of this term is discussed.
8. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
9. See the SEP entry on Simplicity http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/
10. The title of Brooks’ paper is No Silver Bullet, specifically likening a project to a
werewolf—i.e., something that starts out well but becomes frightening and uncontrollable.
But in the case of software projects—and perhaps also of research projects—there is “no
silver bullet” that can slay the beast!
113
PART THREE
Grounded Theorizing
THE GERUNDS OF THE GROUNDED
THEORY METHOD
In the same way, for a chronic invalid nothing exists in a city except phar-
macies and hospitals, clinics and medical commissions pronouncing on
categories of disability. For a drunk, a city is built from half-litre bottles
of vodka… . And for someone in love, a city consists of benches in bou-
levards… of the hands of the city clock pointing towards the time of a
rendezvous.
—Vitaly Grossman (Everything Flows, p. 56)
The use of the term Grounded Theorizing in the title of this book is deliberate,
as it stresses that research is primarily a process; any methodology must take
full account of this. Glaser and Charmaz, in their own ways, have argued that
GTM-oriented researchers should aim to express their core concepts in the
form of gerunds, because these accentuate this aspect. Charmaz is keen that
the coding process is “done with gerunds,” rather than with an eye for topics
or headings or some other more structural and less action-oriented form. In
so doing she takes her lead from Glaser’s 1978 book, Theoretical Sensitivity, in
which he demonstrates how coding with gerunds helps researchers develop
explanations and conceptual models that center on actions and social pro-
cesses. Confusingly, a gerund is actually a noun form created from a verb by
adding the “-ing” suffix. This means that a gerund can be treated in the same
way as any other noun—for example, “Abstracting is a core aspect of GTM”
(the subject of a sentence), “He enjoys coding” (the object of a sentence). Even
though they are technically nouns, they are derived from verbs; so they can
suggest ideas about processes and simultaneously take on noun-like qualities
such as properties, dimensions, and so on.
In English all gerunds end with –ing, but not all words of this form are
strictly gerunds; in many cases such words are termed present participles, and
114
114 Grounded Theorizing
act as modifiers of other words.1 Like many aspects of English grammar, the
term present in this case is itself misleading because such words usually appear
in connection with other verbs which themselves can refer to past, present,
or future. The present participle in the sentence “he went swimming” actually
refers to something in the past, and is not a gerund. The gerund form is in evi-
dence in a sentence such as “he likes swimming,” as in this case “swimming”
acts as a noun—you could replace it with another noun such as doughnuts,
which would not work in the former case!2
In fact, because both gerunds and present participles evoke ideas about
actions and processes, there is no need to get too hung up on the distinc-
tion between them. Nevertheless if you refer to the gerund approach in your
research reports you ought to be able to offer a reasonable account of what
the term means and what its use implies. The key point is that the gerund
form invokes the idea of a process, which is one of the prime aims of grounded
theorizing. The first two grounded theories developed by Glaser and Strauss
each centered on different aspects of the process of “dying”—“awareness” and
“time.” Not all GTM outputs use gerunds, however, and in the examples I offer
in later chapters it is apparent that some students opted for alternative aspects
or terms in their coding, but this did not prevent them from moving their
focus to embrace actions and social processes.
Within the realm of social theory, however, the concept of action is com-
plex and controversial. Theorists like Talcott Parsons, taking his lead from
aspects of Émile Durkheim’s work, stressed the structures within which social
action takes place, exemplifying what is termed the “structural-functionalist”
approach. This was criticized by many theorists who wanted to focus on social
actors as agents. Harold Garfinkel (1967) ridiculed Parsons’s position, saying
that it characterized individuals as “cultural dopes” who lack real autonomy
and act merely in compliance with established “alternatives of action that the
common culture provides.” This tension between agency and structure con-
tinues to perplex social theorists, although at present there is something of
a consensus around what Anthony Giddens termed “structuration” (1984),
which offers a duality of agency and structure. This emanates from earlier
work such as Noam Chomsky’s concept of linguistic structures, which pro-
vide the essential generative basis for language; also from the writings of
Claude Lévi-Strauss on culture and kinship, and Zygmunt Bauman on cul-
ture as praxis (1999). Charmaz and Glaser are correct to stress the value of
the gerund form for GTM coding, with its relationship to action, but this is
not the be-all and end-all of the matter, as can be seen from Strauss’s final
book Continual Permutations of Action. Here Strauss drew on his background
in Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism, with some references to GTM.
Despite the unprepossessing title, his argument develops from an acceptance
that social interaction produces and sustains social structure, and that this
can be supported from close (grounded) observation and analysis of existing
115
Grounded Theorizing 115
social practices. In some senses this echoes Giddens’s ideas, although he is not
referred to in Strauss’s book.
Part Two of this book covers the key aspects of the historical develop-
ment of GTM (Chapter 3) and provides an overview of the method as a whole
(Chapter 4). Taken together these two chapters develop the characterization of
GTM as a method in terms of some of the components of the 5x(P+P) model I
introduced in Chapter 2; preconceptions and perceptions as well as purpose and
periphery. It is now time to turn to the details of the method in use, including
the topics of process and procedures, products and presentation, and pragmatics
and personnel—that is, dealing with such issues as “How does one get started?”
“What needs to be done?” “Who is involved?” as well as “When can research-
ers move on from data-gathering to substantive theoretical statements?” In
the chapters that comprise Part Three I have deliberately used the gerund/
participle forms for key aspects of GTM—coding, categorizing, memoing, and
so on, in order to stress that research is itself an active and social process.
In the GTM literature different authors have adopted different strate-
gies in dealing with these aspects of the method. Glaser and Strauss in their
early works (described as the trilogy: Awareness, Discovery, and Time) offered
two eloquent articulations of grounded theories—Awareness and Time—each
capped with a chapter drawing together what they considered to be the key
methodological insights and lessons. Glaser followed this with books that
dealt with key aspects of GTM, notably Theoretical Sensitivity, as well as with
extended accounts of formal grounded theories. Strauss, and later Strauss and
Corbin sought to offer expositions in the form of guidelines, with all the dan-
gers that accompany such initiatives, as I explained in Part Two.
In light of the extensive literature on GTM any discussion of the method
needs to take some account of existing sources available to students and
researchers, but with the aim of complementing and supplementing published
sources, maintaining the clear understanding that no single text or source on a
method can or should be taken as sacrosanct. Keeping this caution in mind, in
the chapters that follow I discuss the processes, procedures, and products that
are “essential” to GTM (see Chapter 4) against a backdrop of key GTM texts;
including Charmaz’s Constructing Grounded Theory (2006, 2014), Glaser’s
Theoretical Sensitivity (1978), and The Handbook of Grounded Theory (Bryant
and Charmaz, 2007a). I focus not only on the activities themselves but also on
the ways in which researchers can and should get started in their research. This
focus involves consideration of issues such as motivation and rationale. In this
regard I am deliberately taking an approach that differs from but supplements
Charmaz’s accounts.
Rather than devoting individual chapters to coding, memoing, sampling,
and saturation, I opted to begin with a discussion and clarification of termi-
nology (Chapter 5), continuing with a worked example and an exercise for
readers (Chapter 6), followed by an abbreviated example of a grounded theory
116
(Chapter 7). These form the basis for more detailed consideration of pro-
cess and procedure in the early stages of a GTM-oriented study (Chapter 8),
followed by a chapter illustrating differing strategies used by PhD students
(Chapter 9). The next three chapters in the section discuss memoing as a
form of reflective research practice (Chapter 10), later stages in coding and
abstracting (Chapter 11), and issues such as saturation and dissemination
(Chapter 12). Chapter 13 offers an extended account of the concept of abduc-
tion, until recently a relatively unfamiliar and alien term, but one that is of
central importance to GTM and that demands greater attention in the meth-
odological literature in general.
To reiterate the point made in the introduction to this book, however,
readers may decide to go first to Chapter 7, which offers an example of the use
of GTM, prior to reading Chapters 5 and 6.
Notes
1. For a very clear and concise explanation of the distinction see http://www.chomp-
chomp.com/terms/gerund.htm
2. A colleague now refers to “Bryant’s doughnut test for gerunds”; but take care, it is
not fully tested!
117
Coding
TERMINOLOGY AND CLARIFICATION
Coding is certainly a key element of the grounded theory method (GTM), the
exact form of coding lying at the heart of the method being a distinctive and
radical departure from existing forms and practices of the 1960s. The intri-
cacies of GTM coding have become an area of controversy, emanating from
Glaser’s contention that Strauss, together with Corbin, had undermined the
distinctiveness of GTM in Basics of Qualitative Research (Strauss and Corbin,
1990/1998). In the 1990s many publications reporting on GTM research made
no mention of this matter, more often than not assuming a direct and unbro-
ken line from the founding trilogy of Glaser and Strauss through to Strauss’s
solo writing and lecturing, as well as his work in conjunction with Corbin. The
authors of these publications describing GTM research gave no indication and
did not seem to be aware of the divergence between Glaser and Strauss (see
Smit and Bryant, 2000). In recent years it is clear that GTM researchers have
felt the need to refer to the matter, even if they are not able or willing to devote
the time and space to confront it in any detailed manner.
One of the aims of this chapter and the ones that follow is to provide read-
ers with a coherent account of coding such that the process itself can be clearly
understood, together with its relationship to GTM as a whole and research
practice in general. This necessitates engagement with the differing strategies
and rationales relating to coding, but with a view to demonstrating that such
differences are far better seen as alternative orientations and practices for the
consideration of researchers, rather than the basis for proprietorial and inter-
necine disputes. Certainly there are many examples of inadequate, ambigu-
ous, or tendentious GTM-type coding; but similar accusations can justifiably
be made of any other form of analytical research technique—qualitative or
quantitative—without bringing the entire method or technique into disrepute.
One of the skills that researchers need to develop is the ability to read research
reports with sufficient sensitivity and understanding that they can distinguish
117
118
between the good, the bad, and the ugly. Texts like this one ought to assist in
this regard, so that the good ones come to the fore as potential exemplars.
For GTM, there is a further complication emanating from Glaser’s attack
(Glaser, 1992) on the work of Strauss and Corbin and the various ways in
which the method has been developed and presented since that time. Some of
these issues will be discussed in the later sections of this chapter, and also in
Part Four, which offers an analysis of a range of GTM papers and the ways in
which many of them demonstrate methodological positioning.
Terminology
Before proceeding any further there needs to be some discussion and clari-
fication of the terminology used in GTM. Terms such as codes, concepts, and
categories are the most widely used, but their meanings and ramifications
are not always clear and consistent. In The Handbook of Grounded Theory we
offered the following entries in the Discursive Glossary, extracted from some
of the relevant chapters and also from the first edition of Kathy Charmaz’s
Constructing Grounded Theory.
CODES
What is a code? A code sets up a relationship with your data, and

with your respondents –S. L. Star
Codes in grounded theory are such transitional objects. They allow us

to know more about the field we study, yet carry the abstraction of the
new – S. L. Star
Codes capture patterns and themes and cluster them under an

evocative title –L. Lempert
From these extracts it can be seen that there is consensus around the idea of
codes. They are transitional in the sense that the ones defined in the early stages
of a project will almost certainly not last in the same form throughout the analy-
sis and later stages of data sampling: yet they are essential products in providing
the basis and spur to later parts of the process. They are the outcome of early
attempts at abstraction, and they serve as staging posts. In producing codes in the
early stages of a project researchers are involved in breaking down the data into
components and analyzing the resulting fragments in order to propose ways in
which some of them might be related as clusters, themes, or patterns (Figure 4.2).
CATEGORIES
From the early days of grounded theory, many users of the

method found it difficult to understand the notions “category” and
119
Coding 119
“property” and to use them in research practice, since these terms

were only vaguely defined in The Discovery of Grounded Theory –
U. Kelle (2007, p. 194)
… the crucial difference between Glaserian and Straussian category

building lies in the fact that Strauss suggests the utilization of a specified
theoretical framework based on a certain understanding of human
action, whereas Glaser emphasizes that coding is a process of combining
‘the analyst’s scholarly knowledge and his research knowledge of the
substantive field’ (Glaser 1978: 70) and has to be realized in the ongoing
coding process, which often means that it has to be conducted on the
basis of a broad theoretical background knowledge which cannot be made
fully explicit in the beginning of analysis –U. Kelle (quoted in Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007a, p. 604)
Glaser and Strauss described categories as “conceptual elements

of a theory” (1967, p. 36). Categories emerge initially from a close
engagement with data, but can achieve a higher level of abstraction
through a process of ‘constant comparison’ which allows their
theoretical elaboration and integration –I. Dey (quoted in Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007a, p. 604)
Here is a term that has become commonplace in GTM texts, but which was not
clarified in the early GTM writings. The term clearly refers to a higher level of
abstraction, above and beyond that found in initial codes; the result of theoret-
ical elaboration. In developing the idea of clusters or patterns, categories can be
thought of as containers for related data, where some properties are common
to all those within a category. For some researchers these “containers” emerge
from the data, but for others the process involved is one of active construction
resulting from detailed examination of the data at hand by the researchers. The
extracts from Udo Kelle hint at the distinctions between Glaser and Strauss/
Corbin on this topic. The idea that categories can be constructed, however, has
important ramifications that neither the Glaserian nor the Straussian positions
encompass, as explained later in this chapter.
CONCEPTS
It is through the production of concepts that the subjects of

a grounded theory study are transformed into theoretical
objects – B. Gibson
Barry Gibson complements Dey’s view of categories, so that the moves through
codes to categories and then to concepts can be seen as stages in the process of
theoretical elaboration. The transformation is carried out by the researchers as
they progress through the stages of the method. Unfortunately other writers
120
use these terms in contrasting ways, which can be confusing and perplexing—
for instance:-
We are now moving toward a more “focused coding” procedure that con-
sists of building and clarifying concepts. Focused coding employed in
grounded theory starts to examine all the data in a category by compar-
ing each segment of data with every other segment, working up to a clear
definition of each concept. Such concepts are then named and become
“codes” – S. N. Hesse-Biber
Researchers commonly use grounded theory method to generate con-
cepts, as opposed to generating theory –C. Urquhart
Here Hesse-Biber refers to concepts becoming codes, while Urquhart invokes
a distinction between researchers who produce concepts rather than theories,
implying that theorists are better and more effective GTM researchers.
From these and other examples that can be found throughout the GTM
literature, it becomes readily apparent that different authors use the same term
to mean different things, and conversely use different terms for the same thing.
In many cases the term code can be substituted for concept and vice-versa.
There is no definitive solution for this issue, which emanates in part from
Glaser and Strauss’s earliest GTM writings, where, as Kelle points out, terms
such as concept and category were used without clear and precise definitions.
Later work by Strauss, and Strauss and Corbin sought in some degree to rem-
edy this initial lack and explain how the overall process could be set against a
general framework of social action; their explicit guidelines were in part what
prompted Glaser’s criticism.
CODING
Coding: the process of defining what the data is about. Unlike

quantitative research, which applies preconceived categories or
codes to the data, a grounded theorist creates qualitative codes
by defining what he or she sees in the data. Thus, the codes are
“emergent”—they develop as the researcher studies his or her data.
The coding process may take the researcher to unforeseen areas and
research questions. Grounded theory proponents follow such leads;
they do not pursue previously designed research problems that lead
to dead-ends. (Charmaz 2006)
The most basic operations which provide the basis for category
building are “coding” and the constant comparison of data, codes and
the emerging categories –U. Kelle
Coding is the core process in classic grounded theory methodology.
It is through coding that the conceptual abstraction of data and its
reintegration as theory takes place –J. A. Holton
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Coding 121
The topic of coding forms the basis for some of the later chapters, and the pro-
cess itself is certainly one of the essences of GTM, and a major innovation and
contribution to research in general.
CATEGORIZING
Categorizing: the analytic step in grounded theory of selecting

certain codes as having overriding significance or abstracting
common themes and patterns in several codes into an analytic
concept. As the researcher categorizes, he or she raises the
conceptual level of the analysis from description to a more abstract,
theoretical level. The researcher then tries to define the properties
of the category, the conditions under which it is operative, the
conditions under which it changes, and its relation to other
categories. Grounded theorists make their most significant
theoretical categories into the concepts of their theory. (Charmaz)
This is further discussed later in this chapter in conjunction with the term
category.
CONCEPTUALIZING
The term conceptualizing is not defined in many GTM texts, including The
Handbook of Grounded Theory (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007a). Yet Strauss and
Corbin clearly noticed its relevance and argued that it was the “first step in the-
ory building” (1998, p. 103), a form of abstracting. This implies that it comes
into force in the middle and later stages of GTM-oriented research, after some
form of preliminary or open coding of initial data has been performed.
CODES, CATEGORIES, CONCEPTS: A HIERARCHY
In The Handbook of Grounded Theory Kathy Charmaz and I argued that one
way of clarifying these terms was to see them as a hierarchy in the general pro-
cess of abstracting, moving from codes at the lowest level through categories,
and then on to concepts. Similarly, in terms of the processes involved, coding
is followed by categorizing, and conceptualizing; although there will be over-
lapping and iterations around these. In the glossary for the second edition of
her book Constructing Grounded Theory (2014), Charmaz articulates this in
the entry for “concepts:”
Concepts are abstract ideas that account for the data and have specifiable
properties and boundaries. Grounded theorists construct fresh concepts
from inductive data and check and develop them through abduction… .
Although most scholars view theories as demonstrating relationships
122
between concepts, many grounded theorists focus on developing one

concept. (p. 342)
Here Charmaz seems to equate a concept with a category, echoing the sense
that Glaser uses in arguing that a grounded theory should center on a single
core category that can be characterized in terms of its properties and relation-
ships to other non-central concepts. The relationship between “inductive data”
and “abduction” is clarified in Chapter 13.
Taken together, these various terms refer to some of the key products
developed in using GTM, and also to some of the key processes. The hierar-
chy of codes, concepts, and categories is one way of explaining the relation-
ship between the different products and processes, but other authors have
used alternatives. The main point is to strive for consistency and coherence,
although even the most meticulous writer can be found to have erred, using
the same term in different ways, or using different terms synonymously.
Writing clearly and persuasively is always difficult, and in this field the dif-
ficulty is exacerbated, given the various and contending views of GTM, many
of which make precise—even idiosyncratic—use of common terms. Table 5.1
summarizes the foregoing discussion on terminology, and readers can benefit
from referring back to Figure 4.2, which locates these three aspects on the
spiral model.
It is important that researchers understand that all these process and
products are related through the generic process of abstracting. This activity
starts from engagement with the research topic itself, and is driven by the aim
of eliciting a series of detailed accounts from “the data,” including such ele-
ments as actors’ narratives, responses to questions, and documents, among
others. Subsequent stages involve moving beyond these details toward a model
centring on a small number of core terms that capture certain key features—
for example awareness, or supernormalizing.1 In some cases this development
will emanate from a single term: the core concept. The process as a whole
will involve analysis of actors’ narratives and other data, from which certain
characteristics and concepts will be derived, and these will be assembled into a
model or theory. This product should do far more than reiterate the accounts
and data themselves. That is what Glaser and Strauss, Strauss and Corbin,
Glaser, Charmaz, and others mean by their respective admonitions to “move
beyond the data,” avoid simple re-description, and so on.
Later chapters in this book offer examples of coding, as well as exercises
for the reader. Chapter 8, for example, takes up the issue of how researchers get
started on their coding in the first place. At this point, however, it is important
to understand the way in which Glaser and Strauss offered a radically innova-
tive approach to coding in their early work.
Prior to the emergence of GTM, coding was a process performed before
the start of data collection. The composition of and relationship between the
123
Coding 123
TABLE 5.1
Summary of terminology
Codes Relationships
Transitional
Abstraction
Familiar/new
Patterns, themes, clusters
Categories Categories and properties—ambiguities
“Conceptual elements of a theory”
Higher levels of abstraction
“Containers” for data
Concepts Outcome of focused coding
Transformation into “theoretical objects”
“Account for the data”
Coding Innovative approach in GTM
Key feature across the method and later taken
up and adapted in other, related approaches
Categorizing Selecting codes
Raising codes to higher levels of abstraction
Conceptualizing “First step in theory building”
codes was determined usually as a result of derivation of hypotheses from

existing theories. Coding took the form of collecting data against previously
prepared coding grids like the one in Figure 5.1. In many cases the application
of such codes was undertaken in order to verify the theory from which the
codes were derived; hence Glaser and Strauss’s characterization of the pre-
dominant trend in US social research at the time as “verificationist.” For the
most part this form of research relied on coding approaches to data gathering
that required the data to be in a quantitative format, amenable to statistical
analysis.
In one of the most notable large-scale studies of the time, the Marienthal
study (Jahoda, et al, 1932), Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues used a range of
different methods as part of their sociographic study of that Austrian village
near Vienna, including surveys, statistical analyses, participant observation,
and action research. The research team, 15 in all, took part in the activities
of the local community, aiming to be active participants rather than neu-
tral observers. Marie Jahoda (Lazarsfeld’s wife at the time) even returned to
Marienthal years later to assist in various self-help and community projects.
The report was notable for its narrative style and innovative ways of integrat-
ing data from different sources and in different formats, although it relied pre-
dominantly on quantitative data and associated forms of analysis. Lazarsfeld
later felt that this reliance was misplaced or over-played, at the expense of the
data itself. Following his settling in America, and by the time he was teaching
at Columbia in the late 1930s, Lazarsfeld had become the doyen of social sci-
ence research, and he is now regarded as one of the founders of empirical soci-
ology and mathematical sociology. His textbooks achieved canonical status,
124
During the past month, how troublesome have each of the following symptoms been?
(Please mark the appropriate box on each row for each area that you have pain)
No pain Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely

experienced troublesome troublesome troublesome troublesome troublesome
Head ache
Neck pain
Shoulder
pain
Elbow pain
Wrist/hand
pain
Chest pain
Abdominal
pain
Upper back
pain
Lower back
pain
Hip/thigh
pain
Knee pain
Ankle/foot
pain
Other pains
FIGURE 5.1 A typical coding grid to be used as the basis for data gathering, in this case for
research into pain management.
Source: Measuring troublesomeness of chronic pain by location Suzanne Parsons et al. HYPERLINK Creative
commons licence http://bmcmusculoskeletdisord.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2474-7-34.
many of them first published in the 1950s, but still in print or in revised format
into the late 1990s.
While working toward his PhD at Columbia, Glaser was influenced by
Lazarsfeld, and Glaser credits Lazarsfeld with many insights into method-
ological issues in his account of this time (Glaser, 2008). Lazarsfeld, how-
ever, did not develop these ideas, and perhaps he never understood the full
ramifications of some of his proposals. In any case it was Glaser and Strauss
who moved on from traditional or classic research studies to introduce a new
approach that was inimical both to the grand theorists and to the standard
methods of conducting social research.
One way of contrasting the differences between the coding strategies of
projects such as the Marienthal study and GTM can be illustrated in a series
of diagrams. Research based on preconceived categories can be represented by
a form of Venn diagram2 in which the different circles are labeled and known,
and the hypotheses relate to the area that intersects with both circles. In the
example given in Figure 5.2, this concerns the possible relationship between
125
Coding 125
University Degree Social Class

Social Class C2DE
ABC1
X X1 X3
X X2 X
X X
X
X
X1 & X2 are from ABC1 and have a degree

X3 is from C2DE and has a degree
None of the others has a degree
FIGURE 5.2 A Venn diagram showing the intersections of circles representing the relationship
between social class and attainment of university level education.
social class and attainment of university-level education. The categories are

already defined; social class can be either ABC1 (i.e., classes A, B, and C1)
or C2DE, and the other aspect refers to those who have attained a univer-
sity degree. By definition, no one can be in more than one social class, but
across the sample under investigation not all will have a university degree.
The research will therefore collect data according to these properties, and the
analysis might consist of a test to confirm whether or not there is a statisti-
cal correlation between class and university education. For the purposes of
such a study, other aspects of the sample will be ignored. Of course, this is a
highly simplified example, but it will serve to highlight one of the key innova-
tive aspects of GTM.
For GTM, research begins not with predefined categories but with an ini-
tial idea that some constrained aspect of social activity is likely to prove to be
an interesting topic of study. So at best there is a tentative idea of a boundary
for the initial stage; an organization, a group of people recovering from an ill-
ness or misfortune, a group of professional practitioners, or such like. Initially
data will be drawn from this source, perhaps by a process of interviewing peo-
ple connected with it in some manner; a purposive sample. Data may also be
derived from other sources, instead of or in addition to interviews. This initial
data will be subject to coding, and analysis of these codes will provide the basis
for establishing initial categories. In some cases the result of this initial stage
may be a redefinition of the boundary and nature of the research itself. These
initial categories can be represented diagrammatically in a fashion similar to
that for the earlier example (Figure 5.2), but their basis is entirely different;
they are derived as a result of the initial data gathering and coding, not from
existing hypotheses or theories.
126
The process of constant comparison can be seen as in effect populating

the sectors or, more formally, the sets of the Venn diagram. But whereas the
decision on populating the sets in the earlier example was based on fairly
unambiguous properties—social class, ABC1 or C2DE; university degree, Yes
or No—for GTM coding, the process relies heavily on the theoretical sensitiv-
ity of the researcher(s). This is illustrated in the chapters that follow, includ-
ing discussion of a published paper on GTM (Chapter 6), a brief example
(Chapter 7), and also some more extended accounts drawn from PhD students
(Chapters 8–12). For now, the diagrams illustrate the general principles.
Figures 5.3 represent an attempt to illustrate some key aspects of the GTM
research process using similar diagrams. Figure 5.3 illustrates the stage of ini-
tial categorizing based on the first stage of coding, usually termed open coding,
as it is based on an open approach to the study. In Figure 5.3 the context is
shown as a shape with a dotted outline to indicate that at the start this is indis-
tinct and may change shape and size once the research is underway. Purposive
sampling will produce initial data represented by the X’s in the diagram. Once
a researcher has undertaken initial coding, the result might be represented
by Figure 5.4, with some outline groupings being constructed. This leads on
to the stage of grouping the data in initial codes, perhaps described in terms
of themes or patterns derived by researchers from the data—Figures 5.4–5.6
indicate the ways in which different researchers might begin to group the same
data. The discrepancies have been exaggerated for effect—a more likely and less
dramatic outcome is given in Figure 5.7 for three researchers producing results
that differ but with a considerable degree of commonality. The process thus far
has been exemplified by moving from a Venn diagram with a single, perhaps
ill-defined boundary toward identification of themes or clusters around the
data. Not all this data will be enclosed by the clusters or tentative categories.
Also, one or more categories may at this point be set to one side in favor of one
or more of the others—see Figure 5.10. It may be that the researchers do not
feel convinced that these first efforts can be substantiated across their data, in
Scope only tentatively

defined at this stage
Initial context
linked to purposive sample
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
FIGURE 5.3 GTM Research – initial stage

127
Coding 127
Initial context
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
FIGURE 5.4 GTM Research – initial stage Coding by GTM Researcher 1
which case they will continue with further data gathering and open coding
until they have the confidence to move on. Assuming that they do make this
move, they will use these codes to direct the next stage of investigation, which
will no longer be “open,” but directed by these initial codes; in GTM this is
termed theoretical sampling (see Chapter 12; also Charmaz, 2014).
Figure 5.8 illustrates the result of the move from codes to categories;
essentially grouping codes into a smaller number of sections in the diagram,
although some distinctions within these groupings may still be retained.
Further sampling and analysis may be carried out, as shown in Figure 5.9,
but if the result only adds further examples to the existing categories, then
this provides a basis for claiming that the categories are well-established—
that is, further data will not lead to the identification of additional categories.
Figure 5.10 illustrates the situation where two categories have been identified,
and the researchers have opted to focus on one of them, perhaps leaving the
other one for a later study, much as Glaser and Strauss focused initially on
Awareness, later moving on to develop the concept of Time.
At this point researchers have to go beyond the data, and offer concep-
tualizations that account for the categories and the relationships between
Initial context
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X

128
Initial context
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
them—Figure 5.10—and from there to aim to achieve theoretical satura-

tion, at which point sampling to test the categories themselves continues
until no further aspects of the categories or the relationships between them
are evoked—Figure 5.11. This then is a basis for articulation of a substantive
grounded theory, validation of which derives from the context from which the
theory has been drawn—Figure 5.12.
The core category can now be understood as a concept that ties together
the more detailed levels of codes and categories. This stage involves theoretical
coding, which is crucial to GTM and is often the step that is missing or under-
developed in published accounts of GTM research.
In their chapter in The Handbook of Qualitative Research, Strauss and
Corbin criticized GTM research that failed to incorporate “theoretical cod-
ing,” indicating that the phenomenon of GTM as a research method that was
purely and simply oriented about low-level coding was already apparent in the
early 1990s. Charges of this sort, however, need to be treated with some cau-
tion, as Glaser and others now claiming the mantle of “classic GTM” accuse
Strauss and Corbin of omitting precisely this aspect of the method in their
own writings. For example, Cheri Ann Hernandez (2009) argues: “[T]‌he iden-
tification of theoretical codes is essential to development of an integrated and
Initial context
X X X
X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X X X
X
X
FIGURE 5.7 GTM Research – initial stage 3 Researchers A, B, J

129
Initial categories
X
X X X
X X
X
X
X X
X
X X
X
FIGURE 5.8 GTM Research – later stage. Focused Coding – firmer idea of context and boundary
Initial categories
X
X X X
X Y Y X
X Y
Y
X Y
X X
Y X
X X
X
‘Y’s represent later results

after theoretical sampling
FIGURE 5.9 GTM Research. Theoretical Sampling
Focus of further conceptualization

-the arrows and shapes indicate
concepts in the developing theory Category/concept set aside at
–hence the dotted outlines this stage
FIGURE 5.10 Theorizing – Categories and Relationships

130
The ‘Z’s represent the outcomes of

further sampling to investigate and
establish properties of and
relationships between categories
Z
Z
FIGURE 5.11 Theoretical Saturation
explanatory substantive theory when a researcher is using classic grounded

theory research methodology, but it is not a part of Straussian qualitative data
analysis as described by Strauss and Corbin” (emphasis added).
In Theoretical Sensitivity Glaser distinguished between substantive and
theoretical codes as follows:. “Substantive codes conceptualize the empirical
substance of the area of research. Theoretical codes conceptualize how the
substantive codes may relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated into
the theory” (Glaser, 1978, p. 55). Substantive codes arise from “fracturing”
the data, and theoretical codes reintegrate these components, weaving “the
fractured story back together again” (Glaser, 1978, p. 72) to form “an orga-
nized whole theory” (Glaser, 1998, p. 163). As I pointed out in Chapter 3,
The arrows and the different shapes

represent the concepts that provide the
explanatory power of the SGT
Validation of the SGT with
regards to the context from
which it has been derived–
in terms of fit, grab,
usefulness.
Z
Z
FIGURE 5.12 GTM Development of Substantive Grounded Theory

131
Coding 131
Theoretical Sensitivity was lauded by Strauss, who incorporated large sections

verbatim into Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, which itself provided
the basis for Basics of Qualitative Research. Yet it was only the latter that pro-
voked Glaser’s ire. The distinction between substantive and theoretical codes
derives from Glaser and Strauss’s early joint GTM texts, and it was developed
in Glaser’s account in Theoretical Sensitivity. Strauss and Corbin lamented the
failure of researchers claiming use of GTM to incorporate theoretical coding,
but Hernandez is correct to note that in their Basics of Qualitative Research the
term is missing. In fact, Strauss and Corbin share with Glaser the suspicion of
those who claim use of GTM but fail to move from the fracturing that results
in “substantive” coding to the articulation of more integrative conceptualiza-
tions ones. They differ, however, in their formulations of the ways to move for-
ward to articulation of genuinely grounded theories. Strauss and Corbin see
the move from initial codes to later categories and concepts as facilitated by
their coding paradigm, whereas, for Glaser, this forces the process and under-
mines the open-ended and flexible character of GTM; instead he offers what
he calls his coding families.
The path to theoretical coding is fraught with difficulties—again one of
those aspects of GTM that has been termed “simple and straightforward” but
that is in fact complex and demanding. This is not to say that theoretical coding
can only be successfully carried out by researchers with some level of expertise
and experience in using GTM. On the contrary. Glaser and Strauss’s advocacy
of GTM as a method for all researchers, and especially for those in the early
stages of research careers, must certainly apply. Researchers can only develop
their theoretical sensitivity by using the method and seeking to develop their
skills of abstraction and conceptualization in significant studies, moving from
the novice level to higher levels of competency along the lines shown in the
Dreyfus model, which is discussed in Chapter 13. Using GTM facilitates and
encourages the generation of substantive theories along the lines articulated
by Glaser and Strauss, both for experienced and less experienced researchers.
If some of these aspects are perplexing, readers can be reassured to know
that all of them will be covered in the remaining chapters in Part Three, and
reiterated in Part Four.
The key innovation with coding in GTM is that it begins only after the
initial phase of data gathering; the codes are derived from the data rather than
being set up and used to direct the data gathering itself. In many cases the data
is in the form of partial or verbatim transcripts of open-ended interviews, but
there is no reason why data gathering should not also be done from docu-
ments or other sources. Developing research in this manner is seen by many
investigators as akin to a leap in the dark as there seems to be no clear under-
standing of what data to collect, and from whom or from what: Setting up the
codes prior to data collection will guide the researcher on both counts—the
data to be collected and the likely sources. Glaser and Strauss wished to offer
132
an alternative to any form of research that began with clearly articulated ques-
tions, aims, or directives, as they were keen to encourage researchers to go their
own way, eschewing existing theories and other forms of research templates,
including prepared coding grids. The best way to develop an understanding of
GTM is to look at some examples of the approach and to try it out—which is
what Chapters 6 and 7 offer.
Key Points
¤ Coding with gerunds—the distinction between the present participle

and a gerund; the doughnut test
¤ Codes, categories, concepts
¤ Coding, categorizing, conceptualizing
¤ GTM coding—key innovation
¤ Sampling
Notes
1. This was the core concept in the theory developed by Kathy Charmaz for her PhD
thesis. Glaser refers to it in an article in 2014, although without mentioning Charmaz.
http://groundedtheoryreview.com/2014/06/22/applying-grounded-theory/
2. http://www.mathsisfun.com/sets/venn-diagrams.html—for a vivid explanation of
sets and Venn diagrams
133
An Example of Coding and a Coding Exercise
The outcome of the early coding stages of a grounded theory method (GTM)
research project may not appear to be a model in the usual sense of the term,
but it will certainly be an abstraction or series of abstractions, reflecting the
focus of the researcher(s) concerned and the interaction between researcher(s)
and the context under investigation. The value of such a product can only be
judged in terms of the ways it provides an interim foundation for later concep-
tual development and refinement.1
To begin to illustrate some of these issues, an example taken from a clear
and cogent paper on GTM (Giske and Artinian, 2007) is presented in Table 6.1.
The text on the left-hand side is taken verbatim from some of the authors’
interviews, the comments on the right-hand side are their initial codes.
Notice how verbatim extracts on the left-hand side are compressed into six
brief notes on the right-hand side. Some of these are abbreviations of the rel-
evant section of the extract, some echo the terms and phrasing of the extract,
and others use different terms altogether. This demonstrates the process of
abstraction involved in the initial coding, essentially producing a focused and
constrained series of statements that encapsulate what have been selected as
key features in the actors’ accounts. Different researchers may well produce
differing sets of codes; indeed, across any meaningful subset of data it is highly
unlikely that any two researchers would produce identical sets of codes, even
allowing for slight differences in phrasing and terminology.2
The title of the paper from which this material is taken includes the phrase
“Working with Classical Grounded Theory,” invoking Barney Glaser’s writings in
the wake of his critique of Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin in the 1990s. I term
this methodological positioning in my analysis of GTM papers in Chapter 14. As
noted in earlier chapters, it will become clear in this chapter and beyond that
I have severe misgivings regarding Glaser’s accounts of GTM in many respects,
including his characterization of the lineage of the method. But I am also keen
to stress that, with regard to any individual example of GTM-oriented research,
it is far more important to judge the outcomes in terms of their usefulness as 133
134
TABLE 6.1
A coding example based on material extracted from an article by Tove Giske and Barbara
Artinian titled A Personal Experience of Working with Classical Grounded Theory: From
Beginner to Experienced Grounded Theorist3
Data Open coding
Sometimes you think about the worst, you know, but they have Thinks about the worst
informed me that they have taken so many tests; I have Uncertain despite many
been to gynaecological examination, they have taken lots samples and no findings
of blood samples, and my liver is OK, and they find nothing. Smoulders
But even though it lies there smouldering. (Interview 3)
It is important for me to get to know, to be able to move on, Wants to know to move on
either with treatment, that I am well, or that I have to live Can live with it if he knows why
with this. If they can tell me; Ok, this is nothing dangerous,
you can come to controls, so can I manage to live with
the pain. But I have to know the reason why it is so.
(Interview 9)
I read a book I brought and I listen to music to possess Try to think of other things
another world while I am here. I need to overcome a
threshold to get rid of what my head is full of.
Note: TRACTS are taken from several patients—some male some female
working concepts, rather than in terms of some conception of “methodological

purity” or adherence to one form of GTM rather than another.
In much of the GTM literature it is implied that a lone researcher carries
out the coding across the entire research project, but of course even in the
original studies this was not the case. Glaser and Strauss, together with Quint,
must have performed the coding across the data as a team, although the mono-
graphs that form the canonical trilogy of their early GTM works—Awareness,
Discovery, and Time—give little or no clue regarding the details of this process.
Did Glaser and Strauss do all the coding in concert, studying the notes and
extracts together? Or did each one peruse the same extract individually, later
bringing their respective accounts together for a further stage of comparison,
discussion, and resolution?4 A close reading of Awareness and Time fails to offer
much clarification, given that most of the text uses the passive voice, thereby
evading the issue of using the first or third person. Discovery uses the term
“the researcher” (singular) throughout, although at one point (pp. 107–108)
the following point is made:-
If one is working on a research team, it is also a good idea to discuss theo-
retical notions with one or more teammates. Teammates can help bring
out the points missed, add points they have run across in their coding and
data collection… . (emphasis added)
Given that the initial GTM studies were carried out by three people, this per-
haps indicates that they did code separately,5 and they may even have collected
data on their own. What is surprising is that, apart from this brief paragraph, no
further mention is made in their trilogy of the issue with regard to the method.
135
An Example of Coding and a Coding Exercise 135
This is not meant as a criticism of these early works; rather I seek to bring
to readers’ attention the point that coding should not be thought of as a solo
activity in the research process. In fact, the default position ought to be that
the coding process will involve more than one researcher, although the ways in
which this is implemented will vary. For instance, it may be that at the begin-
ning of the study the same data is coded by more than one researcher, each
doing this on his or her own only later coming together for discussion and
further analysis. Another possibility is that the coding may be done in con-
cert from the outset. Carolyn Wiener’s chapter in The Handbook of Grounded
Theory addresses “Making Teams Work in Conducting Grounded Theory,”
and refers to a GTM-oriented project carried out in the 1970s by a team of
four researchers led by Strauss.
If coding can be seen in this manner it also has ramifications for other
aspects of the method. Glaser has not really taken this up in his writings, and
in fact he continues to imply that the work is usually carried out by a lone
researcher. His recent work on memos for instance (Glaser, 2013) states: “[I]‌t is
normative for no one to read another persons (sic) memos. I have never known
someone to ask another person to read his memos or someone to ask another
person to read his memos. Thus memos can take any form. They are norma-
tively and automatically private.” This may be the case for some early, highly
informal memos, but surely he and Strauss must have exchanged memos and
discussed and even composed others in concert in their work on awareness and
time? Wiener certainly refers to memos from Strauss and the other members
of the team with the implication that exchanging memos with colleagues and
using them as the basis for conceptual development was taken for granted.
The topic of memos is discussed further in Chapter 10, but for now read-
ers need to note that GTM and other methods texts that assume research is
carried out by a single person can be misleading and fail to engage with key
aspects of doing research. Doctoral research is usually carried out and evalu-
ated on an individual basis, but even for PhD candidates there are processes of
review and discussion involved. Also, PhD students will usually be expected
to present their findings at various stages of their research to their supervi-
sors and other advisors for comment. If this is not an expectation for all par-
ties involved then something is surely amiss with regard to the relationship
between student and mentor. In some cases this can prove problematic if
the academics themselves are not conversant with GTM—or in some cases
have some antipathy toward the method (see Part Four, where such issues are
discussed). It should be the responsibility of academics supporting student
endeavors to ensure that there are numerous and appropriate opportunities for
students to present their work for review. Glaser and Strauss clearly did this for
the initial Doctoral Program at the University of California at San Francisco
(UCSF), and each individually continued to do so when they went their sepa-
rate ways. Glaser continues to offer seminars for GTM researchers, where each
136
attendee is given the opportunity to present ideas for discussion and exchange
memos, and it is important that PhD researchers using GTM understand the
importance of such activities. Given the widespread and growing use of GTM
among researchers, particularly at the doctoral level, and the concomitant use
of coding as a component of other methods,6 coding seminars or workshops
need to be on offer together with strong encouragement for researchers to
avail themselves of these opportunities both as observers and as participants.
It must be stressed, however, that the relationship between PhD student
and advisor/supervisor is not the same as that between colleagues on a joint
research team. In the latter case, sharing ideas and discussions are a key aspect
of the work. In the former case care must be taken by the advisor/supervisor
not to intervene as an active researcher but remain in an advisory role—
supporting and mentoring their students in their research but not actively
guiding them.
This collaborative or mentored aspect of the method is in evidence in the
paper that is the subject of Table 6.1, the title of which refers to “A Personal
Experience.” The paper has two authors, one based in Norway and the other in
the United States, but their respective roles are clarified when the report states
that the work was carried out in Norway, with the interviews undertaken by the
Norwegian-based author working under the supervision of the US-based one.
The paper is phrased very carefully, with distinct uses of the first-person—I and
my—and the third-person—we. It provides an excellent example of clarifying
GTM in use. The paper is not concerned primarily with the research findings as
such, but rather with how GTM was implemented. “Our aim is to illustrate the
thinking and working processes involved in generating a substantive grounded
theory by making explicit a seemingly chaotic process” (emphasis added).
These initial codes can be thought of as ways in which the researcher has
sought to highlight some key aspects of the “data.” For those writing from a
basis in Glaser’s view of GTM, this is seen and described in terms of the ini-
tial stages in the process of emergence. But the use of a phrase such as “the
theory emerges from the data” is problematic, because it obliterates the active
roles of the researcher(s). Different researchers may well look at the same data
and produce a range of codes; some may well be common to several or all
co-researchers, others may only have been developed by one researcher. This is
grist to the mill for those working within a constructivist orientation; different
people will construct or develop codes as the result of complex interactions
between themselves and the “data.” The example in this chapter is the work of
more than one researcher, and it seems to have come about in its published
form only after discussion and revision between the research team.
The only way of beginning to understand the process of coding is to try
it out. So to demonstrate the initial stages readers are invited to look at the
brief extract—Table 6.2—from an article published in the UK newspaper The
Guardian in late March 2012. The column on the right-hand side has been
137
TABLE 6.2
Coding exercise (extract); details of the full article are given as Doctorow (2012)
Data Open coding exercise
Many big firms use “lawful interception” appliances that monitor Try to produce some open
all employee communications, including logins to banks, codes in a manner similar
health providers, family members, and other personal sites. to that for the extract from
Even firms that don’t require self-signed certificates in their Giske et al. in Table 6.1—do
employees’ computers may use keyloggers, screenloggers, this before you turn to the
and other spying tools to watch what you do and capture coding exercise in Table 6.3.
your passwords. If your employer, school or institution gets
to control the software on your computer, you can’t know that
it’s not snooping on you at all times. Just ask the kids in the
Lower Merion School District, whose school-issued laptops
were loaded with software that let school administrators
covertly watch students at home and at school through the
computers’ webcams.
left blank, so in a manner similar to that shown in Table 6.1, readers can try
to come up with some initial codes of their own and write them in that space.
Now if readers look at Table 6.3, they will see the codes that I developed on
the basis of my reading of the “data.” Some of the codes readers produce may
be similar to mine; others may well be different. Investigators’ ideas will depend
not only on the extract itself, but also a host of other factors such as their expe-
riences, interests, and ways of understanding and interpreting the extract itself.
If readers had done this as a group exercise, they would probably have found
a wide range of “codes” from the combined efforts of the group, and if pushed
to arrive at some consensual view, one or another participant may well have
found him or herself embroiled in animated and extensive discussions with the
TABLE 6.3
Coding exercise—outline example
Data Open Coding
Many big firms use “lawful interception” Use of IT by companies/employers

appliances that monitor all employee
communications, including logins to banks, Interception and monitoring
health providers, family members, and other
personal sites. Even firms that don’t require Employees communicating practices
self-signed certificates in their employees’
computers may use keyloggers,
screenloggers, and other spying tools to Recording and capturing
watch what you do and capture your
passwords. If your employer, school or
institution gets to control the software on Control of software/computer hardware
your computer, you can’t know that it’s not
snooping on you at all times. Just ask the
kids in the Lower Merion School District, Snooping and watching
whose school-issued laptops were loaded
with software that let school administrators
covertly watch students at home and at
school through the computers’ webcams.
138
other participants. If someone asserted that codes “emerge” from the data, there
would be justifiable grounds to challenge this claim, since people would have
expended a good deal of conceptual energy in arriving at these abstractions;
activities that are obscured if the term emerge is used to describe the process.
Examples and exercises like this one are useful ways of illustrating cod-
ing, but in a real research project, data would not occur in this isolated form.
So it might be that the extract in Table 6.2 was one of five articles taken from
different newspapers or Web sites covering the same topic on the same day.
Alternatively, the extract might be one of 10 articles taken from the same
source over a series of dates. In each case the codes identified in the first
instance may be broadly similar, but the later ones, based on codes derived
from the wider sample, will differ. Responses to the question “what is hap-
pening here?” will be different in each case. So, for the analysis of different
sources reporting the same story contextualizing the article might note that
this source, unlike others, takes a stance concerned with citizens’ privacy and
rights, drawing attention to the use of scare quotes around terms such as “law-
ful interception.” This may lead to posing further questions of the data such as
“Who is in control here?” or “What prompted the writing or publication of
this article?” This takes us well beyond the brief extract, but illustrates the ways
in which coding across a wider set of data opens the way for further issues and
codes to be identified and developed in subsequent stages of the research itself.
It must be stressed that the outcome of all coding activities has to be judged
in terms of the usefulness of the abstractions that result, rather than any crite-
ria of “correctness.” There is no right or wrong set of codes to be derived from
this initial process; only codes that might prove to be useful in developing an
explanation, a model, a theory of some aspect of social interaction. Glaser and
Strauss exemplified this in their early work, with their first extended GTM
publication focusing on “awareness” and their subsequent one, based on the
same data, focusing on “time.”
In the examples used in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 the data has been presented in
textual form; a verbatim extract in the first case, and an extract from a news-
paper article in the second. But although the word data derives from the plural
form of the Latin word datum, meaning something that is given or presented,
what counts as data in any research endeavor is far from given or presented.
For Giske and Artinian the data took the form of extracts from interviews
performed early in a research project designed by Giske for her doctoral study
centered on “an interest in learning more about how patients existentially
experienced uncertainty and life-threatening situations.”
I have used the extract for the second coding example in several workshops
and presentations in recent years, having selected it after scanning the online edi-
tion of the newspaper looking for a suitable example for a group of students. So in
each case there was a purpose in the selection of the data or the source for the data.
In the first case there is also the question of getting the data into a form ready for
139
analysis. The authors describe this in some detail, pointing out that the interviews
took place face-to-face and were then transcribed—so this was probably done solo
by Giske. Coding was based on analysis of the transcriptions. Although interviews
are regarded as the default source for data in many qualitative methods, and par-
ticularly so in GTM, it may be that other sources play at least an equally important
role. Thus data may be in the form of Web sites, documents, published research,
and so on. Kathy Charmaz (2014) offers a succinct but informative account of
what is involved in “gathering rich data” and covers sources such as ethnographic
studies, various forms of document, and observation.
If you attempted the coding exercise I hope you found that the process was
far less daunting than you might have thought. Also, this may have led you to
try some initial coding on other data sources, perhaps those related to your
own research interests and ideas. If you did one or the other, or both, this may
have led you to wonder about a number of other coding issues such as these:
¤ How do I get started?
¤ What counts as data, and what about selection and preparation
of data?
¤ How are the results of coding presented and recorded?
¤ How do I move on from the initial stages?
These will all be taken up in later chapters in Part Three.
Key Points
¤ Move from verbatim extracts to initial codes

¤ Importance of trying to code from data
Exercise
1. Note down your responses to the four questions given above; revisit
them as you read the chapters that follow.
Notes
1. Part of this chapter is based on sections from my chapter in The Oxford Handbook of
Qualitative Research (Bryant, 2014).
2. When I showed the extract to a colleague he underlined the following terms—
blood, liver, shoulder, pain, danger, with a code centered on distinguishing between self
and symptoms/ailments/physicality.
3. Tove Giske, Bergen Deaconess University College Bergen, Norway, Barbara Artinian
School of Nursing Azusa Pacific University Azusa, California © 2007 Giske et al. This is
140
an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
4. As indicated in Figure 5.7.
5. Stern has accused Glaser and Strauss of “treating her [Quint’s] data as their own.”
6. See Frederick Wertz et al. (2011) for a comparison of coding in five different
methods—Phenomenological Psychology, Grounded Theory, Discourse Analysis, Narrative
Research, and Intuitive Inquiry.
141
An Abbreviated Example
RESEARCH PITCHING
The previous chapter ended with a series of questions regarding the process of
starting and moving forward with a grounded theory method (GTM) study.
In order to illustrate some of these features, this chapter focuses on a highly
condensed example of GTM modeling and conceptualizing.
In 2013 I took part in a seminar for a group of PhD students. During the
course of the two days each student was required to present an account of his
or her work. Some of the students were nearing completion and submission of
their respective theses, others were at the early stages of their research. One or
two were using GTM, but most were not. I treated the 15 presentations as my
data, and took notes during each of the presentations, which typically lasted
around 15 minutes and was supported by a few slides to illustrate the work.
After the presentations had been completed I reread my notes and analyzed
them to arrive at what I termed “some grounded thoughts” on the exercise as a
whole. I did not record the sessions and so had no access to verbatim accounts,
and had to rely purely on my response to the presentations themselves. In
effect I was coding as I went along. As I worked through my notes I underlined
certain points or terms, grouped common terms together, and labeled them.
Eventually I arrived at a highly provisional outcome, but one firmly grounded
in the data—that is, my notes on the presentations themselves. This was an
iterative process, using a limited data resource; the resource itself being a sam-
ple of self-selecting students who had chosen to attend the seminar.
On the basis of this process I arrived at the core category of Research
Pitching based on my analysis of the notes taken during the presentations, hav-
ing derived the following codes:-
¤ “My PhD”—This was a recurrent term, in many cases presenters
used this exact phrase. In GTM this is termed an in vivo code,
that is, one using the exact words employed by one or more
respondents. I labeled this code as indicating “ownership” and 141
142
“responsibility,” also highlighting the importance of each student’s

personal motivation for undertaking the research.
¤ Narrating—All the presenters referred to the ways in which some
aspect(s) of their background or experience was important, leading
to their choice of research ideas. In many cases the presenter
employed the metaphor of a journey or story. This also led to
metaphors of growing, uncovering, and so on.
¤ Hiding in full view: exposing/concealing—Some of the
presentations centered on the big picture of the research topic;
others focused on quite detailed aspects. The code I derived to
cover this variation indicated that any presentation will inevitably
stress some aspects at the expense of others, but that in so doing it
often results, paradoxically, in attention being drawn to some of the
omitted aspects, thus ignoring or downplaying those that actually
were presented. This phenomenon was in evidence in the responses
elicited from other participants during ensuing discussions. The
result was that some participants felt that the responses to their
presentations focused on things that had not been covered while
ignoring issues that had been raised specifically.
¤ Immersion—Many of the presentations included reference to the
extent to which the research issues, problems, or questions were
part of the researcher’s immersion and involvement in his or her
field or profession. This also led to the next characteristic.
¤ Relevance—Presenters were at pains to stress that their research
was not “academic” in the sense of being of little or no “practical
relevance; of only theoretical interest” [Oxford English Dictionary],
but on the contrary was likely to be relevant and useful.1
¤ Modeling—This could have been a core category in itself, with
some presenters indicating a disdain for models and theories
(especially those found in the literature), and others went to some
lengths to explain the value and use of such models or frameworks
in their research. There were even a couple of presentations that
paradoxically did both. I also noted that many of the presentations
indicated or actually demonstrated that the outcome of the work
would in fact be a framework or model—hence the scale of
reference-disdain associated with this aspect.
¤ (De-)Sensitizing—Again, this could have been a core category, and
refers to the ways in which terms and concepts were incorporated
into the presentations. The phrase “Sensitizing Concept” was
used by one presenter. In Chapter 3 I refer to the term and the
important role it played in the work of Herbert Blumer, who was
a colleague of and influence on Anselm Strauss at the University
of Chicago. For Blumer, sensitizing concepts, as distinct from
143
An Abbreviated Example 143
definitive concepts, give a general sense of guidance and reference,

and are suggestive rather than prescriptive. Concepts such as
“culture” or “governance”—both of which featured in some of
the presentations—are paradigm examples. As the presentations
developed I felt that there was an obverse side to this idea of
“sensitizing”—that is, de-sensitizing—whereby terms and concepts
are introduced using something akin to the very skilful sleight-of-
hand of an adept conjuror, as if reference to such terms had some
magical or mystical explanatory power without recourse to any
further explanation or analysis.2 Thus terms such as change and
management were used as key aspects of the research itself, but
without any further comment or analysis. In this sense they might
be seen to de-sensitize or deflect concerns. This might be justifiable
in some contexts, but researchers need to take care that they are
engaging with the critical literature relevant to their chosen topics,
and not evading or avoiding issues by an unquestioning use of
evocative terminology.
From all of this I constructed a core concept or category that I termed Research
Pitching, and I developed my ideas in the form of a diagram indicating the
ideas associated with Research Pitching. Note that I chose to put aside two
very promising concepts, Modeling and De-sensitizing, each of which might
be developed further in later grounded theorizing. As it stands, this product is
very much provisional. The next stage would need to be developed from this
interim stage to a more grounded and robust conceptualization, invoking the
process of what in GTM is termed theoretical sampling, that is, moving from a
fairly open-ended form of enquiry to a stage at which the research is directed
toward the more definite issues developed during this first stage. So in this
case I might move on to interview other PhD students, as well as trying to
gather data from people presenting their ideas at academic conferences or in
published papers.
In terms of the diagrams in Chapter 5, particularly Figure 5.9, the X’s
would represent the initial set of students who presented at the seminar, and
the Y’s would represent the further students and researchers that might be
investigated—perhaps now in the form of one-to-one interviews—using spe-
cific questions—rather than through observation of their presentations. The
result may well lead to a revising of the initial model, but assuming it did not,
I would seek to ensure that the links between my categories and their indi-
vidual characteristics were corroborated by further data so that I could claim
theoretical saturation.
Assuming I articulated and explained my findings for this substantive
grounded theory (SGT), I might at a later date look at research funding appli-
cations and interview research directors and fund coordinators to see if the
144
Motivation/Personal itch
Narrating/Journey
Ownership/Responsibility Immersion
RESEARCH
PITCHING
Hiding in full view

Relevance/Application/Use
Modeling–reference
and disdain [De-]Sensitizing
FIGURE 7.1 Research Pitching—early model.
SGT could be extended into a formal grounded theory, perhaps also looking
at other contexts, apart from research, where the idea of pitching had some
explanatory power and usefulness.
The diagram in Figure 7.1 indicates that the core category is termed
Research Pitching, with dimensions or properties associated with it—
motivation, narrating, and so on. The two features that were identified as
potential core categories themselves are indicated with the thick arrows. For
some this is not “orthodox GTM,” but remember George Box’s dictum, quoted
in Chapter 2, that theories, models, and the like are to be judged in terms of
their usefulness! Given that this text is aimed at researchers, you will probably
have your own immediate response to my model in terms of “fit,” “grab” and so
on, and it may be that in the near future you will be planning for the research
pitching involved in your own PhD examination or conference presentations.
At this point it is worth clarifying and characterizing the key activities
and features involved in this example. To begin with, there are the issues of
the initial motivation and starting point. My motivation was to demonstrate
the use of GTM to the participants in the research seminar, to help them begin
to grasp the way in which the method provides a valuable and usable way of
making sense of a social context, resulting in a theory or model that incor-
porates key aspects of the processes that constituted the context itself. The
starting point for this fairly abbreviated example was the seminar itself, and
the individual student presentations. In similar fashion, Glaser and Strauss
developed their early work from shared motivations that emanated in part
from their respective bereavements (Glaser’s father had recently died, as had
Strauss’s mother), and their starting point was provided by a grant from the
National Institutes of Health. Aspects of such motivations are not negligible
145
An Abbreviated Example 145
and may prove highly relevant for the research itself, as well as for the research
findings when they are presented and disseminated. Judgment regarding the
impact and influence of such aspects—beneficial or detrimental—is best left
to others to determine, but it has to be based on clear accounts provided by the
researchers themselves. This issue is taken up in Chapter 8.
The data was drawn from these presentations and accessed by my attend-
ing each of them and taking notes contemporaneously. Later in the day I ana-
lyzed my notes and enhanced them as my analysis led to my adding further
details not noted during the presentation. In some instances I elicited other
issues that I had not noted but that were brought to mind at this later stage.
Although in the strict sense of the term, there was not the iteration that is
a key part of an extended GTM project, there were two important iterative
processes. First, because the presentations took place over two days, the initial
analysis at the end of day one provided a basis for a more focused view on
day two. Second, at several points in my analysis I found myself going back
to earlier presentations to ascertain whether aspects derived from the later
ones had also been present in these earlier ones. The result was a model, with
a core concept, and brief notes on the various codes that can be thought of as
early memos.
My purpose in presenting this example of GTM is to indicate that the pro-
cess of developing grounded theories is most certainly not one that involves
developing grand theories from large samples using vast amounts of data. On
the contrary, grounded theories can originate from something relatively low-
key and ready-to-hand. Any researcher considering use of GTM, but perhaps
unsure how best to proceed, should be prepared to try a similar exercise. This
is an important feature, as the method itself has suffered from a bad press, in
part because of the numerous poor examples of qualitative research that claim
to exemplify the method—although in such cases this is often a cover for poor
research—and also in part because the prospect of going into a research set-
ting with apparently very little preparation and a high risk of failing to find
anything can be daunting. Many of my PhD students have expressed these
concerns, worried that they will waste valuable time and effort in an explor-
atory phase of using GTM, resulting in no meaningful outcome. After all, the
idea that going to interview a few people using very open-ended questions
will result in a fruitful basis for more focused research goes against much of
what they have read and been taught about the process of enquiry—usually
envisioned as something clearly defined at the outset. When faced with my
students’ concerns, I feel like adapting the encouraging words of Obi-Wan
Kenobi in Star Wars; “feel the force of GTM, and trust the outcome.”
The example given above summarizes some key features of the method,
including the process of moving from consideration of a disparate social setting
to a more abstract and focused view of key features of that setting, producing
a conceptual model that paves the way for further research and analysis: an
146
outcome that should also afford more effective practice for the participants.
This comprises a series of stages that lead from motivation and a starting point;
through identification of sources of data, initial analysis, and an increasingly
focused process of iteration around further identification of data sources; to
subsequent analysis leading to higher levels of abstraction. These higher levels
of abstraction either require further iteration or provide an adequate basis for
conceptual articulation as a theory. The key techniques involved in this theo-
retical progress include coding and memo-making, as well as incorporating a
variety of forms of sampling. In order to explain these in more detail, I now
turn to examples drawn from the work of some of my PhD students.
Exercises
1. Have another look at the example of Research Pitching and make

notes—a memo—on your own response to the model in terms of “fit,”
“grab,” and so on. (The terms are discussed in Chapter 4, particularly
Table 4.4.)
2. Now add further comments in terms of how you might approach and
plan for your own forms of research pitching in the future.
Notes
1. Needless to say I objected to this meaning of the term “academic” and instead pointed
out that a more suitable alternative stresses issues such as education and scholarship!
2. The parallel to conjuring was perhaps elicited in part as a result of the two day
seminar including a dinner on the first evening, before and during which a professional
magician entertained us with some close-up magic.
147
Process and Procedure

GETTING STARTED AND MOVING FORWARD
Rationale and Motivation
An issue that is often ignored in discussions of the grounded theory method

(GTM) is the initial rationale and motivation for the research that is to be
undertaken. The GTM mantra, including the idea that the researcher should
have “no preconceptions,” can preclude or lead away from consideration of
this initial aspect of the research. Part of the motivation for Glaser and Strauss’s
initial work was certainly their respective bereavements (Glaser’s father had
recently died, as had Strauss’s mother); hence the dedicatees of Awareness of
Dying. Yet it is noteworthy that the only mention of this is in the appendix
at the end of the book. There may have been several reasons for this, includ-
ing perhaps the expectation of the time that research monographs should not
include personal statements of this kind. Ironically, the growth in use of GTM
and the extensive publications that report on the associated findings frequently
illustrate precisely this form of personal statement. These have fed into and
driven forward a welcome trend in research publications that does not treat
researchers as neutral, robotic data-gatherers-cum-analyzers, but rather aims
to focus on their distinctive roles and forms of participation, engagement, and
positionality.
One of the findings from my analysis of the PhD student presentations in
Chapter 7 was the way in which all of the presenters took pains to justify and
explain their choice of research topic in terms of their previous background,
current employment or interests, and quest for something that would have
relevance. This is a key issue, but can be confusing if the GTM advice to enter
the research process “with an open mind” and without preconceptions is taken
too literally. In Chapter 4 I pointed out that this open mindedness should now
147
148
be considered as one of the “accidents” of GTM. Yet Glaser has continued to

use the dictum “No preconceptions,” and as recently as late 2012 provided a
lengthy account of it in The Grounded Theory Review.
A dictum is a useful ploy, but it should not be taken too far. Popular dictums
(dicta) such as “never give a sucker an even break,” “there’s one born every min-
ute,” or “you can take the boy/girl out of [place name e.g. Texas, Yorkshire, …]
but you can’t take [placename] out of the boy/girl” (readers can probably supply
other examples fairly readily) usually contain an important grain of truth or
insight, but such sayings need to be treated with care, and with critical disdain.
The origin of this aspect of GTM writing comes from the early work of Glaser
and Strauss, where they were at pains to stress that the method was at odds with
what they saw as the orthodoxy of verification of existing theories. In a sense,
demanding “no preconceptions” amounts to an over-playing by Glaser and
Strauss in their efforts to offer an alternative to the verificationist model, which
they justifiably saw as relying on all-too-explicit preconceptions that then con-
strained the research that followed. (In this they took their lead from Herbert
Blumer in his critique of William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki’s study of
The Polish Peasant, Blumer noting that a fair amount of the findings were “fore-
shadowed in the previous writings of Thomas”).1
Glaser offers the following points on the open-ended, non-hypothesis-
based approach that is central to GTM:
As the reader knows, this position taken 45 years ago has flowered and
boomed (A Bryant bloomed?). Grounded theory today is used all over
the world, principally for PhD theses and then in subsequent research
of those GT PhD’s. We were sufficiently correct to open up a whole new
world of theory generation no matter what the latent theoretical perspec-
tive of GT researchers have as academics in health, management, social
work, political science, business and sociology. No preconceived research
works as GT. But the world wide use of GT or supposed GT versions has
increased our knowledge of the subtleties of requiring no preconception
or giving the arguments for preconceiving research aspects in some ways.
I hope to detail many of these subtleties in this book so the reader can be
aware of what it means to suspend preconceptions in service of emergent
generating of theory.2
But immediately Glaser tempers that dictum with the following advice.
Keep in mind that preconceived concepts do not have to be forgotten.
They are just to be suspended for the GT research so the researcher is open
to the emergent. Why let them get in the way? Sure, they may have legiti-
mate power as sanctified by the literature, but this power must be ignored
or resisted. Otherwise it will take over and stop the generation and subse-
quent power of a classical substantive GT with fit and relevance that works
in explaining what is going on. (emphasis added)
149
Process and Procedure 149
This may seem to be useful advice, but it is open to misinterpretation. Many

years ago, before we all finally got wise to the dangers of cigarette smoking,
people were allowed to smoke inside offices, theaters, cinemas, and even air-
craft. As no-smoking policies gradually came into force, one of the first steps
at my place of work was an insistence that in any shared office no smoking
would be allowed unless every occupant agreed to the contrary. The result was
that in many offices “No Smoking” signs became prominent, but in one room,
shared by several inveterate smokers, an alternative sign was put up saying,
“As Little Smoking as Possible.” In a similar fashion Glaser’s advice in its more
extended and nuanced form might be taken to mean “As Little Preconception/
Preconceiving as Possible,” rather than “No Preconception.” But this is not
really helpful to PhD students and other researchers because it fails to engage
with the nature of people’s preconceptions and the ways in which these need
to be articulated, confronted, and addressed rather than being swept aside in
the manner that Glaser seems to be advising.
In my early paper on GTM (Bryant, 2002) I referred to the example of
Gert-Jan de Vreede et al. (1998), who in using GTM, acknowledged that their
research was in part “guided by … relevant existing theories.” They under-
stood that this might have led to “data collection efforts” being “prestruc-
tured using research domain relevant theories such as the cultural theories of
[Geert] Hofstede or the TAM,3.” But they reassured their readers that “[W]‌e
decided not to do so in order to avoid a standard way of thinking about the
phenomena observed.” It is not clear how they managed this feat of cognitive
evasion, but their imagery is revealing as they develop the point: “Having too
much a priori theoretical guidance can block a researcher from seeing what
is and is not really significant.” This evokes the idea of cognition as a process
requiring a free-flowing route from source to receiver; preexisting ideas just
getting in the way. The assumption is that these existing ideas can be turned
off like a tap, so allowing researchers to claim either that they have discounted
various issues with which they have familiarity or they are immune to such
influences and hold a neutral and disinterested position. Unfortunately, as the
twentieth century economist John Maynard Keynes observed; “Practical men,
who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences,
are usually slaves of some defunct economist.” In other words, it is far better
to try to acknowledge one’s initial ideas than to discount them in this manner.
Researchers claiming immunity from such influences, or omitting any refer-
ence to them, may well be those most affected by them.
The issue comes into clearer focus if we recognize that our understanding
of these cognitive processes is always couched in metaphorical terms, and that
the use of one metaphor rather than another has a significant impact. Glaser
uses the metaphor of “suspension,” which is ambiguous; it is also a form of
preconception because there are alternative metaphors for cognitive processes,
as discussed below. We may be said to suspend judgment if we hear differing
150
views about a film or play prior to seeing it for ourselves, but in such cases
the options are fairly clear, whereas “suspending preconceptions” is far more
complex. How do we know what our preconceptions actually are? If they are
preconceptions they may well be so deeply hidden and taken-for-granted that
it is not possible for us to articulate them. It should also be noted that Glaser
extends his point by using another metaphor, namely that preconceived con-
cepts “get in the way,” implying that observation and research is all about clear-
ing a path of obstacles to the development of understanding and insight. This
is similar to the idea of de Vreede et al. of “too much a priori theoretical guid-
ance” blocking the researcher. In both cases the implication is that research-
ers can somehow get unfettered access to the data or phenomena if they can
remove such impediments. These forms of argument are dependent on the
possibility that researchers can identify and articulate their preconceptions,
and then somehow disregard them. The problem is that identifying and articu-
lating all of one’s preconceptions is not feasible. Seeking to do so will involve
invoking other preconceptions, which in turn will need to be addressed, lead-
ing to an infinite cycle of iteration. As Michael Polanyi (1962), among others,
pointed out, our knowledge of the world is composed of both tacit and explicit
forms, the former being an aspect of our understanding that we cannot access
ourselves, but that forms the basis upon which we are able to develop our
explicit knowledge. Attempts by other people to offer explication of my or our
tacit knowledge may offer useful insights, but their explanations will similarly
rely on their tacit knowledge.
If, however, a different metaphor is used, the characterization of what is
involved also changes to something more feasible, credible, and defensible.
Instead of “suspension” and “unblocking,” with concomitant ideas that pre-
conceptions are obstacles to comprehension, we might look at cognition as a
process whereby our preconceptions are a necessary and enabling precursor to
our understanding. The discussion of Thomas Kuhn’s work in Chapter 2 and
the general trend in constructivist epistemology develops from this argument.
We are able to gain an understanding of what is happening and so develop
new insights precisely because of our preconceptions; different people’s pre-
conceptions may well lead to new insights—or in Kuhn’s terms a shift from
one paradigm to another. Innovative insights arise precisely from someone
seeing things differently, based on a different set of preconceptions, and not
because they have no preconceptions.4
In fact, it might be argued that Glaser and Strauss were in precisely this
position at the outset of their pioneering work on death and dying in the
1960s. The position from which they started their work was as distinct from
existing ideas as was Antoine Lavoisier’s “discovery” of oxygen from Joseph
Priestley’s (see Chapter 2). In their justified concern about countering the
formulaic manner of doing research by deducing hypotheses from existing
151
theories, however, Glaser and Strauss perhaps over-played the necessity that
researchers enter domains of investigation with an open mind, rather than
with prepared questions and concepts awaiting verification. Hence their
initial advice regarding preconceptions, which in any case was immediately
tempered in Discovery in a footnote explaining that researchers do not com-
mence their investigations as a tabula rasa as referred to in Chapters 2 and 3.
Unfortunately they never addressed the impact of a researcher’s starting with
what might be termed a tabula inscripta—that is, a position in some senses
already tuned to a particular orientation, albeit one that is open to surprises
and novel insights, exemplified in the example in Chapter 6 by Tove Giske
and Barbara Artinian, both of whom were nurses and nursing instructors.
Anyone reading research accounts that state that “I/ we started this
research with no preconceptions” will usually find that the sentences that fol-
low indicate all too clearly that was not the case. Unfortunately such examples
only offer ammunition to investigators ready to discount and criticize GTM,
whereas the literature on GTM indicates that many of the most compelling
outputs of the method-in-use come from researchers who clearly had exten-
sive experience highly relevant to the domain of study, yet were open to new
insights and the general idea of serendipity in their work.
Giske and Artinian (see Chapter 6), writing from an avowedly Glaserian
position, illustrate what I term Methodological Positioning (see Chapter 14),
but coupled with the insightful and methodologically sensitive position
I would advocate. They quote Glaser (1998) as follows:
The first step in grounded theory is to enter the substantive field for research
without knowing the problem. This requires suspending your knowledge,
especially of the literature, and your experience. The researcher must take
a “no preconceived interest” approach and not ask questions that might be
on his mind. (Glaser, 1998, p. 122)
Giske, the researcher, notes that “[S]‌uch suspension of knowledge and experi-
ences can be hard, but it is necessary to be able to do a GT study.” She explains
that she “approached doctoral study with an interest in learning more about
how patients existentially experienced uncertainty and life-threatening situ-
ations. To be able to use GT, I had to be willing to enter the field with the
attitude of not knowing the main concern of the participants, acknowledging
that patients do not necessarily share professionals’ view of problems.” Later
she notes, “[my] background as a nurse and nursing teacher had given me
considerable experience in meeting patients in the diagnostic phase, which
influenced my theoretical sensitivity, as did my interest in spiritual care.” This
allows the reader to gain insight into Giske’s starting point, motivation, and
experience.
152
Another metaphor used is that of a lens; so researchers will explain that

they viewed a topic through a particular lens. A Google search on the topic
produced the following examples:
¤ Viewing clinical research career development through the lens of
social cognitive career theory
¤ Viewing Dissemination and Implementation Research through a
Network Lens
¤ Seeing through the eLife Lens: A new way to view research
A lens is understood to be imbricated with observation, bringing certain
aspects into focus, while pushing others into the background. This idea is
founded on the supposition that there are complex processes and charac-
teristics involved in the interaction between researcher or observer and the
investigation. This undermines the positivist view that such processes can
be undertaken in a direct and neutral manner. On the one hand, the lens
metaphor can be used in the sense of employing existing theories or mod-
els to guide researchers, and so it runs counter to Glaser and Strauss’s posi-
tion in their early work. On the other hand, by making such aspects of study
explicit, researchers offer a far more realistic view of their initial position,
assuming those declarations are made in good faith and with some degree
of acuity. Generally, statements to the effect that one can or should shed all
preconceptions should now be seen as misguided and naive, and even the
positivists have moved on, although only in the form of post-positivism or
neo-positivism.5
At the outset it is important that researchers try to articulate their moti-
vations and relationship to the research and its key issues. Claiming that one
has no preconceptions is not convincing, nor is it defensible. Statements along
those lines usually indicate reticence on the part of the researcher to confront
potential preconceptions that may well influence or even interfere with the
research, either forcing one’s conceptualizations into unacknowledged and
uncontrolled directions or precluding possible innovative insights.
Presentation of one’s research outcomes should clarify rationale and moti-
vation, how these guided the initial stages of the research, and if and how they
changed over the course of the project. It is, however, important to distinguish
between statements made at the start of one’s research, and those made about
the starting point of the research once the work has been completed. All too
often the latter assertions amount to highly artificial statements that bear little
or no resemblance to what was actually the case during the earliest stages—a
form of fictionalized recall; hence the importance of keeping and using con-
temporaneous notes, which in GTM is encapsulated in the essential process of
memoing or memo-making (see Chapter 10).
In the paragraphs that follow I include examples of starting points and
opening statements from my PhD students, most of which are taken from
153
their completed theses, but based on their initial proposals. Note how these
statements embody combinations of motivation, rationale, characterizations
of general contexts, and orientation, as well as points and issues of concern.
For instance Gerhard Drexler offers the following:
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the complex issues that both
managers and scientists are facing with regard to identifying ideas and
partners for collaborative innovation processes. The particular focus is on
the initialization of partnerships and the generation of joint ideas as the
result of various activities carried out in a collaborative venture.
Stella Walsh describes the process by which her GTM-oriented study devel-
oped from her previous work, which initially led to her initiating a hypothesis-
based project, which foundered once the full complexity of the issue was
confronted, and from which she moved to use of GTM.
The research focus for the current study emerged from previous research
I had undertaken with older people, which initially developed out of the
debate at the introduction of value added tax on fuel in the 1990s [in the
United Kingdom –A. Bryant]. The debate at the time proposed that, as a
consequence of the introduction of the new fuel tax, older people would
spend less on food to compensate for the increased spending on fuel.
A previous study has been undertaken which considered this hypoth-
esis and the relationship between food and fuel choices made by older
people. The groups of older people at this stage included mixed gender
groups based at Age Concern, XXX and at a local community centre in
YYY. Discussions with these older people indicated that the dichotomy
of choice between food and fuel over simplified their decision-making.
Moreover, the tax rises envisaged did not materialise and additional win-
ter fuel payments were made available for the older population, thus off-
setting the anticipated burden of the increased fuel tax and the suggested
reduction in available income to spend on food. Their choice and use of
resources were much more sophisticated and complex than the simple
choice between food and fuel. As this greater level of complexity had been
identified in decision-making for food it was inappropriate to continue
with the research based solely on a comparison of two variables, food
and fuel.
Premila Gamage similarly did not start out to use GTM, in fact she had largely
completed her fieldwork and data gathering before deciding to use the method.
At the early stages of the study my intention was to conduct a qualitative
research but not in accordance with any particular approach. Therefore
at the initial stages the grounded theory approach had not been adopted.
However, as the study progressed and data collection was underway
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I located my methods in a grounded theory approach as it fits well with

the study’s interpretivist epistemological position and analytic needs
explained earlier.
Ibraheem Jodeh, on the other hand, set out from the start to use GTM, and his
work opens with the stark claim that “this research has been started without
any preconceptions or hypotheses.” He continues:
The data were collected by conducting interviews with people in the field
work; then, were analysed directly to generate and construct a large num-
ber of concepts and categories related to the research topic. Analysing
data directly clarified the categories and their properties, and relation-
ships between them. The interviews were conducted with three groups of
participants: the tax administration, the staff members, and the chartered
accountants and tax commissioners.
But in 2008, four years earlier, at the outset of his research, he had a far firmer
idea of what his work might involve than one might suppose from reading
this later statement. His stated aim at that time was to “understand the role of
accounting information systems to increase the efficiency of the tax system in
developing countries; it will be a case study of XXXX as one of the develop-
ing countries.” So he clearly had fairly firm ideas about his work at the outset,
although he was sufficiently flexible and insightful to follow the data once his
data collection was underway.
In comparison, Transmissia Semiawan started with a very clear view
of the context of her research, and it remained an anchor point of her work
through the research, supplying the basis for her research questions as they
were developed during her studies.
Information is now becoming one of the important elements of orga-
nizational management resources. The role of information resource in
an organization is very important. In organizations like higher and fur-
ther education institutions (referred to hereafter as HFEIs), information
plays an important role in promoting interaction to their stakeholders.
The availability of information is a crucial need for all levels of academic
activities— teaching/
learning, research, public service activities— and
for the communities within and outside the institution—academic and
administration staffs, students, alumni, industries, and other universities’
stakeholders.
The above situations lead to a very complicated working culture that
intensifies the complexity of information-based activities throughout the
institution that need to be controlled and managed. Managing and con-
trolling the activities within an information-driven environment should
include management of all resources or “information assets” …
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From this position she derived two key research questions:

How could a Higher Education [HE] institution handle the complexity
of its organizational activities?
How could an HE institution manage and value its information assets as
well as expose its organizational strengths?
These were used as a basis to derive more targeted questions to be used both
in interviews and in her analysis: A subset of these is given in Box 8.1. They
are certainly more explicit than the very generic ones suggested by Glaser
and Strauss, yet they provide a basis for interviewees to offer wide-ranging
responses, which is what happened during the research.
Doctoral students and researchers in general are expected to develop,
change, enhance, and adapt their ideas as their research progresses, and similar
expectations should also apply to the use of methods. Researchers often have
to change and adapt the methods they started out using precisely because the
research itself moves in unexpected directions. Examples of this occurred in
the cases of Gamage and Walsh, two of the students whose work is presented
above. In both cases the researcher started out with ideas about her research
that did not include using GTM. But as the work progressed, and guided by
their sensitivities and insights, both students came to see GTM as appropriate,
although in a different form from that described in the textbooks.
Rationale and motivation should be treated as important aspects of
research reports and reflections. They can be located as key factors under the
heading of Process and Procedures, as well as under Products and Presentation
in the 5x(P+P) schema introduced in Chapter 2. Researchers should ensure
that they offer clear statements on these issues, and they should not resort to
phrases along the lines of starting their work “without preconceptions.” From
this basis, GTM can be seen as a guide for researchers in harnessing and devel-
oping their theoretical sensitivity as they move from detailed engagement with
BOX 8.1
Semiawan Initial Research Questions
How information assets within a [higher education] HE institution interact with

each other to affect how the institution approaches its information management
How the users (university community) perceive the value of information?
What are the HE institution’s objectives and priorities with regard to an
information system?
What information the HE institution holds and where it is held
What resources the HE institution has and how they make the information
accessible and useful
Who/what and how to manage and to process the information
What are the technologies used and how are they are managed to support
information-based activities?
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a chosen topic to the development of forms of useful and insightful abstrac-

tion. Other routes to this objective are available, but GTM offers a robust and
adaptable method if it is used with intelligence and insight.
All Is Data; but Data Is Not All
Once the rationale and motivation for the research have been addressed, the
next step is initial engagement with the research context, and the data to be
drawn from it. The aim of GTM-oriented research is to develop theories that
are “grounded in the data.” As explained in Chapter 3, Glaser and Strauss posi-
tioned their method as one that avoided “mindless empiricism” on the one
hand, and “verificationism” on the other. The grounded theory method pro-
vided a means for generating theories from data, but the term data is unfor-
tunately far from simple. The word itself means “given” from the Latin datum
(singular; data plural),6 but data is rarely if ever just “given” or presented to the
researcher. Even in the case of the PhD presentations discussed in Chapter 5,
the data was only readily at hand after extensive arrangements were made
to organize the symposium and ensure attendance by most of those invited,
although the event was arranged for purposes other than data gathering for
an example of GTM in practice. So the data was derived from a convenience
sample.
The research literature is replete with terms relating to data, and these
include data collection, data gathering, and data capture. If the first term is
fairly neutral, the second perhaps elicits ideas about harvesting and separating
the wheat from the chaff, and the third may suggest ideas about data needing
to be hunted down, tamed, and controlled in some manner. Even if data is
seen as “collected,” this should not be taken to imply that selecting and sort-
ing are not inherently involved as aspects of these activities. Researchers have
used video-recording for their data, but even so, when replaying the record-
ings they will inevitably focus on certain facets of what they see at the expense
of others. The default for many GTM studies is for data to be elicited in the
form of one-to-one interviews, and these days the demands of formal research
committees and review boards is that such interviews must be recorded and
transcribed as part of the research process—a form of quality assurance and
a basis for validation if such a level of scrutiny is required. Glaser, however,
firmly resists this tendency, arguing quite correctly that if researchers rely on
the availability of a full transcript they will fail to grasp the pertinent aspects of
the interview as it unfolds in real time. This is theoretical sensitivity in opera-
tion, with the researcher playing an active and constitutive role in data gather-
ing. Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory put this succinctly when they stress
that “[G]‌rounded theory allows researchers to distinguish with confidence
between the noise and the music in one’s data.” In this, the unstated corollary
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is that one person’s noise may well be another person’s music. For GTM, this
implies that it is highly improbable that two researchers will ever arrive at
identical sets of codes from independent analysis of the same set of data.
In many cases the initial source of data is prompted by the general research
context, sometimes tempered by interest in a key characteristic of that context,
and also by the availability of people to interview. Thus Drexler, a part-time
PhD student working full-time in a senior capacity with a renowned, mul-
tinational organization, started with an interest in innovation and the ways
in which collaborations between commercial and research organizations were
initiated. Given the senior and highly networked position he held in his orga-
nization, he was able to establish focus groups and initial, open-ended inter-
views involving key figures. In a similar fashion, Jodeh was concerned with the
ways in which the information and communication technologies (ICT) were
being incorporated into taxation systems in developing countries. He had
worked in the tax office of one such country, and so he had access to people
with relevant expertise and experience upon which he could build. In contrast
Walsh and Gamage in varying degrees came to GTM at later stages of their
research. Gamage had already gathered much of her data during the fieldwork
phase of her project.
In all cases, however, the researchers took onboard the idea that whatever
their initial ideas might have been, the process of analysis had to allow for the
unexpected and the possible change of direction in the project itself. Drexler
and Jodeh were far less constrained in this regard, given their starting points;
but this is not to diminish the research approaches taken by the others. Memos
from all of them indicate the points at which they felt future steps and the
general direction were becoming clearer; often in ways that surprised them,
bearing out Einstein’s dictum about research: “If we knew what it was we were
doing, it would not be called research, would it?” presented in Chapter 2.
In the case of my example in Chapter 7 drawn from the student presenta-
tions, I did not record and transcribe them; instead, I relied solely on the notes
I made at the time, supplementing them with further observations or recall
once I went over my notes later in the day. Some of my students did record
their initial interviews and transcribed them; others used email exchanges
or messaging in an audio-video application. In many cases this also involved
translation from the original language into English. This in itself comprises
a form of coding, one that is concerned with preserving the full details of the
original account, rather than GTM coding, which is aimed at distinguishing
and focusing on particular aspects.
Each format and process has its own benefits and disadvantages; some-
times these are one and the same thing. For instance, email exchanges can be
seen as beneficial because respondents have time to reply and do so in written
form, thus offering a transcript ready-made. But for the same reason, such
exchanges can also be seen as precluding immediate responses, which should
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occur in dialogue with the researcher. This asynchronous form of exchange

operates in contrast to face-to-face interviews, which are synchronous and
so do not allow the level of reflection and deliberation afforded by email
exchanges. The point is not to suggest that one form is better than any other,
but that whatever strategy is used, the researcher should be clear in expressing
the reasons for the choice, as well as the benefits and disadvantages that follow.
From these initial stages the researcher will be faced with a vast amount
of detailed data. Prior to the articulation of GTM, this data was recorded on
previously prepared coding sheets or forms (see, for example, Figure 5.1). This
inevitably meant that anything that did not fit with such preconceived schemas
tended to be ignored or discarded, or perhaps was reshaped in some manner
to be accommodated. For GTM-oriented research this is anathema; instead
the researcher develops appropriate schema by analyzing the data using a pro-
cess that is also called coding but that at the time of its introduction in the
1960s represented a major innovation and radical departure from existing ver-
sions. Since that time the process of coding has become widely understood
to cover the GTM version, and for some researchers coding is erroneously
equated solely with GTM; but other methods have appeared on the scene that
closely build on the GTM version—see Wertz et al, (2011).7
Unfortunately this form of coding is often seen as the be-all and end-all of
the method, with researchers claiming to use GTM but offering little more than
a set of abbreviated commentaries on interview data gathered and analyzed in
a relatively unsophisticated and impressionistic manner. This has resulted in
many evaluators and reviewers and editors regarding GTM as “research-lite.”
Consequently GTM-oriented proposals and publications are seen as highly
questionable from the outset, with many GTM-oriented researchers having a
hard time presenting their proposals or getting their papers published. Several
editors of journals have told me that they are generally suspicious of submitted
papers claiming use of GTM, and that they reject them without sending them
for further review. They justify this by referring to research reports that claim
use of GTM but go no further than offering verbatim extracts of interviews,
accompanied by tortuous and/or superficial analyses and lists of codes with
little or no effort at providing a conceptual schema coherently derived from
the data. This misappropriation of GTM has clearly plagued the method from
the outset, with Strauss and Corbin referring to the issue in their chapter in the
first edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research in the early 1990s, arguing
that such applications of the method fail to rise to the level of theoretical codes.
In a similar vein, but from a different perspective, Glaser has also been
at pains to criticize research outputs that make ill-founded claims to the use
of GTM. In his terms these are nothing more than examples of “full concep-
tual description” incorporating “qualitative data analysis” [QDA].8 He intro-
duced the former term in his response to Strauss and Corbin’s book, Basics
of Qualitative Research (1990/1998), and has expanded on it when discussing
159
what he sees as efforts at remodeling grounded theory (see, for example, Glaser,
2004). In seeking to clarify what he understands as the distinctions between
GTM and QDA, he refers to the topic of “data” as follows:
The difference between the particularistic, routine, normative data we all
garner in our everyday lives and scientific data is that the latter is produced
by a methodology. This is what makes it scientific. This may sound trite,
but it is just the beginning of many complex issues. Whatever method-
ology may be chosen to make an ensuing research scientific has many
implicit and explicit problems. It implies a certain type of data collection,
the pacing and timing for data collection, a type of analysis and a specific
type of research product. (emphasis added)
In the case of qualitative data, the explicit goal is description. The
clear issue articulated in much of the literature regarding qualitative data
analysis (QDA) methodology is the accuracy, truth, trustworthiness or
objectivity of the data. This worrisome accuracy of the data focuses on
its subjectivity, its interpretative nature, its plausibility, the data voice and
its constructivism. Achieving accuracy is always worrisome with a QDA
methodology. (Glaser, 2004)
This is both confused and confusing. It is certainly the case that in doing
research the focus on data will be far more conscious and deliberate than
in daily life, although, as I argued in earlier chapters, the generic process of
abstraction occurs as an inevitable part of both activities. GTM is a method
that draws attention to this cognitive process, raising researchers’ awareness
and also offering ways of harnessing it effectively in investigative projects.
Unfortunately the claim that data is “produced by a methodology” goes
well beyond this harnessing of awareness, and it might be interpreted as an
extreme and ill-founded form of constructivism, which is certainly not what
Glaser intended. What Glaser is perhaps trying to argue is that identification
and analysis of data using a particular research method is markedly different
from the ways in which we use data in our routine and everyday activities,
much as I argued in Chapter 2 when I stated that doing research is distinct
from the sort of investigations that we might undertake in our day-to-day
existence.
Glaser’s use of the terms objectivity and subjectivity in the second para-
graph of the extract is equally misleading. He develops the point about a meth-
odology producing its data, and criticizes QDA both for the truth and accuracy
of the data it produces (objectivity) and its interpretative nature and plausibil-
ity (subjectivity). Much as he may protest about such labeling, Glaser’s posi-
tion is firmly in the objectivist camp, as Charmaz has shown (see Chapters 3
and 4). The complexities involved in maintaining a strong distinction between
objective (facts) and subjective (values) largely dissipates for those taking up a
Pragmatist position, as shown later, in Part Four.
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The problem is that the issues around what is meant by data, and research-
ers’ relationships to it, are especially fraught with regard to GTM. Glaser’s dic-
tum, “All Is data” is perfectly correct and highly pertinent to characterizations
of GTM that set it apart from other approaches. Close engagement with the
data is a necessity for GTM. Unfortunately, Glaser and those who have taken
up the mantle of “classical” GTM have not engaged with the ways in which
developments in epistemology since the 1960s have affected our understand-
ing of the concept of data. Thus, in Glaser’s efforts to distance his variant of
GTM from any others, he seems to imply that “Data Is all”; so a close engage-
ment with the data is not only necessary, it is also entirely sufficient for the
generation of theory, which will emerge independent of the actual research-
ers involved. Glaser’s concern to distinguish “classical” GTM, initially from
Strauss and Corbin’s work and latterly from variants of the method such as
those by Charmaz and myself, leads him to offer the paradoxical argument
that data is both necessary and sufficient for developing grounded theories,
and that in extremis the data in question is produced by the method.
Faced with this highly contested issue, it is crucial that researchers who
gather data and opt for GTM-type analyses clarify their procedures and forms
of analysis and not resort to simple invocation of one or another canonical text
accompanied by all or part of the GTM mantra. Given the range of potential
coding approaches now available, they may also need to explain why other
forms of coding were not used in their work, even if those forms might have
been applicable and are closely related to GTM coding. (The volume by Wertz
et al.—including Charmaz—offers a clear and informative guide to five differ-
ent ways of qualitative coding.)
The conflict over this issue was intensified by Glaser’s criticism of Strauss
and Corbin’s work, because it centered on coding. Thus, ever since the 1990s
the topic has been a touchstone for distinguishing between and evaluat-
ing variants of the method. Thus Glaser saw Strauss and Corbin’s “coding
paradigm” as a form of coding that moved away from GTM, undermining
the flexible approach pioneered in the early writings. As explained in Part
Two, Strauss’s efforts were in response to requests from students and novice
researchers for further elucidation and guidelines for the method. In their
chapter in The Handbook of Qualitative Methods Strauss and Corbin, how-
ever, gave clear indications that they had misgivings regarding the ways in
which the method had been taken up. The distinctions between the variants
is addressed in this chapter and others in Part Three, and I would also recom-
mend Charmaz’s account in c hapters 5 and 6 in the most recent edition of her
book (Charmaz, 2014).
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the distinctive role that is
given to coding in GTM, an aspect that gets lost if too much effort is expended
on examining the differences between the various approaches. Einstein again
offers a suitable aphorism: “Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and
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more complex… . It takes a touch of genius—and a lot of courage to move in

the opposite direction.”
Coding in GTM must be seen as a process of abstraction, a process by
which people move from a detailed yet inchoate set of observations, notes, and
other sources to a more refined and focused view. Glaser has characterized it
as moving “beyond the data,” which is certainly a more useful image than that
given in his 2004 paper. This is both a cognitive and a methodological pro-
cess, and it necessarily involves disregarding some aspects and reformulating
others that take on a more central role in the resulting model or schema. As
I have noted in several places in the preceding chapters, and in including the
extract from Vitaly Grossman’s Everything Flows at the start of Part Three, we
all engage in abstracting in our everyday lives, using different issues at differ-
ent times—for example, traffic and weather conditions when we are driving,
pharmacies if we are feeling unwell, and so on. We cannot “process” all the
sensory inputs that are available, and even if we could this would still involve
more than merely taking in all such inputs. In one of the fantasy short stories
by Jorge Luis Borges, Funes the Memorious, the hero sustains an injury to his
head after falling from his horse. When he regains consciousness he finds that
he has acquired the ability to remember everything. Far from being a blessing,
this is actually an affliction.
He had effortlessly learned English, French, Portuguese, Latin. I sus-
pected, nevertheless, that he was not very good at thinking. To think is
to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the teeming
world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars… .’ (Borges, 2000,
emphasis added)
Our ability to abstract is a crucial aspect of our daily lives, which are as Glaser
suggests “particularistic, routine, normative.” But this also applies to the more
constrained and complex processes involved in doing research. The criticism
made by many GTM authorities, including Charmaz, Glaser, Strauss, and
Corbin, that some researchers fail to develop their work beyond the data would
resonate with poor Ireneo Funes: amassing vast amounts of data, but without
any moves toward classifying or categorizing it, is not progress. (Figure 5.3 can
be taken as an illustration of The Funes Problem.) But this also undermines
Glaser’s view that amassing data will lead to the emergence of higher level
abstractions or theories.
For Borges, the process of thinking necessarily involves far more than
piling up data; it requires a form of sensitivity that resembles Glaser’s con-
cept of theoretical sensitivity, yet at a lower level of formality and intensity.
In a research context this everyday activity takes on a more formalized role.
In projects that start from clear hypotheses or research questions, the nature
of this selectivity is stated from the outset, often in very stark terms. Glaser
and Strauss were concerned that such research was far too constrained and so
162
unlikely to engage the imaginative and innovative strengths of new research-

ers. Their alternative was to start from a different point with a distinctive ori-
entation, as far as possible engaging with the richness of the issues at hand
prior to any form of selection or narrowing of focus—although a focus will
be needed for subsequent stages. Their admonition to keep an open mind can
be seen in this light, as can the point about preconceptions, but only in the
critically limited sense of delaying derivation of formal hypotheses or research
questions until later in the process.
Many writers on GTM stress that key features of the method are simple
and straightforward, usually to impress on readers the fact that they should
not feel inhibited about trying to use them. This applies in particular to cod-
ing and memo-making.9 These same processes, however, are also described as
requiring skill and expertise, sometimes by the same authors who argue for
their simplicity.
In the introduction to The Handbook of Grounded Theory (Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007a), one section is titled “GTM: Simple but Skilful”. An excerpt
from the text follows:
One of the recurrent themes in many chapters is that GTM, far from being
a mystical complex approach, is in fact “simple” and straightforward. Thus
Lora Lempert notes that memo-making is not mystical but simple; Judith
Holton sees the solution to the chaos of coding inundation as “relatively
simple,” as also is recognition of the point at which to stop collecting data.
Carolyn Wiener points out that, with regard to the method of constant
comparison, “the basic rule is simple.” Conversely many contributors
make the point that several key facets of GTM rely on extensive experi-
ence and skill on the part of the researcher. Wiener notes that one of the
key characteristics of the team in which she worked with Strauss was that
“All of us were skilled at coding but he was especially gifted at it.” Sharlene
Hesse-Biber argues that one of the most difficult skills in learning qualita-
tive analysis “is the ability to see what is in the data.”
Glaser exemplifies this in his 2004 paper, arguing that GTM is “just straight-
forward conceptualization integrated into theory.” But he immediately follows
this assertion with a characterization of theoretical sensitivity that defines it as
consisting of “two essential characteristics [of the researcher] … the personal
and temperamental bent to maintain analytic distance, tolerate confusion and
regression while remaining open, trusting to preconscious processing and to
conceptual emergence … the ability to develop theoretical insight into the area
of research combined with the ability to make something of these insights. He/
she must have the ability to conceptualize and organize, make abstract connec-
tions, visualize, and think multivariately.”
Any confusion that is sown by such paradoxical statements is exacerbated
once researchers first try coding. They find it all too easy to begin highlighting
163
certain aspects of their data, but they then continue to do this until they end up
with huge numbers of codes, sometimes covering nearly all the original data.
Aware of the behavior of the protagonist in the Borges story, I term this The Funes
Problem, and the key is to explain how to avoid this inclination to amass infor-
mation and, instead, to develop the “touch of genius” to which Einstein alludes.
As I have mentioned already there is understandable trepidation among
researchers when they are advised to trust to the strength and power of GTM
and start to gather data with only a very general set of guidelines. In many
cases the starting point will be data in the form of partial or verbatim tran-
scripts of open-ended interviews, but there is no reason why a researcher can-
not begin with documents or other forms and sources of data. Developing
research in this manner is seen by many investigators as akin to a leap in the
dark as there seems to be no clear understanding of what data to collect, and
from whom or from what. If the codes are set up prior to collection, this will
guide the researcher both in terms of the type of data to be collected and the
most likely sources. But Glaser and Strauss wished to provide an alternative,
and offered the following as the sorts of question that should be posed at early
stages of research; a generic starting point:
¤ What is this data about?
¤ What is this a study of?
¤ What is going on?
¤ What are people doing?
¤ What are people saying?
These are very open-ended questions, so it is worth offering further back-
ground to each one, but it should be noted that these are my own expositions
and may well differ from those of other GTM writers.
¤ What is this data about?—The researcher should not assume that
the meaning and import of the data are readily apparent. The
research orientation should allow for serendipity and surprise; this
is what is meant by the researcher keeping an open mind.
¤ What is this data a study of?—In many instances grounded theory
researchers have found that data collected with perhaps one issue
or idea in mind leads elsewhere as the analysis develops, evoking
unexpected outcomes.
¤ What is going on?—Researchers should not assume that what
people say or talk about are the core or primary activities. It is
the unspoken or unacknowledged aspects that are critical, raising
suspicions when researchers rely too readily on the exact terms
used by one’s respondents—referred to as “in vivo” codes in GTM.
The concept of “hiding in plain sight” referred to in Chapter 7 is an
example of this. GTM stresses the need to examine and articulate
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the process-oriented features of a situation, which implies moving

beyond the descriptions offered by respondents, developing
ideas that can only be elicited from responses to very open-
ended interviews or dialogues from the outset. This may be more
complicated with other forms of data—for example, documents,
electronic resources, and the like. Essentially there is a need for an
orientation that engenders a healthy skepticism in research.
¤ What are people doing?—This involves not only asking people
about what they do, and also what they think other people do, but
also observing people’s actions and interactions, thus building up
a model of the social processes that constitute the setting under
investigation.
¤ What are people saying?—Researchers should not merely note
down people’s utterances;they need to investigate these more
deeply—again taking a skeptical view of what people say and what
they actually mean … and what they omit.
Additional questions have been added to this list over the years, incorporating
those emanating from articulation of a constructivist and reflexive account of
GTM. Charmaz offers several questions aimed at sensitizing researchers to the
range of different participants’ viewpoints, issues of power and control, as well
as structure and context, and the ways in which changes come about.
¤ From whose point of view is a given process fundamental? From
whose is it marginal? Do these differences emanate from individual
idiosyncrasies, or are they symptomatic of cultural, ethnic, or other
structural divisions?
¤ How do the observed social processes emerge? How do
participants’ actions construct them? In what sense do participants
create and sustain the social context, and in what senses are they
constrained by it?
¤ How do structure and context serve to support, maintain, impede,
or change this context?
¤ Who exerts control over these processes? Under what conditions?
Are any hierarchies or power differentials in operation—formally
and/or informally?
¤ What meanings do different participants attribute to the process?
How do they talk about it? What do they emphasize? What do they
leave out?
¤ How and when do their meanings and actions concerning the
process change?
¤ How does the involvement of the researcher have an impact on the
setting and interactions of the actors themselves? This challenges
the concept of the neutral observer.
165
¤ How do researchers maintain a balance between the data and their

own experience? Or in Glaser’s terms, between “emergence” and
“theoretical sensitivity?”
In many respects these questions are similar to those that should be posed
by people involved in activities such as organizational (re)-design and change
management, although in these instances their understanding will be con-
cerned primarily with having an immediate impact on the context; however,
this is not always of immediate concern for GTM research, particularly at the
doctoral level. When early computer-based systems were being introduced into
organizations it was always a battle between those who saw this as an opportu-
nity to change the existing structures and practices and those who simply saw
the technology as a way of speeding up and automating existing routines and
conventional practices. The role of Systems Analyst became widespread at this
time (1970s onwards), and the systems analyst was often seen as “an agent of
change.” Working in a fashion similar to a GTM researcher, it was crucial that
systems analysts operated with an open mind, prepared to be shocked and
surprised by their investigations, and using the sort of questions listed above.
In addition, one of the best ways into dialogue with the domain experts in an
organization was not to ask what that person did, but how they would describe
what their colleagues and others did, which raises the issue of the perspective
from which all and any of these questions are posed and answered.
Again, the perceptive reader might wonder whether such an open-ended
and flexible stance is feasible. “Surely”, they wonder, “the researcher(s) must
have something definite in mind at the start of their efforts, even if it is only
a fairly broad idea of a topic worthy of further investigation.” The examples
in this and later chapters illustrate this feature, with many researchers having
a fairly well-defined target, context, or issue from the outset, although this
changed in the light of the initial data collection and analysis (see the example
of Ibraheem Jodeh, the fourth of the examples given at the beginning of this
chapter).
In the years following publication of Glaser and Strauss’s early work,
Strauss took the method to a wider audience of PhD students, both in the
United States and Germany. The response seems to have been enthusiastic, but
it was clearly accompanied by requests for further elucidation about what was
involved in the processes and procedures of the method, mainly in coding.
This is only to be expected because anyone presented with a new technique will
want to know what criteria are available against which one’s progress might be
assessed and evaluated. How does a researcher know that he or she is doing
coding “correctly” or in an “appropriate” manner? In the early days of GTM
there were only a very small number of people with experience in the method,
able to offer requisite forms of guidance and support. Doctoral students were
unlikely to have access to research supervisors with this expertise, and so it
166
was important that further elucidation of the method would become available
and accessible by a wider readership. Glaser’s book on theoretical sensitivity
was one early and highly important example, and it remains a key text for
GTM (Glaser, 1978). It was initially published as part of a series on “Advances
in the Methodology of Grounded Theory,” although there do not seem to have
been any other titles in the series, and this phrase is now given as the subtitle
of the book itself. Strauss published Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists in
1987 and then Basics of Qualitative Research in 1990; Glaser has added to the
GTM literature with numerous expositions and examples of GTM-oriented
PhD research.
Those who have experience in supervising doctoral researchers may well
say that the best strategy is to advise students using GTM to just do it and see
what happens, but this will only be a feasible option if students feel confident
that there will be adequate support from their advisors as frequently and read-
ily as they feel it necessary, and even then students usually access the relevant
literature for additional assurance. I have found that several of my own PhD
students have gone to the literature and returned with their first efforts couched
in terms taken from a specific text—often Strauss and Corbin—despite my
advice not to do so (see Chapter 19). I suspect that in many instances this is
because the ideas expressed in Basics of Qualitative Research are far easier to
interpret as offering a detailed outline of the coding-cum-analyzing process,
even if they were not intended to be treated in a highly systematized manner.
So Glaser’s consternation does appear to be warranted to some extent. Any
effort to offer an explanatory framework runs the risk of being taken far too lit-
erally, so that even heuristic advice gets taken up as if it is an algorithm. Strauss
and Corbin seem to have had some inkling of this, given their comments in
their chapter in the first edition of The Handbook of Qualitative Research.
In fact, when my PhD students did go to the GTM literature at the start
of their work, they did so in an intelligent manner and quickly found a wide
range of sources and examples. For instance Drexler cited many GTM authors
and generally proved himself to be a highly competent practitioner of GTM,
but note the following point he made in his dissertation:
From the practical point of view, the researcher followed the approaches
of a number of research articles which, in his opinion, provided fea-
sible methodological guidance and offered reasonable results (e.g., Pace,
2004; … Drury et al., 2008; …) (emphasis added)
As demonstrated later, however, Drexler certainly did not follow one approach
slavishly, but on the contrary developed his own strategy in line with the
research setting and the engagement with the data.
Charmaz offers a very clear and cogent account of Strauss and Corbin’s
approach in the first two editions of their book (Charmaz, 2014, chapters 5 and
6). She draws attention to the ways in which Strauss and Corbin’s work revises
167
and re-directs GTM, and she also discusses the benefits and drawbacks that
this engenders. She makes her position with regard to this view of GTM very
clear, explaining that axial coding may prove helpful, but that it may also limit
the vision of the researcher. Her preference is for “simple, flexible guidelines,”
although researchers have to be able to tolerate ambiguity in the early stages of
their work. I fully concur with this view, both of Strauss and Corbin’s approach
and the process of coding Charmaz recommends. Interestingly, although sev-
eral of my students refer to Strauss and Corbin’s work, they almost always end
up developing their concepts in a far more flexible manner, and with little or
no recourse to the coding paradigm and the development of hypotheses and
tests. Semiawan, who did make extensive use of the coding paradigm, used it
in parallel with a form of representation and analysis that she developed her-
self (see Chapter 15).
As explained later, in Chapter 11, the later forms of coding to be used—that
is, later in the sense of subsequent to initial, open coding—involve researchers’
confronting what Charmaz defines as the “tension between emergence and
application” (2014, p. 151). Taken out of context, this might appear somewhat
cryptic; it is taken up in more detail in Chapter 11 discussing the GTM process
of theoretical coding. At this point it can be summarized as follows: Moving
from what may well be a plethora of initial codes to a smaller number of more
focused and conceptualized codes or categories involves researchers’ draw-
ing on resources that include the data and open codes, but also application
of schemas and organizing principles from relevant existing sources. Glaser’s
criticism of Strauss and Corbin’s coding paradigm was that it channeled and
constrained this conceptual stage at the expense of the data. But Glaser himself
saw the need for forms of guidance, and in Theoretical Sensitivity, which pre-
dates Strauss’s solo work by more than a decade, he offered his 18 theoretical
coding families (Glaser, 1978, c hapter 4). These include:
¤ The Six Cs (causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences,
covariances, conditions
¤ Process Family (stages, phases, phasings, transitions)
¤ The Degree Family
¤ Type Family
¤ The Strategy Family
¤ Interactive Family
¤ Identity-Self Family
Glaser added to these in his later book Doing Grounded Theory (1998). Clearly
trying to employ the coding paradigm or one or more of the coding families
in a slavish and mechanistic manner will not lead to the development of a
grounded theory or any other form of conceptual insight. Nevertheless, the
process of moving from early coding to an integrated and meaningful model
168
or theoretical statement is not simple or straightforward; conceptual assistance

may prove invaluable if employed in an intelligent manner.
It is interesting to note that when introducing his discussion on theoreti-
cal codes in 1978, Glaser stated that “like substantive codes they are emergent”
(p. 72, emphasis added). This description of the outcome of the process of theo-
retical coding is an evocative one, as the term emergent implies that a com-
plex series of factors leads to an outcome that cannot be fully analyzed only in
terms of its causes and antecedents. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(SEP) offers a concise definition of the concept; “emergent entities (proper-
ties or substances) arise out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’
or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them” (emphasis in original). Yet the article
itself opens with the admonition that “[E]‌mergence is a notorious philosophi-
cal term.” The primary reason for this emanates from arguments concerning
the distinction between the organic and the inorganic, and the human and
the non-human; whether or not consciousness is an emergent property of the
brain. The SEP article quotes from John Stuart Mill:
All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing
inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic
state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of
those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects
which would be produced by the action of the component substances con-
sidered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our
knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to
be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the
separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the
living body itself. (A System of Logic, Bk. III, Ch. 6, §1)
Whatever the merits of such arguments might be, for GTM the use of the
term emergent has resonance in describing the move from gathering of data
to developing and presenting codes and concepts. This process of “moving
beyond the data” should result in something that amounts to an activity other
than re-describing or re-stating details from source data, or in Mill’s words
“no mere summing up of the separate [details].” Furthermore, in defining such
outcomes as emergent, the issue of agency is left open, as opposed to claim-
ing that such outcomes “emerge from the data,” where the theory takes on
an active role in conjunction with some inherent propensity of the data. It is
unfortunate that in his later writings Glaser continues to use the term emerge
rather than emergent. To argue along the lines that codes and concepts “emerge
from the data” disguises the complexities of the actual process, largely obscur-
ing or under-playing the interaction between the active researcher(s) and the
context, including the data. Use of the term emergent codes by itself, however,
still leaves a crucial ambiguity with regard to who is actually responsible for
the final outcomes. Far better to embrace the issue of abduction as a critical
169
and essential aspect of grounded theorizing, as I explain in Chapter 13, avoid-

ing terms such as emerge and emergence altogether.
For all of my PhD students who have used GTM, when it came to their
coding strategies, they chose to follow a path far more akin to that of Charmaz
and some of Glaser’s ideas, rather than Strauss and Corbin’s.They have done
so largely because they found that this is what works, rather than at the urg-
ing of their supervisor. In all cases, however, the process of abstraction-cum-
abduction was clearly in evidence.
The set of questions given above provides one way into the process of
abstracting, but the questions can be supplemented with or substituted by oth-
ers which, although less generic and more attuned to the project, are none-
theless pitched at a sufficiently high level so as not to prejudge the key issues;
such questions allow for unexpected responses. They also provide the basis
for interviewing strategies and also for investigation based on other data
resources, such as documents and archives.
Jodeh in his research started from an initial motivation drawn from his
own background and experience within the taxation system in his home
country. At several points he claims that he started the research without any
preconceptions—despite my protestations to the contrary—but it is evident
that he exemplifies someone seeking to keep an open mind, but certainly not
someone with an empty head. His starting point was his intention to study
“the role of deployment of [Information and Communication Technology]
(ICT) in the taxation systems,” drawing on his “previous experience … as an
auditing and assessing officer.” This is in fact an important point because it
gave him access to people working in the system and so provided the basis for
his initial interviews across three groups of people:
The first group representing tax administration that is responsible for the
introduction and deployment of ICT in the tax system. The second group
representing the assessing and auditing staff that is responsible for using
and benefiting from applications of ICT while achieving their work and
duties. The third group is the local community who benefit from elec-
tronic services through deployment of ICT in tax system, this group is
represented by chartered accountants, taxation experts and tax commis-
sioners as a mature, aware and critical user. (Jodeh PhD thesis)
His first stage interviews were oriented around what he termed “WH-
questions.” The questions themselves were pitched at a generic level, but clearly
anchored to the topic. More important, the ways in which the responses were
analyzed was open-minded.
The researcher was able to conduct his initial interviews only through
unstructured interviews because he began the research without precon-
ceptions or hypotheses (well certainly without hypotheses –A. Bryant).
170
So as to form guiding interests and open-ended ideas, the questions of the

initial interviews were formed to be WH-Questions, such as, Why, How,
What, When, Where and Who; and expressions like: Tell me about… ,
Explain to me … , Could you describe … ? This type of question was
based on the researcher’s experience as well as on some reports of the [XXX
department]. Also, it was based on information released on the website of
the [department] and some of the ministries concerned … (nb: forms of
data –Web site, his own experience and recall of data from his time at the
various bodies concerned. Also use of third person. A. Bryant)
He listed example questions.
What is happening in the tax system after the government decided to
move towards e-government, and after it decided to choose the Tax
Department as a sample for the application of e-government?
How has the Tax Department become able to collect data and
information after the introduction of the application of ICT in the
tax system?
What has changed in the procedures of the auditors and assessing
officers after the introduction of the application of ICT in the tax
system?
How do you decide the priorities of introducing the applications of ICT
in the tax system?
Explain to me the strengths and weaknesses in the deployment of ICT in
the tax system.
Explain to me the challenges that have faced the Department when ICT
was deployed in the tax system.
Tell me about the opportunities available in the Department that help in
accepting ICT in the tax system.
What are the methods you used for the promotion of electronic services
to taxpayers?
How do the staff and the taxpayers evaluate the ICT applications?
Tell me about your evaluation of the deployment of ICT into the tax
system.
Gerhard Drexler provides an example of a slightly different approach.
“Interviews were carried out in three main waves, eleven at the beginning,
nine during selective coding and [an] additional three to strive for theoretical
saturation.” He also used focus groups in the early stages.
For analysis of the statements of the participants the tape was listened to
for several times and emerging topics of each discussion were listed on a
flip chart. Supported by two scientists from the company’s R&D depart-
ment, the whole sessions were listened to again and additional notes
were added to flip charts until no new topics emerged. For the provision
171
of a clearer picture of the outcomes of the focus group, the topics were
categorized and re-arranged until the result was satisfactory in terms of
completeness and structure. A summary of the result was also sent to the
participants asking them to provide amendments or additions if neces-
sary. No replies were received.
In order to create a visual impression of the issues involved in col-
laboration between universities and industry, a cognitive mapping
approach was chosen. Drawing on common language uses of the term, a
map can be defined as a visual representation that establishes a domain,
names the most important entities that exist within that domain, and
simultaneously places them within two or more relationships. A domain
forms a particular landscape and makes it more clearly the subject of
consideration.10
Note how these groups were established and the recordings used for analy-
sis, with initial notes being made in the form of flip chart summaries, which
essentially is a highly preliminary form of coding, and one that relied on con-
sensus from the three people involved. This was followed by listening to the
recordings again in a team of three, resulting in an initial schema of codes
and categories as discussed and defined in Chapter 5. They allowed a form of
member-checking, sending their summaries to the participants for comment a
practice that can prove to be a hazardous and arduous process, and is not one
that I would recommend, although in this case “no replies were received.” Note
also that a visual version of the outcomes was prepared, which proved to be far
from a trivial exercise.
Stella Walsh and Premila Gamage started the process of coding from
highly distinctive positions.
At the early stages of the study my intention was to conduct a qualitative
research but not in accordance with any particular approach. Therefore
at the initial stages the grounded theory approach had not been adopted.
However, as the study progressed and data collection was underway
I located my methods in a grounded theory approach as it fits well with
the study’s interpretivist epistemological position and analytic needs
explained earlier. (Gamage, PhD thesis)
Gamage had already collected much of her data before opting to use GTM, so
her strategy was different, although by no means an unusual one. The sources
of data were five locations in her home country in Asia. Her chief interest was
in a program centered on the development of telecenters in rural locations,
and she had spent time in the field observing what went on and interview-
ing various people involved in managing and using these centers. Telecenters
are “public places where people can access information and communication
technology (ICT),” in many cases this being their only possible access to such
172
facilities. The bulk of her analysis took place after the data had been collected,
and her coding strategy, based on discussions with her supervisors, was to
focus on one of the five centers in the first instance and analyze the data from
that site.Her data was in the form of extensive notes, observations, interviews,
and transcripts. The interviews were semistructured rather than the more
open-ended form favored in the GTM literature, but given the constraints
that existed and the delayed realization that GTM was likely to prove to be
the best approach, this was unavoidable. The key was to be completely frank
about her methodological development and use her insight and theoretical
sensitivity in the analysis stages. Once she had developed initial codes from
this data she moved on to repeat the process with one of the remaining four
sites, which would provide a basis for comparison. There was the risk that the
two subjects of research would prove to have little or nothing in common, but
it was far more likely, given that they were both telecentres, that the results
would indicate commonalities and patterns, so that the preliminary findings
could be applied iteratively to the first telecenter, then refined again if neces-
sary across both of the data sets, resulting in a more focused outcome that
could be used to approach the remaining three examples looked at individu-
ally and collectively.
Another of my students started to use GTM from the outset, but in con-
junction with ethnography and participant observation. Her later analysis
drew on ethnomethodology and discourse analysis. Other researchers have
combined GTM with Action Research [AR], a method that lays stress on pro-
ducing effective interventions in the research domain—the use of the term
action coupled with research. Bob Dick’s chapter in The Handbook of Grounded
Theory discusses the ways in which AR and GTM complement each other; in
brief, whereas the strengths of AR can be found in terms of ideas about action
and intervention, the strength of GTM lies in the way in which it leads to new
theoretical insights tuned to the investigation.
Glaser’s continued stress on “all is data” is borne out by this variety of
methodological experiences and strategies, although his argument that GTM
offers “a total package” seems misleading if it is taken to mean that it cannot
be modified to and combined with other research approaches and situations;
in any case it begs the question “Which form or variant of GTM?” in Chapter
4 I sought to offer a characterization of the “essences” of GTM, drawing on the
work of Glaser, Strauss, Corbin, and Charmaz. This characterization provides
a basis for judging the use of GTM in research projects, although it will not
necessarily be a guide to the quality of the research itself.
In her methodology chapter, Gamage reviewed different approaches to
the method, finally referring to Charmaz’s itemized list of what is common to
GTM, as quoted in Chapter 4. The extent to which Charmaz’s aspects are neces-
sary and sufficient is discussed in the earlier chapter, but the critical issue is the
173
BOX 8.2
Starting Points of the PhD Students
Gerhard Drexler Offers clear contextual statement, based on his

experience and concerns developing from practice and
expertise
Premila Gamage Did not start research with the grounded theory method
(GTM) in mind
Ibraheem Jodeh Similar in some regards to Drexler. Took up GTM from
the start and followed it rigorously; but note the initial
set of questions used in getting started
Transmissia Semiawan GTM in parallel with other methods
Stella Walsh Lightbulb moment early on
way in which any method can be employed in a research project and adapted
to fit the purposes at hand. Gamage and Walsh did not use GTM “according
to the book” or in its canonical form, but they did produce meaningful results,
and GTM was a key component in helping them achieve that. They both dem-
onstrated methodological sensitivity as well as theoretical sensitivity.
Chapter 9 deals in more detail with the coding strategies taken by my
research students. The range and variety of these strategies demonstrate that it
is not helpful to ask the extent to which each study has adhered to some single
idea of GTM, but rather to appreciate how GTM has helped the researchers
arrive at robust and insightful outcomes, including the articulation of a sub-
stantive theory. These examples, and others to be found in the literature, pro-
vide the basis for lessons to be learned in terms of methodological insights and
innovations, enhancing researchers’ understanding of GTM in use.
Box 8.2 summarizes the differing starting points of the PhD students
referred to in this chapter.11
Key Points
¤ Importance of clarifying your motivation and rationale for

undertaking a research project
¤ Problems regarding avoiding or suspending preconceptions
¤ Different metaphors of cognition—suspending and unblocking,
constructing, jargonzing
¤ All is data; but data is not all

¤ Suggested initial questions for GTM-oriented research, but examples
of alternative starting points from PhD students
¤ Coding and abstraction—avoiding The Funes Problem
174
Notes
1. Znaniecki himself welcomed Blumer’s critique, calling it “profound and salutary”;

see https://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Thomas/Thomas_1939a.html
2. A colleague who saw Glaser’s book Jargonizing (2009) remarked that the outcome of
his “GT [grounded theory] based on one year’s careful reading and constant comparison of
the 27 articles, plus introduction and glossary, in the Sage Handbook (Bryant and Charmaz,
2007)” was all too predictable given that the only contributions exempted from his criti-
cisms were those by himself and his frequent co-author Judith Holton: So perhaps this was
not an example of starting a GT study with an open mind. An extract from Glaser’s book is
available at http://groundedtheoryreview.com/2009/03/30/992/
3. Geert Hofstede has written extensively about cultural differences; the TAM is the
Technology Acceptance Model.
4. Kuhn uses the example of developments in atomic theory in the nineteenth century
influenced by John Dalton, who was primarily a meteorologist, and so something of an
outsider with regards to chemistry.
5. Use of the prefix “post” indicates movement “beyond,” while “neo” indicates some-
thing “new.” Yvonna Denzin and Norman Lincoln refer to post-positivism, but it hardly
differs from positivism according to their account. Loraine Blaxter and colleagues also use
the term, but simply refer to Denzin and Lincoln. As I explained in Chapter 2, the distinc-
tion that has the most “grab,” as far as I can see, is the one that centers on truth being either
“discovered” or “constructed.” Readers should refer to sources such as Denzin and Lincoln
and the Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry for Auguste Comte http://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/comte/ for further elucidation.
6. In the United States it is conventional to use the term data as a plural—Charmaz
uses sentences along the lines of “the date are… .” In the United Kingdom the term is mostly
used as if it is singular—I use sentences such as “the data is gathered.”
7. http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/Intro_QDA/how_what_to_code.php This is an interest-
ing Web site that offers a wide range of coding ideas and tips. Researchers should be ready
to experiment in the early stages of their research, and to keep an open mind regarding
coding procedures. They should also be aware that the “preferred method” on one project
may not necessarily prove effective and applicable to a later one.
8. It is unclear whether Glaser coined the term qualitative data analysis (QDA), or
whether it was already in use, but it has now achieved a level of general acceptance among
researchers, devoid of the resonances that Glaser imparts to the term—see for instance
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/Intro_QDA/what_is_qda.php
9. Glaser’s writings offer many examples. “It is simple enough to get out of the data
to the emergence of conceptualization if the researcher uses the GT procedures set out in
detail in many of my books.” “When not laced and lumped with QDA requirements, GT
procedures are fairly simple.”
10. In many regards this is a similar approach to the Venn diagrams provided in
Chapter 5.
11. Chapter 19 comprises extended accounts from four students of their use of GTM,
including Premila Gamage, Transmissia Semiawan, and Stella Walsh, as well as a new name,
Andrea Gorra.
175
Coding Strategies
TALES FROM THE FRONT LINE
According to Darwin’s Origin of Species, it is not the most intellectual

of the species that survives; it is not the strongest that survives;
but the species that survives is the one that is able best to adapt
and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds itself.
(Megginson, ‘Lessons from Europe for American Business’,
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (1963) 44(1): 3-13, at p. 4.)
In order to give further substance to the discussion on coding, I now present

detailed accounts of the coding strategies used by my PhD students.1 Readers
should note that although there are significant differences in the approaches
taken, there are also clear and important similarities. Initially each researcher’s
strategy is described and illustrated with relevant examples. The chapter con-
cludes with analysis of the different approaches and the common aspects. In
several instances the primary language in which the data was gathered was not
English. In all cases, however, once the data was in a form ready for the stu-
dent’s analysis, other important issues arose concerning the process of analysis
itself. Different GTM authors advocate different coding strategies, but they all
stress the need to get close to the data. In her work on coding, Kathy Charmaz
offers a number of precepts under “code for coding” (p. 120, 2014—terms in
italics); in each case I have added my own explanation of what each involves:
Remain open—Although researchers will inevitably approach the research
domain with preexisting knowledge and ideas, they must be prepared to be
surprised and challenged by what they find, resisting the temptation to fit their
data to familiar conceptual frameworks of classifications. This means that a
researcher’s initial responses to the data should be more in line with, “That’s
something I hadn’t thought of before; not what I expected” (surprise), rather
than, “Oh yes, that’s just like X’s theory or model” (confirmation of existing
and expected ideas).
Stay close to the data—Coding should be clearly seen to derive from the
data, rather than being based on major conceptual leaps invoking the experi-
ence and knowledge of the person doing the coding. To an extent, leaps of this 175
176
kind come in later in the research process, and therefore they are a key aspect
of Chapter 13, on abduction.
Keep your codes simple and precise & Construct short codes—Avoid using
lengthy verbatim extracts from the data as codes. Think of codes as signaling
an issue in the data, rather than as a complete definition or detailed descrip-
tion. Such definitions and descriptions are best written in memos for the
researcher’s codes, a feature of later stages of the work.
Preserve actions—In the introduction to Part Three I explained that both
Kathy Charmaz and Barney Glaser favor the use of gerunds as part of the over-
all aim of producing theories that center on action and social processes. In the
discussion in both editions of her book, Charmaz distinguishes between “cod-
ing for topics and themes,” and “thematic coding,” and she provides a stark
illustration of the differences between the two forms of coding applied to the
same data. Nevertheless, as shown in the examples that follow, this need not
always be the case, and it may well be that trying to impose gerunds on the
early coding is not the best strategy.
Compare data with data—Once the process of coding is underway it is
important to retain control of the codes, as they rapidly proliferate and can
become unmanageable. GTM is the method of constant comparison, and that
is an important feature throughout coding, because it should lead researchers
constantly to be aware of how their codes might be classified in relation to one
another, something else that is illustrated in the examples that follow.
Move quickly through the data—Coding, particularly in the initial stages
of research, should not be something the investigator agonizes over. Glaser’s
favoring of field notes over verbatim transcripts of recorded interviews ema-
nates in part from this concern, Glaser cautioned that a researcher’s theoretical
sensitivity is more likely to be brought into play in the preparation and revisit-
ing of notes than in detailed analysis of the full transcript. This was certainly
the case in my abbreviated GTM study on Research Pitching.
These advisory comments on coding are useful as heuristics for research-
ers who have not tried this approach before, but the only way to become an
accomplished GTM coder is to do some coding oneself. The key purpose of
initial coding is to scrutinize the data in order to produce usable and useful
abstractions. The paradox is that to a large extent the usefulness and usability
will only come to light once later stages of the work have been completed.
Coding is a special and nuanced form of abstraction that requires skill, prac-
tice, and expertise—that is, “theoretical sensitivity.” Novice and relatively
inexperienced GTM researchers are understandably daunted by this activity,
raising concerns such as the following:
¤ What do I code?
¤ When do I start coding?
¤ How will I know if my coding is working?
¤ How do I cope with all the codes?
177
Coding Strategies 177
¤ What about using technology?

¤ What’s the difference between line-by-line, word-by-word, and
incident-by-incident coding?
The following extracts should provide material that helps resolve these con-
cerns Then, in the concluding section of this chapter, I return to them and
other issues raised by these examples.
Andrea Gorra Described Her Coding Strategy
The data collection and analysis for this study followed a cyclical
process typical for GTM, by using early findings to shape the on-going
data collection. The pilot study involved tracking participants’ mobile
phones and conducting eight interviews. This data collection phase was
followed by five more in-depth interviews that helped to explore issues
raised in the pilot study. The survey aimed at exploring the research
area on a wider scale than would have been possible with interviews
being conducted and analysed by a sole researcher. More interviews
were undertaken after the completion of the survey and these could
address issues brought up by initial survey findings. Details about the
sampling approaches for each of the three data collection phases can be
found in the relevant sections in this chapter.
Respondents’ perceptions and beliefs are at the heart of qualitative
research and this was the main motivation for complementing the
location requests with interviews. Semi-structured interviews were
conducted with all four participants shortly before and after the four
week tracking period to learn about their opinions and perceptions
regarding mobile phone location data and privacy. The interview
questions were of exploratory nature due to the small scale of this
study and early stage in the overall research project. The questions were
designed to identify patterns and common themes in the participants’
accounts and sought to identify the meaning of privacy in relation to
mobile phone location data in the participants’ everyday lives.
During the interviews it was important not to restrain the
participants but to give them time to talk about how they understood
and described their experience of mobile phone tracking. This was
particularly important as privacy is such an elusive concept, that can be
perceived differently by different people. Figure 9.1 gives an overview
of the interview themes.2
Once she had completed the pilot study, Gorra moved on to two further
phases of interviews, which are referred to in Chapter 11. For present pur-
poses, the interesting aspect of her strategy was the way in which she captured
178
Geographical
Location
Participants'
definition
Technology
Awareness
of location data Privacy
Trade for
personal gain?
Legal
Framework
Nothing to worry,
nothing to hide?
Tracking
Access
Control over Misuse
location data Concern
Retention
Dissemination Trust
In government
In service
provider
FIGURE 9.1 Graphical representation of interview themes.
the data as she developed her ideas. She set out to use the software package
NVivo in the early stages of her work, but she later described this in her the-
sis as “a false start,” although she did perform the first stages of coding using
NVivo. Later, however, she re-coded her data and noted down her codes on
colored sticky notes, which allowed her to rearrange them as she added to
them and analyzed them again.
Once she was satisfied with the arrangement of the codes, she transcribed
the details into a matrix created as a Word document, with the codes on the
left-hand side and their properties and dimensions on the right-hand side.
These codes were re-applied to the interview transcripts using NVivo, from
which a final set of codes was produced. An overview of this process is pre-
sented in her diagram, reproduced here as Figure 9.2.
Gorra remarked that she found that her “initial codes were often either
too narrow, too close to the interviewees’ exact words or seemed to mirror
themes known from the literature.” The re-coding exercise not only helped
her extricate herself from the difficulties she encountered using NVivo, it also
179
Codes on Post-it Matrix with properties & (Re-)apply codes to
Final codes in NVivo
notes dimensions in MS Word interviews in NVivo
Writing Memos
= when developing the final

categories and links between them,
Categories and initial
the writing of memos became particularly
theoretical framework
important.
FIGURE 9.2 Graphical representation of coding process.
180
resulted in a set of codes that provided a far richer foundation for further
research and analysis. Some new codes reconfirmed the initial ones, but many
led to revision and refinement of the earlier ones. Thus she did not claim to
have discounted her prior knowledge of existing work, but instead worked
through the data with a critical orientation attuned to discounting received
ideas in favor of the data itself.
Some of her memos were used to reflect on changes in codes and the
respondents’ perspectives on the subject area. Furthermore she worked with a
“fellow student who also used the grounded theory approach,” swapping inter-
view transcripts with her and comparing results. “In a feedback session follow-
ing this exchange, codes were discussed and confirmed.”
Gerhard Drexler’s Coding Strategy
As noted in Chapter 8, Drexler initially developed his work using focus groups
rather than individual interviews, and initial coding took place with him and
two colleagues noting points on flip-charts. Thus he notes the following issues
with regard to his strategy.
Preliminary documentation was done hand-written during the sessions.
Immediately after each session a summary of the notes was presented to
the participants and corrected or completed if necessary. The whole ses-
sion was audio-taped.
According to Yin (2003), data analysis consists of examining, catego-
rizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence. For analysis
of the statements of the participants the tape was listened to for several
times and emerging topics of each discussion were listed on a flip-chart.
Supported by two scientists from the company’s R&D department, the
whole sessions were listened to again and additional notes were added
to flip-charts until no new topics emerged. For the provision of a clearer
picture of the outcomes of the focus group, the topics were categorized
and re-arranged until the result was satisfactory in terms of completeness
and structure. A summary of the result was also sent to the participants
asking them to provide amendments or additions if necessary. No replies
were received.
The two R&D colleagues are not referred to by name, and it is unclear the
extent to which they had input in determining in what regards the outcome
was “satisfactory.” It must, however, be assumed that the final decision was that
of Drexler himself. Once this initial coding had been accomplished, he opted
for a visual representation of the outcome.
In order to create a visual impression of the issues involved in collabora-
tion between universities and industry, a cognitive mapping approach was
181
chosen. Drawing on common language uses of the term, a map can be

defined as a visual representation that establishes a domain, names the
most important entities that exist within that domain, and simultaneously
places them within two or more relationships. A domain forms a particu-
lar landscape and makes it more clearly the subject of consideration.
An example of a cognitive map from Drexler’s work is reproduced as Figure 9.3.
Premila Gamage Coding Strategy
Gamage noted that her approach combined ideas from Anselm Strauss and
Julie Corbin, as well as Charmaz and Glaser.
Although this study was conducted more in line with [the] Strauss and
Corbin (1998) and Charmaz (2006) approach, transcripts were ana-
lysed using “key point coding” (Glaser, 1992) which means identifying
key points rather than individual words. Strauss and Corbin’s (2008)
“microanalysis technique, analysing data line-by-line and word-by-word”
(pp. 58–60) was not used because dividing the data into individual words
sometimes causes the analysis to become lost within the details of data.
This may have especially true in this study and may have led to greater
confusion since the interviews were conducted in Sinhala language (one
of the native languages in Sri Lanka) and translated into English.
I revisited transcripts again and again to identify points such as
events, activities, functions, relationships, contexts, influences and out-
comes (Douglas, 2003) regarded as important to the investigation.
Glaser’s idea of key point coding contrasts with coding that aims to examine
each line or even each word. Coding with an eye on “key points” raises the
issue of what counts as a key point, although Glaser would probably contend
that these aspects “emerge from the data.” But if we eschew what Charmaz
describes as an objectivist account of research in favor of a constructivist one,
researchers will have to contend with the issue that one person’s key point may
be peripheral or invisible to another person, the outcomes of each being influ-
enced by their respective forms and levels of theoretical sensitivity. Coding is
a process of “separating the music from the noise,” but one person’s music may
be another’s noise.
This chapter is concerned with coding strategies, notably the broad range
of approaches used by students seeking to achieve their overall objectives. The
distinctions between key point, line-by-line, and word-by-word coding are
those of different tactics—that is, more focused activities aimed at more imme-
diate results. Discussion of these different tactics usually takes place against
the background of data in the form of notes or transcripts of open-ended
182
Personal
Phone & Mail Meetings
+
+ Knowledge
Literature & Getting in Touch
Spillover
Patents
Partner +
Reputation –
+
+ + Social Idea Generation
Networks
+
Positive Partner +
Attitude Identification
+ Non-disclosure
+ agreement
– Partner
Familiarity +
Events &
Congresses Project planning
Brokers & & contract Funding
Internet +
opportunities
+ +
Existing
Barriers Letter of
Intent Project Procedural
Feasibility
FIGURE 9.3 Cognitive map.
183
interviews. Thus word-by-word coding would require verbatim transcripts of

all or part of the interview, and close analysis of each word. Nevertheless, a full
transcript might also include nonverbal utterances and incomplete or indis-
tinct terms that might prove elusive for coding. Line-by-line coding is also
problematic for interviews, as it is not clear what constitutes a “line,” and this
determination will be dependent on how the data is presented and organized.
Glaser’s preference for “key point” coding aligns with his advising against
recording and transcribing interviews. If the researcher does not have access
to the full transcript he or she will be less likely to focus on the minutiae of
respondents’ exact wording, instead becoming attuned to aspects as they arise
in the course of the exchanges.
Tactically, key point coding may well be the best option, and it is likely
to prove useful as an entry point for those new to this approach. As opposed
to the fairly definitive ideas of either line-by-line or word-by-word coding,
key point coding is something of a sensitizing tactic—that is, there is no hard-
and-fast specification for identifying ‘key points’, it is more a case of seeing
the strategy as a general guide. Furthermore the most effective orientation in
terms of judging the outcomes of this form of coding may well be what is
termed IKIWISI—I’ll Know It When I See it.
An increasing amount of data used in GTM research now comes in the
form of documents, Web sites, and various electronic sources—emails, tweets,
conversations and exchanges on social media sites. Given this range of differ-
ent types of data, it is critical that coding be carried out with a clear under-
standing of the nature of the data drawn from this wide and disparate group
of sources. Thus documents that may have gone through several drafts and
revisions will demand close textual analysis in order to try to bring out the
deliberations that may have gone into the published version, whereas many
informal and less prepared and primed forms of data may not. Charmaz’s
point about “moving quickly through the data,” however, applies to all forms,
whether written, noted down, or transcribed, and the idea of moving quickly
reinforces Glaser’s preference for key points or incidents.
Gamage makes the point that she was worried about getting lost in the
details if she tried any “microanalysis” techniques, particularly because she
had conducted the interviews in one language and coded in another. This is to
understand that translation is a process that aims to preserve the sense of the
original in the language into which it has been translated. It is never simply a
process of word-for-word conversion. GTM coding, however, has a completely
different objective; breaking the data apart and focusing on certain aspectsof
it. Gamage’s coding was done with an eye for what she terms “events, activities,
functions, relationships, contexts, influences and outcomes,” a list she attri-
butes to David Douglas (2003).
An example of Gamage’s key points is provided in Table 9.1, which also
indicates the potential codes derived from each. The data is from Gamage’s
184
TABLE 9.1
Examples of key points and codes from the data in Kotmale (Sri Lanka) research site
Key point Code
Kt1P25 This time we charged for all courses Charging a nominal fee, Thinking of
because we have to pay the bills and sustainability, Living poor people
attend to other maintenance. But a small
fee. Compared to other institutions very
much less. Poor people live in this area.
Kt2P17 Charged little more than the previous time, Increasing fees little, Living poor
but very little because poor people live people, Thinking sustainability,
around. We also provided other services Providing additional services
like photocopy, fax, typesetting
Kt4P6 Students who come for Nenasala classes Using Internet only by Nenasala
only use Internet. Not any others. People students, Struggling to live life,
have other priorities. They lead a difficult Having different needs in life, Using
life. Their needs are different because of Internet rarely for educational
the simple life. It’s very rarely use Internet purposes, Using Internet mainly for
for educational purposes. Watch You Tube recreational purposes.
and listen music.
Kt6P5 Used Internet only during the course but not Not using Internet after the course,
much. Watched cricket match. Never used Using Internet for recreational
e-mail even during the course. purposes, Not using e-mail at all
Kt7P5 We have a simple life. We don’t need Leading a simple life, Finding Internet
Internet for our life. It is good for is not useful, Finding useful for
education. education
investigation of the Nenasala education program in Kotale in central Sri Lanka,

a educational program in computer use initiated after the 2004 tsunami.
Following the example set by Gorra, Gamage had started out using sticky
notes, but she found them too unwieldy to use in reality, although she mim-
icked the approach using software.
The coding was done manually. Initially I thought to do coding by using
“post-it notes” but had to give up the idea for practical reasons. At the
initial level of coding, a large number of codes get generated. Therefore a
considerable amount of space is required for laying post-it notes for sort-
ing. Therefore, I used MS Word as a substitute surface and tables, and
text-boxes as post-it notes. A colour code was applied to differentiate the
research sites, concepts and categories.
The codes on the left-hand side of Table 9.2, which is taken from the work
completed by Gamage, are grouped together and used in developing a single
code on the right-hand side. Gamage clearly took the idea of using gerunds to
heart; all codes listed make use of this form.
Stella Walsh Coding Strategy
Walsh’s research on food choices and nutrition did not begin with GTM, and
the change was only decided on later, after her first contact with the research
185
TABLE 9.2
Gamage’s refinement of coding
Initial open codes Changed to
Depending on donors totally

Starting to collapse without donor support Depending on donors
Funding from international bodies
Not getting enough support from the Sri Lanka Information

Not getting enough support
and Communication Technology Agency (ICTA)
from ICTA
Getting little support even now
Depending on outside support

Receiving outside support Depending on outside support
Receiving support from the United States
Receiving government support as the first center

Finding impossible to operate without Subsidies
Depending on subsidies
Asking for further subsidies
Thinking religious institutes need more Subsidies
Finding difficult to pay bills after subsidies

Requiring some support even after the Subsidies Depending on subsidies
Not receiving any support from ICTA after 5 years
setting. Once she had set out to use GTM, however, she set up a number of
interviews and ended up with more than 60 hours of recordings. In many
cases a scheduled one hour interview went on for considerably longer, which
is a common experience in qualitative research. She collected quantitative
data, and this was also used in her coding and analysis. She cited the work of
Thomas Wengraf (2001), who “argues that there can be the misunderstand-
ing that information from qualitative interviewing can simply be extracted and
quoted” (Walsh PhD thesis—emphasis added). Coding in GTM is far from a
simple exercise in “extraction”; rather it is based on a systematic process of cat-
egorization, which as Charmaz points out is not a linear process but one that
requires considerable thought, interpretation, and consideration on the part of
the researcher. “The aim of coding was the systematic process to reduce data
and identify the drivers that influenced food choices and consumption pat-
terns (emergent themes) and subsequently move to develop theory.” Walsh’s
idea of “reducing the data” refers to the ways in which a large number of
codes are analyzed in order to produce a far smaller number of categories that
embrace the key themes and provide interim points of reference as a theory or
model is developed.
Categories are therefore more than names assigned to different events
or clumps of data and involve conceptualisation of essential elements
or features (Egan, 2002). A category is deemed to be saturated when it
is rich in detail and no additional data is being found and collection of
any new data would have limited value (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The
process continued in an inductive way until categories were saturated
186
and no further properties emerged. Other categories were rejected if suf-

ficient information was not found in the data or subsequent interviews
revealed nothing significant.
Walsh notes that initially she made use of “themes that had been identified
before the interviews, income, shopping, class and age.” In some cases these
proved useful as the work progressed, but others were later excluded, such
as “influence of religious practices on food choice, as they were never raised;
use of cookery books as they were not used and individual personal likes and
dislikes.” Reporting aspects in this manner makes it clear that the researcher
was sensitive to the data and prepared to dispense with some of her initial
ideas. For Walsh, the coding process was fluid and presented her with many
surprises as “categories developed and sub-categories formed, whilst others
were found to be of less value and were either merged with developing cat-
egories or seen as single incidents that remained unsaturated and excluded… .
Ownership of property was only mentioned twice and was therefore excluded.
Moreover the two views were contradictory and therefore property did not
develop as a saturated category.” This is an insightful and thoughtful account of
her experience and probably resonates with many others who have used GTM
in their research.
In terms of general organization and management of her data, Walsh
devised her own “personalised method … that combined the use of multiple
paper copies” which were “cut up and put in folders” and “file” cards. She “read
and re-read” her transcripts, composing memos; in some cases adding these
in the margins of her paper copies. In later stages paper copies were selected
and sections cut out and sorted into categories. She took great care to append
details to these materials “so that an audit of the sections could be tracked.” She
also used a range of colored papers to help in sorting and identifying. After a
time, however, this mass of paper became overwhelming, and she moved on to
use of Word files; one for each interview transcript, to a total of 42. It is worth
quoting from her work with regard to the next stages, as she illustrates the way
in which a researcher using a GTM-oriented approach often needs to move
away from strict adherence to the method in order to progress with the data at
hand. Again, it is important that researchers are candid and honest about this
in reporting their approach.
These [the Word files of the transcripts –A. Bryant] were searched for
key terms and concepts in the same way as the paper copies using dif-
ferent colours in the text. Once initial searches had taken place the data
was then transferred into files. Coding included more initial direction
than identified and would be desired by GTM outlined by Strauss and
Corbin (1998). Although coding the interviews was undertaken system-
atically to achieve validity and the identification of core categories the
187
data was not coded in the same manner in a strict GTM as the coding
system was based on some pre-existing categories such as age related
choices, gendered nature of choices, income and shopping. The data also
included the quantitative data, which were analysed using basic numeri-
cal methods and although tabulated and presented separately were not
analysed separately but in an integrated manner although they were
quantified and not included in the coding. The quantitative data from
the food frequencies and itemised till-receipts provided a useful com-
parative measure of foods consumed and purchased and were used to
develop a background of data, identifying similarities in food choices
and patterns of consumption. The quantitative and qualitative data were
used as independent measures to triangulate data and also underpin
analysis of patterns of consumption and types and variety of foods eaten
which provided key understanding of concepts of food choices, role of
expenditure and views of income and food choices. The data therefore
aided and added to the qualitative data.
Walsh also used diagrammatic tools in her work, including the Inspiration
package,3 which incorporates mind-mapping software with memo-writing
facilities. She offered a clear and succinct account of her approach (Box 9.1).
BOX 9.1
Walsh’s research strategy—summary form
The following summarizes the approach taken in the current study based on GT
guidelines;
Literal transcriptions were made of the taped interviews

Memo-riting throughout the process of transcription and interviewing
Interviews were interrogated before the next staged interview and guided the
questions in the second interview
Patterns within the data were searched through constant comparison and
memo-writing, based initially on line-by-line reading of the transcribed interviews
and re-listening to the tapes to establish initial categories.
The data were looked at for “empirical indicators” consisting of behavioral
actions and events. Descriptions by the women, identified by actions, episodes,
ideas, or events that shared common characteristics were coded into categories.
Provisional code names were given and codes developed as the text was read and
reread.
The categories were initially provisional and developed by open coding, and
further systematic linkages between the codes were identified and categories
developed.
The process developed with further verification that the incident fitted into the
category and progressed to coding,
Development of theoretical comparisons, with the literature as an integral part
of the development of theory based on evolving theoretical analysis.
Development of the literature review as themes demanded.
188
Ibraheem Jodeh Coding Strategies
Jodeh began his data collection on the introduction of Information and

Communication Technology (ICT) into the Tax Department in his home
country with a series of unstructured phone interviews, which were recorded
with the agreement of his respondents. He built on his prior experience work-
ing in the tax office in his home country and decided to conduct initial inter-
views with representatives from three groups of people: tax administrators
“responsible for the introduction and deployment of ICT in the tax system”;
representatives of those charged with “assessing and auditing staff … respon-
sible for using and benefiting from applications of ICT” in their work; mem-
bers of the local community “who benefit from electronic services through
deployment of ICT in tax system,” including “chartered accountants, taxation
experts and tax commissioners.”
As noted in Chapter 8, Jodeh used a series of what he termed “WH-
Questions” (WH indicating “what?” “who?”) in these interviews. For example
“Tell me about …” “Explain to me …” “Could you describe … ?” He also
drew on information available on various official Web sites, such as those of
various government departments connected with ICT and finance. The ques-
tions themselves might appear to be more directing than ought to be the case
for GTM-oriented research, but the ways in which he used the responses vin-
dicated his approach and led him to develop his work in an open-minded
and insightful manner (Box 9.2). His approaches to data gathering and his
responses are discussed further in Chapter 10 and 11.
He was well aware of the differences between those who do and those who
do not encourage recording interviews; explicitly referring to Glaser (1998),
who sees recording as leading to “a loss in time and data,” and Charmaz (2008,
p. 87), who supports recording interviews because it “provides details about
data and gives new insights and more codes to the researchers.”
Transmissia Semiawan Initial Phase
Semiawan began her coding using the line-by-line tactic. This was followed by
focused coding, which resulted in identification of various categories, includ-
ing their properties and dimensions. The line-by-line coding also involved
Charmaz’s suggestion of looking for indication of “actions” in the data. To
assist in this process Semiawan made the following points:
To make the processes easier, the researcher applied the following steps:
From the textual data of interview, find the significant data by inter-
preting the reality there in the data based on each of “the participants’
actions and statements.” This is the way the researcher analysed the data
from each participant’s perspective.
189
BOX 9.2
Jodeh’s “WH-Questions”
The following are some examples of these questions:

What is happening in the tax system after the government decided to move
towards e-government, and after it decided to choose the Tax Department as a
sample for the application of e-government?
How has the Tax Department become able to collect data and information
after the introduction of the application of Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) in the tax system?
What has changed in the procedures of the auditors and assessing officers
after the introduction of the application of ICT in the tax system?
How do you decide the priorities of introducing the applications of ICT in the
tax system?
Explain to me the strengths and weaknesses in the deployment of ICT in the
tax system.
Explain to me the challenges that have faced the Department when ICT was
deployed in the tax system.
Tell me about the opportunities available in the Department that help in
accepting ICT in the tax system.
What are the methods you used for the promotion of electronic services to
taxpayers?
How do the staff and the taxpayers evaluate the ICT applications?
Tell me about your evaluation of the deployment of ICT into the tax system.
Symbolise or make a code of the significant data “with words that

reflect the action” (Charmaz, 2006) and create a list of action phrases.
According to Strauss (1987) these action phrases are called empirical-
indicators that are the actual data that describes actions or statements in
“the words” of the participants.
Focus on the list of action phrases and do comparative analysis over
the action phrases and find one or more phrases that have similar ideas
or meanings.
Try to think of a “name” which represents a group with similar mean-
ing. As the comparison process continues, the indicators are becoming
concept-indicators that lead the researcher towards “an underlying unifor-
mity which in turn results in categories” (Strauss, 1987). This is the begin-
ning of applying the OO ideas of conceptualisation and class relationship
as the researcher sensitively4 examines the data and objectifying the phe-
nomena by looking at similarities and differences through the data.5
The result of this step was 15 “groups of action phrases with similar ideas or
meaning.” These included “Bureaucracy,” “Experiences,” “Technology,” and
“Users.” This was followed by application of axial coding aimed at providing
“more precise and complete explanations about the phenomena” (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998); involving specification of relationships between categories and
subcategories, as well as “the properties and dimensions of a category.” The
objective of this step was to “reassemble the data … fractured during initial
190
coding to give coherence to emerging analysis” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 60, quoted

by Semiawan in her PhD thesis).
Semiawan made extensive use of Strauss and Corbin’s ideas, which are
highly distinctive and heavily criticized by Glaser. In this regard she has so far
proved unique among my students to date, being the only one who used axial
coding and the approach offered by Strauss and Corbin in a concerted manner.
She refers to the second edition of their book Basics of Qualitative Research in
describing their coding paradigm.
… a combination of the following three elements (Strauss and Corbin,
1998):
conditions: set or circumstances or situations, in which phenom-
ena are embedded; these answer the why, where, how come, and when
questions
actions/interactions: strategic or routine responses made by individ-
uals or groups to issues, problems, happenings, or events that arise under
those conditions; these answer by whom and how questions
consequences: outcomes of actions/interactions; these answer what
happens because of actions/interactions
The three elements, as Strauss-Corbin further explained, give “pat-
terns of happenings, events, or actions/interactions that represent what
people do or say, alone or together, in response to the problems and situa-
tions in which they find themselves”
However Semiawan also refers to Glaser’s “18 types of coding families” as
potentially of use to GTM researchers at this point. She makes reference to his
“model” type, and uses it “to illustrate the generated theory … [taking] two
models to describe the theory, one is an algorithm-like model and the other is
diagrammed-style model.” The approach taken by Semiawan was itself highly
innovative and effective in her work, and it is discussed as a topic in its own
right in more detail in Chapter 15.
In essence she saw the process of specifying and establishing categories
and their relationships as one in which the “theory is developed from the data
by means of the core process of comparative analysis through which the data
is conceptualized and integrated to form a theory using the coding process
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998).” This form of coding process involved identifying
“elements of the theory –categories, properties and hypotheses” which were
used in conceptualizing the theory itself.
Other Coding Strategies
Another student adopted the coding strategy of open coding followed by selec-
tive coding. The former involved the “process of breaking down, examining,
191
comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data. The aim of open coding

was the development of categories.” This was followed by selective coding
which “involved selecting a core category: systematically relating it to other
categories, validating those relationships and filling in categories that needed
further development or refinement.” This was accompanied by writing memos
which provided “records of analysis and diagrams [and] were developed as
visual representations of the relationship between concepts.”
This student started her research as a “study of designers with the intent
in examining how they worked within multidisciplinary teams.” As her work
progressed she came to understand that “this was the point of departure to look
at other data” (emphasis added). This is common in GTM-oriented research,
and she referred to Charmaz (2006 p. 17), who noted that “we may begin our
studies from those vantage points but need to remain as open as possible to what-
ever we see and sense in the early stages of the research.”
As part of his research and preparation, another student, Zoran Mitrovic,
contacted various people with experience in writing about and using GTM. He
noted that some of the respondents suggested that he use Glaser’s theoretical
coding families, such as “Six Cs, degree, dimension, to mention only a few out
of the 18.” He also noted, however, that Glaser himself is wary of those who
might prove over-reliant on the coding families strategy which “leads scholars
to impute conscious intentions when participants may not hold them” (Glaser,
1978, p. 76, quoted in Mitrovic, PhD thesis). Thus Mitrovic did not use “any
single coding family,” but “all of these categories or concepts were concep-
tually described through their origin, conceptual characteristics (properties),
and the possible way/s of achieving them.”
It is noteworthy that all of the students used visual representation as part
of their coding strategy. This is an issue that did not figure in the early writ-
ings on GTM. I suspect that GTM researchers from those times may have
used various informal visualizations in their work, but mostly they would have
been rough-and-ready sketches that remained with the researcher’s private
notes. In recent times, however, with the advent of readily available and usable
computer graphics packages, there are opportunities to develop visualizations
quickly and easily that are presentable and informative for published versions
of GTM research, as well as highly valuable to the researchers themselves as
they develop their ideas. This trend is certain to continue as new researchers
will have grown up with the expectation of having and using software applica-
tions for such purposes. The point made in Chapter 2, however, regarding the
care that needs to be taken in incorporating such representations into pub-
lished papers and the like needs to be borne in mind when a researcher intends
to incorporate visual representations into formal publications.
What the examples drawn from my students also demonstrate is that they
had clearly consulted numerous sources on GTM coding, including the found-
ing texts, the separate writings of Glaser, and Strauss, Strauss and Corbin, and
192
TABLE 9.3
Summary of coding strategies employed in the work of six PhD students
Gerhard Focus groups followed by interviews
Drexler Recorded the sessions
Reviewed with 2 R&D colleagues
Member checking—BUT no responses
Visual model produced—Cognitive mapping
Premila Not using GTM at the start
Gamage Mix of Glaser, Strauss and Corbin, Charmaz, Bryant
Ref Douglas 2003
Manual coding—mimicking sticky notes approach but in software—MS Word and
colors
Stella Walsh 60+ hours of interviews
Coding “to reduce data and identify the drivers that influenced food choices and
consumption patterns (emergent themes) and subsequently move to develop
theory”
A personalized method of organization was first developed that combined the use
of multiple paper copies; “cut up and put in folders” and “file” cards. The actual
process required that the transcripts were read and re-read and memos added.
Memo writing was an essential part of grounded theory analysis. Memos and
notes were made in the margins, and work was copied with double spacing with
comments made in the available space. Material was chosen, sections were
cut up and put into categories. Source information was added to the cut out
sections so that an audit of the sections would allow the material be tracked.
The use of different colored paper was found to be a simple but practical aid in
sorting and identifying categories quickly.
THEN the researcher moved to use of computer when the amount of paper became
unmanageable
Mind-mapping—visual
Summary
9 points
The following list summarizes the approach taken in the current study based on GT
guidelines;
1. Literal transcriptions were made of the taped interviews
2. Memo writing was done throughout the process of transcription and interviewing
3. Interviews were interrogated before the next staged interview and guided the
questions in the second interview
4. Patterns within the data were searched through constant comparison and memo
writing, based initially on line-by-line reading of the transcribed interviews and re-
listening to the tapes to establish initial categories.
5. The data was looked at for “empirical indicators” consisting of behavioral
actions and events. Descriptions by the women, identified by actions, episodes,
ideas, or events that shared common characteristics were coded into
categories. Provisional code names were given and codes were developed, as
the text was read and reread.
6. The categories were initially provisional and developed by open coding, and
further systematic linkages between the codes were identified and categories
were developed.
7. The process developed with further verification that the incident fitted into the
category and progressed to coding,
8. Development of theoretical comparisons, with the literature as an integral part
of the development of theory based on evolving theoretical analysis.
9. Development of the literature review as themes demanded.
Andrea Pilot study—8 interviews and tracking
Gorra Then 5 more plus survey; then more interviews
Use of sticky notes and graphics (photos)
(continued)
193
TABLE 9.3
Continued
Ibraheem Previous experience important in getting started

Jodeh 3 groups initially—examples of questions (phone interviews—recorded for later
reference and repeated listening
Transmissia Line-by-line coding of transcripts
Semiawan Sequence a–d
Result 15 groups …
Axial coding—reassembling Strauss and Corbin’s conditions-actions-consequences
model with Glaser’s coding families
Textual and diagrammatic outcomes in parallel
Object Oriented (OO) type approach—hierarchies and relationships
the recent work of Charmaz and others. Each of them developed individual
insights and practices in the light of their reading and their research. This
reinforces Glaser and Strauss’s initial aim of encouraging novice researchers
to generate their own ideas, but it actually takes this point further by demon-
strating that these new ideas are not confined to the products of their research,
but also involve the process and procedures; a combination of growing theoreti-
cal sensitivity with methodological sensitivity. The PhD students all managed
to produce useful and usable abstractions that encapsulated key features of
their chosen topic, in most cases readily related to actions and social processes.
They also demonstrated how they moved from breaking the data into compo-
nent parts to the later stage of re-integrating them to provide a picture of “what
is going on.”
Some students used a range of approaches, amalgamating what are pre-
sented as opposing views on GTM. Others brought in additional methods
such as ethnography and dialogue analysis. Semiawan developed additional
ways of modeling as part of her use of GTM. They all provided excellent
accounts in their work of how they developed their approach, an aspect that
is demanded in PhD theses, although it may not always be relevant for other
forms of publication. As I discussed in Chapter 2, however, the demand for
more detail on methods in journal papers is in many ways a welcome one. In
the past research findings might have been regarded in the same way Otto von
Bismarck viewed the making of laws: “Laws are like sausages, it is better not to
see them being made.” But this era has long passed and it is now an expectation
that some level of methodological detail is supplied in academic papers as well
as in PhD theses.
Further aspects of the process of my students’ research are covered in the
remaining chapters in Part Three, but at this point the issues raised in the early
part of this chapter can now be clarified as follows:
What do I code?—Coding can be applied to a wide variety of forms of
data, including interview transcripts, documents, Web sources, and even video
194
recordings. In most cases GTM researchers have relied primarily or solely on

interviews, but these studies also rely on observation or immersion in the
research context by the researcher(s); Glaser’s argument about the importance
of field notes is part of this.
When do I start coding?—Coding can begin as soon as data is available.
Some of my students completed a small series of interviews before coding,
but others coded the first interview and used this as a guide to the later ones.
Several researchers gathered their data with a view to using another method,
and they only implemented GTM at a later stage. This meant that their cod-
ing strategy differed from the textbook accounts of GTM, but the process of
coding and raising codes to categories and core concepts was still recognizably
GTM-oriented.
How will I know if my coding is working?—This is an issue that troubles
researchers before they start coding, and that dissipates when coding is under-
way. The reason is that once initial coding has been performed, researchers
find that they have produced codes that provide a coherent basis for subse-
quent stages. Even in the cases where there is a large number of initial codes,
researchers manage to group them into themes or clusters, and they then use
these as guides to subsequent stages.
How do I cope with all the codes?—All my PhD students used some
form of visualization for managing their codes, usually employing different
colors. Gorra developed the use of sticky notes, and later computer files; more
recently, she has worked with two other PhD students on a more formalized
approach to the use of color. Visualization clearly helped the researchers, and
it also assists those reading the research outputs, provided that the diagram-
matic representations are clearly integrated into the text and general discussion
of the work. A diagram may be worth a thousand words, but it is important to
make sure that those words align with the rest of the publication, and that can
only be done discursively.
What about using technology?—This is very much a matter of choice for
individual researchers. Some are highly adept at using technology, and over
recent years the range of possible options has increased dramatically. Some
researchers, however, have found that the technology really “gets in the way,”
with more attention being focused on using the technology, detracting from
focus on the data. There is, however, no point in being dogmatic about this one
way or the other. The technology is developing and becoming more readily
available, even to those with little or no technical background. Some research-
ers will struggle, not realizing that technological assistance is at hand and
could have proved enormously effective and useful; others will opt for a tech-
nological package that serves them well, and still others will be disappointed
in the application chosen, either finding that it does not quite deliver or that it
proves too constraining.6
195
What’s the difference between line- by-

line, word-by-word, and
incident-by-incident coding? These different tactical approaches to cod-
ing vary in terms of the level of analysis. Word-by-word lies at one extreme
(microanalysis), and focusing on incidents operates on a wider perspective.
Researchers need to understand that this range of possible options is available,
but the choice of which to use is dependent on the data, the context, and the
researcher. Taking into account Charmaz’s admonition about moving quickly
through the data, word-by-word approaches may preclude this and should
perhaps be used only after an initial incident-oriented sweep through the data
has been conducted. The PhD students whose work has been discussed in this
book demonstrated a range of mature and insightful approaches that drew on
different tactics—ranging from forms of microanalysis to event and incident
coding.
In this chapter I have presented an account of coding and the different
coding strategies adopted by GTM-oriented researchers. It is important not to
lose sight of the rationale for this aspect of GTM, and to understand that each
researcher may well find it necessary to refine and adapt these ideas in their
own studies. The aim of GTM-oriented research is to move from the develop-
ment of low-level abstractions to higher-level concepts and theories. A parallel
and complementary aspect is that of memo-making, the subject of Chapter 10.
Key Points
¤ Coding tactics—key point, line-by-line, word-by-word

¤ Coding strategies—examples from PhD students
¤ Avoiding The Funes Problem (see Chapter 8)—don’t get lost in the
details
¤ Transcription and Translation
¤ Presentation—use of cognitive maps, sticky notes, color codes
¤ 6 Questions—and some answers
Notes
1. The extracts from students’ work are taken from their respective PhD theses. I am
responsible for the extracts, as well as for the use to which they have been put and the com-
ments made about them.
2. Also see Chapter 19 for an extended account of Gorra’s use of GTM.
3. http://www.inspiration.com/
4. Footnote incorporated by Semiawan in her thesis: “sensitivity”—to respond to the
subtle nuances of, cues to, meanings in data.(Strauss-Corbin, Glaser)
196
5. Footnote incorporated by Semiawan in her thesis: “OO ideas” refers to her use of the
“Object Oriented” approach to modelling information systems which is explained in more
detail in Part Four
6. Readers interested in investigating the options in this regard should refer to the vari-
ous Web sites on CAQDAS—Computer Aided Qualitative Analysis Software. For instance
http://onlineqda.hud.ac.uk/Intro_CAQDAS/ and http://www.surrey.ac.uk/sociology/
research/researchcentres/caqdas/
197
10
Reflecting and Recording

MEMOING AND REFLECTIVE RESEARCH
The previous chapter was concerned with the ways in which the research pro-
cess was initiated by several PhD students and developed using GTM. This
involved attention to rationale and motivation, as well as the students’ ini-
tial encounters with the research context in order to begin engagement with,
and investigation of, the data. Several examples were presented, and various
coding strategies used by PhD students were also discussed. An important
aspect of GTM, which should be common to all and every use of the method,
involves maintaining a contemporaneous record of people’s thoughts and ideas
as the work progresses. Although this is something found in many methods, in
GTM this is what comprises the process of memo-making or memoing.
In The Handbook of Grounded Theory Kathy Charmaz and I included
the following extracts in the discursive glossary (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007,
pp. 608–609)
Memo-writing: the pivotal intermediate step in grounded theory between
data collection and writing drafts of papers. When grounded theorists
write memos, they stop and analyse their ideas about their codes and
emerging categories in whatever way that occurs to them (see also Glaser
1998). Memo-writing is a crucial method in grounded theory because it
prompts researchers to analyse their data and to develop their codes into
categories early in the research process. Writing successive memos keeps
researchers involved in the analysis and helps them to increase the level of
abstraction of their ideas. (Charmaz, 2014, p. 343)
If data are the building blocks of the developing theory, memos are the
mortar (Stern, 2007, p. 119)
197
198
Memos are uniquely complex research tools. They are both a method-
ological practice and a simultaneous exploration of processes in the
social worlds of the research site. Memos are not intended to describe
the social worlds of the researcher’s data, instead, they conceptualize
the data in narrative form. Remaining firmly grounded in the data,
researchers use memos “to create social reality” (Richardson 1998: 349)
by discursively organizing and interpreting the social worlds of their
respondents. (Lempert, in Bryant & Charmaz, 2007a, p. 609)
When memoing a topic analytically, the researcher generates a set of cat-

egories, contrasts, comparisons, questions, and avenues for further con-
sideration which are more abstract than the original topic. (Lempert, in
Bryant & Charmaz, 2007a, p. 609)
Note the range of terms that are used in these introductory quotations—
memo-writing, memos, memoing, all involve both the process and the prod-
uct. Also, it is important to understand the range of ideas expressed in these
extracts. They include activities that lead from data collection to drafting
papers and other forms of writing, the analysis of data leading to the develop-
ment of codes and categories, as well as more generic aspects of exploration
and discursive organizing. They serve a variety of purposes, but have in com-
mon the role of integrating the processes of abstraction and conceptualiza-
tion that move the research from data gathering to articulation of a theory or
model. As the research moves toward more focused and abstract concepts,
memos likewise become more precise and in some cases more formal and
structured. As Barney Glaser and Kathy Charmaz argue, these later forms of
memo provide the basis for eventual publications of the research itself; a GTM
technique referred to as theoretical sorting.
Memo-writing must be seen as a core aspect of the GTM process, and
indeed it should be taken up by all researchers as part of standard good prac-
tice. But it is important to understand that there is no single correct form of
memo-making or of a memo itself. The practice will change as the research
develops, and different researchers will adapt and adopt different styles of
memo and memo-making. The key is that memos or any other form of
research journal are written and updated as the research progresses: contem-
poraneously. There is no point looking back after the event and attempting to
construct the process of moving from the early stages of the research project
to the later ones. This is important for PhD students, because the thesis is
not only a record of what has been achieved; what constitutes the “contribu-
tion to knowledge.” It must also offer a substantive account of the process of
getting there.
There is, however, no mention of memos in Glaser and Strauss’s canoni-
cal texts Awareness and Time, although the “Appendix on Method” in the
199
Reflecting and Recording 199
latter refers to field notes. The other publication in their trilogy, Discovery,
refers explicitly to “memo-writing,” but only briefly.
From the point of generating theory it is often useful to write memos on,
as well as code, the copy of one’s field notes. Memo writing on the field
note provides an immediate illustration for an idea (p. 108).
The term “field-note” has disappeared from the GTM literature, and might now
be thought of as a form of memo written during the process of data gathering,
although memos themselves go beyond this and encompass the processes of
conceptual development and refinement. As explained later in this chapter,
students in the doctoral program at the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF) took a course on field research prior to taking the one on GTM, and
so it may well have been the case that Glaser and Strauss assumed that social
researchers kept such journals as a matter of course. In any case, in their early
GTM trilogy Glaser and Strauss were more concerned with highlighting other,
innovative and challenging features of the method. Over the years, however,
the topic of memo-writing and the incorporation of the content of the memos
into research reports have been given far more attention, and the central role
of memo-making or memoing is clearly stressed. Moreover memos are now
understood to form an important basis for theoretical sorting.
According to Glaser (2005) sorting is a creative activity: “Tempting
one’s creativity is actuated by this process. Fear that one does not have
creativity stops this type of sorting and causes the fleeing to computer
retrieval of data on each category, resulting in full conceptual description
[Glaser’s term for research that fails to reach the theoretical level]. Hand
sorting releases the creativity necessary to see a TC [theoretical code]
in the memos, as the analyst constantly compares and asks where each
memo goes for the best fit” (p. 36) –quoted by Phyllis Stern (Bryant and
Charmaz, 2007a, p. 611)
For GTM, memo-making complements the iteration around data gathering
and analysis, ensuring that the researcher(s) and the audience for the research
reports have access to the ideas at the different stages of the development from
the initial encounter with the research context through the subsequent moves
aimed at achieving a more focused set of powerful abstractions and concepts.
There is an intimate and necessary relationship between coding and memo-
making as GTM techniques, even though each can be seen individually as
a technique amenable to other methods. The key issues around memos and
memo-making can best be demonstrated with examples.
One of my PhD students, Gerhard Drexler, used memos in the early stages
of his research to summarize ideas both about the research and his develop-
ing understanding of GTM itself. This is actually quite common among PhD
students when they are in the early stages of their GTM-oriented research,
200
BOX 10.1
Drexler Memo 240609 (excerpt, translated from German)
Grouping first-order categories into second-order themes

There is process (C1-1 to C1-9) and something in addition (support factors,
conditions, requirements and related factors). Looking at these categories, there
seems to emerge some kind of linear process and a surrounding environment. In
order to head towards the development of core categories and clear theoretical
arguments, the process and its environment should be connected or merged.
Charmaz (06): “Although I have not used axial coding according to Strauss and
Corbin’s formal procedures, I have developed subcategories of a category and
showed the links between them as I learned about the experiences the categories
represent” (p. 61).
Looking for links seems easy—just take the figure (see figure 11.3) of process
and environment and use different colours for different themes and identical
colours for connected themes.
Might also make sense to condense some clusters into new categories.
because they are recording their developing understanding both of the

research project and the method. Thus an early memo (see Box 10.1) is con-
cerned with Drexler’s understanding of what has happened in order for him
to progress from “first-order categories” to “second-order themes,” and then
toward “core categories and clear theoretical arguments.” In so doing he quotes
from Charmaz on the topic of linking subcategories, although in a fashion
that is not the same as that advocated by Strauss and Corbin. The memo is
given a date, plus a comment noting that it has been translated from its origi-
nal language. As it stands it is a good example of an early memo, both in the
sense of being composed in the early stages of the research project, and as one
that exemplifies the thoughts and concerns of someone at an early stage of
his research development. This example summarizes the researcher’s thoughts
about the data itself, which perhaps may be leading to a model of “a linear pro-
cess and a surrounding environment.” It includes the comment, “[L]‌ooking for
links seems easy,” and that the (implicit) process of comparison has resulted
in “clusters” that may offer a basis for “new categories.” There is also the point
about use of colors, which he later develops and which is common to many
other researchers.
Later, he prepared a memo focusing on the early ideas about his core cat-
egory (Box 10.2). Again, there is reference to GTM itself in the comment on
key aspects of core categories drawn from the GTM literature, before Drexler
offers fairly detailed aspects of his chosen category.1
He goes on to offer an alternative approach, developed at a slightly later
stage, again interweaving ideas about the developing research and his thoughts
on his use of GTM (Box 10.3).
And then a final version which appears in Box 10.4.
I have used several fairly lengthy extracts from a sequence of Drexler’s work
that illustrate the ways in which memos move from informal and exploratory
201
BOX 10.2
Drexler: The Core Category—an early approach (excerpt)
Memo CoreV1
A core category must be central; all other major categories can be related to it.
It must appear frequently in the data. This means that within all or almost
all cases, there are indicators pointing to that concept, and the explanation that
evolves by relating the categories is logical and consistent.
[…]
“Attracted by contribution?”
firms are attracted by ideas of their partners
PROs [Public Research Organizations] are attracted by the firm’s economic
resources
PROs contribute through ideas and concepts
firms contribute through financial (e.g. royalties) and structural (e.g. production
facilities) contributions
Mutual attraction through mutual contribution—the more feasible a concept
becomes, the more likely a contract will be established.
“Contributive evaluation?”
… “Contributive evaluation” is a new sequence of activities which is not
mentioned in literature so far. Literature tackles opportunity identification,
knowledge exchange, trust building, strong ties, reciprocity, mutual
understanding—but not a synergistic mode of evaluation. Synergistic means that
PROs contribute as much knowledge as possible to enable a firm to positively
evaluate a proposal for a collaborative project.
“Generating ideas” is the first intellectual contribution within this process of
collaboration initiation. Ideas are novel and do not exist in reality like patents or
existing technologies. What follows is more or less a contribution to evaluation.
Each piece of knowledge makes evaluation easier and enhances the chance
of success. This means that some research and development activities do
take place before a formal contract is eventually established. PRO activities
comprise feasibility studies and prototyping, firm activities cover market research,
operational feasibility, cost calculation, and legal compliance. Both parties engage
in identification of subsidies.[……]
“Generating ideas” was identified as a key category (DC3) and its
consequences are “joint interest in specific ideas,” “trust” and “commitment.”
What’s missing here is the further effort (still informal!) of all parties to evaluate,
develop ideas, and conceptualise ideas in the sense of “concept development”
and “feasibility study.” Interviewees stated that especially this further refinement
and enhancing the feasibility makes the difference.
Main research question: What are the guiding criteria of a practice-oriented
process framework for the initialization of collaborative activities with focus on the
creation of ideas in the front end of the innovation process? The practice-oriented
aspect is guided by the steps identified in C1-1 to C1-9, and a couple of enabling
factors. “Generating ideas” appears too narrow as the core category.
statements to far more detailed descriptions of primary aspects of his work.

(The full version of the memo referred to in Box 10.4 is far more detailed.) He
included these memos, and many others, in the work he submitted, which is
entirely appropriate for a doctoral thesis. It may be less so for a journal paper
if the main topic is the substantive theory itself, although incorporation of
202
BOX 10.3
Drexler: The Core Category—an alternative approach (verbatim)
Memo CoreV4
Companies only want to establish contracts with PROs if a new product or
technology is already clearly defined and external support is needed. Positive
evaluation is more likely to occur if an innovative idea is clearly defined and
likelihood of success is most likely (technology, markets, customers, etc.). PROS
contribute by supporting evaluation and by mitigating risk. So both parties are
interested in and contribute to the process of evaluation and alignment.
Summarised as “collaborative ideation” and “collaborative evaluation,”
these interactive phases represent a new sequence of activities which was
not described specifically in literature so far. Literature tackles opportunity
identification, knowledge exchange, trust building, strong ties, reciprocity, mutual
understanding, but not a synergistic mode of ideation and evaluation. Synergistic
means that PROs contribute as much knowledge as possible to enable a firm to
positively evaluate a proposal for a collaborative project.
“The criteria for establishing the core variable (category) within a grounded
theory are that it is central, that it relates to as many other categories and their
properties as possible, and that it accounts for a large portion of the variation in a
pattern of behaviour. The core variable reoccurs frequently in the data and comes
to be seen as a stable pattern that is increasingly related to other variables”
(Holton, 2007, p.280).
Taking Holton’s comment into consideration, a single key category does not
fulfil her criteria. Neither “building relationships” nor “generating ideas” nor
“aligning contributions” per se can be termed core variable. All of them influence
the decision to collaborate in a more or less synergistic mode. Relationships
form the basis for idea generation, and ideas are the building blocks of projects.
Everything is intertwined and one of the key categories as the core would be
misleading.
material along these lines might be included to demonstrate how the research
was accomplished.
Zoran Mitrovic refers to his memos in his text, although they are not pro-
duced as distinct sections in the thesis. This contrasts starkly with the work of
Drexler. The reader is largely left to infer the memo-making that went on from
the ways in which Mitrovic reports trying out various ideas, offering tenta-
tive explanations, and moving toward an eventual model centering on types of
adequacy. For example, Box 10.5 presents his discussion of how he integrated
two codes, Support Gap and Benefit Gap, into a single concept.
It might be supposed that several memos, written at different times in
the course of the research were drawn upon for this discussion, all leading to
Mitrovic’s eventual model focusing on different types of adequacy.
Andrea Gorra was the student who pioneered the use of sticky notes in
her coding (see Chapter 9). Some of her memos present snapshots of her ideas,
combining textual descriptions with diagrams like the situational maps intro-
duced to GTM by Adele Clarke (see Clarke, 2005). In this example Gorra pro-
vides an account of her thoughts, underlining terms that later get taken up
as codes or aspects of categories and concepts. To enhance the impact and
203
BOX 10.4
Drexler: The Core Category—the final approach (excerpt)
Memo CoreV6
“Defining Needs,” “Building Relationships,” “Generating Ideas,” and “Aligning
Contributions” are antecedents of “Establishing Contracts.” The better these early
phases have been executed, the more likely a contract with the respective partner
is signed and executed.
Interviewees’ statements do clearly indicate that there is a continuous
process which ends up in a decision somewhere between the generation of ideas,
their evaluation, or their conceptualisation. “Weaving the fabric” and “assembling
the gearbox” seem to be metaphors for a continuous process which takes shorter
or longer time for its completion –the contract.
[…]
Thus, a tentative core category has to cover all early phases with their more or
less fuzzy boundaries and their environment. In summary, the whole sequence of
subsequent phases aims to develop formal collaboration for the purpose of joint
innovation and/or R&D. So the core which emerges from the data is “Aligning
Collaborative Innovation.”
This category represents an explanation of the phenomenon of establishing
formal collaboration through the process which is defined by its sub-categories
and their relationships. It also represents the theoretical scheme of collaborative
activities which are reflected in the data. “Aligning Collaborative Innovation” in the
realm of university-industry interaction as defined in this study is the process of
merging the interests of two or more organisations into one formal relationship.
“Aligning” stands for accommodating, harmonising, orientating, and
coordinating. It summarises the effort from the first to the last phase of the
initialisation and formation of collaboration, which has to be developed through
increasing interaction between the prospective partners.
usefulness of the memo, she offers a diagrammatic representation of issues

around the issue of power relationships, incorporating extracts from her inter-
view data Box 10.6.
Later Gorra refines these ideas into of a visual memo (Box 10.7).
In a manner similar in many regards to Drexler’s, Ibraheem Jodeh sub-
mitted a thesis in which large sections were in the form of contextualized
memos. Box 10.8 presents an example; note the use of the third person—“the
researcher.”
A later memo refers to a list of key points or incidents derived from his
coding. He first gives some of the key points (Table 10.1) arising from coding
the interviews (e.g., I-3/19 refers to interview 3, line 19).
He notes that “[T]‌ hese incidents were given the code: Continuing
Progressive development,” and offers the memo in Box 10.9 to expand on
this code.
In contrast Jodeh also prepared memos in response to precise comments
from the people he interviewed. For example “Fighting without soldiers”
(Box 10.10) and “Who will ring the bell” (Box 10.11). In both cases the memo
is clearly derived from respondents’ terms, but Jodeh has revised them and
expanded on the metaphorical resonances to good effect.
204
BOX 10.5
Mitrovic Memo: Merger of the identified gaps: Adequacy Gap
A closer examination of the identified gaps (Support Gap and Benefit Gap) has
shown that these gaps have common grounds and can be “merged” into a single
one. These common grounds were found at both sides of the gaps: the support
provision and support usage.
Although successfully identified, at that point of the research it was still not
clear what the real nature of the Adequacy Gap was: it was still unclear why the
supposed benefits were unattainable. In other words, it was unclear why the
surveyed small businesses had complained about not attaining benefits when the
support providers claimed that their support had successfully been used by many
(other) small businesses This was followed by another crucial question: how is it
possible to make that support more adequate (in a meaning: more beneficial for
small businesses) and, in that way, to bridge Adequacy Gap?
The above questions guided further theoretical sampling and additional
analysis of the provided ICT-based support and its usage in XXXX. In other words,
it guided the collection and subsequent analysis of additional data associated
with the above questions.
This revealed further key concepts associated with both the nature of the
Adequacy Gap and the means of bridging it.
The definition of Servicing Adequacy emerged while analysing the identified
types of this adequacy: Declared Adequacy, Denied Adequacy, and Confirmed
Adequacy. This analysis was done by conceptually classifying and comparing the
properties of these three types of Servicing Adequacy. This process resulted in
the identification of the conceptual properties of the whole concept of Servicing
Adequacy and its definition.
BOX 10.6
Gorra Memo about situational map, taking into account power relationships
Mapping the social conditions that might be experienced by interviewees in daily

life has helped me to highlight the position and influence of stakeholders involved
with location data, such as [nongovernment organizations] NGOs and security
services.
The situational map has emphasised the relevance of the phenomenon
terrorism, which can be classified as political element. Terrorism has an impact
on major issues and debates of Britain as a nation. Currently, there are numerous
discussions in the media, revolving around national security, such as ID cards and
the introduction of new terrorism laws. Temporal events such as the 07 July 2005
London terrorist bombings have added to the increased media coverage about
national security. [In] Particular these temporal events have led to the normative
expectation of the government towards the general public to sacrifice some
privacy in the name of terrorism; “there is nothing to fear for citizens if there is
nothing to hide.”
And of course the widespread use of electronic communications,
predominantly the mobile phone, has a great impact on the situation of concern.
All these reasons have turned the long-term retention of communications data
(incl. [including] location data) into a widely accepted utensil in the government’s
tool box for the safeguarding of national security and fight against terrorism.
(continued)
205
Related to all these human and non-human elements is the notion of power.
Respondents mention a link to power regarding different data collections and
seem to perceive a varying degree of power of other actors depending on the area
in their life (see graphic below).
Who has power?
The government has the most

power (to use data against me)
Implications of power
Other individuals abuse/misuse are different for
have power but in a different way. all three areas.
People can track me down if I give
them my mobile phone number
(P133_M), ‘I choose what I tell’
(P117_M) What about?
- trust
Commercial Companies. I get the - confidence
feeling that ‘consumer rights’ are well - influence (related to power)
understood by respondents. And that
the commercial companies haven’t
got much power.
BOX 10.7
Gorra Memo: Control over personal data—a visual memo
Choosing what to tell This is where mobile

(personal relationship) phone settings are
important
My data Wanting to have (to regulate
Wanting to give consent for
CONTROL over data 'Contactability')
access & use by commercial
organisations
Government
(- no personal relationship)
->sometimes resignation: data is
shared anyway (Menwith hill)
-> other times: privacy vs. security
Respondents describe the desire to retain control over their personal data. This
relates to the previous memo about “power relationships” (Memo 1 in Box 10.6)
and the Category “Process of monitoring and use of data”. The potential of what
can be done with the personal data depends on who has collected the data and
who has access to it. For example, respondents distinguish three areas relevant
to privacy and in each of these areas a Balancing Act takes place.
206
BOX 10.8
Jodeh Memo “Enhancing Achievement”
Enhancing Achievement
The researcher noticed that employees, especially those in the tax system, were
fully convinced that the deployment of ICT had helped to speed up the delivery
and follow-up procedures, and that it has shortened the time and effort required
in routine processes and procedures. Some transactions that used to need more
than a week to be achieved can be now achieved in just a few minutes. According
to one of the employees in the main directorate, a transaction was delayed by
approximately 15 minutes before it was followed up by another tax directorate in
another geographical area through the Workflow system and the electronic link
between tax departments. According to interviewees, this transaction used to
take more than a week to be achieved before the deployment of ICT. Also, the
researcher recorded that the introduction of ICT has helped to provide information
and documentation needed by the assessing and auditing officers to make their
decisions which leads to a saving of time and effort of the department and
taxpayers, and thus works to increase the satisfaction of taxpayers and reduce
the effort required by employees to achieve their tasks.
TABLE 10.1
The key points made in the work of Ibraheem Jodeh. These points were given
the code: continuing development (extract)
ID Key Point (The Incident)
I -1/5 The field of programming and other areas to keep in touch with global
developments.
I -1/29 After two months, there will be an experiment and a test to apply the second
stage.
I -1/86 Therefore, in the first stage, we should standardise the operating software,
develop and modernise the communication networks.
I -2/10 We will work to develop payments processed electronically.
I -2/14 It requires developing, modernising and routine maintenance of our software.
I -2/111 The number of those who have been given the password to use e-services
is 20,000 taxpayers, and we work to motivate all the taxpayers to have a
password in the coming years.
I -3/19 E-applications help us greatly to improve the services provided, and we need
continuing development.
I -3/83 E-applications help to create transparency, but we are still at the beginning of
the road. So, we have to develop it.
I -4/4 Current e-applications are in need of development and expansion to include all
the functions.
I -5/1 E-application as a new idea is only recently introduced, and still requires
development.
I -5/40 The attempt is still in its early years, but I think it will get better with the
passage of time and development.
I -7/73 The number of these breakdowns has decreased after the establishment of the
Maintenance Division within the Department.
207
BOX 10.9
Jodeh Memo 2—Progressive Development
Progressive Development
The researcher noticed the first and second interviewees, who are responsible for
the deployment of ICT in tax system, are interested in developing and improving
the services provided to taxpayers, and that there is determination and insistence
by the tax administration that the electronic services will include all the tax
system activities in the near future. During the period of the interviews, an
agreement was signed with Microsoft to develop some electronic services in the
tax system. The researcher believes that the tax administration is determined,
theoretically at least, that the development of ICT is a progressive need, so the
administration intends to enhance the performance of the tax system, face the
challenges and surrounding difficulties and provide tax services as an e-tax in a
more attractive and acceptable form.
BOX 10.10
Jodeh Memo “Fighting Without Soldiers”
Fighting Without Soldiers

The researcher noticed that there are organisational difficulties facing the tax
system which weaken its ability to achieve its objectives on the one hand, or to
take advantage of ICT, on the other. The researcher has recorded, analysed and
followed up another key point related to low salary and financial incentives of
assessing, auditing and programmer officers in the department. Low salaries and
few financial incentives work to increase resignation cases among highly skilled
staff. And thus, the tax department, according to an interviewee, has become a
training centre where the employees gain experience and move, then, to work in
the private sector or even outside Jordan. This impacts negatively and significantly
on the performance, efficiency and capacity of the tax system in Jordan, and as an
interviewee put it, “the department is fighting without an army.”
BOX 10.11
Jodeh Memo “Who will ring the bell?”
Who Will Ring the Bell?

The researcher observed that some mangers and staff members asked him at
the outset if the Director-General approved to record his interview; and when they
knew that the Director-General hadn’t approved to record his interview, they did
not approve as well.
This observation was recorded and it helped in the formation and the
generation of many questions in the subsequent interviews. These questions
played a big role in exposing the weaknesses in the tax administration such
as: reluctance to make decisions regarding the tax issues that face the taxpayers
in the first instance.
One of the chartered accountants said: “we need mangers who can ring the
bell, start change and innovate; we don’t need people who work with conventional
methods, and fear change and innovation; and depend on the plans of their
bosses even if those plans were wrong” I -15/10.
208
BOX 10.12
Jodeh Memo the Initial Matching
INITIAL MATCHING
After conducting the initial study and getting the initial GT results, the researcher
was required, according to the GTM, to go back to the literature review to make a
quick matching between initial GT results and prior theories. This matching aims
to give the researcher a picture of some important points on the topic of study
before moving on to the next step of the GTM which is the main study.
Memo [Box 10.13] below was written whilst reviewing the literature about the
UK’s experience in deploying ICT in its taxation system, where the researcher
found some points similar to the findings of the initial GT results and some
others dissimilar to these findings. These points will be taken into account when
conducting the main interviews at the next stage.
In a later chapter of his thesis Jodeh took his interim model back to the
literature (see Chapter 12) and this led to two related memos that formed an
important part of his later work.
The final example (Box 10.14) is from the work of Transmissia Semiawan,
who used both textual and diagramatic memos. She also used a very distinc-
tive approach, described in Chapter 15, which is indicated in the memo.
BOX 10.13
Jodeh Memo: Similarities and Distinctions
Similarities and Distinctions

The researcher noticed during the literature review about the UK experience in the
deployment of ICT in taxation system that there are similarities and distinctions
between his initial results and experiences of developed countries.
These initial results agree with prior theories and experiences of developed
countries in terms of the needs, aims and advantages of the introduction and
deployment of ICT in taxation systems.
But at the same time, there is a clear distinction in some other points such
as: the initiative, motivation, long-term plans, incentives for taxpayers, cooperation
with the tax community and the challenges and difficulties in the surrounding
environment.
So the researcher should take into account the difference between
the taxation systems in developed countries and developing countries as
follows: principles, criteria, rules and rates of taxation on the one hand, and the
introduction and deployment of ICT in taxation systems as: a provider of a better
service, more reasonable cost for the Tax Department and customers, facilitator
of compliance of the population and the level of national income on the other.
The researcher will take into account all these points in his main study, which
will be conducted in the form of semi-structured interviews at the next stage of
the study.
209
BOX 10.14
Semiawan’s analysis demonstrated by a diagrammatic memo
Construction of
meaning
The units
Textual memo –about ‘managing Diagrammatical memo

information’ risen out from the about working beyond
highlighted items (blue) that boundaries across the
characterise the idea organisational units
Key Points
¤ Write memos contemporaneously—and label them clearly with the

date on which they were composed
¤ To start with, compose the memos in any manner that seems useful
and appropriate—they need only be accessible to you, although you
may also find it useful to share them with your peers or advisors.
210
¤ As the research develops prepare memos in line with the developing

abstractions.
¤ In later stages draft memos with an eye to a research output accessible
to others—that is, to be used verbatim in one’s thesis, or in journal
papers or other publication and presentations.
¤ Use diagrams as well as text, or any other appropriate format.
Memoing and Reflective Practice
The preceding examples illustrate widely different memoing strategies, and are
taken from the work of highly capable and ultimately successful PhD candi-
dates. It may well be the case that readers will feel that they have already tried
their own forms of memoing, perhaps without using the term or realizing that
this is what was involved. In many respects memoing is one form of what is
now termed critical reflection or reflective practice.
Doctoral students should appreciate the value of a research journal, and
the GTM process of memo-making is one important example of this tech-
nique. As a research supervisor, I can attest to the value of this aspect of doc-
toral research, and many of my students have made extensive use of their
memos in developing their ideas, and later in writing and presenting their
work.2 The ways in which GTM-oriented research incorporates memo-mak-
ing has developed over the years so that it is now accepted that GTM research
reports include memos from various stages of the investigation. Although
it should be noted that neither Awareness nor Time incorporates memos in
any obvious manner; the term is listed in the index in Discovery, but not in
Awareness, Time, nor does it appear in Status Passage.
Memo-making is a form of reflecting and learning; memos themselves are
evidence of that process. Thus publishing one’s memos indicates not only the
ways in which the research developed at a variety of levels—empirical, proce-
dural, and conceptual—but also how the researcher employed and, we hope
became more adept in terms of theoretically sensitivity. Taken together this
evidence of reflection provides a basis for judging the actual research process
as well as affording an insight for others keen to learn from the example and
experiences of others. In this regard memo-making is one form of what is now
termed reflective practice.
The term is associated most readily with the work of Donald Schön,
author of The Reflective Practitioner (1983). Schön was concerned that expert
or competent practitioners needed to pass on their knowledge to others, but
that the art of practice was something that “might be taught if it were con-
stant and known, but it is not constant” (Schön quoting a private communi-
cation from Harvey Brooks). Schön took issue with those who saw practice
211
as something inferior to “real research” carried out in constrained academic

settings removed from day-to-day problem-solving. He was convinced that
practice was the best laboratory for developing knowledge, but that this could
only happen if practitioners were aware of the necessity to reflect on what
they were doing.
There are interesting parallels between Schön’s work and GTM, some of
which are further outlined in Chapter 13, on abduction. Schön’s main objec-
tives, however, were not only to encourage practitioners to reflect on their
practices, but to do so as part of their practices.
… contrary to Hannah Arendt’s observation that reflection is out of place
in action, skillful practitioners sometimes respond to a situation that is
puzzling, unique, or conflicted, by reflecting at one and the same time on
the situation before them and on the reflection-inaction they spontaneously
bring to it. In the midst of action, they are able to turn thought back on
itself, surfacing, criticizing and restructuring the thinking by which they
have spontaneously tried to make the situation intelligible to themselves.
(emphasis added)
Reflecting in this manner could overcome what Schön termed “overlearning,”
which although not clearly defined, resonates with Glaser and Strauss’s criticism
of verification and reliance on grand theories. Thus “reflection in action” serves
to bring out some of the tacit norms and assumptions that underlie accepted
practices, resulting in new insights and criticisms of the received wisdom handed
down as part of the processes of professionalization. Schön was determined to
encourage ways in which practitioners can facilitate processes that bring “sur-
prise, puzzlement and confusion” to the situations that confront them. “When
someone reflects in action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is
not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs
a new theory of the unique case.” (emphasis added) He goes on to say,
A practitioner’s reflection can serve as a corrective to over-learning.
Through reflection, he can surface and criticize the tacit understand-
ings that have grown up around the repetitive experiences of a special-
ized practice, and can make new sense of the situations of uncertainty or
uniqueness which he may allow himself to experience.
Schön distinguishes between the “Expert” and the “Reflective Practitioner,”
illustrating their differing positions in the form of a dialogue (Box 10.15).
Memos are a key feature of GTM, derived in part from the idea of field
notes, an aspect of social research that was highly important in Strauss’s early
work, before he teamed up with Glaser; in Chapter 3 I discussed Strauss’s own
reference in Discovery to the notes from the study of Boys in White, of which
he was a co-author. Strauss had worked extensively with Leonard Schatzman
prior to his work with Glaser, and Schatzman taught with both of them at
212
BOX 10.15
Donald Schön’s view of “Expert” versus “Practitioner”
The expert believes

… I am presumed to know and must claim to do so, regardless of my uncertainty
I keep my distance from the client and hold onto the expert role
I look for deference and status in the client’s response to my professional
demeanor
A reflective practitioner believes …
I am not the only one in the situation with relevant and important knowledge
I seek out the client’s thoughts and feelings. Respect for my knowledge will
emerge if I am helpful
I look for a sense of freedom and connection with the client
A traditional contract …
The client is placed in the professional’s hands and gains a sense of security
based on faith
The client need only comply with advice and all will be well
The client is pleased to be served by the best person available
A reflective contract …
The client joins with the professional to gain a sense of involvement and action
The client exercises some control over the situation—both are inter-dependent
The client can test judgements against the competence of the professional.
The client makes discoveries about knowledge and practice
http://www.uiowa.edu/~c07p134/Schön.htm
UCSF, presenting the field methods course that students took before moving
on to the GTM course (see Gilgun, 1993). There are clear parallels between the
practice of memoing and the more generic one of keeping a research journal,
but the distinctive GTM aspects should not be under-played. The exemplary
use of memos made by the students referred to in the first part of this chap-
ter clearly demonstrates the essential characteristics of GTM memo-making.
Furthermore, positioning this distinctive approach against the wider one of
reflective practice brings out some of these features more starkly, and also
makes the case for regarding GTM as a key contribution to a model of good
research practice; highly relevant for doing research in general, regardless of the
methods and strategies employed by individual researchers.
Finally, I want to reiterate the point about research rarely being an indi-
vidual activity, which is critical with regard to memos; sharing memos and
presenting them to others as a basis for discussion is an important aspect but
rarely is it addressed as a clear topic for consideration. Strangely, in his more
recent work on memoing, Glaser seems to ignore some of these developments
and to preclude this sharing aspect (Glaser, 2013). He notes that “[M]‌emos are
neglected as a GT procedure,” which was certainly the case in the early days of
GTM but was hardly true by 2013; but that is a minor issue. He goes on, to say,
It is normative for no one to read another persons memos. I have never
known someone to ask another person to read his memos or someone to
213
ask another person to read his memos. Thus memos can take any form.
They are normatively and automatically private. Their style is free. Memos
can take any form, shape or whatever without being critiqued or eval-
uated. They have no perfection. They give autonomy freedom to the
researcher. They are a precursor to writing a working paper on the emerg-
ing theory. They grow from jots to growth in lengths that capture style
and integrative complexity as the GT research progresses. (taken verbatim
from his article –emphasis added)
The assertions in this quotation seem bizarre; surely he, Strauss, and Quint
must have shared their thoughts and ideas as their research on death and dying
progressed in the 1960s, including various notes in the form of what would
now be clearly understood as memos? Even if this was not the case, why make
this claim for all memos? Some memos may well never be seen by others, but
as the research develops, there are very good reasons for some to be shared. My
PhD students know that I will suggest that they write a memo and share it with
me as a basis for discussing their work and ideas. A memo, however, serves as
the basis for discussion, and not as a draft to elicit comments regarding style,
expression, clarity, and so on. Memos may later provide the basis for a written
output, but their use is left to the discretion of the author and originator.
I have recently had a meeting with one of my PhD students who came to
see me as he had arrived at a point in his research that, in his words, required
“a major manoeuvre.” When we discussed this concern, it transpired that, hav-
ing worked on his topic for almost two years, he was now ready to state his
research question in very clear terms: a result of three rounds of interviews
that had moved from purposive sampling and open coding to theoretical sam-
pling and more focused coding. He was wondering whether or not to incorpo-
rate this clarification in his initial chapters, but he realized that to do so might
mislead his readers into thinking that this clarity was present from the outset.
In fact, he understood that this was not the correct option, but he needed guid-
ance on how best to incorporate these new insights. After we had discussed
this at some length, my suggestion was that he draft a memo with the title
“A Major Manoeuvre,” examining the options and outlining how he thought
it best to progress. A week later he sent me the memo, informing me that in
preparing it he had developed more confidence in the progress he had made
in his research, and where it was leading. We used this information as the basis
for further discussion and clarification; how he later incorporates the memo
and our discussion into his work will be up to him.
The student examples illustrate the role that memos play in written work
presented to a wider readership, which surely reinforces Glaser’s point when
he asserts that memos “track the generation of a substantive GT from start to
working paper” (Glaser, 2013). So while some memos will be best left for indi-
vidual consideration, others should be shared as the research develops, and
later refined and used as the basis for published work. The key must always
214
be to write memos as the work progresses; revisiting and supplementing them

with further memos at later stages.
Memoing is an integral part of GTM, but it is closely related to other ideas
that both predate and derive from GTM. The precise details relating to memos
and memo-making have developed and altered since the 1960s, and one key
influence appears to have been Strauss’s previous experience in using field
notes in research, such as that for Boys in White. Linking memoing with reflec-
tive practice also highlights the way in which it exemplifies what John Dewey
termed knowing in action, which Strauss may well have had in mind when he
and Glaser were developing GTM.
There is something of an irony in the way in which reflective practice has
been developed in recent years, with Schön’s ideas now being promulgated as
a series of checklists, thereby undermining the central idea of openness and
flexibility. This is unfortunately an all-too-common tendency and applies to
many forms of insight and heuristics: there is no good lesson that cannot be
taken up in a poor and unreflective manner.
Key Points
¤ Memos and memo-making; products and process

¤ Contemporaneousness! Write memos as the research progresses;
there is no substitute for this way of capturing and recording the
development of ideas.
¤ No correct format for memos—but different audiences
¤ Differing styles of incorporation—or not—of memos into final
products
¤ Use of series of memos charting development of abstraction from early
codes to final categories
¤ Parallels between Reflective Practice and Memo-making
Exercises
1. You may have been making notes as you have been reading this book,
but whether you have or not, write a memo about your impressions so
far with regard to what you have read.
2. Chapter 2 pointed to the common aspects shared by GTM and the
Agile approach; there are also similarities between Reflective Practice
and the Agile approach. This is evident from a comparison of the
aspects of reflective practice in Box 10.15 with the entries for GTM
and the Agile approach in Table 2.5.
215
Notes
1. NB: The extracts in all cases in this chapter are taken verbatim from the original—
including use of “?.” Ellipsis […] indicates where some sections of the memo have been
omitted.
2. This also applies to my many other PhD students who did not use GTM.
216
217
11
Moving On: Later Sampling, Coding, and Analyzing
One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but

a pupil.
—Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus Spoke Zarathustra)
Chapters 9 and 10 dealt with the initial stages of GTM-oriented research, and
referred to the directions in which Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser took
GTM in their separate writings in the 1980s and 1990s. Glaser reacted with
vehemence to Strauss’s work with Julie Corbin, and he has continued in this
critical vein, claiming the mantle of “classic” GTM for his work and that of
others closely aligned with his position. In so doing he is making proprietary
claims on GTM as a whole, and more recently he has intimated that although
Strauss had a role in its development, his (Glaser’s) was the larger and more
influential contribution. In 2014 he wrote, “I am writing about only the appli-
cation of classic GT as I originated it in 1967 in which the concepts of a GT the-
ory are abstract of time, place, and people” (Glaser, 2014, emphasis added).1
In Chapter 3 I quoted from Strauss and Corbin’s paper to the effect that “a
child once launched is very much subject to a combination of its origins and
the evolving contingencies of life. Can it be otherwise with a methodology?” If
Strauss can be seen as a parent who understands that his child has to grow up
and develop, perhaps making mistakes and moving off in directions not fore-
seen or approved of, Glaser might be cast as the parent who wants to ensure
“the best” for his child, perhaps at the expense of being overly protective and
constraining. Both positions are understandable, and either one, taken to the
extreme can lead to disaster and disappointment. In the Handbook of Grounded
Theory Kathy Charmaz and I referred to GTM as “a family of methods,” along
the lines of Leo Tolstoy’s dictum (from Anna Karenina) “All happy families
are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” GTM seems to be
unhappy in its own way, and Glaser has shown his anguish with anyone stray-
ing beyond his idea of GTM, a constant aspect of his work starting in 1992,
and continuing through 2004 and 2014 (Glaser, 1992, 2004, 2014).
In some respects Glaser’s concern is proprietary, stemming from his 1992
book, Basics of Grounded Theory: Emergence vs. Forcing, in which an entire
chapter is devoted to intellectual property. Nevertheless, he has also argued 217
218
that “GT methodology is itself a GT that emerged from doing research on

dying patients in 1967, It was discovered, not invented” (Glaser, 2004, emphasis
added). If “discovered” is to be understood in the sense that “Cook discovered
Australia,”2 then neither Glaser nor Strauss, nor anyone else can claim owner-
ship. If it is to be understood in the sense of the discovery of oxygen, discussed
in Chapter 2, then there is a constructivist slant to the argument,3 although
even in this case issues of ownership are not appropriate. Ironically, had Glaser
claimed that GTM was invented, then the issue of intellectual property would
have some relevance, but he explicitly rejects this. I would concur with the
idea that GTM is itself an example of a grounded theory, and thus is modifi-
able, given that modifiability is one of the key criteria of a substantive GT
according to the early GTM texts. Glaser himself makes modifiability a central
issue in Theoretical Sensitivity, noting in the concluding chapter, “In sum, new
uses and directions of Grounded Theory are just beginning to be proliferated.
Grounded theory is a general methodology for generating theory.” (Glaser, 1978,
p. 164, emphasis in original) Chapter 10 of Theoretical Sensitivity outlines sev-
eral examples of researchers beginning to use GTM in new ways and across
new fields, and Glaser refers to these in an enthusiastic manner.
Whatever one’s view might be with regard to the development of GTM
since its inception, it has clearly moved on, perhaps not in ways entirely to
the liking of its progenitors. As I point out in the Introduction to this book,
I regard the early canonical books on GTM as providing a basis for later vari-
ations, especially the three strands emanating from the writings of Strauss/
Corbin, Glaser, and Charmaz/Bryant. So each one builds on the initial work,
but this necessarily involves clarifying, enhancing, and revising those initial
ideas. This is common to all three strands, and also to any other variants that
might come under consideration.
There are many examples in the literature that compare and contrast what
have come to be called Glaserian, Straussian, and latterly Constructivist posi-
tions. These terms are useful to researchers and students trying to navigate
their way around the GTM literature, in planning to implement the method.
But in some cases these efforts are cryptic and misleading. I have noticed that
one example, ironically devised by one of my PhD students, Patrick Onions,
has gained some currency (Onions, 2006). In the light of this and various
other examples I offer my own views, incorporating a tabular overview, but
would advise readers not to refer only to the table but to take account of the
accompanying explanation; also to refer to other accounts such as those in
Charmaz (2014), Babchuk (2010), Heath and Cowley (2004), and Walker and
Myrick (2006).
Table 11.1 is based on the comparisons made by Onions, with my com-
ments (in italics) against each of the entries in the table; in many cases indi-
cating qualification or disagreement with Onions’s ideas. Glaser’s position
is derived from his solo writings on GTM, including Theoretical Sensitivity
219
TABLE 11.1
Derived from Patrick Onions (2006) quoted by Gerhard Drexler (PhD thesis)—italics
are my comments (A. Bryant)
Glaserian Straussian
Beginning with an “empty mind” Having a general idea where to begin

Somewhat simplistic—Glaser does This is clearly stated in Basics of Qualitative Research,
acknowledge that researchers have but is also implicit in the earlier joint works of Glaser
preconceptions; but he also believes and Strauss.
that these can be “suspended,” and that Strauss and Corbin quote from Dey to the effect that an
they “block” the process of enquiry. open mind is not an empty head.
Emerging theory (neutral questions) Forcing the theory (structured questions)
Part of the GT Mantra—“theory emerges Strauss and Corbin still use the phrase that the
from the data” researcher should allow “the theory to emerge from
the data”; although they also discuss the ways in
which processes of interpretation come into play.
Development of a conceptual theory Conceptual description
Glaser uses the term “conceptual theory” Strauss and Corbin differentiate between “description,”
in 1978; he also refers to it in 2004, “conceptual ordering” and “theory.” So to pose the
contrasting it with “thematic analysis” “distinction” in this manner is misleading.
and “accurate description” which
characterizes QDA
Theoretical sensitivity comes from Theoretical sensitivity comes from methods and tools
immersion in the data Strauss uses the term in “Qualitative Analysis for
The term is used in “Discovery” as a Social Scientists,” partly in quoting Glaser and also
requirement for the analyst “so that in his own wider sense, clearly linking it to the
he can conceptualize and formulate a researcher’s knowledge and experience. In “Basics of
theory as it emerges from the data.” Qualitative Research” the term is referred to simply
as “sensitivity” and takes on a wide but also less
focussed meaning.
Theory is grounded in the data Theory is interpreted by an observer
An essential part of GTM There are intimations of an interpretivist position in
the 1st and 2nd editions of “Basics of Qualitative
Research,” but Strauss remained committed to the
“groundedness” of GTM in all his writings.
The credibility of the theory is derived The credibility of the theory comes from the rigour of
from its grounding in the data the method.
Strauss would fully concur with this. Neither Strauss nor Glaser was especially concerned
with “rigour.” Glaser continues to stress “fit” and
“grab,” Strauss always stressed the usefulness of the
substantive theory.
A basic social process [BSP] should be Basic social processes need not be identified
identified Strauss and Corbin recognized that looking for BSPs
This is a matter of stress—perhaps Glaser may not be relevant or helpful for researchers in
can be understood to place more fields outside social sciences—e.g. education,
emphasis on this aspect than Strauss law, and so on. They were offering a more flexible
did. On the other hand he has also approach than first envisaged in “Discovery.”
argued that pursuit of BSPs forces the
data—precisely his criticism of Strauss
and Corbin. (see Charmaz, 2014,
pp31-5)
The researcher is passive The researcher is active
Glaser has continued to misunderstand or The first two editions of “Basics of Qualitative
evade the constructivist critique of his Research” do refer to the researcher in a more
position. active context, but the general tone is still that of the
theory emerging from the data. The researcher may
be considered as “active,” but not in a constructivist
manner.
(continued)
220
TABLE 11.1
Continued
Glaserian Straussian
Data reveals the theory Data is structured to reveal the theory

This is ambiguous. This is also ambiguous.
Coding is less rigorous, a constant Coding is more rigorous and defined by technique.
comparison of incident to incident, with The nature of making comparisons varies with the
neutral questions and categories and coding technique. Labels are carefully crafted at the
properties evolving. Take care not to time. Codes are derived from “micro-analysis which
“over-conceptualize,” identify key points consists of analysis word by word.”
This is ambiguous—Glaser sees coding Strauss and Corbin link their ideas to micro-analysis
as rigorous although he also wishes and action; but this is not vastly different to Glaser’s
to avoid what he terms “worrisome work at the time.
accuracy.”
Strauss would concur with the point about
over-conceptualizing.
Two coding phases or types, simple Three types of coding, open (identifying, naming,
(fracture the data then conceptually categorizing and describing phenomena), axial
group it) and substantive (open or (the process of relating codes to each other) and
selective, to produce categories and selective (choosing a core category and relating
properties) other categories to that)
All aimed at generating a single core A different approach to, and form of, coding.
category.
Regarded by some as the only Regarded by some as a form of qualitative data
“true” GTM analysis
Glaser claims the mantle of “classic” GTM, Regarded by Glaser as QDA—which he used as a
but given Glaser and Strauss’ position derogatory epithet, although the term has now a
with regard to “classic” US social more generic meaning.
science this may be a double-edged
sword.
(1978), which Strauss quoted from at length in Qualitative Analysis for Social
Scientists (1987). Strauss’s position is derived from the 1987 book and from
the first two editions of Basics of Qualitative Research (Strauss and Corbin,
1990, 1998).
The first row in Table 11.1 is rather misleading, although examples of
where to begin and how to keep an open mind can be found in the literature
on GTM. As explained in Chapter 4, Glaser has taken account of keeping an
open mind and avoiding the influence of preconceptions in his recent writ-
ings, although he still offers an unrealistic and implausible position. His use
of the metaphor of conception as a form of “unblocking” leads to his advice
to “suspend” preconceptions; the metaphor itself being a preconception, as
Reddy has argued in his paper on “The Conduit Metaphor” (see Bryant, 2006).
Strauss understood that the position in Discovery was unrealistic, invoking Ian
Dey’s witticism that GTM involves entering the research domain with an open
mind, but not an empty head.
In considering the second row of Table 11.1, the issue of theory emerging
from the data is common to both Glaser and Strauss/Corbin. It was tempered
in the latter, but retained its importance. Moreover the idea of using structured
221
Moving On: Later Sampling, Coding, and Analyzing 221
questions was not part of Basics of Qualitative Research. Glaser’s contrast of

“emergence versus forcing” is a succinct summary of his view of the different
positions, but it does not tell the whole story.
Moving on to the third row of Table 11.1, the term “conceptual theory”
is problematic. Glaser uses it freely, although without indicating what a non-
conceptual theory might look like. It may well have been a term that was used
loosely in the early GTM writings, but that Strauss with Corbin later revised,
using the contrasts between “description” at one level, and “theory” at the other,
with “conceptual ordering” somewhere in between. Strauss and Corbin’s term
“description” equates with Glaser’s “accurate description,” and also comes into
play in Strauss and Corbin’s chapter in The Handbook of Qualitative Research,
where they criticize those who claim to have used GTM, but who fail to move
beyond a descriptive level.
Theoretical sensitivity, shown in the fourth row, is an essential feature of
GTM, as I argued in Chapter 4. It clearly has ramifications for all research-
ers, but it emanated from GTM and is a key topic in both Glaser’s work and
Strauss’s. Certainly Strauss and Corbin offer a greater level of advice on how
novice researchers might move from the lower levels of abstraction to the
higher ones, but this move certainly did not preclude recognition of the neces-
sity for theoretical sensitivity. I would argue that with the plethora of methods,
mixed methods, computer-based tools, and the like available to the mod-
ern-day researcher, the role of theoretical sensitivity has assumed increasing
importance. Researchers have to gain familiarity with the tools and techniques
that are available, and make clear and informed choices regarding their selec-
tions and implementations. Making these choices is something that becomes
far more coherent with a constructivist orientation than within an objectivist
one. This leads to the next row in the table, on theory, where Onions seems to
be reading a constructivist position back into Strauss’s work. This is not upheld
by analysis of Strauss’s work. Furthermore, both Glaser and Strauss remained
committed to the groundedness of the method.
For Onions the difference with regard to the issue of Basic Social Processes
seems quite stark; Glaser advocating their identification, Strauss and Corbin
demurring. But their respective expositions are in fact more nuanced and indi-
cate a far higher level of agreement. Charmaz’s account (2006 & 2014) clarifies
this and offers a firmer basis for understanding the role of BSPs in GTM.
The points about data—“revealing theory”—and coding are ambiguous as
stated by Onions. The idea of coding in Strauss and Corbin’s work is certainly
more structured than Glaser’s, but Glaser would certainly not wish to see his
form as less rigorous. One of his concerns is what he terms “worrisome accu-
racy,” which might be understood to refer to researchers concerned more with
verification and truthfulness than with “fit” and “grab.” But this is not to deny
the necessity for rigor in moving toward substantive theories. It is perhaps a
different understanding of the concept of rigor, and one that Strauss adhered
222
to throughout his work, in common with Glaser. As was pointed out earlier,
this idea is captured in the last paragraph of Awareness, which notes that a sub-
stantive grounded theory “is often of great practical use long before the theory
is tested with great rigor” (p. 293).
By contrast, Strauss and Corbin’s position is far more overtly linked to the
level of microanalysis, and it can be seen to be an attempt to offer detail to what
was a rather under-developed part of GTM in the early books. Udo Kelle has
pointed out that the process of category building was critically under-played in
Discovery and the other early GTM writings of the time, especially with regard
to the “role of previous theoretical knowledge in developing grounded catego-
ries” (Kelle, 2007). Kelle sees the divergences between Strauss and Glaser as
in some degree centered on the different ways in which they sought to char-
acterize this aspect of GTM in more detail. He dates this conclusion from
Theoretical Sensitivity, in which Glaser describes two different types of cod-
ing, each producing a distinctive form of code; coining the terms “theoretical
coding” and “substantive coding,” as well as theoretical and substantive codes.
Given Strauss’s enthusiastic reference to Glaser’s book Theoretical
Sensitivity, and his incorporation of a large section in Qualitative Analysis for
Social Scientists he must have welcomed Glaser’s efforts at clarification and
exposition. The second half of Chapter 1 of his book is taken verbatim from
Theoretical Sensitivity and the first half of Chapter 1 introduces “the coding par-
adigm,” so it is strange that it was only the appearance of Strauss and Corbin’s
book (1990) three years later that provoked Glaser’s ire. As Kelle points out
(Kelle, 2007) Strauss and Glaser had already gone their separate ways by the
late 1970s, early 1980s. Strauss continued working and researching at UCSF,
and Glaser moved out of a full-time academic career. So, although Strauss
drew on Glaser’s 1978 book, Theoretical Sensitivity, he did so in a highly selec-
tive manner, ignoring Glaser’s concepts of “theoretical coding” and “coding
families” in favor of his own “coding paradigm.”
In fact, both men were working toward a similar aim: helping researchers
understand what was involved in “generating genuine categories.” Strauss saw
the problem as follows: “The common tendency is simply to take a bit of the
data (a phrase or sentence or paragraph) and translate that into a précis of it”
(Strauss, 1987, p. 29; quoted in Kelle, 2007, p. 101). Kelle makes the point very
clearly and cogently.
The coding paradigm fulfils the same function as a Glaserian coding fam-
ily; it represents a group of abstract theoretical terms which are used to
develop categories from the data and to find relations between them.
Similar to Glaser´s coding families, the coding paradigm takes into
account that the development of categories requires either a previously
defined theoretical framework or at least the possibility to draw on a selec-
tion of such frameworks if one wants to avoid being flooded by the data.
(p. 201; emphasis added)
223
Glaser and Strauss were each trying to offer ways of avoiding what in Chapters 8
and 9 I termed The Funes Problem, whereby researchers found themselves con-
fronted by a large number of disparate “codes” and no obvious way of cluster-
ing them. Strauss, together with Corbin, offered a procedure and framework
for resolving this complexity—axial coding and the coding paradigm—which
proved popular but also tended to be taken up and applied in a mechanistic
fashion; in the second edition of their Basics of Qualitative Research, Strauss’s
co-author Julie Corbin warned against using the approach as a “recipe.”
Glaser’s criticism was in part well-founded, but in taking issue with Strauss
and Corbin’s work he over-played several aspects of GTM, including its inductive
nature and the ways in which concepts and theories result. The lack of concern
about the issue of “data,” the need to distance GTM from all other qualitative
methods, and the underlying positivism/objectivism were common to both
forms of GTM, although all of these were more forcefully expressed by Glaser.
Yet if Strauss and Corbin’s form of assistance to researchers in “generating
genuine categories” was overly mechanistic and likely to constrain the process,
Glaser’s was lacking in coherence. As Kelle commented:
A crucial problem with Glaser’s list of coding families is that it lacks a
differentiation between formal or logical categories (like causality) and
substantial sociological concepts (like social roles, identity, culture); both
types of categories would have to be linked to each other in order to
develop empirically grounded categories. Although Glaser’s list of coding
families certainly does not exclude such a sophisticated use of theoretical
codes, the whole problem is not even mentioned in Theoretical Sensitivity.
(Kelle, 2007, p. 200)4
In her discussion of theoretical coding, Charmaz refers to the unresolved ten-
sion between “application” and “emergence”; that is to say, between applying
resources such as Glaser’s coding families—originating in his 1978 book, but
also to be found in slightly different forms elsewhere (Glaser, 1998, 2005); and
on the other hand ignoring such promptings and relying solely on close analy-
sis of the data. She argues that theoretical codes have to be used skillfully, and
“can add precision and clarity –as long as they fit your data and substantive
analysis” (p. 151). In fact, her term “application” applies equally to Strauss and
Corbin’s approach. Both theoretical coding and coding families and axial cod-
ing and the coding paradigm can be useful tools, but with the understand-
ing that if used in an indiscriminate and mechanistic manner, the outcome is
unlikely to constitute a substantive grounded theory.
Glaser characterized the distinction between his view of GTM and that of
Strauss and Corbin as that of, respectively, “emergence versus forcing”; regarding
only the former as being GTM. In fact, both Glaser’s ideas and those of Strauss,
and later Strauss and Corbin, emanate from similar concerns; offering support
for researchers seeking to move toward categorization and conceptualization.
224
The distinctions between Glaser’s suggestions and those offered by Strauss

and Corbin are deep-seated and significant, but not to the extent of warranting
Glaser’s vehemence. They should each be regarded as potential solutions to a
generic issue, which goes beyond GTM as such, but which through the articu-
lation of GTM has become a widely recognized aspect of doing research: Close
analysis of the data amounts to more than piling it up, then fracturing it into
parts, with a resulting reiteration of the data itself in different format. This is
an important lesson for all forms of research, such as the current vogue for
“evidence-based research,” which is usually undertaken with a policy initiative
in mind, and which all too often fails to move beyond the data.5
Charmaz notes that in her research she has rarely found it necessary to
use theoretical codes, and she also distances herself from the coding paradigm
and axial coding. Instead, she has found that concepts and coherence can be
formed from close analysis of the data itself, drawing on various resources
such as her experience and expertise.
My PhD students demonstrated similar skills, and even if they referred to
one or another form of coding, the details have largely been marginalized or
ignored once the later stages of analysis have got underway.
What might seem to be an inchoate process of moving from disparate
codes to concepts and themes should in fact be recognized as a key feature of
GTM, drawing precisely on researcher’s theoretical sensitivity or researchers’
theoretical sensitivities. It requires skill and practice. It also draws upon two
essential features of GTM: serendipity and abduction.
The irony is that the Glaser-versus-Strauss/Corbin issue may well be
largely irrelevant in practice. They each offer distinctive paths through a seri-
ous aspect of research, but with regard to GTM in use, researchers from nov-
ices to experts seem to be far more insightful and so require less guidance than
might at first sight appear. In fact, GTM-oriented researchers may not realize
that they are using abduction, but that is what they manage to accomplish (see
Chapter 13). The examples of my students illustrate this, but before looking at
their work the generic process of categorizing requires further attention.
Interlude—Classifying and Categorizing
In Chapter 5 I defined a number of key GTM terms. In some cases I used

examples from the literature, including Charmaz’s work and the The Handbook
of Grounded Theory, but I also offered some examples of my own, which may
conflict with other sources. I reiterated the hierarchy used in the Handbook
of codes-categories-concepts, and quoted the definition of categorizing from
Charmaz (2006), which follows here:
Categorizing: the analytic step in grounded theory of selecting certain
codes as having overriding significance or abstracting common themes
225
and patterns in several codes into an analytic concept. As the researcher

categorizes, he or she raises the conceptual level of the analysis from
description to a more abstract, theoretical level. The researcher then tries
to define the properties of the category, the conditions under which it is
operative, the conditions under which it changes, and its relation to other
categories. Grounded theorists make their most significant theoretical
categories into the concepts of their theory.
The problem with categorizing is that it is fraught with difficulties, and not
only for GTM and other research methods. Again, Jorge Luis Borges illustrates
the issue, this time in his tale The Analytic Language of John Wilkins (Borges,
1993) where he quotes from
a certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled “Celestial Empire of benevolent
Knowledge.” In its remote pages it is written that the animals are divided
into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking
pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine
camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher,
(n) that from a long way off look like flies.
Clearly Borges is offering a parody, and no such book as the Chinese encyclo-
paedia ever existed, but his list is not wildly different from an actual ancient
Chinese encyclopaedia, and he may have had this one in mind.
Here are the 32 subdivisions of this encyclopedia:
1. Heavens/Time: Celestial objects, the seasons, calendar mathematics
and astronomy, heavenly portents
2. Earth/Geography: Mineralogy, political geography, list of rivers and
mountains, other nations (Korea, Japan, India, Kingdom of Khotan,
Ryukyu Kingdom)
3. Man/Society: Imperial attributes and annals, the imperial household,
biographies of mandarins, kinship and relations, social intercourse,
dictionary of surnames, human relations, biographies of women
4. Nature: Proclivities (crafts, divination, games, medicine), spirits and
unearthly beings, fauna, flora
5. Philosophy: Classics of non-fiction, aspects of philosophy
(numerology, filial piety, shame, etc.), forms of writing, philology and
literary studies
6. Economy: education and imperial examination, maintenance of the
civil service, food and commerce, etiquette and ceremony, music, the
military system, the judicial system, styles of craft and architecture6
Borges explains that he registers “the arbitrarities of Wilkins, of the unknown
(or false) Chinese encyclopaedia writer and of the Bibliographic Institute of
Brussels” in order to demonstrate that “there is no classification of the Universe
226
not being arbitrary and full of conjectures. The reason for this is very sim-
ple: we do not know what thing the universe is.” (emphasis added—“know”
equates to issues of epistemology, “is” equates to ontology)
Kelle quotes the two key requirements for categorizing from Discovery
¤ Categories must not be forced on the data, they should emerge
instead in the ongoing process of data analysis.
¤ In developing categories, the sociologist should employ theoretical
sensitivity, which means the ability to see relevant data and to
reflect upon empirical data material with the help of theoretical
terms. (Kelle, 2007, p. 193)
Taken together they encompass precisely the tension referred to by Charmaz,
the paradox of categorizing being its reliance both on the data and the ways
in which the researcher brings to bear various other conceptual resources.
Simply stating that categories and theories emerge from the data is mislead-
ing and obtuse, and it does a disservice to GTM itself. In his chapter in the
Handbook, Dey provides an excellent discussion of what he terms “Grounding
Categories”: pointing out the critical ambiguities and lacunae in Discovery and
other GTM texts, but also welcoming the way in which Glaser and Strauss
envisaged “a dual role for categories … [that] went well beyond classical con-
ceptions of classification and anticipated future developments in the study of
categorization in cognitive psychology and linguistics” (2007, p. 169).
Borges, writing in the early 1950s, recognized that categorizing is inex-
act and provisional, but it is also an inevitable part of our thinking. We clas-
sify and categorize all the time, usually in ways that help us in our daily lives.
Nevertheless the process itself is fraught with contradictions, as Dey and
Kelle, and many others explain. In a library, books are classified and arranged
physically according to one or more forms of indexing and cataloguing, but
in the Pepys Library in Cambridge, UK, the books are arranged by size from
1 (smallest) to 3000 (largest).7 This optimizes the space required on a shelf,
since the books will all be of equal or approximately equal height. In a house-
hold someone may order their food cupboard with one section for tins and the
other for bottles; but an alternative might be to classify with regard to contents
rather than type of container. The preferred form will be selected on the basis
of “conventional wisdom,” cultural factors, individual preferences, and ideas of
relevance and usefulness. In GTM when researchers are involved in “ground-
ing categories” they need to discount the conventional wisdom and any cul-
tural mores and assumptions as far as possible, and develop the patterns and
themes that are produced from their detailed analysis of the data—which itself
may in part encompass the participants’ various ideas—explicit and tacit. As
explained in the discussion of Big Data (Chapter 16), however, they must also
develop an awareness of the possibility of apophenia—literally, seeing patterns
where there are none.
227
The examples that follow indicate the ways in which several of my stu-
dents developed their categories and concepts, demonstrating their theoretical
sensitivity, which with regard to this aspect of GTM can be summed as mov-
ing from knowledge of the data to the wisdom of higher level abstractions and
concepts. Or in the words of Miles Kington: “Knowledge is knowing that a
tomato is a fruit, wisdom is not putting it in a fruit salad.” But Dey has written,
Nevertheless, categories play a dual role in grounded theory which tran-
scends the classical definition of concepts in terms of indicators. They can
be both “analytic” and “sensitizing.” They allow us to conceptualize the key
analytic features of phenomena, but also to communicate a meaningful
picture of those phenomena in everyday terms. They allow us to classify
phenomena, but also to construct relationships among the different ele-
ments of a theory. (Dey, 2007)
He also quoted Bruner et al. on the subject:
A category is, simply, a range of discriminably different events that are
treated “as if ” equivalent (Bruner et al. 1986: 231). (Dey, 2007)
No [research] plan ever survives contact with the [research context]

enemy—Helmuth von Moltke the Elder8
Many of my PhD students have found themselves confronted by a plethora of

codes, but they all managed to move beyond this stage using a variety of strate-
gies. In all cases, however, they went over their data several times—either in
order to confirm their initial coding or to re-focus and revise their ideas—and
in some cases both. Also, as explained in Chapter 9, they almost all developed
some form of visualization.
One or two did refer to Basics of Qualitative Research in the early stages of
their work, but only one persevered with the coding paradigm, using it as one
part of her overall approach. What all the students found, however, was that
their initial ideas about their research strategy required revision and enhance-
ment once their investigations were underway.
As I discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, both Strauss and Glaser
felt the need to provide researchers with tools and techniques (as discussed in
Chapter 2) to assist them in the later stages of coding and categorizing. This
need was engendered by their aim of fostering confidence in novice research-
ers so that they would generate their own theories. Having recognized that
the early GTM texts were cryptic with regard to key aspects of this process of
coding and categorizing, they sought to add additional resources to offer fur-
ther assurance to the endeavor. The irony is that for many novice researchers
these additional aspects have not proved critical, and substantive theories have
been produced without recourse to the coding paradigm or coding families.
228
This should not be seen as a criticism of Strauss, Glaser, Corbin or any other

GTM writers; indeed it is testimony to the potential of GTM itself.
If you attempted the coding exercise in Chapter 6 you probably found that
your codes differed from those offered in the text. In some cases yours may
well have been broadly similar to those suggested, but in others they may have
been markedly different. It is important to understand that codes should not
be judged in terms of “correctness” but rather their “usefulness,” explanatory
power, and conceptual reach. Initially a set of codes should afford researchers
with a view of the research context that indicates further issues and avenues for
exploration. If the result of initial coding fails to do this, something has gone
awry in the relationship between the researchers and the data. Perhaps there
has been insufficient access or engagement, or the data is too sparse? Perhaps
the coding process has resulted in an unmanageable plethora of codes? In fact
this is rarely a problem; nevertheless researchers and their advisors should be
aware that moving through the method is not simple and straightforward.
It is also important to stress that the GTM literature can be highly mislead-
ing in implying that the research is carried out by a single person, operating
largely on his or her own. In many of the examples that follow students refer
to working with their colleagues, sharing their codes, and attending coding
workshops. The process of “generating genuine categories” is enhanced when
it relies on the insights of more than one person, given the idiosyncrasies that
we all exhibit in classifying and categorizing.
Before exploring these examples, it is worth returning to the paper by
Tove Giske and Barbara Artinian referred to in Chapter 6 to illustrate the later
codes that they developed. Table 11.2 presents the open coding, the subsequent
selective coding, and the final concepts. Although an abbreviated example, the
overall trend is very clear: the final concepts—all expressed as gerunds—can be
related to the earlier codes, but the ways in which they are developed are depen-
dent on the insights of the researcher (Giske), presumably with the help and
support of her advisor (Artinian). The paper itself reproduces one of Giske’s
memos on “ambivalence and balancing” that illustrates the ways in which the
codes for “thinks about the worst” and “Uncertain despite … ” are eventually
included within the concept of “balancing between hope and despair.”
The authors note that at one point they were unable “to organize the con-
cepts into a theory,” and this prompted them to the “idea of expressing our cur-
rent understanding of waiting for a diagnosis as a picture.” They prepared memos
and then Giske worked together with “a student nurse and a painter,”9 who “lis-
tened to my narration of waiting for a diagnosis and preparing for the final inter-
view conceived as walking down a corridor with many doors, where the patient
faced the door at the end symbolizing the concluding interview.” Her colleague
produced paintings that elicited new insights from Giske and her advisor.
After having seen this painting, we knew that it expressed the whole
idea and that when we would finally be able to express the main concern
and the core category, it would come out of that picture. In this way, the
229
TABLE 11.2
Tove Giske and Barbara Artinian—Coding
Data Open coding Selective coding Final concepts
Sometimes you think about the worst, you Thinks about Ambivalence Balancing
know, but they have informed me that the worst between hope
they have taken so many tests; and despair
I have been to gynaecological examination, Uncertain Uncertainty
they have taken lots of blood samples, despite many
and my liver is OK, and they find samples and
nothing. But even though it lies there no findings
smouldering. (Interview 3) To receive Seeking and
Smoulders giving
information
It is important for me to get to know, to be information
Wants to know Create a room
able to move on, either with treatment, to move on of rest
that I am well, or that I have to live
with this. If they can tell me; Ok, this Can live with it if
is nothing dangerous, you can come to he knows why
controls,so can I manage to live with the
pain. But I have to know the reason why
it is so. (Interview 9)
I read a book I brought and I listen to music Try to think of Seeking respite
to possess another world while I am other things
here. I need to overcome a threshold to
get rid of what my head is full of.
pictures facilitated our process of conceptualizing what was happening in

our study. Having done so, we later could explain the picture to others.
There is a clear indication in the paper of the points at which Giske worked on
her own, and where the two authors worked in concert: “our current under-
standing,” “we knew that it expressed,” as opposed to “listened to my narration.”
So the process of moving from the initial codes to the final concepts was a com-
plex one involving investigation by one researcher, discussions with her advisor,
collaboration with a third person—who was herself a student nurse with rel-
evant experience and ideas—and finally a joint process of conceptualization—
“our process of conceptualizing.” Someone writing from an avowedly “classical”
GTM orientation, Giske has clearly illustrated the ways in which the outcomes
of the research have been achieved as a result of active collaboration; a case of
insights being actively developed and constructed rather than concepts emerg-
ing from the data. Further examples from my PhD students follow.
GERHARD DREXLER
In Chapter 9 we saw an example in Drexler’s research, where he used focus

groups for his initial coding, and accomplished this in part with the assistance
of two colleagues. One of the outcomes of this approach was a summary of
“perceived collaboration problems and constraints” with regard to the ways in
which people from different types of organization make contact and initiate
collaboration. Box 11.1 lists his summary.
230
BOX 11.1
Summary of perceived collaboration problems and constraints (Drexler)
How do I find the knowledge or technology I need?

Who is the ideal partner for my project?
One or more partners?
How do I identify the most suitable partners for my projects?
Not easy to generate new ideas.
Contracts and agreements compromise idea creation.
Project partners are easier to handle than partners for idea generation.
Scientists don’t care about economic rationale and restrictions.
Low profile of industrial liaison offices in the university.
To trust a partner is a prerequisite for the success.
New ideas are more important than solving old problems.
Potential conflicts regarding royalty payments or other intellectual property rights.
Concerns about confidentiality.
Concerns over lower sense of urgency of university researchers compared to
industry researchers.
Tolerance for new ideas.
No distinction between invention and innovation.
None or inappropriate performance indicators.
Mutual lack of understanding about expectations and working practices.
Inability to apply innovations across departments.
Lack of cross-cultural understanding.
Feeling of not being listened to.
Personal interest rather than problem solving.
Source: Author [Drexler], based on focus group results.
He used this list, plus the data underlying it, to produce a cognitive map
that essentially categorizes his initial findings, in addition indicating his ideas
of the relationships between them. In doing so he followed the work of Adele
Clarke with her GTM-based method of situational analysis (Clarke, 2005) (see
Figure 9.3).
To contextualize this output, Drexler restated the initial purpose of his
research, which was “to advance the understanding of collaboration forma-
tion between enterprises and universities.” He clarified how he had got this far:
¤ He had developed and refined “a set of questions based on the
outcomes of focus group research”
¤ Conducted and coded “six preliminary interviews”
¤ Carried out “initial coding with focus on phases and processes
related to formation of collaboration in the front end of
innovation.”
He quoted from Charmaz to underline what had been accomplished by these
activities: “Initial codes often range widely across a variety of topics. […]
Initial codes help you to separate data into categories and to see processes”
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 51). This was followed by a table of extracts from these
interviews in which Drexler identified each uniquely. Examples of these from
231
TABLE 11.3
Gerhard Drexler interview examples
G2 Incident/Quotation
1 “I prefer scientists from universities who already know about our products and
processes.”
3 “It took me several years to identify ad approach contact persons in our local universities
and research institutes. But now, if we suddenly need their expertise, I know where
to go.”
4 “The feeling of sitting around the same table motivates collaboration. When ideating you
wish to get immediate feedback and interaction.”
39 It is imperative to understand what kind of knowledge and capabilities the partners
possess.
53 Certainly we have a budget for funding diploma theses just because we want to keep our
relations with universities alive. So we know the professors and the professors know
what we are doing and can approach us in case they find something that could be of
benefit.
G6 Incidents/Quotations
4 “We are open about our core knowledge and our thoughts about new opportunities. If our
partners acknowledge this, in many cases they are willing to give something back, e.g.
knowledge and ideas.”
10 “Research activities are quite free und unstructured, while product development is much
more disciplined, there are specs and defined milestones.”
22 “Partners like universities must be motivated to help us integrate leading-edge scientific
discoveries into a new product or process.”
interviews G2 and G6 are given in Table 11.3; Figure 11.1 illustrates these find-
ings as a situational map.
Again, he followed Clarke’s approach to produce what she terms a situ-
ational map; explaining that this was produced as a result of “data compared
with data to find similarities and differences.” He refers to his grouping of
codes into “clusters” in order to identify “similarities and patterns,” adding that
A number of memos were written in order to keep records of the ideas
and specific quotes, and on how the codes seemed to be related. Focus
was put on patterns which resemble processes, like conceptions of phases
or stages.
Apart from again quoting from Charmaz, he also quotes from Corbin and
Strauss (2008, p. 96) for the definition of a process as an “ongoing action/inter-
action/emotion taken in response to situations or problems,” and from Melanie
Birks and Jane Mills (2011, p. 175) “Process: dynamic activities occurring in all
aspects of life, not necessarily limited to conceptions of time, phases and stages.”
Drexler wove his ideas together in the form of a memo, justifying this step
with reference to Charmaz’s recommendation that “As you raise a code to a
category, you begin to write narrative statements in memos that
¤ define the category
¤ explicate the properties of the category
232
FIGURE 11.1 Abstract Situational Map of Interviews G2/G6/G20 from the work of Gerhard Drexler.
¤ specify the conditions under which the category arises

¤ describe its consequences
¤ show how this category relates to other categories.” (2006, p. 92)
He produces the result of a “chain of events” incorporating “eight out of nine
preliminary categories.” Table 11.4 indicates this outcome, clearly summariz-
ing his work and supporting “data” in the form of “representative quotations.”
This is an excellent example of moving beyond the data, based on close anal-
ysis of that data, and with only minimal recourse to ideas about processes,
families, or what Charmaz refers to as “application” of additional explanatory
frameworks.
As well as presenting his interim findings, Drexler was also keen to
explain and clarify the process that had led him there. In addition to refer-
ring to Corbin and Strauss, and Charmaz, he also cited a paper by Ralph
LaRossa to support the way in which his coding has been accomplished. This
had involved
a cyclical connection among the phases of coding (LaRossa, 2005), such
that “… coding does not follow a stepwise procedure so much as it, once
it has commenced with the initial round of open coding, follows a contin-
uous back-and-forth between types of coding in order to distil a grounded
theory rooted in a solid rationale.” (p. 840)
The data underlying this was derived from a total of 17 interviews, resulting in
“269 codes and 68 memos.” That sounds overwhelming, but Drexler certainly
233
TABLE 11.4
Early categories and supporting quotations (nb: Only two steps in Drexler’s sequence
are provided here, rather than the full list.)
Categories Representative quotations
Identifying “When they combine different types of expertise, they are more likely to approach
problems problems from distinct perspectives.” [G16_19]
“We need a certain amount of background knowledge to identify firms’ current and
future problems.” [G20_15]
…
Developing “It’s not the idea; it’s the convincing demonstration of an invention which leads to a
concepts contract. We have to make sure that the new technology will be successful and it
will create value.” [G2_9]
“In many cases their requirement of a concept needs some early stage research to
answer a specific technical question.” [G13_12]
managed to develop and sustain theoretical control of this and raise the con-
ceptual level of his analysis.
He also noted that apart from the interviews he also benefited from “a
number of discussions with scientist and managers who did not directly par-
ticipate in this study in the form of interviews. They were met on business
trips, congresses, workshops, and at presentations of the author of this study
on topics related to open innovation.” In some cases he produced “memo-
like” notes supplemented by “business reports, patents and product specifica-
tions”: Bearing out Glaser’s dictum “All is data.”
The Concept of “Concept”

In his interviews, Drexler noticed that some respondents used the term “con-
cept.” One of his categories is “Developing Concepts,” so in order to avoid
any misunderstandings about these uses of the term and its use in GTM he
considered it “essential to highlight the differences between the definition of a
‘concept’ in GTM and … ‘concept’ in the terminology of R&D managers.” In
so doing he offers a useful overview of the term across several texts on research
methods in general, and GTM in particular.
Table 11.5 presents a compilation in which Drexler, in his own words,
“summarises some definitions of the term concept in qualitative research
and raises some concerns about the precision and application of that term in
grounded theory research.”
Table 11.6 clarifies two of his categories, suggesting the properties and
dimensions for each.
Drexler moved to a second round of interviews, which resulted initially
in “197 new codes,” but after “re-listening and sifting through the transcripts
of the first round of interviews” he was able to narrow that number to 38
new codes.
234
TABLE 11.5
Clarification of the term “concept”
Citation Source
Concept: “Clearly specified ideas deriving from a particular model.” Silverman (2015),
p. 377
“A concept is basically the underlying meaning, uniformity and/or Goulding (2002), p. 77
pattern within a set of descriptive incidents.”
“A concept is a higher level code which identifies influencing factors Goulding (2002),
on behaviour and describes the relationship between them. The p. 169
conceptual code should have properties and dimensions and should
be interpreted at a theoretical level.”
“Concepts: Words that stand for groups or classes of objects, events, Corbin & Strauss
and actions that share some major common property(ies), though the (2008), p. 45
property(ies) can vary dimensionally.”
“…, but perhaps researchers need to clarify further distinctions between Bryant & Charmaz
code and category and concept.” (2007), p. 18
“A concept is a word or category that describes how the data varies with Birks & Mills (2011),
respect to the unit of analysis.” p. 93
“The language used by different grounded theorists can seem confusing Birks & Mills (2011),
until you realize that the terms ‘concepts,’ ‘codes’ and ‘categories’ p. 89
generally mean the same or similar things.
Source: Drexler PhD thesis
TABLE 11.6
Properties and dimensions of two initial categories
Generating ideas Interview
new impulses (incremental—radical) G4-8
not quite clear (fuzzy ideas—clear picture) G3-s1
problems trigger innovations (unknown—known) G11-6
starting point (no cost—intangible rewards) G18-s1
initially lacking substance (content—benefit) G6-s1
fuzzy thoughts (crazy—unlikely) G6-s2
explained in a few words (inspiring—animating) G15-8
ideation phase (discussing—creating) G13-10
proposals for free (at no cost) G8-1
Developing concepts
transforming ideas into concepts G6-14
scoping proposals (investigation—planning) G8-4
highly specialised knowledge (complex—novel) G13-15
feasibility studies (industry) G4-8, G12-14, G1-9
feasibility studies (PROs) G15-9, G13-7
clarifying time to market (estimation—analysis) G10-15
defining and designing products (properties) G1-10
making ideas executable (feasibility—financing) G7-13
commercial potential (acceptance—revenue) G7-10
Convincing demonstration (prototyping) G2-9
proofing benefit (cost—earnings) G11-11
Probability of success (technology-market need) G12-16
Source: Drexler PhD thesis

235
A further round of analysis resulted in “a number of new categories.”

In order to distinguish codes and categories and concepts, the researcher
followed Bryant’s and Charmaz’s (2007) advice, “It would seem that the
best working model places these terms in a hierarchy from bottom to
top: respectively code, category, concept.”
He lists the total of 23 “preliminary categories” grouped into two “clusters”;
“process-related categories,” and “environment-related categories.” In a memo
he pointed out that the original nine categories, all process-related, had been
identified from the original interviews and were also identified in the latter
ones. The other group of categories resulted from analysis of the second group
of interviews, and subsequent re-consideration of the first ones.
Drexler moved from open coding or initial coding to focused coding,
although not exactly in the way in which Charmaz defines the term. Her defi-
nition is as follows:
A sequel to initial coding in which researchers concentrate on the most
frequent and/or significant codes among their initial codes and test these
codes against large batches of data. Researchers can then take those codes
demonstrating analytic strength and raise them to tentative categories to
develop. When the researcher’s initial codes are concrete, the researcher
can code them by asking what analytic story these codes indicate, and thus
arrive at a set of focused codes. (2014, p. 343)
Charmaz’s definition of coding incorporates the idea that “the codes are
emergent—they develop as the researcher studies his or her data.” The term
“emergent” in this sense indicating that the codes exist at their own level of
abstraction, having arisen as a result of the complex relationship between
researcher(s) and data. This is something that cannot be understood merely
as a sum of constituent parts, and certainly not as something that “emerges”
from the data without taking account of these more complex interactions and
cognitive processes. (This is explained in more detail in Chapter 8.)
To an extent Drexler took a different route from that intimated by
Charmaz. He started to group codes into categories after his first round of
interviews but did not explicitly use these in his later interviews. Yet he did
report that these later groupings supported the initial nine categories, and that
after analyzing all the data he could justify these further categories and group
all of them into two clusters.
In fact he did combine aspects of focused coding with theoretical cod-
ing, so that he arrived at the point where he could group categories together
to indicate “possible relationships” (Charmaz) and “weave the fractured story
back together” (Glaser), telling the story in a different and more purposeful
manner. The discussion he provides indicates this process. For instance in the
236
BOX 11.2
Memo 240609 (Drexler) (excerpt, translated from German)
Grouping first-order categories into second-order themes

There is process (C1-1 to C1-9) and something in addition (support factors,
conditions, requirements and related factors). Looking at these categories, there
seems to emerge some kind of linear process and a surrounding environment. In
order to head towards the development of core categories and clear theoretical
arguments, the process and its environment should be connected or merged.
Charmaz (06): “Although I have not used axial coding according to Strauss and
Corbin’s formal procedures, I have developed subcategories of a category and
showed the links between them as I learned about the experiences the categories
represent” (p. 61). Quote from Charmaz 2006
Looking for links seems easy—just take the figure of process and environment
and use different colours for different themes and identical colours for connected
themes.
Might also make sense to condense some clusters into new categories.
passage that follows he comments on how his categories compare with the
extant literature, adding new resonance to the topic as a whole:
… the categories “proximity,” “alignment,” “concept development,”
“informal process,”, and “feasibility” have not been tackled prominently
in extant research literature and thus seemed to be an interesting theme
in collaboration research. It was also interesting that personal traits and
skills seem to be of high priority and importance.
Drexler refers to this stage of his research as “relating the first-order categories
to each other” (see Box 11.2), and later stages center on focused coding in
Charmaz’s sense. Figure 11.2 shows in diagrammatic form how he grouped his
first-order categories into second-order themes.
In the later stages of his research Drexler produced a model incorporat-
ing five higher-order or what he terms “conceptual” categories, deriving these
from the initial 23 interviews, and the 388 codes. Having derived them he
sought to establish their validity by presenting them to “four former interview-
ees” and “four scientists from three organisations not included in this research
so far.” Their comments and the ways in which their responses lend credence
to the five categories were duly recorded in a detailed memo.
The overall result of his research was a model centered on “aligning col-
laborative innovation” illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 11.3. This is
referred to again in Chapter 12.
ANDREA GORRA
Turning now to the work of Gorra, we see a different approach in taking initial
codes to further stages of abstraction. From her initial codes she derived a
number of “themes” which were used as the basis for the interview questions
237
Achieving results
Acquiring Formal
subsidies agreements
C1-9
Creating Developing C1-8
advantages concepts
Protecting IP
Aligning interests
C1-7
Reducing risk Demonstrating
Evaluating feasibility
ideas C1-6
Building trust
C1-5 Generating
Informal
ideas process
Face-to-face
C1-4
Building relationships
Prior Networking
knowledge Identifying
acquisition C1-3 partners
C1-2 Proximity
Searching for
C1-1 opportunities Prior
Personal traits partnerships
Identifying problems
FIGURE 11.2 Clusters of first-order categories.
in the second and third phases of her research. Table 11.7 gives examples of
themes and associated starting points for the interviews. She noted that the
interviews themselves elicited further themes.
In discussing the interviews Gorra noted that two further sets of interviews
were required once she realized that she needed to develop and change her
questions as the interviews progressed. So by the latter stage of interviews she
took notice of Charmaz’s advice (2006) “to phrase interview questions to allow
respondents to express their views without constraints.” A question initially
Defining Building
Needs Relationships
Antecedents
Aligning Collaborative Generating

Innovation Ideas
Establishing Aligning
Contracts Contributions
FIGURE 11.3 Aligning Collaborative Innovation.

238
TABLE 11.7
Themes of interview questions for second and third interview phases
Theme Notes about question
Mobile phone Mobile phone usage and habits in everyday life situations.
Privacy An open question as to what privacy means to the interviewee.
Deliberately trying to avoid mentioning any categories of privacy known from the
literature.
Phone as Referring to technical and legal facts of mobile phone location data that were
tracking sent out prior to the interview.
device Is the interviewee aware of location data before this study?
¤
¤ Are any issues or concerns raised?
In addition to these themes, participants mentioned terrorist attacks, current politics, and ID
cards.
Source: Andrea Gorra PhD thesis
phrased “Have you ever heard of mobile phone location data before taking part
in this study?” was changed to “What do you know about mobile phone loca-
tion data?” Moreover a question referring to consumer loyalty cards and the
storage of personal information by commercial companies was removed once
it was found that “respondents did not perceive this area as related to privacy.”
As I mentioned in Chapter 9, Gorra first used NVivo software in her cod-
ing but found that this did not produce a satisfactory outcome. In part this
was because her initial ideas were not borne out by the first set of data, and her
methodological sensitivity was such that she recognized this and opted for a
fresh and ultimately more suitable approach, which amounted to use of pen
and paper and line-by-line coding. The codes that she developed ranged from
some at what she termed a “microscopic” level and others that led to “more
abstract categories [coming] into view.” All of these were recorded, with key-
words or phrases “noted on differently coloured Post-It notes and stuck onto a
blank A2 flip chart sheet.”
As more and more interviews were coded, this sheet started looking less
like a random collection of labelled Post-It notes but more like a brain
storm map or a tree where branches of thought grew from certain cat-
egories. Memos were written throughout this exercise to keep track of
thoughts and ideas regarding the data analysis.
Gorra’s work developed through a series of stages, starting with her first inter-
view phase and open coding resulting in a set of initial codes. This was fol-
lowed by a second series of interviews from which she derived a set of focused
codes. On the basis of this material she devised a survey that was completed
by over 450 people, and the data was then analyzed with the aid of [Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences] SPSS. A third set of interviews, with questions
revised as referred to above, took place, and further analysis for focused codes
was carried out. From this analysis she developed her final categories.
239
Because Gorra re-ran her analysis, having been dissatisfied with the early
efforts using NVivo, her early codes were the result of analyzing the pilot
interviews twice; once using NVivo and then again using pen and paper. The
result was that the two sets of codes could be compared, and that comparison
“helped to clarify whether the codes were reliable and truly represented the
empirical data.” They were broadly similar, but “initial codes were often either
too narrow, too close to the interviewees’ exact words or seemed to mirror
themes known from the literature.” Clearly Gorra’s theoretical sensitivity was
developing, and her insights into the shortcomings of her first efforts proved
beneficial to the research as a whole.
She sought further grounding by “swapping a number of interview tran-
scripts with a fellow student who also used the grounded theory approach. In a
feedback session following this exchange, codes were discussed and confirmed.”
She summed up the process as one leading to a “set of codes … that captured
on a conceptual level what had been expressed in the interviews.” From all of
this she defined five “Groups or Themes of Focused Codes” (see Table 11.8).
Gorra was now confronted with the situation that both Strauss and Corbin
and Glaser sought to ameliorate with their respective frameworks—the coding
paradigm and coding families, respectively. She tried to use the coding para-
digm in looking for “properties and dimensions” for the tentative categories.
She saw this as a tool “to map out the characteristics of those [categories] and
to explore their meanings,” with dimensions then being “used to recognise
TABLE 11.8
Groups of focused codes and their descriptions
Groups or themes Description of the code
of focused codes
1. M
obile phone ¤ Phone ownership (details about mobile phone contract, usage, settings
use and reasons for getting a phone)
¤ Features of phone used (use ring tone settings according to situation)
¤ Awareness of & attitude towards technology, relationship to phone,
including feelings (being contactable via phone, being dependent on
phone)
2. Location ¤ Location data (awareness of, thoughts about regulation, storage, technical
aspects, ownership, access, dissemination)
¤ Implications of knowledge of one’s location (feelings/thoughts about one’s
location, use and misuse of location data: parents & children, workplace
3. Privacy ¤ Participants’ definitions, what is it about (space, controlling information,
liberty to do things, bodily privacy)
¤ Balancing act
4. Emotions, “me” ¤ Trust, feeling respected, worrying, thoughts about future, information about
me: financial, access to information, sharing information
5. State, “they” ¤ CCTV, attitude towards government, Big brother, safety/security, crime,
terrorism, ID cards
¤ Other people knowing what I am doing, (not) doing something wrong, being
anonymous
¤ Attitude towards commercial businesses (loyalty cards, etc)
Source: Gorra PhD thesis

240
variations of that category and of the final theory.” She even developed this for
one of her categories “Use of phone to regulate social interactions.”
[This] proved to be of limited use for the analysis. For some categories it was
possible to devise a number of suitable properties. However, the researcher
decided that for most of the categories it did not make sense to assign
properties and dimensions, as this forced the qualitative data into a rigid
framework without adding much value to interpretation of data and anal-
ysis. Instead Charmaz’s (2006) approach was adopted, which uses the less
restrictive way of making comparisons between data. (emphasis added)
In her methodological account Gorra stated that she adopted neither axial
coding nor theoretical coding. She did, however, use Clarke’s “Situational
Map” to develop her ideas from categories to concepts and a substantive theo-
retical statement. In many respects Clarke’s approach seeks to lend support
at the same point and for much the same reasons as Strauss and Corbin’s and
Glaser’s. For Clarke Situational Maps build on the work of Strauss, taking GTM
into what she terms a “Postmodern turn” (Clarke, 2005). Tom Mathar (2008),
in a clear and succinct discussion of these ideas, notes that Clarke is concerned
to offer researchers ways in which to address aspects of power and reflexivity
in their analysis; something that she regards as neglected in GTM. Given the
developing concepts in Gorra’s work, such as surveillance, privacy, trust and
such like, it was not too surprising that she found Clarke’s ideas valuable and
resonant. Box 11.3 illustrates her situational map. The headings are taken from
Clarke’s work, and on first reading it might appear paradoxical for Gorra to
have used this guide given her aversion to other suggested tools that she saw as
too restrictive and constraining. It is clear, however, that issues of power and
authority, as well as different people’s perspectives on those and related issues
such as privacy and surveillance have “earned their way” into Gorra’s account,
and so Clarke’s framework is highly appropriate.
IBRAHEEM JODEH
Jodeh conducted a small number of initial interviews, coding for “key points,”
and producing a tabulated list of them. Codes were identified for each inci-
dent, and incidents with a common code were amalgamated. He derived
his codes “when there was a basic and important idea relevant to the study.
Sometimes, “after having a second look at the data, the researcher combined
more different codes into one code because they had the same idea.” (emphasis
added) Examples of incidents and codes are given in Table 11.10 (The inter-
view identification number ID I-1/94 indicates that the example text is from
interview 1, line 94.)
This combining of codes provided the basis for derivation of higher level
codes that brought similar incidents together. For instance Jodeh identified a
241
BOX 11.3
Situational Map (after Clarke, 2005)
Individual Human Actors Collective Human actors

Unorganised private individuals, Organisations
such as ■ mobile phone service providers (such as O2, .)
■ mobile phone users ■ commercial organisations (retail businesses,
■ non-mobile phone users marketing)
■ criminals ■ UK government, EU commission (‘legislative’)
■ terrorists ■ police (‘executive’)
■ emergency services
■ NGOs (e.g. Privacy International, Statewatch)
■ terrorist and criminal organisations
Political Elements Economic Elements
■ political parties ‘Condition’ of
■ government/parliament {the gov.’s ■ economy (fairly good)
‘task’ to provide national security} ■ particular industries
■ NGOs (see also Organisations) ■ mobile phone -handset
■ is terrorism a political element? ■ service provider
■ network infrastructure
What if there would a lesser terrorist
■ internet service providers
threat?
Would data retention not be an ■ > What if the economy was worse than now,
issue then? would the situation of data retention be the same?
Would any other uses for the retention Would this mean-fewer handsets on the market (&
of communications data be mobile phones not as wide spread in society)
advocated? ■ data storage costs could be too high to make
blanket data retention possible
Temporal elements Major issues/debates
■ 9/11, terrorist attacks in Sept. 2001 In the daily politics
in the US ■ security and ‘fight against terrorism’ vs. civil
■ 07/07, London terrorist attacks in liberties and privacy (particularly after London
July 2005 terrorist attacks, July 2005)
{I call these ‘temporal’ because these ■ ID cards
events have lasted only for a few
moments. However, the political and
social impacts have lasted much
longer.}
Non-Human Elements Socio-cultural/symbolic elements
Technologies in general ■ the British population does not want to have
■ trend towards digital generation, (biometric) ID cards
access and storage of data,
■ increasing access to broadband ■ mobile phones as ‘life style accessory’, a
internet, ubiquitous electronic ‘must’ for many: OAPs to school kids (safety,
communications (email, chat, connectivity, convenience)
voice-over-IP)
Mobile phone technologies
■ handsets: mobile phones as ■ Britain’s multicultural society
versatile lifestyle accessories: music
player, organiser, games,.
■ mobile phone network
infrastructure: 99.9% coverage in UK
Spatial Elements Related discourse
■ spaces relevant for situation. How ■ Normative expectations “in the name of
accurate is location data? terrorism, I am happy/expected to sacrifice my
■ geographical aspects of privacy.”
terrorism: (Yorkshire), UK, Europe, ■ mass media: terrorism needs fighting with all
the world means
242
TABLE 11.9
Category “Use of phone to regulate social interactions” and its properties and dimensions
Category Properties Dimensions
Use phone to “regulate” Ring tone settings ring, vibrate, silent, mute, switched off
social interactions Features of phone used voicemail on/off
Phone with person Yes, no, usually rarely
Source: Gorra PhD thesis
code “Achieving transactions faster” indicating the 13 incidents noted across

his first seven interviews.
¤ I -1/98 Electronic applications help increase the speed of
achievement.
¤ I -1/101 The assessing and auditing officer’s capacity of
achievement has become speed.
¤ I -2/93 This process used to take more than a week to be achieved.
¤ I -3/1 Completing transactions becomes faster.
¤ I -3/10 Electronic contact through email between the assessing
officer or the auditing officer and the taxpayers helps to
achieve speed.
He supported this conclusion with a detailed memo—Box 11.4.
He continued with this process of integrating codes into what he referred
to as “categories,” ending up with a total of nine. Each category was based on
a number of codes and a smaller number of concepts, which is a different
order from the one Charmaz and I suggested in the Handbook. The outcome at
this stage of Jodeh’s work was a small group of preliminary “categories,” which
other investigators might term focused codes, that provided the basis for his
later research.
An example of one of these codes, “Supportive Factors,” is given in
Figure 11.4.
TABLE 11.10
Key points and codes (Jodeh)
ID Key point (the incident) Code
I -1/94 The task of the assessing officer now is to feed Saving effort

data into systems. Reducing pressure on staff
I -4/36 There are some staff members who can not put Lacking structured training
data onto the computer, and they ask their
colleagues to do it.
I -4/45 Many of the training programs held were not well- Lacking structured training
prepared and, therefore, ineffective. Lacking good planning for future
Lacking effective training
243
BOX 11.4
Jodeh Memo “Enhancing Achievement”
Enhancing Achievement
The researcher noticed that employees, especially those in the tax system, were
fully convinced that the deployment of ICT had helped to speed up the delivery
and follow-up procedures, and that it has shortened the time and effort required
in routine processes and procedures. Some transactions that used to need more
than a week to be achieved can be now achieved in just a few minutes. According
to one of the employees in the main directorate, a transaction was delayed by
approximately 15 minutes before it was followed up by another tax directorate in
another geographical area through the Workflow system and the electronic link
between tax departments. According to interviewees, this transaction used to
take more than a week to be achieved before the deployment of ICT. Also, the
researcher recorded that the introduction of ICT has helped to provide information
and documentation needed by the assessing and auditing officers to make their
decisions which leads to a saving of time and effort of the department and
taxpayers, and thus works to increase the satisfaction of taxpayers and reduce
the effort required by employees to achieve their tasks.
Jodeh used these nine categories as a format for re-approaching the litera-
ture prior to conducting his main study. This was done in order to “review and
understand the deployment of Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) in taxation systems of developed countries in general, and to highlight
the experiences of the UK regarding the introduction and deployment of
ICT in its taxation systems.” His memo, titled “Similarities and Distinctions,”
Category
Supportive Factors
Human resources
General support
Official support
Infrastructure
Concepts
support
support
Integrating the Accepting e-applications Establishing Interesting of tax

taxes departments, from staff, infrastructure revenue,
Receiving support Recruiting highly qualified ready for Using modern
from the staff, Getting rid of electronic link, technology in the
Codes
government, managers resistant to Introducing world,

Interacting with change e-services Receiving support
the e-services from the global
organisations
FIGURE 11.4 Category “Supportive Factors.”

244
written after this review was completed noted that “there are similarities and
distinctions between … initial results and experiences of developed coun-
tries.” There was congruence between his initial results and “prior theories and
experiences of developed countries in terms of the needs, aims and advantages
of the introduction and deployment of ICT in taxation systems,” but “a clear
distinction in some other points, such as: the initiative, motivation, long-term
plans, incentives for taxpayers, cooperation with the tax community and the
challenges and difficulties in the surrounding environment.” He understood
from this that the later stages of his research needed to take account of aspects
such as “principles, criteria, rules and rates of taxation on the one hand, and
the introduction and deployment of ICT in taxation systems as a provider of
a better service, more reasonable cost for the Tax Department and customers,
facilitator of compliance of the population and the level of national income on
the other.”
This is again a different strategy from that of the other students whose
work has been explored in this book, and certainly it differs from many text-
book views of GTM. But it is clearly grounded in the data, guided by the
researcher’s insights, and clearly articulated for the reader. In effect Jodeh has
drawn on good practices of GTM coding, although he has pre-empted the
issue of producing a potentially unwieldy number of low-level codes by iden-
tifying a structure for integrating them at an early stage of analysis, far earlier
than might have been expected, but still warranted by the data itself. As is
discussed in Chapter 12, he used these findings as the basis for his theoretical
sampling and further conceptualization in the subsequent stages of his work.
Research Strategies: Plans and Situated Actions
Thomas Gladwin (1964) has written a brilliant article contrasting the

method by which the Trukese navigate the open sea, with that by which
Europeans navigate. He points out that the European navigator begins
with a plan-a course-which he has charted according to certain universal
principles, and he carries out his voyage by relating his every move to
that plan. His effort throughout his voyage is directed to remaining “on
course.” If unexpected events occur, he must first alter the plan, then
respond accordingly. The Trukese navigator begins with an objective
rather than a plan. He sets off toward the objective and responds to
conditions as they arise in an ad hoc fashion. He utilizes information
provided by the wind, the waves, the tide and current, the fauna, the
stars, the clouds, the sound of the water on the side of the boat, and he
steers accordingly. His effort is directed to doing whatever is necessary to
reach the objective. If asked, he can point to his objective at any moment,
but he cannot describe his course (Gerald Berreman 1966). Quoted
245
by Lucy Suchman in the Introduction to Plans and Situated Actions

(Suchman, 1987)
In an earlier section of this chapter I revised von Moltke’s dictum about the
non-survival of plans in the face of later engagement with practical com-
plexities. A less combative and more considered way of making this point
can be found in Suchman’s Plans and Situated Actions, where she contrasts
those who draw up and reply on detailed plans with those who are guided
by “situated actions.” Her aim was to “explore the relation of knowledge and
action to the particular circumstances in which knowing and acting invari-
ably occur.” This resonates both with John Dewey’s Pragmatism, with its
stress on the interdependence between knowledge and action (see Chapter
17), and Donald Schön’s stress on what he calls “knowing in action” (see
Chapter 10). All three scholars share a critique of the view that something
has to be thought out prior to action, offering instead an alternative where
thought and action go hand-in-hand.
Without engaging with the full complexities of the arguments for and
against each of these positions, it should be apparent from the preceding
chapters that my view of research incorporates what can be termed “knowing
in action,” recognizing that a research project exemplifies a series of situated
actions. Furthermore, GTM in its essential characteristics embodies a heuris-
tic method that offers guidance and support for researchers as they progress
through their investigations, being faced with decisions and choices entirely
contingent on their previous work. I take this exploration of GTM as a heuris-
tic method further in Part Four.
The examples given in this chapter should be seen to illustrate a number
of key features in the process of moving from the initial stages of coding-cum-
analysis through to the intermediate phases that should provide the basis for
articulation of a substantive theoretical statement. Whatever their plans might
have been at the start of their research, each student found that once his or her
investigation was underway the process was open to a range of contingencies
that only became apparent as their ideas developed.
In general, they all allowed themselves to be surprised by the data and
the ensuing analysis. They selected aspects that they saw as relevant, in some
cases following the guidelines from GTM authorities—for example, look-
ing for action phrases, using gerunds, and so on—but also departing from
these rubrics if their deliberations led elsewhere. Once they had fractured the
data they understood the need to re-integrate it, focusing on some aspects
at the expense of others. Their use of terminology was consistent, although
often at odds with that used elsewhere, such as in texts by Charmaz, Strauss
and Corbin, and in the introduction to the Handbook. But what the students
had in common was a process of developing categories—sometimes termed
themes, clusters, concepts, and the like—that were clearly derived from the
246
data, and that were amenable to being established as the basis for later stages
of their work.
These significant accomplishments were achieved through concerted
effort, although in their theses they were presented as relatively straightfor-
ward, which is intimated in the four accounts given in Chapter 19. In the
course of their work none of these students was daunted by the number and
disparity of the initial codes to the extent of feeling overwhelmed and unable
to persevere. They managed this transition in a variety of ways, often inad-
vertently and unknowingly drawing on ideas developed by Charmaz, Strauss
and Corbin, and Glaser in their respective discussions on focused coding and
theoretical coding.
Transmissia Semiawan exemplified this in drawing on Chapter XI
in Discovery, which is titled “Insight and Theory Development.” She was
impressed by Glaser and Strauss’s argument that people’s insights “are the basic
source of a theory.” Furthermore they claimed that there are three roots where
people’s insights would be gained from:
¤ Personal experiences while people do activities as their experiences
or while rethinking and reflecting those of their own experiences;
¤ Other people experiences which can be obtained through reading,
watching, listening, or talking;
¤ Existing theory; as the references to the development of the
new one.
On this basis Semiawan reported that her analysis of what she termed “the
phenomena”
… was based on the combination of her personal experiences, partici-
pants’ experiences and related theories from literature. Thus, when analys-
ing the interview transcripts and developing the concept using memoing
the researcher sometimes added information from literature available
in order to support and to make clear the description based on her and
the participants’ opinions. It is not easy to see the difference between the
researcher’s personal reflection and the participants’ views. This is because
the interview transcript resulted from the discussion between them in
terms of mutual construction of meaning.
But she was keen to stress that “the justification of being a phenomenon was,
again, that it is anchored in the context.”
Semiawan provides clear grounds for understanding that theoretical cod-
ing need not be regarded as a distinct activity undertaken at a particular stage
of analysis. It is not a process that can be turned on when required in the
analysis. It can be elicited at very early stages, almost as soon as the initial
coding-cum-analysis has been accomplished. To use William Gibson’s phrase,
pattern recognition comes all too easily and readily to most of us. (Gibson’s
247
novel of that name has as one of its central themes “the human desire to detect
patterns or meaning and the risks of finding patterns in meaningless data.”10)
Glaser and Strauss’ admonition regarding the influence of existing theories
and knowledge at the outset of one’s research was probably not stated with this
exact issue in mind, but it should now be read to incorporate it. I would also
argue that our understanding of theoretical sensitivity should be enhanced so
that it clearly includes the skill of resisting the impulse for pattern recognition
as an immediate and habitual form of cognition: something that is all too easily
invoked inadvertently by our unconscious resort to commonplace ideas and
mores, as well as individual theories and models. There needs to be a balance
between constructing patterns from the data—what Glaser would prefer to see
described as discovering patterns in the data—and guarding against the dan-
gers of apophenia.11 Hence the importance of the various ways in which GTM
outcomes—substantive theories—are given credibility, a topic that is discussed
in Part Four, although in the examples taken from my PhD students they go
to great lengths to provide the basis for and justification of their codes, catego-
ries, and concepts.
Key Points
¤ Annotations and explanations added to Onions’s table explaining

difference between Glaser’s and Strauss’s view of GTM
¤ Glaser and Strauss were both trying to offer help and support for the

same set of issues—facilitating the generation of genuine and powerful
concepts and categories
¤ Charmaz’s distinction between “application” and “emergence”
¤ General issue of development of categories and concepts—and
theoretical coding—may not be problematic in practice.
¤ Classification and Categorization—Borges on Chinese Encyclopaedia

and Kington on tomatoes
¤ Different levels of coding: open, selective, focused, theoretical

¤ Visual representation of products—e.g. cognitive maps,
situational maps
¤ Doing research is a series of situated actions
Other notable features derived from the work discussed in this chapter
include the following:
¤ Use of diagrams—in some cases derived from the GTM literature
(coding paradigm, situational map), or from other sources, or invented
by the student
248
¤ Use of color—highlighting themes across interview data and other

sources by using colors to distinguish concepts or categories
¤ Coding using key points or incidents as the initial strategy, rather
than line-by-line or word-by-word—although in some cases these
more detailed forms were brought into play at a later stage to provide
evidence or the basis for codes and even categories
¤ Evidence of thought in preparing the sections in their work on

presentation of their findings at different stages, and the ensuing
discussion
¤ Clear links between reflection and analysis, with many students
reporting that in writing their memos they were also developing their
analyses and insights
¤ Semiawan’s and Jodeh’s evocative use of language in their coding and
memoing
Notes
1. Papers such as those by Holton (2008) and Hernandez (2009), published in Glaser’s
house journal GT Review, stake a claim for GTM’s having largely been developed by Glaser
on his own, prior to his teaming up with Strauss.
2. Australia was there all the time, James Cook just happens to be generally acknowl-
edged as the first person from Europe who got there.
3. Priestley did not discover it because he never acknowledged its existence, but
Lavoisier coined the term after replicating Priestley’s work.
4. A failing that neither Glaser nor anyone else has never addressed
5. A similar issue arises with regard to the current trend of “Big Data”; discussed in
Chapter 16.
6. http://a very.morrow.name/blog/2013/01/borges-c hinese-e ncyclopedia/ the text of the
encyclopaedia itself is available online at http://archive.org/stream/cu31924022247658#page/
n3/mode/2up
7. http://www.magd.cam.ac.uk/the-pepys-library/
8. The original quotation refers to a battle plan.
9. Clarification—this is one and the same person, not two different people.
10. William Gibson, Pattern Recognition http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pattern_
Recognition_%28novel%29—emphasis added
11. This term is explained in more detail in Chapter 13, a useful overview can be found
at http://skepdic.com/apophenia.html.
249
12
Getting to an End-point

THEORETICAL SATURATION
All research involves a series of compromises. There is only a finite amount of

time for the study, deadlines loom; funding may not stretch to cover planned
visits for interviews or trips to an archive; the team of researchers cannot man-
age further tasks. In the age of Google and Internet searching, the range of
possible sources is vast and the best that researchers can hope for is that they
have located and accessed most of the relevant materials. At some point the
project has to be brought to a halt.
None of this is unique to GTM-oriented research, it applies to all investi-
gatory projects, but GTM deals head-on with many of these issues in ways that
should be lauded, but that are instead treated as weaknesses in the method.
This paradox is best considered by examining the issues of achieving and dem-
onstrating theoretical saturation and producing a substantive theory.
Theoretical Saturation
As noted throughout this book, the origins of GTM date to the work of Barney
Glaser and Anselm Strauss in the 1960s. Three of their early texts are consid-
ered canonical: Awareness of Dying, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, and
Time for Dying (this trilogy is abbreviated herinafter as Awareness, Discovery,
and Time). In Discovery the term theoretical saturation is defined as a follows:
The criterion for judging when to stop sampling the different groups per-
tinent to the category is the categories theoretical saturation. Saturation
means that no additional data are being found whereby the sociologist
can develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and
over again the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is
saturated. (p. 61, emphasis added)
249
250
Unfortunately the full import of this definition has been misunderstood so

that it is often assumed that saturation centers on the data rather than the
properties of categories. In part this is because there is confusion relating to the
forms of sampling involved in GTM.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of research sampling—probability
and non-probability. The former is used in quantitative approaches, where a
random sample of a population is required; that is, where there should be an
equal probability of any member of that sample being selected. Non-probability
sampling does not involve the criterion of randomness; the members of the
sample are selected on the basis of a purpose or, sometimes, on the basis of
convenience. Convenience sampling, as the term implies, occurs where the
research sample is drawn from people at hand; thus the example in Chapter 7
was based on a convenience sample. Such a sample might seem to be a rather
haphazard and ill-founded basis for research, and in some respects this may be
the case. For instance the vast proportion of psychological research has been
and continues to be conducted on the basis of convenience samples mostly
drawn from undergraduates, which is a highly convenient but hardly a repre-
sentative sample of the general population.1 Convenience sampling often leads
to other forms of sampling such as “snowball sampling”; in that approach, par-
ticipants initially approached for the research suggest others who might be of
interest.
The general form of GTM sampling at the start of a project is purposive;
that is, the participants are chosen with a purpose in mind. For example, one
of my PhD students whose work has been cited in this text, Gerhard Drexler,
was interested in the ways in which innovative projects were initiated, and so
he chose people involved in these forms of activity and collaboration. Another
of the PhD candidates, Stella Walsh, selected women from a section of the
local population based on their class background, age, and geographical loca-
tion. The paper by Evelyn Labun and Julia Emblen (2007) clarifies the basis for
their research, combining all these three forms of sampling (purposive sam-
pling by implication):
The purpose of this study was to examine the interrelationship of health,
illness, and spirituality for Punjabi Sikh living in Canada. A grounded
theory study with a convenience sample and use of snowballing technique
provided a sample of 15 participants ranging in age from 20 to 70 years.
The role of the initial motivation and rationale for the research is clearly
important at this early stage, as was discussed in Chapter 8. The data gathered
from the initial sample is subjected to the coding-cum-analysis that comprises
open or preliminary coding. This may well yield results that are unexpected,
an outcome reported by almost all of my students and a common result in
GTM research. Indeed if a GTM researcher reported that the initial codes
and potential categories aligned precisely with their expectations, then there
251
Getting to an End-point 251
would be grounds for concern; there would also be concern if the researcher
claimed to have had no expectations!
Once an initial (purposive) sample has been subjected to the scrutiny
of coding, the results from that process provide the basis for the next sam-
pling stage: theoretical sampling. In the second edition of her classic work,
Constructing Grounded Theory, Kathy Charmaz offers a succinct distinction
between the two forms; “Initial sampling in grounded theory gets you started;
theoretical sampling guides where you go” (2014, p. 197).
In probability sampling there will be concerns relating to the randomness
of the sample, the nature of the population, and the sample size. But these are
not issues for sampling in GTM. The sample is never random, the size of the
sample is not a concern, and the aim is not to provide a statistical result gen-
erally applicable across a population. Criticisms of GTM research that point
to the small sample sizes and methods of non-random sampling simply miss
the point.
There are, however, sampling issues in GTM pertaining to the link between
theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation. Once the initial coding has
been achieved researchers should have developed tentative categories; if not,
they will be confronted with The Funes Problem (see Chapter 8). The catego-
ries drawn from initial coding, which some students referred to as clusters,
themes, or patterns, provide the basis for the next stages of the investigation,
which Charmaz characterizes as “strategic, specific, and systematic” (2014,
p. 199). Things have moved beyond the initial exploratory and open-minded
stage, to a stage at which the focus is on the outcomes to date, with a view
toward corroborating, enhancing, enriching, and finally saturating the catego-
ries. (See Box 12.1 for a simplistic but stark example, and Box 12.2 for a very
clear and cogent account.)
Drexler exemplifies this in his work on developing collaborations. He car-
ried out three main phases of interviews, “11 at the beginning, nine during
selective coding and additional three to strive for theoretical saturation.” He
quoted from Strauss and Corbin to note that this was “the point in analysis
when all categories are well developed in terms of properties, dimensions, and
variations. Further data gathering and analysis add little new to the concep-
tualization, though variations can always be discovered” (Corbin and Strauss,
2008, p. 263). He justified his claim to have reached this point in his research
on the basis of a combination of three activities. The first concerned the last
three interviews, which were conducted on the basis of his identification of
a core category and its sub-categories; in other words, these interviews were
carried out to investigate precisely these categories, and not to collect more
data in any wider sense. “These did not reveal any new aspects and confirmed
what has been said earlier by participants number one to 20.” Drexler held
workshops “with managers of R&D, technology, and marketing … to discuss
the outcome of this dissertation for the purpose of improving the company’s
252
BOX 12.1
Theoretical Saturation
A slightly trite but illustrative example

A researcher, called TB, has recently tasted something called Crème Brûlée, and
decides to investigate what it is made from. He has no idea about the ingredients,
so he searches the web to look at recipes for this concoction (purposive
sampling).
A Google search returns more than 600,000 “hits.” He looks at the first ten
recipes, and using GTM coding he ends up with the following “codes”—realizing
that some are verbs and some are nouns
Eggs, Cream, Sugar, Vanilla, Egg Yolks, Milk, Double Cream, Demerara Sugar,
Vanilla Pods, Icing Sugar, Single Cream, Caster Sugar, Vanilla Essence, Jasmine Tea,
Lemon Peel, Whipping Cream, Icing Sugar
Mixing, separating, whisking, beating, baking, cooling, scooping, blow-torching,
caramelizing, eating
He develops the following higher-level categories
Cream; Eggs; Liquid; Sweetener; Flavouring (gerund); Preparing; Presenting
After further consideration the category Liquid is combined with Cream, and
labelled as Dairy; the categories Preparing and Presenting are combined into a
single category.
The categories develop as follows:

Eggs—whole but separated, only yolks, number 3–9
Dairy—cream, cream and milk, single or double or whipping cream, milk on its
own; volume
Sweetener—caster sugar, icing sugar, Demerara, unrefined; quantity—
tablespoon or weight.
Flavouring—vanilla (pod or essence), jasmine tea, lemon peel
Preparing and Presenting—range of techniques and equipment
The Google search is repeated, but with the search terms expanded to include
the names of the five categories (theoretical sampling). The first 25 recipes on
the list are examined. The result is that they add nothing to the categories already
established, although in one or two cases alternative dishes are referred to—but
these do not impact upon the categories themselves. (It is noted that the dish
itself is also referred to by other names such as burnt cream, crema catalana, or
Trinity cream—but adding these to the search list produces no further revisions to
the categories.)
Theoretical Saturation has been achieved and can be demonstrated. The claim
has nothing to do with the number of sites examined, only with the contents of
the sites themselves and the ways in which they corroborate the categories.
In presenting the Substantive gounded theory (SGT) for this, the relationships
between the categories would be explained—possibly diagrammatically. One
option to do this might be to offer something akin to Drexler’s sequential diagram
and explanation in Box 12.5, but that is not the only option.
open innovation efforts. No new aspects related to the categories emerged and
the outcomes were well accepted by the participants.” Finally he gave a few
public presentations on his work, including “follow-up discussions with par-
ticipants … but no new or significant aspects emerged which had not already
been covered by the categories.”
This is an exemplary outline both of the achievement of theoretical satura-
tion, and of its description and justification. Drexler correctly places the stress
253
BOX 12.2
A PhD student’s thoughts on theoretical saturation
I was just asked a question about saturation in grounded theory by a colleague.

The question was to check the position of “data saturation” in a grounded theory
process map. I was not 100% sure of my answer. But I felt “data saturation” is
not an appropriate term, also, I felt “saturation” is used to judge both a category
and the theory. Thus, I said that the judgement of “saturation” should be put after
axial coding.
Then I read through the bible—Strauss and Corbin’s book «Basics of
Qualitative Research» quickly. I found that they used “category saturated” and
“theoretical saturation.” In page 136, they noted, “A category is considered
saturated when no new information seems to emerge during coding, that is, when
no new properties, dimensions, conditions, actions/interactions, or consequences
are seen in the data.” They put this description in the Axial Coding chapter.
Meanwhile, in page 212, there is a paragraph explaining theoretical saturation.
“A question that always arises is how long a researcher must continue to sample.
The general rule when building theory is to gather data until each category is
saturated (Glaser, 1978, pp. 124–126; Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 61–62,
111–112). This means until (a) no new or relevant data seem to emerge regarding
a category, (b) the category is well developed in terms of its properties and
dimensions demonstrating variation, and (c) the relationships among categories
are well established and validated. Theoretical saturation is of great importance.
Unless a researcher gathers data until all categories are saturated, the theory will
be unevenly developed and lacking density and precision.” They put this in the
Theoretical Sampling chapter. Therefore, from my understanding, it has category
saturation and theoretical saturation. Category saturation means one category is
saturated. Theoretical saturation means all categories are saturated. Category
saturation is a criterion of theoretical sampling either at the late stage of Open
Coding or in Axial Coding, strictly speaking, in Axial Coding. Theoretical saturation
is a criterion of theoretical sampling in Selective Coding.
Hope I didn’t misinterpret the “saturation” in grounded theory.
Source: http://jin-thoughts.blogspot.co.uk/2008/03/theoretical-saturation.html
Student at Sheffield … Dept of Information Studies 2008 (PhD awarded in 2009)
on finding that nothing new could be added to the categories, which is the key
concern at this point in his research. Theoretical saturation is not concerned
with the data itself, so it cannot be claimed purely and simply because the new
data fails to add anything to the data already gathered. It is centered on the
categories and so is only brought into play once these have been sufficiently
well established to guide the further research activities.
Charmaz quotes Glaser’s “sophisticated view of saturation”
Saturation is not seeing the same pattern over and over again. It is the
conceptualisation of comparisons of these incidents which yield different
properties of the pattern, until no new properties of the pattern emerge.
This yields the conceptual density that when integrated into hypotheses
make up the body of the generated grounded theory with theoretical com-
pleteness. (2001, p. 191; Emphasis Added)
254
Charmaz quite correctly notes that theoretical sampling and the progres-
sion from this to theoretical saturation goes well beyond the idea of GTM
as purely inductive. “It involves a form of reasoning, abduction, which distin-
guishes grounded theory” (2014, p. 200, emphasis added). Abduction is con-
sidered as a separate topic in Chapter 13, but for now it needs to be pointed
out that the process is one of inference, or as Jo Reichertz puts it, “a mental
leap.” It is not inductive, and so evades the problem of induction—i.e. “the
black swan.” (Reichertz, 2007).2 Drexler did not have to worry about missing a
single example of collaboration that did not fit with any of his categories; once
he had established his categories his only concern was to sample theoretically
for those until he could demonstrate that the properties were resilient and he
could establish a theoretical link between them. So he began to consider ideas
for this theoretical grounding as hypotheses to be tested against the data he
already had, as well as guiding him in any further investigation.
Of course it can still be claimed that the process of theoretical sampling
might be brought to an end prematurely, with the researcher failing to find
any further aspects of the categories concerned purely because the search was
not sufficiently extensive or rigorous. But similar criticisms apply to all other
research methods, and ultimately the issue of whether or not the research find-
ings actually bear out the conclusions is a matter of judgment, initially for the
researcher(s) and later for those evaluating or scrutinizing the work.
There are those who censure GTM, arguing that audacious claims to have
achieved theoretical saturation are no substitute for the rigor claimed for
research based on statistical data from large (random) samples and applica-
tion of widely approved statistical tests. This is to ignore the issue of statistical
research that is ill-founded and poorly designed, and sometimes deliberately
over-sold or linked to particular agendas (see the work of Ben Goldacre for
numerous examples—referred to in Chapter 1). Any method can be misap-
plied or used as a cover for poor research. The issue of theoretical saturation
in GTM, on the other hand, signals to researchers that they have a definite
issue that needs to be attended to in order for their outcomes to be taken to
the next level of theoretical abstraction. In so doing researchers are given
clear guidance on a key topic that is far more ambiguous or ignored in other
methods.
Judith Holton, who works closely with Glaser, sums up the position that is
reached once theoretical saturation has been established:
At this point, the concepts have achieved theoretical saturation and the
theorist shifts attention to exploring the emergent fit of potential theo-
retical codes that enable the conceptual integration of the core and related
concepts to produce hypotheses that account for relationships between
the concepts thereby explaining the latent pattern of social behaviour that
forms the basis of the emergent theory. (Holton, 2007)
255
In other words, it provides the platform for delineating the substantive theory
itself.
Substantive and Formal Theory
From its inception GTM was designed as a method to lead to two forms of
theory; substantive and formal. These were contrasted with the grand theories
that predominated in social science in the 1960s, and they were similar to what
Robert K. Merton called “theories of the middle range.”
Our major task today is to develop special theories applicable to limited
conceptual ranges —theories, for example, of deviant behavior, the unan-
ticipated consequences of purposive action, social perception, reference
groups, social control, the interdependence of social institutions —rather
than to seek the total conceptual structure that is adequate to derive these
and other theories of the middle range. (Merton; originally published in
1949; revised 1957 and 1968)
This sentiment is echoed in Discovery, where the two forms of theory are
defined as follows:
By substantive theory we mean theory developed for a substantive or
empirical area of sociological inquiry, such as patient care, geriatric life
styles etc… . By formal theory we mean theory developed for a formal or
conceptual area of sociological study such as status passage, stigma, devi-
ant behavior, etc. (Glaser and Strauss)
Other definitions refer to substantive theory as “a theoretical interpretation or
explanation of a delimited problem in a particular area, such as family rela-
tionships, formal organizations, or education” (Charmaz, 2006), and as pro-
viding “[not only] a stimulus to a good idea, but it also gives an initial direction
in developing relevant categories and properties and possible modes of inte-
gration [theoretical codes]” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 79).
Formal theory on the other hand is
a theoretical rendering of a generic issue or process that cuts across

several substantive areas of study. The concepts in a formal theory are
abstract and general and the theory specifies the links between these con-
cepts. Theories that deal with identity formation or loss, the construc-
tion of c ulture, or the development of ideologies can help us understand
behavior in diverse areas such as juvenile gangs, the socialization of
professionals, and the experience of immigration. (Bryant & Charmaz,
2007a, p. 608)
256
These theories have application over a wide range of empirical areas.

In most cases GTM-oriented research offers the prospect of produc-
ing a substantive theory, which may provide the basis for a formal theory.
As Margaret Kearney argues in her cogent discussion of “Grounded Formal
Theory,” Glaser and Strauss recommended “what they termed a multi-area
formal theory, and this is the approach that was seen in all their own formal
theorizing.” Thus they took up their substantive work on, for example, aware-
ness contexts and status passages, and further “studies of diverse and often
quite disparate social groups would be selected based on theoretical sampling,
and systematically compared using the same techniques as in substantive theory
development” (Kearney, 2007, p. 137, emphasis added).
In other words, the techniques of GTM were employed in order to
provide a basis for widening the scope of the substantive account that had
already been established. Kearney notes that this involved “library work to
find substantive studies.” So, she goes on to say, theoretical sampling for for-
mal theorizing is
essentially the same as was recommended for substantive theory, but
instead of seeking out live examples within a single milieu under study,
one would seek out examples collected by others in more disparate settings
and conditions. The library or bookshelf, rather than the human activity
surrounding a researcher in the field, becomes the pool from which to
elicit theoretical comparisons. … [these] systematic comparisons could
lead to hypotheses about the role and impact of various combinations of
conditions on resulting actions. (Kearney, 2007, p. 137)
Kearney also mentions the possibility of producing a formal theory without
first producing a substantive (p. 137), discussed, but points out that Glaser
and Strauss noted that this “would require a lot of work and discipline and
would lack the advantage of a starting point of a substantive theory. They cau-
tioned that this approach would require first organizing and reviewing mas-
sive amounts of data, and they offered this approach only as one hypothetically
available but not recommended.” (p. 137)
In Status Passage, the only jointly produced formal theory from Glaser and
Strauss, they offer a brief but succinct account of their method for “Generating
Formal Theory” (Glaser and Strauss, 1971, chapter 9).
Because so much relevant data and theory was “in us” from our previ-
ous work, the principal mode used to generate theory was to talk out our
comparisons in lengthy conversations, and either record the conversation
or take notes. We … studied relevant literature for more data and theory.
These conversations went on almost five days a week for three months. At
this time we gave up in exhaustion, and with the realization that we could
begin to write it all up. (emphasis added)3
257
It is important to understand that Glaser and Strauss presented these two

forms of theorizing as “differing in degree,” both being examples of “theories
of the middle-range” (Status Passage, Chapter 9, p. 178). As I explain in Part
Four, both forms need to provide theories that fit, work, have relevance and
are readily modifiable.
Dissemination
Glaser has always stressed the importance of publication, and in Chapter 1

I argued that research without publication is more akin to a pastime or a hobby.
In effect a grounded theory of any sort can only be considered as such once it
has been disseminated. But this may occur in stages, rather than as a one-off
development, especially in the case of doctoral research where the developing
conceptualizations are presented by the researcher to a group of advisors and
mentors, and only later to independent examiners.
All my PhD students submitted their theses for examination, presenting
their work in extended form to illustrate the process and procedures by which
they had moved from initial ideas to their final model or theory. Their products
and presentation were aimed at their viva voce examination and the panel of
examiners. I cannot do justice to their final outputs, but to give readers some
idea of what they produced, moving from theoretical saturation to theoretical
articulation of their work, this chapter concludes with examples drawn from
five of them (Boxes 12.3–12.7); presented here to encourage and motivate
readers (heuristically), rather than as outcomes to be copied (mechanically).
Boxes 12.3 and 12.4 summarize the outcomes of Andrea Gorra’s and
Transmissia Semiawan’s research, respectively. Boxes 12.5 and 12.6 do likewise
for Gerhard Drexler and Stella Walsh, and they also indicate that both students
took their research back to the literature once it had been completed. This is
a step that is frequently ignored in GTM-oriented research. There are good
reasons for not producing a wide-ranging and critical review of the literature
at the start of the research—although as explained in earlier chapters this is
not something that can be entirely avoided; it is also critical that researchers
make a thorough investigation of the literature derived very clearly from their
findings. This is what is meant by theoretical coding. Drexler notes that his
model is “supported by a number of extant theories,” and in the thesis itself
he used those theories to substantiate his work and offer further elucidation
of the categories and relationships between them. Similarly, Walsh went back
to the literature to “enhance internal reliability and generalisability,” the latter
being indicated where her findings complemented other areas of work such
as “the sociology of food, social geography and leisure studies.” On the basis
of the return to the literature, she was also able to justify the claim that her
258
BOX 12.3
Gorra—extract from conclusion of PhD thesis
This research study has investigated the implications of mobile phone location
data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy. Citizens are being monitored in
response to threats such as crime and terrorism and these growing collections
of data may impact on individuals’ civil liberties including privacy. The mobile
phone can be seen as a very privacy invasive technology. It blurs the boundaries
between different areas in life, such as family and work life. Mobile phone
location data encompasses private and public spaces, and communications data
is retained for ordinary citizens as well as for criminals. This study has taken to
heart the call of researchers for more empirical studies investigating the impact
of communications technologies on everyday life, … the area of communications
data retention has received very little empirical research interest so far … .
The main contribution of the thesis is the development of a substantive
theory grounded in empirical data from interviews, location tracking and a survey.
This theory is specific to a particular area, as it maps the relationship between
mobile phone location data and perceptions of privacy within the UK. The theory
establishes links between concepts such as definitions of privacy and the process
of monitoring. It explains how individuals use mobile phone settings as a way to
regulate privacy, in other words, to regulate access to the mobile phone user.
Five final grounded theory categories were devised directly based on
empirical data. The categories are as follows, 1) Areas of privacy, 2) Participants’
privacy definitions, 3) Contactability—Use of mobile phone to regulate privacy,
4) Perceptions of location tracking and power relationships, 5) Balancing.
By explicating the relationships between those categories, a theory about the
phenomenon under study was developed. The theory explains that mobile phone
users are predominantly aware of the existence of mobile phone location data
and can imagine useful applications for this type of data. They do not perceive the
retention of mobile phone location data as a form of surveillance or an invasion
of mobile phone user’s privacy but instead see the data primarily as a crime
investigation tool. Respondents believed that the reasons for data being collected
were more important than the actual act of being monitored, which emphasises
the importance of the core category balancing which captures the balancing acts
related to privacy that every individual needs to perform in everyday life.
BOX 12.4
Semiawan
The model encompasses four interrelated phenomenological categories. The

first two categories—considered as the core categories—are Academic Life
and Organisational Culture. These two main categories are interrelated to one
another with the support of the other two categories: the Unit Work and the
Communication Metaphor. As the result of conceptual abstract process, the
four categories are significantly based on the fundamental concepts of sharing
information, communication, learning and knowledge development, resource
management and communication across the organisation. The basic concepts
suggest common properties and behaviours that characterise each of the four
categories.
259
BOX 12.5
Drexler
[The figure at the bottom of this box depicts a scheme of the process elements
that constitute the theory “Aligning Collaborative Innovation.” Based on focus
group research and a total of 23 interviews, it was discovered that collaboration
is triggered by three different types of need, i.e., urgent, operational, or strategic
ones. Depending on the type of need, partners are identified and approached.
The most intriguing finding was that ideas for innovations are generated jointly by
the prospective partners …). This represents novel insight which has not been
tackled in previous literature. Ideas act as a kind of “glue” which tightens the
relationships by providing a common goal. Prior to the establishment of a formal
contract, a number of activities make sure that the contributions of the partners
are aligned as the sound basis of a R&D contract. Thus, the outcomes of this
research fulfil the general requirements of Gioia and Pitre (1990), who defined
theory as a statement of concepts and their relationships that shows how and/or
why a phenomenon occurs.
Defining
needs
Building
d organisationa
al an l tr relationships
son ai
R&D er
ALIGNING
ts
P
projects
COLLABORATIVE
INNOVATION
Generating
ideas
Aligning
contributions
The theory “Aligning Collaborative Innovation” is supported by a number of

extant theories.
■ “Theory of Sensemaking” (Weik, 1995): participants in interorganisational

relationships use formalization as a means to make sense of their partners.
■ “Social Capital Theory” (Coleman, 1988): interactive ties give communities
and organisations a sense of identity and common purpose can be used

for a variety of purposes. Ongoing experience within a network of exchange
relationships is likely to be a source of trust (Granovetter, 1985).
■ “Social Exchange Theory” (Blau, 1964): non-formal relationships have a strong
effect on the formal terms of contracts that regularize cooperation. Because an

exchange requires a bidirectional transaction it creates interdependence, which
involves mutual and complementary arrangements.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: Wiley.

Coleman, S. J. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American Journal of
Sociology, 94, Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and Economic Approaches
to the Analysis of Social Structure, pp. S95–S120.
Gioia, D. A. & Pitre. E. (1990). Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building. Academy of
Management Review, 15 (4), pp. 584–602.
Granovetter, M. S. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.
American Journal of Sociology, 91, pp. 481–510.
Weik, K. (1995). Sensemaking in Organisations. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
260
BOX 12.6
Walsh
This study has allowed voices of working-class women to be heard and highlights
the usefulness of qualitative methods in exploring the study of food choices.
The in-depth data have revealed a level of understanding not available from
quantitative data alone. This marginal group of older working-class women were
unique and have been neglected as a central focus in previous studies. This
study pointed to the continued importance of food choices in the lives of older
women. The women’s identities had previously been constructed by the provision
of meals for others and this was no longer paramount. Cooking from fresh foods
was in decline, despite having requisite cooking skills. A more important factor
influencing food choices was their changing culinary culture and social logic.
The loss of their central gendered role, cooking food for men, has had a greater
impact on food choices than income and was a key finding and major contribution
to the field of study.
In addition the changing external environment had had a major impact on
their food shopping patterns and social networks. Together these influences had
resulted in increasing individualism for the women.
However, selecting their own food continued as an important activity, central
to the women’s view of independence, coping with ageing, health and well-being.
The women viewed food choice differently than other areas of independent living.
Support in other areas of the household was accepted as appropriate as they
grew old, whilst control of food choices was key to independence, allowing the
women independencein their own homes. Understanding that women viewed
food choices differently than other aspects of support in their lives is important,
especially as numbers of older people continue to increase.
The information and themes that emerged indicated a wider complexity than
had been anticipated and extended into an understanding of the importance
of resources including the individual household and external environment. The
importance of understanding age was also significant. Comparisons of the
past with the present were important and have resulted in individuals forming
a positive view of current standards of living. Older women’s flexibility, common-
sense coping strategies and adaptability meant that current standards of living
were adequate for their needs and income had a perceived limited influence on
food choices.
The current study identified that there was limited support from family, friends
and external agencies and the sample of older women were no longer living in
a close-knit working-class community. Class recognition was muted, which was
expected, yet despite decline in class recognition food choices remained linked to
age, gender and class. This needs recognition in health promotion and food policy
planning.
This chapter maps out four emergent themes and highlights key findings and
the major contribution made to the field of study. Comparison of the emergent
theory to existing literature can enhance internal reliability and generalisability.
There are several areas where generalisability of the current findings with other
areas of work is relevant, including the sociology of food, social geography
and leisure studies. However, this is not the same as making claims of
representativeness due to the small size, specific locality and nature of the
research. Particular attention is paid to work by Wrigley et al. (2003, 2004) and
Short (2003). These areas of work provided contrasting and complementary
findings to the current study.
The analysis explores four main themes,
1. Experiences of ageing, income and standard of living,

2. Social logic of culinary culture and gendered role of food choices,
261
3. External environment and shopping,

4. Increasing individualism.
A key finding in this study reveals the complexity that had not, to date, been
clearly acknowledged in research elsewhere. The current study found evidence
of a complex relationship between food choices and increased individualism
in the home, which in turn is related to the impact of changes in the external
environment. Age, class and gender remain key underlying determinants of the
social economic experience of everyday life and food choices for older women.
Short, F. (2003). Domestic cooking skills –what are they? Journal of HEIA 10(3), 13–22.
Wrigley. N., Warm, D., Margetts, B. & Lowe, M. (2004). The Leeds ‘food deserts’ intervention
study: what the focus groups reveal. International Journal of Retail Distribution Management, 32(2),
123–136.
Wrigley. N., Warm, D., & Margetts, B. (2003). Deprivation, diet and food retail access: Findings from
the ‘food deserts’ study. Environment and Planning, 35(1), 151–188.
BOX 12.7
Walsh
Core Categories
This study reveals the complexity that had not, to date, been clearly acknowledged
in research elsewhere. Moreover, it provided a fuller understanding of the everyday
life of older women and it identified that age, class and gender remain key
underlying determinants of food choices for older working-class women. Therefore
the four themes are all interconnected and interrelated, underpinned by lifelong
experience of social structures. The four themes are,
1. Complex subjective positive perceptions of standard of living, and lack of

awareness of relatively low-income levels influencing food choices. This
included complex relationships with resourcefulness and expectations based
on age, gender and class.
2. The changing social logic of food choices, eating alone and changing cooking
skills as a consequence of the changing gendered role of food choices.
3. Changing shopping patterns as a result of the changing external environment
resulting in the loss of social networks.
4. Changing internal networks within the flats community that impacted on food
choices and increasing individualisation.
study revealed “complexity that had not, to date, been clearly acknowledged in
research elsewhere.” Box 12.7 indicates Walsh’s core categories.
The outcome of Ibraheem Jodeh’s research is summarized in Box 12.8, both
in diagrammatic form and also stating two of the hypotheses he developed as
outcomes of his substantive work. Once he had derived this he carried out
what he termed “the second matching between the main GT results and the
existing theories. This matching aimed to give the researcher a clear picture by
showing how and where his main results fit with the previous findings. Also,
this matching aimed to help him in the analysis and interpretation of the main
GT results.” He illustrated this diagrammatically in Figure 12.1, which “illus-
trates the research process that was used in this study by using the Bryant and
262
BOX 12.8
Jodeh
The main GT results consist of one core category, one indirect sub-category and
five direct sub-categories. The core category is the deployment of ICT in the tax
system; the indirect sub-category is achieving the tax system’s objectives; and the
direct sub-categories are creating transparency, increasing the ability, incentive
factors, the weakness in the tax administration, and disincentive factors.
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between the deployment of [Information
and Communication Technology] ICT in the tax system and creating transparency.
This hypothesis includes the following sub-hypotheses:
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and expansion
in publishing public information electronically.
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and clarity and
strength in the transactions follow-up.
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and reducing
the role of personal relationships and favouritism.
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and the
introduction of e-services culture.
Hypothesis 5: There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax
system and incentive factors.
This hypothesis includes the following sub-hypotheses:
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and official
support.
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and human
resources incentives.
There is a relationship between the deployment of ICT in the tax system and general
incentives.
Achieving the Tax System’s

Creating Transparency
Objectives
Increasing the ability
Deployment of ICT in theTax System
Weakness of the Disincentive

Incentive Factors
Tax Administration Factors
263
Research topic Initial Literature Review Conducting initial

• Writing the Proposal of PhD Study interviews
• Seven unstructured recorded
phone interviews
• Document analysis
Using GTM process

• Open coding through
line by line analysis
• Focused coding
• Theoretical coding
Initial GT results
• 72 concepts
• Nine memos
• Nine categories
• Writing the Initial Study
A quick return to the Literature Conducting main interviews

• Review to make a quick (first) • 24 Face-to-face semi-structured
matching between initial GT results recorded interviews
and existing theories • Document analysis
• One memo
Using GTM process

• Focused coding
• Theoretical coding
Main GT results
• Changes and development on the Initial GT results
• Eight memos
• One core category
• One indirect sub-category
• Five direct sub-categories
• Writing the main Study
Returning widely to the Literature

• Review to make the second matching
The Main GT Results Analysis
between main GT results and
existing theories
Writing the thesis
FIGURE 12.1 Theresearch process using the Bryant and Charmaz approach to the grounded
theory method (GTM)
Charmaz approach of GTM”. But note that in Chapter 11 the approach used by
Semiawan indicates that theoretical coding need not be regarded as a distinct
activity undertaken at a precise stage of analysis. Moreover it is not a process
that can be turned on when required in the analysis. (Chapter 18 offers further
comments on theoretical coding.)
264
Key Points
¤ Theoretical Saturation—has to be justified and not merely claimed

¤ Theoretical Coding and Return to the Literature
¤ Note the following points in Boxes 12.3 through 12.8—use of
diagrams, explanatory terms, reference to other theories and models,
final expression of core categories or concepts, methodological issues,
hypotheses as products
Notes
1. I am always suspicious of the findings of psychological research, assum-

ing that far too often the “sample” has been conveniently drawn from the local
undergraduate population or from a subset of those willing to spend their time
participating in opaque or bizarre activities. A recent article casts doubt on the replica-
bility of 75% of psychology findings http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/aug/27/
study-delivers-bleak-verdict-on-validity-of-psychology-experiment-results
2. See Chapters 13 and 16 “A black swan is an unpredictable, rare, but nevertheless
high impact event”—see http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Black_swan
3. This extract hints at their joint working practices—including joint memo-making
and extended discussions.
265
13
Abduction—No Longer an Alien Concept
Abduction: a type of reasoning that begins by examining data and

after scrutiny of these data, entertains all possible explanations
for the observed data, and then forms hypotheses to confirm
or disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most plausible
interpretation of the observed data.
—Kathy Charmaz, p.186, 2006, (emphasis added)
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in their initial work on grounded theory
characterized the method as inductive, largely in contrast to what they saw as
the dominant or classical mode of research, which they described as deductive,
predominantly involving deducing or deriving hypotheses from the existing
theories of the day. To paraphrase Karl Marx “The ruling theories are the theo-
ries of the ruling theorists.”1
Their view of induction largely went by default because they did not offer
any extended account of the term, and certainly they did not engage with
the philosophical debates around the concept. For Glaser and Strauss the
grounded theory method (GTM) was inductive because it centered on the
process of gathering data and decomposing it into “incidents,” which could be
integrated to produce higher level concepts and categories. This was achieved
through the process of comparative analysis, resulting in innovative theoreti-
cal statements. In sum, the application of the method moved researchers from
individual instances—incidents or similar—to more general statements that
were constrained by the research context. These were termed substantive theo-
ries that might be taken up and extended to more formal ones if they could be
developed and shown to have wider application. As noted in the Introduction
and throughout this book, Glaser and Strauss originated grounded theory in
the mid-1960s. Their initial publications on the subject, Awareness of Dying,
Discovery of Grounded Theory, and Time for Dying, the “trilogy,” are consid-
ered canonical texts. In this book they are abbreviated for ease of reference as
Awareness, Discovery, and Time.
The processes of deduction and induction can be characterized in very
simple terms as follows: deduction involves arguing from the level of the
265
266
general to that of an exact instance, whereas induction moves in the opposite

direction from the particular to the more general.
Examples of deduction can be provided in the form of syllogisms, although
other deductive statements are possible. Here is a widely quoted example of a
syllogism:-
¤ All men are mortal
¤ Socrates is a man
¤ Therefore Socrates is mortal
Deduction operates by drawing necessary conclusions from the premises
¤ All books on Grounded Theory refer to coding
¤ This book is on Grounded Theory
¤ Therefore it refers to Coding
But it is all too easy to make an erroneous move from the premise to the con-
clusion; for instance:-
¤ All books on Grounded Theory refer to coding
¤ This book refers to coding
¤ Therefore it is on Grounded Theory (WRONG)
The conclusion is not valid because some books on coding may well not refer
to GTM, but only to other methods. The difference between the two syllogisms
is illustrated in the form of a Venn diagram in Figure 13.1.
For verification of existing theories deduction takes the form of what is
termed the hypothetical-deductive process. A hypothesis is stated, based on an
aspect of an existing theory. The hypothesis takes the form of a prediction,
and if this prediction is upheld it is taken as verifying the theory from which it
was derived. In some cases this approach can be used to distinguish between
two or more contending theories: for instance, between a theory that is based
Books that refer

to CODING
Book title ‘X’–refers to
coding –but it is not
about GTM
X
Book title ‘Y’–refers to

Books that refer coding and is about GTM
Y to GTM
FIGURE 13.1 Deduction. Incorrect and correct forms of syllogism.

267
Abduction—No Longer an Alien Concept 267
on the earth orbiting around the sun (heliocentric), and one that is based on
the sun orbiting around the earth (geocentric). Predictions about timing of
eclipses or explanation for the movement of Mars (which appears to go back-
wards at certain points) provide some basis for deciding that one model is a
better form of explanation than the other. As I explained in Chapter 2, how-
ever, such results cannot be seen as proving the theory once-and-for-all. Karl
Popper’s view was that science proceeds by way of conjectures and hypotheses
and deduction, but only in the sense that the questions or tests deduced from a
theory are capable of returning results that might disprove or falsify the theory
itself. Even if a theory was not falsified by this process, it could not be said to
have been proved, but only corroborated by the various tests carried out so far;
the possibility of falsification is always present, since for Popper falsifiability
was a key issue in any theory being regarded as scientific.
Induction operates by drawing probable conclusions from the premises,
based on collections of data, or instances.
¤ Every meal I’ve eaten at Chez Antoine has been served on a
chipped plate. So all their plates must be chipped.
OR
¤ I’ve been on the Eurostar five times, and each time we’ve been
delayed by more than an hour. So all the Eurostar trips must be late
by at least one hour.
OR
¤ All the swans I’ve seen swimming on the river are white. So all
swans must be white.
For induction there is the issue of the basis for moving from a number of
isolated instances to a general statement. It may well be that all the plates at
the restaurant are chipped. On the other hand I may have been unlucky in my
trips on Eurostar, and my assertion would be easily countered by someone
with a very different set of experiences or by analysis of a larger number of
completed journeys. In the case of white swans, as mentioned in the discus-
sion of induction in Chapter 2, we now know that even a very large number
of sightings in the Northern Hemisphere, by many different observers, would
not have guaranteed the probability of the conclusion. Induction can lead to
high levels of probability, but with no guarantee that a black swan might not
be around somewhere.
In the simple sense that induction involves a logical process moving from
the particular to the general, then GTM might perhaps be seen as inductive.
A set of data is gathered, or constructed, which can be examined and from
which patterns or themes might be derived that have greater explanatory
power across aspects of the context under investigation. But the problem with
268
this approach is that it might take the researcher no further than re-describing
the situation in a slightly different manner, but lacking in theoretical insight
and conceptual power. Glaser’s concern in distinguishing between what he
terms Full Conceptual Description or Qualitative Data Analysis and the con-
ceptual insights and outcomes expected from GTM emanates from this. In
contrast, in 1994 Strauss and Corbin made the following observation with
regard to the role of induction in GTM.
Thoughtful reaction against restrictive prior theories and theoretical mod-
els can be salutary, but too rigid a conception of induction can lead to sterile
or boring studies. Alas, grounded theory has been used as a justification
for such studies. This has occurred as a result of the initial presentation
of grounded theory in The Discovery of Grounded Theory that had led
to a persistent and unfortunate misunderstanding about what was being
advocated. Because of the partly rhetorical purpose of that book and the
authors’ emphasis on the need for grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss
overplayed the inductive aspects. (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, p. 277,
emphasis added).
Strauss was keen to stress that the primary objective of the method was, and
remains, the articulation of novel theoretical insights, which can be substan-
tively linked to the data. The process of moving from “data” to “concepts” is,
however, far more complex than that described—or implied—in many GTM
texts: It is certainly not a case of a theory emerging from the data. Detailed
accounts in Glaser and Strauss’s early work such as Awareness and Time dem-
onstrated the complexities of the process at great length; but problems arose
when they tried to summarize the method in the appendices at the end of each
book, which have been largely ignored.
In the chapter on memo-making, reference was made to the work of
Donald Schön and the impetus for his work on reflective practice emanating
from the paradox that the art of practice was something that “might be taught
if it were constant and known, but it is not constant.” So practice cannot be
taught in a conventional manner, but this is not to preclude forms of guidance
or mentoring that can and should assist in a researcher’s development from
novice to higher levels of expertise and effectiveness.
Schön draws on the work of researchers like Michael Polanyi to make
the point that we know more than we can tell or explain. Polanyi employed
the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge to highlight this point.
Similarly, Schön quotes from the twentieth century systems expert Geoffrey
Vickers to the effect that “in all our ordinary judgments of quality, we ‘can
recognize and describe deviations from a norm very much more clearly than
we [can] describe the norm itself ’.”
This all amounts to the realization that although some aspects of our activ-
ities and practices can be described in terms of rules and procedures, there
269
are other complexities that cannot. Schön criticizes “those who confine them-
selves to a limited range of technical problems on the high ground, or cut the
situations of practice to fit available techniques, [because they] seek a world
in which technical rationality works.” There has to be an understanding that
When we go about the spontaneous, intuitive performance of the actions
of everyday life, we show ourselves to be knowledgeable in a special way.
Often, we cannot say what we know. When we try to describe it, we find
ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously inappro-
priate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action
and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing. It seems right to say
that our knowing is in our action. And similarly, the workaday life of the
professional practitioner reveals, in its recognitions, judgments and skills,
a pattern of tacit knowing-in-action.
This special way of being knowledgeable might now be understood as an
example of abduction; a form of inference that is distinct from both deduction
and induction. Jo Reichertz notes that the term itself was “[F]‌irst introduced in
1597 by Julius Pacius to translate the Aristotelian concept apagoge,” but abduc-
tion “remained quite unnoticed for almost three centuries” until it was taken
up by one of the founders of Pragmatism, C. S. Peirce, who defined it as “the
process of forming explanatory hypotheses.” Moreover “[I]t is the only logical
operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.172). He also claimed that
abduction incorporates ‘all the operations by which theories and conceptions
are engendered’ (CP 5.590). Given the stress that Glaser and Strauss placed
on GTM as a process of developing new theoretical insights, and also noting
Strauss’s background in Pragmatism it is not surprising that there is now a
growing recognition that although the process of induction certainly has a role
in GTM, it is abduction that needs to be understood as a far more important—
indeed essential—aspect.
Strauss taught and lectured in Europe as well as the United States, and
he was a frequent visitor to Germany, where his influence was not limited to
his GTM writings. Many of his writings were available in German. “Strauss
had been an invited visiting professor at the Universities of Frankfurt and
Constance in Germany, Cambridge and Manchester in England, Paris and
Adelaide. He maintained extensive research networks in Germany, as well as
Japan and France.”2 The result of this work is that in the German-speaking
world GTM is known primarily through the early works of Glaser and Strauss,
the later writings of Strauss and Corbin, Strauss’s solo writings and lectures,
and also through the work of his German-speaking students. Part of this leg-
acy has been a far better understanding of the importance of Pragmatism for
GTM, and the role of abduction. The work of Reichertz exemplifies this in
offering an insightful and critical exposition of Peirce’s ideas on abduction,
and the ways in which it is central to GTM. (The chapters in The Handbook
270
of Grounded Theory by Reichertz, Udo Kelle, and Jörg Strübing exemplify the
distinctive contribution made by this source of GTM writing.) Reichertz sum-
marizes abduction as follows:-
Something unintelligible is discovered in the data, and on the basis of
the mental design of a new rule the rule is discovered or invented and, at
the same time, it also becomes clear what the case is. The logical form of
this operation is that of abduction. Here one has decided (with whatever
degree of awareness and for whatever reasons) no longer to adhere to the
conventional view of things. (Reichertz, 2007, p. 219 emphasis added)
From this assertion by Reichertz, abduction can be seen to be something of
a logical “leap,” as opposed to the more careful and considered processes of
induction and deduction. It is far more of a cognitive process than a logical
one, although in recent years the term has been taken up in a more formal-
ized manner by philosophers and computer scientists. Reichertz criticizes
this non-cognitive characterization of abduction, arguing that it is based on
an erroneous view that offers a “particular hope, that of a rule-governed and
replicable production of new and valid knowledge. This hope is found, above
all, in artificial intelligence research and in a number of variants of qualitative
social research.” In part this misunderstanding arises from a failure to under-
stand that Peirce “combined two very different forms of inference under the
name of hypothesis. When he became aware of this unclear use of the term
hypothesis, he elaborated a clear distinction in his later philosophy between
the two procedures, and called the one operation qualitative induction and
the other abduction.”
For Reichertz, Peirce’s concept of abduction “is therefore a cerebral pro-
cess, an intellectual act, a mental leap, that brings together things which one
had never associated with one another: A cognitive logic of discovery.” So in
no way should it be considered to offer the basis for a rule-governed path to
innovative insight and new knowledge. For Peirce it was not a logical form
of inference in the same category as induction and deduction. Abduction
occurs “like lightning,” rather than as a careful and considered thought pro-
cess. This might seem to imply that the discovery of new ideas is something of
a haphazard process, requiring luck and perhaps precisely those instances of
“immaculate conceptualization” that Glaser disdains. But this is to ignore the
issues raised by Schön, for instance, with regard to practice—that is, that, how-
ever well-trained and experienced a practitioner might be, there will always
be occasions when the unexpected and inexplicable will occur. At such times
the reflective practitioner will be unable to resort to the rules and the received
wisdom, and instead must “allow himself to experience surprise, puzzlement,
or confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique.”
Peirce understood this in a similar fashion, and Reichertz stresses that
although “ ‘abductions cannot be forced by a specific procedural program, one
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can induce situations… in which abductions fit. According to Peirce, the pres-
ence of genuine doubt or uncertainty or fear or great pressure to act is a favorable
‘weather situation’ for abductive lightning to strike” (Reichertz, 2007, p. 221,
emphasis in original). Peirce also offered an alternative approach, advising the
investigator to “let his mind wander with no specific goal.” A “mental game
without rules he calls musement, a game of meditation, or daydreaming.”
Although these two may seem to differ, “[I]‌n both cases the procedures
mean that the consciously working mind, relying on logical rules, is outmaneu-
vered. Peirce-the-detective allows no time for the calculating mind to busy
itself with the solution of his problem, and Peirce-the-daydreamer switches off
his power of logical judgment by entrusting himself to the ‘breath of heaven’ ”
(Reichertz, 2007, p. 221).
These both resonate with the GTM advice to enter the research setting
with an open mind, ready to be surprised and allow the “data” or whatever
to influence the process of investigation; then moving swiftly through the
data, to facilitate this “outmaneuvering” of one’s prior knowledge and expec-
tations. But note that abduction is a cognitive process emanating from the
researcher(s) working closely with the data.
For Reichertz the divergence between Glaser and Strauss in their later writ-
ings can best be understood as oriented around the idea of abduction: Strauss
takes it up and uses it to distance his idea of the method, not only from ver-
ificationist deductive methods of investigation but also from being “induc-
tive” in any straightforward manner: The stress is on generating new ideas
and concepts. Glaser, on the other hand, adheres to the centrality of induction
and emergence. To justify his view of Strauss’s work, Reichertz points to two
examples in Strauss’s writings.
Example (a): One passage is very clear as regards “induction” as a basis
of coding. It here becomes apparent that Strauss doesn’t mean the logical
conclusion “induction” at all but rather all the actions and attitudes which
lead to a hypothesis, and exactly this is also addressed by Peirce with his
considerations: “Induction refers to the actions that lead to discovery of
a hypothesis—that is, having a hunch or an idea, then converting it into
an hypothesis and assessing whether it might provisionally work as at
least a partial condition for a type of event, act, relationship, strategy, etc.”
(Strauss, 1987: 11f; quoted in Reichertz, 2007, p. 224; emphasis added).
Example (b): In Strauss’ work, one can find repeated references at the level
of the research logic to a permanent testing of verdicts once taken. Data
elevation, coding, and the making of memos are related to each other in
a three-step process: Hypotheses lists deduction of consequences and the
testing of these consequences by means of the data and data analysis. This
exactly corresponds to the logic of “abductive” research: “(…) data col-
lection leads quickly to coding, which in turn may lead equally quickly, or
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at least soon, to memoing. Either will then guide the searches for new data.
Or they may lead directly to additional coding or memoing. Or—please
note!—they may lead to inspecting and coding of already gathered (and
perhaps already analysed) data. That latter kind of “return to the old data”
can occur at any phase of the research, right down to writing the last
page of the final report of the theory” (Strauss 1984: Unit 1, 18, quoted in
Reichertz, 2007, p. 224, emphasis added).
This enhances the importance and innovative aspects of GTM, as it can now be
seen as a method guiding researchers between Scylla and Charybdis; with the
paradoxes of induction and deduction on one side, and what appears to be the
arbitrary and haphazard process of discovery on the other. Popper argued that
the “logic of discovery” had to be separated from the “logic of justification.”
Conjectures, guesses, immaculate conceptualizations, and the like c an origi-
nate from anywhere: deep analysis of various materials, previous experiments,
even dreams or falling apples. The process of justifying such flashes of insight,
however, involves rigorous testing and re-testing, at best achieving corrobora-
tion, always falling short of certainty. The grounded theory method, taking its
prompt from Peirce, offers an approach to investigation that enhances the pos-
sibility of new insights arising precisely by guiding researchers to “stay close
to the data,” open their minds to new insights, encourage opportunities for
serendipity, and generally outwit the “consciously working mind” that all-too-
often results in simply confirming our existing ideas—confirmation bias—and
reinforcing what Schön terms our “overlearning.”
Schön’s ideas resonate with those of Peirce, Strauss, and others, but he is
mostly concerned with the experienced and learned practitioner, rather than
with the novice. GTM, however, was originally targeted at the early-career
researcher, but this may have been largely because Glaser and Strauss saw their
own contemporaries in the 1960s as more entrenched and less likely to be
able to maneuver themselves to positions that facilitated and even encouraged
abductive thinking.There is a parallel here with the ideas of Thomas Kuhn and
Ludwik Fleck, each of whom argued that many innovative ideas, leading to
paradigm shifts, originated from outside the generally recognized boundaries
of classical disciplines (see Chapter 2).
Nevertheless there is no reason to discount the possibilities of abduction
from among the experienced and learned researchers. On the contrary, in
many cases the skill of the experienced practitioner is to be found in the ways
in which abductive thinking occurs, although on a far smaller scale than that
leading to paradigm shifts; but this is perhaps more akin to the ways in which
a skilled GTM researcher might work.
One model that offers a useful and illuminating framework for these
aspects of research and practice can be found in the work of brothers Hubert
and Stuart Dreyfus3 (hereinafter D&D) in their book dating from the 1980s
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Mind Over Machine (1988). In this treatise they give their account of the route
from “novice” to “expert” in the acquisition of general and specialized skills.
The route involves moving from learning and obeying strict rules, to an appre-
ciation of contextual pressures, the role of intuition and reinterpretation of
experience, and the inevitable ambiguity arising from application of strict sys-
tems of rules in a wide variety of circumstances. Again, this echoes Schön’s
point about any experienced practitioner inevitably encountering uncertainty.
The lowest of their five stages is that of Novice, where the acquisition of a
new skill begins with a focus on rigid rule-structures and unambiguous “facts”
originating from authoritative sources—for example, particular people or key
texts. These resources can be used in a fairly straightforward manner, without
reference to external features. D&D illustrate this with reference to the nursing
novice who “is taught how to read blood pressure, measure bodily outputs, and
compute fluid retention, and is given rules for determining what to do when
those measurements reach certain values” (p. 22). This imparts a basic syntax
to the learner, a set of hard-and-fast rules and procedures that are seen either
as independent or only very loosely related to one another.
This is followed by the second stage, that of Advanced Beginner, which is
reached once experience of real situations has been acquired, leading to an
appreciation that repeated patterns of events and features will be encountered,
and which may in part be context dependent. Again using the example of the
nurse, there will be the ability to distinguish different sounds and patterns of
breathing, and to appreciate the possible causes behind them. But there will
not yet be the ability to explain to others exactly how they differ, or perhaps
even why they differ. This shifts from formal expressions of independent rules
to the realization that adhering strictly to a single rule may have an impact on
other rules, and that less formalized “rules of thumb” need to be developed.
These are required both in the sense that rules about combinations of rules are
needed, and that application of many rules is now understood as itself requir-
ing judgment and insight.
The third stage is Competence, and it involves both the skill to adopt a
“hierarchical procedure of decision making” (p. 24), predicated on a wider
view of the situation, and a plan based on this appreciation. Again, the
example of the nurse illustrates the point. The competent nurse will not just
move through procedures and patients in a prescribed order, but will be able
to assess priorities of need and sequences of treatment. D&D term this the
“combination of non-objectivity and necessity.” This implies the beginnings
of a movement away from reliance on rule-based models of practice to a con-
textually sensitive model. It is nonobjective in the sense that the competent
student starts to appreciate that any rule or body of rules cannot be applied
mechanistically and heedlessly. Situations will occur in which rules will have
to be broken or amended, or new ones invented. Furthermore, the compe-
tent and intelligent actor does not wait until the sequence of events demands
274
selection and application of a rule or procedure, but plans ahead and makes
decisions based on predictions and priorities. This planning introduces the
aspect of self-awareness or reflexivity: the actor assesses, decides, and acts, tak-
ing responsibility for decisions and actions. This results in a shift away from
the lower levels of skills acquisition, where any error can be blamed on the
rules themselves (or their inadequate scope or specification), to the position
where the competent actor can regard decisions as involving aspects of per-
sonal responsibility and sensitivity. To this extent, D&D’s model stands in con-
trast to models of intelligence that characterize it as “problem-solving” and
“rule-based.” In this sense D&D are in the same camp as Reichertz, distancing
their position from those who define abduction as “rule-based,” mistakenly
attempting to fit a model of cognition into a logical framework of inference
that might be taken up and automated into a programmed set of impersonal
rule-like procedures.
Writing in the 1980s, and targeting the more extreme claims of the
Artificial Intelligence [AI] community, D&D were keen to stress that there is
more to intelligence than mechanistic rule following. If the competent prac-
titioner already transcends this rule-based view, then the next two levels take
it further. Both are characterized by “a rapid, fluid, involved kind of behav-
iour that bears no apparent similarity to the slow, detached reasoning of the
problem-solving process” (p. 27). The major distinguishing feature of stages
4 and 5—respectively Proficiency and Expertise—is the ability to assess situ-
ations holistically, and intuitively. The proficient performer will still operate
analytically, but within an intuitive understanding and organizing of the situ-
ation. The expert will not even need this partial level of analytical activity if
the situation is within the realms of normality and familiarity. In normal cir-
cumstances the expert can function without recourse to conscious, analytic
reasoning. D&D give a dramatic illustration of this with regard to an expert
chess player being given the task of adding numbers spoken to him at a rate
of one number per second, while playing five-seconds-a-move chess against
a player of only slightly lesser ability, and convincingly beating his opponent.
There are two key features of this model that are highly pertinent to the
present discussion. The first is that abduction, far from being something
strange and alien is to a limited extent a common process for all of us. We are
all proficient and expert in a range of activities that at one time or another were
very new to us, but are now part of our general repertoire; for instance, rid-
ing a bike, driving a car, playing a musical instrument, or making a cup of tea.
Mostly we accomplish these tasks intuitively and almost automatically, we do
not have to think about each aspect or action. But if something unusual occurs
we find ourselves confronted by a level of uncertainty that may force us to
attend to detailed aspects of our behavior that in the normal course of events
remain implicit or taken for granted. In other words we become abductive,
taking leaps in our reasoning, largely because to delay would lead to failure or
275
disaster. Schön refers to this as “reflecting in action” as opposed to “reflecting

on action.” The former happens quickly and leads immediately to response
or action, the latter is more considered, and should involve thinking about
something that happened in the past and an assessment of how it could have
been done differently or more effectively. Reflecting in action opens up the
possibilities of seeing things in a new light, casting off the habits and assump-
tions that usually sustain our actions. If this is followed later on by reflecting
on these new possibilities, it may result in fresh insights and ideas that can be
tested more rigorously.
The problem of doing research is that it is hard to break away from
ingrained habits and see things in a new light if the objective of the research
is to test what is already accepted as part of the theoretical canon. This diffi-
culty is exacerbated if researchers are expected to serve an apprenticeship that
involves close study of the classic theories—the received wisdom. Glaser and
Strauss sought to circumvent this problem in part by developing a method of
research that was designed to maximize the chances of encountering uncer-
tainty and surprise, thereby encouraging development of new conceptual
insights and theories. Close encounters with research contexts and their “data”
parallel to some extent the wide range of experiences that practitioners will
encounter in the course of their daily activities. Inevitably some of these will
produce surprises, the responses to which result in innovative insights and
reconsideration of people’s received understanding of domain knowledge.
By intervening in the research setting and encouraging participants to think
about aspects of their activities and environment that are usually taken for
granted, GTM elicits features that otherwise might go unnoticed. In some
cases this process might become evident as the data is being gathered, but it
also might only come to light at a later stage when the data is being scrutinized
and reflected on in memos.
Glaser is the most widely experienced practitioner of GTM, starting
in the early 1960s and continuing to the present day. Those among the first
cohorts of the doctoral program at the University of California, San Francisco
(UCSF) come a close second. GTM is not meant only for the novice, whether
a researcher is a novice or an expert in D&D’s terms is not important; rather
it is the extent to which anyone is prepared for surprises and able to make
the leaps in understanding that are involved in abduction. In a footnote in
Awareness, Glaser and Strauss refer to an earlier research project published as
Boys in White. Strauss was one of the researchers and authors, and the footnote
refers to the observation that standard training of medical students failed to
include how to interact with dying patients and their relatives, but this insight
was “the result of a secondary analysis of field-notes” (emphasis added) from
this study. It is not clear when this secondary analysis was carried out, but
there is no reference to the observation in Boys in White itself, so presumably it
was something that Strauss came across at a later date. Perhaps the realization
276
came about once he, Glaser, and Jeanne Quint had started the work that led
to Awareness, and it might have acted as a spur to the abductive leap that took
these three from their detailed studies of the various medical contexts to the
articulation of Awareness and later, Time.
The second way in which D&D’s model is appropriate is that the moves
from Novice to Expert can also be applied to the ways in which researchers
gain competence in research in general, and in particular methods. The stu-
dents who used GTM initially were novices seeking rules and procedures that
could be invoked as they undertook their investigations. Of course in a sense
this is anathema to GTM, and both Glaser and, later, Strauss working with
Julie Corbin, tried to offer students precisely such formulations, but only as
starting points for their work. If this was not stressed sufficiently in Strauss and
Corbin’s works Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists and Basics of Qualitative
Research, and it does not seem to have been, then it is certainly brought to the
fore in their chapter in the Handbook of Qualitative Research. This delay was
unfortunate, because the investigative process in GTM should have been made
central to texts aimed at students. As I pointed out in Chapter 11 on cod-
ing strategies, many of my students did start to take up the ideas in Basics of
Qualitative Research, despite my urging them not to do so. In their later work,
however, they demonstrated that they had moved from the novice level to,
at the very least, advanced beginner or competence, able to understand how
contextual pressures encountered in their studies might necessitate revising or
even dispensing with some of the “rules of the game of GTM” (see Chapter 19).
In effect D&D’s model charts the ways in which researchers develop the skills
that comprise theoretical sensitivity and, at the same time, enhance their meth-
odological sensitivity with regard not only to the method(s) they are using but
also to more general methodological issues.
Charmaz’s definition of abduction given at the beginning of this chap-
ter incorporates the way in which one of the outcomes of GTM can be a set
of hypotheses, each of which can be used to “explain” the data. Critically for
GTM, these hypotheses arise from close scrutiny of the data, rather than being
derived from a set of theoretical statements. Charmaz notes that once estab-
lished, the researcher examines these contending hypotheses to find the “most
plausible interpretation,” a process that initially may involve a flash of insight,
a guess, or a leap in the dark—that is, abduction. From this point, a more rig-
orous stage of investigation should follow.
Abduction in this sense is a key aspect of practice among skilled clini-
cians in their diagnoses. Patients can have identical symptoms but different
underlying causes. For instance patients complaining of abdominal pain may
be suffering from any one of at least ten different groups of illness; some are
fairly trivial but others are far more serious. A skilled clinician will not test
for all and every possibility, but will, like the “Expert” in D&D’s model, make
a considered but not exhaustive decision to rule out some possibilities and
277
investigate others. The process is termed “differential diagnosis,” and although

it may in most cases be a mixture of what Schön describes as “reflecting in
action” as well as “reflecting on action,” for a medical emergency the former
will be relied on far more than the latter. A similar process will be invoked if
an airline pilot is suddenly faced with an emergency situation, although some-
times the response proves to be fatally incorrect.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) gives two examples of
abduction in scientific reasoning, and they are worth quoting in full before
I conclude this chapter with a summary of the central role of abduction
in GTM.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was discovered that the orbit
of Uranus, one of the seven planets known at the time, departed from the
orbit as predicted on the basis of Isaac Newton’s theory of universal gravi-
tation and the auxiliary assumption that there were no further planets in
the solar system. One possible explanation was, of course, that Newton’s
theory is false. Given its great empirical successes for (then) more than
two centuries, that did not appear to be a very good explanation. Two
astronomers, John Couch Adams and Urbain Leverrier, instead suggested
(independently of each other but almost simultaneously) that there was an
eighth, as yet undiscovered planet in the solar system; that, they thought,
provided the best explanation of Uranus’ deviating orbit. Not much later,
this planet, which is now known as “Neptune,” was discovered. (SEP,
emphasis added)
The second example concerns what is now commonly regarded to
have been the discovery of the electron by the English physicist Joseph
John Thomson. Thomson had conducted experiments on cathode rays in
order to determine whether they are streams of charged particles. He con-
cluded that they are indeed, reasoning as follows:
“As the cathode rays carry a charge of negative electricity, are deflected
by an electrostatic force as if they were negatively electrified, and are acted
on by a magnetic force in just the way in which this force would act on a
negatively electrified body moving along the path of these rays, I can see
no escape from the conclusion that they are charges of negative electricity
carried by particles of matter.” (Thomson, cited in Achinstein 2001, p. 17)
The entry in SEP points out that this conclusion did “not follow logically from
the reported experimental results,” and there was no additional data that could
be referred to. Yet Thomson felt that this was an inescapable conclusion, not
because all the evidence pointed that way, but because it was the most plau-
sible explanation; worthy of further investigation.4
Abduction is far more common than might appear at first sight; both in
everyday interaction and in more specialized practices. For GTM it is critical
as it clarifies the respect in which the method affords the basis for far more than
278
straightforward re-description or re-interpretation of the data. A grounded

theory should be clearly and closely based on the data, but it must also go
beyond that data in the sense of presenting what Charmaz terms “plausible
explanations.” Yet arguing that this is a process of induction is not convincing
or plausible. Inductive inference is not only susceptible to the “black swan”
phenomenon, but explanations based on induction are open to the issue of
“under-determination”; that is, for any set of data there will always be more
than one set of applicable explanations or hypotheses. If these are all viewed
in equivalent terms, then there is no way of favoring one over any of the oth-
ers, but if the process of abduction is understood in a fashion similar to that of
differential diagnosis, the theorist can opt for the most plausible and proceed
accordingly.
For GTM-oriented research this means that at various stages of the inves-
tigation the data will be open to several possible interpretations, and this will
necessitate choices by the researcher(s) with regard to the way in which the
study should proceed. In terms of the various stages of coding, this implies
that the deriving of meaningful codes and categories from the data amounts
to making tentative hypothetical claims—that is, that the higher level abstrac-
tions do offer plausible explanations for the data. This process is constructive
in that for any non-trivial set of data, different researchers will almost certainly
produce different codes, even if there is a degree of commonality between
them. It is also abductive becausethe outcomes are based on plausibility not
random explanations produced in a haphazard fashion.
In Chapter 6 I made extensive use of the paper by Tove Giske and Barbara
Artinian, and in Chapter 11 I used the following extract in my discussion
of later stages of coding and the move from early ideas and data to the final
concepts. It can now be read as an example of an abductive moment in the
research process.
After having seen this painting, we knew that it expressed the whole idea
and that when we would finally be able to express the main concern and
the core category, it would come out of that picture. In this way, the pic-
tures facilitated our process of conceptualizing what was happening in our
study. Having done so, we later could explain the picture to others.
Although reporting on an experience of “working with classical grounded the-
ory,” this extract clearly encapsulates an example of abduction. Giske and her
artist colleague studied the painting based on Giske’s narration, and somehow
“knew that it expressed the whole idea.” This then needed further conceptual-
izing before they could explain their ideas to others. The process as a whole
moved from data collection and coding, through to later conceptualizing, but
only after a cognitive process elicited by scrutiny of the painting. A fine exam-
ple of enacting abstraction and abduction (see Chapters 17 and 18).
279
Peirce’s arguments are critical in any discussion on abduction, and he was

also a key figure in the development of Pragmatism, which I and many others
would argue is a crucial, if largely under-appreciated, foundation for GTM.
Current debates among philosophers on induction are varied and complex,
but one trend is now to acknowledge the difficulties and paradoxes of induc-
tive inference, while at the same time recognizing that it is commonplace and
unavoidable both in everyday discourse and in more specialized realms of sci-
entific reasoning. The result is that philosophers now use the phrase “inference
to the best explanation” [IBE] as justification for this form of reasoning, which
is precisely what Peirce meant by “abduction.”
In philosophical and scientific realms the importance of abduction and
the role it plays in the development of new insights are now achieving wider
recognition and appreciation. In this sense they are belatedly catching up with
the basic tenets of GTM.
Key Points
¤ Differences between induction, deduction, abduction

¤ Problems of induction—black swans
¤ Problem of deduction—incorrect syllogisms
¤ Abduction—a cognitive form of reasoning
¤ Problem of current uses of abduction to refer to rule-based forms of
generating knowledge
¤ Dreyfus and Dreyfus—model of transitions from Novice to Expert
¤ Differential Diagnosis as form of abduction
¤ GTM—an abductive method, avoiding verification of hypotheses
(deduction), piling up data (false reliance on induction), and ad hoc
researching
Notes
1. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which
is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are noth-
ing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant
material relationships grasped as ideas.” Karl Marx http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/
352090-the-ideas-of-the-ruling-class-are-in-every-epoch
280
2. See the obituary for Anselm Strauss by Clarke and Star, http://www.socresonline.
org.uk/1/4/strauss.html
3. Respectively, a philosopher and a mathematician/engineer.
4. The SEP entry offers references of further examples from the literature. Antoine
Lavoisier’s “discovery” of oxygen referred to in Chapter 2 may well also be an example of
abduction given his use of existing data—Joseph Priestley’s—to arrive at a novel insight
requiring further testing.
281
PART FOUR
Grounded Theory—Themes and Variations
The chapters in Part Four build on and reiterate the key themes in the previous
sections. Chapter 14 presents the outcomes of a GTM study of a large number
of GTM papers culled from the online journals available through my univer-
sity library, aspects of which have already been indicated in earlier chapters.
Chapter 15 is based on the work of one of my PhD students, who used an
idiosyncratic and effective approach in her research. It is included here as a
way of reiterating the key points made earlier, as well as offering an alternative
orientation to GTM itself. Chapter 16 is based on a paper co-written with a
colleague on the topic of Big Data, at present a hot topic, which touches on sev-
eral critical issues relevant to GTM and research in general. Chapters 17 and
18 reiterate many of the key points made throughout this book; respectively
clarifying the essential relationship between GTM and Pragmatism and the
ways in which GTM should be regarded as a guide to good research practice—
inverting the all-too-common view of GTM as a model of deficient research.
Chapter 19 offers extended accounts of use of GTM in PhD research by four of
the students whose work has been used in the earlier chapters The final chap-
ter argues that one of the greatest theorists of the last 200 years can be regarded
as a Grounded Theorist, even though his main work was published more than
100 years prior to Discovery of Grounded Theory.
282
283
14
A Grounded Theory of Grounded Theory

Journal Articles
In 2012 I decided to undertake a project to investigate GTM research papers

using GTM as my method. This involved using the university library resources
which facilitate electronic searching of online journals.
I used the term grounded theory, which resulted in several thousand
results. I checked through several hundred papers and downloaded a random
sample of more than 100 publications. These were printed out and placed in
three binders for convenience in reading, and the papers were studied with the
aim of developing initial codes. The order in which the papers were printed
and read was random.
Open Coding
After I read the first 20 papers2 I derived a number of codes. These included
the following:-
Title –does the title indicate that GTM was used; if so, how?
Referencing –which GTM texts were referred to in the bibliography of
the article?
First mention –which GTM text was referred to first in the article itself?
Omission(s) –were any key GTM texts missing from the article?
GTM Mantra –were any of the aspects of the GTM mantra included;
were findings presented using the passive voice or misplaced agency?
Method statements –definition or description of GTM?
Method details –reference to induction, abduction, coding,
memo-making, etc.
Process –details of use of GTM
Data –details of forms of data –usually interviews
Products –details of the results –codes, concepts, categories, theory, etc. 283
284
284 Grounded Theory—Themes and Variations
Positioning –was there any mention of the variants of GTM; if so, did the
author(s) position themselves with respect to these?
Tailoring –had the method been adapted or tailored in some way; was it
used in conjunction with other methods?
Presentation –was the data presented with verbatim quotes, diagrams, or
other means of representation?
Software –was some form of software used, and how?
Reliability of findings and Credibility –reference to various ways in which
the findings could be claimed to be reliable or credible
Initial Codes
I wrote memos on these and offer the following extracts to explain my ideas
at the time.
Title—In some cases the title of the paper indicated that GTM had been
used, either in general terms or more precisely—for example, Classical GT, or
Constructivist GT. In other cases there was no indication of this in the title of
the paper, and the only reason it was returned as part of my search was inclu-
sion of a related term in the “keywords” section. I noted other variations in
the terms used—GT approach, Using Grounded Theory, A Grounded Theory
Approach, How to Do a Grounded Theory Study.
Referencing, First Mention, Omissions—It was noticeable that there was
considerable variation in the references. Many mentioned Glaser and Strauss’s
Discovery of Grounded Theory (hereinafter referred to as Discovery, but there
were some that referred to Strauss and Corbin’s Basics of Qualitative Research
as if it was the key text. There also seemed to be something special about the
very first reference made to a GTM publication in a paper, as it was frequently
included in a sentence justifying the use of the method or relating the method
to the research. Given the range of papers, from many different disciplines and
areas, there was a wide variation in sources listed; but a scan of the references
quickly indicated which key sources were included and which were omitted.
nb: I noted the date of each publication at this point, as clearly papers dat-
ing from 1990s could not include citations to more recent GTM publications;
although it was notable that many papers post-2000 referred to the 1st edition
of Strauss and Corbin (1990).
GTM Mantra—Authors used phrases such as the theory emerged from
the data, we conducted this research without referring to the literature, no pre-
vious research had been carried out in this area, we bracketed our previous
285
A Grounded Theory of Grounded Theory Journal Articles 285
experience, and so on. But in almost all cases such claims were either clearly
contradicted or implicitly undermined with references to existing studies,
indications of the importance of the researcher’s own experience and exper-
tise, or justifications for the interpretation of the data during the analysis
phases. I also noted the use of the metaphor of emergence and whether or
not it was complemented by use of what I have termed passive voice and
misplaced agency.
Method statements—Many authors offered extended accounts defining
or describing GTM. This was interesting for a number of reasons—(1) Even
relatively recent papers included such sections, as if there was an understand-
ing that GTM was not completely accepted or understood; (2) The descrip-
tions of the method indicated the views of the author(s) with regard to one or
other of the GTM variants.
Method details—This denotes the distinctive aspects of GTM to which
the authors sought to draw attention. These included references to induc-
tion, abduction, coding, memo-making, constant comparison, and so on,
supported with quotations or citations of relevant GTM texts. I noted that
these sections discussed (1) the processes involved in carrying out the GTM-
oriented research; (2) the types of data that were used—the predominant form
being interviews; (3) the products or details of the results, using terms such as
codes, concepts, categories, and theory, among others.
Positioning—In many cases authors mentioned variants of GTM,
and in so doing explicitly or implicitly positioned themselves with respect
to these.
Tailoring—Some papers explicitly announced that GTM was being used
in conjunction with other methods, and in others there was clarification of
how GTM had been adapted or tailored. In other cases the tailoring was less
explicit.
Presentation—Authors used different forms of presentation; use of ver-
batim quotes, diagrams, or other means of representation. Reference was
made to more detailed presentations prepared for other readerships. One or
two discussed use of software.
Reliability of findings and Credibility—Authors broached this topic,
noting that GTM is seen as having a problem with regard to issues such as
validity and reliability. There was discussion of criteria for qualitative research
outcomes, such as those offered by Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln; oth-
ers referred to Kathy Charmaz’s four aspects. (Table 14.1 indicates the cod-
ing for some of these first articles. This is presented in some detail to give an
indication of the coding and analysis involved.)
286
TABLE 14.1
Lists examples of this first stage of coding.1
Outlines of extracts and codes
Grenier, M.
Coteaching in Physical Education: A Strategy for Inclusive Practice,
Adapted Physical Activity Quarterly, 2011, 28, 95-112
No existing research Mantra
First mention—Schatzman and Strauss 1973 Field Research Pre-GTM reference
Strauss and Corbin 1990 Use of S&C approach
GTM and data analysis of interview transcripts—first mention of Process
method detail
No reference to works by Glaser and Strauss, or Glaser
… “categories emerged” [use of terms—code, category, concept, Omissions
theory, model, framework] Mantra and Products
Verbatim quotes from interviews to make key points Presentation
Solomon, A. H. et al
“ ‘Don’t Lock Me Out’ ”: Life-Story Interviews of
Family Business Owners Facing Succession
Family Process, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2011
Use of GT methodology
Grounded theory emerged No tailoring
Interviews [other forms of data mentioned or used] Mantra
“500 pages of data were mined using GT analysis” Process and Data
Process and Data and Mantra
“GT is a ‘procedure through which the social scientist
Method statement—quote
systematically reads successive autobiographical texts,
from specific source, but
categorizing and recategorizing narrative content in a
not one of the “usual
continuously evolving effort to arrive at an inductive portrait
suspects”
of a given social phenomenon’ ” McAdams 1998 p491—
“Personal narratives and the Life Story,” in L Pervin and O John
Eds Handbook of Personality Theory
Ref to Charmaz 2006, also to Strauss and Corbin 1990—none First reference to GTM texts;
to Glaser Omission
5 major categories Products
“four influences that constitute our grounded theory” p154
Use of diagrams Presentation
Short quotes from interviews
“we had no preconceived notions, at start of interviews” Mantra
Zunker, C. & Ivankova, N.

Applying Grounded Theory to Weight Management among
Women: Making a Commitment to Healthy Eating
The Qualitative Report, 16(3), 860-880
Title includes phrase “Applying GT” Title
Abstract—“categories emerged,” “axial coding,” substantive Mantra—also Strauss &
theory was labelled “Approach to healthy eating” Corbin reference
“current study examined the central phenomenon or “core Product
category” of how women approach healthy eating” p187
“qualitative approach, or methodology, allows us to discover how Method statement—
meanings are formulated through culture” 187 general level
“Qualitative research used inductive logic (i.e. moving from
general to specific)” [???] Role of induction
Refers to “interpretive process”
Mention of research questions as “first steps” Tailoring
First ref to Corbin and Strauss 2008 3rd edition of Basics
… this phenomenon has “not been studied” Mantra
GT approach “goes beyond description” Mantra
GT—develop a theory, help explain practice or provide Potential product
a framework … (Creswell 2007, p63)
287
TABLE 14.1
Continued
“three dominant designs within grounded theory: systematic, Positioning—BUT note

emerging, and constructivist” (no refs to Charmaz; BG; G&S Omissions
Use of field notes Process
Use of software MAXQDA Software
“categories were identified” Mantra Passive voice
Core category “emerged from the data” Mantra
Tables detailing open and axial coding—NB headings used p191-6 Coding paradigm
Use of “conditions”
Selective coding—or integration … “final step for building a
theory”
Diagram of “approach to healthy eating theory” Presentation
Credibility … three verification procedures; triangulation, member Credibility
checking, peer debriefing
Theory relates to one substantive area … may offer “implications
Product—substantive theory
in other substantive areas”
Masley P. M. et al
Physical Therapist Practice in the Acute Care Setting: A Qualitative
Study Physical Therapy Volume 91 Number 6 June 2011
Research report; abstract refers to “Methods”—refers to Tailoring
interviews, coding of transcripts, comparative analysis [no
mention of GT at this point—these are all techniques!]
First mention of GT—Chenitz and Swanson From Practice to First reference to GTM
Grounded Theory, 1986 Method details—BSSP
Then reference to basic social psychological process—ref Method details—sampling
Hutchinson & Wilson “Grounded Theory: the method”
in Munhall & Oiler Boyd Nursing Research 1993 Tailoring—use of literature
Purposive sample
Semi-structured interviews—questions “derived from the Method details—constant
information in the literature” comparison
Constant comparative process … interviews/analysis Products—concepts, themes
Identified “concepts”
“core constructs”—four themes Process—joint effort
“we labeled” Presentation
Diagram of “theoretical model”—8 themes, 4 core constructs
GTM text
Ref to BG Basics
Nunney, J. et al
How Do the Attitudes and Beliefs of Older People and Healthcare
Professionals Impact on the Use of Multi-Compartment
Compliance Aids? A Qualitative Study Using Grounded Theory
Drugs Aging 2011:28 (5)
“using grounded theory” Title
Refers to existing research, previous studies—so not a new field Tailoring
Strauss & Corbin 1998 First reference
Semi-structured interviews—questions “informed by the findings Tailoring
of a previous scoping study”
“in accordance with the grounded theory methodology, as the Mantra—passive voice
interviews were undertaken and new themes emerged, the Method details—following
topic guide was reviewed …”405 the data
Line-by-line analysis, S&C, “allowed themes to emerge and memos Method details—coding and
were written” memoing
“the data analysis was undertaken by JN” [active form of the verb!] Main author—prime coder
Almost overwhelming use of quotes Presentation
Review of literature undertaken prior to research Tailoring
Conclusion discussed practice of medicine needs assessment Product—link to practice
(continued)
288
TABLE 14.1
Continued
Almqvist, A. et al
PARENTAL LEAVE IN SWEDEN: MOTIVES, EXPERIENCES, AND
GENDER EQUALITY AMONGST PARENTS
Fathering, Vol. 9, No. 2, Spring 2011, 189-206.
Section on previous research Tailoring
Qual research design based “inspired by a model
constructed by…”
Data from semi-structured interviews, “analysed with the help of Tailoring—use of other
analytic frames” p193!!! “This involves a joint venture between methods and framework
theoretical pre-understanding and openness in the analysis, a
methodology (sic!) that has become a norm in grounded theory
(Charmaz, 2006; Clarke, 2005)” p193!!!! First reference
“Symbolic interactionism was chosen for our basic theoretical
framework”
Analysis and synthesis “inspired by grounded theory (Glaser and Reference to Discovery
Strauss, 1967)”
Categories—generated “both theoretically and empirically”
Example of coding similar to Charmaz Methods details
Section on “trustworthiness” mentions credibility, transferability, Credibility
dependability
“a pattern emerged”
Ref to Strauss 1978 Negotiations Positioning by implication
Refs Charmaz; G&S, Clarke
Hunter, A. et al
Navigating the grounded theory terrain. Part 1. Nurse Researcher.
18, 4, 6-10. 2011
GTM as topic … see title Title
Keywords … “PhD methodology”
Paper on the “decision to use GT” … methodological Methods statements
complexity Positioning—but neutral
Classic GT—seen as G&S, then BG; Straussian; constructivist Methods statements
Ref to Walker & Myric, 2006 “four main tenets”—conceptualisation
and theory development; theories must be “ ‘grounded’—
that is derived from social reality. This is managed through
simultaneous data collection and analysis” p7; researcher
approach topic with an open mind, “not favouring a priori
beliefs”; theoretical sampling;
GT—delivers rigorous data collection and analysis Positioning
3 competing approaches—table 1
Initial attraction of Charmaz—but “she did not provide the steps to
guide the researcher towards applying the theory (AB method?)
in real research” [???]
“collaboration and co-construction … not sufficiently defined” Positioning
Opts for Straussian … “in search of what McCallin (2003)
described as the certainty offered by this approach” [certainty?]
Read S&C 1990 and 1998—found guidance and detail; also Tailoring—move from Strauss
support for preliminary literature review & Corbin to Glaser
Decided that axial coding was not required “as theoretical coding,
as outlined by Glaser (1978, 1992), brings the data back
together, conceptually telling the story of how the categories
relate to each other.” P10
NB find subsequent paper!!! Nurse Researcher—Hunter
A Murphy—see below
289
TABLE 14.1
Continued
Augustijnen et al, M-T.
A model of executive coaching: A qualitative study
International Coaching Psychology Review Vol. 6 No.
2 Sept 2011
Semi-structured interviews; analysis “followed the grounded Methods statement
theory method”
Results—“a coaching model” Product—model
“extensive literature survey” Tailoring
Ref Discovery First reference
Iterative process of collection and analysis Method details
“Various alternatives in Grounded Theory have been Positioning
developed”—ref Heath & Cowley, 2004 … Classic
G&S 1967, “adopts a post-positivist ontology and emphasis
objectivity”; “reformulation … developed by Strauss and
Corbin (1998) … relativistic ontological position” … Charmaz
constructivist
Use of S&C in this study—allows literature review, Positioning
more “practical”
2nd literature review “conducted after data collection” Literature as data
10 interviews Return to the literature
Mention of sampling and saturation … but nothing further
Methods details
in the analysis or discussion
Sbaraini, A. et al
How to do a grounded theory study: a worked example of a
study of dental practices
BMC Medical Research Methodology 2011, 11:128
… How to do a grounded theory study Title
GT methodology “most-often cited by authors of qualitative Positioning
studies in medicine”
“a chequered history” … “Many authors label their work Positioning
“grounded theory” but do not follow the basics of the
methodology.” REFS R Barbour; M Dixon-Woods References
“may be … because there are few practical examples of
grounded theory in use in the literature”
GT—fractured into 4 types, with a 5th emerging; 1) BG’s Positioning
‘classic; 2) S&C; 3) Charmaz constructivist; 4) Clarke Pomo
Situational Analysis; 5) “emerging variant is ‘Dimensional
Analysis’ ” based on Schatzman’s work (see chapter in Positioning
Developing GT)
Study used Charmaz approach
Table 1—stages of GT study—useful Methods details
Section on ethical issues … number of applications to ethics
committee as research evolved—good practical point
Positioning
Want to avoid people using GT as “an approving
bumper sticker”
Ref to Handbook
Livingstone, W. et al
A path of perpetual resilience: Exploring the experience of a
diabetes-related amputation through grounded theory
Contemporary Nurse (2011) 39(1): 20–30.
Title include phrase “Exploring the experience of … through Title
grounded theory”
(continued)
290
TABLE 14.1
Continued
Unstructured interviews with 5
Resulting substantive theory Product
Reference to previous studies Tailoring
Ethics approval for interviews—approach to potential Process
interviewees
Open coding commenced after first interview—built list of Method details
“recurring codes”
“Categories were developed by cross-referencing the codes and Method details
concepts.” 22
Core category developed … “Categories were developed.” Products
[ACTIVE] Active voice
Evaluation of “accuracy of the developing theory, external Software
validation and a computerised qualitative data analysis Validation
program (NUDIST version 60 were used.” 23
Table 1—outline of codes, concepts, core categories and basic Presentation
psychosocial processes [GOOD]
Lit reviewed after core category developed Method details
Only GT ref—BG Basics; other refs for methods in general Positioning by implication
Polit & Beck; Taylor et al Omission
Jonasson, L. et al
Empirical and normative ethics: A synthesis relating to the
care of older patients Nursing Ethics 18(6) 814–824
“Five concepts were used in the analysis; three from the
grounded theory studies and two from the theoretical Tailoring—Mixed Methods
framework of normative ethics. A simultaneous concept
analysis resulted in five outcomes …”
Method “Simultaneous Concept Analysis (SCA)” chosen
because it “could answer the research questions and develop
a process model”—useful when “concepts are close to each
other” [???]
Used 3 empirical studies—1) observational plus follow-up Metaphor—“closeness”
interviews with older patients 2) interviews if next-of-kin
3) observational plus follow-up interviews with nursing staff
Used Qualitative Content Analysis QCA
9 step procedure
Ref to BG TS but nothing else Positioning
FOCUSED CODING AND SAMPLING
These codes were used as the basis for investigation of 30 further papers,
resulting in a more focused set of categories and eventually a group of four
concepts as follows:
Methodological Positioning—This code was now expanded to incorporate
aspects of Title, Referencing, and Mantra. It incorporates the ways in
which authors position their research and understanding of GTM
291
against the variants and authoritative texts. I thought that this was
similar to the idea of badging in the sense of marketing products and
services.1
Tailoring—The way in which authors explain how their ways of doing
research involve processes or procedures that depart from what they
see as the authoritative or definitive form of GTM.
Warranting—The process of explaining the criteria against which the
research outcomes can be understood to be credible. Another, but
rather unwieldy term for this is Credibilizing.
Methodologizing—The process of explaining what I have termed “the
method-in-use,” which is more than stating that a particular
method, or combination of methods, was used. It also includes an
awareness of the need for justification of methodological choices and
stances, although the level and detail required will vary depending
on the readership.
During the course of this later phase I wrote various memos, and Box 14.1
offers a few extracts from these to illustrate my reflections as the study
progressed.
BOX 14.1
Extracts from 2nd Stage Memos
Extracts from various Memos …

Many papers refer to Strauss and Corbin’s book with regard to analysis of the
data but without referring to GTM as such, although many do use the term
“constant comparative method” or something similar. This might be seen
as evidence that such researchers are not using GTM at all as Glaser might
argue, but there are also cases where a similar orientation is evident and the
author(s) do refer to Glaser and Strauss’s work, sometime also to Glaser’s
1978 book.
The most parsimonious explanation might be that Strauss and Corbin’s books
gained impetus in the literature on qualitative research in the 1990s, and in some
cases researchers picked up these techniques in the sense of the explanation
of this term presented in Chapter 2. The GTM package becomes unravelled
as researchers tailor their understanding of different methods to the research
contexts—research as a series of situated actions.
…
Several papers also refer to use of these analysis techniques as part of
an ethnographic study, alluding to “field notes,” with occasional reference to
Schatzman & Strauss. Other papers refer to the larger package, bundling GTM
with Symbolic Interactionism (SI); in some cases referring to Clarke, but not all.
There is a firmer basis for the weaker, but more profound claim that both GTM
and SI resonate with the ideas of investigating and analyzing social interaction,
292
and that both are built upon a perspective that includes the social actors as
sentient and creative participants.
…
No specific ref to GT—BUT use of phrases such as
■ “analysis of data occurred concurrently with its collection throughout my study”
■ “… I used methods of constant comparison to code field notes and interview
transcripts and create conceptual categories”—reference to Strauss and
Corbin, 1990
…
Statements regarding the use of Strauss and Corbin; for example “because of
its well-structured and specific process of model-building, through a combination
of inductive and deductive methods which enable empirically validated conditional
concepts and relationships to emerge.”
…
Alternative ideas about processes:
■ “Subsequent analyses of patterns by code between the two coalitions were
used to explain findings from sociometric data” …
■ “Building theories from case study research” nb: So here no claim to use GT
but use/reference to Strauss and Corbin with regard to identifying patterns—

BUT no evidence of detailed use of coding paradigm.
Examples of partial badging … in wider terms aspects of GT have moved into
the research repertoire … akin to Action Research with its whole plethora of
trends and facets (see Bradbury, 2015)
…
Many authors prefer the term “model” rather than “theory,” also refer to “first
abstraction of the data.” Several use quantitative and qualitative data.
…
Team developed an initial code book based on constructs from prior research
…
Smith et al … . interpretative phenomenological analysis [IPA]
IPA “aim to explore, in detail, how individuals themselves conceptualize the issues
they face” (Smith et al, p.133) NB link to GTM … stress on actor’s conceptualizations
but recognition that “analysis is unavoidably an interpretative process”
ACHIEVING SATURATION
Having established these concepts I continued my research with the remain-

ing papers aiming at saturation of the categories, which I managed to achieve
without having to go through several hundred remaining papers. Close analy-
sis of a further 30 proved more than sufficient, although this phase did draw
my attention to a couple of “outliers,” papers that took GTM as the topic rather
than the resource—that is, where the paper discussed GTM as a method, set-
ting it against other methods or generic methodological concerns, but where
no actual research project was discussed.
293
In this last phase I also drew on the ideas of Ludwik Fleck regarding text-
books referred to in Chapter 2:
The textbook changes the subjective judgment of an author into a proven

fact. It will be united with the entire system of science, it will hencefor-
ward be recognized and taught, it will become a foundation of further
facts and the guiding principle of what will be seen and applied.
Figure 1 in the Introduction to this volume can now be slightly revised,

indicating the authoritative texts for the three main variants of GTM
(Figure 14.1). Those teaching research methods need to take care in how
they present the differing views of the method, because they will in one way
or another be changing their own “subjective judgments” into “proven facts”
that their students may well invoke as guiding principles in their respective
research practices. Teachers also need to make sure that they address the
use of different metaphors relevant to research—for example, discovery,
construction, lenses, dialogue—and with regard to cognition—for example,
flow, blocking, suspension, emergence. (I have offered some starting points
for this in c hapter 3 of my book Thinking Informatically—Bryant, 2006.)
The Handbook of Grounded Theory
Strauss & Glaser Charmaz &

Corbin Classical or Bryant
Variants and Coding Objectivist Constructivist &
Further Paradigm Basics of GT Pragmatist
Articulations Basics of Issues of GT Constructing GT
e.g. QR 1st, 2nd , Review Grounded Theory
Clarke, 3rd and 4th and Grounded
Situational editions Theorizing
Analysis
Glaser & Strauss

Theoretical Sensitivity, Status Passage, Anguish, Negotiations
CANONICAL
Glaser, Strauss & Quint
Awareness, Discovery, Time, The Nurse and the Dying Patient
FIGURE 14.1 The Grounded Theory Method: Canonical Basis and Main Variants 2016.

294
Methodologizing
Tailoring Positioning Warranting
The meaning of the diamond shape will

be explained in Chapter 15
FIGURE 14.2 Methodologizing -Diagrammatic representation of a grounded theory of grounded
theory papers
The Handbook of Grounded Theory can be seen as offering a broad over-

view of GTM, across all the variants.
Figure 14.2 illustrates the overall model, taking Methodologizing as the
core concept, with the other three concepts related to it. The details for each
concept are given in abbreviated form in Table 14.2 and in slightly more detail
in four memos—Boxes 14.2–14.5.
TABLE 14.2
Abbreviated details of Methodologizing and related concepts
Methodologizing Links to other methods
Scope of GTM
Philosophical issues—induction, deduction
Theoretical Saturation as complex and confused issue
E & O issues
Differing perspectives
Methodologizing internally and externally
Positioning Lack of existing research
Textual reference(s)—Discovery, Strauss & Corbin, Glaser, Charmaz
Induction
GT & SI—Blumer
Reference to split between Strauss/Corbin and Glaser
Constructivist GT
Metaphors—e.g. emergence … internal/external dimension; mixed
methods; triangulation
Tailoring Use of field notes
Use with other methods
2+ researchers coding
Recognition of paradoxes
Scope—coding only of interviews
Conceptual model developed
Use of GT for data analysis
Axial coding or Coding Families
WH questions
Warranting Rigour
Precision
Number of codes and categories
Fit, relevance, work
Parallels with other approaches
295
BOX 14.2
Methodologizing
This concept refers to the ways in which researchers link their actual approach
to other methods—in the context of GTM-oriented research it involves a range
of complex aspects that are covered by the three lower-level components.
At this level, however, the process of methodologizing includes discussion
of the scope of GTM, reference to philosophical issues such as induction,
deduction, and concern with ontological and epistemological topics—a common
indication of this will be in reference to “research paradigms.”
The GTM topic of Theoretical Saturation is an aspect, although mention of it
may indicate confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the researchers.
Methodologizing has both internal and external aspects
■ Methodologizing internally—involves discussion of 5x(P+P) aspects of GTM;
e.g. the ways in which coding-cum-analysis was carried out, use of software
and so on
■ Methodologizing externally—involves discussion of GTM with an eye on
gatekeepers, colleagues, peers, later evaluators; also writing for the

discipline/field in more general terms; writing for the wider world of methods,
and the incorporation of tools, techniques, and processes.
BOX 14.3
Positioning
This aspect is demonstrated in researchers’ statements relating to aspects or

features of GTM—also to omissions of references to canonical or authoritative
texts and issues.
Examples of topics/statements
■ Induction or Inductive Method
■ Lack of existing research
■ Textual reference(s)—Discovery, Strauss & Corbin, Glaser, Charmaz—or
omission of one or more of these

■ GT & SI—in either a strong form (complete package) or weaker form (focus on
actors’ meanings)
■ Reference to split between Strauss/Corbin and Glaser
■ Reference to issue of epistemology and development of Constructivist GT
■ Metaphors—e.g. emergence
Also an external dimension—i.e. positioning with regard to other methods such as

Action Research, ethnography, Mixed methods; triangulation
296
BOX 14.4
Tailoring
Researchers refer to the details of how they accomplished their research, and
so offer examples of GTM-in-use—and ways in which the approach may only
involve aspects of GTM as a minor component of other methods
■ Use of field notes
■ Use with other methods—major/minor roles
■ 2+ researchers coding—team aspects
■ Recognition of paradoxes of research in general and GTM in particular—e.g.

advising against reading the literature at the outset, avoiding preconceptions,
waiting for the theory to emerge
■ Scope—coding only of interviews without further sources of data
■ Conceptual model developed—sometimes researchers fail to get to this level,
others develop a central concept or conceptual framework rather than anything

they refer to as a substantive grounded theory
■ Use of GTM for data analysis—but nothing further
■ Axial coding or Coding Families
■ WH questions—researchers starting with a range of questions that are more
targeted than the very generic ones offered by Glaser and Strauss, and
Charmaz.
BOX 14.5
Warranting
There is an understanding that research outputs must offer justification

for the findings, even if issues such as “verification,” “generalizabilty,” and
“replication” are not appropriate to GTM—they are certainly not applicable in
a fashion identical to other, particularly quantitative methods.
GTM-oriented researchers need to justify their findings—grant them
credibility and warrant them in some ways. Thus the need to cover topics such
as Rigor, Precision (validation against the precise background for SGTs), the
Number of codes and categories; Fit, Relevance, Usefulness; Parallels with
other approaches (see Chapter 18).
Key Point
¤ The key points for this chapter are given in the various boxes and
figures
Exercises
1. Look up some of the papers referred to in Table 14.1 and try to derive
codes of your own—although a more challenging and useful exercise
would be to use a different set of keywords, based on your own
research ideas.
297
2. On the other hand you could use the model presented here—together
perhaps with the concept of badging—and see what happens if you
try to develop a formal GT along the lines referred to by Glaser
and Strauss in Status Passage and by Margaret Kearney (2007). (See
Chapter 12.)
Notes
1. Badging may itself prove to be the initial basis for derivation of a formal grounded
theory (FGT), but I have not taken it any further at this point.
2. I have given the location and full title for these papers so that readers have the
option of coding these few for themselves and comparing their codes with mine. The
left-hand column is taken verbatim from my notes—including abbreviations, incomplete
phrases, and so on.
298
299
15
Another View of The Grounded Theory Method

ANOTHER WAY OF MODELING
Our perspective [i.e., his and Strauss’s view of GTM] is but a piece
of a myriad of action in Sociology, not the only, right action
—Barney Glaser, Theoretical Sensitivity
To date I have supervised over 40 students in the completion and award of

their PhDs. Several students opted to use the grounded theory method (GTM),
sometimes of their own accord, and sometimes at the urging of their super-
visory team. Previous chapters have used extracts and ideas drawn from their
theses, illustrating the range of different approaches and implementations.
In all cases the students worked on deriving a grounded theory, sometimes
in the form of a model or framework. The topics they engaged with varied
widely, but many of them concerned issues centered on uses of new technol-
ogy, particularly information and communication technology (ICT), as well
as practices of information management and information systems in general.
As explained in Chapter 2, in developing information systems there has been
a focus on methods for many years, always with an eye on the products result-
ing from such activities and procedures. Having worked as a systems analyst
for several years in the 1980s, I was always aware that there were similari-
ties between methods used in developing information systems (IS) and those
used in research, particularly GTM. Both involved investigation into hitherto
unknown areas, requiring open-mindedness and imaginative ways of deriving
detailed accounts of complex settings. With IS development it was important
to understand each project as unique, and to specify and implement systems
accordingly; avoiding the temptation to use previous experiences and ideas
from earlier systems. IS development and GTM place emphasis on deriving
outcomes that had practical significance, working computer-based systems
and effective conceptual frameworks, respectively.
One student took these ideas much further in her work, arguing that some
of the specialized models used in developing information systems could be
incorporated into GTM: adding another feature—a technique—to the method
for consideration by researchers. This chapter offers an overview of the ways in 299
300
which IS development and GTM compare and contrast with each other, also
offering an overview of the ways in which the Object-Orientation approach to
IS development can highlight and reinforce key aspects of GTM. This is not to
argue that these insights have to be incorporated, but instead indicating their
relevance and usefulness in conjunction with the method, and so may provide
researchers with additional insights and potential approaches to their work.1
A Very Brief Summary of IS Development
Although there is no need to assume any familiarity with IS development, it

is worth giving brief consideration to the ways in which these activities devel-
oped in the light of technological developments associated with the spread of
computer technology from the 1960s onward. (More detailed overviews can
be found, for instance, in the various editions of Avison and Fitzgerald’s work
dating from 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2006.) The initial motivation behind IS
development methods (ISDMs) was to provide ways in which to counter the
tendency of early systems efforts to become chaotic and unmanageable. As a
result ISDMs were designed as fairly blunt instruments, largely with a mana-
gerial focus. The main objectives in their application was capture of details
and control of budget and schedule. Over time these methods became more
all-encompassing, with battle lines drawn between different approaches and
arguments revolving around what now appear to be fairly trivial distinctions.
The early methods focused either on modeling the structural aspects of
the target systems or on the process ones; although it quickly became apparent
that any truly effective method had to incorporate both structure and process.
This is similar to saying that a model of a car has to include not only the chas-
sis, engine, and other automotive parts but also representation of, for instance,
the manner whereby the fuel is converted into energy to drive the wheels. Yet
even these two aspects are insufficient, because there also has to be a way of
modelling the behavioral or event-based aspects. Again, using the example of
a car, this would involve modeling the fact that someone has to get into the
car, insert and rotate the ignition key, engage a gear, control the accelerator
and brakes, and so on.
For a retail system, this will entail the structural aspects, such as the items
for sale and customer details; the processes for linking items to customers in
the form of a transaction; and the events that might be associated with these,
such as a customer entering the shop or ordering by phone or on-line. Systems
analysts are guided in their initial analyses by looking for nouns to suggest the
structural features and for verbs to suggest the processes and, in some cases the
behavioral aspects. The results of such methods can be expressed in three dis-
tinctive models: respectively, data (structure), process, and event (behavior).
301
Another View of The Grounded Theory Method 301
As I discussed briefly in Chapter 2, the various methods for systems

modeling have developed since the 1980s. At first many of these were tar-
geted at technical specialists rather than at the people who would actually
use the system. So as the range of implementation of computer-based sys-
tems expanded, so too did the methods, and they eventually became ends
in themselves rather than means to an end—so cumbersome that they came
to be seen not as a solution but rather as adding to the problem. In any case
technological advances meant that many of the paper-based aspects of IS
development were no longer needed, or could be done far more quickly using
computers. Furthermore the business-led demands for systems required far
more rapid turnaround from requirements to delivery, and so leaner and
more agile approaches were developed. The essential role of the analyst,
however, remained central, although how this role was enacted changed
dramatically. (The details behind this brief and inevitably cryptic sketch are
portrayed in the succeeding editions of Avison and Fitzgerald’s work).
What remains the case, however, for systems analysis and GTM-oriented
research, is the central aspect of the ways in which they both need to proceed as
an open-minded, in-depth, iterative investigation of a specified domain.2 Both
activities require analysts or researchers to have confidence to build on their
own insights, developed in conjunction with close investigation of a specific
topic, avoiding the temptation to find recourse in existing models, either in the
form of previously developed systems (for systems analysts) or grand theories
(for GTM researchers). Stress must be put on having analysts and researchers
use their own skills and experiences, what Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss
termed Theoretical Sensitivity, which, I would now argue, needs to be comple-
mented with the skill of Methodological Sensitivity. Together, these skills provide
the basis for moving from close investigation of the data—being grounded—
through conceptual abstraction, and on to the development of usable and use-
ful theories and models.
In implementing the basic concepts of GTM, movement from data-
gathering through conceptual abstraction to the development of new theories
and models is an important aspect of the method, but one that is eclipsed
by an equally important innovation: the idea that theories are “grounded in
data.” This grounded-ness was advocated by Glaser and Strauss in an effort
to persuade researchers that there were alternatives to what was then (1960s)
the predominant process of deriving and verifying hypotheses from existing
theories. GTM starts with the data, but it should not be thought of as mind-
less data-gathering. There is the critical aspect of researchers developing their
insights as a necessary part of the process of “generating theory” using GTM;
in Glaser and Strauss’s Discovery immediately after the introductory chapter
comes one entitled “Generating Theory,” and the index entry for “insight” is
cross-referenced to this chapter.
302
Glaser and Strauss emphasized that the researcher’s insights are criti-
cal in generating theories, although they must be grounded in the data. In
Discovery they expanded on this by pointing to three methodological corol-
laries, explaining that such insights could come from various sources (1967,
pp. 251–253).
¤ The personal experiences people encounter while carrying out
activities and also when later thinking about and reflecting on their
own experiences;
¤ Other people’s experiences obtained through reading, watching,
listening, talking, or communicating with others and the media;
¤ Existing theories, albeit only after being aligned with what has
already been found in the field.
In building a theory, researchers can and should use their own experiences,
the experience of others, and existing literature and theories. The issue for
Glaser and Strauss was the way in which these sources were used: the way
in which researchers develop their experiences, in conjunction with the data
grounded in the context, to produce innovative theoretical statements. This is
a key issue for all methods. Glaser and Strauss were arguing that GTM is one
innovative and highly effective way of doing this, rather than claiming any
methodological monopoly.
Glaser and Strauss’s approach resonates with the Triarchic model of intel-
ligence proposed by Robert Sternberg (1995). The Triarchic Theory posits
three facets of intelligence:
Analytical Intelligence, which is measured by analogies and puzzles
1.
and reflects how an individual relates to the internal world.
Creative Intelligence, which involves insight, synthesis, and the ability
2.
to react to novel stimuli and situations. This is the Experiential aspect
of intelligence and reflects how an individual connects the internal
world to external reality.
Practical Intelligence, which involves the ability to grasp, understand,
3.
and solve real problems in everyday life. This is the contextual aspect
of intelligence, and it reflects how the individual relates to the external
world. In short, practical intelligence is about being “street smart.”
So in terms of GTM the Triarchic model can be seen to resonate with
Glaser and Strauss’s aim of encouraging researchers to develop new concepts
and innovative insights, using their intelligence analytically, creatively, and
practically.
¤ Analytically, by focusing on a topic or domain; asking questions of
the data that such an orientation evokes; in Glaser’s terms posing
the question “What is this data about?”
303
¤ Creatively, by going beyond the data; abstracting, coding,

categorizing, and conceptualizing.
¤ Practically, by seeking to test out the concepts and theories in a
practical fashion to see if they satisfy the GTM criteria; i.e. do
the insights “fit” the context in the sense of enhancing people’s
understanding, do they “work” in the sense of increasing people’s
effectiveness, and do they have “grab” in being seen as a basis for
further conceptual development.
This provides the basis for a strategic approach to research that embodies three
strategies. The first strategy entails developing an understanding of one’s exist-
ing knowledge. This means that researchers need to explore their personal
insights, or in Glaser’s terms that they should be able to “see” what is going on
within the world around them (Glaser, 1992 p. 22). This can also be seen as a
way in which the “positionality” of the researcher is taken into account, which
is not an issue easily associated with all forms of GTM.
The second strategy focuses on “cultivating insights.” In relation to
Triarchic theory, this is the way theorists use their creative intelligence in order
to gain knowledge by gathering experiences from the world around them and
picturing the situation or associated problems. This involves an inversion of
the first strategy, since theorists need to confront their own views and con-
ceptions with those of others involved in the area under investigation. In this
sense, theorists seek to enter the research domain from different standpoints,
responding or reacting to the experiences of others, as well as other theories.
When reviewing their own experiences, borrowing others or referencing other
theories, the theorists may gain “information” differently and simultaneously
from all these sources (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pp. 251–253). With the infor-
mation obtained and by combining this with their own theoretical sensitivity,
theorists may develop their insights as a result of these challenges.
Researchers can move to the third strategy, which involves considering
the practical aspects of how they can “exploit their implications” (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967, p. 254). In this way they test their enhanced knowledge and
theoretical sensitivity in terms of exploiting their substantive findings. This
will involve positioning themselves and exploring their knowledge in order to
develop their theoretical insights.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggested that use of these three strategies
“should blur and intertwine continually,” which reinforces one of the key
innovations of the method; the iteration between data-gathering and analy-
sis. This provides a basis for arguing that GTM is highly congruent with the
generic process involved in systems development; especially the earliest stages
of requirements analysis and systems modeling. In both GTM and ISD the
researcher or analyst begins by engaging with a domain, which may or may
not be clearly demarcated. The investigator’s initial orientation to this must be
304
one of open-mindedness, as he or she seeks to understand the situation rather

than impose preconceived ideas or solutions on it.
In early ISDMs this was referred to as an “exploratory” or “feasibility”
stage, but this assumes that the problem or issue has already been identified,
and the task at hand is to define possible solutions that can be assessed in terms
of suitability, cost, and so on. In some cases this will be an appropriate course
of action, but in others, where the problem itself is not fully understood, it
may lead to imposition of an unsuitable solution. Such settings should be seen
as “problem situations,” requiring what are now termed “problem structuring
methods,” which center on an understanding that characterizing problems can
itself be challenging and complex, demanding a participative and negotiated
form of involvement (see Checkland, 1999; Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001).
The initial and critical outcome of such methods is the clear depiction of a
“problem definition.”
GTM advocates that researchers adopt a similar approach, warning against
any temptation to formulate a hypothesis prior to initial engagement with the
research domain. The initial stage should be one of gaining familiarity, based
on adopting a position of open-minded and flexible questioning. Both the IS
analyst and the GTM researcher need to adopt an initial position of humility,
recognizing that much of the expertise and knowledge of the domain, and the
key problems or issues, reside in the heads of those already in place; imposing
externally derived models, frameworks, or solutions may preclude any chance
of accessing these resources and eliciting useful data.
The first step might be termed “Questioning the world”; seeking to appre-
ciate and understand the domain. The objective here is for analysts/research-
ers to try to identify phenomena that are based in or derived from the actual
environment. In GTM this involves “coding,” and the innovative aspect that
Glaser and Strauss introduced was the instruction that codes were not to be
prepared before-hand, as was the case prior to GTM, but were to be derived
from the data itself. In a similar fashion, IS analysts should investigate the
systems context with a view to developing relevant models, rather than impos-
ing preexisting ones. In both cases the experienced researcher or analyst will
engage with the process of abstraction, developing categories or codes that
help classify the myriad details of the situation into more manageable and
manipulable concepts.
Next comes “Comparative analysis,” or making “theoretical comparisons,”
a core process in generating theory. Here theorists attempt to generate a theory
or elements of theory from their insights through a codifying method. This is
an “analytic process through which data is conceptualised and integrated to
form theory” using the coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The coding
process involves at least two phases (Charmaz, 2006): open coding and selec-
tive coding.
305
Open Coding includes identifying significant events, actions, processes or

objects within the data as concepts or phenomena according to their defined
properties and dimensions, as well as linking categories to other categories or
their subcategories at the level of properties and dimensions.
Selective Coding involves the process of integrating and refining the the-
ory in terms of finding the core categories that “account[s]‌for most of the
variation in a pattern of behaviour” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Glaser, 1992).
On the basis of the foregoing it can be seen that there are clear paral-
lels between GTM and ISD. Both entail immersion in a setting, on the basis
of which abstractions need to be developed so that appropriate and relevant
models can be derived. The three strategies advocated by GTM involve the
use of comparative analysis to develop initial insights. These insights provide
the basis for abstractions or concepts, which themselves provide the basis for
further investigation, the outcome of which will be more refined concepts
that can be formulated as theoretical statements. This iterative and incremen-
tal process is mirrored in the effective practices of IS analysts who address a
situation with a view to developing an understanding of current systems, pro-
cesses, and issues. This leads to tentative models or abstractions that provide
the platform for more detailed investigation, following which more refined
and relevant models may be produced. The two forms of GTM coding, taken
together, combine many of the aspects of IS analysis and model building.
The key innovations of GTM, dating from the 1960s, can now be seen
as presaging the ways in which IS development has itself changed since the
1980s. Early ISDMs were aimed at offering a basis for managing the highly
disparate and seemingly chaotic activities of analysts, programmers, and oth-
ers. Consequently there was a stress on supervision and organization, incor-
porating detailed procedures, and close scrutiny and oversight. These early
models were based on pre-existing approaches to large construction projects.
It soon became apparent that although these “structured” methods were use-
ful for those seeking basic knowledge about and qualification relating to IS
development, they were far too prescriptive and cumbersome. The initial
alternatives sought to reduce adherence to procedures, and instead focused
on outputs in the form of working products and models. Furthermore, greater
emphasis was placed on the ways in which analysts and others needed to gain
familiarity with the setting, drawing on the insights and experiences of those
involved. Against a background of technical advances that permitted short,
intensive cycles of development, IS development became a more responsive or
Agile practice3 that sought input from all manner of potential sources of infor-
mation, and then sought validation through presentation of any findings or
outputs to the principal stakeholders involved. From this idea, it was no great
step toward an iterative approach to development and a view of IS develop-
ment as a process of continuous growth, dialogue, and negotiation rather than
306
one-off large-scale construction. (The long and ever-growing list of IT systems

failures, particularly in the public sector, attests to the fact that perhaps these
lessons have not been fully heeded.)
While questioning the world, analysts position themselves in the area
under study in order to investigate the current systems, understand the prob-
lem domain, and identify opportunities for further development. The early
stages of requirements analysis are akin to GTM comparative analysis. Each
involves conceptual abstraction, which should lead analysts/researchers to
identify appropriate concepts in order to answer questions related the prob-
lems or issues, and potential ways in which improvement or enhancements
could be achieved. Conceptual abstraction will require use of analytical and
creative aspects of intelligence, and analysts/researchers will need to develop
their skills so that they employ their knowledge and experience, together with
that of other actors, iterating through cycles of data-gathering, analysis, and
abstraction. By doing this constantly and systematically, analysts/researchers
are able to establish an understanding that goes beyond both their own initial
knowledge and that of the participating actors. The good analyst, like the good
grounded theorist, will engage and participate in order to arrive at fresh con-
ceptual insights.
According to Glaser (1978) innovative conceptual outcomes could be in
the form of an idea or a new theory about the substantive area of knowledge in
terms of the main concern within the real world that needs to be solved: “The
analyst is constantly going beyond his data to new problems and ideas.”
The method itself “constantly opens up the mind of the analyst to a myriad
of the new possibilities for research, for ideas, for other substantive areas of
endeavour, for formal theories, for projects and for variations in method.”
Information systems development should lead to new insights and pos-
sibly an enhanced system or series of flows and processes, addressing some
if not all of Peter Checkland’s “5 Es”—efficacy, efficiency, effectiveness, ele-
gance, ethics. In contrast, GTM should lead to concepts and theories that
have “fit,” “grab,” “work,” and are “modifiable” (Glaser, 1978). A tabular com-
parison of the “5 Es” against Glaser’s criteria reinforces these resonances
(Table 15.1).
The initial method formulated by Glaser and Strauss developed in distinc-
tive ways in the hands of each of its progenitors. Somewhat later, Strauss and
Corbin’s approach was a response to continuous demands from students and
novice researchers for a manual for GTM, something that Glaser saw as far
too prescriptive, again presaging the criticisms of ISDMs, by this time often
couched in formal manuals comprising several thick volumes, by those keen
to advocate a more flexible and agile approach to IS development.
The correspondence between GTM and ISDMs can be summarized as
shown in Table 15.2. The next section outlines the ways in which the core aim
of abstraction, common to both, is actually enacted. For GTM it is embodied
307
TABLE 15.1
Checkland’s “5 Es” and grounded theory (GTM) criteria
Efficacy—does it work at all? Fit—is it relevant and appropriate to the context?
Work—does it have explanatory power?
Efficiency—use of resources Work—does it help the actors involved achieve their aims and
objectives with less effort?
Effectiveness—does it contribute Relevance—is the outcome “relevant to the action of the
to and have resonance with the area?” (Glaser 1978)
wider context?
Ethics—is it morally sound? Not specifically addressed by GTM, although Charmaz’s work
on GTM and Social Justice (2011) takes up this issue as a
new avenue of GTM-oriented research, and student Stella
Walsh refers to this in her PhD thesis
Elegance—does it have allure? Grab—are participants interested in the outcome? Do they
see its significance?
Is the explanation parsimonious?
Is it usable and useful?
TABLE 15.2
GTM versus information systems development methods (ISDMs)
Development of GTM Evolution of IS Development
Glaser & Strauss’s original statements in Discovery, Early ideas about Software Development
Time, and Awareness were aimed at novice Life Cycle centered on frameworks for
researchers, although not necessarily easily managing and controlling ISD projects.
accessible to them. Early models, and their associated ISDMs,
They did, however, offer a strategy for qualitative responded to the need for widening
research, incorporating rigor and robustness— the focus beyond the programming
responding to criticisms that qualitative research and testing phases; also offering ways
was vague and impressionistic. in which projects could be rigorously
controlled.
They share a concern not to impose solutions without first ensuring that the participants are
actively involved and incorporated within the initial investigations.
Strauss and Corbin responded to demands by IS Development Methods became
novice researchers for clear guidelines; Glaser’s “standards” and highly prescriptive.
criticisms saw this effort as mechanistic and Novice analysts learned the methods
undermining essential GTM characteristics. but did not necessarily become better
Glaser’s statement of “classic” GTM itself used analysts.
potentially prescriptive aspects such as his Critics pointed to these cumbersome
coding families. methods as the problem, not the
These later were given a reduced role, while solution: “paralysis by analysis.”
“Memos” took on more importance. Newer methods were developed that were
more flexible and agile
There was a general problem of guidelines and heuristics being understood to be strict rules
and norms. Later elucidations offered as further insights and support exacerbated this by
adding further details that were treated formally as templates and strictures.
Constructivist approach; a re-affirmation of GTM Agile development is articulated, with a
concepts, but taking account of key ontological stress on collaboration among team
and epistemological issues. members, as well as between team and
Stress on positionality of researcher(s) and role of customers in order to comprehend the
participants in developing an understanding of the systems context.
situation by means of construction of meaning.
The resolution to this was to stress the participative nature of such projects; now seen as
constructed and negotiated.
308
in developing concepts and theories, in IS development it centers on modeling

objects and processes. Here again there are clear similarities between the two,
and drawing attention to this provides mutual benefit.
GTM AND OBJECT ORIENTATION
Yair Neuman (2003) makes the following point about “objects”:-

The world as it appears to us is a world of objects, whether concrete or
abstract. This is the reified universe. It is a question whether our world
is really populated by objects, or whether those objects are static forms
imposed on reality through our mind.
The idea of object modeling of computer-based systems has been around since
the 1960s, but it became more widespread, incorporating analysis and design,
in the 1980s and beyond. Many of its proponents claimed that object model-
ing—or Object Orientation [OO]—was more natural than other contending
approaches, and that ISDMs centered on OO provided a “seamless” route from
analysis to implementation, with the promise of re-use for the future. We now
know that although the move to OO led to many improvements, a good deal of
its early promise remains unfulfilled and is perhaps chimerical. This is to say,
OO was “oversold” (Bryant & Evans, 1994).
Object modeling is a form of classification and categorization; so too are
other forms of modeling. Those who oversold OO failed to recognize that
object modeling is a process reliant both on the object domain and those doing
the modeling. What appear to be “natural” and “obvious” domain objects to
one person may seem contrived and inadequate to another. In any case the
objective in modeling is relevance and application rather than precision or
accuracy: George Box’s adage “All models are wrong; some models are useful”
(Box, 1979). This is equivalent to the GTM precepts that the outcome should
“work” and “fit.”
This was understood by Strauss in one of his earlier books where he
explained the nature of objects in terms that are broadly similar to those found
in OO texts. But note the final proviso, which Strauss himself under-played or
overlooked in his later GTM writings:
… any particular object can be named and thus located in countless ways.
The naming sets in within a context of quite differently related classes.
The nature or essence of an object does not reside mysteriously within the
object itself but is dependent upon how it is defined by the namer …
(1959, p. 20; emphasis added)
Strauss went further, noting that there is an intimate link between classifica-
tion and action.
309
The direction of activity depends upon the particular ways that objects are
classified (p. 21) … . it is the definition of what the object is that allows
action to occur with reference to what it is taken to be (p. 22 –stress added)
So not only are there strong resemblances between IS development and GTM
in terms of their processes and activities, these extend to their respective prod-
ucts and presentation. Both IS development models and GTM theories and
concepts can be judged against similar criteria, but they must be assessed in
terms of whether or not they are coherent and persuasive. Each must pass
muster in terms of whether its outputs are useful in the sense of acting as tools
or facilitating action within a certain domain of activity.
This resemblance extends further to more detailed aspects of the two
approaches, shedding light on each as a result. Figure 15.1 illustrates an over-
view of this comparison, incorporating the procedures and the products. In
OO there is a movement from initial categorization to the formality of an
object or class model. In GTM the movement goes from initial categorization
to determination of core categories and concepts that form the basis of a sub-
stantive grounded theory.
Object modeling using differentiating Theory development process using comparative analysis
process
Identifying properties and

Identifying categories from
behavior of an ‘object’ through
initial coding
encapsulation process
Candidate Categories and

Open
Objects Concepts
coding
Iteration Iteration
Categorization/classification Categorization/classification
by differentiating objects and by comparing concepts and
their relationships their relationships
Object classes,
relationships Saturated concepts
and core categories
Selective
coding
Building the Object
model Defining a Theory
Object or Class
Substantive Theory
Model
FIGURE 15.1
Comparison of the Object Orientation (OO) process and the grounded theory
method (GTM) in Theory Development.
310
Both OO and GTM involve categorizing and discrimination. These are

activities that are not restricted to object modelers and GTM researchers;
everyone engages in these sorts of actions all the time. So in a sense it is a
natural activity, but this is not the same thing as saying that the objects or cat-
egories that arise are themselves natural. On the contrary, as Neuman explains,
objects themselves only exist as a result of our conceptualizing and naming
them in the course of our activities interacting with world:
When we attend to an object in our environment this object does not a

priori exist as such. It comes into being primarily through the intimacy we
establish with it, and only then are we able to “objectify” it by conceptu-
alising it and by giving it a name. Therefore, in our daily experience, and
at the most basic level of being-in-the-world, we are primarily involved
in activities. We interact with the world and with primordial singularities
in the world, through our interactions with the world; we constitute the
mind and the world.
For both ISD and GTM it is important to understand that this conceptualizing
is undertaken by all the various stakeholders involved. The role of the analyst/
researcher is to allow different perspectives to be aired for discussion, so that
they can be brought to some level of consolidation and over-arching abstrac-
tion, although it may not be possible or even desirable that all are treated
equally. The analyst/researcher is a participant, but he or she also has to take
on a more specialized role, centering on theoretical sensitivity, and so moving
beyond the data to develop models or concepts and theories that have more
substance and can be applied within the actual domain (see below).
GTM specifies a category of “in vivo” codes, those that are derived from
“widely used terms that participants assume everyone shares” (Charmaz,
2006, p. 55). It is important that this type of code is elicited, but it is also cru-
cial that such codes are treated as problematic and in need of scrutiny and
analysis. Some may survive and become core components of categories and
concepts; others will be subsumed or will disappear entirely. In ISD the terms
and phrases used by stake-holders must be treated in a similarly circumspect
fashion.
At the detailed level of both approaches, there are also close resemblances.
For instance the OO notation can be applied to the derivation of concepts and
categories in GTM, as Figure 15.2 exemplifies. The concept “Status Passage”
can be seen as a higher level abstraction of concepts such as “Studenthood,”
“Dying,” and “Engagement for Marriage.” This implies that there are a num-
ber of common aspects for the latter three concepts, which are all forms of
Status Passage, but each of them has its own unique characteristics that are
not shared by all the other forms. The dotted line on the right-hand side of the
diagram indicates that there may well be other forms of Status Passage that
can be added to this list; again, such additional ones would share the common
311
STATUS PASSAGE
S P E C I A L I Z A T I O N
G E N E R A L I Z A T I O N
ENGAGEMENT FOR
STUDENTHOOD DYING
MARRIAGE
FIGURE 15.2 Status Passage hierarchy.
features encapsulated by “Status Passage” itself, as well as having their own.

The arrows also apply to GTM; the one labeled “Specialization” indicates the
move from a formal GT to a substantive one—that is, the SGTs “Dying” and
“Studenthood” are specialized forms of “Status Passage.” Conversely the arrow
labeled “Generalization” indicates that Status Passage is pitched at a more gen-
eral and wide-ranging level.
Glaser and Strauss suggested that the process of generating categories
and their properties leads to a basis for stating hypotheses, “generally gener-
ated from the relations among categories and their properties” (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967):
Hypotheses –the comparison of differences and similarities among
groups not only generates categories, but also rather speedily generates
generalised relations among them. It must be emphasised that these
hypotheses have at first the status of suggested, not tested, relations among
categories and their properties, though they are verified as much as pos-
sible in the course of research. (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 39)
From this researchers should be aware that there may be common interactions
among the categories in terms of their properties, and one way of thinking
about this is in terms of generalization. In the OO approach generalization
occurs when categories are found to share common characteristics or proper-
ties. So if two classes or categories are found to share properties, a higher level
category can then be developed which covers the common features, although
some aspects will only be associated with one of the lower level categories.
Glaser and Strauss developed the category “dying” in their early works
as part of a substantive grounded theory (SGT), and they later described the
formal grounded theory of status passage; although even in 1965 Glaser’s arti-
cle on dying referred to the concept of status passage. So there is no reason
312
DEPENDING ON
S P E C I A L I Z A T I O N
G E N E R A L I Z A T I O N SUBSIDIES
Receiving Finding impossible Thinking religious

Government to operate without institutes need
Support subsidies more subsidies
FIGURE 15.3 PhD student Premila Gamage’s consolidation of early codes.
why researchers would not be able to articulate the more general category that
would guide them in their investigations leading to the more context-specific
form or forms. Moreover even within research aimed at developing a substan-
tive grounded theory, a model using these different levels can prove useful in
guiding researchers in their conceptualizing. For instance when my PhD stu-
dent Premila Gamage refined her initial codes, the tabular form—Table 9.2—
could also have been represented diagrammatically in a fashion similar to that
for Status Passage—see Figure 15.3, and here the dotted line refers to the other
items not included in the diagram.
If generalization is a way of expressing a form of equivalence across cat-
egories, the OO concept of composition refers to one category being composed
of a group of two or more component subcategories. For instance, returning
to an earlier example, a car comprises a chassis, engine, brake system, and
so on. Each component part will have its own properties and characteristics.
The higher level category will also have properties and characteristics, some
of which may be clearly derived from one or more components—for example,
engine capacity—but others of which may only be applicable to the top level
category itself—for example, registration number, owner, insurance group.
This composition of categories and subcategories is shown in Figure 15.4 using
the codes, categories, and the concept from Ibraheem Jodeh’s research exem-
plified in Figure 11.4. Here the top category is composed of four lower-level
concepts, each of which is composed of a number of codes. (Because of lack of
space, only one group of codes has been included in the diagram.)
In the example given in Chapter 14, the category Methodologizing is com-
posed of the sub-categories Positioning, Tailoring, and Warranting. In that
instance there is no sharing of properties between the concepts; the category of
Methodologizing is composed of the other three, and it also exhibits properties
313
Supportive Factors
Official Human Infrastructure General

support resources support support
support
Getting rid of Accepting Recruiting

managers resistant to e-applications highly
change from staff qualified staff
FIGURE 15.4 PhD student Ibraheem Jodeh’s model.
of its own. This concept of composition raises the question of the extent to
which any of the components exists independently of the higher level category.
In the case of the car, the component parts exist in their own right, regardless
of their status as components of a car; the wheels existed before being used in
assembling the car, and they may continue to exist after the car itself has been
dismantled. In other examples this may not be the case, or there may be some
dispute regarding the component parts—for example, a hen’s egg consists of
a shell, yolk, and white, but they all come into existence at the same time.
Nevertheless, each part can take on a separate existence at a later stage. In
Figure 15.4 the mid-level concepts are seen as composed of lower level codes,
the latter only existing as part of the mid-level concepts once these mid-level
concepts have been constructed—that is, the codes themselves have no inde-
pendent existence. This in indicated by the rhombus being drawn with a filled
center. In contrast, I have interpreted Jodeh’s mid-level concepts as having an
independent conceptual existence apart from the higher-level category—so
the rhombus above them is only drawn in outline. The diagram is dependent
on the topic and the researchers’ informed inferences.
Grounded theories are comprised of categories that are abstractions rather
than physical objects, so these issues arise in a different manner. Yet the range
of possibilities can help guide researchers to a consideration of the extent to
which their categories and subcategories might have relevance or resonance
beyond the source from which they were derived. For Methodologizing, in
314
other circumstances the three subcategories or lower-level concepts may well

have relevance in their own right, but here they serve to offer explanatory
power as components of the higher level category.
A researcher using GTM may find that this sort of diagram, and some
of the accompanying OO concepts, can be useful guides as they derive and
name/identify candidate categories and concepts. Thus OO facets such as com-
position and generalization can alert GTM researchers to look for similarities
and resemblances between aspects that at first sight seem to have little in com-
mon, or to investigate the domain for underlying patterns that can be linked
with external features. It is common for GTM researchers to find themselves
overwhelmed by interview transcripts and lists of several hundred potential
categories, so a simple and clear modellng technique offers the potential to
provide invaluable assistance.
This is not to argue that these forms of representation can stand alone;
they summarize and present a great deal of complex information and so can
be used in conjunction with other forms of representation as a basis for dis-
cussions with stakeholders. (Udo Kelle in The Handbook of Grounded Theory
refers to a similar idea, although not in any great detail—Kelle, p. 195.)
Both OO and GTM offer ways of adding and ensuring rigor and relevance
to the processes of modeling and theorizing, building on implicit schemas that
actors use in their everyday activities and interactions, yet moving beyond
them to provide enhanced understanding of the domain. The resulting object
models, or grounded theories, must, however, have substantive links to the
domains from which they have been drawn, and in which they are grounded.
That is the foremost objective.
Key Points
¤ Parallels between systems analysis and GTM-oriented research

¤ Triarchic model of intelligence—analytic, creative, practical; resonance
with discussion in Discovery that also refers to use of personal and
others’ experience.
¤ GTM position regarding open-mindedness during research, and

particularly at the outset, matched by idea of systems analysts being
open to the idea of “problem structuring” at the outset as opposed to
imposing a solution to a clearly defined problem.
¤ Checkland’s 5Es and desirable aspects of a GT—grab, fit, usability, and
usefulness
¤ Systems analyst and perhaps GTM researcher as “agent of change”
¤ OO modeling applied to GTM—composition and generalization
315
Exercise
1. Find examples of grounded theories and see if you can apply the ideas
outlined in this chapter to the theories themselves—for example, look
at the examples referred to in Chapter 14.
Notes
1. Much of what follows in this chapter is based on an unpublished paper by Bryant

and Semiawan, which itself was based on Dr. Semiawan’s PhD thesis. The degree was
awarded in 2008.
2. Alvin Gouldner, writing in the 1970s, makes a similar point–see Chapter 18.
3. GTM and the Agile approach were discussed in Chapter 2.
316
317
16
It’s All in the Big Data

DATA, BIG DATA, AND THE GROUNDED THEORY METHOD
“Torture the data, and it will confess to anything.”

–Ronald Coase, Economics, Nobel Prize Laureate
In 2008, Chris Anderson, at that time the Editor-in-Chief of Wired, proposed

that in the age of the petabyte, there was no longer any need for the scien-
tific method, or for models or theories (Anderson, 2008)1. With all the data at
hand, such devices for comprehending were no longer relevant or necessary.
Although it might be contended that this was more provocation and journal-
istic hubris than formal or substantiated claim, the technologies underlying
this claim have gathered momentum ever since in the form of “The Age of Big
Data,” so that Anderson’s term petabyte (1015 bytes or 1 million gigabytes) has
now been eclipsed by exabytes, zettabytes, and yottabytes (respectively, 1018,
1021, 1024 bytes).
The origins of the phrase “The Age of Big Data” are unclear, but the term
has been used since the 1990s. Contrary to Anderson, however, the ability to
develop abstractions and concepts is as important as it ever was; perhaps even
more so. These skills and techniques need to be widely understood and read-
ily available in an era when we are all analysts and researchers, at least to the
extent of our use of the Internet with its potential for searching and investigat-
ing online resources.
One way of doing this is to offer critical insights into these activities—
modeling, conceptualizing, and theorizing—by comparing and contrasting
Knowledge Discovery from Data (KDD)2 with GTM. The former is a technical
orientation, that although it predates Big Data, lies at the heart of emerging
tools and techniques. The latter a widely used approach to qualitative research
aimed at developing conceptual models “grounded in the data.”
The influence of Anderson’s article should not be underestimated. His ear-
lier paper “The Long Tail” (2004) proved highly influential; the term has now
entered the standard lexicon of many disciplines—chiefly, marketing, micro-
finance, business modeling, innovation, and social networking. Consequently
his later article was widely read and evoked both critical responses and some 317
318
measure of acceptance, continuing to be widely referred to in current papers

on Big Data. Unfortunately it exemplifies a common misunderstanding of
concepts such as “model,” “theory,” and “scientific method.”
Anderson approvingly quotes George Box’s dictum that “all models are
wrong, but some models are useful.” This is usually invoked to underline the
idea that our knowledge of the world is based on approximations and inter-
pretations, and has been referred to in precisely this manner in earlier chapters
(Chapters 2, 7, and 15). It is more appropriate to judge models and theories
in terms of their usefulness, rather than their overall accuracy. Anderson,
however, refers to Box as support for the project to jettison these imperfect
constructs as a whole. With the advent of Google—the generic phenomenon
as well as the company itself—models are on their way to becoming obso-
lete: Once we have all the data there will be no more need for models, because
they are at best incomplete. Anderson seems to assume that once all the data
is collected it will be a fairly straightforward step to move seamlessly to “cor-
rect” and presumably useful and usable, conclusions that have been arrived
at via a range of computer-based and computational applications targeted
on the data: emergence on a truly massive scale. This rather glosses over the
manner and extent to which a complete set of data renders models or other
forms of explanation obsolete: Anderson assumes this is the case, but there is
the contrary argument that with a plethora of data there is actually a greater
demand for some form of model or abstraction. Having lots of data may lead
to The Funes Problem, which I introduced in Chapter 8, at the level of mil-
lions of gigabytes! So there is a need for ways to avoid being overwhelmed by
the details, but it needs to be understood that, intrinsically, explanation and
understanding necessitate the use of forms of abstraction—that is, models
developed by people in order to provide a focus on some aspects of the data
at the expense of others. Only in this way can any findings from the data be
incorporated into our actions and strategies—that is, be of actual use.
It is therefore important to take issue with Anderson, while recognizing
that his argument offers important insight into the possibilities opened up by
“The Age of Big Data.” Therefore, I counter his overall conclusions by stressing
that effective use of such resources still requires the extensive cognitive skills
and sensitivities of researchers and analysts. There are new opportunities for
research and conceptualization with Big Data, but there are also new pitfalls
and perils.
Anderson identifies the scientific method with what has been termed
“naive Baconian inductivism”—that is, the idea that stacking up vast amounts
of data, observations, or the like will lead to increasingly better (more com-
plete, more certain, even definitive) knowledge. The weakness of this approach
has been described in Chapters 2 and 13, but it was also exemplified with
the advent of technologies such as management information systems (MIS)
in the 1960s and 1970s, which, it was claimed, would make management
319
It’s All in the Big Data 319
decision making ever more effective, as more information was made available
to the decision makers. Already in the 1960s Russell Ackoff (1967) charac-
terized and criticized this misconception in his classic paper “Management
Misinformation Systems,” pointing out that no manager would ever refuse
offers of additional data or information, but that the result of this was all too
often a decline in effective performance rather than an improvement.
The Promise of Big Data
Anderson is justified in directing attention to how best to appreciate and

exploit the potential of these resources, and also to grasp that the develop-
ments associated with the concept of Big Data have qualitative rather than just
quantitative ramifications. Consequently it is necessary to re-evaluate existing
forms of analysis, and to encourage the development of novel and innovative
tools and techniques for dealing with Big Data. But this is far from providing
the basis for the jettisoning of tried-and-tested forms of reasoning and analy-
sis. In concluding his article Anderson states,
… the opportunity is great: The new availability of huge amounts of data,
along with the statistical tools to crunch these numbers, offers a whole
new way of understanding the world. Correlation supersedes causation,
and science can advance even without coherent models, unified theories,
or really any mechanistic explanation at all. There’s no reason to cling to
our old ways. It’s time to ask: What can science learn from Google?
The respondents in the online “Reality Club” at Edge, in their discussion of
Anderson’s article (Dyson et al., 2008), saw this as a provocation, including
a mistaken view of the scientific method, but justifiably making the case for
new forms of coping with and understanding the potentialities of massive
collections of digitized data. Several of the respondents made the point that
Anderson’s arguments might have application to marketing and advertising,
but that moving from this to scientific theorizing was hardly warranted. One
of the members of the group, Bruce Sterling, summed it up as follows:
Yet I do have to wonder why— after Google promptly demolished
advertising—Chris Anderson wants Google to pick on scientific theory.
Advertising is nothing like scientific theory. Advertising has always been
complete witch-doctor hokum. After blowing down the house of straw,
Google might want to work its way up to the bricks (that’s a metaphor).
(Dyson et al., 2008)
Anderson himself does not seem to have engaged with his critics, but he
largely reiterated his views in the keynote address he gave to the marketing
320
organization conference, DMA 2012. But the blogger reporting on the presen-
tation noted that Anderson contrasted
true data-driven, test obsessed companies with visionaries and innova-
tors. He compared Amazon who, as king of the digital A/B test, drives its
strategy and marketing almost wholly by data, to Apple at the other end of
the spectrum. Anderson’s view is that neither approach is right or wrong –
without data, accurate decisions could never be made, whereas without
innovation, new concepts would never be born. A dichotomy which is, or
should be, close to every modern marketer’s heart (Cummins, 2012)
This is a more nuanced view of Big Data, seeing innovations and insights com-
ing from a variety of sources. In the interim the claims for and understanding of
Big Data have developed, so that now to operate in this field one needs not just
technical skills and expertise centered on analytic tools developed for specialist
applications such as astronomy (SKYCAT), fraud detection (HNC Falcon and
Nestor PRISM), and financial transactions (various), but the ability to present
the outputs visually and also to understand the questions to pose in the first
place. Yet this is not accepted by everyone so there is a continuing argument
between those who point to a growing and largely unresolved demand for “data
scientists,” and others who assert that “[E]‌nterprises won’t need data scientists
as their applications will process and analyse the data for them. Yes, someone
will still need to know which questions to ask of the data, but the hard-core sci-
ence of it should be rendered simpler by applications” (Asay, 2013).
Critical Issues for Big Data
As the claims for Big Data have been presented, they have been challenged from
various quarters. The accuracy and completeness of Big Data sets have been
brought into question, with people pointing out that a significant proportion
of the data is often missing or incomplete, and the data that is present is often
erroneous or ambiguous. In addition, the stages of preparation and analysis are
far from neutral and non-controversial. Despite this, the insights and models
that can be derived from Big Data have certainly been used effectively in the
realms of advertising and marketing, justifying Anderson’s point that “Google
conquered the advertising world with nothing more than applied mathemat-
ics. It didn’t pretend to know anything about the culture and conventions of
advertising—it just assumed that better data, with better analytical tools, would
win the day. And Google was right” (Anderson, 2008). But to move from this
to more grandiose claims about the end of science as we know it is far-fetched.
Big Data has started to provide invaluable material for astronomers, epi-
demiologists, forensic scientists, and medical specialists such as oncologists;
321
but in all these cases it has done so in conjunction with the specialist knowl-
edge and expertise of the practitioners themselves. In other words this con-
junction of data, computer-based analytic tools, and the skills and insights of
specially trained and experienced people has resulted, in some cases, in the
development of new and improved theories and insights, enhanced levels of
understanding, and more effective policies and interventions. In any massive
set of data, however, it will always be possible to detect “patterns” through use
of computational tools or from people looking at the data in some way, but it
is now understood that in many instances these patterns may be spurious. The
term apophenia, originally coined with regard to various forms of neuroses,
is now applied—in a nonclinical manner—to this phenomenon of Big Data,
referring to the detection of patterns where none exists.
Big Data is no basis for jettisoning expertise, nor is it justification for
claiming that “more is better.” Anderson may have achieved renown on the
basis of his paper on “The Long Tail,” but the person regarded as “The Father
of the Long Tail” is Benoit Mandelbrot, and his work and career offer useful
counterpoints to claims like Anderson’s, among other proponents of Big Data.
Mandelbrot is famous for his work on fractals and roughness,3 which provides
the basis for many of the uses of massive data sets. Mandelbrot has recounted
the episode when, in 1961, he was on his way to give a seminar at Harvard
I stepped into the office of my host, a Harvard economist. On his black-
board, I noticed a diagram nearly identical to one I was about to draw. His
diagram referred to a topic of which I knew nothing: records of the price
of cotton. My host had given up his attempt to model this phenomenon,
and he challenged me to take over. (Mandelbrot, 1967)
This led Mandelbrot to write his now classic paper “The Variation of Certain
Speculative Prices” (1967), which offered completely new ways of analyz-
ing data—leading to concepts such as “long tails” or “fat tails,” fractals, and
roughness. In an interview for Edge (Obrist, 2008) Mandelbrot wondered how
things might have turned out differently had someone cleaned the blackboard
before he entered the room. He refers to Pasteur’s maxim to the effect that
chance favors the prepared mind, but adds that “I also think that my long
string of lucky breaks can be credited to my mode of paying attention: I look at
funny things and never hesitate to ask questions” (emphasis added). This out-
look gives encouragement to the sorts of abductive leaps that involve “pattern
recognition,” but it also emphasizes that such insights require a basis in prior
experience or expertise.
In drawing the contrast between Amazon and Apple, Anderson seems
to recognize the necessity not only for brute-force data analysis but also for
human insight (Cummins, 2012). Mandelbrot’s cognitive leap exemplifies this
idea, incorporating aspects such as serendipity and abduction. The Age of Big
322
Data still requires researchers and analysts to engage in processes of mod-

eling and theory generation, continually offering further bases for establish-
ing rigor and relevance in their theoretical and conceptual development. In
effect, these data sets are another, and increasingly important, resource for
developing our insights, rather than something that effectively displaces exist-
ing approaches: There is something of a renewed necessity in encouraging the
skills and tools that might lead to these conceptual developments and out-
comes. If GTM in the 1960s was a call to stay grounded in the data, in the
current era this needs to resonate in the call to stay grounded in the Big Data.
Looking at the challenges and opportunities afforded by digitization
involves an understanding of the technical activities involved in KDD, focus-
ing on both the promise and the limitations of these techniques for generating
theoretical insights. This can be done by drawing attention to the resonances
and complementarities between KDD and GTM, throwing new light on age-
old questions around the issue of the sources and nature of knowledge, and the
status of knowledge claims.
The Nature of Data
Both KDD and GTM have close links with data. For KDD, data is regarded as
something to be mined and explored in searching for associations. For GTM,
data is seen as the bedrock for developing theories, a process that must be
“grounded in the data.” The metaphorical imagery is similar, and in both cases
it is troublesome and misleading. But the critical point is that both approaches
adhere to the principle of close investigation and analysis of data as a core
activity in theoretical development.
The language in which many of the claims about KDD are expressed
echoes those of GTM, with the same ambiguous or misleading ramifications.
In KDD one of the key techniques is “Knowledge Discovery through Data
Mining,” described as the process of using Data Mining (DM) methods to
“extract knowledge” from massive data archives. In this regard DM is a com-
ponent of the KDD process, providing the means and techniques “to extract
and enumerate patterns from the data according to the specifications of mea-
sures and thresholds, using databases together along with pre-processing, sub-
sampling and transformations of the data” (Fayyad et al, 1996).
Although many standard texts portray the relationship between data and
information as that between raw material and processed product, this “chemi-
cal engineering metaphor,” linked to the mining metaphor, has long been
subject to criticism emanating from a semiotic or semantic perspective that
refuses to endorse these views of the distinction between data and information
expressed in many standard texts. (See Bryant, 2006 for an extended critique.
Although it is disappointing to note that despite the longstanding and seri-
ous nature of these forms of criticism, many scholarly papers and core texts
323
remain stubbornly resistant even to acknowledging the contested nature of

these claims.) In her paper for the First Monday issue centering on Big Data,
Annette Markham offers a refreshing critique of the term, invoking the work
of Geoff Bowker who argued that the term “raw data” is an oxymoron, and
Clifford Geertz who is quoted to the effect that “what we call our data are really
our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their
compatriots are up to” (2013, quoted section 4, emphasis added). The division
and contrast between the “objectivists” and the “constructivists” run through
the domain of Big Data in much the same way as they affect GTM.
The metaphorical resonances of the term “data mining” may now in
the digital age have allure, given the ways in which vast stores of data can
be searched and analyzed using current technologies. Mining may well be a
reasonable metaphor and label for these processes, although it must be under-
stood that only a limited range of such activity centers on data-processing
performed by silicon-based entities (computers), and these must be initiated,
guided, utilized, and kept in control by meaning-oriented actions of carbon-
based (human) entities. It may, therefore, be valid to argue that the existence
of massive data sets affords additional enhancements and opportunities for
analysis and investigation. Furthermore, to some extent standard statistical
models that try to take account of sampling are not always relevant when one
has the entire population at hand. Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the
enduring relevance of modeling, interpretation, and investigative methods in
general, all involving conscious activities and choices. As Klaus Bruhn Jensen
puts it: “[T]‌he question is who codifies what –and whom –with what conse-
quences” (2013 section 2, emphasis added).
Investigation and research have always employed a wide variety of
resources, including documents, observations, and various forms of field stud-
ies and participative activities, now in addition we have access to the expanding
panoply of digital resources, including media such as email, blogs, and social
media such as Facebook and Twitter. The process of researching, however, can-
not just be a matter of amassing data until something almost magically emerges
from it. The aim of investigation and research is not merely to report upon
or transcribe reality, but to derive patterns and offer critical and innovative
insights, including explanations aimed at responding to “why?” and “how?”
type questions. This has not changed with the advent of the data age, but the
glut of data certainly appears to offer new opportunities for research. A serious
consideration of the nature of these new prospects sheds light on general issues
and features of the development of theoretical and conceptual insights.
An Example of Big Data Analytics, and Its Wider

Ramifications: Culturomics 2.0
In 2011 First Monday published a paper by Kalev Leetaru (2011) offering a

contribution to what he terms the “emerging field of Culturomics,”4 which
324
“seeks to explore broad cultural trends through the computerized analysis

of vast digital book archives, offering novel insights into the functioning of
human society.” Leetaru sees his work as heralding Culturomics 2.0, since he
has taken this work a stage further, adding “higher-level knowledge about
each word, specifically focusing on news-tone and geographic location.” In
September 2011, the BBC reported on his work using the highly misleading
headline “Supercomputer predicts revolution”:
A study, based on millions of articles, charted deteriorating national senti-
ment ahead of the recent revolutions in Libya and Egypt. While the analy-
sis was carried out retrospectively, scientists say the same processes could
be used to anticipate upcoming conflict. The system also picked up early
clues about Osama Bin Laden’s location. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-14841018
Leetaru cannot be held responsible for the headline, nor for the report itself,
and the body of the news report does offer a far more nuanced account of the
work, something that a close reading of Leetaru’s article confirms. Nevertheless,
it is evident from Leetaru’s own account that he is making claims for the pre-
dictive capabilities of his approach, although the analysis carried out was
entirely retrospective. More important for our present purposes, his overall
strategy provides the basis for a discussion of the ways in which the analyses
of and findings from Big Data need to be evaluated, critiqued, and challenged
rather than received and accepted purely and simply as the result of applying
noncontroversial computational analysis to a massive set of data—in this case
amounting to several million news articles, several billion words.
Leetaru’s study builds on previous work in Culturomics, combining this
with studies that investigated the “tone” of news reports. His work is premised
on the assertion that news reports “contain far more than just factual details: an
array of cultural and contextual influences strongly impact how events are
framed for an outlet’s audience, offering a window into national conscious-
ness.” He characterizes his data domain in noting that “accurately measuring
the local press in nearly every country of the world requires a data source that
continuously monitors domestic print, Internet, and broadcast media world-
wide in their vernacular languages and delivers it as a uniform daily translated
compilation.” Consequently the study uses the summary of world broadcast
(SWB) collection, plus various other sources such as New York Times (NYT)
digital archive. This data is sampled by context (social media) and location
(Egypt)—the latter being chosen as “having the highest penetration of social
media of any Middle Eastern or North African country.” Leetaru goes on to
offer an extended discussion of the advantages and weaknesses of the vari-
ous data sources. The sources were subjected to “two key text mining tech-
niques: sentiment mining … and full-text geocoding.” These were used first
on the SWB archive, then on the NYT source in order to provide two samples
325
for comparison. The outcomes were transformed into graphical figures, with
supporting explanations in terms of changing level of tone with regard to
precise terms.
Leetaru’s method can be characterized in terms of KDD, a term that
came into prominence in the 1990s, evolving from the earlier process of Data
Mining, and that is now associated with concepts such as Business Intelligence
and Data Analytics. As the issue of Big Data has developed, KDD has evolved
in terms of associated tools and techniques, but essentially it addresses the way
in which massive data sources can be used as the basis from which to derive
patterns and models, often with a commercial interest guiding the agenda. The
key features can be summarized as follows:
¤ Developing an understanding of the application domain
¤ Creating target data sets
¤ Data cleaning or pre-processing
¤ Data reduction and projection
¤ Data mining
¤ Interpretation of results
DEVELOPING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE APPLICATION DOMAIN
Leetaru can be seen to have oriented his work around an interest in Culturomics
wedded to a view that interrogation of large text archives provides a basis for
“insights to the functioning of society, including predicting future economic
events.” This is derived from his understanding of previous work—for exam-
ple, his references to Bollen, Mao, & Zeng (2011), Gerbner & Marvanyi (1977),
Michel et al (2011), and Mishne & Glance (2006). His knowledge of the work
of those writers provides the basis for his use of similar data sources and data
mining techniques, guided by a strategy focusing on tone and geographical
analysis as possible constructs.
CREATING TARGET DATA SETS
The target data sets Leetaru relies on are the SWB collection and the NYT
archive; he offers a fairly extended account of the rationale for choosing these,
with analysis of the latter source being used as a check on the results emanat-
ing from the analysis of the former. He also used a “web crawl of English-
language Web-based news sites” in order to ascertain the coverage of SWB
with regard to non-Web sources.
DATA CLEANING OR PREPROCESSING
In KDD projects, data cleaning is a step that involves operations such as

removal of outliers, deciding on strategies for missing values, and identifying
326
the sample population. Leetaru offers some account of this last aspect, and his
web crawl and later analyses using “two well-known tonal dictionaries” can be
seen as a strategy for coping with outliers and missing values.
DATA REDUCTION AND PROJECTION
This next step involves processes like data transformation and reduction of
dimensionality, which may involve identification and creation of new variables
based on text mining. Leetaru’s research side-steps these aspects because it is
driven by the initial strategy focused on “tone” and “location.” As reported in
the paper cited and in his subsequent publications, the results seem to have
dovetailed neatly with his initial suppositions around “tone” and “location”;
had they not, perhaps some forms of data reduction and projection might have
been required.
DATA MINING
This step involves using various KDD techniques to search for patterns in the
data and thus afford a basis for the creation of models. Such techniques include
supervised methods (e.g., Regression, Neural Networks) or unsupervised
methods (e.g., clustering). The choice of technique depends on the nature of
the research question and the data set. Leetaru used “sentiment mining” and
“full-text geocoding”; in his paper he offers an outline of the algorithmic basis
of each technique.
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Leetaru’s paper is replete with graphical representations of his findings,

together with extensive discussion and explanations of the results. He also
extends his work by taking his initial results and applying the model to other
geographic locations and time periods. Regardless of the actual techniques
used in the previous steps, the process of interpretation is critical, both with
regard to the ways in which Leetaru himself explains his findings and the ways
in which others interpret and evaluate his work. It has to be noted that he
has continued to claim that his approach has predictive value, something that
has been taken up and reported across the media and many other sources—
something to which his Web site attests.5
By briefly characterizing Leetaru’s work vis à vis the steps of KDD, some
of the hidden suppositions underlying many Big Data findings can be brought
to light. In order to expand upon this further, KDD can be compared and
contrasted with GTM. Both methods or approaches center on investigation
of “data,” with the aim of producing useful conceptual outcomes: KDD is an
approach designed for generating models from extensive digital data sources;
327
GTM is a tried and tested research method that advocates an iterative pro-
cess of data-gathering and analysis in order to develop conceptual analyses.
Thus GTM offers clarification with regard to the analysis of Big Data, both in
terms of undertaking the analysis itself and in providing the basis for a critical
understanding what such “findings” involve.
In fact, both KDD and GTM can be seen as instantiations of hermeneutics—
the GTM approach of iteration between data-gathering and analysis is akin to
the hermeneutic circle in which our understanding of certain detailed aspects
is dependent on our understanding of the whole, which is itself dependent on
understanding the details.6 The aim of both GTM and KDD is best thought of
not as a circle but rather as a spiral, moving from an origin focused on the data
toward ever-higher levels of abstraction and conceptual reach (see Figure 4.2).
Unfortunately much of the hype and writing about Big Data fails to acknowl-
edge this; instead, usually presenting the findings as definitive.
A better understanding of the skills and procedures required for more
effective and insightful use of Big Data can be developed if the stages summa-
rized above are redefined in the light of the key features of GTM. These pro-
vide the basis for offering an alternative approach for data-driven investigation
and analysis; whether aimed at Big Data or more limited resources, they can be
summarized under the following headings:-
¤ An initial interest in a problem domain
¤ An open but purposive sampling strategy in the earliest stages
¤ Simultaneous and iterative data collection and analysis
¤ Construction of various higher level abstractions—codes and
categories in the parlance of GTM—derived from examination
of the data, and not from previously derived theories of logical
categories
¤ Repeated sampling and analysis in order to perform constant and
repeated comparisons of the data in order to develop theoretical
concepts and abstractions
¤ Selection of one or more concepts for further development
¤ Application of the selected concepts for use in a more deliberate
manner against the context and appropriate data—theoretical
sampling
¤ Articulation of theoretical statements and constructs offering a
substantive account of aspects of the initial context
GETTING STARTED—DEVELOPING AN UNDERSTANDING

OF THE DATA DOMAIN
The various contributors to the October 2013 issue of First Monday made
the point that although the term “data” initially referred to what was given or
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present-at-hand, this is highly misleading as data is usually gathered or “har-

vested” (Helles 2013) with an aim in mind. With regard to Big Data, it is cru-
cial to ensure that there is clarity and comprehension of the agenda underlying
the implementation of analytic tools and strategies to existing data sets that
appear to have “grow’d like Topsy.”
Glaser and Strauss, in promulgating GTM, sought to provide a justifica-
tion for researchers keen to investigate a topic, however vague, without hav-
ing to provide a detailed account from the very beginning. Similarly, KDD
requires that in the early stages investigators seek an understanding of the
problem domain, engaging in exploratory research aimed at articulating a
research problem in such a way that useful variables can be identified from
the data set to formulate models. Although it can be contended that this is
“data fishing,” it should also be understood that having too constrained an idea
about hypotheses, research questions, or agendas early on in the knowledge
discovery process may be inappropriate. To extend the mining metaphor, it is
perfectly possible to prospect a domain or data set with no clear idea of what
might be mined, or at least remaining open to the possibility of finding unex-
pected results. Ultimately a clearer idea of what is involved in the data domain
will be required, but this need not be obvious at the outset. It may be one of
the early outcomes of the research exercise itself, just as it is in GTM when
researchers move to theoretical sampling.
The exploratory phase of “open coding” in GTM should lead to identifica-
tion of issues in the sense that researcher(s) begin to identify patterns across
incidents; in much the same way KDD practitioners should aim to identify
useful variables from the data set that might provide the basis to formulate
models. In both cases this is an activity to promote early forms of abstraction
in the hope that they can guide further investigation of the research domain in
a more focused manner. In contrast to examples such as Leetaru’s research—
where he interrogated his data with “tone” and “location” in mind—GTM
advocates wide-ranging queries of the data in the first instance: for example,
“What is happening here,?” “What is this data a study of?” and so on. The
researcher has to be prepared to be surprised by the results of such queries.
Both KDD and GTM start from a grounded-ness in the data, the former
oriented to a passive data set, and the latter usually associated with a setting
populated and constituted by social actors. But for each, the basic issue is how
can investigators make sense of large amounts of rich data without using pre-
conceived strategies or concepts for classification and decomposition. This is
not to say that such forms of preconception are misguided, but rather to stress
that there are other useful and proven strategies worthy of consideration.
For KDD, using these insights from an understanding of GTM, when con-
fronted by Big Data—either as an investigator or as someone responding to
someone else’s findings—one should seek clarification regarding the nature of
the data and the ways in which it has been used in the articulation of aspects of
329
interest—i.e., variables, patterns, codes or other abstractions. Although it may

be countered that the GTM strategy may not be readily adapted to the massive
data sets that now confront researchers, it is important to keep in mind that
there are always several ways of interrogating a data set, whether by asking dif-
ferent questions or by using a different algorithm.
DEVELOPING A FOCUS
Once an initial level of abstraction has been accomplished, GTM researchers

take a more targeted approach to data-gathering. This is based on developing
abstractions or concepts as a result of having accomplished the initial coding
or categorization of the data—that is, the researcher(s) should now have an
idea of what is going on in the environment under investigation, and what the
data can be understood to indicate. This more focused engagement with the
data resonates with KDD, where once the research problem has been identi-
fied or characterized a target data set needs to be created or derived from an
existing one. This will involve selecting variables of interest, roughly equiva-
lent to codes in GTM, usually in the form of keywords or phrases that need to
be elicited from the data set. But this needs to be done in a controlled manner
to avoid a proliferation of variables that may result in misleading or ambigu-
ous results. Conversely, too few variables can result in incomplete or incoher-
ent models. The key point is that this stage necessitates conscious choices by
the investigators to limit the scope and focus of the investigation.
Both GTM and KDD call for an informed and clearly stated set of selection
criteria with a cogent rationale for choosing to focus on one or more aspects
within the target domain while explicitly excluding others. This newly derived
basis serves as a guide for further investigation in terms of identified variables,
patterns, or concepts. In this sense the subsequent stages of the analysis can
be said in part to be “driven by the data,” but this should not obscure the cru-
cial role played by the active and, I hope, insightful role of the investigators
themselves. Many of the key activities will be driven by the investigators as
they move to re-evaluate the data at hand. For KDD, this stage is termed data
refinement and involves the identification and bracketing or disregard of outli-
ers, deciding on strategies for missing values, and further characterization of
the sample population, procedures designed to produce a more focused basis
for analysis, based on detailed and iterative investigation of the data at hand.
There is divergence here between GTM and KDD: for GTM, the issue of
missing values does not arise, because the process of developing abstractions
must be grounded in the data that has been used, not data that is “missing.”
In GTM there is a distinction between outliers and negative cases. Negative
cases may provide a rationale for enhancing one’s concepts to cover varying
aspects that can take account of the instances under consideration; a nega-
tive case may be taken account of by adding a new dimension to the analysis.
330
Some investigators would argue, however, that the robustness of one’s find-
ings depends in part on the extent to which negative cases or contrary find-
ings were sought—along the lines of Karl Popper’s advocacy of a strategy of
Conjecture and Refutation. Outliers on the other hand, or what Nassim Taleb
(2010) has termed “Black Swans,” may require a major shift in focus that in
essence leads to a different if related investigatory project.
In generic terms, both KDD and GTM stress the necessity for moving on
from the initial “findings”; refining and narrowing the focus, on the basis of an
iterative process of sampling and analysis. This may necessitate reducing the
dimensionality of the data, as well as creation of new variables—“text mining”
in KDD parlance, “coding” in various ways in GTM. The aim for both is to
move from low level and manifold codes or variables toward a smaller number
of more abstract ones with greater conceptual power and reach.
In effect these diverse strategies center on a search for patterns or other
forms of regularity or grouping. In this regard, KDD employs a range of tools
and techniques—terms explained in Chapter 2—under the general heading of
“data mining.” The choice of technique depends on the nature of the research
question and the data set. The activity of “searching” for patterns, and the “cre-
ation” of models both involve engagement with the data—resonating with the
grounded-ness of GTM. What has to be understood is that these are processes
that involve interpretation and interrogation of the data by people and not
application of algorithms and other automated processes.
The reason for dwelling on these aspects as they are incorporated into
both investigative approaches is to provide a basis for assessment and evalu-
ation of the plethora of Big Data “findings” that are already becoming a cen-
tral feature of our “familiar knowledge” or “conventional wisdom,” emanating
from Internet sources and searches, news reports, policy initiatives, and other
aspects of our time. It will be increasingly important that these findings and
pronouncements are approached and evaluated with an understanding of their
dependence on the skills, decisions, and choices of researchers and analysts in
selecting appropriate application of techniques and methods. Since findings of
Big Data analyses are themselves forms of data, anyone seeking to understand
or incorporate such accounts needs to be aware of the necessary skills involved
in interrogating the data at hand, and the various ways in which we inevitably
tend to categorize and stress certain features as we seek relevant and useful
conceptual insights. We are inevitably and actively involved in an engagement
with the data—a process of dialogue and engagement, rather than one of col-
lection, discovery, and largely passive reception.
Leetaru’s work, which is a noteworthy exemplar of Big Data type research,
from the outset focused on the issues of tone and location. In so doing he was
careful to evaluate possible data sources and explain the ways in which he car-
ried out “sentiment mining.” But this leaves open the possibility that he found
what he was looking for. Perhaps a more open-ended search would have led in
331
different directions or resulted in a more ambiguous set of findings? Instead of

targeting the entire data set from SWB he might have taken a small subset and
carried out a less constrained form of analysis before proceeding to the full-
blown data mining itself. Moreover, although he was careful to describe the
processes of sentiment mining and geocoding that were used, the algorithms
incorporated in the tools are themselves opaque.
What his paper illustrates is that research using Big Data should be seen
as affording the potential for developing new insights, a process that requires
a methodical approach combining computational analyses of these resources
with expertise of researchers and practitioners. These key issues and priori-
ties need to be stressed as part of conceptual and theoretical development,
recognizing that researchers may enter the process at different points and with
different (tacit) perspectives. They may also enhance or develop the process by
returning to more “classic” research modes, or to other alternatives. In the case
of Leetaru’s work, it can be seen that what was erroneously reported as a case
of computer technology directly offering predictions is in fact a far more com-
plex process derived initially from human ingenuity and suppositions, then
implementing computational power and massive data sets now available to
researchers. The outcomes are reliant on these new resources, but only in the
sense that the processing power of advanced technologies is necessary but not
sufficient to get from the data to the final outcomes.
EXAMPLES OF BIG DATA FINDINGS
Although the term “The Age of Big Data” has been much hyped, this is not to
deny that there have been numerous accounts of the effective use of the out-
comes of these new forms of analysis. The existence of extensive data archives,
and the development and refinement of KDD tools and techniques, affords
researchers new opportunities for analyses and theoretical insights derived
from massive data sets. Some of these approaches have already yielded signifi-
cant outcomes, mainly with regard to practices such as marketing and adver-
tising. The competitive edge, however, that might be obtained may be only
temporary. For instance the use of data analysis in the recruitment of baseball
players, as recorded in Moneyball—the book (Lewis, 2004) and the film—
was of maximum effectiveness only while one team knew of its capabilities.
Another notable example is President Barack Obama’s re-election campaign
(Issenberg, 2012), something that will surely be mimicked by all candidates
with the necessary resources in the future.
In fact, the Obama campaign did not only “crunch” the data;, it relied on
initial human insights and intuitive leaps to get things going.
In late spring, the backroom number crunchers who powered Barack
Obama’s campaign to victory noticed that George Clooney had an almost
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gravitational tug on West Coast females ages 40 to 49. The women were far
and away the single demographic group most likely to hand over cash, for
a chance to dine in Hollywood with Clooney—and Obama.
So as they did with all the other data collected, stored, and analyzed in the
two-year drive for re-election, Obama’s top campaign aides decided to put this
insight to use (Scherer, 2012).
In 2012 the Executive Office of the President listed more than 50 Federal
programs “that address the challenges of, and tap the opportunities afforded
by, the Big Data revolution.” The document itself offers brief accounts of these
projects, mostly couched in terms of how these forms of analysis “could enable”
certain activities in the future.
What all these issues demonstrate is that extending data analytics into
more and more realms of our daily existence is a highly complex, and social,
phenomenon. It does not reduce the need for insight and careful, robust
research; on the contrary, it adds to the issues that need addressing, and some
of these are encompassed by the term theoretical sensitivity, which lies at the
heart of GTM. At the same time, these developments raise a number of issues
such as ownership and control of the data, access to the data, knowledge of the
algorithms or analytic tools in use, and the impact of widespread dissemina-
tion of the findings.
THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY
Although there are differences in the approaches and justifications emanating

from various sources describing GTM, all are agreed that initial engagement
with the data, followed by initial analysis and subsequent iteration between
sampling and analysis are at the very heart of the method. KDD researchers
are presented with a large sample of data that can be examined with a view to
identification of patterns and development of initial ideas about useful con-
cepts. One of the skills needed in KDD is the ability to discard some aspects
of the data and to focus on others that might provide a basis for concept
development and theoretical innovation. In GTM this skill is a key aspect of
theoretical sensitivity. Glaser’s characterization of the term, as being “sensi-
tive to theoretical issues while scrutinizing the data” (Glaser, 1978), hints at
what is involved. But Jo Reichertz (2007) made the point even more force-
fully in discussing the necessity for understanding theoretical sensitivity as
a form of abduction, as the result is to bring together the logic of discovery
with the logic of justification for methodological consideration. By so doing,
it highlights a key issue that should be central for all researchers, but it applies
especially to those undertaking qualitative research: Some aspects of research
really do depend on the skills of the individual researcher; methods alone are
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necessary but not sufficient. Researching is not just the case of collecting data
or evidence, the researcher is a key factor in the research landscape, a link in
the chain that reaches iteratively around data, codes, concepts, knowledge-
discovery, data mining, and tentative theories. It is important to put the stress
on the human activity of theorizing as opposed to theories per se; and it is also
crucial who is doing the theorizing.
Furthermore there is a major paradox at the heart of discussions about Big
Data. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in 2008 Chris Anderson
talked of “The Age of the Petabyte,” and we have now moved, in just a few
years, to several orders of magnitude beyond this. This rapid growth implies
that for the foreseeable future the volume of data being produced will continue
to grow in a similar fashion. If this is the case, then, by definition, we can never
have a complete set of data. On the contrary the search for complete data is
the digital task of a Sisyphus; we are forever doomed to gather “complete” data
sets, only to see yet more data arriving every millisecond. The necessity for
insight, modeling, and theorizing is as important as ever, and our theories are
always contingent. The demand for grounded theorists is as least as important
as the one for data scientists.
Notes
1. This chapter is based in part on sections of the paper titled In the Realm of Big Data,
which I wrote with Uzma Raja (Bryant & Raja, 2014).
2. KDD (knowledge discovery in databases) includes data mining, machine learning,
and decision support systems, all of which can be used to analyze very large data sets.
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benoit_Mandelbrot
4. There seems to some confusion regarding this term, which is sometimes pre-
sented as Culturnomics—see http://nationalsecurityzone.org/war2-0/kalev-leetaru-on-
culturnomics/ for a recent interview with Leetaru. Readers might wonder if both terms
would be picked up by a text-mining algorithm!
5. His Web page reports on many of these aspects http://www.kalevleetaru.com/.
6. For example, if you have ever read a detective novel or seen a detective film, once
you know “whodunnit” you cannot read the book or see the film in the same way again. If
you have seen the film “The Usual Suspects” you will understand this—if you have not, then
you have a treat in store when you do.
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17
The Grounded Theory Method and Pragmatism

INSTRUMENTAL THEORIZING
You read the pragmatists and all you know is: not Descartes,
not Kant, not Plato. It’s like aspirin. You can’t use aspirin to give
yourself power, you take it to get rid of headaches. In that way,
pragmatism is a philosophical therapy. It helps you stop asking the
unhelpful questions.
—Richard Rorty
What is Pragmatism?
In his final book Anselm Strauss noted that although his research projects were
not “guided by any explicitly formulated theory of action… . [I]‌t is now clear
that a list of assumptions about action and interaction obviously derived from
Pragmatism have run like a red thread through my research” (Strauss, 1993).
I have used the term Pragmatism with reference to the American philosophi-
cal movement of the 1870s in many of the preceding chapters, drawing atten-
tion to key features that are important in a discussion of GTM. But I now offer
a more extended account.
Originally established as a philosophical position by Charles Sanders
Peirce, it was taken up by William James and John Dewey, and in its origins it
is an entirely North American [USA] phenomenon. It fell into disregard fol-
lowing the death of Dewey in 1952, but it has undergone a significant revival,
notably through the work of Richard Rorty (1931–2007). It is now a thriv-
ing orientation—with subdivisions and distinctive variations—in the hands
of philosophers like Robert Brandom (2011). James is credited with the first
mention of the term Pragmatism, although he claimed that C. S. Peirce had
come up with its central ideas 20 years earlier. Peirce later came to distance
himself from James and Dewey, for a time using the term Pragmaticism for his
philosophical position.
But it was in the work of John Dewey that the Pragmatist position took its
clearest formulation. Dewey taught both at the University of Chicago and at
335
336
Columbia University, New York, in the Department of Philosophy; these are

the universities where, respectively, Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser worked
prior to their move to the University of California San Francisco (UCSF),
where they began their collaboration, and together with Jeanne Quint, devel-
oped GTM. Dewey’s influence at Columbia did not last much beyond his
death and it is unlikely that Glaser or any other social scientists at the time
would have come across his work.1 But his influence in Chicago was signifi-
cant as his ideas were highly influential in the work of G. H. Mead and those
who followed him, such as Herbert Blumer, Robert Park, and Everett Hughes:
Although thought of as sociologists, like Mead they considered themselves
equally to be philosophers.
The Chicago School of Sociology can be seen as comprising two overlap-
ping phases. The first includes the work of the immediate successors to Mead,
and includes Park, Blumer, and Hughes. One of its most notable outputs is
the report on The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, by W. I. Thomas
and Florian Znaniecki, as was mentioned in Chapter 3. Blumer, although
linked to this group, also contributed a detailed critique of their work, point-
ing to its methodological weaknesses. W. I. Thomas, together with his wife
D. S. Thomas, was also responsible for what is now referred to as the Thomas
dictum: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”
(Which applies equally to women!) The group continued to have influence,
operating post-1945 with new members, including Howard Becker, Herbert
Gans, and Blanche Greer, as well as Anselm Strauss. In fact, Strauss worked
with them on the study Boys in White, of which he is one of the authors.
There were several common themes across these groups. They rejected
the dualism of individual and society, drawing on the Pragmatist position that
action and interaction are interwoven, so that it is only through social inter-
action that individuals develop; setting one against the other made no sense.
James had argued that there is no need to postulate an “inner being,” since we
are each an effect of our interactions past and present. The Chicagoans exem-
plified this in their work; Charles Horton Cooley used the term “the looking-
glass self,” and Strauss wrote about “Mirrors and Masks.” The culmination of
this way of thinking can be found in Blumer’s statement of the principles of
Symbolic Interaction [SI], which took up Mead’s idea that meaning was a con-
stitutive part of society.
The three premises of SI were that (1) “human beings act towards things
on the basis of the meanings that they have for them,” which included physical
objects, activities and encounters with other human beings, institutions, other
collectivities, concepts, and ideals; (2) “the meaning of such things is derived
from, or arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows”;
(3) “these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative
process used by the person dealing with [these] encounters” (Blumer, Symbolic
Interactionism,1969, p. 2).
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The Grounded Theory Method and Pragmatism 337
Celine-Marie Pascale argues that the main difference between the first and
the second groups was that whereas the earlier group used case studies and
functional explanations of norms and rules, accompanied by “positivist data
collection” (Pascale, 2010), the succeeding group eschewed generalization in
favor of internal validity and production of theory characterized by sympa-
thetic introspection, participant observation, and interviews. Strauss can be
seen as having drawn ideas from both groups—he was younger than Blumer
and Park but older than Becker—but clearly taking a lead from the second
group and using this in his collaborative work with Glaser and beyond.
Both groups of the Chicago School took up and developed the highly
distinctive Pragmatist position regarding knowledge, action, and interac-
tion. These all emanate from the Pragmatist view of “truth”: the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) summarizes James’s view of truth as fol-
lows, using his own words:
The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of
belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. (1907: 42)
“The true”, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our
thinking, just as “the right” is only the expedient in the way of our behaving.
Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the
whole, of course. (1907: 106)
Other formulations fill this out by giving a central role to experience:
Ideas … become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfac-
tory relations with other parts of our experience. (1907: 34)
Any idea upon which we can ride … ; any idea that will carry us
prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, link-
ing things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so
much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. (1907: 34)
Dewey developed James’s argument as part of his opposition to what he
termed “the spectator theory of knowledge,” which characterizes knowledge
as the outcome of a largely passive process of observation of an accessible and
unproblematic reality; a world-in-itself awaiting discovery. In its place, Dewey
proposed “the experimental theory of knowledge,” where all knowledge is
seen as provisional and is judged in terms of how useful it is for the knowing
subjects. Rorty took up both of these aspects in his book Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature (1980), where he directed his criticisms at the correspon-
dence theory of truth—that is, the idea that truth claims could be judged in
terms of how closely they corresponded to reality itself.
For Pragmatists, knowledge exists in the form of statements or theories
that are best seen as instruments or tools; Dewey actually coined the term
instrumentalism for his approach, perhaps echoing James’s statement given
above.2 Tools are to be judged in terms of usefulness, and that judgment will
be context-specific, although a tool that is useful in one situation may also be
338
useful in others. There are no once-and-for-all-time truths, just as there are no

universally useful tools. Consequently we must always allow that all and any of
our current ideas and “truths” may be surpassed in the future; in Pragmatists
terms they are fallible. Rorty sums this up with the argument that, on the one
hand, any of our ideas must be open to doubt (including this one); but on
the other hand they cannot be doubted all at once. He invokes Otto Neurath’s
image of our conceptual tool-set as a raft on which we are perpetually afloat.
Over time the planks will rot and need to be replaced, but replacing all of them
at the same time is neither feasible nor advisable.
The metaphor of floating can be extended to the argument that there are
no fixed points from which to observe reality, and so appeals to “raw experi-
ence,” “objective facts,” and the like are ill-conceived. This also implies that one
needs to take account of the position and orientation of the person or persons
making the observations and statements about the world. Rorty takes this still
further in stating that there is no extra-linguistic form of representation. If we
want to describe and discuss reality we have to use language—taken to involve
speaking, non-verbal forms of communication, writing, and making pictures.
I would sum this up as squeaking, fidgeting, and scribbling—that is, speaking/
vocalizing, gesturing/body language, and writing/drawing.
One consequence of this is that, for Rorty, knowledge is not a hierarchi-
cal structure, with science or philosophical insight at the top and other forms,
such as common-sense, or practical wisdom, in inferior positions. Rather,
knowledge should be seen as a web or network of statements rather than as an
edifice. The value of any form of knowledge will be in its usefulness and appli-
cability, which may be constrained in terms of time and place and user. Rorty
approvingly quotes. Nietzsche’s dictum that what passes for truth—or more
poignantly The Truth—is in fact “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms” (quoted by Rorty, 1991, p. 3).
Another key aspect of Pragmatism, and an exceedingly useful one, is what
might be termed the so what? principle, or the difference principle—that is, for
any argument, particularly one about metaphysics or foundations or similar,
one must ask “what practical difference would it make if either I or my oppo-
nent was correct/incorrect?” If the answer is none, then forget it!3
There are two key corollaries of the Pragmatist position, shared by many
Pragmatists of different hues, not simply Dewey and Rorty. The first is the
rejection of any quest for certainty, a position with political and ethical rami-
fications. In far too many cases certainty leads to despotism, fanaticism, or
intolerance; it also blocks progress. Voltaire famously observed that while
“doubt is uncomfortable, certainty is ridiculous.”4 The Pragmatists argue that
certainty is more than ridiculous, it can lead to “cocksure dogmatism” and
worse. Fallibilism is a reasonable alternative, but this should not be confused
with skepticism, such as the Cartesian variety, which proceeds by disbelieving
339
anything that appears doubtful with the eventual aim of arriving at a basis of
certainty.
If the first corollary springs from the Pragmatist rejection of Cartesian
Rationalism, the second corollary relates to a rejection of Lockean Empiricism,
which is premised on a model (metaphor) of the mind as an empty vessel,
which is filled by the senses that a person experiences. Locke used the term
tabula rasa, a blank slate, coupled with the dictum that “Nihil est in intellectu
quod non prius fuerit in sensu” (Nothing is in the understanding that was not
earlier in the senses).5 For Pragmatists the mind is neither self-contained and
distinct from physical matter, which is one of the key precepts of Cartesianism,
nor is it an empty vessel embodied in a passive observer. The aphorism from
Plutarch that Kathy Charmaz and I used at the start of The Handbook of
Grounded Theory was a deliberate choice: “The mind is not a vessel to be filled,
but a fire to be ignited.” For Pragmatists, action and emancipation lie at the
basis of developing knowledge. The quotation that follows, although lengthy,
neatly summarizes some of the key features of Pragmatism.
According to such Cartesianism, the mind is a self-contained sphere whose
contents—“ideas” or “impressions”—are irredeemably subjective and pri-
vate, and utterly sundered from the public and objective world they pur-
port to represent. Once we accept this picture of the mind as a world unto
itself, we must confront a host of knotty problems—about solipsism, skep-
ticism, realism, and idealism—with which empiricists have long strug-
gled. Pragmatists have expressed their opposition to this Cartesian picture
in many ways: Peirce’s view that beliefs are rules for action; James’s teleo-
logical understanding of the mind; Dewey’s Darwinian-inflected rumina-
tions on experience; [Karl] Popper’s mockery of the “bucket theory of the
mind”; [Ludwig] Wittgenstein’s private language argument; Rorty’s refusal
to view the mind as Nature’s mirror; and [Donald] Davidson’s critique
of “the myth of the subjective.” In these and other cases, the intention
is emancipatory: Pragmatists see themselves as freeing philosophy from
optional assumptions which have generated insoluble and unreal prob-
lems. (McDermid, 2006, n.p http://www.iep.utm.edu/pragmati/.)
There is now a wide variety of Pragmatist positions, but overall there is a
clear line starting with Dewey and James, later passing through what Strauss
refers to as “Chicago Pragmatism,” and moving on to essential features of
GTM. In an interview in 1994 Strauss noted the influence of many individual
figures in his intellectual formation, including Park, Hughes, and Blumer,
all of whom were, as we have seen, associated with the Chicago School.
This reinforces the sentiment in the introduction to Qualitative Analysis for
Social Scientists (Strauss, 1987) in which he referred to the “general thrust of
American Pragmatism” (p. 5), chiefly authored by Dewey, but also by Peirce
and Mead.
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The importance of Pragmatism for GTM has been pointed out by some
of its adherents, notably those in the German-speaking world such as Hans
Joas (1987), Jo Reichertz (2007), Udo Kelle (2007) and Jörg Strübing (2007).
In some instances their interest was ignited by Strauss himself or by one of
his students or colleagues. Strauss had been introduced to the work of Dewey
and James while he was an undergraduate at the University of Virginia in the
1930s. Later, as he developed his interests in both psychology and sociology,
Strauss used these ideas in his own work on action, structure, and process.
Dewey and Peirce are mentioned in Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists,
and the first two editions of Basics of Qualitative Research open with a quota-
tion from Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934). In Strauss’s final book, Continual
Permutations of Action, he made extensive reference to Pragmatism in the
introduction, where he charts his own intellectual development, oriented
around the work of Dewey understood through the teaching of Mead and later
developments of the Chicago School.
The paradox with Strauss is the paucity of his use of Pragmatism in his
writings on GTM. There are a few passing references, but these are never
developed as explanatory devices for the grounded theory method as a whole.
This is unfortunate given the ways in which a consideration of GTM in the
light of Pragmatism can clarify and resolve some key issues.
To begin with, the contrast between the “objectivist” and the “constructiv-
ist” forms of the method can be seen as emanating from two contrasting meta-
phors. In the former, the world it is seen as composed of objects—physical and
conceptualhaving some form of independent existence—which are amenable
to observation and (gradually enhanced) understanding. In the latter, our view
of the world is viewed as constructed in the course of our various activities;
both at the mundane and routine level, and also as part of more specialized
activities, such as research and various professional practices.
Clearly, my view resides firmly with the constructivist position, but by
itself this can lead to a paradoxical position. Once one moves away from
a position whereby knowledge claims are seen to be founded on some
form of true and accurate representations of reality—orientations such
as positivism, post-positivism, realism, representationalism, and founda-
tionalism all apply here—there is a tendency to move toward an uneasy
relativism and a form of epistemological special pleading. This can eas-
ily lead to the ultimate caricature of post-modernism, whereby any and
every claim to knowledge is upheld as equally valid; based on the tenet
that all forms of knowledge claim are relevant or contextually appropri-
ate or legitimate. Yet this is itself a knowledge claim with pretensions to
universal validity; that is, all forms of knowledge are constructed: So out-
and-out constructivism is a contradiction in terms. A Pragmatist position,
however, is immune from this paradox since, by definition, a Pragmatist
acknowledges that Pragmatism is itself fallible and contingent; at the same
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time it is enormously useful as the basis for effective action. Rorty’s idea of
the ironist position captures this succinctly.
I use “ironist” to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency
of his or her own most central beliefs and desires –someone sufficiently
historicist and nominalist6 to have abandoned the idea that those central
beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and
chance. (Rorty, 1989, p. xv; emphasis added)
A reinterpretation of the roots of GTM, linking it far more clearly to
Pragmatism, can help to clarify the essences of the method and to show why
some aspects are best regarded as accidents. Shining this light on GTM can
also assist those teaching and guiding research students, as well as providing
useful justifications to those using GTM to quell many criticisms aimed at the
method.
For instance students repeatedly request clear and concise criteria for
developing and evaluating their concepts and codes, and if terms such as “fit,”
“grab,” and “usefulness” are presented to them without much further explana-
tion, these can seem to be inexact terms and folksy idioms that have no place
alongside more conventional criteria. Those assessing and evaluating such
research proposals can find themselves similarly discomforted, leading to a
view of GTM as a weak and deficient method. Anyone surveying the meth-
odological scene will treat such critical terminological ambiguities as indica-
tive of severe conceptual weakness in the method as a whole. How does one
explain to a skeptical examiner or assessor what is meant by grab or fit, or a
concept earning its way?
Yet if we move away from “the metaphysics of the real,” and instead adopt
the Pragmatist view that theories and concepts are best considered in terms
of their usefulness rather than their truthfulness, a whole host of features of
GTM appear in a far clearer light. These issues are summarized in Table 17.1
which should be referred to in conjunction with what follows, and readers
might also wish to turn to Table 4.4 and read or reread the account of the
terms ‘fit’, ‘grab’, ‘work’, and ‘modifiability’ in the light of this characterization
of Pragmatism
The Pragmatist position7 referred to above is that there are no fixed points
from which reality can be observed; there can be no appeals to raw experi-
ence. This undermines the GTM precept of not engaging with the literature if
the main justification for such an admonition is that by avoiding this engage-
ment, the reader-researcher will be in a neutral or unbiased position: there
are no such positions. This is not to say that valuable insights and innovative
conceptualizations can only come about following an engagement with the
literature; on the contrary, there is still value in the GTM precept of initiating
one’s research with flexibility and openness that may preclude a formally stated
hypothesis or even a more casual research question.8
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As I noted earlier, Rorty approvingly quotes Nietzsche’s dictum that The

Truth is “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms.”
That quotation continues to the effect that the metaphors become worn out,
like well-used coins where the image has been effaced through constant
exchange. This is readily apparent in GTM writings, where the term emer-
gence is used. One of Glaser and Strauss’s primary texts exploring GTM, The
Discovery of Grounded Theory, is replete with use of the term; concepts emerge
from the data, theories emerge from the concepts, and so on. In some of his
later writings, Strauss reduced his use of the term, although it still appears in
both Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists and Basics of Qualitative Research.
The issue is not that the term is metaphorical itself, but that continued and
unquestioning use of this metaphor can obscure the issues of where codes, cat-
egories, concepts, and theories come from, as well as the processes involved in
their derivation and articulation. Indeed the metaphor inevitably lends weight
to the spectator view of knowledge that Dewey sought to undermine.
Basics of Qualitative Research relies less on emergence than some of the
earlier works do, but Strauss, writing with Julie Corbin still opts consistently
for the passive voice in describing the method—that is, the data is collected …
is used. The outcome is that little or no consideration is given to the active role
of the researcher—and the spectator view of knowledge and the idea of emer-
gence are thus reinforced.9 Strauss’s use of the term “slices of data,” originating
in 1987, prompts the obvious questions of “Who did the slicing?” and “Could
it have been done differently?” But Strauss never raised these issues and con-
tinued to use the phrase without further examination.
The metaphor of emergence needs to be jettisoned, or at least brought into
focus and re-examined. Like all research methods and philosophies of knowl-
edge, GTM has to take account of the active and guiding role of the researcher
or observer. This is nothing new, nor is it unique to qualitative social research.
It cannot be avoided by using the passive voice or imputing agency to the data
or the concepts—for example, the concept emerged. A Pragmatist develop-
ment of this issue stresses the active, non-spectator view of the researcher, but
it also places equal emphasis on the grounded-ness and contingency of any
knowledge or concepts that are developed. From the Pragmatist viewpoint,
concepts are tools, and the value of a tool is not its universal validity but its
usefulness. So while the metaphorical baggage associated with emergence
must be discarded, the stress on grounded-ness must be retained.
The problems that people have with the term theory can be readily
resolved through an understanding of how it has been used by Glaser, Strauss,
and others in discussing GTM: Theories, like concepts, have to earn their way;
otherwise they are speculative or simply idle banter. This understanding reso-
nates with Dewey’s view of knowledge as instrumental, so that theories are
best seen as tools. Some tools are linked closely to a task; others are more
generally adaptable.
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Theory for GTM holds a central role and is a primary objective. But it is
important that researchers understand that grounded theories are not meant
to be speculative, nor are they meant to be seen as universal explanations. On
the contrary, researchers should aim to develop their own theories, based on
central concepts that can be justified by the ways in which they can be shown to
have been derived from the iterations between engagement with the research
setting and conceptual analysis. Claims for extension or application to other
circumstances may come at later stages, but even if these cannot be borne out,
the initial theory should still retain its grab and fit.
The importance of GTM for practice-led disciplines has always been
seen as a key strength of the method. The early GTM research was car-
ried out in medical institutions, in part because Strauss had by that time
(early 1960s) moved to the School of Nursing at the University of California
San Francisco (UCSF), where he founded the Department of Social and
Behavioral Sciences. But another reason that GTM was taken up so widely
and enthusiastically by practitioners in a wide variety of medically oriented
practices was the influence of Jeanne Quint, who was, first and foremost a
nursing practitioner, and a highly innovative one. The initial GTM studies
of Glaser and Strauss were framed against the background of caring for the
terminally ill, and there is clear continuity in the later work at UCSF with its
orientation toward practice-led research in the general area of medical and
social care.
From the perspective of Pragmatism, the issue of the relationship between
theory and practice is one of how useful the former is with regard to the lat-
ter; theories are judged in terms of their utility, as examples of “enacted truth.”
If a new theory has no impact on existing practices, then we are in the realm
of Dewey’s difference principle, which states that any dispute between pro-
ponents of the old theory and the new one is not of any practical concern,
although it may be that these differences do prove to be important at a later
time. New theoretical insights, whether in the form of grand theories, con-
ceptual models, or some such, need to be judged in terms of the differences
they make to people’s practical understanding and actions. Strauss’s continu-
ing interest in theories of action and interaction in social settings provided
evidence of this need.
In Chapter 3 I surmised that in the early GTM writings Strauss down-
played any Pragmatist aspects in order not to detract from the innovative and
challenging methodological features of the method; also perhaps because
Pragmatism was not a position that he and Glaser shared or had discussed.
Strauss hinted at some of these Pragmatist aspects of study in footnotes and
asides in his later GTM work, but overall his silence on the subject is perplex-
ing. In some of his later writings he distanced himself from sole reliance on
induction, including from the rather vague form mentioned in Discovery. In
1987 he referred to Peirce and the idea of abduction, but only in passing in a
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footnote (1987, p. 12). Charmaz relates that as early as 1969 Strauss described
GTM as “an abductive method” (2014, pp. 200–203).
In his last book, Continual Permutations of Action, Strauss explained that
it was only at the behest of some of his colleagues that he was finally persuaded
to write specifically about the theory of action that was central if implicit in his
entire body of work. He was stirred by Corbin’s review of his intellectual biog-
raphy (see Maines, 1991), which was “so persuasive about the place of action/
interaction” in his work. Strauss’s discussion in the introduction to Continual
Permutations of Action traces the development of his ideas from Dewey and
Pragmatism and its “direct connection” with “Chicago interactionist sociol-
ogy.” He starts with Dewey’s “scheme about ongoing continuous acting” (p. 2,
emphasis in the original), pointing out that
Acting is ongoing, as is the experiencing that is integral to it; action is
mainly routine; interrupted routine action … precipitates mental pro-
cesses that involve a review of imagined options … and leads to the reor-
ganization and continuance of action. (p. 3)
Mead and the Chicago theorists took this role of action further, although in
some respects these ideas were so deeply imbued that many “Chicago inter-
actionists … tread … some of [these] paths but with little or no awareness of
their Pragmatist assumptions” (p. 4, emphasis added). Perhaps Strauss wrote
this with himself in mind?
Whatever the case may be with regard to Strauss’s relationship with
Pragmatism and the lack of its incorporation into his GTM writings, consid-
eration of the Pragmatist roots of GTM can resolve and clarify many of the
key issues that have arisen from various critiques and developments of GTM.
This builds on work that others have already begun, clarifying the relationship
between GTM and Pragmatism, providing the basis for restating and high-
lighting ways in which the method can be further articulated and applied.
By adopting a Pragmatist perspective on GTM, investigators can begin to
resolve a number of problematic aspects of the method. Moreover they can
bring the core strengths of the method into clearer focus. First and foremost
many of the issues separating the different writers on GTM can be cast aside.
Thus whether researchers see themselves following Glaser, Strauss and Corbin,
Charmaz and Bryant, or any other authors of GTM variants, the key issue
becomes the extent to which their substantive research produces conceptual
innovations and theoretical insights that prove useful. The epistemological
issues that separate different strands, or branches, of the GTM family, can be set
to one side provided that people’s research writings do not seek to make strong
epistemological claims. The overarching criterion of good research should be
that it makes a difference. This requirement can also be applied to methods,
and GTM can be assessed in terms of the concepts and theories that have been
developed through use of the method, whichever version has been adopted.
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Furthermore, the Pragmatist position on truth also highlights the stress

put on the development of concepts and theories by GTM. These outcomes are
to be judged against the circumstances from which they were developed, and
they can be taken as working hypotheses or theories for potential extensibility
to other settings. They can also be taken back to the initial setting and used
to inform practices, procedures, and policies. The strong tradition of GTM
among practice-led disciplines attests to this.
All of this knowledge of the Pragmatist position on truth helps substanti-
ate the way in which terms such as fit, grab, work, and modifiability, should
be understood as part of GTM, and they can be applied to the method itself.
GTM proves itself as a method for arriving at conceptualizations that have
some immediate impact on people’s actions –a grounded theory ‘works’ in
that it is often proven to be of ‘great practical use long before the theory is
tested with great rigor’ (Discovery, p. 293). Moreover the reason for it ‘work-
ing’ is that it ‘fits’ with the context, and proves amenable—has ‘grab’—to key
social actors in that context.
All claims to knowledge, however, must be seen as instrumental and provi-
sional. So no theory can be proven once-and-for-all, but a good theory should
prove to be modifiable in the light of later developments and experiences.
Researchers can make claims for their own findings, but further developments
and wider claims rely on a range of possible sources, including further work
by the researcher, additional research by others, and responses from those who
were active in the initial research setting itself. This last point is not explicit in
all forms of GTM, but the constructivist form emphasizes it unequivocally,
and it is supported by the Pragmatist assertion that any attempt to provide
clear demarcations between lay insight and expert knowledge will ultimately
prove unsustainable.
One aspect in which the Pragmatist orientation might prove troublesome
in the conduct of some forms of GTM research is rejection of the spectator
view of knowledge. Researchers need to be aware of their own role and posi-
tion in the activity of researching, and this brings in aspects such as position-
ality, orientation, diversity, and reflexivity (see Mruck and Mey, 2007 for an
extended discussion). But researchers who refuse to entertain such issues in
their work, or who claim that GTM can deal with all such perspectives without
addressing any of them in detail, can also fall back on the Pragmatist position
that because all knowledge claims are provisional and open to doubt, so too
are those that argue for inclusion of such issues. In fact, positionality applies to
GTM itself, as Glaser readily attests in Theoretical Sensitivity, where he stresses
that “Our perspective [i.e., his and Strauss’s view of GTM] is but a piece of a
myriad of action in Sociology, not the only, right action” (1978, p. 3, emphasis
added).
What is often missing, or implicit, in GTM writings is the context in
which researchers operate. The early GTM work was carried out by Glaser,
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Strauss, and Quint, and later projects were carried out by Strauss and small
teams of researchers (Strauss et al., 1985). Moreover, research findings have
been reported in journals, conference proceedings, and so on. So there is
always a community or audience for research at some stage. Researchers
studying for a PhD, however, are usually lone researchers, although they are
linked in some manner to a research-and-support network of advisors and
mentors, and so it is not surprising that much of the GTM literature appears
aimed at this audience. But ultimately the reception and assessment of peo-
ple’s research goes on within a community, with an audience of peers as well
as the ineluctable gatekeepers. It may also involve practitioners, research
subjects, and other participants. Rorty in a typically provocative mood, sums
this up with the apothegm that “what counts as an accurate report of expe-
rience is a matter of what a community will let you get away with” (2007,
p. 11). These consensual and collegial aspects are all too often left implicit in
GTM writings, but the Pragmatist stance helps correct this because it ema-
nates precisely from a concern with knowledge, or rather knowing, as a con-
tinuous social activity.
All of the above demonstrates that those who have already established
the links between GTM and Pragmatism have opened up an important path
for developing the method. If Pragmatism was a red thread running through
Strauss’s work, it was largely invisible in his GTM writing. This was unfortu-
nate because it meant that he was unable to articulate how the ideas of Dewey,
Mead, and others come to a new fruition in the method itself. The result was
that Strauss’s own version of GTM was left open to a wide range of criticisms,
including Glaser’s; many of them justified to a significant degree. More criti-
cally, it left the method itself open to a range of criticisms from which it has
had to be extricated repeatedly.
What GTM and Pragmatism have in common is a concern with people’s
engagement with the world, reliant on detailed observation and insight, fol-
lowed by never-ending and iterative efforts to comprehend, persuade, and
enhance. To quote one of Oscar Wilde’s aphorisms: “It is only shallow people
who do not judge by appearances. The true mystery of the world is the visible,
not the invisible.”10
A NOTE ON PRAGMATISM, POST-MODERNISM, AND RELATIVISM
One of the key problems with constructivism is that it can easily end up as
a full-blown relativism or post-modernism. Anyone proposing such a view-
point is quickly seen to be in a paradoxical position. The claim that there is
no objective ground for truth, and that all truth claims are contextually spe-
cific is itself a truth claim, and so it is open to its own critique. Rorty offers
a clear way out of this dilemma, drawing on Dewey and his contemporaries,
347
but offering his own style of argument. Rorty’s key concern is to counter all
forms of foundationalism: that is, all forms of argument that are premised
on there being an ultimate foundation for knowledge claims—for example,
“the truth” or “objective reality.” Those investigators proposing arguments
that propagate post-modernism or relativism are correct in pointing to the
weaknesses in the arguments of those who presume a foundation for knowl-
edge claims, usually premised on the idea that truth is a reflection of reality
or “a mirror of nature”; but the former group fails to see that this applies
equally to the foundations of their own position. Pragmatism avoids this
pitfall, and Rorty himself has a coherent argument that avoids relativism
and the paradox of constructivism. In his critique of John Searle, who des-
perately wishes to retain some form of “objective truth and validity,” Rorty
offers the following:-
What we say is that you gain nothing for the pursuit of such truth by talk-
ing about mind dependence or mind independence of reality. All there
is to talk about are the procedures we use for bringing about agreement
among inquirers. (1998, p. 72)
Many people find this position uncomfortable, and Rorty certainly provoked
such reactions with his writing. But it is important not to misunderstand what
he and others are arguing. A recent article exemplifies the fundamental mis-
understanding, although it is perhaps surprising to see it coming from Crispin
Sartwell, an associate professor of philosophy who claims to have studied with
Rorty, among others.
But the ‘80s heyday of Rorty … is beginning to seem like a long time
ago, and a backlash seems to be in progress. More recent work in philoso-
phy includes various forms of realism about the world: the idea that real-
ity is not the product of consciousness, or of human perceptual structures
or languages or interpretive communities, but exists independently. We
don’t make the world, as one might put it; the world makes us. Where
for decades or even centuries, philosophy has focused on our representa-
tions and descriptions of the world, on human consciousness and cultural
systems, many are now turning to the external features of the world that
constitute the content of our experiences and the context of our social
practices. (Crispin Sartwell, 2015; emphasis added).11
To accuse Rorty of arguing that “reality is the product of consciousness” is
absurd; in fact, it is such poor thinking that “it is not even wrong”—a phrase
coined by the physicist Wolfgang Pauli when commenting on work that was
especially ill-conceived. Rorty never denies the existence of reality, but he
does deny the possibility of humans accessing it or discussing it in any non-
linguistic fashion—our only tools are what I would term squeaking, scratching,
348
and fidgeting. If I do not have the key to open a door, that is not the same
thing as denying that the door exists. Sartwell seems unable or unwilling to
recognize this distinction. To mix several metaphors: Extreme relativists may
allow someone to hold the position that the door does or does not exist—or
perhaps it is a horse in disguise; Rorty and his ilk acknowledge the existence
of the door but argue that there is only one type of key (the linguistic one) that
will open it. Sartwell’s use of the phrase “many are now turning to the external
features of the world” gives the game away as it implies that one can just open
the door and access the reality behind it. Yet, what is involved in “turning to
the external features?” Sartwell’s metaphor implies that we can turn to face
external reality and observe it directly and immediately, echoing Plato and
the allegory of the cave (see Chapter 2)—this is hardly a significant critique of
Pragmatism; it is not even a novel or potent argument, it is simply positivism
in a new guise.
Rorty is adamant that out attention to the procedures we use to sustain
agreement among enquirers only has one objective.
Sociologists and psychologists might stop asking themselves whether they
are following rigorous scientific procedures and start asking themselves
whether they have any suggestions to make to their fellow citizens about
how our lives, or our institutions, should be changed. (1998, p. 70)
In other words, how do sociologists’ and psychologists’ suggestions add up in
terms of civic fit and grab and earning their way? GTM already has this idea
at its core and, as mentioned in Chapter 15 in connection with Checkland’s E
for Ethics (Table 15.1). Charmaz has developed this theme specifically in her
paper on GTM and Social Justice (Charmaz, 2005). Moreover GTM should
be seen as perpetuating Dewey’s concept of knowledge as an incessant con-
versation. Conversations do not reach an end point, but they start and stop
and start again as the situation demands, and they move on in new directions
and with new participants. Strauss made this point early on in Qualitative
Analysis for Social Scientists, and in general he saw theory as an ongoing pro-
cess; Glaser similarly sees theorizing as a perpetual activity, with knowledge
claims being at best provisional, although he is reticent in applying this to
GTM itself.
It is critical that this Pragmatist understanding of GTM is continually
brought to the fore as it reinforces the essences of the method and disperses or
remedies the accidents, so providing a far stronger view of GTM. Chapter 18
takes this line of thinking further, arguing that GTM can be seen as a model
for good research practice; but at this stage it is important to reiterate the
distinctive features of this orientation in a tabular format (see Table 17.1).
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TABLE 17.1
ESSENCES re-considered in the light of a Pragmatist perspective
Enacting abstraction and abduction
Coding-cum- This is described in Charmaz’s terms as conducting “data collection and analysis
Analysis-cum- simultaneously in an iterative process”
Memoing Coding with gerunds can now be understood to characterize the process
as one that seeks to produce codes that encompass action and social
interaction. GTM can be seen as a method that encourages the development
of abstractions for action—in other words for the development of theories
or models that are not only useful but provide the basis for more effective
actions, interventions, and practices.
This central feature of the method resonates with the Pragmatist view of knowing
in action, and also with the concept of Reflective Practice. The processes
and procedures of GTM also offer a useful distinction between routine
knowing in action and the more rigorous and systematic forms that should be
implemented in doing research, although this distinction can be thought of as
one of difference in degree rather than difference in kind.
Substantive and Generating theory is the prime objective of GTM
Formal Theory Substantive theories—“developed for a substantive or empirical area of
Generating sociological inquiry, such as patient care, geriatric life styles etc.”
Formal theories—“theory developed for a formal or conceptual area of
sociological area such as status passage, stigma, deviant behavior, etc.”
In Charmaz’s terms the method emphasizes “theory construction rather than
description or application of current theories.” This may result in innovative
conceptual formulations of a more limited kind than full-blown theories;
provided that these conceptualizations prove useful and effective in practice.
Substantive grounded theories (SGTs) and formal grounded theories (FGTs) were
defined by Glaser and Strauss as example of theories of the middle range—
after Robert K. Merton. For Glaser and Strauss such theories were limited in
their range and generalizability. The criteria for both forms were couched in
terms of their explanatory power against the contexts from which they had
been derived (Substantive GTs) and those closely related to them (Formal
GTs). In this regard they are forms of theory that the Pragmatists would refer
to as instrumental—judged by the uses to which they can be put, and not in
terms of “truthfulness” or what Glaser refers to as “worrisome accuracy”—a
term that still confounds many people, but which takes on a more profound
meaning in the light of Pragmatism, even if that is not what Glaser had in mind
in coining the term.
GTM eschews the idea of providing definitive statements about reality in favor
of provisional ones that are to be judged in terms of immediate validity. SGTs
and FGTs are interim points in an incessant dialogue sustained by social
actors in their social interactions, developing and acting upon their ideas and
conjectures.
Purposive/ Initial sampling is undertaken with a purpose or target context in mind—and may
Convenience start from a convenience sample.
Sampling Later stages will use the provisional codes and categories as guides for further
followed by sampling—termed theoretical sampling.
Theoretical Given the Pragmatist precept of knowledge being judged in terms of its
Sampling usefulness and applicability in a particular context, starting out with a
purposive sample can be seen as a way of ensuring that such studies have a
good chance of providing usable and useful outcomes, with the understanding
that the purpose itself may change as a result of the initial sampling and
analysis.
The later stages of theoretical sampling provide a technique for ensuring a
greater degree of validation of the findings against the context and the now,
more highly specified, purpose of the research.
(continued)
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TABLE 17.1
Continued
Theoretical GTM specifies the point at which data gathering and analysis can be ended. This
Saturation is when the researcher(s) can justify their view that there is sufficient data to
substantiate their model—i.e., that the categories in their model are borne out
by the data, and that further data drawn from their research context adds no
further detail to the categories and concepts already articulated.
Theoretical Saturation can be seen as a basis for claiming validation of a
research project. This is not to claim that some definitive end-point has been
reached.
In Awareness Glaser and Strauss argued a substantive grounded theory “is
often of great practical use long before the theory is tested with great rigor”
(p. 293). This is fully in line with the Pragmatist idea of instrumentalism.
Moreover the initial move from SGT to FGT may be directed by testing whether
the more limited theory or concept “earns its way” in the new context—again
this resonates with the Pragmatist view of knowledge, and not with concerns
about “truth” or “worrisome accuracy.”
Use of the Initially researchers will have to indicate some familiarity with the existing
Literature literature—it is a standard expectation in evaluating research proposals. In so
doing the aim is to situate the planned research against current knowledge
rather than using such material for precise hypotheses.
At later stages of GTM-oriented research, the researcher(s) need to substantiate
their categories and concepts by taking the findings back to the literature—this
is in part what GTM writers refer to as Theoretical Coding.
Rorty’s contention that truth is what “a community will let you get away with”
is borne out by the need for GTM-oriented researchers, and others, to locate
their work against existing “authoritative” sources—as challenge, revision,
or support. Rorty’s work was and remains a challenge to philosophy and
philosophers; so too, Glaser and Strauss put down a challenge to their peers.
In both cases, however, a community did develop that upheld the innovative
insights put forward.
Criteria—fit, The criteria for GTM are linked to the way in which substantive grounded theories
grab, work, need to be validated against the context from which they have been derived.
modifiability The Pragmatist idea of instrumentalism offers the basis upon which GTM ideas
about credibility and validity can be substantiated; Strauss may have had
Dewey’s ideas in mind when these terms were introduced in the early GTM
texts.
Openness to This is an essential aspect of all research—but GTM specifically focuses on it.
Serendipity (NB: This is perhaps derived from Glaser’s time at Columbia and working with
Robert K. Merton, who wrote about the topic, although his writing was not
published until after his death.)
Rorty’s metaphor of the floating raft evokes this to some extent, but Lucy
Suchman’s contrast between plans and situated actions is even more apposite.
Research, or rather doing research, has to be seen as a series of situated
actions, in some cases based on an initial plan. Albert Einstein’s point is
worth restating: “If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called
research, would it?”
Pragmatism This is something of a controversial claim as an “essence” of GTM, but this book
offers considerable substantiation for it. Strauss hints at it in some places,
and some of his students have also developed this aspect.
This applies in particular to the process of abduction, with GTM characterized as
essentially an abductive method.
The earlier chapters, together with this one, provide the basis for seeing
Pragmatism as an essential aspect of GTM. The abductive aspect of GTM is
highly significant.
351
TABLE 17.1
Continued
ACCIDENTS re-considered in the light of a Pragmatist perspective

Induction/ Researchers should refer to the claims that GTM is “inductive”—but point out
Inductive that this was later recognized by Strauss as “over-played,” and that the use
Approach of the term in the early texts was limited and is now regarded as misleading
and largely unhelpful. The key point, still relevant, was to mark a distinction
between GTM and “deductive” approaches—a distinction that can be made
more effectively with regard to GTM’s starting point as opposed to research
approaches that emanate from hypotheses relating to existing theories.
The Pragmatist idea of abduction is far more important than the issue of
induction. Researchers need to understand that groundedness in the data is
not the same as an over-reliance on induction.
Rationale of This was always a difficult claim to substantiate—but more so now in the age of
No Existing Google. Researchers should seek to offer some justification for the potential
Research innovative insights to be achieved by their GTM-oriented research, rather than
trying to point to a dearth of research.
This rationale is neither feasible nor relevant. The more appropriate criterion is
usefulness.
Emergence The metaphor of emergence is widely used, and in most cases detracts from the
actual efforts of the researchers themselves. It is a highly attractive metaphor,
but best avoided, even by those with positivist or objectivist inclinations.
Dewey’s critique of the spectator model of knowledge applies directly to the
ramifications of the emergence metaphor, as both relegate the knowers to a
largely passive status. The constructivist variant of GTM is far more apposite,
although constructivism itself is based on a paradox that Pragmatism,
particularly in Rorty’s ironist version, avoids and precludes.
Pragmatism resolves the four accidents given below with the recognition that knowing is a dialogical
form of action and interaction. There is no neutral basis, devoid of prior knowledge, preconceptions,
and existing ideas, from which data can be gathered and processed. Nevertheless, researchers
who make such claims cannot be simply discounted on the basis of their epistemological position;
their research outputs must be judged terms of fit, grab, and usability.
Delayed literature Not an option, and in most cases researchers are already familiar with the
review literature as a result of immersion in the field; which is why they are keen to
pursue further research.
No A claim that is not really feasible, which Glaser himself admits—see Part Three
preconceptions of this book.
Researchers need to offer an account of their preconceptions and leave the
readers and reviewers to judge the extent to which these guided or constrained
the research itself.
The lone Even the PhD researcher is, and should be, supported by a team of supervisors
researcher and others. The initial GTM research was undertaken by a team of three, and
this needs to be recognized more clearly in the GTM literature.
Positivism/ Researchers have to recognize that the early GTM writings were in part written
Scientism with an agenda of advocating a “scientific” basis for qualitative research—but
where the authors’ understanding of what this entailed was rapidly becoming
outdated in the wake of debates (re)-ignited by the work of Thomas Kuhn and
others that followed.
It is now widely understood that there are differing “paradigms” for research—
although the extent to which these can be selected and taken up as guides to
the research process itself is debatable.
Glaser’s response has, unfortunately, been to ignore the issues and simply state
that GTM is inured to such concerns. The writings of Charmaz and others have
engaged with these issues, and the substance of this work needs to be taken
in to account by GTM researchers whether or not they are in agreement with it.
352
Notes
1. John Dewey should not to be confused with Melville Dewey associated with the
Dewey Decimal system of library cataloguing, although both held posts at Columbia: M.
Dewey in 1880s, J. Dewey 1904 onwards.
2. The following paragraphs characterizing Pragmatism are based closely on parts of
my article for Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung /Forum: Qualitative Social Research (FQS)
(Bryant, 2009).
3. In some cases these differences of opinion may be well worth pursuing. Dewey’s ideas
about difference are echoed in Gregory Bateson’s oft-quoted definition of information—“the
difference that makes a difference” (1972)—and takes on a deeper meaning when associ-
ated with Dewey. Bateson also took up Peirce’s ideas about abduction.
4. http://www.people.ubr.com/authors/by-first-name/v/voltaire/voltaire-quotes.aspx
5. This is termed “The Peripatetic Axiom,” and this version is attributed to Thomas
Aquinas http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peripatetic_axiom.
6. Again the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entries for nominalism and
historicism offer excellent accounts of the terms.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-historicist/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/
7. This is my interpretation of Pragmatism, derived almost entirely from my reading
of Dewey and Rorty.
8. Apart from the Pragmatist argument against strict adherence to this GTM principle,
there is also a pragmatic one, since it is usually mandatory that there be some form of litera-
ture review in any research proposal, whether for a PhD or for a specific research project.
9. This is still the case in the 3rd edition—Corbin and Strauss (2008).
10. http://thinkexist.com/quotation/it_is_only_shallow_people_who_do_not_judge_
by/262237.html
11. Crispin Sartwell: Philosophy returns to the real world, New York Times Opinionator
13-APR-2015 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/04/13/philosophy-returns-to-
the-real-world/
353
18
Grounded Theory as a Guide to Good

Research Practice
A METHOD FOR ENACTING ABSTRACTION AND ABDUCTION
Chapter 3 is titled “1967 And All That,” because it provides a discussion of

the historical background to the development of GTM. It is a play on W. C.
Sellar and R. J. Yeatman’s brilliant satire on English history, 1066 and All
That: A Memorable History of England, comprising all the parts you can remem-
ber, including 103 Good Things, 5 Bad Kings and 2 Genuine Dates. In a simi-
lar vein the grounded theory method can be seen as comprising some good
things, a few misunderstood things, and several genuine innovations that need
to be widely recognized across the research community.
The grounded theory method has been around for 50 years and there is
some basis for the claim that it is by far the most widely invoked research
method, and almost certainly the most widely invoked qualitative research
method. Yet all too often academics and researchers who ought to know bet-
ter express reservations, doubts, or even complete ignorance of the details
of the method. In some cases their reservations are based on experience of
examples of poor research invoking GTM. But as I have argued throughout
this book, such misapprehensions should not be confined to GTM, they are
common across all methods. Certainly there are some issues that seem partic-
ularly prevalent and bothersome for GTM, but in many cases my distinction
between the essences and accidents of the method can provide a firmer basis
for judging such reports. Table 18.1 offers a summary of some of the criticisms
of the method, and the ways in which they should be assessed and brought to
bear on specific writings—aimed both at assisting researchers in presenting
their proposals and their findings, and at evaluators/gatekeepers in assessing
such submissions.
Yet it is important to stress the ways in which GTM can be seen to exemplify
and support several key aspects of good research practice; something that is
repeatedly ignored by the wider research community and insufficiently empha-
sized by those with knowledge and experience of the method. One key feature
is the way in which GTM offers researchers of all levels the basis for gaining
353
354
TABLE 18.1
Suggested responses to criticisms of the grounded theory method (GTM)
Criticism of GTM The accidents and misunderstandings
Poorly thought out Advice for researchers

research—ad Make sure you clarify your use of GTM, and that you ensure that your readership cannot assume that this is an excuse for not engaging with
hoc, no plan, no the literature or failing to give a detailed plan. Unfortunately, although GTM has been around for 50 years and is the most widely invoked
hypotheses research method, there are many research evaluators who do not understand that research can begin without hypotheses and a detailed
plan for verification. Your colleagues using quantitative methods will almost certainly not be faced with this problem, because those
with little or no understanding of statistical methods either keep quiet about it or have the humility to admit this and leave evaluation to
those who do. At the very least refer to some of the GTM authoritative texts for support, and give an outline of how you will develop your
research through the process and procedures of the method—you might find the 5x(P+P) sections in Chapter 2 useful for this. Avoid the
mantra—see below.
Advice for evaluators and gatekeepers
With regard to research proposals, be on the lookout for proposals that use the language of GTM as a rationale for a poorly thought-out
proposal. (Glaser has used the term jargonizing, although not specifically in this regard!) See below “GTM Mantra”
In contrast, if a research proposal canters on GTM in a more significant sense, then it should clearly indicate the starting point(s), including the
rationale and motivation—perhaps in personal terms as well as scholarly ones. There should also be some indication of the objectives; also
of the ways in which the research will aim to progress through the stages of sampling and analysis.
Do not, however, rule out proposals because they fail to offer specific hypotheses to be tested. Grounded theory has been around for 50 years,
and it is about time that those without at least some understanding of qualitative research in general and GTM in particular were precluded
from evaluation of proposals.
Personal orientation Advice for researchers
You do not need to apologize for this orientation if you do adopt it, but it may well be helpful in clarifying your initial position with regard to the
topic. It is certainly preferable to an impersonal, objective style that hides these aspects. You will need, however, to consult with mentors and
advisors regarding the acceptable style for your particular audience—university examination panel, publisher’s house-style, and so on.
Do not discount research reported in personal terms, although in some cases it may fall at the first hurdle if the house style specifically
precludes such usage. Some reviewers do reject this sort of presentation immediately, but this is to preclude many potentially interesting and
valuable contributions.
Epistemological Advice for researchers
fairy-tale—no Do not claim that you started your research without any preconceptions, or that you have managed to discount all and any that you had. Rather,
preconceptions, clarify your motivation and level of experience and familiarity with the context and issues at hand. Leave any judgment on these to your
theory emerging readers.
from the data
355
If a researcher claims that he or she started the research without preconceptions or by blocking them out, ask what is meant by this claim and
how one can be sure that this was indeed accomplished. Question the researcher about the initial motivation for the research, and why the
selected starting point and orientation might have benefitted the research—provided this was clarified.
If such claims are made in a paper submitted for publication, this may well provide grounds to reject the paper out-of-hand, or you may be willing
to persevere with the account itself and raise the issue in your review/response.
No engagement with Advice for researchers
the literature I have explained why this is an accidental feature of GTM. In any case it is no longer defensible, even if it once was. You will almost certainly
have decided to carry out your research because of your familiarity with the topic, so there is no point pretending otherwise. Nevertheless,
you can certainly indicate the point at which you curtailed your literature review, and show how you intend to reengage with the literature at a
later stage—theoretical coding or return to the literature.
If at the proposal stage a researcher claims not to have engaged with the literature because that is what use of GTM involves, then do feel free
to point out that this is not an essential part of the method, and quite possibly indicates that the research proposal itself is far from suitable.
Also allow that GTM-oriented research does not require a profound and critical literature review at the outset, although a case does need to
be made for the potentially innovative contribution of the research proposed. Finally, there should be reference to how the literature will be
addressed at a later stage of the research—a return to the literature or theoretical coding.
No theory at the end Advice for researchers
of the research The grounded theory method is meant to result in a theory, but it is important that you clarify what is meant by this. Few if any of us are
theorists in the mold of Charles Darwin or Albert Einstein; but that does not preclude your ability to contribute innovative insights with regard
to a specific topic or context; perhaps in the form of a framework, model, or conceptualization.
See above with regard to the expectations of GTM-oriented research. Bear in mind that there should be some equivalence between outcomes
for different methods at the same level—i.e., PhDs should be judged in equivalent terms regardless of the methods used. Some researchers
will verify or contradict established hypotheses, theories, or models; others will produce new or slightly revised models or frameworks. A few
will offer genuine and far-reaching insights and innovations.
Theoretical Saturation Advice for researchers
Do not simply state that theoretical saturation has been reached, and certainly do not claim this in terms of the sampling not producing any
further codes or categories. Saturation refers to the categories themselves, and can only be accomplished once you have moved to more
focused forms of sampling. You need to justify your claim to have reached saturation—see the two examples given in Chapter 12 for further
details, and refer to the quotation from Charmaz below.
Theoretical saturation is something of a hostage to fortune. It can be seen as a weakness of GTM because it seems to be an excuse to curtail
data gathering with little or no justification. But it is actually a strength of the method if used correctly and clarified appropriately. All GTM-
oriented researchers should indicate how they achieved saturation for their categories along the lines of the definition in Charmaz’s book—
i.e., “gathering more data about a theoretical category reveals no new properties nor yields any further theoretical insights” (2014, p. 344).
(continued)
356
TABLE 18.1
Continued
Criticism of GTM The accidents and misunderstandings
Same data used for Advice for researchers

generating theory This is not a problem provided that you explain the difference between validation and verification (see Chapter 5). For a substantive GT its
and validating the validity is precisely the “fit” with the context from which the data has been drawn. Just make sure you explain this clearly in your reports and
theory presentations.
See above—but be wary if researchers simply claim that they have eschewed “verification” in favor of a grounded theory, with no further
explanation.
Folksy criteria—fit, Advice for researchers
grab, work, … See Table 18.1 on these criteria—but ensure that if you do refer to them you also explain the key issues.
See Table 18.1—if researchers do refer to these criteria then they should also explain them in regard to more conventional criteria—see Table 18.3
Failure to engage with Advice for researchers
key concerns—GTM If you must engage with epistemological and ontological issues then try to make sure that what you claim is defensible and reasonable, even
fit all paradigms, if controversial. There is little or no general agreement on these issues, but it should be important that anyone referring to such topics can
uses all data,. … demonstrate familiarity with claims and counter claims, and not simply state that such issues are irrelevant or “moot” as in the extract below.
… classic grounded theory is presented as a general method, which can use any type of data and is not attached to any one theoretical
perspective; it is essentially ontologically and epistemologically neutral. As such, Glaser (2005) has argued that discussions of ontology
(what we believe about the world) and epistemology (how we can come to know what we know) are moot within classic grounded theory.
(Breckenridge & Elliot, Grounded Theory Review, Issue 1, June 2012, Volume 11—emphasis added
Treat epistemological and ontological claims with some reticence, and do not judge the research outcomes against the claims: I have found
many excellent research reports based on highly questionable epistemological bases—see above regarding the lack of general agreement.
It is sometimes useful and necessary to challenge these sorts of claims. Perhaps it is time that PhD examiners, publishers, and editors
clearly stated the extent to which these sorts of claim are crucial or should be excluded from research reports. This is not the same thing as
excluding discussions of the methods-in-use for the research itself!
Just story-telling— Advice for researchers
verbatim extracts The early GTM texts used virtually no verbatim extracts, but their use is now something of an expectation in writing about GTM research. The
with little or no skill is to present your audience with sufficient detail to justify your arguments, but also to ensure that your conceptualization and abstraction
explanatory value is brought to the fore. If you read GTM research papers that seem simply to be at a narrative level, then this may well be because the
researchers themselves failed to move beyond a low level of coding and are simply re-describing their data.
357
There is nothing intrinsically wrong or misguided about research accounts that rely on some form of narrative. Lucy Suchman’s book is an
excellent example of a narrative account that is far more revealing and useful than any statistical report on use of complex technology.
Research submissions that do no more than tell a story should be challenged to examine what else they contribute, as should the writers of
such submissions. Similar challenges should also be made in response to research using all other methods.
Small samples— Advice for researchers
issue of The grounded theory method uses convenience and purposive sampling at the outset—it is important that this is explained, and it involves
generalizing clarifying the purpose—however broad. The goal is to deal with the first topic in this table. The later forms of sampling only become fixed
once the research is under way, and again it is important that this is mentioned in any research plan and clarified in later reports of the
findings. You may also need to justify the small sample size, as explained in Chapter 12.
See above—do not expect large samples, but do expect clear accounts of the purpose and nature of the initial samples and clarification of later
sampling.
Poor metaphors and Advice for Researchers
reliance on the If you must use all or part of the mantra at least explain what you mean. Simply stating that “all is data,” or your “theory emerged from the
GTM mantra data” is inappropriate and simply offers an easy target to your readers.
If you claim that there is no existing research, you will need to substantiate this—and that is non-trivial.
If authors use the mantra with no further explanation you may feel able to discount this in favor of their actual findings; but in far too many
cases it will, understandably, prejudice your evaluation.
Challenge any claim along the lines of there being no existing research in their area—what did they find from a Web-based search?
GTM variants Advice for researchers
In discussing your research strategy you will need to explain your specific use of GTM. This will necessitate some engagement with issue
around the variants of the method, but you can circumvent this to some extent by referring to key texts and arguments. There are some
cogent examples provided in the chapters in Part 3, and also the extended accounts in Chapter 19.
There should be some reference to the main variants of the method, although this should not need extensive explanation. The accounts given
by four of my PhD students offer clear examples of how insightful researchers resolve the issues through developing their methodological
sensitivity.
358
confidence in their abilities to exercise and develop their skills, something

that is highly important to students embarking on PhDs and other early-stage
researchers. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, the originators of the method,
not only proclaimed the importance of generating theory, as opposed to verify-
ing or testing existing theories, but they also critically outlined a method for
accomplishing this that was an alternative to hypothesis testing and verifica-
tion. Researchers could commence their investigations without clearly specified
questions or hypotheses. On the one hand, this might lead to poorly conceived
and conducted research, but on the other hand a clear idea at the outset of any
research project can prove to be highly constraining and also the basis for con-
firmation bias—that is, research that results in confirming what was supposed
to be true before the start of the research, arising from researchers selecting or
interpreting results that confirm their preconceptions, and ignoring or misrep-
resenting those that do not. Remember Karl Popper’s critique of verification
(see Chapter 2), which points out that it is far too easy to see confirmation if
that is all one is looking for. “Once your eyes were thus opened you saw con-
firmed instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory.
Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and
unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth.”
One way in which GTM is seen to counter such prejudice in research is
its maxim of “no preconceptions,” a position that Glaser has stuck to through
thick and thin, sometimes tempering this along the lines of “as few preconcep-
tions as possible.” The frailty and impracticality of this view was explained in
Chapter 8, and even with regard to Glaser and Strauss themselves, it is clear
that from the start of their research into dying their minds may well have been
open, but their heads were far from empty. Each in his own way had signifi-
cant and extensive knowledge of some of the relevant literature, and each had
a personal orientation to the research after the death of a parent. If research-
ers claim to be immune from any preconceptions, or somehow capable of
disregarding their prior knowledge and beliefs, this gives ample grounds for
skepticism regarding the outcomes. But one of the ironies of GTM-oriented
research is that a good deal of it is reported using highly personal terms, with
the researcher(s) going to great lengths to explain the personal motivations for
undertaking the research in the first place. This aspect of Glaser and Strauss’s
early work was clearly important, although unfortunately mention of it was
delayed and relegated to the appendix in Awareness. This is a far more credible
basis for doing research, and there is a strong case to be made for research-
ers reporting their findings in personal terms, rather than opting for what is
regarded as the preferred alternative of using the passive voice. Although by no
means a definitive statement on the matter, the following extract issued by one
university’s “Writing Center” is highly informative and persuasive.
You may have been told at some point in your academic career that the
use of the passive voice is almost always bad, except in the sciences. The
359
Grounded Theory as a Guide to Good Research Practice 359
passive voice is a sentence structure where the subject who performs

the action is ambiguous (e.g., “you may have been told,” as seen in the
first sentence of this paragraph; see our handout on the passive voice for a
more complete discussion).
The rationale behind using the passive voice in scientific writing is
that it enhances objectivity, taking the actor (i.e., the researcher) out of the
action (i.e., the research). Unfortunately, the passive voice can also lead to
awkward and confusing sentence structures and is generally considered
less engaging (i.e., more boring) than the active voice. This is why most
general style guides recommend only sparing use of the passive voice.1
Here I might add that care also needs to be taken not to overuse the active
voice, avoiding too many sentences starting with “I” or “We.” Nevertheless it
is important that research reports clarify the extent to which the efforts were
or were not those of a lone researcher. The paper by Tove Giske and Barbara
Artinian (2007) referred to in Chapter 6 is an excellent example of clarity in
this regard, using “I” and “We” to indicate different roles played by the authors
and others involved in the project.
The other “good things” about GTM can be found in Table 18.2, with
brief explanations for each, although in many respects the substantive case
for each of them has been made in the foregoing chapters. These strengths
include the process and procedures of GTM, but also some of the other aspects
of the 5x(P+P) model detailed in Chapter 2. For instance, even though there
has been a good deal of heat emanating from the differing accounts of Barney
Glaser and Anselm Strauss, as well as Strauss & Julie Corbin, and latterly the
constructivist variant, the resulting engagement with epistemological and
ontological issues, although not always undertaken willingly, has undoubt-
edly shed considerable light on these topics for GTM-oriented researchers,
researchers in general, and those with an interest in research methods as such.
Similarly the development of the Pragmatist perspective in GTM has
brought to light ideas about the link between thought and action, theories as
tools or instruments, consensus models of truth, and differing criteria regard-
ing credibility and validity. In an earlier paper Kathy Charmaz and I (2011)
discussed the issue of GTM and credibility, referring to the credibility of the
data, analytic credibility, and theoretical credibility. Charmaz herself offers a
clear set of guidelines for use in evaluating grounded theory against four cri-
teria: credibility, originality, resonance, and usefulness (Charmaz, 2014, pp.
336–338). These are referred to in Table 18.2 in conjunction with the GTM
criteria of fit, grab, and modifiability.
Many other aspects of GTM exemplify good research practice and ema-
nate from the process and procedures of the method; for instance memo-mak-
ing, sampling, theoretical coding, and theoretical saturation—see Table 18.2.
The final feature is theoretical sensitivity, a term introduced in Glaser and
Strauss’s Discovery of Grounded Theory, expanded on in Glaser’s book of the
360
TABLE 18.2
14 GOOD THINGS ABOUT GTM enacting abstraction and abduction
Personal Motivation GTM writers have often used the active voice in their work; The
Use of active voice—first Handbook exemplifies this in many chapters, and in a powerful
person singular and plural and persuasive manner.
The passive voice is too often used ambiguously in research
reports. It is often crucial that the actions of the researcher are
clearly reported, and also, where more than one researcher was
involved, who did what and how they collaborated.
Clear statements explain the initial rationale and motivations
of a research project are preferable to accounts that avoid
or exclude these issues, and present the research in an
impersonal fashion.
Sampling Now that we have the possibilities of Big Data—see Chapter 16—
it is even more crucial that issues around sampling are clarified.
It cannot simply be assumed that those with access to the
largest data-sets necessarily have the basis for “better” results.
Small samples for qualitative research can provide the basis for
important and effective findings, while algorithmic analysis of
massive data-sets may simply return false patterns or ineffective
results.
Iterative approach This is now something of a common-place across many methods,
to abstraction and all derived from GTM itself.
conceptualization
Groundedness “Staying close to the data” and similar epithets now abound and
are not confined to GTM researchers. The current invocation of
“evidence-based research” is a belated and limited catching-
up with this. The phrase has been contrasted with eminence-
based research—i.e. exactly what Glaser and Strauss had in
mind in their criticism of the grand/eminent Parsonians and
Mertonians.
Memo-making Although derived from existing practices around field-notes, memo-
making in its concerted GTM manifestation takes these further
and, considered together with the concept of reflective practice,
provides an important basis for all forms of doing research.
Theoretical Sensitivity An evocative phrase that should be introduced to all courses on
research and research methods. The term has been discussed
and exemplified throughout the earlier chapters, and linked to
Methodological Sensitivity
Theoretical Saturation A misunderstood term, but one that, used correctly, provides
a clear objective for GTM-oriented research, and for other
qualitative researchers.
Theoretical Coding In some regards the term itself is not an essentially good thing
given that so many excellent GTM-based researchers seem
not to incorporate it as such. However, the need to return to
the literature at a late stage of research is clearly crucial, and
often ignored in many PhDs and research reports; not only GTM-
oriented ones. So this aspect of GTM is a good thing, drawing
attention to a specific aspect of research in general.
Abduction The term itself is still an alien concept for many; GTM is a method
that enacts abstraction and abduction—one result of which has
been an increasing awareness (!) of the term and its importance
in innovative and creative research.
Theories of the middle Derived from Merton, but the specific characterizations of SGTs
range—SGTs and FGTs and FGTs indicate the ways in which theories can be derived and
applied without aiming at universal and far-reaching forms of
explanation.
361
TABLE 18.2
Continued
Clarity on validation and The idea of validating research against the context from which it
generalization has been derived has been criticized, but on reflection it makes
extremely good sense provided that this is not then seen as
justification for immediate generalization. On the other hand the
issue of wider remit for SGTs is an important one, and there
should be more pressure for GTM researchers to develop their
SGTs into FGTs.
Status of qualitative GTM provides the basis for qualitative research that stands
research on its own, providing a depth of explanation and basis for
application. This is attested to by the large number of cases in
which practices in areas such as medical care, health care, and
education have been changed and enhanced as a result of GTM-
based research, often accomplished by practitioners themselves.
Engagement with E and O Although these issues may seem troublesome and irksome for
issues GTM, for many other methods they are often notable only by
their complete absence or evasion. The debate around concepts
such as data, emergence, and the role of the researcher in the
context of GTM has also raised these as concerns for research
and knowledge claims in general.
Criteria for SGTs and FGTs Glaser uses terms such as “fit,” “grab,” “modifiability,” and “work.”
Charmaz prefers “credibility,” “originality,” “resonance,” and
“usefulness.” What they have in common is the immediacy of
usefulness, echoing the claim in Awareness that substantive
grounded theory “is often of great practical use long before the
theory is tested with great rigor.” (See Table 4.4 for further details.)
same name, and in part the basis for the constructivist critique of both the
Glaser variant and the Strauss/Corbin variant. One discussion of the term can
be found in the first edition of Strauss and Corbin’s book Basics of Qualitative
Research (1990), where the section headed Theoretical Sensitivity refers to
“sources of sensitivity” and “keeping a balance between creativity and science.”
Theoretical sensitivity refers to a personal quality of the researcher. It indi-
cates an awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data. One can come to
the research situation with varying degrees of sensitivity depending upon
previous reading and experience with or relevant to an area. It can also
be developed further during the research process. Theoretical sensitiv-
ity refers to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to
data, the capacity to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent
from that which isn’t. All this is done in conceptual rather than concrete
terms. It is theoretical sensitivity that allows one to develop a theory that
is grounded, conceptually dense, and well integrated-and to do this more
quickly than if this sensitivity were lacking. (pp. 41–42)
In the second edition (1998) the term is noticeable by its absence, and the
equivalent section is headed “Maintaining a Balance between Objectivity and
Sensitivity,” and seems to represent a retreat from the tentative steps toward a
less positivist/objectivist stance in the earlier edition. I have sought to outline
362
the dimensions of the term in many places in the preceding chapters and have
also introduced the term Methodological Sensitivity as its partner: Together,
they refer to the ways in which researchers need to balance respect and regard
with skepticism and suspicion. The constructivist variant of GTM embraces
this tension, and in so doing contributes to a general understanding of what is
involved in doing research.
In Chapter 2 I quoted Rorty’s view that “[N]‌othing is to be gained for
an understanding of human knowledge by running together vocabularies in
which we describe the causal antecedents of knowledge with those in which we
offer justification of our claims to knowledge.” In other words we cannot justify
our research findings, our theories, merely by demonstrating how closely we
followed a particular method or approach. But this is not to deny the impor-
tance of being able to demonstrate the credibility and suitability of our meth-
ods. The grounded theory method is certainly amenable to this, despite the
bad press that it has received and continues to receive. Charmaz refers to the
“untapped versatility and potential” of GTM (2014, p. 337), I can be more pre-
cise, again echoing Sellars and Yeatman’s 1066 and All That, and say that the
method comprises 14 Good Things, A few misunderstood Accidental Things, and
Several Genuine contributions. The Good Things are summarized and explained
in Table 18.2; the Misunderstood Accidents, in Table 18.1.
Table 18.3 summarizes my advice regarding issues around GTM, and the
ways these should be addressed both by researchers (not only PhD students)
and by evaluators (journal editors, reviewers, and those refereeing research
proposals). Of course, I realize that in presenting these ways of approaching
issues I am offering a hostage to fortune as some researchers may offer their
responses to these in a mechanistic and unreflective manner, and some evalu-
ators may apply them likewise: But I am sure that will not apply to you!
GTM: The Affinity between Positivism and Romanticism
As an example of serendipity, as I was working on this chapter (April

2015) I happened upon a paper by Alvin Gouldner dating from 1973 titled
Romanticism and Classicism: Deep Structures in Social Science, which sheds
some useful light on Strauss’s background and Chicago Pragmatism in general.
The main thrust of Gouldner’s paper is that Romanticism embodied a trend
in thought that rebelled against “disciplined conformity to … received and
impersonal rules.” Initially this stance was purely dogmatic, lacking in “ratio-
nale of a new language or a new logic.” Gouldner traces this trend through
the development of European social thought, and in so doing he notes that
both the Romantics and the Positivists shared an antipathy toward traditional
forms of authority, the former seeking a new basis in the imagination, and
the latter in science. The “purest vein in Romanticism in American sociol-
ogy is, I believe, to be found in the Chicago School … its leading exponents
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TABLE 18.3
Grounded theory research: suggested questions for students/authors to prepare
for; and issues for evaluators to raise
Advice for researchers Advice for evaluators and gatekeepers
Questions and issues to prepare for Questions to pose and issues to raise
You should be able to offer clear and Posing questions such as these should not come
cogent responses to some of the as a surprise to a well-prepared and insightful
questions given below—or perhaps avoid GTM-oriented researcher and/or one who has
some of them by judicious writing of your got this far in this book! Of course, some of
proposal and/or final presentations. the questions may not be relevant given the
particular approach and use of method(s).
1) How is it possible to conduct research unguided by hypotheses or clear research questions
at the outset?
2) Why are there hypotheses at the end of your thesis and not at the beginning?
3) What is meant by an inductive approach developing from a position with no
preconceptions?
4) You claim that there is no existing research in the area which you are considering/have
studied; can you substantiate this? Or did you just not investigate very thoroughly?
5) What is involved in coding data from which a theory can emerge?
6) There seem to be two chapters relating to the literature in your thesis—please explain the
reasons for this?
7) You claim that GTM is an abductive method—what does this mean?
8) You claim to have used a constructivist approach—what does this mean, and doesn’t
it imply that reality does not exist outside our consciousness, and all truth claims are
relative?
9) You claim to have used Classical/Glaserian/Straussian/Constructivist GTM—what does
this involve and in what ways does it differ from other variants?
10) Have you addressed the issue of positionality and self-reflexivity in your research?
11) Why did you use GTM? Why did you use it in the way you did, as opposed to how it is
described in/by [NAME OF TEXT OR AUTHORITY]?
12) You use terms such as “code,” “concept,” and “category”; how do these differ and relate
to one another, have you offered clear and distinct definitions of these? Have you adhered
to these definitions in your work?
13) You claim that GTM is grounded in the data—can you explain this in more detail, and
include an explanation of what you mean by “data.”
14) In your concluding chapter you refer to your substantive grounded theory, please explain
what substantive means, and what makes your model a theory.
are Anselm Strauss, Erving Goffman and Howard S. Becker.” In seeking to

combine the strengths of both science and imagination, Gouldner singles out
“Strauss (together with B. Glaser) [who] has spoken for the merits of “data-
grounded theory” (sic!), which is primarily a polemic against deductive,
formal styles of sociological theorizing and an argument for inductive theoriz-
ing—once again revealing the paradoxical but abiding affinity of certain forms
of Positivism and Romanticism.” Moreover Gouldner later quotes Strauss
describing Romanticism in the hands of G. H. Mead, who stripped it of “its
mysticism” and gave it “biological and scientific traits”; providing the basis
for prying open “the deterministic framework of modern science” restating
“problems of autonomy, freedom and innovation.”
What is remarkable in Gouldner’s account is his range of observations
regarding Romanticism in its Meadian form. He sees it as encouraging
“direct contact and immersal,” encouraging “resistance to the quantitative
study,” stressing “direct and first-hand research,” and contributing to “the
364
democratization of the concept of data.” This amounts to an embryonic sum-

mation of many of the key ideas in Glaser and Strauss’s Discovery of Grounded
Theory, apart perhaps from the last one. He also sheds light on the meaning
of analytic induction, referred to in Discovery, which Gouldner points out was
“developed by Florian Znaniecki and Alfred Lindesmith.” This technique leads
from successive and intensive study of individual cases to general conclusions,
emphasizing “the value of the individual event.” So there is a clear lineage from
European Romanticism, together with American Pragmatism, through Mead’s
ideas to Strauss and GTM; although there are clear distinctions between GTM
and its precursors—for example, with regard to analytic induction—of which
Gouldner may not have been aware at the time (see Chapter 4).
But Gouldner then offers further insights regarding Paul Lazarsfeld, a key
influence on Glaser. For Gouldner, writing in 1973, Lazarsfeld is “surely the dean
of social science methodologists in the United States today,” but his (Lazarsfeld’s)
position is that social scientists should not be guided first and foremost by “for-
mal canons of science” but by “the implicit rules and procedures which success-
ful social scientists tacitly employ and embody in their researches” (emphasis
in original). Gouldner goes on to argue that Lazarsfeld views social science
research proceeding “on the basis of (at first) inarticulate operational rules and
often ineffable information or experience” (emphasis added). The “inarticulate-
ness of the creative … needs to be rendered articulate.” Gouldner concludes
that while the “sociological theorists at Chicago University were more Romantic
that those at Columbia University, it maybe that the statistical methodologists at
Columbia University were more Romantic than those elsewhere.”
So Gouldner effectively provides an outline lineage for GTM: Romanticism
reinterpreted by Mead, drawing on John Dewey and Pragmatism; a method-
ological view of creativity coming via Lazarsfeld. What Strauss and Glaser pro-
vided in their innovative method was a significant move forward from analytic
induction, building on the idea of combining the strengths of being scientific
with being imaginative, coupled with a pioneering and enduring statement that
explicates precisely the tacit and implicit aspects that Lazarsfeld saw as requir-
ing clear articulation. With such a rich and potentially paradoxical pedigree, it is
not surprising that at various points and from various viewpoints one or another
aspect has either been downplayed or overemphasized. The key is to strive for a
methodological sensitivity with regard to GTM that keeps all these characteristics
in mind, while recognizing the profound influence and value that emanate from
the method itself. The headline entry in Table 18.2 encapsulates these rich and
innovative features of GTM: a method for enacting abstraction and abduction.
Note
1. http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/sciences/
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19
Four Accounts of Grounded Theorizing
No doubt we will always prefer the later versions of grounded

theory that are closest to or elaborate our own, but a child once
launched is very much subject to a combination of its origins
and the evolving contingencies of life. Can it be otherwise with a
methodology?
—Anselm Strauss & Julie Corbin, 1994
In preparing this book I asked several of my former PhD students to prepare

an account of their experience of using the method. The four accounts that
follow are produced verbatim, although I have deleted some of the details if
they refer to aspects covered in earlier chapters. I believe that taken together
they offer a rich and informative source for PhD students and others seeking
insights into GTM-oriented research. Readers will note the varied and dis-
tinctive ways in which the students implemented GTM, in some cases at later
stages of their work. Taken together, they demonstrate that there is no one
correct way of using GTM, but with developing methodological and theoreti-
cal sensitivity the GTM researcher can produce insightful and innovative find-
ings.In addition, the researcher is able to offer a clear account of the processes
and procedures that were used, rendering them open to the scrutiny of others
and to meaningful self-reflection.
Andrea Gorra
Andrea completed her PhD in 2006, “Implications of mobile phone location

data on individuals’ perceptions of privacy—a Grounded Theory study.”
REASONS FOR CHOOSING GTM
I considered using grounded theory methodology (GTM) after I started my

PhD. My chosen topic evolved around individuals’ perceptions of privacy and
the (location) data automatically generated by every mobile phone.
365
366
As any PhD student, I started by reading relevant articles, looking at aca-

demic literature but no specific theoretical framework seemed to fit my area.
This was probably the “tipping point”/the point when I started to consider
using the grounded theory methodology. In addition, GTM has the benefit of
appearing to be quite a structured methodology, early data collections inter-
change with early data analysis. This seemed to be a good methodology for me,
my way of working and thinking. It seemed to make sense. The other two—
rather practical—factors that supported my decision to give this methodology
“a try” were that my supervisor had written extensively about this methodol-
ogy and that a fellow PhD student was having the same contemplations about
using the methodology as I did.
During the course of my studies, I met other students using GTM and the
common use of the same methodology provided commonalities and talking
points even with PhD students in completely different fields. This was of par-
ticular importance to me, as I was not part of a research team and other PhD
students were working on different topics and subject areas. At times, being a
PhD student did make me feel quite lonely, so it was great to use a methodol-
ogy that was interesting in itself and provided a shared, common ground with
various other researchers.
DIFFERENT “FLAVOURS” OF GTM
Once I decided on the methodology, after reading some introductory texts and
hearing about the “Glaser–Strauss divide” I had to get onto grips with the dif-
ferent “flavours” or “families” of GTM. I found the book by Strauss and Corbin
immensely more accessible than the Glaser text.
The devil was in the details but some issues and decisions solved them-
selves as I got further and further with data collection and analysis.
After identifying several books that would be suitable to “learn” about the
grounded theory methodology, I started investigating the use of the method
for my study by reading Glaser and Strauss’s frequently cited “Discovery book”
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
This book seemed to be the obvious starting point, judging from its popu-
larity in the references sections of various papers and books. However, after
choosing this book as an introduction to the method, I found it rather dif-
ficult to grasp the basics of GTM. The book did not seem to explain GTM at a
detailed “beginner’s” level but rather dealt with what could be described as the
“grand concepts” of GTM, such as substantive vs Formal theory (p. 42). Even
though the authors refer to existing case studies using comparative methods
(chapter 6) these examples did not help me to understand how to use GTM
for my study or how to exactly start using the methodology. However, later on
in my research project, I did go back to these sections and could relate more
to them then.
367
Four Accounts of Grounded Theorizing 367
I then turned to Strauss and Corbin’s “Basics of qualitative research”

(1998). This book offered a very structured approach to using the method and
seemed more accessible. I particularly found the first half of the book very use-
ful, such as for example the early chapters titled “Practical considerations” and
“Microscopic examination of data.” At the early stage of using the grounded
theory methodology, I tried to understand how the process of using GTM
worked. I was looking for “instructions” which the Strauss/Corbin book—at
first sight—seemed to provide. I particularly liked the examples of open coding
(pp. 106–7) where conceptual names, i.e. codes, had been added to the inter-
view transcript. However, the more I read through the book, the less I could see
how I could transfer these procedures to my study and my interviews. I particu-
larly struggled to understand how to apply some of the concepts presented in
the book’s second half such as axial coding or conditional/consequential matri-
ces to my tentative attempts of coding and to the context of my study.
At this time, I also investigated my supervisor Tony Bryant’s and Barney
Glaser’s written exchanges about the “positivist vs constructivist” orientations of
the method, which amongst others mentioned Kathy Charmaz’s articles in the
Handbooks of Qualitative Research (2000, 2005) and Interview Research (2002a
& 2002b). Charmaz, in a similar way to Strauss/Corbin, provided specific exam-
ples of how she had for instance used line-by-line coding (2006, p. 52), but in
addition also shared some of the interview questions she had used for her stud-
ies. I found this very helpful, as these particular examples showed how to move
from the stage of developing interview question to coding and further analysis of
the data. Charmaz not only focused on how to collect the data but also included
advice on how to analyse data in a more “holistic” way. In other words, she
encouraged me to take into account the context and entire study when analysing
the data; as opposed to dissecting categories into smaller parts and compare those
to other small parts of other categories and codes, as Strauss and Corbin seemed
to suggest. The memos provided by Charmaz were particularly helpful, as well as
her discussion of her view of GTM in that it was “constructed” together with the
participants.
Finally, I decided that this constructivist strand of grounded theory meth-
odology fitted the aims of my research study best, as this “flavour” or family
of GTM emphasizes the research participants’ experience and how they made
sense of reality. Knowledge, and hence the grounded theory, are constructed
by both researcher and research participant with the aim to interpret the
empirical evidence within the research context.
LITERATURE
The “traditional” strand of grounded theory methodology advocates wait-

ing to conduct the literature review until initial findings have been made in
order to not influence the researcher with preconceived ideas (Glaser, 1978).
368
Contrastingly, Charmaz (2006) advises to carry out a very broad review of

literature before collecting the data, followed by another review once the data
collection has been completed.
This study followed Kathy Charmaz’s advice by carrying out an initial
literature review before beginning the first data collection in form of a pilot
study. The main reason for this early literature review was to learn whether
any similar research had already been conducted in this area and to receive
some guidance in formulating the interview questions. The final review of the
literature was guided by findings from the empirical data collections and the
development of the final GT categories, which were supported by written and
visual memos.
After conducting the very first set of pilot study interviews, I felt that
using existing theoretical models could restrict the way in which the data
was interpreted and analysed could hinder the development of ideas and
thoughts. Grounded theory offered an inductive approach, as well as a
structured process, both for data collection and analysis. Another rea-
son for choosing the methodology for my study was that GTM allows
[the researcher] to focus the study on individuals’ perceptions of a
phenomenon—in the context of this study their mobile phone and the data
generated by it.
CODING SOFTWARE
For the pilot study interviews, the qualitative analysis software NVivo was used
in an attempt to make the time-consuming process of open coding quicker
and more efficient.
However, using software to assign codes to interview transcripts did not
produce the expected results, as for example, using the software made it difficult
to keep an overview of all the codes that had been produced over time. I also
felt constrained by the software functionality to sort and categorise the codes
and seemed to spend more time dealing with the software, rather than concen-
trating on the meaning of the interviewees’ statements. Finally, the decision
was taken to discard this approach of using the computer screen and software
but instead I used pen and paper as well as post it notes and flip chart paper.
(Figure 19.1 indicates Gorra’s GT research process.)
Transmissia Semiawan
Transmissia completed her PhD in 2007, “The Crystal Maze Inside –

Out: Information Management Framework for Higher Education Institutions.”
369
Interview Theory
Open Interlink
coding categories to
build theory
group similar
add label
Initial/focused codes
Phenomena Categories
codes
for example event, may have

object, action or share properties properties and
idea dimensions
FIGURE 19.1 Andrea Gorra’s model of her research process.
THE PRACTICE OF GTM
The Implementation of GTM using OO Concept
There have been a number of critical writings about GT method. Most of the
writings debate the practice of the method, particularly the process of com-
parative analysis through coding. The founders of GT method—Glaser and
Strauss—had different perspectives on the process. This has impact on the
development and refinement of the method in relation to its epistemology
and the underlying philosophical assumptions of GT method as a qualitative
method. The impact involved GT method with two epistemologies: positivist
and interpretive. Consequently, with the dual root of its epistemology, the GT
method has been adopted in at least two major different approaches with their
specific characteristics.
With reference to the dual root of its epistemologies, GT method is con-
tested but also flexible, researchers may develop and adapt in terms of apply-
ing and practicing it in different ways in the theory development process.
Considering this idea, I implemented GT method using the constructivist
approach but from the perspective of Object-Orientation (OO). I was chal-
lenged to combine the O-O concepts with GT method in approaching the con-
struction of the meaning process leading towards the development of theory
as my study was intended to generate model within which the construction of
meaning from the reality is concerned.
…
INITIAL PHASE
Initial phase is the phase to take initial coding by means of the line-by-line
coding, which results in some ideas/meanings based on the interpretation
of data appearing in “actions” within every single line or paragraph of data
(Charmaz, 2006). To make the processes easier, I applied the following steps:
370
¤ From the textual data of interview, find the significant data by

interpreting the reality therein the data based on each of “the
participants’ actions and statements.” This is the way I analysed the
data from each participant’s perspective.
¤ Symbolise or make a code of the significant data “with words that
reflect the action” (Charmaz, 2006) and create a list of action
phrases. According to Strauss (1987) these action phrases are
called empirical-indicators that are the actual data that describes
actions or statements in “the words” of the participants.
¤ Focus on the list of action phrases and do comparative analysis
over the action phrases and find one or more phrases that have
similar ideas or meanings.
¤ Try to think of a “name” which represents a group with similar
meaning. As the comparison process continues, the indicators
become concept-indicators that lead towards “an underlying
uniformity which in turn results in categories” (Strauss, 1987). This
is the beginning of applying the OO ideas of conceptualisation and
class relationship as I sensitively examine the data and objectifying
the phenomena by looking at similarities and differences through
the data.
FOCUS PHASE
Focused coding is the next stage through which the classifying process is
undertaken in terms of the development of the relevant categories. Through
this process, an abstract thinking process is involved at the level of properties
and the dimensions of the data.
…
Through comparison analysis the activity above needs to be carried out
constantly in order to bring out other objects and/or their properties. As the
comparison analysis activity continues, I identified other properties … It is
important to note that all of the properties do not come from one group of
action phrases. They may come from the combination of different groups of
action phrases.
…
AXIAL CODING
This phase requires more conceptual analysis because it will give a “big pic-
ture” or “paradigm” through the integration of “structure and process.” This
is in terms of looking at the relationship among the categories to their sub-
categories which provide “more precise and complete explanations about the
phenomena” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
371
¤ Axial coding relates categories to subcategories, specifies the

properties and dimensions of a category, and reassembles the
data you have fractured during initial coding to give coherence to
emerging analysis (Charmaz, 2006, p. 60)
¤ The paradigm will be seen as a combination of the following three
elements (Strauss & Corbin, 1998):
¤ conditions: set or circumstances or situations, in which
phenomena are embedded; these answer the why, where, how
come, and when questions
¤ actions/interactions: strategic or routine responses made by
individuals or groups to issues, problems, happenings, or events
that arise under those conditions; these answer by whom and how
questions
¤ consequences: outcomes of actions/interactions; these answer
what happens because of actions/interactions
The three elements, as Strauss-Corbin further explained, give “patterns of hap-
penings, events, or actions/interactions that represent what people do or say,
alone or together, in response to the problems and situations in which they
find themselves.”
Along with the OO thinking process, I acknowledge the three elements
above through the relationships across the categories and sub-categories using
other characteristics, which are dimensions
…
SELECTIVE CODING
This phase, according to Glaser (1978), Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Strauss
& Corbin (1998), is “defining a central category” and “integrating and refin-
ing the theory.” This is in terms of refining the paradigm or big picture of the
phenomena defined during the axial coding (Strauss & Corbin) or theoretical
codes from the theoretical coding (Glaser). To do this, I need to find a category
or an object class that has a “prime function” to relate other object classes
into an integrated theory (Strauss, 1987). The main or the core category brings
together all the categories by linking them to the level of their properties and/
or dimensions and brings “the substantive meaning” across the connection of
the categories (Glaser, 1978) and fits into the study context.
…
In this phase of selective coding, the “big picture” should be refined into
an integrated theory which provides a description of the whole situation of the
study context in a theoretical direction (Charmaz, 2006).
To see the generated theory occurring over the connection of the catego-
ries around the core category, researchers may need to represent it through
372
theoretical coding. Glaser (1978) gives details of 18 types of coding families as

the theoretical coding types. One of the types is called model which has been
adopted to illustrate the generated theory. I take two models to describe the the-
ory, one is an algorithm-like model and the other is diagrammed-style model.
It was noticed that most of the discussions on coding process above—
open, axial, and theoretical coding—involve results from part of the study.
The results have been considered as “theoretical sampling” which is the point
where researchers decide to carry out further analysis and data collecting
(Strauss, 1987). It is an initial theory and it is only a “sampling” which is not
enough to represent the entire real situation in the fieldwork (Charmaz, 2002).
It is therefore a call for me to discover more object classes or categories and
the relationships among them through deeper comparative analysis in order to
improve the conceptual theory and to give the best explanation about the real
situation under study (Strauss, 1969; Charmaz, 2002b).
In view of the explanation given above, the O-O model is highlighted in
terms of the objectifying process and can be used in the coding process in
order to identify the elements of theory as well as to build the theory. The
objectifying process can be applied in any types of coding process including
axial coding (introduced by Strauss & Corbin) and theoretical coding (referred
to by Glaser), although according to Charmaz the use of these two coding pro-
cess may be ineffective.
The objectifying process is well-suited to the constructivist approach
(referred to in Bryant & Charmaz) as this approach focuses on the construc-
tion of meaning by the individual’s action, interaction and interpretation in
their social activity. Yet, looking at the fundamental aspect of it, the objectify-
ing process is anchored to Strauss theory of “action” as he stresses that “… it is
the definition of what the object “is” that allows action to occur with reference
to what it is taken to be” (Strauss, 1969). In view of that, the use of the objecti-
fying process in the research study was not forcefully applied in any particular
coding process; rather it called attention to classificatory process within which
the codes, categories and concepts were identified by means of their properties
and characteristics.
LESSONS LEARNED
Key lessons I learned from using GTM—particularly from the constructivist

point of view—are as follows:
¤ In relation to the GT method itself—I found out that there are
two skills required when using the method: strong analytical
thinking and theoretical sensitivity. Strong analytical thinking is
required particularly in relation to the conceptualisation process
and the construction of meaning process. These two processes
373
are reasonably difficult to carry out as they strongly count on

the abstract thinking process. To deal with this, I found the
three strategies of generating theory were very important to
become familiar with as they could help researchers to grasp the
fundamental idea of GTM. Moreover, I believe researchers as
grounded theory analysts need to have theoretical sensitivity. This
is mainly in relation to defining the elements of theory and finding
the relationship amongst them towards the generation of theory.
These two are the very basic skills required to become experienced
and be recognised as a grounded theorist.
¤ In relation to the research process and the role of methods, the
role of GTM was very important as the method used from the
beginning of the research work until the development of a theory.
Using the core processes of GTM—conceptual abstract process
and the process of construction of meaning—the method can be
applied to define the research domain, to signify elements of the
theory towards the generation of a theory by means of coding, and
to validate the generated theory. This is the way in which we can
learn how data is constructed, how theory is constructed from data
and how researchers construct the theory.
¤ Other key aspects of the GT method that I learned include:
¤ Conceptual abstract process—this is a very basic process of
generating elements of theory and the theory itself [by means of
construction of meanings].
¤ Comparative analysis—this is a method that can be used to
“discover” or to develop a theory from data by generating
elements of theory which are categories, properties, and
hypotheses. All elements of theory are conceptual abstractions
which are “discovered” (by objectivist) or “defined” (by
constructivist) during data collection and analysis as well as
coding process.
¤ Coding process—this is the way through which researchers carry

out the comparative analysis. It is a conceptualisation process
and “we are coding on the basis of concepts and how they
vary according to their properties and dimensions” (Strauss &
Corbin, 1998, p. 88).
¤ Memoing or memo writing—this allows researchers to illustrate
their interpretation over the data either in “free-style” writing
or in a formal analytical statement. This activity is important
because it directs the step from analysis to writing the theory
(Charmaz, 2002).
374
Stella Walsh
Stella completed her PhD in 2007, “Food choices of older working-class women”
PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE USE OF GROUNDED

THEORY METHODOLOGY.
The intention of this paper is to reflect on a very personal journey on some of

the challenges and advantages of the application and use of grounded theory
methodology (GTM) in research. The reflection is based on a PhD research
project which was an investigation into the “Food choices and consumption
patterns of older working-class women” in Leeds. Reflecting on GTM is not
a straightforward task, as some of the perceived disadvantages of GTM also
became its key strengths.
Previous work in the 1980s on the older population and food and eating
habits had been undertaken before the start of this particular piece of research.
At the time the government were activity encouraging changes in the diet of
the population and low income had been identified as a barrier to making
healthier food choices (little has changed). The link between old age and pov-
erty had also been well documented in the U.K. The healthy diet agenda and
low income set the underlying context for the selection of older working-class
women for the research. Gender was a central theme in the study, as women
survive longer than men. Females have a higher risk of living on low incomes
and in poverty, as a consequence of a range of life-long gender inequalities,
and that twice as many older women as older men will live in poverty. The
women were selected from an area in Leeds which was known for the high
levels of deprivation. The study aimed to identify and explore the practices of
older people living independently within the community, and to understand
the strategies employed by older women on low income to select food. The role
of income together with other factors as identified by the older people them-
selves were examined, to identify the importance of food, in terms of health
and cultural significance in the daily lives of older people.
At the outset of this research a quantitative approach was being used to
document older women’s food patterns and determine nutritional status, and
grounded theory had not been given any consideration. Two factors contrib-
uted to the change in direction and the subsequent use of grounded theory.
Firstly in 1992 the Department of Heath published a comprehensive report
which outlined the nutritional status of the older population indicating that
the dietary intake was adequate and there were no significant nutritional prob-
lems in the older population. Therefore the premises of the initial research and
the need to document food intake to determine nutritional adequacy were no
longer relevant.
375
Secondly, the initial work undertaken in the field with older working-class
women provided valuable insights into the most appropriate methods of col-
lecting data from this age group. The fieldwork clearly indicated older women’s
reluctance to complete written questionnaires and written seven-day dietary
surveys (the latter were viewed as the norm at time to collect nutritional data).
It was pointed out by a local community worker (with experience of working
with this age group) that these women had left school at fourteen and although
they could read and write, it was not an activity they necessarily found easy.
More importantly it was already emerging that the women viewed food in a
more holistic manner than in the way I had envisaged in the initial research
planning. Food was discussed in a holistic manner “grounded” in the context
of their lived experience and was not viewed separately as perceived in the
research foci, and they were keen to talk about their experiences.
Based on these observations I met with my tutor, a sociologist, to discuss
the progress and findings. I referred to the women’s holistic view of food and
it being “grounded” in a lifetime of experience. He questioned me about the
future approach and suggested I consider the use of “grounded theory.” I agreed
I would use grounded theory, but I simply did not understand and thought we
were talking about the same things as I was using the notion of the women’s
“grounded” experience. He suggested I read the literature on grounded the-
ory methodology, I did and I recognised the difference in my nuanced use of
the term and more importantly the usefulness of the approach as it was more
suited to the qualitative direction that the study was now taking. It could be
argued that it was a misunderstanding that led me to the discovery of GT.
Glaser and Strauss (1967) are the originators of grounded theory. Although
Gibson (2007) notes that GTM may not seem very controversial now, at the
time it raised a degree of scepticism. Gibson’s comments may help to explain
the debates around GTM and the differing foci taken by Glaser and Strauss.
Ranges of authors have provided reviews of grounded theory’s historical back-
ground and its subsequent development (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Bryant,
2002; Seale 2004; Kelle, 2007; Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). The publication
by Bryant and Charmaz (2007) Handbook of Grounded Theory explores the
divergent views that now surround GT and many of the differences identi-
fied by authors in distinguishing GT as it has developed. They highlight the
continuing complexities, criticisms and conundrums associated with the
method, but also the great richness and uses of GTM. It is not felt appropri-
ate to include a detailed discussion of the controversies that abound relating
to the split between Strauss and Glaser. However a major issue and one of the
problems of adopting GTM in writing for a PhD submission are how much
of this debate to include or exclude, it appears that to be on the safe side most
students include a lengthy discussion. As the method has been developed over
time and moved on by other authors’ justification of the focus and approach
376
being used in my view is more important. In this study it was based on a con-
sideration of grounded theory using guidelines by Strauss and Corbin (1998)
and as time went on it developed using work by Charmaz.
The importance of GTM for the current work was the relevance placed on
knowledge that was constructed from people’s lived experience, and that the
methodology favoured the use of intrinsic common-sense meanings, which
were being expressed by the older women and contextualised in their local
knowledge. The study design included three staged semi-structured qualita-
tive interviews, which also reflected the aims of GT. The use of three inter-
views fitted with the cyclical process of GTM, collecting data, analysing the
initial interviews before returning to the field to collect more data. The pro-
cess allowed collection of personal descriptions based on lived experience,
expressed and formulated in the women’s own words that provided valuable
opportunities for the participant’s stories to gain depth, detail and resonance.
Information gained from subsequent interviews established a stronger basis
for creating understanding of the wider social processes related to food.
Grounded theory guidelines indicate the need to develop qualitative inter-
views but do not provide details of how these should be undertaken and as
Charmaz (2000) points out GTM does not specify data collection methods.
This for some may be a disadvantage; however, I found it useful as it provided
flexibility. I referred to work by Fielding (1993) and a range of other literature
such as Silverman and Seale for guidance and to help understand the issues
in qualitative interviewing. Moreover as this was a feminist piece of work the
feminist literature related to this was also explored, but at times was unhelp-
ful as at the extremes it raged against any forms of interviewing due to power
relations (Stanley and Wise, 1983). It would be useful for these researchers
to interview older women; as an academic I knew where the power lay and
contrary to all the theory, it was not with me. As to interviews being falsified
I took heart from the following quote “Only a small minority, at the best of
times, can have the necessary sharp-wittedness to make up all the answers-
and compared with the effort involved in this, to state the truth is ordinarily
far simpler”(Elliston, 1965).
The GT process involves details of data collection, methods of coding, data
analysis and the development of related concepts that became the building
blocks of theory. The process of analysing the data and collecting the data run
in parallel and inform each other. Therefore using the grounded theory frame-
work following transcription of the initial interviews, analysis starts to inform
further interviews to collect further data. It sounds clear but in practice the
volume and variety of themes that develop can be overwhelming, particularly
as the data has to be scrutinized in such detail. I also used various computer
software packages which all proved unhelpful and even more time consuming.
One of the strengths and also a potential weakness of GTM is the ability to
use these emerging perspectives or categories to develop theory. The process
377
allowed the women a means to express the way they engaged with food, which
incorporated their understanding of factors that influence their food choices.
The strength in the method is the potential to discover new areas of theory
based in the data; the challenge is in recognising them and also knowing if
they have been addressed elsewhere in the literature. Problems arose as fre-
quently themes emerged which were outside my area of expertise and required
the need to talk to other specialists to help provide insights into the requisite
literature to pursue, otherwise it becomes an impossible task.
It has been argued that the major value of the GTM is that it has “the
potential” to generate theory. For the novice researcher and also somebody
wanting to submit for a PhD, the development of theory is significant to the
outcome. In this case it would be based on development of theoretical under-
standing of the older women’s lives and that the theory would be grounded in
data and evidence-based research. This is also one of the drawbacks of the use
of GTM as at the outset there is the belief that theory will develop, however
there are no certainties, (although this may be true of all research activity).
Charmaz (2000) points out that GTM provides analytical strategies and a flex-
ible framework for the development of theory. The uncertainty whether theory
development may develop is very stressful. Grounded theory also argues that
theoretical saturation will occur and that there is the need for theoretical sen-
sitivity. Selden (2000) argues that theoretical sensitivity is not found in the
data but by the researcher. As a researcher it is unclear, particularly at the out-
set, how all of this will be achieved. … [One problem is] that there are varia-
tions in degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same
category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions.
This relates to Gibson’s concern (2007); he discusses the potential for plurality
of options in GTM for theory building and the problem that it is not readily
apparent how differing disciplines may take a variety of approaches. Moreover
the limitations may be compounded if the approach or approaches are not
clearly stated by the researcher. Despite these problems of uncertainty these
are overcome by adopting and working in a strategic manner, such as writing
memos, being aware of limitations, being open minded and also revisiting the
literature and when necessary completing more data collection.
Any reflection on the use of GTM would not be complete without men-
tion of the role of and use of literature as there has been much criticism and
debate around the role of literature in GTM. Seldon (2000) argues that the
literature is an essential part of the process of developing theoretical sensitivity
and theory in GTM and therefore cannot be divorced from it. I had extensive
knowledge of food literature prior to the start of using GTM but had little
background in many of the themes that emerged. Dey (2007) identifies sev-
eral problems with the classical accounts in coding in GT namely the inabil-
ity to clearly assign categories and events as coding is centred on theoretical
sampling and theoretical saturation, which he attributes to the lack of prior
378
literature and theory, actively discouraged in the early development of GT. On

the other hand Charmaz (2006) qualifies that the use of the literature review in
grounded theory has been misrepresented and she refers to the process as the
disrupted literature review. In my view using the latter interpretation results
in one of the major strengths of grounded theory, with the caveat that the
researcher engages in an active process of research to develop the literature.
The literature can be developed as the process proceeds with the potential to
allow themes to develop (and in reality is probably representative of much
research activity); however it also has its limitations.
The following provides two examples that illustrate these difficulties and
also the creativity that can emerge. The examples also illustrate the need for
support and help in the development of theoretical sensitivity and use of the
literature review. The first example involves the emergence of the role of gos-
sip as a key category identified by the women around shopping for food and
the way it influenced times of shopping, the selection of friends the women
would shop with, those women who kept details confidential rather than those
who gossiped. The whole area of gossip was outside my area of expertise, yet it
was developing as a central theme and an unexpected finding. I sought advice
with tutors and was grateful for the expertise of Professor John K. Walton. He
suggested that I use the work of Melanie Tebbitt. Once I was introduced to
the literature the necessary links were made and developed the theme fully.
Without this help and direction the process would have been much more time
consuming and not as fruitful. Likewise Professor Walton was instrumental
in directing me to read the work of Richard Hoggart, “The Uses of Literacy.”
I was unaware of the work and the title was not inspiring, I was working on
food and I questioned why I should be reading this material. The full title
added little to persuade me; “The uses of Literacy: Aspects of working-class
life with special reference to publications and entertainments.”1 The advice
to read this work was ignored for months; however, when I reluctantly read
the work I quickly realised its value. A large section of the work records the
food and eating habits of the working-classes in Leeds in the 1950s. Moreover
some of the older women I interviewed had lived in the area where the work
had been recorded and the literature provided means of external triangu-
lation and greater depth to understanding in order to develop the theory.
These examples reflect in part the GTM philosophy of not using the literature
too much at the outset. However they also stress the need to pursue relevant
literature and the need for theoretical saturation which can only really be
achieved if the relevant literature is discovered, without this theory cannot be
fully developed.
In conclusion I remain a fan of GTM as it provided the flexibility that was
necessary to uncover the women’s stories, which then developed to add to an
understanding of the sociology of widowhood, which was totally unexpected
379
at the outset. GTM allowed for the development of the data in unexpected
ways, although it was time consuming, frustrating and also at times there was
great uncertainty and anxiety. The main question is would I use it again in
research or advise others to use it. The answer, in part, definitely; but approach
with caution.
PREMILA GAMAGE
Premila completed her PhD in 2012: Tele-service Utilisation in Sri Lanka

A Grounded Theory Analysis of the 1000 Telecentre Programme
Personal Reflection on the Use of Grounded Theory (GT) in PhD Study

This brief write-up provides my experience in using GT in the PhD study
which includes the rationale of the use, how the method has been employed
and the challenges faced. This study examined the tele-service utilisation
and the extent of the influence and effectiveness of the e-Sri Lanka’s 1000
Telecentre Development Programme (TDP) on reducing digital inequalities
in Sri Lanka. Qualitative research was carried out at five rural locations in
Sri Lanka to accomplish this.
I entered the field in June 2008 with the intention of conducting qualita-
tive research but not in accordance with any particular approach. However,
when I returned from the field to university I once again started thinking of
the approach and data analysis. Whilst again and again reading about research
methods and after attending few workshops on the same conducted by the
university I felt that GT fits well with the study’s interpretivist epistemolog-
ical position and analytic needs. Yet I had concerns. When adopting a GT
approach researchers begin their investigation with initial sampling and then
proceed to theoretical sampling. Since I had completed data collection and
returned to UK I was not in a position to go back to the field again to collect
more data. Therefore I was not sure whether I could apply GT for the analysis.
At the same time I came across another PhD student (from the same faculty)
who also conducted qualitative research without any specific approach like
me but thinking of adopting GT for the analysis. After the discussion which
we two had just after a GT lecture, we thought that though unintentionally,
we have followed GT in line with Charmaz for our studies. However I again
discussed the concerns with my Director of Studies [DoS]. This discussion led
me to realise that I need not go back to field again to collect data (theoretical
sampling) as the study was using interviews in several sites (centres) and thus
data could be used for comparison. Further he suggested that I read literature
on GT which I did. This helped me to get a clear idea of GT and I started ana-
lysing data with confidence.
In GT the data collection and analysis progress simultaneously and the
emerging ideas and theory directs the identification and selection of further
380
sources and participants. For this reason I felt that the study was not con-
ducted in true GT approach (the interpretation of data to feed back into the
collection of more data), and therefore I initially claimed that GT has applied
only for the analysis of data.
The data collection began at the first research site for this study but I did
not formally analyse data. However, as soon as possible after the each inter-
view notes were made on the interviews. Thereafter, I listened to interviews
several times and read and re-read notes. This process enabled me to identify
various ideas and concepts that emerge from data and directed my later data
collection accordingly. The interviews were semi-structured so questions were
changed or specific questions were asked to develop data. The range of diverse
participants included in subsequent interviews strengthens emerging concepts
and filled out the gaps in data (as suggested in a grounded theory approach by
Charmaz, 2006). Furthermore data collection was extended to second, third,
fourth and fifth sites repeating the same process. After reading the draft meth-
odology chapter where I explained the above data collection process, two of
the members in my supervisory panel thought that even though the GT had
not been adopted at the initial stages I have located the methods in GT as the
study progressed and data collection was underway.
Initial data was analysed individually for each research site and subse-
quently analysed collectively for all five sites. Although this study was con-
ducted more in line with the Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Charmaz
(2006) approach, transcripts were analysed using “key point coding” (Glaser,
1992) which means identifying key points rather than individual words.
Strauss and Corbin’s (2008) “microanalysis technique, analysing data line-by-
line and word-by-word” (pp. 58-60) was not used because dividing the data
into individual words sometimes causes the analysis to become lost within the
details of data. This may have been especially true in this study and may have
led to greater confusion since the interviews were conducted in Sinhala lan-
guage (one of the native languages in Sri Lanka) and translated into English.
Therefore, it was useful to identify key points and allow the concepts to emerge.
I revisited transcripts again and again to identify points such as events,
activities, functions, relationships, contexts, influences and outcomes
(Douglas, 2003) regarded as important to the investigation. Afterwards the
important segments were very carefully translated from Sinhala to English.
Translation was an extremely difficult task because it was not easy to find the
same meaning or the closest words for some Sinhala words in English. At such
occasions, instead of finding one closest word, I described the situation or the
real meaning by using a few sentences that addressed the issue.
Even though I attended NVivo workshops conducted by the university
I decided to do coding manually. I found from many other fellow students that
even though they have used software programmes to code data at the end they
also had to incorporate manual coding. Therefore I thought better to stick to
381
manual coding. Initially I thought to do coding by using “post-it notes” but

had to give up the idea for practical reasons. At the initial level of coding, a
large number of codes get generated. Therefore a considerable amount of space
is required for laying post-it notes for sorting. Therefore, I used MS Word as
a substitute surface and tables, and text-boxes as post-it notes. A colour code
was applied to differentiate the research sites, concepts and categories.
The translated key points were coded by using simple, short and active
words which reflect those points (Charmaz, 2006; Douglas, 2003). While look-
ing and re-looking for emerging codes, at times more than one code emerged
from the same text. Most of the initial codes were descriptive codes from the
text, which included in-vivo codes or the very terms used by the research
participants in the field to preserve the voice of the participants (Strauss
and Corbin, 1998). During the process of coding, writing memos were also
started. Initial memos helped to capture the key elements/ideas arose from
the interviews and also to incorporate those in the analysis. Afterwards I read
through these coded transcripts to identify the concepts that share common
characteristics or meaning. The concepts were typed in a MS Word worksheet.
Subsequently codes that related to common themes or concepts were clustered
around their respective “concepts.” Thereafter I identified the common charac-
teristics among concepts and grouped those to form categories.
However, during the initial analysis I encountered following problems:
¤ I was uncertain whether to go back and refer my research questions
during the analysis. I was advised by DoS not to devise research
questions during the analysis. As I realised later, otherwise the
initial codes would have done forcefully just to provide the answers
to the questions.
¤ Most of the codes from the data in second research site did not
match with the first site. Therefore, I was not certain how to
proceed with the analysis. As per DoS instructions, I started with
third and fourth sites and then again began the analysis of second
site where I found similar codes.
¤ During the analysis it was difficult for me to find most appropriate
wordings/labels for the concepts and categories emerged. I was
not sure whether this was due to my limited vocabulary or limited
analytical skills but now I think for the both. I feel now if I were given
the chance to code again I would come up with a different set of codes.
¤ I was not certain about the next steps, when to stop the analysis
and when/how to form/emerge the theory. However when I started
coding for fourth and fifth research sites I automatically realised
that I can stop as no new codes are emerging.
Identification of a core-category was not an easy task for me. As a novice
researcher to GT and PhD student who has to meet strict deadlines I was so
382
stressed during the identification process of core category. Apparently I was

worried throughout the analysis not knowing whether the theory will develop
from the analysis. I looked for DoS guidance and had several discussions with
him about the emerged themes and concepts. Then two themes were consid-
ered as core categories but uncertainty remained as both categories were not
solely developed by me as researcher. Therefore once again the research data
was reviewed, and engaged in integrating categories and creating the order of
the data. During this process “Utilisation of Tele-services” was chosen as the
core-category, as it plays a vital role in influencing other categories.
While I was about to complete the writing of the discussion with actual
data I suddenly realised that for GT everything is data and I can include in
the analysis some of the data that I gathered from secondary sources for the
background chapter (digital divide policy perspectives). This introduced
a new category to the framework already developed. I consider this as an
advantage of GT.
Finally I compared the categories, sub-categories, their relationship and
the theory generated with the existing literature. This involved looking for
similarities or contradictions to this and if so, the reasons. I reviewed a broad
range of literature, including that on the digital divide, ICT for development,
and Telecentres to establish how the theory fit, or validated my results or
extended the already existing theories or contradicted them.
Criticising the grounded theory coding procedure Seale (1999: 104) claims
that coding in grounded theory is simply indexing. Yet to what extend coding
can be defined as indexing depends greatly on the researcher’s methodological
talent, theoretical sensitivity and qualitative analytical skills. For this study,
I wrote theoretical memos as a technique (Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin,
1990) and also compared with the literature that transforms pure coding or
indexing into an analytical interpretation. However, as mentioned earlier I did
not write memos during the early stages of data collection as my intention
was conducting a qualitative study without any particular approach. But later
stages I was able to use my field-notes and diaries as memos which helped
enormously. Yet I wish I had written memos in a more methodological man-
ner because as Charmaz (2006) stated I could have easily compiled those to
create the thesis. Finally I would like to state that I became a GT fan because of
its flexible and systematic approach which also could be a challenge for novice
researchers like me. However, I will use it entirely different manner if I were
given another chance to conduct a study.
Note
1. Hoggart, R. (1992:1957). The uses of literacy. Aspects of working-class life with
special reference to publications and entertainments. London, Penguin.
383
20
Charles Darwin
THE SURVIVAL OF THE GROUNDED THEORIST
Every great advance in science has issued from a new audacity of

imagination.
—John Dewey (The Quest for Certainty, 1929, ch. XI)
The theory of evolution springs to mind whenever anyone asks me for an

example of a scientific theory, although, as I pointed out in Chapter 4, the
term theory itself can also be used in a more derogatory sense; something that
is commonly aimed at the theory of evolution by those favouring “creationism”
aka “Intelligent Design” who claim evolution is “only a theory.” Darwin’s work,
however, has stood the test of time and the theory of evolution can certainly
be regarded as an exemplar of scientific reasoning and knowledge. But to what
extent can Darwin himself be considered as a grounded theorist?
Darwin was working and writing some 100 years before Barney Glaser
and Anselm Strauss developed GTM, but if their newly discovered method
was an effective one for generating innovative theories and concepts, then it
should be no surprise to find previous examples of theory generation resonat-
ing with GTM. In fact, as this chapter will demonstrate, Darwin’s comments
on his own work illustrate some of the key features of GTM in an eerily pre-
scient manner. So perhaps GTM was discovered in a manner similar to Cook’s
discovery of Australia! (See Table 4.3.)
Before proceeding with this line, however, I need to clarify the title of this
chapter with its intimation of the phrase “survival of the fittest.” Although the
phrase is now closely linked to the theory of evolution and Darwin himself,
it was coined by Herbert Spencer after he had read Darwin’s On the Origin
of Species, first published in the 1859. Spencer used the term in the context
of arguing that his economic theories echoed Darwin’s biological work. “This
survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms,
is that which Mr. Darwin has called natural selection, or the preservation of
favoured races in the struggle for life.” Darwin took up the phrase in the fifth
edition of his book, using it in the sense of “better designed for an immediate,
local environment.” 383
384
The phrase “survival of the fittest” was taken up by various groups, collec-
tively referred to as “Social Darwinists,” who proceeded to use it as a justifica-
tion for inequalities in society and a laissez-faire, market capitalism with huge
disparities in wealth and access to resources. Darwin himself, however, was far
more cautious.
If we look at Darwin’s Autobiography, now available in a complete form
online,1 there is ample evidence that he was a Grounded Theorist ahead of his
time. Consider the following extract:
After my return to England it appeared to me that by following the exam-
ple of Lyell in Geology, and by collecting all facts which bore in any way
on the variation of animals and plants under domestication and nature,
some light might perhaps be thrown on the whole subject. My first note-
book was opened in July 1837. I worked on true Baconian principles, and
without any theory collected facts on a wholesale scale, more especially with
respect to domesticated productions, by printed enquiries, by conversa-
tion with skilful breeders and gardeners, and by extensive reading. When
I see the list of books of all kinds which I read and abstracted, including
whole series of Journals and Transactions, I am surprised at my industry.
I soon perceived that selection was the keystone of man’s success in mak-
ing useful races of animals and plants. But how selection could be applied
to organisms living in a state of nature remained for some time a mystery
to me. (p. 120 –emphasis added)
Darwin stresses how he went to great pain to amass “all facts,” using “true
Baconian principles.” Francis Bacon, writing in the seventeenth century, pro-
posed what would now be regarded as an empirical and inductive approach
to science, contrasting it with conjectural and syllogistic reasoning (see
Chapter 13). Darwin invokes this approach to underline the basis of his work
in detailed observations and careful data gathering. Ironically one strand of
criticism of GTM refers to its basis in “naive Baconian induction”; although
Brian Haig (1996) defends it from this censure.
The other aspect of this extract from Darwin is the claim that the data col-
lection was conducted “without any theory”; something that could have been
taken word-for-word from many GTM publications.
A few pages later we come across an example of serendipity and abductive
thinking.
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic
enquiry, I happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population, and
being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which every-
where goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals
and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favour-
able variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be
385
Charles Darwin 385
destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. Here,
then, I had at last got a theory by which to work; but I was so anxious to
avoid prejudice, that I determined not for some time to write even the
briefest sketch of it. (p. 123 –emphasis added)
Louis Pasteur is credited with the saying, “in the fields of observation chance
favours only the prepared mind,” which is also in evidence in the extract
from Darwin’s work. Darwin, into his second year of detailed observation
and data gathering, came across Robert Malthus’s work by chance. Had this
occurred two years earlier he would not have been in a position to make the
link between the Malthusian model and his own developing ideas. Malthus
argued that social progress could not continue indefinitely since population
growth would outstrip the growth in resources unless famine, disease, or war
intervened.2 “The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power
in the earth to produce subsistence for man.” Darwin made the link between
this argument, based on human society, and what he would later term “natural
selection,” centering on the natural world as a whole.
As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly
survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for
existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any man-
ner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying condi-
tions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally
selected. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will
tend to propagate its new and modified form. (On the Origin of Species)
The extract from On the Origin of Species is part of his extended account of
the theory of evolution, published in the late 1850s. The previous extract dates
from 20 years earlier and is an example of an abductive leap, demonstrating his
ability to take account of “all possible explanations” arriving at “the most plau-
sible interpretation,” leading to discovery or invention of a “new rule” which
moves away from the conventional wisdom. (See Chapter 13 and the quota-
tions from Kathy Charmaz and Jo Reichertz on the nature of abduction).
A little later in the account of his method, Darwin makes the following
point.
The success of the Origin may, I think, be attributed in large part to my
having long before written two condensed sketches, and to my having finally
abstracted a much larger manuscript, which was itself an abstract. By this
means I was enabled to select the more striking facts and conclusions. I
had, also, during many years, followed a golden rule, namely, that whenever
a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was
opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and
at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were
far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones. Owing to
386
this habit, very few objections were raised against my views which I had
not at least noticed and attempted to answer. (p. 130 –all emphasis added)
Not only does Darwin use the actual term—memorandum—but he also indi-
cates that he composed these contemporaneously. Furthermore there are dif-
ferent forms of memo, including “condensed sketches” and “abstracts.” There
is even an intimation of theoretical sorting with the observation that the larger
manuscript was itself derived from these sketches.
The memoing aspect and theoretical sorting are also evident in some later
sections of his writing.
There seems to be a sort of fatality in my mind leading me to put at first
my statement and proposition in a wrong or awkward form. Formerly
I used to think about my sentences before writing them down; but for
several years I have found that it saves time to scribble in a vile hand whole
pages as quickly as I possibly can, contracting half the words; and then
correct deliberately. Sentences thus scribbled down are often better ones
than I could have written deliberately. (pp. 137–138)
I first make the rudest outline in two or three pages, and then a larger
one in several pages, a few words or one word standing for a whole dis-
cussion or series of facts. Each of these headings is again enlarged and
often transformed before I begin to write in extenso. As in several of my
books facts observed by others have been very extensively used, and as
I have always had several quite distinct subjects in hand at the same time,
I may mention that I keep from thirty to forty large portfolios, in cabinets
with labelled shelves, into which I can at once put a detached reference
or memorandum. I have bought many books and at their ends I make an
index of all the facts that concern my work; or, if the book is not my own,
write out a separate abstract, and of such abstracts I have a large drawer
full. Before beginning on any subject I look to all the short indexes and make
a general and classified index, and by taking the one or more proper portfo-
lios I have all the information collected during my life ready for use. (p. 140,
emphasis added)
I quote these extracts at length because they are excellent summaries of the
key GTM processes and procedures. The one immediately above is exem-
plary in terms of theoretical sorting, although now Darwin’s filing cabinets
would be replaced by various software programs and perhaps color-coded
paper-based notes.
One of the innovations with GTM was that hypotheses become one of
the products of research, rather than one of the starting points. These prod-
ucts, however, can be taken up as starting points for further research in order
to validate them or enhance their explanatory power and usefulness. Again
Darwin worked along similar lines.
387
Charles Darwin 387
Towards the end of the work I give my well abused hypothesis of

Pangenesis. An unverified hypothesis is of little or no value. But if any one
should hereafter be led to make observations by which some such hypoth-
esis could be established, I shall have done good service, as an astonish-
ing number of isolated facts can thus be connected together and rendered
intelligible. (p. 136)
Finally Darwin deals with theoretical sensitivity.
I have now mentioned all the books which I have published, and these
have been the milestones in my life, so that little remains to be said. I am
not conscious of any change in my mind during the last thirty years,
excepting in one point presently to be mentioned; nor indeed could any
change have been expected unless one of general deterioration. But my
father lived to his eighty-third year with his mind as lively as ever it was,
and all his faculties undimmed; and I hope that I may die before my mind
fails to a sensible extent. I think that I have become a little more skilful in
guessing right explanations and in devising experimental tests; but this may
probably be the result of mere practice, and of a larger store of knowledge.
(p. 137, emphasis added)
Darwin delayed publishing his work for some time, and was eventually
prompted to do so after receiving a letter from Alfred Wallace arguing along
similar lines. Both theories were first presented at a meeting of the Linnean
Society in London in 1858. Wallace had actually supplied some specimens to
Darwin, collected on his (Wallace’s) trips to South America and Asia. The idea
of evolution and biological change was much in evidence in the nineteenth
century, so it might be contended that whether it was Darwin or Wallace gath-
ering data, the concept would have emerged anyway. But Darwin makes it
clear that this was not the case as far as he was concerned, although the extract
itself should be read carefully.
On the favourable side of the balance, I think that I am superior to the
common run of men in noticing things which easily escape attention, and
in observing them carefully. My industry has been nearly as great as it
could have been in the observation and collection of facts. What is far
more important, my love of natural science has been steady and ardent.
This pure love has, however, been much aided by the ambition to be
esteemed by my fellow naturalists. From my early youth I have had the
strongest desire to understand or explain whatever I observed,—that is,
to group all facts under some general laws. These causes combined have
given me the patience to reflect or ponder for any number of years over
any unexplained problem. As far as I can judge, I am not apt to follow
blindly the lead of other men. I have steadily endeavoured to keep my
388
mind free, so as to give up any hypothesis, however much beloved (and

I cannot resist forming one on every subject), as soon as facts are shown
to be opposed to it. Indeed I have had no choice but to act in this manner,
for with the exception of the Coral Reefs, I cannot remember a single first-
formed hypothesis which had not after a time to be given up or greatly
modified. This has naturally led me to distrust greatly deductive reason-
ing in the mixed sciences. On the other hand, I am not very sceptical,—a
frame of mind which I believe to be injurious to the progress of science;
a good deal of scepticism in a scientific man is advisable to avoid much
loss of time; for I have met with not a few men, who I feel sure have often
thus been deterred from experiment or observations, which would have
proved directly or indirectly serviceable. (pp. 141–142)
Here we have Darwin drawing attention to his own abilities and skills—close
observation, great industry, careful collection of facts, not following others
blindly. He also points to his weakness of being “not very sceptical.” But he
also stresses his personal motivation for his studies in the first place—a love of
natural science, and a strong desire to understand and explain.
Notes
1. http://darwin-online.org.uk/
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Robert_Malthus
389
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400
401
INDEX
Note: Page numbers followed by b, f, and t indicate boxes, figures, and tables, respectively.
Abduction, xii, 38, 61, 95–96, 102–103, 109t, Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data AnalysiS.
116, 122, 168–169, 224, 254, 269–279, 321, See Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data
349t–350t, 352(n3), 360t–361t, 364 AnalysiS (CAQDAS)
in Darwin’s work, 384–385 content. See Content analysis
definition of, 265 data. See Data analysis
in differential diagnosis, 276–277 narrative. See Narrative analysis
in scientific reasoning, 277 qualitative, 25
Absolute zero, 9, 11(n7) Analytical thinking, 372
Abstracting. See Abstraction The Analytic Language of John Wilkins, 225–226
Abstraction, xii, 97f, 100, 118–119, 131, 138, Anderson, C., 317–321, 333
146, 159, 169, 278, 328, 349t, 360t, 364, 373 Anguish, x, 71, 77t
and coding, 161, 176 Anna Karenina, 83, 217
as everyday activity, 161 Anomie, 66
hierarchy of codes, categories, and concepts Apophenia, 226, 247, 248(n11), 321
in, 121–122, 235 Application, 32t, 232
in initial coding, 133 and emergence, tension between, 167,
Abstraction-cum-abduction, 169 223, 226
Academic [term], 142, 146(n1) Approach(es), research, 15–16, 15t
Academic orthodoxy, challenges to, in 1960s, and products of research, 33–34
xii–xiii Aristotle, on essential and accidental properties,
Accident(s), of GTM, 45, 58(n7), 68, 96, 103–104
103–107, 108t, 148, 341, 351t, 348 Art as Experience, 80, 340
Accidental properties, 103–104 Artificial intelligence, 274
Ackoff, R., 319 Artinian, B., 133, 138–139, 139(n3), 151,
Action(s), 24, 114, 349t, 372. See also 228–229, 229t, 278, 359
Social action Australia, 218, 248(n2)
analysis of, 110 Average, 7
classification and, 308–309 Avison, D., 300–301
observation of, 164 Awareness, 69, 122
situated, 350t Awareness of Dying, ix–x, xiii, 13, 19t, 32t, 35,
theories of, 37t 64–65, 69–70, 77t, 83, 86t, 91, 98, 112(n3),
Action phrases, 189, 370 115, 127, 134, 147, 198, 210, 222, 249, 265,
Action research, 87, 172 268, 275–276, 307t, 350t, 361t, 359
Actions/interactions, 190, 336, 351t, Axial coding, 81(n8), 167, 220t, 223–224, 367,
344–344, 371 370–372
Active voice, 360t, 359
Adams, J.C., 277 Babchuk, W.A., 218
Adler, A., 48–50, 53 Bacon, F., 57, 384
Advanced beginner, 273 Badging, 292, 297(n1)
Agency, and structure, 114 Baker, G., 80
“The Age of Big Data,” 317–318, 331 Basic social process, 219t, 221
Agile practice, 305, 307t, 315(n3) Basics of Grounded Theory: Emergence vs.
Agile manifesto, 37, 37t, 58(n12) Forcing, 217
Analysis, 15, 15t. See also Coding and analysis; Basics of Grounded Theory
specific method Analysis, x, 71 401
402
402 Index
Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory definition of, 121

Procedures and Techniques, x, 17, 24, 32t, later stages of, 227
61, 71–75, 80, 81(n8), 86t, 117, 131, Category(ies), 97f, 109t, 123t, 310–312, 311f
158–159, 166, 190, 219t, 220–223, 227, connection of, 371
276, 284, 340, 342, 361, 367 construction of, 119, 126, 129f
Bateson, G., 352(n3) core, 97, 97f, 122, 128, 141, 144, 200,
Bauman, Z., 114 201b–203b, 371, 381–382
Becker, H., 69, 336–337, 363 definition of, 118–119
Being There, 82(n14) development of, 111, 226, 235–236, 237f,
Benoliel, J. Quint. See Quint, J. 245–246, 376, 381
Berger, P., xii, 55, 76 dual role of, 227
Bias generation of, 222–223
confirmation, 50, 57, 272, 358 initial, 97f
falsification, 50–51 and subcategories, 370. See also Axial coding
Big Data, 226, 248(n5), 317–318, 360t. See also Central activity, 34
KDD (knowledge discovery in databases) Certainty, 338–339
critical issues for, 320–322 Charmaz, K., vii, xi, xv, 25, 31, 32t–33t, 34, 37t,
findings in, examples of, 331–332 40, 60–61, 70, 75–76, 79, 84–85, 86t, 88–91,
promise of, 319–320 95, 100, 103, 106, 107t, 109t, 110, 112(n2),
and specialist applications, 320–321 113–115, 118–122, 132(n1), 139, 159–161,
use of, 327 164–169, 172–176, 174(n6), 181–185,
Birks, M., 231 189–193, 197–200, 200b, 217–218, 221–225,
Bismarck, O. von, 193 230–232, 235–237, 240, 251–255, 261–265,
Black, T.R., 18 263f, 276, 278, 291, 304–305, 307t, 310, 339,
Black swan, 264(n2), 267, 278, 330 349t, 351t, 348, 361t, 359–360, 367–382. See
Blaxter, L., 4, 15, 15t, 42, 42t, 174(n5) also The Handbook of Grounded Theory
Blumer, H., 21, 24, 63, 65–68, 70, 80, 142, 148, Checkland, P., 5 Es, 306, 307t, 348
174(n1), 336–337, 339 Chicago School of Sociology, 21–24, 63, 65,
Boeije, H., 93 69, 75, 90, 336–340, 362–364. See also
Borges, J.L., 161, 225–226 Symbolic interactionism
Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, 5 Chomsky, N., 114
Bowker, G., 323 Clapton, E., 80
Box, G., 19, 45, 144, 308, 318 Clarke, A., 23–24, 70, 84, 202, 230–231, 240, 292b
Boys in White, 66, 69, 211, 214, 275, 336 Classic grounded theory, xi, 11(n1), 72, 85, 86t,
Brandom, R., 335 128, 133, 160, 217, 220t, 307t
Bridgman, P.W., 67 Classification, 308–309
Brooks, F.P., 103, 112(n10) Clooney, G., 331–332
Brooks, H., 210 Close Encounters of the Third Kind, xvi(n2)
Bruce, J., 80 Cluster(s), 119, 251
Bruner, J., 227 Coase, R., 317
Bryant, A., 42t, 76–78, 86t, 149, 160, 197, 218, Code(s), 97f, 123t, 329
255, 261–263, 263f, 293, 308, 315(n1), definition of, 118
322, 333(n1), 339, 352(n2), 352(n7), differing, among researchers, 133, 136,
372, 375. See also The Handbook of 139(n2), 157
Grounded Theory emergent, 235
Bryman, A., 15, 15t focused, 239, 239t
BSP. See Basic social process higher level, 97f
Burns, R.B., 18 initial, 97f, 100, 109t, 136, 228, 284–291,
285t–290t
CAQDAS. See Computer-Assisted Qualitative in vivo, 141–142, 163, 310
Data AnalysiS (CAQDAS) moving from, to categories, 127, 129f
Cartesian Rationalism, 338–339 plethora of, coping with, 167, 227
Case study method, 24–25 problems with, 381
Categorization, 96 substantive vs. theoretical, 130–131, 222, 224
Categorizing, 123t, 224–226 usefulness of, 138, 228
403
Index 403
Code for coding, 175–176 Cognitive map, 180–181, 182f

Coding, xiv, 27, 32t, 34, 61, 99–100, 103, 109t, Collaborative research, 32t
117–132, 123t, 146, 160–162, 165, 170– Columbia University, 63–65, 69–70, 123–124,
171, 220t, 221, 304, 330, 377, 380–381. 335–336, 364
See also Axial coding; Key point coding; Bureau of Applied Social Research, 64
Open coding; Selective coding; Substantive Comparative analysis, 308, 368–370, 372–373
coding; Theoretical coding Comparative method(s). See Constant
abstraction and, 161, 176 comparison, method of
advice on, 175–176 Competence, 273–274
alternatives for, 117 Composition, 312–314
with analysis, 58(n8) Computer(s), 20. See also Information system(s)
concerns about, 176–177 Computer applications, 18
before data collection, 122–123 Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data AnalysiS
data for, 193–194 (CAQDAS), 18, 196(n6)
definition of, 120–121 Comte, A., 45–47, 49, 174(n5)
example of, 134t Concept(s), 97f, 121–122, 123t, 313–314, 328.
focused, 235–236, 291–292, 292b–293b, See also Definitive concept; Sensitizing
293f, 370 concepts
with gerunds, 113–114, 176, 349t core, 97f, 113, 122
ideas and tips for, 174(n7) definition of, 118–120
incident-by-incident, 195 mid-level, 312–313, 313f
vs. indexing, 382 Concept [term], concept of, 233, 234t
initial, 126, 127f, 133, 194, 250, 284–291, Concept indicators, 189, 370
285t–290t Conceptual abstract process, 373
innovative aspects in GTM, 131 Conceptual density, 73
later stages of, 227 Conceptualization, 131, 229, 310, 360t, 372
line-by-line, 181–183, 188–190, 195, 367, 369 Conceptualizing, 123t
in Marienthal study vs. GTM, 124–125, 125f definition of, 121
methods for, comparison of, 140(n6), 160 Conceptual ordering, 219t, 221
by more than one researcher, 134–135 Conceptual schema(s), 99
moving from, to model, 167–168 Conceptual theory, 219t, 221
outcome of, 138 Conditions, 190, 371
as preserving, 157 Confirmation bias, 50, 57, 272, 358
prior to data collection, 131 Conjectures and Refutations, xii, 48, 50
problems with, 381 Consequences, 190, 371
process of, 158, 304–305, 373 Constant comparison, method of, 92–96, 101,
simple, 220t 109t, 110, 119, 126, 176
software for, 18, 368, 376, 380. See also NVivo Constellation, metaphor of, 112(n2)
thematic, 176 Construct(s), 32t
for topics and themes, 176 Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical
when to start, 194 Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, xi, xv,
word-by-word, 181–183, 195, 220t 25, 76, 79, 86t, 91, 110, 112(n2), 115, 118,
Coding-cum-analysis, 19t, 27, 30, 32t, 58(n8), 121, 251
108t, 166, 250, 349t Constructionist [term], 82(n11)
Coding exercise, 136–138, 137t Constructivism, 42, 42t, 56, 76, 150, 159, 219t,
Coding family(ies), 32t, 131, 167, 190–191, 307t, 323, 346–348
222–223, 227, 239 Constructivist [term], 82(n11)
Coding grid(s), 123, 124f, 158 Constructivist approach, 16, 24–25
Coding paradigm, 32t, 167, 190, 222–224, Constructivist grounded theory method, x–xi,
227, 239 24–25, 86t, 107, 107t, 164, 181, 218, 221,
Coding strategy(ies), 124–125, 125f, 175–196 340, 351t, 345, 362, 367, 369, 372–373. See
diversity of, 100, 117 also Grounded theory method (GTM)
and visual representation, 191, 194 Continual Permutations of Action, 80, 114–115,
Coding tactics, 181, 195 340, 344
Cognition, preconceptions and, 150 Conventional wisdom, 59, 102t, 330
404
404 Index
Conversational analysis, 58(n20) Data domain, understanding, 327–329

Cook, J., 218, 248(n2) Data gathering, 99–100, 131, 156, 328–329
Cooley, C.H., 336 Data mining, 322–323, 330
Corbin, J., x, 24, 70, 84, 117–118, 133, 161, 344. in KDD, 326
See also Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. Data projection, in KDD, 326
Corroboration, 48 Data reduction, in KDD, 326
Cowley, S., 218 Data refinement, in KDD, 329
Cream (rock trio), 80 Davidson, D., 339
Credibility, 219t, 361t, 359, 362 Deduction, 94–95, 109t, 265–266, 266f,
Criteria 272, 351t
for GTM, 108t, 350t, 361t, 359. See also “Fit”; vs. induction, 95
“Grab”; Modifiability; “Work” Definitive concept, 68, 70, 143
methodological, 14–15 Degrees Kelvin, 11(n7)
Critical [term], 58(n14) Dennett, D., xvi(n1)
Critical reflection, 210 Denscombe, M., 15, 15t
Culturnomics, 333(n4) Denzin, N., 4, 10, 42, 42t, 72–73, 86t,
Culturomics, 323–326, 333(n4) 174(n5), 285
Description, 219t, 221
Dalton, J., 174(n4) De-sensitizing, 142–143
Darwin, C., 98 de Vreede, G.-J., 149–150
as grounded theorist, 383–388 Dewey, J., 42t, 58(n11), 74, 80, 98, 108t, 214,
Data, 23, 25, 56, 66, 77t, 78, 172, 233, 301, 318 245, 335–340, 350t–351t, 342–348,
for coding, 193–194 352(n1), 352(n3), 364, 383
concept of, 160 Dewey, M., 352(n1)
definition of, 138 Dewey’s Metaphysics, 56
emergence of theory from, 22–23, 219t, 220, Dey, I., 119, 220, 226–227, 377
226, 342, 381 Diagram(s), 34–35, 58(n10), 194. See also
generation of theories from, 156 Situational map
for GTM, 322–323 Dick, B., 172
inductive, 122 Difference principle, 338, 352(n3)
vs. information, 322–323 Dimensions, 371
issues around, 159–160 Discourse analysis, 172
for KDD, 322 Discovery, 56, 218
meaning and import of, 163 logic of, 272
moving beyond, 122, 127–129, 161, 168 The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
nature of, 322–323 Qualitative Research, ix–x, xiii, 17, 19t,
persistent interaction with, 96–97 22–25, 32t, 36, 63–70, 73–74, 77t, 80, 85,
quantitative, 123 86t, 90–94, 104–105, 112(n3), 115, 119, 134,
raw, 323 151, 199, 210–211, 220, 222, 226, 246, 249,
sources of, 125, 131, 138–139, 157–158, 163, 255, 266, 284, 307t, 342–343, 359, 364, 366
183, 323 Doctoral research/dissertation(s), 33–35, 299.
Data [term], as plural vs. singular, 174(n6) See also Research proposals; specific student
Data analysis, 75, 96, 107t, 109t, 111, 145, 226, advisor/supervisor for, 135–136
349t, 367–369, 372, 376, 379–380. See also comments on, 135
Qualitative data analysis (QDA) GTM-oriented, 165–166
in constructivist approach, 107t reviews of, 135–136
in objectivist approach, 107t Doing Grounded Theory, 167
systematic, 111 Doing Quantitative Grounded Theory, 25
tools for, 18 Doing Quantitative Research in the Social
Data capture, 156 Sciences, 18
Data cleaning, in KDD, 325–326 Doing research, 4–5, 8, 10, 11(n6), 14, 36, 38–
Data collection, 96, 108t, 110, 122, 156, 349t, 39, 51, 135, 159, 349t–350t, 360t. See also
367–368, 372, 376, 379–380 Good research practice
boundary for, 125 Doing science, 51
Darwin’s, 384 Doughnut test, for gerunds, 114, 116(n2)
405
Index 405
Douglas, D., 183 Everything Flows, 113, 161

Dramaturgical trend, 64 Evidence-based research, 224, 360t
Drexler, G. (PhD student), viii, 89 Evolution, as theory, 98, 383
coding strategy used by, 180–181, 182f, 192t Expert
later sampling, coding, and analyzing by, 229– vs. reflective practitioner, 211, 212b
236, 230t–231t, 232f, 233t–234t, 236b, 237f route from novice to, 38, 131, 273–276
memos and memo-writing by, 199–201, Expertise, 274
200b–203b, 231–232 Extract(s), verbatim, 133, 138
process and procedures used by, 153, 157,
166, 170–171, 173t Fallibilism, 338
research outcome, 236, 237f, 259b Falsifiability, 48, 267
return to literature, 257 of scientific theory, 50–51
sampling used by, 249 Falsification, 48, 267
and theoretical saturation, 251–254 Falsification bias, 50–51
Dreyfus, H., and Dreyfus, S., 38, 131, 272–276 Family(ies). See also Coding family(ies)
Durkheim, E., 66, 114 of research, 15, 15t
Family resemblances, 83
Easterby-Smith, M., 4 Feminism, 376
Eddington, A., 48–50 Fictionalized recall, 152
Effectiveness, 306, 307t Fielding, N., 376
Efficacy, 306, 307t Field notes, 176, 194, 199, 214
Efficiency, 306, 307t secondary analysis of, 275
Egan, T.M., 185 Figure(s), 34, 58(n10)
Einstein, A., 8, 27, 48–51, 157, 160–161, “Fit,” 27, 37t, 41, 59, 61, 79, 98, 101, 108t, 144,
163, 350t 219t, 221, 303, 306, 307t, 308, 341, 345,
Elegance, 306, 307t 348, 350t, 361t
Email exchange, as data source, 157–158 Fitzgerald, G., 300–301
Emblen, J., 250 5x(P+P) model, 38, 40, 57(n4), 155, 359
Emergence, 22–23, 32t, 77t, 78, 136–137, 165, applied to GTM, 30–31, 31t, 77t
168, 235, 271, 351t, 342 Fleck, L., 52–53, 55–56, 73, 78, 85, 87, 272, 293
and application, tension between, 167, Flick, U., 10
223, 226 Formal grounded theory (FGT), 19, 19t, 26,
vs. forcing, 219t, 221, 223 86t, 98, 115, 144, 297(n1), 311, 349t–350t,
metaphor of, 105, 109t 360t–361t
Emergent [term], in GTM, 168, 235 Formal theory, 108t, 255–257, 266, 349t, 366
Emergent entity(ies), 168, 235 Foundationalism, 340, 346–347
Eminence-based research, 360t Fram, S.M., 93
Empirical checks, 101–102 Framework(s), 99
Empirical indicators, 189, 370 Freud, S., 48–49, 51, 53
Empirical sociology, 123 Full conceptual description, 85, 268
Empiricism, 45. See also Logical empiricism The Funes Problem, 161, 163, 195, 223, 251, 318
Lockean, 339 Funes the Memorious, 161
mindless, 67
Epistemology, 16, 41–43, 56, 78, 160, 344, Galbraith, J.K., 59, 102t
361t, 369 Gamage, P. (PhD student), viii, 174(n11)
definition of, 43 coding strategy used by, 181–184,
interpretive, 369 184t–185t, 192t
Essence(s), of GTM, 45, 58(n7), 96, 103–107, consolidation of early codes, 312, 312f
108t–109t, 121, 172, 341, 349t–350t, 348 grounded theorizing by, account of, 379–382
Essential properties, 103–104 process and procedures used by, 153–155,
Ethical clearance, 34–35 157, 171–173, 173t
Ethics, 306, 307t, 348 Gans, H., 336
Ethnographic research, 79 Garfinkel, H., 55, 114
Ethnomethodology, 58(n20), 172 Gatekeepers, xiv
Evans, A., 308 Geertz, C., 73, 79, 104, 323
406
406 Index
Generalization, 311–314, 361t Grand theories, 66, 77t

Geocoding, 324, 326, 331 Gravitational lensing, 49–50
Gerund approach, 114 Greer, B., 336
Gerund GTM, 37t Grossman, V., 113, 161
Gerunds, 113 Groundedness, 360t
as actions and processes, 113–114 Grounded theorizing, xii, xiii, 61, 113
coding with, 113–114, 176, 349t as Pragmatism, xiv
doughnut test for, 114, 116(n2) Grounded theory See also Grounded Theory
vs. present participles, 113–114 Method (GTM)
Gibson, B., 119, 375, 377 definition of, 89–90
Gibson, W., 246–247, 248(n10) of grounded theory, 283–297
Giddens, A., 114–115 as output, xvii(n3)
Giske, T., 133, 138–139, 139(n3), 151, 228–229, Grounded theory [term], xv, 13
229t, 278, 359 The Grounded Theory Institute, 70, 84
Gladwin, T., 244 Grounded theory method (GTM), vii–viii,
Glaser, B., x, xi, 8, 11(n1), 18, 22, 25, 30–36, 32t–33t, ix, xv, 13
37t, 39, 59, 64, 69–72, 77t, 80, 81(n7–n8), 84, abductive aspect of, 350t, 344. See also
86t, 88, 91–92, 105–106, 108t–109t, 113–114, Abduction
117–124, 128–135, 132(n1), 148–151, 156, academics’ understanding of, xiv, 353
159, 166, 169, 174(n2), 174(n8–n9), 176, and “all possible theoretical
181–183, 190–191, 194, 198, 211–214, 217– explanations,” 102
224, 219t–220t, 235, 248(n1), 249, 253, 257, application to quantitative date, 25
275–276, 392b, 299, 303–306, 307t, 332, canonical basis (texts) of, ix–xi, xif, 64, 86–87,
336–337, 351t, 345–348, 363, 366–371, 380. 86t, 91, 134, 198–199, 218, 249, 265, 293f, 296.
See also Glaser, B., and Strauss, A.; Grounded See also Awareness of Dying; The Discovery of
theory method (GTM) Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative
Glaser, B., and Strauss, A., vii–x, xiii, 6–10, 13, Research; Time for Dying
19t, 21–29, 35–36, 39, 49–52, 56–57, 60, as comparative method, 92–94. See also
63–70, 76–79, 83–84, 86t, 88, 92–95, Constant comparison, method of
98–99, 102t, 104–105, 112(n6), 115, core principles of, 37, 37t
122–124, 127, 131–138, 140(n5), 144, core products of, 77t
147–151, 156, 161–165, 193, 198–199, criticisms of, 10, 353, 357t–360t
246–247, 255–257, 265, 269, 275, 297, as developing social practice, 60–61
301–306, 307t, 311, 328, 349t–350t, 342–343, dissemination of, 70, 84
358–359, 364, 375, 383. See also Awareness and doctoral work, 59–60, 75
of Dying; The Discovery of Grounded Theory; example of, 141–146
Status Passage; Time for Dying failings of, 10
Glaser, W.A., 81(n4) as family of methods, 83
Glaserian position, 218, 219t–220t flexibility of, 60
Goffman, E., 24, 58(n6), 64, 363 founding ideas of, ix–x, xiii, 64, 69
Goldacre, B., 7, 10, 254 Grand Strategy of, 88
Good research practice, xiii, 106, 353–355 as heuristic method, 245
Google, 318–320 ill-founded claims and, 158
Gorra, A. (PhD student), viii, 174(n11), 195(n2) as inductive method, 94–96, 265, 268, 351t
coding strategy used by, 177–180, 178f–191f, and information system development
192t, 194 methods, 20–21, 36–37
grounded theorizing of, account of, initial stage of, 125–126, 126f–128f, 133, 136
365–368, 369f and innovation, 26, 110, 131, 305–306
later sampling, coding, and analyzing by, innovations of, 364
236–240, 238t–239t, 241b, 242t and insight, 26
memo-making by, 202–203, 204b–205b issues around, advice for addressing, 362, 363t
research outcome, 258b key characteristics of, 87–88
Gouldner, A., 315(n2), 362–364 key features of, and Agile manifesto, 37, 37t
“Grab,” 27, 37t, 41, 59, 61, 79, 98, 101, 108t, 144, key texts on, 86–87, 86t, 115
219t, 221, 303, 306, 307t, 341, 350t, 346, later stage, 129f
348, 361t as mechanical (systematized), 90
407
Index 407
method, 19t Hofstede, G., 149, 174(n3)

methodology, 19t Hoggart, R., 378
misapprehensions of, 353 Holton, J.A., 120, 162, 248(n1), 254
misappropriation of, 158 Hook, S., 67
misunderstandings/misapprehensions House, F., 80
of, xiv–xv How to Get a PhD, 4
models, 19t How to Research, 4, 15
open-minded approach for, 147–148, 162–163, Hughes, E., 80, 336, 339
174(n2), 220, 304 Hume, D., 47
originators of, divergence of, 72–73, 89, 117–118, Hydrogen, 54
217, 222. See also Glaser, B.; Strauss, A. Hypothesis/hypotheses, 27–28, 270, 311, 358
as practice-oriented, 27 Darwin on, 388
procedures, 27–33, 31t–33t, 77t. See also existing, 123–125
Procedures as outcome, 19t, 89, 276, 386–387
processes, 27–33, 31t–33t, 77t. See also as starting points, 386–387
Process(es) to test existing theories, 89
as process-oriented, 26 Hypothetical-deductive process, 266–267
and qualitative analysis, 25
rationale for, 37t Idiographic strategy, 18
research activities in, 5–6 Indexing, vs. coding, 382
as simple and straightforward, 162 Individual psychology, 48–49
starting point of, 27, 29 Induction, 23, 50, 56, 74–75, 94–96,
as systematic, 90–92 102–103, 109t, 254, 265–268, 271–272,
techniques, 19t 278–279, 351t
tools, 19t analytic, 94, 364
in use, 89, 89f, 136 vs. deduction, 95
use of, xv–xvi. See also Research, definition of, 95
GTM-oriented Popper on, 48
variants, ix–xii, xif, 31, 32t–33t, 85, 86t, 87–88, qualitative, 270
106–107, 160, 172, 218, 293f, 296, 344, 359, Inference to the best explanation, 279
366–368 Information
writings on, 92. See also Literature, on GTM Bateson’s definition of, 352(n3)
Grounded theory method (GTM) [term], vs. data, 322–323
xvii(n3) Information system(s), development of, 20–21,
The Grounded Theory Review, 70–71, 148, 36–37, 91, 299–301
248(n1) and GTM, 299–315, 307t
GTM. See Grounded theory method (GTM) Insight, 246, 301–303
GT Review. See The Grounded Theory Review cultivating, 303
Guba, E., 42, 42t innovative, 150
Guide for the Perplexed, xvi(n2) Inspiration (tool), 187, 195(n3)
Institutional settings, 39, 76
Haig, B., 384 Instrumentalism, 42t, 337, 350t, 342
The Handbook of Grounded Theory, vii, 29–31, Intellectual property, 217–218
58(n19), 64, 79, 86t, 89, 103, 115, 118, 121, Intelligence, 274
135, 162, 172, 174(n2), 197, 217, 269–270, analytical, 302
294, 314, 339, 375 creative, 302–303
The Handbook of Methodological Innovation, 85 practical, 302–303
The Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4, 60, Triarchic model of, 302–303
72–76, 79, 84–87, 86t, 91, 106, 128, 158, 160, Interaction, 24
166, 221, 276, 367 Interaction Ritual, 24
Heath, H., 218 The International Encyclopedia of Unified
Hermeneutics, 327 Science, 51
Hernandez, C.A., 128–131, 248(n1) Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA),
Hesse-Biber, S.N., 120, 162 18, 292b
Hiding in full view, 142, 163 Interpreting Qualitative Data, 4
Historicism, 45, 58(n16), 341, 352(n6) Interpretivism, 76. See also Constructivism
408
408 Index
Interview(s), 367–368, 376, 379–380 existing, understanding of, 303

as data source, 138–139, 156, 163, 169–171 experimental theory of, 337
face-to-face, as data source, 158 historical factors and, 52
falsified, 376 metaphysical, 46
question phrasing in, 237–238 Platonic, 44–45
recordings of, 35, 156 Pragmatist view of, 349t–350t
semi-structured, 380 scientific, 46–47, 49–50
transcripts of, 35, 138–139, 156 social factors and, 52
Interview Research, 367 spectator theory of, 337, 351t, 348
“In the Realm of Big Data,” 333(n1) study of, 43
Introduction to Research Methods, 18 theological, 46
IPA. See Interpretative phenomenological of things that don’t exist, 44
analysis (IPA) vs. wisdom, 227
Ironist, 45, 341, 351t Kuhn, T., xii, xiii, 47, 51–55, 58(n19), 76, 78,
liberal, 42t 110t, 150, 174(n4), 272, 351t
methodological, 45
Iteration, 145–146, 349t, 360t Labun, E., 250
process of, 96–97, 110 LaRossa, R., 232
Lavoisier, A., 54–55, 150, 248(n3), 280(n4)
Jahoda, M., 123 Lazarsfeld, P., 63, 65–66, 69, 123–124, 364
James, W., xi–xii, 58(n11), 80, 335–337, Leetaru, K., 323–326
339–340 Legal requirements, 35
Jargonizing, 174(n2) Lempert, L., 118, 162, 198
Jensen, K.B., 322–323 Lens, metaphor of, 152
Joas, H., 340 Leverrier, U., 277
Jodeh, I. (PhD student), viii Lévi-Strauss, C., 114
categories and subcategories used by, Liberal ironist, 42t
312–313, 313f The Life of Brian, 112(n4)
coding strategies used by, 188, 193t Lincoln, Y., 4, 10, 42, 42t, 72–73, 86t,
later sampling, coding, and analyzing by, 174(n5), 291
240–244, 242t, 243b, 243f Lindesmith, A., 364
memo-making by, 202–208, 206b–208b, 206t, Literature
242, 243b engagement with, 104–105, 107t, 166, 341,
process and procedures used by, 154, 157, 350t, 352(n8), 367–368, 377
165, 169, 173t in GTM, 377
research outcome, 261–263, 262b, 263f on GTM, 69–70, 73, 92, 115, 166. See also
Justification, 43 specific title
logic of, 47–48, 272 initial discussion of, 104–105
return to, 30, 32t, 104, 107t, 257, 360t, 382
KDD (knowledge discovery in databases), 317, Literature review, 26, 29–30, 68, 110t, 351t,
322, 325–332, 333(n2) 378–379, 382
Kearney, M., 35, 57(n1), 256, 297 Locke, J., 339
Kekule, A., 58(n18) Logical empiricism, 46–47
Kelle, U., 119–120, 222–223, 226, 270, 314, 340 Logical positivism, 46–47
Kelvin, first Baron (Sir William Thomson), 9, Logico-deductive theory(ies), xiii
21, 81(n5) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, xii, 47, 50
Keynes, J.M., 149 Lone researcher. See Research, teamwork in
Key point coding, 181–183, 184t, 380–381 “The Long Tail,” 317, 321
Kington, M., 227 Looking-glass self, 336
Knowing in action, 214, 245, 349t Löwy, I., 53
Knowledge, 78. See also KDD (knowledge Luckmann, T., xii, 55, 76
discovery in databases) Lyons Electronic Office (LEO), 20, 58(n5)
development of, 44
discovery of, vs. construction, 42, 42t, Maimonides, M., xvi(n2)
174(n5) Malthus, R., 384–385
409
Index 409
Management information systems (MIS), Methodological sensitivity, 36, 88, 92, 173, 193,
318–319 276, 301, 360t, 362
“Management Misinformation Methodological statement(s), 28
Systems,” 319 Methodologizing, 392, 294f, 294t, 295b, 294,
Management Research, 4 312–314
Mandelbrot, B., 321, 333(n3) Methodology, 19t
Mantra, GTM, 22, 29, 78, 147, 219t description of, 40–41, 60
Marienthal (Austria), unemployment in, study and information systems, 20
of, 63–64, 81(n3), 123–124 vs. method, 16
Markham, A., 323 Methods in use, 17
Marx, K., 48–49, 51, 58(n6), 265, 279(n1) Methods manuals, 36
Marxism, 48–49, 53 Microanalysis, 222, 380–381. See also Coding,
Mathar, T., 240 line-by-line; Coding, word-by-word
Mathematical sociology, 123 Mill, J.S., 168
MAXQDA, 18 Mill, J., 231
Mead, G.H., 23–24, 63, 65, 74, 80, 336, 339–340, Mills, C.W., 66
344, 363–364 Mindless empiricism, 67, 156
Mean, 7 Mind Over Machine, 273
Meaning(s), actors’, 23–24 The Mirror of Nature, 44
Meaningless [term], 46, 58(n17) Mirrors and Masks, 24, 64, 336
Median, 7 Mitrovic, Z. (PhD student), 191
Medical sociology, 69 memo-making by, 202, 204b
Memo(s)/memoing, 32t, 34, 39, 89, 101, 103, Mode, 7
136, 146, 152, 162, 191, 197–198, 231–232, Model(s), 19, 19t, 32t, 45, 99, 308, 318,
307t, 349t, 360t, 373, 381–382 371–372
contemporaneousness, 198 algorithm-like, 371–372
Darwin’s use of, 385–386 diagrammed-style, 371–372
exchanging, with colleagues, 135, 212–213 as research product, 34
joint, 264(n3) usefulness of, 318
process and products of, 197–199 Modifiability, 37t, 98, 108t, 218, 306, 341, 350t,
and reflective practice, 210–214 348, 361t
sorting of, 33t Molière, 5
Mentoring, 38 Moltke, Helmuth von,
Mertens, D., 5 the Elder, 57(n3), 227
Merton, R.K. (and Mertonians), 63, 65–66, Moneyball, 331
68–70, 76, 255, 349t–350t, 360t Motivation, 360t
Metaphors, 293 for research, 144–145, 147, 152, 155
Method(s), 15–16, 15t, 17–18, 19t, 38. See also Musement, 271
Research method(s); Scientific method Myrick, F., 218
articulation of, 40–41, 60 Myth, 49
changing/adapting, 155
for development of computer-based systems, Nahm, H., 70
20–21, 36–37 Narrating, 142
framework for, 20–21 Naturalistic approach, 18
and information systems, 20 Natural selection, 383–385
as mandatory, 91 Negotiated orders, 109t
vs. methodology, 16 Negotiations, x, 69
mixed, 17 Neo (prefix), 174(n5)
open (non-proprietary), 20 Neo-positivism, 58(n14), 152
and products of research, 33–34 Neuman, Y., 308, 310
proprietary, 20 Neurath, O., 338
shark metaphor for, 84–85 Neuroscience, 7
Methodological ironist, 45 Nietzsche, F., 217, 338, 342
Methodological positioning, 73, 87, 118, Nominalism, 45, 58(n16), 341, 352(n6)
133, 151 Nomothetic strategy, 18
410
410 Index
Novice, 273. See also Expert, route from Peirce, C.S., 58(n11), 80, 269–272, 279, 335, 339,
novice to 343–344, 352(n3)
(Neo)positivist approach, 16 Pepys Library, 226
The Nurse and the Dying Patient, 65 Perceptions, 21–24, 31t, 77t
NVivo, 18, 93, 178, 238–240, 368, 380 Peripatetic Axiom, 339, 352(n5)
Periphery, 24–27, 31t, 77t
Obama presidential re-election campaign, Persistent interaction, with data, 96–97
331–332 Personal statement, 147
Object(s), 308, 310, 340, 372 Personnel, 31t, 35–39, 77t, 115
Objectivist grounded theory method, 86t, 106–107, Petabyte, 317
107t, 109t, 181, 221, 340, 373 PhD research. See Doctoral research/
Objectivists, 323 dissertation(s); specific student
Objectivity, 159, 359 Phillips, E.M., 4
Object Orientation approach, 196(n5), 300, Philosophical Investigations, 83–84
308–314, 368–369, 372 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 337
and GTM, 309–310, 309f Phlogiston, 54
Observation, 45, 47–48, 152 Plan(s), 350t
in ethnographic research, 79 Plans and Situated Actions, 245
observer’s effect in, 78–79 Plato, allegory of the cave, 44–45, 348
theory-laden, 50 Plutarch, 339
Occam’s razor, 102 Polanyi, M., 150, 268
Olesen, V., 70–71, 84 The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, 68,
Onions, P., 218, 219t–220t, 221 148, 336
On the Origin of Species, 385 Popper, K., xii, 47–53, 55, 267, 272, 330, 339, 368
Ontology, 16, 41–43, 361t Positioning, 290–291, 294t, 295b, 303, 307t, 312.
definition of, 43 See also Methodological positioning
OO ideas, 189, 196(n5). See also Object Positivism, 42, 42t, 45–46, 54, 56, 58(n20), 76,
Orientation approach 105, 110t, 152, 340, 351t, 369. See also
Open coding, 99–100, 126–127, 190–191, 220t, Logical positivism
283–284, 304–305, 328, 367 and Romanticism, 362–364
Opening statements, 152–153 Post (prefix), 174(n5)
Operationalism, 67 Post-modernism, 75, 340, 346–348
Originality, 359 Post-positivism, 58(n14), 152, 174(n5), 340
Outcomes. See also Presentation; Products Practitioners, xiv
as emergent, 168 potential, xiv
evaluation of, 133–134 reflective, 211, 212b
The Oxford Handbook of Qualitative Research, Pragmaticism, 335
139(n1) Pragmatics, 31t, 35–40, 58(n11), 77t, 115
Oxygen, discovery of, 54–55, 150, 218, 248(n3), Pragmatism, xi–xii, xiii, 42t, 58(n11), 74–75,
280(n4) 79–80, 99, 102, 109t, 114, 159, 245, 269, 279,
335–346, 350t, 352(n7), 359, 364
Paradigm(s), 110t. See also Coding paradigm; American, 80
Research paradigms grounded theorizing as, xiv
Kuhn on, 51–55, 78 and GTM, 15, 80
Paradigm shift, 55, 150, 272 Rorty on, vii
Park, R., 63, 80, 336–337, 339 Strauss and, 79–80
Parsimony, 103 Pragmatism cum constructivism, 56
Parsons, T. (and Parsonians), 66, 68, 70, 76, Preconceptions, 21–24, 31t, 77t, 104, 110t, 147–149,
114, 360t 152, 162, 351t, 358–359
Participant(s), viewpoints of, 164 identifying and articulating, 150
Participation, in ethnographic research, 79 as obstacles to comprehension, 149–150
Pascale, C.-M., 337 suspending, 149–151, 220
Passive voice, 360t, 359 Presentation, 31t, 33–35, 77t, 115
Pasteur, L., 385 Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 24, 64
Pattern(s), 119, 226, 251, 321 Present participles, vs. gerunds, 113–114
Pattern recognition, 246–247, 248(n10), 321 Priestley, J., 54–55, 150, 248(n3), 280(n4)
Pauli, W., 350 Problem identification, 304
411
Index 411
Procedures, 27–33, 31t–33t, 36, 40, 77t, 91, 115, Four Rules (of critical commentary), vii, ix,
193, 359–364 59, 110
Process(es), 27–33, 31t–33t, 36, 37t, 40, 77t, 91, Rationale, 351t, 360t, 374–375
115, 122, 193, 359–364 for research, 104–105, 147, 152, 155
analysis of, 110 Realism, 45, 340
definition of, 231 Reality, 44–45, 350
Products, 31t, 33–35, 77t, 98, 115, 122, 193 Reflecting in action, 275, 277
Proficiency, 274 Reflecting on action, 375, 277
Pseudo-scientists, Popper’s charge against, Reflection in action, 211
48–51, 53 Reflective practice, 32t, 39, 210–214, 268,
Psychiatric Ideologies and Institutions, 57(n1) 349t, 360t
Psychoanalysis, 48–49 The Reflective Practitioner, 210
Psychological research Refutability, of scientific theory, 49–50
replicability of, 264(n1) Re-grounding of GTM, 79, 106
sampling for, 250 Reichertz, J., 254, 269–272, 274, 332, 340
Publication Relativism, 340, 346–348
GTM-oriented, difficulties faced by, 158 Relativity, theory of, 48–50
importance of, 8, 33, 33t Relevance, 142, 307t, 308
of research results, 257, 346 Remodeling (of GTM), 72–73, 84–85, 159
Pugh, D., 4 Replicability, of psychological research, 264(n1)
Purpose, 24–27, 31t, 77t Report(s), format for, 35
Puzzle(s), 51 Representationalism, 340
Research, 1, 4–5. See also Doing research
QDA. See Qualitative data analysis (QDA) as active and social process, 115
Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists, x, 71–72, aims of, 6
80, 81(n8), 86t, 131, 166, 219t, 220, 222, applied, 6
276, 339–340, 342, 348 classification of, 6
Qualitative data analysis (QDA), 25, 73, 81(n9), definition of, 3, 18
85, 158–159, 174(n8), 219t–220t, 268 dispassionate, 64
Qualitative research, 6–10, 15, 15t, 90, dissemination of, 8, 10, 55
111, 361t emancipatory, 6
data used in, 6–7 vs. enquiry, 4–5
evaluation of, 14 evaluation of, 7
outcomes of, 9–10 existing, lack of, 104–105
reciprocal shaping in, 74 GTM-oriented, xvi, 17
scientific standing of, 106 hypothesis-oriented, 6, 22
Qualitative Research, 4 motivations for, 29, 64
Quantitative grounded theory, 25 nature of, 1, 3
Quantitative methods, 5 non-hypothesis-oriented, 6
Quantitative research, 5–10, 15, 15t, 90, outcomes of, 14, 24, 33, 40, 107
106, 110 personal involvement in, 64
data used in, 6–7 as process, 3, 6, 8, 113
evaluation of, 14–15 as product, 3, 6
outcomes of, 10 pure, 6
Quantum theory, 78, 82(n12)–82(n13) qualitative/quantitative distinction, 6–10,
Question(s) 14–15. See also Qualitative research;
generic, for guiding research, 99, 163 Quantitative research
phrasing, in interviews, 237–238, 367–368 quality of, criteria for, 14–15
research, 27. See also Hypothesis/hypotheses rationale for, 29, 34
for sensitizing to participants’ viewpoints, skills required for, 5–6
164–165 as social activity, 10, 38–39
WH-, 169–170, 188, 189b statistical. See Statistical research
Quint, J., viii, xiii, 9, 39, 64–65, 69, 77t, 108t, subcategories of, 6
134, 140(n5), 213, 276, 336, 346 teamwork in, 38–39, 110t, 134, 136, 228,
351t, 359
Raja, U., 333(n1) texts on, 4
Rapoport, A., xvi(n1) Research [term], 3
412
412 Index
Research community, 7–8 purposive, 100, 108t, 126–127, 250, 349t

Research design, 18 snowball, 250
Researcher(s). See also Theoretical capitalists Sartwell, C., 347–348, 352(n11)
and proletarian testers Saturation, 37. See also Theoretical saturation
as active vs. passive, 219t Schatzman, L., 32t, 211–212
activities of, 10 Scheele, C.W., 55
and actors studied, reciprocal shaping, 74, 164 Schön, D., 32t, 210–211, 212b, 214, 245,
communities of practice for, 7–8 268–269, 272, 275, 277
context of, 345–346 Science, 78
initial stance of, 104 as collective activity, 53
lone. See Research, teamwork in vs. non-science, 48–49, 52, 54
positionality of, 307t, 348. See also Positioning normal, 51
role of, 78, 136, 147, 332–333 orthodox view of, 53–54
route from novice to expert, 38, 131 as puzzle-solving, 51, 53, 55
skills required of, 5–6, 38 as social activity, 52–53
statement of motivations, 152 Scientific data, 159
Researching. See Doing research Scientific discovery, logic of, 47
Research method(s), 1, 15–16, 15t Scientific method, 18, 317–318
articulation of, 40–41 Scientific revolutions, 55
evaluation of, 14 Scientific theory, 48–51, 267
focus on, 13–14 Scientism, 110t, 351t
periphery (scope) of, 24–27 Seale, C., 375–376, 382
purpose of, 24–27 Searle, J., 350
systematic, 92 Secondary analysis, 275
terminology for, 15–16, 15t Selden, L., 377
Research orthodoxy, 13 Selective coding, 190–191, 220t, 304–305, 371–372
Research paradigms, 42t, 351t Sellar, W.C., 81(n1), 353, 362
discussion of, 41–42 Semiawan, T. (PhD student), viii, 174(n11),
Research pitching, 141–146, 144f 315(n1)
Research proposals coding strategies used by, 188–190, 193, 193t,
evaluation of, 27–30, 57(n2), 58(n9), 75, 195(n4), 196(n5)
78, 341 grounded theorizing by, account of, 368–373
GTM-oriented, difficulties faced by, 158 later sampling, coding, and analysis by, 246
Research question(s), 27. See also Hypothesis/ memo-making by, 208, 209b
hypotheses process and procedures used by, 154–155,
Research reports, reading, 117–118 155t, 167, 173t
Resonance, 359 research outcome, 258b
Revelation, 49 Sensitivity, 37, 195(n4). See also Methodological
Rigor, 219t–220t, 221–222, 254 sensitivity; Theoretical sensitivity
Risk assessment, 35 and thinking, 161
Robson, C., 4 Sensitizing concepts, 21, 68, 70, 79, 142–143
Romanticism, 362–364 Sentiment mining, 324, 326, 330–331
Romanticism and Classicism: Deep Structures in Serendipity, 65
Social Science, 362 in Darwin’s work, 384–385
Rorty, R., 42, 42t, 44–45, 56, 335, 337–339, 341, openness to, 109t, 151, 321, 350t
350t–351t, 342, 346–348, 362 Sets, 132(n2)
on pragmatism, vii populating, 126
Rules of thumb, 81(n8) SI. See Symbolic interactionism (SI)
Silverman, D., 4, 10, 376
Sampling, 32t–33t, 100–101, 360t. See also Situational analysis, 230
Theoretical sampling Situational map, 202, 204b–205b, 231, 232f,
convenience, 250, 349t 240, 241b
in GTM, 250–251 Skepticism, 338
initial, 251 Darwin on, 389
non-probability, 250 in research, 164
probability, 250 Smit, K., vii
413
Index 413
Social action, structural-functionalist approach Substantive grounded theory (SGT), 19, 19t,
to, 114 26, 30, 36, 83, 97f, 99, 108t, 143, 219t, 222,
The Social Construction of Reality, xii, 55–56 311–312, 349t–350t, 360t–361t
Social Darwinists, 384 development of, 128, 130f
Social interaction, and social structure, 114–115 Substantive theory, 13, 97, 108t, 255–257, 265,
Social physics, 46 349t, 366
Social process, 164 Suchman, L., 245, 350t
Social research, methods of, 15, 15t Supernormalizing, 122
Social science, 51–52 Survival of the fittest, 383–384
Social science orthodoxy, 51–52 Suspension, metaphor of, 149–150
Sociology Press, 8, 71 Syllogism, 266, 266f
Software Symbolic interactionism (SI), 23–24, 63–64, 114,
for coding, 18, 368, 376, 380. See also NVivo 292b, 336
development of, essences and accidents in, 103 Syphilis, 52–53
Spencer, H., 383 Systems analysis, and GTM, 299–315
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 43, 58(n15) Systems analyst, 165, 300
Star, S.L., 118 Systems modeling, 300–301
Starting point(s), 99–100, 146, 152–153, 163, 173t
Star Trek, 4, 11(n1) Tailoring, 291–292, 2946t, 297b, 312
Statistical research, misuse of, 10 Taleb, N., 330
Status passage (concept), 310–311, 311f TAM. See Technology Acceptance Model (TAM)
Status Passage: A Formal Theory, x, 19t, 69–70, Tavory, I., 156
77t, 86t, 210, 256–258, 297 Tebbitt, M., 378
Sterling, B., 319 Technique(s), 17–18, 19t, 93
Stern, P., 65, 70, 84, 140(n5), 197, 199 research, 15, 15t
Sternberg, R., 302 Technology, using, 194
Strange Brew, 80 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), 149,
Strategy(ies), 17, 19t 174(n3)
research, 15, 15t 1066 and All That, 81(n1), 353, 362
Strauss, A., x, 22, 30–31, 37t, 57(n1), 59, 64, Terminology
69–75, 77t, 79–80, 81(n7), 86t, 90–92, 95, and de-sensitizing, 143
102–103, 109t, 112(n6), 114–120, 131–135, in GTM, 118–121, 123t
142, 166, 189, 191, 211, 213, 217–223, 240, for research methods, 15–16, 15t
249, 269–272, 275–276, 280(n2), 292b, 308, Testability, of scientific theory, 49–50
335–340, 350t–351t, 342–348, 363, Textbook(s), Fleck on, 56, 85
369–372. See also Glaser, B., and Strauss, Text mining, 324, 326, 330–331
A.; Grounded theory method (GTM) Theoretical capitalists and proletarian testers, 21,
Strauss, A., and Corbin, J., x, 16–17, 32t, 39, 60–61, 39, 52, 67
71–74, 84–91, 86t, 106, 115, 120–122, 128, Theoretical coding, 108t, 128–129, 131, 158,
131, 158, 160, 166–169, 181, 185–186, 189– 167–168, 222–223, 235, 257, 263, 350t,
191, 200, 217–224, 219t–220t, 231, 251, 268– 360t, 371–372
269, 276, 284, 292b–293b, 304, 306, 307t, 342, Theoretical Coding Families, 32t
359, 365–375, 380. See also Grounded theory Theoretical elaboration, 74, 119
method (GTM) Theoretical sampling, 97f, 100, 108t, 111, 127,
Strauss, A., and Glaser, B., x. See also Anguish 129f, 143, 244, 251, 254, 349t, 372, 379
Strauss, M.R., 81(n4) for formal theorizing, 256
Straussian position, 218, 219t–220t Theoretical saturation, 33t, 58(n13), 103, 108t,
Strübing, J., 270, 340 128, 130f, 143, 249–255, 252b–253b, 350t,
Structuralism, 114 360t, 377–379
Structuration, 114 definition of, 249
Structure, and agency, 114 Theoretical sensitivity, 22, 36, 86t, 88, 92, 101,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, xii, 126, 131, 155–156, 161–162, 165–166, 173,
47, 51, 78 176, 193, 219t, 221, 224, 226–227, 276, 301,
Studies in Ethnomethodology, 55–56 303, 311, 332–333, 360t, 359, 372–373,
Subjectivity, 159 377–378
Substantive coding, 220t, 222 Darwin and, 387
414
414 Index
Theoretical Sensitivity, x, 32t, 36, 69, 71, 81(n7), University of California, San Francisco (UCSF),
86t, 108t, 113, 115, 130–131, 167, 218–220, 70–71, 79, 84, 135–136, 199, 275, 336, 346
222–223, 299, 348 School of Nursing, 64
Theoretical sorting, 33t, 34, 198–199, 386 University of Chicago, 335–336
Theories of the middle range, 66, 77t, 255, Urquhart, C., 120
257, 349t Usefulness, 99, 318, 341, 361t, 359. See
Theory. See also Scientific theory also “Work”
constructing, 97–98, 108t, 110 The Usual Suspects, 333(n6)
credibility of, 219t, 361t, 359, 362 “Utility,” 59, 61
definition of, 99, 383
derogatory sense of, 383 Validation, 350t, 361t
development of, 376–377 vs. verification, 101, 102t
emergence from data, 22–23, 219t, 220, 226, Vaughan, D., 74
342, 381 Venn diagram, 124, 125f, 126, 132(n2),
generation from data, 156, 301–302, 304, 174(n10)
349t, 358–359, 376–377 Verification, 48–49, 52, 66–68, 358
as grounded in data, 219t orthodoxy of, 148
for GTM, 342–343 vs. validation, 101, 102t
instrumental, 349t Verificationists, 32t, 39, 77t, 123, 148, 156, 271
irrefutability and, 50 Vickers, G., 268
and practice, 346 Vienna Circle, 46–47, 58(n17)
pragmatist view of, xi–xii Voltaire, 338
as research product, 34
substantive, 98 Walker, D., 218
as tool, 99, 109t, 342 Wallace, A., 387
usefulness of, 99, 318, 341, 361t Walsh, S. (PhD student), viii, 174(n11), 307t
Thick description, 73 coding strategy used by, 184–187, 187b, 192t
Thinking Informatically, 293 core categories of, 261b
Thomas, D.S., 336 grounded theorizing by,
Thomas, W.I., 68, 104, 148, 336 account of, 373–378
Thomas Aquinas, 352(n5) process and procedures used by, 153, 155,
Thomas the Tank Engine—A Very Useful Engine, 157, 171–173, 173t
xvii(n4) research outcome, 260b–261b
Thomson, J.J., 277 return to literature, 257–261
Thomson, William. See Kelvin, first Baron (Sir sampling used by, 250
William Thomson) Walton, J.K., 378
Thought collectives, 52, 73 Warranting, 292, 294t, 296b, 312
Time for Dying, ix–x, xiii, 13, 19t, 35, 64–65, 70, Weber, M., 66
77t, 86t, 91, 99, 112(n3), 115, 127, 134, 198, Wengraf, T., 185
210, 249, 265, 268, 276, 307t Wertz, F., 140(n6), 160
Timmermans, S., 156 Wiener, C., 29–30, 70, 84, 135, 162
Tolstoy, L., 83, 217 Wilde, O., 346
Tool(s), 15, 17–19, 19t Wittgenstein, L., 83–84, 339
theory as, 99, 109t “Work,” 37t, 41, 98, 102, 109t, 303, 306, 307t,
Transcription(s). See also Interview(s), transcribed 308, 341, 350t, 349, 361t
analysis of, 138–139 Worrisome accuracy, 220t, 221, 349t–350t
Triarchic Theory, of intelligence, 302–303
Truth Yeatman, R.J., 81(n1), 353, 362
discovery vs. construction of, 42, 42t,
174(n5) Zero, absolute, 9, 11(n7)
Nietzsche on, 338, 342 Zetterberg, H., 69
Pragmatist view of, 337, 348 Znaniecki, F., 68, 104, 148,
Turner, B., 102 174(n1), 336, 363

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i

Grounded Theory and Grounded Theorizing

Grounded Theory and Grounded

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2017

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

PART ONE Research and Research Methods

PART TWO The Grounded Theory Method in Practice

PART THREE Grounded Theorizing: ​The Gerunds of the Grounded

PART FOUR Grounded Theory—​Themes and Variations

17. The Grounded Theory Method and Pragmatism: Instrumental Theorizingâ•… 335

The twentieth century mathematician and systems theory pioneer. Anatol

Various other grounded theory books followed, including Anguish (Strauss

Strauss & Glaser Charmaz &

Glaser & Strauss

1907). Pragmatists treat our concepts and theories as instruments, applying

In the midst of these challenges to academic orthodoxy, Anselm Strauss

manner. Nevertheless it is important to avoid any attempt to impose a tight

¤ Rapoport’s four rules for a successful critical commentary—​I leave it

Research and Research Methods

It is assumed that people know about research: what it involves and how it is to

4 Research and Research Methods

6 Research and Research Methods

as well as various forms of coding, theoretical saturation, and the like. In so

group will certainly incorporate non-​quantifiable assumptions and reason-

8 Research and Research Methods

A Note on Quantitative versus Qualitative Research

10 Research and Research Methods

Though this be madness yet there is method in it (Shakespeare,

As explained in Chapter 1, the term grounded theory is actually a misnomer.

14 Research and Research Methods

themselves will and must always be supplemented by some form of discur-

Two Families—​qualitative Two Strategies—​qualitative and Three aspects

16 Research and Research Methods

18 Research and Research Methods

Burns (2000) offers a fairly orthodox account in his book Introduction

20 Research and Research Methods

A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT METHODS

Over time the plethora of methods dissipated, with general acceptance of

Preconceptions and Perceptions

Both preconceptions and perceptions refer to assumed but unstated aspects

22 Research and Research Methods

classing it as a “perception,” and perhaps as an example of one way in which

A preconception of concern with regard to GTM involves the issue of

24 Research and Research Methods

and others associated with the Chicago School of Sociology, a redoubt of SI

Purpose and Periphery

These aspects of research methods refer to the understanding that investiga-

26 Research and Research Methods

Process and Procedures

28 Research and Research Methods

persuasive for their audience, or for a range of different audiences—​funding

aspects of the detailed data—​perhaps necessitating disregarding some aspects

30 Research and Research Methods

32 Research and Research Methods

Theoretical saturation A common issue for all variants of GTM. It is

Products and Presentation

PART THREE Grounded Theorizing: The Gerunds of the Grounded

PART FOUR Grounded Theory—Themes and Variations

¤ Rapoport’s four rules for a successful critical commentary—I leave it

group will certainly incorporate non-quantifiable assumptions and reason-

Two Families—qualitative Two Strategies—qualitative and Three aspects

persuasive for their audience, or for a range of different audiences—funding

aspects of the detailed data—perhaps necessitating disregarding some aspects

GETTING HUNG UP ON METHODS AND PARADIGMS—THE “E” WORD

themselves “theory-laden,” influenced by the theoretical positions from which

whole—content of scientific knowledge is conditioned by historical, psy-