SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130644. October 27, 1997.]

THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit

by his mother MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA , petitioner, vs . COURT OF
APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

On September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities came to arrest Francisco Juan
Larranaga for the alleged crime of kidnapping and illegal detention. Larranaga however,
remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. On September 17, 1997, his lawyer attended
the preliminary investigation conducted by the Of ce of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu.
Forthwith, counsel moved that his client be given a regular preliminary investigation. The
motion was vehemently denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should
be treated as detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Counsel
was ordered to present Larranaga in person or his failure to do so would be treated as
waiver of his client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded
against pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Larranaga rushed to the
Court of Appeals assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. However, it turned out that on September 17, 1997
the said prosecutors had led an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga
with kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail.
Larranaga's counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the
RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. However, Larranaga was still arrested by
virtue of a warrant of arrest. A second Supplemental Petition was led by Larranaga's
counsel but the Court of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's petitions. Hence, the case at bar.
By resolution, the Court set aside the inquest investigation and ordered the City Prosecutor
of Cebu to conduct a regular preliminary investigation in accord with Section 3, Rule 112;
annulled the Order for Detention during the pendency of the case and ordered the
immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation; and ordered the
Presiding Judge to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of
petitioner in the criminal case pending the result of petitioner's preliminary investigation.
TAacCE

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; INQUEST

INVESTIGATION NOT JUSTIFIED AS ACCUSED NOT LAWFULLY ARRESTED WITHOUT
WARRANT. — Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular
preliminary investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's
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 inquest investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been rst conducted, on the basis of the af davit of the offended
party or arresting of cer or person." The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully
arrested." For one, the petitioner was not arrested as his counsel persuaded the arresting
of cers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation. For another,
the arresting of cers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner
for a crime committed some two (2) months before.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPRIETY THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner, a minor, is charged with
a capital offense — kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its ling in court means his
arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction
will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner's counsel was far from
being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished
copies of the af davits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-extendible
period of twenty (20) days to submit defense af davit. As well pointed out by petitioner's
counsel, the precipitate denial of his motion ". . . prevented petitioner from preparing and
submitting the af davits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and security
guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify in favor of the
petitioner. Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a
capital offense case should have been granted by the prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon,
(247 SCRA 652, 687) we emphasized that "attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded
the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a
quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be
fair and impartial. As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.' A preliminary investigation should
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a
potential accused can be protected from any material damage." HCDAcE

RESOLUTION

PUNO , J : p

On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga led a petition for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal detention against her
minor son, Francisco Juan Larranaga alias Paco, led in the RTC 1 of Cebu City as well as
the warrant of arrest issued. as a consequence thereof. Petitioner as an alternative remedy
prays for the annulment of the order 2 of the Of ce of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying
Larranaga's motion for a regular preliminary investigation and that it be conducted by a
panel of prosecutors from the Of ce of the State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On
October 6, 1997, petitioner led a Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus to relieve her son from his alleged illegal con nement or to grant
him bail.
It appears that on September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for
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 Culinary Arts located at 287 Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City to arrest
Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit
remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The police did not carry out the arrest on the
assurance that Larranaga would be brought to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17,
1997 for preliminary investigation.
On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given
a regular preliminary investigation. He also requested for copies of all af davits and
documents in support of the complaint against his client and that he be granted a non-
extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to le the defense af davit. The
motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that Larranaga should be treated
as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty. Armovit was
ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his failure would be treated
as waiver of his client's right to a preliminary investigation and he would be proceeded
against pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armovit's verbal motion
for reconsideration was denied by the city prosecutor.
On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals assailing
the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. 3 However, Larranaga's effort to stop the ling of a criminal information
against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had led
an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail. On September 22, 1997, counsel
led a Supplemental Petition with the Court of Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu City to
prevent petitioner's arrest. The move again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on
the night of September 22, 1997 by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Cebu City, the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental
Petition was led by Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention
the arrest of Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed
Larranaga's petitions, hence, the case at bar.
On October 8, 1997, we ordered the Solicitor General to le a consolidated comment on
the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days. On October 16, 1997, we
temporarily restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7 of the RTC of Cebu from
proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from becoming moot.
On October 20, 1997, the Of ce of the Solicitor General led a Manifestation and Motion in
lieu of Consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General submitted that ". . . it is within
petitioner's constitutional and legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary
investigation rather than a mere inquest be conducted before resolving the issue of
whether or not to le informations against him." He asked that ". . . the petition be given
due course and petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation." He further
recommended that ". . . during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention."
We agree.
Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation. Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest
investigation. Said section clearly provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
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 investigation having been rst conducted, on the basis of the af davit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person."

The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one, the petitioner was
not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the arresting of cers that
he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu
City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting of cers had no legal authority to
make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime committed some two (2) months
before. So we held in Go vs. Court of Appeals, viz.: 4
"Secondly, we do not belie that the warrantless 'arrest' or detention of petitioner in
the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace of cer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving nal judgment or
temporarily con ned while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
Petitioner's 'arrest' took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
'arresting' of cers obviously were not present , within the meaning of Section 5(a) ,
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the 'arrest'
effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected 'when
(the shooting had) in fact just been committed' within the meaning of Section
5(b). Moreover, none of the 'arresting' of cers had any 'personal knowledge ' of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made
by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did
not, however, constitute 'personal knowledge.'
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section
7 of Rule 112 is not applicable. . . . When the police led a complaint for
frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable
cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguna. Instead, as
noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that
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 Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out
a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled
to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him
without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or
without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his
appearing at the preliminary investigation."

It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to
section 3 of Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a
capital offense — kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its ling in court means his
arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction
will bring him face to face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner's counsel was far from
being unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished
copies of the af davits supporting the complaint and that he be given a non-extendible
period of twenty (20) days to submit defense af davit. As well pointed out by petitioner's
counsel, the precipitate denial of his motion ". . . prevented petitioner from preparing and
submitting the af davits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers, proctors and security
guards who had previously made known their willingness to testify that: cdasia

"— during the whole day of July 16 and again on July 17 petitioner and his
classmates were all in their school at Quezon City; in fact in the afternoon of July
16 and 17, 1997, petitioner and his classmates took their mid-term exams;

— following their exams on July 16 they had partied together rst at petitioner's
Quezon City apartment until about 9 o'clock in the evening, and then repaired to a
Quezon City restaurant at Katipunan Avenue where they stayed on until 3 o'clock
in the morning of July 17; they even had pictures taken of their party;
— indeed petitioner's July 16 examination papers and that of a classmate are
ready for submission as evidence, along with petitioner's grades for the term's
end in September 1997;

— two of their teachers, also a proctor, and a security guard actually remember
seeing petitioner at their Quezon City school on July 16 and 17;

— petitioner was duly registered and attended classes starting June 1997 until
term's end in September 1997;
— petitioner had also been logged to have been in his Quezon City apartment
since June 1997, particularly including July 16 and 17;
— petitioner only went to Cebu late afternoon of July 17 on board PAL ight No.
PR833, as shown by his plane ticket and boarding pass."

Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital
offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. In Webb vs. de Leon, 5
we emphasized that "attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial
system of preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As
this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 'the right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right.' " A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously
conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 protected from any material damage." cdasia

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court resolves: (1) to set aside the inquest investigation of
petitioner and to order the Of ce of the City Prosecutor of Cebu to conduct a regular
preliminary investigation of the petitioner in accord with section 3, Rule 112; (2) to annul
the Order for Detention During The Pendency of the Case issued by Executive Judge
Priscila Agana against the petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304; (3) to order
the immediate release of petitioner pending his preliminary investigation and (4) to order
the Presiding Judge of Br. VII, RTC of Cebu City to cease and desist from proceeding with
the arraignment and trial of petitioner in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304, pending
the result of petitioner's preliminary investigation.
Regalado, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Branch VII.
2. Dated September 17, 1997.
3. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45340.
4. 206 SCRA 138.
5. 247 SCRA 652, 687.

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