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G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999 thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997.

6) hours from September 7, 1997."5 Private respondents did not act


on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. 6
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs. On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 Cebu issued an order, denominated as "Detention During the Pendency of the
NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON, respondent. Case", committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City.7 Five (5) days later,
or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was ordered released by the said court
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy after he had posted bond.8
Ombudsman for the Military dated 19 January 19981 which recommended the
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner against herein private On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of
respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad,
delivery of detained persons, and the Order of April 13, 1998 2 which denied his Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at
motion for reconsideration. the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas.9
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was on November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution
arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged containing the following dispositive portion:
violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children Against Child abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."3 The following day, or on September 8, WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of
1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Republic Act 7610, it is hereby recommended that an
Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one INFORMATION be filed against the two aforenamed accused.
Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle4 . The complaint, insofar as
pertinent, reads as follows: Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscal's Office for
appropriate action.10
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy.
Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu, Philippines and within the By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October
Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named 1995 of the Office of the Ombudsman,11 the case for delay in delivery filed by
accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully, petitioner against herein private respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman for
conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while accused the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its
JASPER AGBAY manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, now
AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the Private denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which issued the questioned
Complainant, Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal against herein
going their destinations. Upon initial investigation of the Bgy, private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but
Captain of Bgy. Catarman, accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was this motion was denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
released and accused JASPER AGBAY is presently detain Liloan
Police Station Jail. Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Sotto Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached.
The grounds relied upon in the present petition12 are as follows:
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan
demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had
I.
"failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the
RELYING ON MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 14, SERIES OF 1995, Philippine National Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995, OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN by virtue of the description of the Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to act
IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE- on his complaint against private respondents who are members of the PNP.
ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT, THE SAID CIRCULAR BEING Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 14
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND VOID. insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military
Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the Philippine
II. National Police.1âwphi1.nêt

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987
NOT HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS COMPENCE TO DETERMINE Constitution, in Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of "one
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian character (emphasis
LILOAN-COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE supplied)." Likewise, R.A. 697513 is categorical in describing the civilian character
CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER. of the police force.14 The only question now is whether Memorandum Circular No.
14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military with
III. jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of the PNP, violates the
latter's civilian character.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE MCTC, WHILE HAVING AUTHORITY TO As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December
CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE "PROPER 199815, the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY " CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE authority to investigate civilian personnel of the government was resolved in the
REVISED PENAL CODE AND, HENCE, THE FILING OF THE affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman.16 In that case, the
COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A petitioners, who were members of the Philippine National Police questioned the
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID NOT INTERRUPT THE PERIOD jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout of
PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125. certain suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court
held that:
IV.
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do
not yield conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
performing other functions or duties affecting non-military
HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF
personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant Constitutional
DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL
provisions reveal otherwise.
LIABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS.
As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such
other powers or perform such functions or duties" as Congress may
V.
prescribe through legisiation. Therefore, nothing can prevent
Congress from giving the Ombudsman supervision and control over
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN the Ombudsman's deputies, one being the deputy for the military
HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE establishment. In this light, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
THE NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN
THEY FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. — The authority
THE 7TH MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of
the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge
of its powers and functions shall be vested in the enterfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of supervision and
Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control control over the said Office.
of the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear
While Section 31 thereof declares: intent and policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian
character of the police force and "would render nugatory and meaningless the
Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators and distinction between cases involving civilian and military personnel and the
Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman."19
personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize
any fiscal, state prosecutor to assist in the Said contentions are misplaced.
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those
designated or deputized to assist him herein shall be The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is by no
under his supervision and control. means a member of the military establishment. The said Office was established
"to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment just as it
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non- champions the common people against bureaucratic indifference". The Office was
military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military intended to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain redress for their grievances
Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no irregularity attended against higher authorities and the drafters of the Constitution were aware that
the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kurutong Baleleng the creation of the Office, which is seemingly independent of the President, to
case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of perform functions which constitutionally should be performed by the President,
investigators.17 might be in derogation of the powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of
the Armed Forces20.
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply to
Comment dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by
on all fours with the case at bar18. Petitioner states that the doctrine laid down in the framers of the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people" 21 and
the said case is simply that "the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non- "a champion of the citizen.22" Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution describes
military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. This the Ombudsman and his deputies as "protectors of the people." Thus, first and
doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or individual cases involving foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including the Deputy Ombudsman
non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military for the Military owe their allegiance to the people and ordinary citizens, it is
Affairs" and does not apply when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the assumption of jurisdiction
indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military by the said office over the investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract
Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular. from or violate the civilian character of the police force when precisely the Office
of the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of the
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:
involving non-military personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to
isolated or individual cases. The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply exercising the power vested in the judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding
Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who
any fiscal, state prosecutor or the or lawyer in the government service to act as shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of deliver such person for the proper judicial authorities within the
certain cases." This Court, absent any grave abuse of discretion, may not period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
equivalent; and thirty-six hours (36) hours, for crimes or offenses constitutes to a "proper judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 of the
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. Revised Penal Code.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without
communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. permitting him to go on bail28. More specifically, it punishes public officials or
employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed
Station on 7 September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
section 5 (b) thereof23. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having
medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty. Under these been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities29.
circumstances, a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the proper
judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest. The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of
justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the
As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant, Joan temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed
Gicaraya, filed a complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner for violation a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as
of R.A. 7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu. may be established by law.30"

Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, as
before the MCTC was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has in the instant case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as a
no jurisdiction to try the offense. This act of private complainant petitioner judge but as a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the cases of Sangguniang Bayan
argues, was unnecessary, a surplusage which did not interrupt the period ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171
prescribed by Art. 12524 considering that under the Rules it is the Regional Trial SCRA 39, where it was held that "when a preliminary investigation is conducted
Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. As such, upon the lapse by a judge, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual
of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80
proper Regional Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Phil. 862, that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in Art.
Art. 125. Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC 125 is applicable.
issued a Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he was acting contrary to
law since by then there was no basis for the continued detention of petitioner.25 Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The cited cases of
Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of whether or not the
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in findings of the Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject to
its 13 April 1998 Order, stated that the duty of filing the corresponding complaint review by provincial and city fiscals. There was no pronoucement in these cases
in court was "fulfille by respondent when the formal complaint was filed on as to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the exercise of its power to
September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours conduct preliminary investigations, is a proper judicial authority as contemplated
after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7, 1997."26 The Solicitor by Art. 125.
General, for his part, argues that while a municipal court judge may conduct
preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties, he still Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of
retains the authority to issue an order of release or commitment. As such, upon Police, supra, since the facts of this case are different. In Sayo, the complainant
the filing of the complaint with the MCTC, there was already compliance with the was filed with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of release or
very purpose and intent of Art. 12527. commitment while in the instant case, the complaint was filed with a judge who
had the power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in the Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case31, this Court even made a
pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person "is a legal one and consists DIGEST
in making a charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper
FACTS:
justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing
by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an Petitioner was arrested and detained for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of
investigation if the evidence against said person warrants." Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. The following day, a Complaint for
violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of
the issue. In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of
judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper
judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997. Without receiving any action
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment32. from these authorities, a case for delay in delivery was filed in the Office of the Ombudsman of the
Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the Military against the herein arresting and detaining officers but was dismissed.
intent behind art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application On appeal, petitioner contends, among others, that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case hence it
cannot be the “proper judicial authorities” referred to in article 125 of the revised penal code.
with the court, he may be released on bail 33. Petitioner himself acknowledged this
power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his ISSUE:
release upon posting bail34. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has
been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with WON the filing of the complaint with the court without jurisdiction constitutes delivery to a “proper
judicial authority” under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article. HELD:

YES.
Finally, we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the
complaint against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If tere was Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
any error in this procedure, private respondents should not be held liable. In the person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail.
same manner, petitioner's argument that the controversial orders issued by the
More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person
MCTC are contrary' to law does not give rise to criminal liability on the part of the for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
respondents. Respondent police officers may have rendered themselves open to periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused
sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order of the court, knowing becomes illegal upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee
fully well that a complainant was a already filed with it. having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities.

The words “judicial authority” as contemplated by Art. 125 mean “the courts of justice or judges of
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person
January 19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13, 1998 Order of the Office of the charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior
courts as may be established by law.”
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition.
No pronouncement as to costs. Upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied
considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and,
upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint
with the MCTC.

RULING:

Petition DISMISSED. On further note, it was the mother of private complainant who filed the
complaint against petitioner with the MCTC. If there was any error in this procedure, private
respondents should not be held liable.
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948 Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of
the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners, officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person
vs. upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a
BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents. judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice
empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which
Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of
against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the
petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the
still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any
against them an information with the proper courts justice. prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order
containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a
sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not
transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial
and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere
by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if there
was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of
question involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the the people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not
officers concerned. be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this
whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by
following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code? examination of the complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to
whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be
any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the
commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of
next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who
the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention
shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Constitution.
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which,
article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the
referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a
provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the
person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and
opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the
within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to
courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the
the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and
temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed
by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant
a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
information filed against him. He shall also informed of the substance of the conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the
testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to proceeding paragraph.
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The
testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense
defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him. cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of
First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed
the Rules of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants,
corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under accused if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer
a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person or person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay
detained shall be released. take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or
be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the
they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the
arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13,
13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Rule 108.
Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not
the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal
quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest
Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and
fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the
defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the
the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the
court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall
in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do
hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without
the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the
investigation. investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding
information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on
investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not
the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal
municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing
the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as DIGEST
the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and
the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the FACTS:
necessary information, must be taken into consideration. Petitioners filed a petition of habeas corpus.

Allegedly, they were charged with the commission of Robbery. Arresting officer then and presented a
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the complaint against them with the fiscal's office on April 2, 1948. Petitioners were not charged in any court or
Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested tribunal for the alleged crime through the filing of information until this petition was heard.
without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any
On the part of the officer, he contends that the petitioners were already delivered to the proper judicial
process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after authorities when a complaint was filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila.
due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting
the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained ISSUE:
for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge. WON the fiscal office is a “proper judicial authorities” referred in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant HELD:

upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases NO.
expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is
to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the
peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with
judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed
has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law".
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.) There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary
commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not
detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or authorized by law to do so.
other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
Also, section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall,
without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take”
responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners,
for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed to include the
fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment
cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without
article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city warrant.
fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being
actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would
the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their be to authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by
law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due
liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release
virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered. him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or
judge.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.


RULING:

Writ GRANTED without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in
the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering
the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
vs. growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women
married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet,
after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and
our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of
to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who
the Philippine Islands? were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned
them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women
might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city
repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts
closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action
period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had
the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an
collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of
that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring
wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board liberty, on December 2, 1918.
the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their
for Davao during the night of October 25. own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The
reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of
Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was
not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly,
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the
original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this
and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right,
authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that
deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether
the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of
and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity.
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and
order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women;
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that
that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired
city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their
they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through
being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means,
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other
and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both
citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the
counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and
his residence.
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply (3) habeas corpus.
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to
require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue
exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive such situation as that now before us.
of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and
the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these
of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and Islands provides:
chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the
same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a
other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all
general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person
persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent
to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile,
against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the
except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a
country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art.
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the
211.)
forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act
(U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is
of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be
Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
Islands. and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties
are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance
there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of of habeas corpus.
their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the
Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of
evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned
restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally
of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ
made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these
of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within
with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in
the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The
failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts
would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ. for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When courts are however very persuasive in nature.
the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked
were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent
date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted
Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the
minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to,
detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement
this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to
equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the
writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater
judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of
should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following
eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted: The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911],
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her
rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers
until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His
Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over
extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was
and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On
great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January
apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child
being brought to their notice. . . . before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately
after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . . might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound
to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been
upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior
confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior
latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was
and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been
a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties
in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. in question being brought before the court on the day named.
D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12
Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses
[1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.) were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before
corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose
as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and
beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those
and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao,
committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the
negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and
Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.) production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
of habeas corpus. having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he
orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and
found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would
purged. only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other
words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it
The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith
with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila and to mitigate their wrong.
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched
to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police
joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this
Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful
contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention
executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings. regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and
reluctantly acknowledged.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial
compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done. It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to
Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this
city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his
contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his
administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an
excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be amount is P100.
guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's
failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
corpuswhen he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and
court. (Ex parteSterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
407.) contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court
within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in respondents. So ordered.
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and
Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to
officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. encroachment.
The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his
duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this
DIGEST less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas;
FACTS:
2) any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel
deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of
the morals of the people of Manila. The women thought that they were being destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not
transported to another police station, while Yñigo, the haciendero from Davao, more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
had no idea that the women being sent to them as laborers him were actually
prostitutes. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of The respondent’s intention to suppress the social evil was commendable,
that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for however, his methods were unlawful.
Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported
to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed a grave
that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their
will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban,
Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Theirchoice
respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
deported to Mindanao against their will. Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said
prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being
consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even
there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 consenting to being transported to Mindanao.
prostitutes. However, the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before
the court on the stipulated date. RULING:

ISSUE: Lukban must be severely punished. Any action in relation to the petition for
habeas corpus is not necessary. Mayor need only to return the women to Manila.
WON the City Mayor has the authority to expel any person from their residence.

HELD:

NO.

The Court held that the respondent, Lukban had no authority to commence such
business agreement. He violated certain laws based on his act of compelling
these women to change their domicile, encapsulated in Art. 211 which states:

1) any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a


general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distance from his domicile, except it
be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not
GR No. L-824 January 14, 1948 same year, the Commonwealth with all its powers and prerogatives (41 Off Gaz.,
86). The Commonwealth government was already exercising all its constitutional
HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO, recurrent, and legal powers without any limitation in the City of Manila. The President had
vs. not suspended the constitutional guarantees.
THE TRIBUNAL OF THE PEOPLE AND JUAN M. LADAW, as Special
Prosecutor, appealed. It is well established doctrine in the Philippines, the United States, England and
Canada that the administration of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the
In an original request for certiorari, the appellant, accused of the crime of means that the party has used to obtain it. 1 It is doctrine followed for many
treason in criminal case No. 3522 of the People's Court, alleges that on April 4, years "until it arose - said this Tribunal in Pueblo against Carlos , 47 Jur. Fil., 660
1945 at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon, he was arrested by the members of the - the dismal opinion of the majority in the Boyd vs. US case in 1885, which has
ICC of the Army of the States United in his residence in San Rafael Street, No. exerted pernicious influence in many States on subsitutional judicial options. "
199-A, Manila, without arrest warrant and was taken to the prisons of
Muntinglupa, Rizal; that a week later his wife who had moved to his home- "The development of this doctrine of the matter of Boyd vs. US was as follows:
residence in Rosario Street, No. 3, Quezon City, was invited by several CIC ( a ) Boyd's cause continued without being challenged in his own court for twenty
members under the command of Lieutenant Olves to witness the registration of years, while he received frequent disapproval in the courts of State ( ante ,
his house in the San Rafael Street; who refused to follow them because they did paragraph 2183) ( b ) Then in the case of Adams vs. New York, in 1904, it was
not carry a search warrant; per as they assured that even without their presence implicitly dismissed in the Supreme Federal Court, and the orthodox precedents
they had to do the registration anyway, she accompanies them; that upon arrival registered in the courts of States ( ante , paragraph 2183) were expressly
in the house, he saw that several effects were scattered on the ground among approved. ( c ) Then, after another twenty years, in 1914, in the cause of
which several documents; that Lieutenant Olves informed her that she had some Weeks vs. US, the Federal Supreme Court moved at this time not because of
documents to prove her husband's guilt; that on June 27, 1946 the appellant wrong history, but because of a misplaced sentiment - it went back to the
filed a motion before the People's Court requesting the return of such documents, original doctrine of the Boyd case, but with a condition , namely, that the
arguing as a reason that they were obtained from their residence without a illegality of the search and seizure should first have been directly litigated and
search warrant, and said court, with serious abuse of discretion or excess of established by a motion, made before the trial, for the return of confiscated
jurisdiction and following the doctrine sitting on the matter ofAlvero against items; so that, after said motion, and only then, the illegality could be noticed in
Dizon (76 Phil., 637) denied it; that unless this Court orders the Special the main trial and the evidence so obtained should be excluded. ... "Under the
Procurator to return them to the appellant, his constitutional rights guaranteed authority of this doctrine of Weeks vs. US, and other decisions of the same school
by the constitution would be violated. And because he has no other simple, quick the appellant exercises the present appeal, requesting the return of documents
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, he asks that this Court illegally removed by CIC members.
( a ) annul the order of the People's Court of July 9, 1946; ( b ) that said Tribunal
be required to order the return to the appellant of such documents; ( c) that a The Constitution guarantees the inviolability of individual rights in the following
restraining order be issued prohibiting the Special Prosecutor from presenting terms; "The right of the people to the safety of their persons, dwellings, papers
them as evidence against the appellant in the treason case. These petitions show and effects against arrest records and kidnappings shall not be violated, unless
that documents are relevant proofs, in addition to administrable because there is for probable cause to be determined by the judge after examining under oath or
no rule that prevents them (Model Code of Evidence, 87). affirmation the complainant and witnesses that I will present, and with a detailed
description of the site to be registered and of the persons to be apprehended or
It is well founded the contention of the appellant that the decision in the case of the things to be seized. " (Title III, Article 1. or , paragraph 3. o .)
of Alvero against Dizon(76 Phil., 637) is not applicable to the particular case. The
documents in the case of Alvero have been confiscated by the members of the We concurred with the Complainant's claim that, under these constitutional
CIC when the military government exercised its full functions as an army of grants, he had the right to have his house respected, his documents should not
occupation. On the other hand, when they seized on April 11, 1945, from the be confiscated by any authority or agent of authority, without a writ of
documents that are the subject of this case, General MacArthur on behalf of the registration duly issued.
Government of the United States, had already restored on February 27 of the
These constitutional limitations, however, do not go so far as to exclude as also punished if he is guilty of a crime, regardless of whether the proof of his
evidence the documents obtained illegally or unduly from it. The Rules of the guilt has been obtained illegitimately. The means used in the acquisition of the
Courts, Rule 123, determines which are the evidence that should be excluded, document does not alter its probative value. So in Stevenson vs. Earnest, 80,
which are admissible and competent and do not classify as incompetent evidence Ill. 513, it was said: "It is contemplated, and such ought ever to be the fact, that
those obtained illegally. The fundamental law establishes the limits to which the the records of courts remain permanently in the places assigned by the law for
executive, legislative and judicial powers may go in the exercise of their their custody. What is written in them? Suppose the presence of a witness to
mergers. The executive should not abuse his power, visiting the domicile of the have been procured by fraud or violence, while the party thus procuring the
citizen or improperly seizing his property and documents; the legislator must not attendance of the witness would be liable to severe punishment, surely that could
pass laws that make illusory the sacredness of the home and the courts must not be urged against the jurisdiction of the witness, if it could not, why should a
punish the violators of the constitution, regardless of whether they are public record, although illegally taken from its proper place of custody and brought
officials or not.vs . States, 28 SE, 624: before The Court, but otherwise free from suspicion, be hold incompetent?

As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our "In Com. Vs. Dana, 2 Metc., 329. e; Court said:" Admitting that the lottery
constitutional inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, was tickets and materials were illegally seized, still this is not legal objection to the
to place a salutary restriction upon the powers of government. That is to admission of them in evidence. If the search warrant was illegal, or if the officer
say, we believe the framers of the constitutions of the United States and served the warrant exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the
of this and other states merely sought to provide against any attempt, by warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done. But this
legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify, or declare lawful, any is no good reason for excluding the papers seized, as evidence, if they were
unreasonable search or seizure. This wise restriction was intended to relevant to the issue, as they were unquestionably were. When papers were
operate upon legislative bodies, so to render ineffectual any effort to offered in evidence the Court could not notice how they were obtained, - whether
legalize by statute what the people expressly stipulated could in no event lawfully or unlawfully, - nor would they form a collateral issue to determine that
be made lawful; upon executives, so that no law violates this question. "
constitutional inhibition should ever be enforced; and upon the
judiciary, so to render it the duty of the courts to denounce as unlawful The appellant cites the case of Bureau vs . McDowell in the following terms:
every unreasonable search and seizure, whether confessedly without any
color of authority, or sought to be justified under the guise of legislative Certain books, papers, memoranda, etc., of the private property of
sanction. For the misconduct of private persons, acting on their individual McDowell were stolen by certain people who were interested in the
responsibility and of their own volition, surely none of the three divisions investigation that was going to practice the Grand Jury against Mcdowell
of government is responsible. If an official, or a mere petty agent of the for certain offense that was said to have committed this, relative to the
state, exceeds or abuses the authority with which he is clothed, he is fraudulent use of the mail. These documents and books were then
deemed to be acting, not for the state, but for himself only; and therefore delivered to Burdeau by the people who had rabaod them. Burdeau was
he alone, and not the state, should be held accountable for his acts. If the the special assistant of the Attorney General of the United States, who
constitutional rights of a citizen are invaded by an individual, the most was to have the direction and control of the prolific United States, which
that any branch of government can do to afford the citizen such redress was to have the direction and control of the prosecution before the Grand
as a possible, and bring the wrongdoer to account for his unlawful Jury. McDowell tried to prevent Burdeau from using such books and
conduct. . . . . documents by a motion he had presented in that regard. Burdeau opposed
the motion, claiming that he had the right to use such papers.
We believe that the authors of the Philippine constitution have never had the
slightest idea to grant criminal immunity to the one who violates the sanctity of "We know of no constitutional principal which requires the government to
the home, nor to any offender of the criminal law for the sole fact that the surrender the papers under such circumstances.
evidence against him has been obtained illegally. The healthy, legal and orderly
procedure is to punish, according to Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, the
"The papers having come into possession of the government without a
individual who, in the capacity of a public official, without registration, improperly
violation of petitioner's rights by governmental authority, we see no
profanes the domicile of a citizen and seizes his papers and that this citizen is
reason why the fact that individuals unconnected with the government law be punished. Releasing the blame for the simple fact that the evidence
may have wrongfully taken them, should prevent them from being held against him has not been obtained legally is sanctioning the crime judicially.
for use in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of
incriminatory character. " (Burdeau vs. McDowell.) Let us consider a case: Juan who witnesses a murder, manages to snatch the
assassin's dagger, and with which he orders him to be arrested and taken to the
"Will our Supreme Court adopt the doctrine announced in this decision? presidency of the town. On the way he meets Pedro who intercedes for the
We submit that this is a bad rule of law, and our humble opinion, should murderer; Juan, by a misunderstood sentimentality, returns the dagger and helps
not adopt our Court." the accused to make disappear all vestige of the crime not to be discovered. Juan
and Pedro, not only commit unworthy acts due to citizenship, but they must be
The appellant then cites decisions of some Supreme Courts of State that have not punished by cover-ups (Article 19, cod., Pen. Rev.) The public will never
adopted this doctrine of the Supreme Federal Court. It is not weird. Each court understand why these two individuals should be punished and, on the other
adopts its own criteria. But of the 45 states of the American Union - According to hand, a court, under the doctrine of Weeks, can order the return of the stolen
Judge Cardozo in its decision handed down in 1926 in People vs . Defore, 150 NE, document that proves the guilt of a defendant and leave him free and the one
585 - fourteen adopted the heterodox doctrine of Weeks and 31 rejected it, and who stole the document.
according to Wigmore, in 1940, fourteen years later, six more states, 37 in total,
including Hawaii and Puerto Rico rejected it, maintaining orthodox doctrine . (8 Another case. By suspicion, a certain Jose is arrested by two policemen when he
Wigmore on Evidence, 3. a Ed., Pages 5-11.) And after considering the various goes to the rostrum where the high officials of the executive, legislative and
decisions of the two schools, Cardozo made these wise observations about the judicial power are gathered together with the diplomatic representatives of the
doctrine of Weeks: friendly nations to witness the stop of the anniversary of the independence; In
his pocket they find a bomb that is capable of flying the entire rostrum. Two
We are confirmed in this conclusion when we reflect how far-reaching in other policemen, after learning of the arrest, search Jose's home and find
its effect upon society the new consequences would be. The pettiest peace documents that reveal that he has received orders from a foreign organization to
officer would have it in his power, through over-zeal or indiscretions, to police all the high government personnel at the first opportunity. The police do
confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the most flagitious. A room not have an arrest warrant or a search warrant. Is it fair that on the motion of
is searched against the law, and the body of a murdered man is found. If Jose in the criminal case against him, Is the court ordering the return of
the place of discovery may not be proved, the other circumstances may documents proving your crime? Would not anarchism be encouraged with such a
be insufficient to connect the defendant with the crime. The privacy of the practice? The court would play the sad role of helping those who wish to
home has been infringed, and the murder goes free. Another search, undermine the foundations of our institutions. In U.Svs . Snyder, 278 Fed., 650,
eleven more against the law, discloses counterfeit money or the the Court said: "To hold that no criminal, in any case, be arrested and searched
implements of forgery. The absence of a warrant means the freedom of for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
the forger. Like instances can be multiplied. society, to a large extent , at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and
the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances. " And
Let's take concrete to the present case. If the documents whose develation the in People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac., 435, said: "Upon what theory can it be held that
appellant asks for, prove their culpability of the crime of treason, why should the such proceeding (for the return of the articles) is an incident of the trial, in such a
State return them and free them from the accusation? Is not this to consent and sense that the ruling thereon goes up on appeal as part of the record and subject
validate the crime? Does not it constitute a judicial approval of the commission of to review by the appellate court It seems to be an independent proceeding to
the crimes, the violation of the domicile of the accused committed by the enforce a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case The right of the
members of the CIC and the treason committed by the appellant? Such a practice defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents from evidence a civil
would foment crime instead of preventing its commission. In addition, obtaining right in no way involved in the criminal case The right of the defendant is not to
documents does not alter their probative value. If a search warrant had been exclude the incriminating documents from evidence, but to recover the
issued, the documents would be admissible evidence. There is no constitutional possession of articles which were wrongfully taken from him. That right exists
or legal provision that frees the accused from all criminal liability because there entirely apart from any proposed use of the property by the State or when it was
was no search warrant. The public vindicta demands that offenders of the penal the invasion of its premises and the taking of its goods that constituted the
offense irrespective of what was taken or what it was made of its use; and the
law having declared that the articles taken were competent and admissible the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered on
evidence, notwithstanding the unlawful search and seizure, how can the the floor. Lt. Olives informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of
circumstance that the court erred in an independent proceeding for the return of documents and things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because
they proved the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued
the property on defendant's demand add anything to detract from the violation of
to her.
the defendant's constitutional rights in the unlawful search and seizure?
Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs.
The Constitutional and the laws of the land are not solicitous to aid Moncado found out that a number of things were missing.
persons charged with crime in their efforts to conceal or sequester
evidence of their iniquity. (8 Wig., 37.) On June 27, 1946, petitioner filed with the People's Court a motion praying that the
return of said documents and things be ordered. The petition was denied on July 9, 1946.
The theory of Weeks vs . US that subverts the rules of evidence not acceptable in
Thereupon, petitioner filed with this Supreme Court on August 10, 1946, a petition
this jurisdiction: it is contrary to the sense of justice and the orderly and sound praying that, among others, said court be required to order the return of the documents
administration of justice. The orthodox doctrine is imposed by its proven and things in question to petitioner, and that the prosecutor be restrained from using and
consistency through many years. We must not abandon it if we want presenting them as evidence at the trial of the criminal case for treason.
constitutional rights to be respected and not desecrated. The guilty must receive
their punishment, even if the evidence against them has been obtained All seized documents were not denied by the prosecution and that the said
illegally. 2 And those who in violation of the law and the Constitution unduly documents are at their possession.
seize such laws must also be punished. This is how the law reigns, majestic and
According to the respondents, the decision in Alvero vs. Dizon (L-342) that the seized
untouched.
documents at his house at the time of arrest be admitted as competent evidence against
the crime charged.
The request is denied with costs.
ISSUE:
Moran, Pres., Feria, and Padilla, MM., Are satisfied.
Tuason, J., concurs in the result. 1. WON the police officers who conducted the illegal arrest, searches and seizures be
held liable
DIGEST
2. WON the evidence coming from an illegal arrest, searches and seizures be given
probative value
Facts:
Petitioner is accused of treason before the People's Court.

Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner was arrested HELD:
by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence
YES
without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was
detained.
1. The healthy, legal and orderly procedure is to punish, according to Article 128
On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario of the Revised Penal Code, the individual who, in the capacity of a public official,
Drive, Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers and ordered to accompany them without registration, improperly profanes the domicile of a citizen and seizes his
to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things belonging to papers and that this citizen is also punished if he is guilty of a crime, regardless
petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the of whether the proof of his guilt has been obtained illegitimately. The means
purpose, she refused to go with them, but after the officers told her that with or without her used in the acquisition of the document does not alter its probative value.
presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decided to accompany
them.
2. It is well founded that the contention of the appellant that the decision in the
Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been case of Alvero against Dizon(76 Phil., 637) is not applicable to the particular
ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in case. The documents in the case of Alvero have been confiscated by the
members of the CIC when the military government exercised its full functions The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
as an army of occupation. receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was
found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least
The orthodox doctrine found in the case of theory of Weeks vs . US is imposed two witnesses, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized
by its proven consistency through many years. We must not abandon it if we property.
want constitutional rights to be respected and not desecrated. The guilty must
receive their punishment, even if the evidence against them has been obtained SEC. 11. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court.
illegally. And those who in violation of the law and the Constitution unduly seize
such laws must also be punished. This is how the law reigns, majestic and The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the justice of the
untouched. peace or judge of the municipal court or of the Court of First Instance which
issue the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by
RULING: oath.
Petition for return is GRANTED. Petitioner remains to be detained without prejudice to the
filing of any case against the arresting officers.

DISSENTING for #2:

No. The seizure of the papers and effects in questions, having been made without
any search warrant, was and is illegal, and was effected in open violation of the following
provisions of the Constitution:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determine by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. (Article III, section 1 [3] of the Constitution.)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except


upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order require otherwise.”
(Article III, section 1 [5] of the Constitution.)

We concurred with the Complainant's claim that, under these constitutional grants,
he had the right to have his house respected, his documents should not be confiscated by
any authority or agent of authority, without a writ of registration duly issued.

The seizure was also in open violation of sections 3, 10, and 11 of Rule 122,which are
as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.


G.R. No. 141176 May 27, 2004 On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his
backwages from Ben in the amount of ₱500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings
ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS, petitioners, from the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988,
vs. applied for a job at his cousin’s place, at Quimpo Boulevard, Davao City. He
SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA MATILLANO, respondents. bought a radio cassette for ₱2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for
₱900.00.
DECISION
On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Matina, Davao City, but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4,
1988, he returned to Nancy’s house and stayed there until the next day,
November 5, 1988.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch 21.2 That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost ₱45,000.00 in cash
at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and
forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s
The Antecedents
employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost
₱45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter,
Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United
aunt, his father’s older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Products Enterprise Store.
Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2, 1988, Lariosawas employed as a laborer at
the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of ₱800.00.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of
The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located at the
Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them
corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to
to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed, they borrowed Lui’s Ford Fierra for their
close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben
transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted
himself opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the
on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife
said store was another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to
remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa
be Ben’s nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and
was with him.
Rene Malang.

After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two
Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer
others, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and
every morning before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free
asked the latter to go with him. Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa
meals and lodging. There were occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of
agreed and boarded Lui’s vehicle. The car stopped in front of Lui’s house, where
Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with them. Lariosa deposited his
the latter alighted and went inside, while his companions and Lariosa remained in
savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.
the car. When Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked
Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. killed. The group went to Ben’s house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined
He went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio them as they drove towards the store.
Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988.
Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told
Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s
him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the
money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of
month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the
the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into
Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his
confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made
things from Kiao’s house.
a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A- your aparador because we are getting something." Paulina told Lui to wait for her
004-88 dated November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry.
case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and
to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the
authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took
board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw two mats and two pairs of ladies’ shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two
Streets. pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to
the latter’s children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did,
In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. Lui and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old
One of them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store coins. Lui and his two companions then went down to the ground floor. When
with the use of the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Lui’s Julieta went out of the room, one of Lui’s companions recognized her as Lariosa’s
companions took his picture. Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them as they left the
knob to open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car and brought to house.
the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to
the police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached
Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he and she was on the verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged
stole ₱45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he did with the money. When Paulina’s stomach. However, Erlinda had to leave because she was worried about
a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa replied that he her mother. Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared hot water and put a
spent the night in the house of his girlfriend’s parents at New Matina, Davao City. soothing ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.
The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left
anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police
cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took these and brought Lariosa Station and caused an entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had
back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two companions were recovered the following items from the Matillano residence -- one pair of colored
waiting. blue pants valued at ₱89.00; one floor mat costing ₱290.00; a pair of black
ladies’ shoes worth ₱126.00; and another pair of ladies’ shoes worth ₱69.00.
Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied
that he used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying
Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his themselves as policemen had gained entry into their house and took the
hands still handcuffed, to a car. Lui’s companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two floor mats; two
boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence. pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one ring; and old
coins.3
Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian
clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that
about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they earlier that day, at 4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo
kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies’ shoes; 1
proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosa’s aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old coins, without his and his
adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosa’s sister, Paulina’s daughter-in-law, Virginia, wife’s consent and without a search warrant.4 In the meantime, Doroteo
the latter’s sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of the Barangay Captain, filed a
Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something." complaint against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed
Paulina remonstrated, "Why are you meddling (manghilabot)?" as Barangay Case No. 168.5

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he
something might happen. He then said, "All right, where is stated that he stole ₱40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United
Products, and that he used part of the money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is a member of the Integrated National
tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies’ shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against him
pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.6 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against
Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes, including a copy of the resolution of
On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of the undersigned, be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office at Camp
Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever action it may take.11
docketed as Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.7 The trial court rendered judgment on
June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National
trial court held that Lui procured Lariosa’s confession through force and Police Commission, thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of
intimidation, in connivance with police authorities. 8The trial court, likewise, found administrative liability for the complainant’s failure to substantiate the
that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery: charges.12 The Commission held that Rojas was merely complying with the
mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui and the latter’s two
What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the companions to the Matillano residence.
burden of this charged against the accused despite want of any
appreciable evidence, can be gathered in the record, as indicating the fear In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H.
of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against him in the Bello III dismissed the petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutor’s resolution
Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment, filed by Paulina Matillano. The Secretary of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for
without any sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint reconsideration thereon.
was intended to support complainant’s ground against any possible
complaint, the accused might file against him with the Department of In a parallel development, Lariosa’s parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a
Labor by way of anticipation.9 complaint for robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary
detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al., with the Commission of Human Rights
On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits: docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a Resolution dated December
4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:
Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June
14, 1989, one Eulogio Matillano, accused’s uncle, is hereby allowed to get WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is
or to retrieve exhibits "H," "I," "J," "K," "L," and "M," consisting of Sony sufficient prima facie evidence:
Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban sunglasses; two (2) bundles of
floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes; and Seiko 1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of
Actus wristwatch.10 the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and

Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, 2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of
Peter Doe, John Doe and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed Domicile, as defined under Art. 128 of the same code.13
against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and
the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On December 13, 1988, the The Proceedings in the Trial Court
court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. Upon reinvestigation,
however, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989,
On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil
recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that
complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli
the charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General’s Office for possible
Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The case was docketed as Civil
administrative sanctions against Rojas.
Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the following:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the


complaint against the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of
3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and favor, viz:
peaceful citizens in the community;
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment
4. That at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while issue ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:
plaintiff husband was away from his residential house at Lily St.,
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there tending the house, 1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;
defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru
intimidation succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after 2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
which they brought with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes,
two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova wrist watch,
3. Litigation expenses of ₱10,000.00;
one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old coins,
without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt
for the items taken; 4. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;

5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by 5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.
one Elinito Lariosa but defendants thru the use of naked power and brute
force, illegally searched the house of the herein plaintiffs in gross violation Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.15
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;
In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that
6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally they did not conduct a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff
search the house of plaintiffs and then taking with them the items Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the house and even brought out pairs of
mentioned above without even the benefit of any receipt is not only pants. They added that the other items were brought out by Lariosa’s sister and
violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies’ shoes, and one (1)
Article 32 of the Civil Code; pair of blue pants.16

7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to
anguishes, wounded feelings, deprivation of the properties taken, enter their house, and with Lariosa’s sister, voluntarily turned over the items
besmirched reputation, and fright for which reason defendants should be declared in the complaint. They testified that no violence, threats or intimidation
made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount of were even committed by them against Paulina Matillano. Defendant Rojas further
₱500,000.00; testified that he was merely complying with the Mission Order issued to him when
he entered the house of the plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants,
8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of and that he remained in the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the
example or correction for the public good, defendants should be made to goods from plaintiff Matillano in the second floor of the house.
pay jointly and severally exemplary damages in the amount of
₱300,000.00; On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed
9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective
counsel for an agreed attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total award testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed
plus per diem of ₱1,000.00 per court appearance; them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject
items to them. The trial court took into account the findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as
10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not
less than ₱10,000.00;14
the order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
Case No. 880-B. contending that:

The Case on Appeal I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-
HONORED DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT
The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND CONCLUSIVE AND
appellants contended, thus: DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA THAT TRIED THE CASE;
MATILLANO VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE HOUSE
BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF HER NEPHEW ELINITO LARIOSA WHO II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
WAS HANDCUFFED; THAT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANO’S
RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED
MATILLANO WAS THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.19
BANSALAN POLICE STATION.
The Issues
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE
CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS – The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent
APPELLEES.17 Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well as to
the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her
On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the
decision of the RTC. The decretal portion of the decision reads: respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners’ liability to the
respondents.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants- Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve
appellees jointly and severally: into and resolve them simultaneously.

1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos The Court’s Ruling
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(₱15,000.00) as exemplary damages; and The petition has no merit.

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00), as attorney’s fees; and Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review
3. To pay the costs. on certiorari. However, the rule admits of some exceptions, such as a case where
the findings of facts of the trial court are substantially different from those of the
appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are determinative of the
SO ORDERED.18
outcome of the petition.20
The appellate court denied the appellees’ motion for reconsideration of the said
The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
decision. The appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.
discarding the factual findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of
the appellate court, the petitioners assert that the inconsistencies between the
testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral. Lui did not conduct any search in the
second floor of the respondent’s house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina A I was in our house.
Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search when she allowed the
petitioners to enter. According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove Q At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you
that they forced their way into the house of the respondents, and that the facts notice any unusual incident that took place in your house?
and circumstances which the appellate court found the trial court to have
overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the A There was.
factual findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate
court failed to discern that the action filed by the respondents with the trial court
Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?
was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery against Lariosa, the respondents’
nephew.
A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight
to the evidence of the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court Q Where did they enter?
erred in giving credence and probative weight to the testimonies of the
petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the appellate court found that the A They entered through the kitchen.
trial court had overlooked facts and circumstances of substance, which, if
considered, would have altered the court’s decision. The appellate court gave Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
weight to the findings of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88. 21
A I was in our sala.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered
The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, (sic) your house?
guns drawn and with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and
barged into the house of the respondents. They proceeded to the sala where A I was afraid.
respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement protests, and because of
petitioner Lui’s warning that she might be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano Q Aside from fear, what did you do?
was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of
their house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, A One of them suddenly said, "Mrs., we are authorities."
thus:
ATTY. TAN:
ATTY. SUARIO:
Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.
Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A I know him.
She is responding the question because my question is, "Aside from fear,
Q Why do you know Eli Lui? what did you do?" and according to this witness, she was not able to do
anything because one of those who entered…(not continued)
A Because he is from Bansalan.
COURT:
Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?
I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.
ATTY. SUARIO: So, the word is "interfering" or "meddling." You record the word
"manghilabot."
Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A One of them said, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get
something from your house." Q When you said "manghilabot," what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?

Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I
they were persons in authority? said why are they doing that (manghilabot)?

A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but Q When you said those remarks, what else happened?
I know (sic) him later to be Leo Rojas.
A It was Eli Lui who answered, "Mrs., do not answer anymore because
Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas? something might happen." (Basig madisgrasya).

A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo ATTY. SUARIO:
Rojas.
"Madisgrasya," Your Honor, is more than something.
Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A He was in civilian clothes.
Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your
house? A He said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting
something." And I even told him that we should wait for my husband but
A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was they did not agree because they said they are in a hurry.
also with them in the name of Elinito Lariosa.
Q And after that, what else happened?
Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?
A I accompanied him upstairs.
A Eli Lui.
Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you
… accompanied upstairs.

ATTY. SUARIO: A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.

At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word "manghilabot" be Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their
incorporated. names?

COURT: A Yes, sir.22


… Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his
cohorts took her personal things, and those of her family’s, from the second floor
ATTY. TAN: of the house:

Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs,
your house. When you said suddenly, will you please describe how did what happened upstairs?
they enter the house?
A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats,
A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the the pair of leather shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also
house. let me open the chest and when it was already open they rummaged
through it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my ring and a
Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door? coinsita, old gold coins.

A They did not. Q When you said "coinsita," what is "coinsita"?

Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)? A Old coins.

A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?
whom I recognized was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.
A They went downstairs.24
Q Was your door opened at that time?

A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.
Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken
Q But you can open it without kicking the door? from your house, do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that
were taken?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes.
Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?
A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?
A Yes, that is true.
Q Who were armed among the five (5)?
Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?
A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.
A Yes.
Q You are very sure of that?
Q One (1) necklace?
A I am very sure. 23
A Yes.

Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?


A Yes. Q Where is Allan residing?

Q Two (2) pairs of pants? A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.

A Yes. Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing
in Bansalan?
Q One (1) ring?
A No more.
A Yes.
Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?
Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of lady’s (sic) shoes?
A He was living in Sta. Cruz.
A That was mine.
Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?
Q What were the color of the shoes?
A He was still single then.
A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).
Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?
Q Where did you buy that shoes?
A Yes.
A In Davao City.
Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?
Q What store in Davao City?
A My children also.
A NCCC.
Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?
Q What particular date when you bought that shoes?
A No, because I still have so many children.
A I think it was in the month of November.
Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?
Q 1988?
A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.
A 1988.
Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?
Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?
A In our house.
A My children.
Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?
Q What are the names of your children?
A Also owned by my children.
A Allan and Danilo.
Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo? A It cannot be counted.

A They used to wear that. Q Could you say three (3) dozens?

Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he A It is really full of dress.
was then residing in Tacloban?
Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?
ATTY. SUARIO:
A More.
May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.
Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts
COURT: and pants?

All right. A Yes.

A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of
they left some of their clothes inside our aparador. clothes, pants, polo shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2)
polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere taken?
Q These polo shirts were still new?
A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still
A Already used. usable the good ones.

Q How about the pants? Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched
your trunk?
A The other one is already used and the other one is new.
A I was ordered to open the trunk.
Q How about the floor mats?
Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?
A That is mine.
A Eli Lui.25
Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or
aparador, is that correct? The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay
Captain26and filed a complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.27
A Yes, that is true.
The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their
Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein? cohorts inside the house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied
by the unshaken testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by
Erlinda Clarin.
A Many.

The petitioners’ attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and
Q Could you say one (1) dozen?
courtesy to respondent Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account
petitioner Lui’s state of mind before he and petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left
the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and proceeded to the house of the If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of
respondents in Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled police authorities, he would not have cared a whit in barging into the
Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police authorities, and forced him to give an respondents’ house with petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, and his
uncounselled extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The petitioners and
Case No. 17,136,88: their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would succeed. Hence, they did
not coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they went to the
Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused respondents’ house with their intention to divest them of their belongings.
denied having anything to do with the lost money of the complainant.
Later, he was turned over to the police for investigation and there without Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by
affording accused with his right to counsel, he was interrogated orally and Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was
was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items merely tasked in the said order to "follow up a theft case within the area of
which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City." The petitioner was not authorized,
accused to the complainant’s establishment and forced to do re- under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as
enactment of the act of robbery, without accused again afforded the right violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment while accused
was handcuffed, as shown in the pictures taken by the police. ART. 128. Violation of domicile— The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling
statement (Exhibit A), no longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found
him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of maltreating the accused even in therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having
the presence of the guards in the jail and seriously threatening accused to surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the
admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New Matina, premises, shall refuse to do so.
SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious
threatening words of accused’s companion in the jail, that if he will refuse If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not
to sign his alleged confession, he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
with the police. made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui
seems to have an open hand in the prosecution of accused. He was the Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the
one who called the police to arrest him, even without a warrant of arrest. second floor of the respondents’ house and himself conduct a search therein, he
Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in the allowed them to search the premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their
investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents,
in a car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was
establishment of complainant during the re-enactment in going to petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence, and
Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by accused out of the to arrest the persons committing such crimes.
money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows (sic) [that] the police
despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities (sic), [had] The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the
gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any following grounds: (a) she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a
possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the occupants of the respondents’
favor, by manifesting control over the police power of investigation highly house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all women; (c) the
and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused.28 respondents failed to report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and,
(d) the provincial prosecutor’s resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 880-B for robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the
Secretary of Justice, and the ruling of the National Police Commission they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties from the house of
exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability. the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have been acquired by Lariosa
with money stolen from his uncle, Ben.36 The decision of the National Police
We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court. Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of grave misconduct was anchored on its
finding that the petitioner was merely performing his duty as ordered by his
First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay superior officer.37 It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the
permanently in Bansalan. He went there only to collect money from a certain complaint for violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-
Matura and other businessmen.29 She also testified that there were many cases 1488 because the crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan and
against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The case was dismissed, but not in Davao City.38 In contrast, the Commission on Human Rights recommended
one of her neighbors was rendered missing.30 If the petitioner, a businessman for the indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for
ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing Lariosa under the very noses of police violation of domicile.39
officers, he would, likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent
Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her personal belongings. It must be Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code,
stressed that petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a police the dismissal of the complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City
officer from Davao City. Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court and the National Police Commission are of
no relevance to the civil complaint for damages filed by the respondents against
Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the petitioners may still
occupants of the respondents’ house were all women. They must have believed proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions against
that there were male occupants; hence, barged into the house with drawn guns. them.

Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement before The petitioners’ contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right
the Bansalan Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with against unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under
guns. They threatened her life and, without any search warrant therefor, divested Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "the right of the people to be secure in
her and her family of their personal belongings against their will.31 their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." This
provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent
appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the
Paulina Matillano declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner
contrary is proved.40 The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the petitioners and their cohorts searched the
carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure
house and carted away their personal belongings.32 That the report made before
becomes unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional
the Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina Matillano’s sworn statement are not
provision41 because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right.
as complete as her testimony before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits
Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot invoke regularity in the
are usually taken ex parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but
performance of official functions.42
they do not detract from the credibility of the witness.33 An entry in the police
blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want of suggestions or inquiries,
without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall the connected The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be
memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. 34 The presumed.43 There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention
same principle applies to entries in the barangay blotter. to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must
be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,
Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-
(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.44 The
administrative agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the
waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as affirmed by the Secretary of
every reasonable presumption against any waiver of fundamental constitutional
Justice,35 found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners because
rights.45 The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into her or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search be liable to the latter for damages.
therein.46 A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of "x x x
the law.47
"(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, against unreasonable searches and seizures.
that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search
and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, "x x x
respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet
and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable
also be adjudged."
search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui
threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was
out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and "ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right. analogous cases:

Furthermore, the petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily "x x x
handed over the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that
there was foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of the articles they "(6) Illegal search;
wanted to retrieve from the respondents’ house. Even if respondent Paulina
Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was only because the "(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing and 35.
so.
"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
the respondents for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City, conspired with exemplary damages may also be awarded."
petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the respondents’ house,
and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina Matillano. Although petitioner xxx
Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by allowing
petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the "The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It
respondents of their belongings. The petitioners even left together after the is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To
incident. make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past
In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48 we had the occasion to state: have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United
damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public States this remedy is in the nature of a tort." (emphasis supplied)
officer or private individual, thus:
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who liability of persons indirectly responsible, viz:
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
"[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same extent
32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person ‘directly or as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even
indirectly’ responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and received for safekeeping the goods unreasonable seized by the PC raiding team
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.49
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
xxx
SO ORDERED.
"While it would certainly be too naïve to expect that violators of human
rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it DIGEST
should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, FACTS: Sometime in September 1987, Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt. Lariosa was
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. then employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a
monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao.
xxx Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the
afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime.
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also
‘directly’ should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses happened to be Ben’s nephew.
within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations." (emphasis supplied) On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off.
He went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court Matillano, where he rested until the next day. Lariosa reported for work the day
correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly after but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid
involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter
search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in to the Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without
the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal retrieving his things from Kiao’s house.
sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:
Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store.
"Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith
appellees’ (respondents’) merchandise and of filing the criminal complaint executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s employment was
for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in
protection and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former
the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from those acts that it was employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise
upon appellant (petitioner) corporation’s instance that the PC soldiers Store.
conducted the raid and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances
should answer the trial court’s query— posed in its decision now under
consideration – as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the on November 6, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve
seized merchandise to appellant (petitioner) corporation." his things and decided to go to the beach. they borrowed Lui’s Ford Fierra and
when he was going to buy fish, Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Lariosa was with him.
Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By
Lui later on arrived on board a vehicle. Lariosa came back and agreed and Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied
boarded Lui’s vehicle. The car stopped in front of Lui’s house. When Lui returned that he used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in
from his house, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his
the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The hands still handcuffed, to a car. Lui’s companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan
group went to Ben’s house to get the keys to the store. boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian
money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of clothes, Lui, Tan and Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at
the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they
confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then
a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City. proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosa’s aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the
adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosa’s sister, Paulina’s daughter-in-law, Virginia,
the latter’s sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked.
An incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something."
admit that he had stolen Ben’s money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Paulina remonstrated, "Why are you meddling (manghilabot)?"
Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl,
in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because
admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based something might happen. He then said, "All right, where is
in Davao City. your aparador because we are getting something." Paulina told Lui to wait for her
husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A- Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and
004-88 dated November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the
committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed to handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took
coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized two mats and two pairs of ladies’ shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two
to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on board a police pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to
car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets. the latter’s children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did,
Lui and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old
coins. Lui and his two companions then went down to the ground floor. When
A police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them Julieta went out of the room, one of Lui’s companions recognized her as Lariosa’s
handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them as they left the
the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Lui’s companions took his house.
picture. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car and brought to the corner of
Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the police car An information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa
driven by Rojas. Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to with robbery with force upon things. The RTC in this case acquitted Lariosa of the
confess that he stole ₱45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal what he did with crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosa’s
the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.
replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriend’s parents at New
Matina, Davao City. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Lariosa’s parents on the other hand, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint
Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that for robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against
Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al.
these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and
his two companions were waiting. The petitioners contend that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search and seizure when they were expressly permitted to enter their
house and that they claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed
over the articles to petitioner Lui. a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of
ISSUES: the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
WON respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her
house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order
by her and her family; NO that the said is to be valid.

Held: In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search
Petitioner Rojas’ reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly,
Sergeant Alberto Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet
merely tasked in the said order to "follow up a theft case within the area of and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or resist
responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City." The petitioner was not authorized, did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and
under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and
violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house
when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could,
ART. 128. Violation of domicile— The penalty of prision correccional in its thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee
who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling The petitioners’ claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over
against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found the articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was
therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the retrieve from the respondents’ house. Even if respondent Paulina Matillano did
premises, shall refuse to do so. hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was only because the petitioner and his
cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing so.
If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not
constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search
made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the
second floor of the respondents’ house and himself conduct a search therein, he
allowed them to search the premises without a warrant. The petitioners and their
cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents,
much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was
petitioner Rojas’ duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence, and
to arrest the persons committing such crimes.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE
PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:

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