CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS.

ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE

TANGONAN (Wife of deceased CAMILO TANGONAN) | G.R. NO. 199886

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint against Petitioner alleging that when ALLAN RAPANAN and
Tangonan's deceased husband, CAMILO TANGONAN, were traversing the National Highway of
Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan via motorcycle, they were stuck and electrocuted by a live tension
wire from one of the electric posts owned by the Petitioner CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., and that the mishap was due to Petitioner's negligence when it failed to
fix and change said live tension wire despite being informed that the same might pose danger to
persons, animals, and vehicles passing along the highway.

Petitioner CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., for its part, contended that typhoons
struck the area causing some of its electric poles to fall and high to fall and high-tension wires to
snap and cut off. Thus, it cannot be faulted for negligence considering that typhoons are
fortuitous event. It also alleged that it was able to clear the said areas of fallen electric poles and
dangling or hanging high tension wires immediately after the typhoons, to secure the safety of
persons and vehicles traveling in said areas. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of
the mishap was the victims’ negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle
they were riding on.

RTC: Ruled in favor of the Petitioner and dismissed the complaint holding that the proximate
cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the motorcycle.

CA: Reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-delict, holding that clearly, the cause
of the mishap which claimed the life of CAMILO and injured RAPANAN was the dangling wire
which struck them. Without the dangling wire which struck the victims, the CA held that they
would not have fallen down and sustained injuries. The CA found that if petitioner had not been
negligent in maintaining its facilities, and making sure that every facility needing repairs had
been repaired, the mishap could have been prevented.

ISSUE: WON the Petitioner should be held liable for negligence.

RULING: NO.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of interest of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, causing
injury to another.

Elements of Quasi-Delict:
1.) Damages to the Plaintiff;
2.) Negligence by act or omission, for whose act the Defendant must respond;
3.) Connection of cause and effect between the negligence and damages;
The Court held that the second and third element are absent in the instant case.

There was no negligence on the part of the Petitioner considering that they have exercised
diligence by moving the live tension wires on the shoulder of the road, thus, at the time of the
fatal mishap, the wires were far enough so as not to expose passing motor vehicles and
pedestrians from danger. Thus, there is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was
allegedly the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries.

Moreover, evidence shows that the motorcycle was probably running too fast that it lost control
and started tilting and sliding.

MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. VS CONRADO BARRIOS, ET. AL. | G.R. NO. L-1539

FACTS:

BARRIOS, ET. AL. filed a complaint against MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. seeking to recover
an alleged debt and obligation of the former to the latter. Said debt was incurred by MA-AO
before the outbreak of the war.

Executive Order No. 32 was implemented which provided for a debt moratorium, specifically
stating that: “Enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations… entered into
in any area after the declaration by Presidential Proclamation that such area has been freed
from enemy occupation and control is temporarily suspended.”

In view of the said moratorium, MA-AO filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint filed by
BARRIOS, ET. AL. on the ground of lack of cause of action, arguing that BARRIOS, ET. AL.
have no right to demand the payment of the MA-AO’s alleged debts until the termination of the
moratorium.

TRIAL COURT: Denied MA-AO’s motion to dismiss.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

ISSUE: WON BARRIOS, ET. AL. have cause of action against MA-AO.

RULING: NO.

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. These essential
elements are wanting in this case.
Executive Order No. 32, said debts are not yet payable or their payment cannot be
enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium, which is still in force. As MA-AO is not
yet in default, BARRIOS, ET. AL. have no cause of action against him. While the debt
moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner has no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs. There
is no such action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or recognize his debt which is not yet
payable. To allow the BARRIOS, ET. AL’s action and grant the relief demanded in the
complaint, would be to compel the defendant to pay legal interest of the amount claimed
from filing of the said complaint, as well as the attorney's fees of 10 per cent of the sum due
thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if the MA-AO’s obligations to the plaintiffs
were already payable and he had failed or refused to pay them. Why should the defendant be
required to bear the expenses incidental to a suit before he has violated the plaintiffs'
right?

DULAY, ET. AL. VS CA, ET. AL. | G.R. NO. 108017

FACTS:

An action for damages was filed against BENIGNO TORZUELA and SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO. INC. and SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
for the death of ATTY. NAPOLEON DULAY. TORZUELA was a security guard on duty when he
and Dulay had an altercation.

SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action alleging that it is based on negligence under
quasi-delict, an action which cannot lie because quasi-delicts are limited to acts of negligence,
while the alleged shooting was committed with deliberate intent. It further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code cannot
lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code. In addition, SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION argued that
petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.

RTC: Issued an order granting Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. Inc. motion to dismiss
and motion for exclusion as defendant.

CA: Affirmed RTC’s decision. The Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied.

ISSUE: WON an action for damages based on negligence under quasi-delict proper.

RULING: YES.

It is a well-settled rule that the nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument
or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. An examination of
the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking
their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility
for the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.

There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers
not only acts committed with negligence but also which are VOLUNTARY and INTENTIONAL.
"Fault or negligence" as used in Article 2176 covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also "acts in criminal in character" whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.

Private respondents submit that the word "intentional" in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter,
and should be read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with negligence as defined by
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons, this Court
will not disturb the above doctrine on the coverage of Article 2176.

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and
voluntary, it was therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to
private respondents.

Relatively, Article 2180 provides that when an injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the employer (particularly in the selection or supervision of employees). Liability of an employer
is direct and immediate and the same is not conditioned on prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of insolvency. A defense to this is the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family.

MANDARIN VILLA, INC. VS. CA AND CLODUALDO DE JESUS

G.R. NO. 119850. 20 JUNE 1996.

FACTS:

In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, PRIVATE RESPONDENT DE JESUS hosted a dinner for his
friends at the MANDARIN VILLA, INC.’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa Seafoods Village in
Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to DE JESUS the bill amounting to
P2,658.50. DE JESUS offered his BANKARD credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes
later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. DE JESUS
demonstrated that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. DE
JESUS approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. DE JESUS offered his BPI
express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified.
This incident induced DE JESUS to file a suit for damages against MANDARIN VILLA

TRIAL COURT: Rendered a decision ordering MANDARIN VILLA and BANKARD to pay jointly
and severally DE JESUS.

CA: Modified the trial court’s decision, Finding MANDARIN solely responsible for damages and
absolved BANKARD of any responsibility therefor.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: WON MANDARIN VILLA was negligent; If negligent, WON such negligence was the
proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.

RULING:

Petition DISMISSED.

The test for determining the existence of negligence in a case may be stated as follows: DID
THE DEFENDANT IN DOING THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENT ACT USE THE REASONABLE
CARE AND CAUTION WHICH AN ORDINARY PRUDENT PERSON WOULD HAVE USED IN
THE SAME SITUATION? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. In the case at bar, the Point-of-
Sale Guidelines which outlined the steps that petitioner must follow under the circumstances
reveals that whenever the words CARD EXPIRED flashes on screen, petitioner should check
card’s expiry date as embossed in the card itself. If unexpired, petitioner should honor the card.
Clearly, it has not yet expired in 19 Oct 1989 when the same was dishonored by
petitioner. Hence, petitioner did not use the reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation and as such, petitioner is
guilty of negligence.

The humiliation and embarrassment of private respondent was brought about by the fact
of dishonor by petitioner of private respondent’s valid BANKARD. Hence, petitioner’s
negligence is the proximate cause of private respondent’s damage.

PANTRANCO VS MARICAR BAESA | G.R. NO. 79050-51

FACTS:

Spouses Baesa, among other passengers, boarded a jeepney driven by David Ico to go on a
picnic in Isabela, to celebrate their 5th Wedding Anniversary. While driving at 20kph, a speeding
Pantranco Bus encroached the jeepney's lane and collided with it, resulting to the death of the
entire Baesa Family except for Maricar Baesa. Through a guardian, Baesa filed separate
actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against Pantranco.
Pantranco, for its part, contended that it was the jeepney's driver, Ico's negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident and invoked due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its drivers.

CFI: Rendered a decision against Pantranco and awarded damages to Baesa.

CA: Modified the decision of the CFI as to the amount of damages awarded. Pantranco’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Pantranco filed the instant Petition for Review arguing that the Court of Appeals faulted in not
applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. It claimed that under
the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney, Ico, who had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with
reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.

ISSUE: WON last clear chance doctrine applies in this case, transferring the liability to Ico.

RULING: NO.

The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v.
Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:

The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it
appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.

Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable
to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as
a defense to defeat claim for damages.

For the doctrine of last clear chance to apply, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of
peril or upon exercise of due care have been aware of it. In this case, the jeepney driver, Ico
was not aware of the peril as it has been shown that he remained at the speed of 20kph even
upon seeing the Pantranco Bus encroaching its lane based on the assumption that the bus
would return to its lane.

Even assuming that Ico was aware of the peril, last clear chance doctrine can never apply
when a party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by application of all means at hand after peril should have been known or
discovered, as in this case.
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS CA | 269 SCRA 695
(PAGE 47 – BOOK)

THE UNITED STATES VS MARIANO CRAME | G.R. No. 10181

FACTS:

MARIANO CRAME was charged of the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless
negligence for being the chauffeur of a motor vehicle, with reckless imprudence and in violation
of the regulations and without using reasonable care and diligence to prevent injury to persons
and property and without paying any attention to the pedestrians occupying and crossing said
street, by his neglect and imprudence in the management and lack of control of his motor
vehicle causing it to knock down, drag, and run over the body of one GEORGE B. COOMBS, a
private in the United States Army, who was then and there occupying and crossing the said
Calle Herran, thereby causing injuries, wounds, and bruises upon the latter’s person.

CFI: Convicted CRAME of the crime charged against him for despite having seen the soldier
Coombs crossing the street at a certain distance in front of the automobile, did not reduce the
speed of the automobile sufficiently, nor attempt to stop the machinery entirely, if that was
necessary, to avoid an accident; in that it does not appear that the accused sounded his horn or
whistle or used his voice to call the attention of the person who was crossing the street or notify
him that he should stop and avoid being struck by the automobile; and in that the accused was
driving in the center, or rather, a little to the right of the center of the street instead of on the left
side thereof."

Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON CRAME should be convicted of the crime charged against him; WON the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.

RULING: YES.

It appears clearly established by the evidence that the accused was driving on the right-hand
side of the street when the accident happened. According to the law of the road and the custom
of the country he should have been on the left-hand side of the street. According to the
evidence there was abundant room for him to drive upon what may properly be called the left-
hand side of the street and still be free from danger or risk. Instead of that he chose to take what
appears from the evidence to have been almost the extreme right-hand side of the street.

It was also clear from the record that the accused was driving much faster than he claims he
was or else he was negligent in not watching the street for foot passengers, or in the handling of
his automobile.
QUOTED SA BOOK:

“…we believe it to be the rule that testimony that plaintiff, while driving on the right-
hand side of a wide road, was overtaken by an automobile which struck the hind
wheel of his wagon, establishes a case of negligence. (Salminen v. Ross, 185
Fed., 997.) And a bicyclist has the burden of disproving his negligence when he
rides up behind an- other who is walking where he has a right to walk and, without
giving any warning, strikes him with his vehicle. (Myers v. Hinds, 110 Mich., 300.)
And we have held in the case of Chapman v. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), that
where, in an action to recover damages for having been run down by defendant’s
automobile, it appeared that the automobile, at the time the injury was produced,
was being driven on the wrong side of the street, the burden of proof was on
defendant to establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his
negligence.”

Whichever way the case is looked at, whether from the viewpoint of the failure to see the soldier
in time to avoid the accident or failure to stop or give warning by horn or whistle, it is clear that
the learned trial court was right when it held that the accused was guilty of negligence.

The judgment appealed from was affirmed.

LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA VS PASCASIO, ET. AL. | G.R. NO. 118141

FACTS:

FLORENCIO V. RUEDA, husband of petitioner LEONILA GARCIA-RUEDA, underwent surgical

operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by
DR. DOMINGO ANTONIO, JR. who was the surgeon, while DR. ERLINDA BALATBAT-REYES
was the anesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications
of “unknown cause,” according to officials of the UST Hospital.

Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband’s body. Consequently, the NBI ruled
that Florencio’s death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering
anesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr.
Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. The case was
initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was
related to the counsel of one of the doctors. The case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G.
Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion of the petitioner. The case was then referred to
Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be
held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr. Antonio be dismissed.
Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos Sioson, recommended that the case be re-raffled on
the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred
to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, who endorsed that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be
dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. Pending the
resolution of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba’s resolution,
the investigative “pingpong” continued when the case was again assigned to another
prosecutor, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto
was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who
resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved by
both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 against PROSECUTORS GUERRERO, MACARAEG, and ARIZALA for manifest
partiality in favor of DR. REYES before the Office of the Ombudsman.

OMBUDSMAN: Issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.

Petitioner assailed the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the
recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same.
Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that
there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE: WON there was negligence on the part of the physicians which resulted to the death of
Petitioner’s husband.

RULING: YES.

No less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed negligence
on the part of the attending physicians in administering the anesthesia.

The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can
best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of
a medical negligence case without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and
consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position
to pass judgment on such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting evidence and
findings. The bases of a party’s accusation and defenses are better ventilated at the trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation.

QUOTED SA BOOK:

A word on medical malpractice or negligence cases.

 In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice
or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional
which has caused bodily harm.

In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health
care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.

Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.

When the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient
relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients.
They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these
professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon
whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice.
Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill
during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for negligence.

Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anesthesia, the

necessity of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff,
have been applied in actions against anesthesiologist to hold the defendant liable for the death
or injury of a patient under excessive or improper anesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-
pronged evidence: evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the
particular kind of case, and a showing that the physician in question negligently departed from
this standard in his treatment.

Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries:
whether the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the
proximate cause of the patient's injury. Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the
occurrence of the victim's death after the negligent act of the anesthesiologist in administering
the anesthesia, a fact which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal
case. To be sure, the allegation of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI
deduced that the attending surgeons did not conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior
to the operation. It appears that the cause of the death of the victim could have been averted
had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also,
we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available to counteract whatever
deleterious effect the anesthesia might produce. Why these precautionary measures were
disregarded must be sufficiently explained.

KENNETH T. RHODES VS CHARLES DEHAAN, M.D., ET. AL. | 337 P.2d 1043 184 Kan. 473
(1959)

FACTS:

KENNETH T. RHODES filed an action to recover damages for malpractice against herein
Defendants-physicians, his cause of action being predicated on acts of negligence when the
said physicians, allegedly with negligence and carelessness, performed an abdominal operation
for surgical treatment of a duodenal ulcer. After such operation, RHODES suffered intense and
disabling pain in the right arm, right shoulder, in the area of his back between his shoulders, in
the area of the neck and base of the skull, and because of this condition, he was not released to
return to work. Even after being able to return to work, he still suffered much pain and disability
in the right arm and shoulder. He as well later discovered that he had a hernia in the region of
the surgery incision. RHODES alleged that said injuries and resulting pain, suffering and
disability are the direct and proximate result of negligence of the defendants and their agents,
servants and employees.

The DEFENDANTS, for their part, attacked the Petition filed by RHODES by motion requesting
an order requiring RHODES to elect whether his cause of action was based upon res ipsa
loquitur or upon allegations of specific acts of negligence and to make the petition more definite
and certain. Upon RHODES’ filing of an amended petition, DEFENDANTS filed separate
demurrers on the ground that it did not state a cause of action.

RHODES contended that allegations respecting the injuries sustained by him, under the
conditions and circumstances set forth in the petition, authorize an inference or raise a
presumption that the DEFENDANTS were guilty of negligence, hence such petition states a
cause of action under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

DEFENDANTS, on the other hand, insisted that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or the
presumption of inference of negligence does not apply to malpractice actions because
negligence in such actions cannot be inferred from bad result, failure to recover, unusual
happening, or other circumstance showing lack of success resulting from an operation.

TRIAL COURT: Sustained the demurrers to the Petition.

ISSUE: WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case.

RULING: NO.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself”.
The Court recognized the general rule that a physician or surgeon is presumed to have
exercised his legal duty of ordinary care and skill and is presumed that he possesses the
reasonable degree of learning and skills ordinarily possessed by members of his profession and
of his school of medicine in the community where he practices, and that he carefully and
skillfully operated on a patient. No presumption of negligence of a physician or surgeon is
to be indulged from the fact of injury or adverse result of his treatment of, or operation
on the patient. In an action for damages occasioned by negligence or malpractice of a
physician, every fact necessary to constitute a cause of action must be alleged in the
petition with reasonable definiteness and certainty.

The mere fact of injury or adverse result from the treatment or an operation does not make
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable, and the fact that injury occurs is not sufficient to
establish liability. Negligence is never presumed but must be established by proof.

The facts stated in the petition are not sufficient to warrant the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, thus, the trial court’s action in sustaining the demurrers to the petition was proper
and must be, as it was, upheld and affirmed.

QUOTED SA BOOK:

“The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was
not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.”

[G.R. No. L-2826. June 11, 1951.]

ALFREDO N. CRUZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE M. VALERO and LUZON SUGAR

COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees.

FACTS:

Appellant ALFREDO N. CRUZ had deposited and stored a total of 1,081.79 piculs of centrifugal
sugar in the Appellee LUZON SUGAR COMPANY’s warehouse within its compound, with the
obligation on its part to deliver it to the appellant on demand. CRUZ claimed that when he
wanted to withdraw the amount of centrifugal sugar he had stored in its warehouse for
safekeeping and the number of gallons of molasses he had left in its possession contained in
cylindrical tanks, LUZON SUGAR COMPANY did not have the same in its warehouse because
the appellee JOSE M. VALERO had disposed of the same without his knowledge and consent.
CRUZ filed an action for recovery against the company.

LUZON SUGAR COMPANY, for its part, claimed that had in its warehouse sufficient amount of
centrifugal sugar manufactured by it and was in a position to deliver sugar to planters who
wished to withdraw and take delivery thereof, when the central was bombed by Japanese
airplanes, the warehouse damaged by sharpnel and some piculs of centrifugal sugar were
looted, some taken by the Imperial Japanese Army after the occupation of the town of Calumpit
by the said Army. Said reason rendered it impossible the delivery of centrifugal sugar and
molasses belonging to CRUZ.

TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the complaint holding that the loss of the piculs of centrifugal sugar
was due to a fortuitous event or force majeure.

Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON LUZON SUGAR COMPANY should be held liable for the loss of the piculs of
centrifugal sugar belonging to CRUZ.

RULING: NO.

The preponderance of evidence shows that there was enough sugar to cover and deliver the
piculs of centrifugal sugar to CRUZ. However, it was established that the Luzon Sugar
Company compound was bombed and the Japanese Army occupied it and that some of the
sugar stored in the warehouse were looted, some taken by the Imperial Japanese Army and the
remaining brought to Northern Luzon by the said Army.

Therefore, there is no legal way of holding that the LUZON SUGAR COMPANY and its
President JOSE M. VALERO are responsible for the loss of the said sugar, molasses, tires and
tubes, because the loss was due to the war or to a fortuitous event.

G.R. Nos. L-2152 and L-2153 | July 31, 1951

SIMEONA N. DE CASTRO, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, vs. JOSE G. LONGA, defendant-

appellee:

PAZ DIAGO DE CASTRO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellant, vs. JOSE G. LONGA, defendant-

appellee.

FACTS:

The Hacienda Biason in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental was owned pro-indiviso by
SIMEONA M. DE CASTRO, her niece PAZ DIAGO DE CASTRO, and the HEIRS of the late
JOAQUIN MONTENEGRO.

SIMEONA M. DE CASTRO, with approval of her husband, Luis F. de Castro, executed a

contract of lease of their undivided shares in the said hacienda in favor of JOSE G. LONGA for
a period of six agricultural years.
On the same date, PAZ DE CASTRO, together with Ines Lezana, executed a contract of lease
of their undivided shares in the said hacienda in favor of JOSE G. LONGA for the same period
of six agricultural years.

JOSE G. LONGA took possession of the hacienda in accordance with the aforesaid contracts of
lease and was able to pay to the plaintiffs the corresponding rentals due for the agricultural
years 1939-1940 and 1940-1941 by means of quedas issued by the Central Azucarera de Bais
in the name of the lessors.

G.R. NO. 2151: SIMEONA N. DE CASTRO, ET AL. seek to recover from JOSE LONGA the
rentals corresponding to the crop years 1940-1941, 1941-1942, 1942-1943, 1943-1944 and
1944-1945, plus damages, due to the alleged failure of the defendant to deliver the Hacienda
Biason upon the termination of the lease at the time and in the condition agreed upon in the
contract of lease.

G.R. No. 2153: PAZ DIAGO DE CASTRO seeks to recover from JOSE LONGA the amount of
731 piculs of centrifugal sugar representing the rental which the defendant allegedly failed to
deliver to the plaintiff for the agricultural year 1941-1942, alleging that:

1) for the third year of his lease contract with the defendant (1941-1942) the latter failed to
deliver to the plaintiff the rental due for said year in the amount of 731 piculs of
centrifugal sugar;

2) that for the fourth, fifth and sixth year of the contract (1942-1943, 1943-1944, 1944-
1945), the defendant likewise failed to pay to the plaintiff the corresponding rentals due
for said years;

3) that the lease contract by not delivering to the plaintiff on or before June 30, 1944,
twenty (20) hectares of vacant fields free from cogon grass and appropriate for planting
sugar cane; and

4) that the contract for his failure to secure and furnish the plaintiff with a bond of P10,000
which should have been subscribed by one Gaspar Vicente to guarantee performance of
the term of the contract.

In both cases, the defendant raised as his affirmative defense, the facts that due to the war or to
the Japanese occupation, he was unable to fulfill the terms of his lease contract. Consequently,
he should be excused from complying with the same.

CFI: Absolved LONGA from the two complaints.

Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON defendant LONGA should be held liable for his failure to comply with his
obligations under the above-mentioned lease contracts.

RULING: NO.

LONGA’s failure to meet his quota for the agricultural year 1941-1942 was due to:

1) stoppage of the mill by the central in view of the order of President Quezon to suspend
the same during the Japanese occupation;

2) the fact that the laborers whom LONGA had employed for that milling season were
temporary ones, known in the locality as "sacada", which means that they were laborers
recruited from other provinces and brought to the hacienda for that milling season only.
Upon the outbreak of the war, the said laborers abandoned the hacienda and returned to
their respective homes thus making it impossible for LONGA to harvest and mill all the
sugar cane planted by him;

3) the fear and apprehension entertained by the people as a result of the impending
invasion of the province by the enemy considering that the Hacienda Biason was about
seven kilometers away from the aforesaid Central and adjoining it was a Philippine Army
camp;

4) when the Japanese occupied the Municipality of Bais, they immediately took possession
of the Central and established a garrison thereat.

It, therefore, appears that LONGA’s failure to comply with the terms of the contract was due to
war, or to its effect, and to other factors which he could not have foreseen or avoided,
which in the light of the authorities and precedents on the matter are deemed to be sufficient
cause to justify the non-fulfillment of the terms of his contract of lease, and to relieve him
of all responsibility therefor.

This is more so if we take into account the fact that to produce or mill sugar cane at that time
was contrary to public policy as it would be giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and was
in violation of specific order emanating from our legitimate government to forestall any help that
may be rendered to the enemy, it being an undisputed fact that sugar is essential not only to
feed the enemy but as raw material for fuel to bolster up his machine.

The decision appealed from was AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. L-40948 | June 29, 1976

 GREGORIO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANCISCO CONSOLACION, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Br. II, CORAZON RAMIREZ UY, and LUCIO
GALAURA, respondents.

FACTS:

SIMEONA ESTRADA, wife of Plaintiff GREGORIO ESTRADA, was a passenger of the AC Jeep
owned and operated by private respondent CORAZON RAMIREZ UY and driven by private
respondent LUCIO GALAURA, while said jeep was cruising along Claro M. Recto Avenue,
heading towards the direction of the Jones Circle, Davao City, it bumped a Ford pick-up truck
and as a consequence thereof, plaintiff's wife sustained a fractured left humerus, fat
(pulmonary) embolism and shock due to respiratory failure. She was brought to the San Pedro
Hospital where she died.

GREGORIO ESTRADA filed a complaint for damages against CORAZON RAMIREZ UY and
LUCIO GALAURA alleging that GALAURA was without regard for the safety of plaintiff's wife
who was among his passengers and did not take the necessary precaution to avoid the
accident. ESTRADA further alleged that CORAZON RAMIREZ UY, as owner of the AC jeep and
a common carrier, in violation of the contract of carriage, failed to safely transport his wife to her
place of destination by reason on Uy’s "failure to exercise even the diligence of a good father of
a family" and her "gross and evident bad faith, malevolence and wantonness" in discharging her
obligation as a common carrier.

UY and GALAURA, in their answer, alleged that the proximate and only cause of the accident
was the negligence of third persons: DANILO ANG, the driver of the Toyota pick-up truck; and
RODOLFO D. ENDINO, the driver of the Ford pick-up truck, who were then driving their
respective vehicles at a fast rate of speed, and to whom CORAZON RAMIREZ UY had no
supervision and control.

UY and GALAURA filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages claimed.
ESTRADA opposed the said motion relying heavily on the presumption that in case of death of
the passenger, the common carrier is presumed "to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently," unless the carrier proves that he has observed extraordinary diligence with due
regard to all the circumstances, which movants failed to do.

TRIAL COURT: (Through Hon. Judge CONSOLACION) granted the motion. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed was denied for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prohibition to annul said order of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the incident which led to the death of ESTRADA’s wife was due to a fortuitous
event or force majeure, which would exempt UY and GALAURA from liability.
RULING:

Under the contract of carriage, private respondents assumed the express obligation to transport
the wife of petitioner to her destination safely and to observe extra ordinary diligence with due
regard for all the circumstances, and that any injury suffered by her in the course thereof, is
immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. To overcome such presumption, it must
be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means that
the carrier must show the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons * * * as far as human care
and foresight can provide", or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.

In order to constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary that:

1) the event must be independent of the human will;

2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and
3) the obligor must be free of a concurrent or contributory fault or negligence.

UY and GALAURA submitted affidavits to prove that the accident which resulted in the death of
ESTRADA's wife was due to the fault or negligence of the drivers of the two pickup trucks over
whom the carrier had no supervision or control. Having, therefore, shown prima facie that the
accident was due to a caso fortuito and that the driver of the respondent was free of concurrent
or contributory fault or negligence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to rebut such proof. Having
failed to do so, the defense of the carrier that the proximate cause of the accident was a caso
fortuito remains unrebutted.

As to the procedural issue on the propriety of the grant of summary judgment, the SC held that
the issue as to whether a carrier used such reasonable precautions to avoid the accident as
would ordinarily be used by careful, prudent persons under like circumstances is a question
essentially one of fact and, therefore, ordinarily such issue must be decided at the trial. But
where, as in the case at bar, ESTRADA has not submitted opposing affidavits to controvert UY
and GALAURA’s evidence that GALAURA was free of contributory fault as he stopped the
jeepney to avoid the accident, but in spite of such precaution the accident occurred, respondent
Judge CONSOLACION did not act arbitrarily in declaring that "there is no genuine issue to any
material fact and no controversial question of fact to be submitted to the trial court."