M.H.

RAKES VS THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY

GR NO. 1719, January 23, 1907
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

FACTS:
The plaintiff, one of the employees of the respondent, works at transporting iron rails from a barge in the
harbor to the company’s yard near the malecon in Manila. While working, the car used in the transport canted at a
certain spot or near the water’s edge which caused the rails to slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg
which was later amputated to the knee. He soon filed an action for damages against the respondent.

He alleged that the respondent is negligent to properly secure the load on iron to vehicle transporting it
that would have prevented side pieces or guards to prevent the iron rails from slipping of respondent is negligent
to secure that the construction and quality of the track is that of general standard of tramways of that character. He
also alleged that the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie were the immediate cause of the occasion of
the accident which were raised by the recent typhoon.

In its defense, the defendant argued that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to his
employment and as such, assumed by him. The defendant contends that it was the plaintiff’s negligence that
contributed to the accident in (a) having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work and (b) he
walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards, either before it or behind it.
Considering that before the start of the particular load the foreman frequently reiterates a general prohibition
made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car. Hence, the company should be exonerated from
liability.

ISSUE:
Does the plaintiff’s contributory negligence exonerate the defendant from liability?

RULING:
No.

The court in citing the case of Davies vs Mann ruled that: “Although the defendant’s negligence might have
been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained if the
proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to want of ordinary care and caution in the person
injured; that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action it be shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequence of the injured
party’s negligence.”

In this case, the defendant is guilty of negligence for its failure to provide safety appliances for the use of
the employee when it failed to build and maintain a track or tramway in reasonably sound condition, so as to
protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty,
otherwise the accident could not have occurred; consequently, the negligence of the defendant is established. Its
contention of assumed risk by the employee also does not hold water since the occurrence of the accident was due
to the failure to repair the track or duly inspect the same which violates its legal duty.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. The officers of the company and three of the
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the
side of the car and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before starting the particular load. Hence,
the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a
proximate, although not as a primary cause.

Thus, as cited by the court in the case of Marquant, the cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the
victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the
contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect of only reducing the damages. As ruled in Heil vs
Glanding, “the reason why, in case of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against
the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the other; it that the law cannot measure how
much of the damage suffered is attributable to the plaintiff’s own fault. If he were allowed to recover, it might be
that he would obtain from the other party compensation for his own misconduct.”

With such, the court ruled that instead of P5,000 as compensation for the damages, P2,500 is deducted as
an amount fairly attributable to his negligence and direct judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff.

Title: NAPOCOR(National Power Corporation) vs. CASIONAN

Citation: GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008
TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

FACTS:

Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life. He
worked as a pocket miner.

A trail existed in Dalicno, Benguet and this trail was regularly used by members of the community. Sometime in the
1970’s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of
the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet.

In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno, Benguet. They cut two bamboo poles for
their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as
both passed through the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.

As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension
wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was
already dead.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability.

HELD:

NO, the court finds no contributory negligence on Noble’s part.

The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the lines were
sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were
properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would
not have been electrocuted.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause
him harm or put his life in danger.

In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were
no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the
high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicno to Itogon, Benguet. Hence, Noble should not
be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.

In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its
liability.

TITLE: NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF RAY
CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents.
CITATION: G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005
TOPIC: Contributory Negligence

FACTS:
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City
and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed
the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a
Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the
same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to
Sergio.
Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment
against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel
Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in view of the
contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of
the motorcycle. He is not the real party in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore
she is not liable for damages.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy
Orpilla that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the
accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent?
2. Whether or not the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?

HELD:
1. No.
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was the
proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of
Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened.
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing
into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of
another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence”. Raynera,
being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in
front of him. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be
the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made
by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision.

2. Yes.
The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s
negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows:
When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own
injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of
the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it
was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was
tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio,
contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms
of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover
damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private
respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

TOPIC: Contributory Negligence

TITLE: LARRY ESTACION vs. NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, CECILIA
BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, Respondents.
CITATION: G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006

FACTS:
On October 16, 1982 in the afternoon, respondent Noe Bernardo was going home to Dumaguete from Cebu.
He boarded a Ford Fiera jeepney driven by Quinquillera and owned by Bandoquillo. He was seated on the
extension seat at the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride so Noe offered his seat and
hung/stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The Fiera slowed down and stopped to pick up more passengers.
Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck owned by the petitioner Larry Estacion and driven by Gerosano, which was
travelling in the same direction, hit the rear portion of the jeepney. The Fiera crushed Bernardo’s legs and feet, and
he was brought to Silliman University Medical Center where his lower left leg was amputated. Police report
showed that there were 10 more who were injured by the accident.
On February 18, 1993, Bernardo, and his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete a complaint for damages arising from quasi-delict against petitioner as owner of the truck and
his driver. RTC ruled that Gerosano was negligent and it was the direct and proximate cause of the incident. It also
held petitioner liable as employer. CA affirmed in toto the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable and whether or not Bernardo was guilty of contributory negligence?
HELD:
Yes.
From the way the truck reacted to the application of the brakes, it can be shown that Gerosano was driving
at a fast speed because the brakes skidded a lengthy 48 ft. as shown in the sketch of the police. There was also only
one tire mark which meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned properly, otherwise, there would have
been 2 tire marks. It is the negligent act of the petitioner’s driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled
with faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of the respondent Bernardo’s injury. As employer of Gerosano,
petitioner is primarily and solitarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. He is presumed to be
negligent in the selection of his employee which petitioner failed to overcome. He failed to show that he examined
driver Gerosano as to his qualifications, experience and records.
Bernardo is guilty of contributory negligence by standing at the rear portion of the jeep. Contributory
Negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Bernardo’s act of
standing on the left rear portion showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm
or put his life in danger. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
Quinquillera (jeepney driver) was also negligent because there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules
and regulations. He also allowed Bernardo to stand on the left rear of his jeep. There is also a presumption of
negligence on the part of the owner of the jeep, Bandoquillo, to which she did not rebut.

TITLE: Libi vs. IAC

CITATION: G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY PARENTS)

FACTS:
Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, and deceased Wendell Libi, between 18 to 19 years old, were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident.
After the girl decided to end the relationship finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible, the boy incessantly
pursued her and prayed that they be together again this made the guy resort to threats. But the girl hold steadfast
to her decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria
Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from
the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D.
Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation
of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts. Private respondents,
bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners,
puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie
Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside
and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Libi shall be liable for vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

RULING:
Yes.

The Court has perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who
shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the
crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory
that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary
and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for
her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen
their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer
in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really
been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not
have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had
free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in
not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was
only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s
gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work
such as being drug informers, or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of
Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a
revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano,
et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses,” followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages
caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring
for purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the
parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a
hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses.
Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi delicts of their minor
children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed
to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. We
believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for
solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is
primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that “(t)he responsibility treated of
in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.”

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the parents for crimes
committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasi-delicts
and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both
codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence
or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil
Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex
delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit: “Should there be no person having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law.”

TITLE: MACARIO TAMARGO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY BY PARENTS
FACTS
On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by petitioner
Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal case for Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto. He, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
On December 10, 1981, prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto before the then CFI. This petition for adoption was granted on, November 18, 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents,
Spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondents, natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's
Decision, CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review with the SC, petitioners contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
ISSUE
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted
child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
RULING
NO.
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave
rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen
to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed
and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority
was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the
suit for damages.
Parental authority is NOT properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. The court does not consider
that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time
in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time
the tort was committed.
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the
period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are
given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either had not
yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto
was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.

IN CASE IPANGUTANA LANG NI

BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of
public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility
for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a
position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU
DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.
GR No. 132266 | December 21, 1999
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT)

FACTS:

At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez), was
driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal
flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's
Permit to Drive at the time.

Benjamin Abad was a manager of petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux
Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around
the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General
Maxilom St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries
to the former. Abad brought Vasquez to Cebu Doctors' Hospital where he died.

A Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. An action
for damages was then commenced by respondents against Abad and petitioner Castilex

Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and solidarily respondents

Petitioner Castilex and Abad separately appealed the decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner Castilex liable but held that the
liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.

Hence, Castilex filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an employer, Castilex, may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
2. Whether or not the private respondents have sufficiently established that Abad was acting within the scope of
his assigned tasks.
RULING:

1. Yes. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances
where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply

However, Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate.

The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph
should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry
to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.

DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:

 Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry.
 The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of
the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses
negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
 The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
 Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their
functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed

2. No. Abad testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the
name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the petitioner.

The RTC and CA connotes that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his
assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. However, the Supreme Court do not agree with RTC and
CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was
operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.

American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the
use of an employer's motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place
where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the
scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of
some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even
though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of
 some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at
the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even
though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going
to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the
time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of
regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he
has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the return trip

In the case, it is undisputed that Abad did some overtime work at the petitioner's office. After, he went to Goldie's
Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private respondents,
a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and
Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts
littered the place.

At the Goldie's Restaurant, Abad took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when Abad was leaving the
restaurant that the incident in question occurred

Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal
working hours. Abad's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place
which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position

Since no evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner Castilex had
no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its
vehicle

TITLE: ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA,
BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA
CADIZ, respondents.
CITATION::G.R. No. 82465, February 25, 1991
FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents, respondents
spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home
after doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female teachers was
apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. He was
brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves,
Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly
incurred from the death of their 13-year old son. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of
the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning,
respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas,
Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay respondents.The precautions and
reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of the standard required by law
under the circumstances. Had the defendant teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before
they allowed the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the children were swimming was
indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who according to the female teachers were there to
supervise the children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They
were somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking spree.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna. There was no sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly
no evidence has been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin
had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora Cadorna
had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie
Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs.
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA declared that the teachers failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard against the foreseen harm. Also, the school and
principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand,
under Art 2180.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are negligent for the death of Castillo, thus liable for damages.
RULING:
NO.
The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or
guilty of the negligence of those under them.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join
the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will
be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore, respondent Court of Appeals committed an
error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's
son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the
act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance
of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and
students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident happened
while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic
had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned
activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the
picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to
the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by
any jurisprudence.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students
who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout
masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness,
Segundo Vinas, testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought by the
defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did
all what is humanly possible to save the child.
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The
case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral
damages can be assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean
that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a
family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.

FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORP VS WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his
capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR.,
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY EMPLOYERS)

Facts:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer, assigned to
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning each school day.
While riding the school jeep, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the
vehicle while the both of them was on their way home one late afternoon. A fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved
towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic,
and hit him.
Potenciano sued Filamer for damages but the latter denied any liability by contending that Funtecha was
merely a working student who, under the Labor Code and its implementing rules, is not considered an employee of
Filamer. Furthermore, Funtecha’s act of taking over the vehicle was outside the scope of his janitorial duties.

Issue: Whether Filamer is liable for the injury caused by Funtecha?

Ruling: Yes. Filamer is liable under the vicarious liability.

The implementing rules of Labor code is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
It is not the decisive law in the civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a labor
dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim
brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary
liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be
used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from
the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's
position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the
act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised
the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by
which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the
employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.

The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of
an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee
driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any
act in furtherance of his master's business.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely
was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but
ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is
constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of
his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond
the scope of his janitorial duties.

TITLE: BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DIVINA VDA. DE DIONISIO, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children MARK ANGELO and MA. LIZA, both surnamed DIONISIO
CITATION: G.R. No. 116624. September 20, 1996
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER (PRINCIPLE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR)

FACTS:
• On 2 November 1990, at about 3:30 in the afternoon, petitioner’s Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was driven by
Juanito Fidel to its terminal on 2nd Avenue, Caloocan City, for repair of its brake system. Juanito Fidel told
mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matter so that proper order to the mechanics could
be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank.
• Shortly after, Juanito Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver’s seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt
something was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and
 convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked thereat owned by the same petitioner.
Fidel summoned his co-employees and they all helped to extricate Mario Dionisio. They rushed him to St. Luke’s
Hospital in Quezon City, however, few days after, he expired.
• A complaint for damages against Baliwag Transit was filed by the wife before the RTC of Quezon City.
• RTC rendered a decision ordering Baliwag Transit and its employee Juanito Fidel jointly and severally to pay the
heirs of the deceased.
• Private respondent appealed to the CA wherein it increased the amount of damages rendered by the RTC.
• Petitioners maintain that respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appealed judgment despite the
contributory negligence of the deceased Mario Dionisio, i.e., in failing to take the necessary precaution while
doing repair work on the brake system of Bus No. 117, and that the increase of the award of damages is
unreasonable being unsupported by law and the evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

RULING:
NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that under Article 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, of the Civil Code provides that
the employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by
the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part
of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape
solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it
exercised such degree of care.

In the case at bar, the circumstances clearly show that the proximate cause of the death of Mario Dionisio
was the negligence of driver Juanito Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident.
He boarded his bus, sat on the driver’s seat and was at the steering wheel when the bus moved pinning down the
deceased who was repairing the defective brake system below. Driver Fidel should have known that his brake
system was being repaired as he was in fact the one who told Dionisio to do the repair. Fidel should have parked
the bus properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should have placed a
stopper or any hard object against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded
Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll, pinning down the deceased which resulted in his serious injuries and
eventual death. The reckless imprudence of Juanito Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended party for
damages together with his employer.
 Therefore, Petitioner’s failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused
by him.

** Wala gi mention sa case ang term jd na respondeat superior pero mao ra jd knuhay ni ang meaning.
The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior:
• One type of vicarious liability is respondeat superior, which means “let the master answer.”When respondeat
superior applies, an employer will be liable for an employee’s negligent actions or omissions that occur during
the course and scope of the employee’s employment. This means that the employee must be performing duties
for the employer at the time of the negligence for the employer to be held liable under respondeat superior.
• A plaintiff need not show that the employer was independently negligent but must prove there was an
employment relationship.
• Respondeat superior only applies to employment relationships, not the relationship between a company and an
independent contractor.

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and General Manager, petitioners, vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY EMPLOYERS)

FACTS:

On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by LG Foods Corporation (LG Foods) and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer.
Charles died as a result of the accident. An information for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide was filed
against the driver before the Bacolod MTCC. Before the trial could be concluded, however, the accused driver
committed suicide. The case was then dismissed. On June 23, 1999, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for
damages against LG Foods alleging that as employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. In their defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to have exercised such
diligence and prayed for dismissal for lack of cause of action. Also, in their motion to dismiss, they argued that the
complaint was a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under Art. 103 of RPC and, as such, there must
first be a judgment of conviction against their driver to hold them liable. Since such condition was not fulfilled due
to the latter’s death, they argued, the spouses had no cause of action. The trial court denied the motion for lack of
merit. Also, it denied the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG Foods then went on certiorari to the CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion of the part of the trial judge. The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision ruling
that the complaint by the spouses does not purport to be based on subsidiary liability since the basic elements of
such liability, such as conviction and insolvency of the accused employee, were not even alleged in said complaint.
It then said that the complaint purports to exact responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176 of CC, which
is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the Art. 103 of RPC. Liability
under Art. 2180 of CC is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Vallejeras cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as
maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 2180 of the Civil Code
 Ruling:
The case is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 of the Civil Code to recover damages primarily from LG
Foods as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed by
A2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees.
The Court in this case, ratiocinated and explain the following grounds why LG Foods is liable to the private
respondent:
First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint suggests that the LG Foods are being made to account for their
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under said provision.
Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was for damages based on quasi-delict, it alleged gross fault and
negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the "act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another." Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from
law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional torts; and culpa aquiliana); or (b) where the
injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of these
two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs
have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
This is illustrated in A1161, CC providing that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by
penal laws subject to the provision of A2177 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. This means that A2177 provides an alternative
remedy for the plaintiff. The choice is with the plaintiff.
Fourth. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate, not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency. This was the recourse of the
spouses since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver.
Fifth. LG Foods has been alleging that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees." This defense is an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents' cause
of action as one for quasi-delict under A2180, CC.
Sixth. Since it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of due to its premature termination, the fact that there
was no prior reservation made to institute a separate civil action is of no moment.

MEDARDO CADIENTE VS BITHUEL MACAS

GR NO. 161946, November 14, 2008
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (OWNER OF VEHICLE)

FACTS:
Respondent Bithuel Macas, was standing on the shoulder of the road, an uncemented part of the highway
intended for pedestrians where the stationary vehicles could unload passengers was bumped and run over by a
Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca causing the respondent to suffer severe muscular and major vessel
injuries, bone fractures in both thighs and other parts of the leg which led to both legs amputated up to the groins.
Cimafranca with the eyewitness brought the victim to the hospital in Davao Medical Center but had absconded and
disappeared since then.
 Upon investigation, the Ford Fiera was owned by the petitioner, Atty. Medardo Cadiente who claimed that
when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the vehicle since he sold the same to Engr. Rogelio
Jalipa wherein the certificate of registration and Official Receipt were turned over to him with the understanding
that the latter would cause for its registration.

A case for torts and damages was then instituted by the respondent’s father against Cimafranca and
Cadiente before the RTC Davao wherein the latter filed a third party complaint against Jalipa. Nevertheless, Jalipa
contended that he sold the same vehicle to a certain Abubakar where he implead such. The RTC ruled Cadiente and
Jalipa jointly and severally liable for the damages to the plaintiff for their own negligence which was affirmed by
the CA. Aggrieved, Cadiente appealed before SC in a petition for review on certiorari, hence this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner and Jalipa are jointly and severally liable

RULING:
No.

The court in citing PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc., that the registered
owner of the vehicle, even have already sold it to some else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever
damage or injury the vehicle may cause. As explained:

…Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or
owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond
financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually
without means to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner.
The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner given
the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.

Similarly, in Villanueva v. Domingo it provides that the policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification
of the owner who can be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so as
not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be secured.

Hence, since the Ford Fiera was still registered in the petitioner's name at the time when the misfortune
took place, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the permanent injury it caused the respondent, who had since
stopped schooling and is now forced to face life with nary but two remaining limbs.

Duavit vs CA
Topic: VICARIOUS LIABILITY; Owner of Vehicle (No EER)

FACTS:
On July 28, 1971, plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep owned by plaintiff, Ruperto
Catuar was driving at the moderate speed and while approaching Roosevelt Ave., Virgilio slowed down; suddenly,
another jeep driven by defendatn Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff’s jeep on the portion near the left rear
wheels and as a result of the impact, plaintiff’s jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30yards. The jeep was
damaged (windshield, differential part near the left rear wheel and top cover of jeep); Virgilio was thrown to the
middle of the road, wrist broken and sustained contusions on the head. While Antonio was trapped inside and his
leg was fractured.

Virgilio and Antonio both were able to incur expenses due to the injuries sustained and were incapacitated from
their respective work. Thus they filed for damages against Oscar (the driver) and Duavit (the owner of the jeep
driven by Oscar).
Duavit admits ownership of the jeep, but denied that Oscar was his employee, at anytime until the present. Oscar
on the other hand, presented that he was an employee of the Board of Liquidators from 1966 to 1973 and
categorically admitted that he took the jeep from Duavit’s garage without the latter’s consent and was even filed a
case for theft of the jeep but the case did not push through as his parents apologized on his behalf. He also made it
appear that he took all the necessary precaution while driving and the accident was due to the negligence of
Virgilio.

Trial Court found Oscar negligent but found no employer-employee relationship between him and Duavit, and the
latter was absolved from liability under Article 2180.

When appealed to CA, it held Duavit jointly and severally liable with Oscar. CA held that it is immaterial whether or
not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record or registered owner and not necessary to prove
actual owner of the vehicle and who the employer of the driver is. It is a conclusive presumption of the facts and
law and not subject to rebuttal of proof tot he contrary.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct.

RULING:
NO.
In the case of Duquillo vs. Bayot, it was held that the defendant owner of the truck cannot be held liable for
anything, since the driver of the truck was not his employee nor did have anything to do with the latter’s business
thus there was not the remotest contractual relation between the victim and the truck owner. It necessarily follows
from all this that articles 1101 and following of the Civil Code, have no application in the case.

The Court upholds the said ruling as still relevant and better applicable to the present circumstances. Unlike the
basis that was relied upon by the CA, where the owner, relying on his representation, registered the vehicle in his
name, and the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration of
ownership and registration. While in another case relied upon by the CA, where the owner, also at the time of the
incident she already sold the jeepney, but was still found civilly liable since she failed to surrender to the Motor
Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in violation of a commonwealth act.

In this case, the CA misplaced its reliance of the cases. Petitioner did not levy ownership but completely denies
Oscar being his employee. The jeep was virtually stolen from the garage of Duavit. To hold therefore, Duavit
caused by Oscar who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the
owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle.

The court cannot just rule based on precedents. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual
circumstances. In this case, it failed to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-emloyee relationship between
the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner of the vehicle’s use, the Court cannot hold the
owner liable.

MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (GPI)

G.R. No. L-11154 34 Phil 311 March 21, 1916
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY STATE, PROVINCIES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES)

FACTS:
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a collision with the General Hospital Ambulance which
turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn in Taft Avenue. Merritt was so
severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the
General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in
the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely, unconscious. The marks revealed
that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury.
His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected.

The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was incapacitated
from pursuing his occupation. In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which
later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit against the GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said
suit.

On this appeal, Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred:

• “in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the
complaint,” and
• “in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the
damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.”

On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred:

• in finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was
due to the negligence of the chauffeur, who is an alleged agent or employee of the Government;
• in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a
result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and
• in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Government is legally liable to the plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence against
it.
Whether or not the ambulance driver is considered as an employee of the government.

HELD:

NO, the government is not liable by allowing a lawsuit to commence and neither that the ambulance driver is
considered as an employee of the government.

The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean concession of its liability. When the State allows itself to be
sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State is liable.

Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The responsibility of the state
is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim.

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special
agent. Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As stated by Justice Story of United States “The
Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs,
since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest.”

TITLE:MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRME, JUANA RIMANDO-
BANIÑA, IAUREANO BANIÑA, JR., SOR MARIETA BANIÑA, MONTANO BANIÑA, ORJA BANIÑA, AND LYDIA R.
BANIÑA, respondents.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY STATE, PROVINCIES, CITIES AND MUNICIPALITIES)

FACTS:
At about 7am, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by
the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and 4 others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
Private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and
Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney in the CFI of La Union. However, the
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against Municipality of San Fernando and the driver of a dump truck of
the Municipality.
The case was subsequently transferred to respondent judge’s court. The private respondents amended
their complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action and non-
suability of the State, among others.
Respondent judge ordered defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs for damages.
Upon MR, respondent judge issued an order providing that if defendant’s municipality and Bislig further
wish to pursue the matter already disposed of, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the
Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions?
HELD:
1. Yes.
Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the
state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable."
Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test
of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions.

2. No.
The Supreme Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show
that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, we arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –
– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified,
absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
TITLE: Palisoc vs. Brillantes
CITATION: G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY TEACHERS)

FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the Manila
Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired between the
deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was
already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted
Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face.
Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon
an engine block and faint. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken
to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. It was found that the cause of death being “shock
due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The incident was testified by the lone eyewitness, Desiderio Cruz, a classmate
of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who has no motive or reason to testify one way or another in
favor of any party. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Teodosio
Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Santiago M. Quibulue, who was the teacher in charge at the time of the
incident, and (4) Antonio C. Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of
MTI.

The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so long as
they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and
boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such
control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. This legal
conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The
trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the
defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc together with the defendant Virgilio
Daffon?

RULING:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and severally
with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI board of directors.
Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as party defendant.

The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in
the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The
rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as
they remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and
are called upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In the law of torts, the governing
principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of
the students’ activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as
well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that
would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students.
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, “the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are
supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority” and “where the parent places the child under the
effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.”
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the same
cited article.

In this case, the unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the
exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory
damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary damages denied in
the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.

TITLE: ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY BY TEACHERS
FACTS
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying.
As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along
with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old
and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, the vehicle owner, Vivencio and St. Marys Academy
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
The RTC ruled against petitioner and held it liable for Sherwin’s death.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise
affirming the decision a quo, in toto. The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in
allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct?
RULING
NO.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to
all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
 However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
In the case at bar, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause
of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits
establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the
cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep.
Respondents, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the
accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on
Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall
be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and
the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and
which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.

DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
TOPIC: VICARIOUS LIABILITY (BY PROPRIETOR OF BLDG, ENGR, ARCHITECT, CONTRACTOR)

FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by
the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch38I, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision in
holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor
of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid
the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.