Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

DOI 10.1007/s10701-013-9721-9

The Paraconsistent Logic of Quantum Superpositions

N. da Costa · C. de Ronde

Received: 23 September 2012 / Accepted: 13 May 2013 / Published online: 31 May 2013
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Physical superpositions exist both in classical and in quantum physics.

However, what is exactly meant by ‘superposition’ in each case is extremely dif-
ferent. In this paper we discuss some of the multiple interpretations which exist in
the literature regarding superpositions in quantum mechanics. We argue that all these
interpretations have something in common: they all attempt to avoid ‘contradiction’.
We argue in this paper, in favor of the importance of developing a new interpreta-
tion of superpositions which takes into account contradiction, as a key element of the
formal structure of the theory, “right from the start”. In order to show the feasibility
of our interpretational project we present an outline of a paraconsistent approach to
quantum superpositions which attempts to account for the contradictory properties
present in general within quantum superpositions. This approach must not be under-
stood as a closed formal and conceptual scheme but rather as a first step towards a
different type of understanding regarding quantum superpositions.

Keywords Quantum superposition · Para-consistent logic · Interpretation of

quantum mechanics

N. da Costa
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, Brazil

C. de Ronde ()
Instituto de Filosofía “Dr. A. Korn”, Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET, Buenos Aires,
Argentina
e-mail: [email protected]

C. de Ronde
Center Leo Apostel and Foundations of the Exact Sciences, Brussels Free University, Brussels,
Belgium
846 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

1 Introduction

There is an important link in the history of physics between the interpretation of

theories and their formal development. Relativity would have not been possible with-
out non-Euclidean geometry nor classical physics without infinitesimal calculus. In
quantum mechanics, the formal scheme was elaborated—mainly by Schrödinger,
Heisenberg, Born, Jordan and Dirac—almost in parallel to the orthodox interpre-
tation. However, still today, the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains con-
troversial regarding most of its non-classical characteristics: indeterminism, holism,
contextuality, non-locality, etc. There is, still today, no consensus regarding the mean-
ing of such expressions of the theory. In this paper we shall be concerned with a spe-
cific aspect of quantum mechanics, namely, the principle of superposition which, as it
is well known, gives rise to the so called quantum superpositions. Physical superposi-
tions exist both in classical and in quantum physics. However, what is exactly meant
by “superposition” in each case is extremely different. In classical physics one can
have superpositions of waves or fields. A wave (field) α can be added to a different
wave (field) β and the sum will give a ‘new’ wave (field) μ = α + β. There is in this
case no weirdness for the sum of multiple states gives as a result a new single state.
In quantum mechanics on the contrary, a linear combination of multiple states, α + β
is not reducible to one single state, and there is no obvious interpretation of such su-
perposition of states. As a matter of fact, today quantum superpositions play a central
role within the most outstanding technical developments such as quantum telepor-
tation, quantum cryptography and quantum computation [22, 27]. The question we
attempt to address in this paper regards the meaning and physical representation of
quantum superpositions. There are many interpretations of quantum mechanics each
of which provides an answer to this question. In the following we shall review some
of these proposals. We shall then argue in favor of the possibility to develop a new
interpretation which considers contradictory properties as a main aspect of quantum
superpositions and present an outline of a formal approach based on paraconsistent
logic which attempts to consider contradiction “right from the start”. We must remark
that we do not understand this approach as a closed formal and conceptual scheme
but rather as a first step towards a different type of understanding regarding quantum
superpositions.
Paraconsistent logics are the logics of inconsistent but nontrivial theories. The ori-
gins of paraconsistent logics go back to the first systematic studies dealing with the
possibility of rejecting the principle of noncontradiction. Paraconsistent logic was
elaborated, independently, by Stanislaw Jaskowski in Poland, and by the first author
of this paper in Brazil, around the middle of the last century (on paraconsistent logic,
see, for example: [5]). A theory T founded on the logic L, which contains a symbol
for negation, is called inconsistent if it has among its theorems a sentence A and its
negation ¬A; otherwise, it is said to be consistent. T is called trivial if any sentence
of its language is also a theorem of T ; otherwise, T is said to be non-trivial. In classi-
cal logics and in most usual logics, a theory is inconsistent if, and only if, it is trivial.
L is paraconsistent when it can be the underlying logic of inconsistent but non trivial
theories. Clearly classical logic and all usual logics are not paraconsistent. The im-
portance of paraconsistent logic is not limited to the realm of pure logic but has been
Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858 847

extended to many fields of application such as robot control, air traffic control [25],
control systems for autonomous machines [26], defeasible deontic reasoning [24],
information systems [1] and medicine.
In the following, we attempt to call the attention to the importance of extending
the realm of paraconsistent logic to the formal account of quantum superpositions.
Firstly, we shall discuss the very different meanings of the term ‘superposition’ in
both classical and quantum physics. In Sect. 3, we shall present some of the very dif-
ferent interpretations of the meaning of a quantum superposition which can be found
in the literature. In Sect. 4, we shall argue in favor of the importance of considering an
interpretation of superposition in terms of paraconsistent logic. In Sect. 5, we present
a formal scheme in terms of paraconsistent logic which attempts to account for the
inner contradictions present within a quantum superposition. Finally, in Sect. 6, we
argue in favor of considering contradiction “right from the start”.

2 What Is a Quantum Superposition?

In classical physics, every physical system may be described exclusively by means of

its actual properties, taking ‘actuality’ as expressing the preexistent mode of being
of the properties themselves, independently of observation—the ‘pre’ referring to its
existence previous to measurement. Each system has a determined state characterized
mathematically in terms of a point in phase space. The change of the system may be
described by the change of its actual properties. Potential or possible properties are
considered as the points to which the system might arrive in a future instant of time.
The occurrence of possibilities in such cases merely reflects our ignorance about what
is actual. Contrary to what seems to happen in quantum mechanics, statistical states
do not correspond to features of the actual system, but quantify our lack of knowledge
of those actual features [11, p. 125].
Classical mechanics tells us via the equation of motion how the state of the system
moves along the curve determined by initial conditions in the phase space. The repre-
sentation of the state of the physical system is given by a point in phase space Γ and
the physical magnitudes are represented by real functions over Γ . These functions
commute between each other and can be interpreted as possessing definite values
independently of physical observation, i.e. each magnitude can be interpreted as be-
ing actually preexistent to any possible measurement. In the orthodox formulation
of quantum mechanics, the representation of the state of a system is given by a ray
in Hilbert space H. But, contrary to the classical scheme, physical magnitudes are
represented by operators on H that, in general, do not commute. This mathematical
fact has extremely problematic interpretational consequences for it is then difficult
to affirm that these quantum magnitudes are simultaneously preexistent. In order to
restrict the discourse to different sets of commuting magnitudes, different Complete
Sets of Commuting Operators (CSCO) have to be chosen. The choice of a particu-
lar representation (given by a CSCO) determines the basis in which the observables
diagonalize and in which the ray can be expressed. Thus, the ray can be written as
different linear combinations of states:
       B3     
αi ϕiB1 + αj ϕjB1 = ϕqB2 = βm ϕm + βn ϕnB3 + βo ϕoB3 (1)
848 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

The linear combinations of states are also called quantum superpositions. As it was
clearly expressed by Dirac [12]: “The nature of the relationships which the superposi-
tion principle requires to exist between the states of any system is of a kind that cannot
be explained in terms of familiar physical concepts. One cannot in the classical sense
picture a system being partly in each of two states and see the equivalence of this
to the system being completely in some other state.” The formal difference of using
vectors in H instead of points in Γ seems to imply that in quantum mechanics—apart
from the ‘possibility’ which is encountered in classical mechanics—there is another,
different realm which must be necessarily considered and refers, at each instant of
time, to contradictory properties. To see this, consider the following example: given
a spin 1/2 system whose state is |↑z , we let it interact with a magnetic field in the
z direction. All outcomes that can become actual in the future are potential proper-
ties of the system, in an analogous manner as all possible reachable positions of a
pendulum are in the classical case. But at each instant of time, for example at the
initial instant, if we consider the z direction and the projection operator |↑z ↑z |
as representing a preexistent actual property, there are other incompatible properties
arising from considering projection operators of spin projections in other directions.
For example, in the x direction, the projection operators |↑x ↑x | and |↓x ↓x | do
not commute with |↑z ↑z | and thus, cannot be considered to possess definite values
simultaneously. Since Born interpretation of the wave function, these properties are
usually considered as possible. However, this possibility is essentially different from
the idea of possibility discussed in classical physics which relates to the idea of a pro-
cess. If we consider that the formalism of quantum mechanics provides a description
of the world, a representation of what there is—and does not merely make reference
to measurement outcomes—, at each instant of time the properties, |↑z ↑z |, |↑x ↑x |
and |↓x ↓x | must be taken into account independently of their future actualization
for they all provide non trivial information about the state of affairs. In particular,
the properties |↑x ↑x | and |↓x ↓x |, which constitute the superposition and must be
considered simultaneously are in general contradictory properties.
In the quantum logic approach one of the properties, namely, the one in which we
can write the state of affairs as a single term, is considered as ‘actual’ while the others
are taken to be ‘potential’ properties. Potential properties can become actual. These
properties, e.g. |↑x ↑x |, |↓x ↓x |, |↑y ↑y | and |↓y ↓y | in our example, are always
part of superpositions with more than one term and are constituted by contradictory
properties. However, from a mathematical perspective, independently of their mode
of existence, both potential and actual properties are placed at the same level in the
algebraic frame which describes the state of affairs according to quantum mechanics:
the projections of the spin in all directions are atoms of the lattice and there is no
formal priority of the actual over the potential properties. This rises the question if
one can consider quantum superpositions as preexistent entities, independently of
their future actualization.
In the laboratory, it is precisely this contradictory potential realm which is neces-
sary to be considered by the experimentalist in the developments which are taking
place today regarding the processing of quantum information as quantum computing
and quantum communication [22, 27]. This seems to point in the direction that these
properties have an existence which cannot be reduced to their becoming actual at a
Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858 849

future instant of time. Superpositions correspond to possible outcomes which occur

on an equal footing in the superposition of the final state, so that there is no sign
that any one of them is more real than any other [11, p. 120]. Taking these problems
into account there are many interpretations which attempt to provide an answer to the
question: what is a quantum superposition? We shall discuss in the next section some
of these proposals.

3 The Multiple Interpretations of Quantum Superpositions

As we have seen above, the formal description of quantum mechanics seems to imply
a deep departure from the classical notion of possible or probable. This was cleverly
exemplified by Erwin Schrödinger in his famous cat experiment [30], in which a half
dead and half alive cat seemed to laugh of the idea of possessing a determined state.
However, one can find in the literature, there are many different interpretations of
quantum mechanics in general and of the meaning of a quantum superposition in par-
ticular. In this section we shall review some of these very distinct interpretations. We
do not attempt to provide a complete review of interpretations but rather to analyze
instead their specific understanding of quantum superpositions.
Although we must take into account the fact that ‘state vector’ and ‘cat’ are two
concepts in different levels of discourse [10, p. 189]. From a realist perspective, which
considers physics as providing a description or an expression of the world, the ques-
tion still arises, if this formal or mathematical representation given by superpositions,
namely Eq. (1)—which allow us to calculate the probability of the possible measure-
ment outcomes—, can be related conceptually to a notion which can allow us to
think, independently of measurement outcomes, about the ‘superposition of states in
Hilbert space’ in an analogous manner as we think of a ‘point in phase space’ (in the
formal level) as describing an ‘object in space-time’ (in the conceptual level). What
is describing a mathematical superposition? Can we create or find adequate concepts
which can provide a representational realistic account of a quantum superposition
independent of measurement outcomes? Of course, from a general empiricist per-
spective one is not committed to answering these set of questions. The idea that the
quantum wave function as related to a superposition is just a theoretical device with
no ontological content goes back to Bohr’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. The
impossibility to interpret the quantum wave function in an ontological fashion can
be understood in relation to his characterization of Ψ in terms of an algorithmic de-
vice which computes measurement results.1 This position radically addressed seems
to end up in the instrumentalistic account shared implicitly by many and developed
explicitly by Fuchs and Peres [18]. Bas van Fraassen, whom we consider a close fol-
lower of Bohr’s ideas, has also taken an anti-metaphysical position with respect to the
interpretation of the quantum wave function. His justification stands on his empiricist
account of both physics and philosophy (see [33, Sect. 9.1]).
From an empiricist perspective the formalism does not provide a description of
what there is. Superpositions are thus, a theoretical device through which one can

1 According to Bohr [35, p. 338] the Schrödinger wave equation is just an abstract method of calculus and
it does not designate in itself any phenomena. See also [3] for discussion.
850 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

consider the actual observation hic et nunc. Empiricism can be linked to probability
in terms of the frequency interpretation which rests, contrary to the original concep-
tion of probability, not on the idea that probability describes in terms of ignorance
an existent state of affairs, but rather in a set of empirical results found in a series
of measurements. However, and independently of the problems encountered within
such empiricist stances, if superpositions are considered just as a theoretical device,
then the question of interpretation seems to loose its strength. For why should we
pursue an interpretation if, like Fuchs and Peres remark, quantum mechanics does
the job and already provides an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macro-
scopic events? There are other reasons which one could put forward to account for
the importance of interpretation even from an empiricist perspective (see for example
van Fraassen [32]), however these reasons must remain only secondary in the quest
of science.
On the contrary, from a realist position, there is need to provide an answer to the
link between the theory and its conceptual understanding of the world. To put it in
a nutshell: what is quantum mechanics telling us about the world? As noticed by
Bacciagaluppi [2, p. 74], the hidden variable program attempts to “restore a classical
way of thinking about what there is.” In this sense, Bohm’s proposal seems to restore
the possibility of discussing in terms of a state of affairs described in terms of a set of
definite valued properties. In Bohmian mechanics the state of a system is given by the
wave function Ψ together with the configuration of particles X. The quantum wave
function must be understood in analogy to a classical field that moves the particles in
accordance with the following functional relation: dx dt = ∇S, where S = δ (δ being
the phase of ψ ). Thus, particles always have a well defined position together with
the rest of their properties and the evolution depends on the quantum field. It then
follows that, there are no superpositions of states, the superposition is given only at
the level of the field and remains as mysterious as the superposition of classical fields.
The field does not only have a dynamical character but also determines the epistemic
probability of the configuration of particles via the usual Born rule.
A different approach, which starts from a particular interpretation of quantum su-
perpositions is the so called many worlds interpretation (MW), considered to be a
direct conclusion from Everett’s first proposal in terms of ‘relative states’ [14]. Ev-
erett’s idea was to let quantum mechanics find its own interpretation, making justice
to the symmetries inherent in the Hilbert space formalism in a simple and convinc-
ing way [8]. MW interpretations are no-collapse interpretations which respect the
orthodox formulation of quantum mechanics. The main idea behind many worlds in-
terpretations is that superpositions relate to collections of worlds, in each of which
exactly one value of an observable, which corresponds to one of the terms in the
superposition, is realized. Apart from being simple, the claim is that it possesses a
natural fit to the formalism, respecting its symmetries. The solution proposed to the
measurement problem is provided by assuming that each one of the terms in the su-
perposition is actual in its own correspondent world. Thus, it is not only the single
value which we see in ‘our world’ which gets actualized but rather, that a branching of
worlds takes place in every measurement, giving rise to a multiplicity of worlds with
their corresponding actual values. The possible splits of the worlds are determined by
the laws of quantum mechanics but each world becomes again ‘classical’. Quantum
Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858 851

superpositions are interpreted as expressing the existence of multiple worlds, each of

which exists in (its own) actuality. However, there are no superpositions in this, our
actual world, for each world becomes again a “classical world”. The many worlds
interpretation seems to be able to recover these islands of classicality at the price of
multiplying the ‘actual realm’. In this case, the quantum superposition is expelled
from each actual world and recovered only in terms of the relation between the mul-
tiple worlds.
The Geneva school to quantum logic and similar approaches such as that of Foulis
and Randall [17] attempt to consider quantum physics as related to the realms of ac-
tuality and potentiality in analogous manner to classical physics. According to the
Geneva school, both in classical and quantum physics measurements will provoke
fundamental changes of the state of the system.2 Continuing Heisenberg’s consid-
erations in the new physics, Constantin Piron has been one of the leading figures
in developing the notion of potentiality within the logical structure of quantum me-
chanics [28, 29]. Following [31], a physical property, never mind whether a classical
or quantum one, is specified as what corresponds to a set of definite experimental
projects. A definite experimental project (DEP) is an experimental procedure (in fact,
an equivalence class of experimental procedures) consisting in a list of actions and a
rule that specifies in advance what has to be considered as a positive result, in corre-
spondence with the yes answer to a dichotomic question. Each DEP tests a property.
A given DEP is called certain (correspondingly, a dichotomic question is called true)
if it is sure that the positive response would be obtained when the experiment is per-
formed or, more precisely, in case that whenever the system is placed in a measure-
ment situation then it produces certain definite phenomenon to happen. A physical
property is called actual in case the DEPs which test it are certain and it is called
potential otherwise. Whether a property is actual or potential depends on the state
in which one considers the system to be. Though in this approach both actuality and
potentiality are considered as modes of being, actual properties are considered as
attributes that exist, in the EPR sense as elements of physical reality,3 while poten-
tial properties are not conceived as existing in the same way as real ones. They are
thought as possibilities with respect to actualization, because potential properties may
be actualized due to some change in the state of the system. In this case the super-
position provides a measure—given by the real numbers which appear in the same
term as the state—over the potential properties which could become actual in a given
situation.

2 What is special for a classical system, is that ‘observables’ can be described by functions on the state
space. This is the main reason that, a measurement corresponding to such an observable, can be left out
of the description of the theory ‘in case one is not interested in the change of state provoked by the
measurement’, but ‘only interested in the values of the observables’. It is in this respect that the situation
is very different for a quantum system. Observables can also be described, as projection valued measures
on the Hilbert space, but ‘no definite values can be attributed to such a specific observable for a substantial
part of the states of the system’. For a quantum system, contrary to a classical system, it is not true that
‘either a property or its negation is actual’.
3 Einstein designed, in the by now famous EPR ‘paper’ [13], a definition of when a physical quantity could
be considered an element of physical reality within quantum mechanics. By using this definition Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen argued against the completeness of the quantum theory. For a general discussion
see [16].
852 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

4 Quantum Superpositions and the ‘Contradiction’ of Properties?

Although the interpretations we have discussed in the previous section from both
their formal and metaphysical commitments have many differences, there is still
something they all share in common: they all attempt to avoid contradictions. Indeed
‘contradiction’ has been regarded with disbelief in Western thought due to certain
metaphysical presuppositions which go back to Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Kant.
Even after the development of paraconsistent logic in the mid XX century and the
subsequent technical progress this theory has allowed, the aversion towards contra-
diction is still present today within science and philosophy. The famous statement of
Popper that the acceptance of inconsistency “would mean the complete breakdown
of science” remains an unfortunate prejudice within present philosophy of science
(see [4, Chap. 5]).
Leaving instrumentalist positions aside, one of us has argued elsewhere [6] that
one can find in the vast literature regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics,
two main strategies which attempt to provide an answer to the riddle of ‘what is quan-
tum mechanics talking about’. The first strategy is to begin with a presupposed set
of metaphysical principles and advance towards a new formalism. Examples of this
strategy are Bohmian mechanics, which has been discussed above, and the collapse
theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (also called ‘GRW theory’) [19],
which introduces non-linear terms in the Schrödinger equation. The second strat-
egy is to accept the orthodox formalism of quantum mechanics and advance towards
the creation and elucidation of the metaphysical principles which would allow us to
answer the question: ‘what is quantum mechanics talking about’? Examples of this
second strategy are quantum logic and its different lines of development such as the
just described Geneva School of Jauch and Piron, and the modal interpretation (see
for example [7, 9, 34]). From this perspective, the importance is to focus in the for-
malism of the theory and try to learn about the symmetries, the logical features and
structural relations. The idea is that, by learning about such aspects of the theory we
can also develop the metaphysical conditions which should be taken into account in
a coherent ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But even independently of the choice of this strategy, it seems quite clear that
technical developments which are taking place today regarding quantum mechanics
have advanced quite independently of the commitments to any classical metaphysical
background. Quantum computation makes use of the multiple flow of information in
the superposition even considering (in principle) contradictory paths. Also quantum
cryptography uses the relation between contradictory terms in order to send messages
avoiding classical spies. At a formal level, the path integral approach takes into ac-
count the multiple contradictory paths within two points [15]. Thus, since both the
formalism and experiments seem to consider ‘contradictory elements’ within quan-
tum mechanics, we argue that it can be of deep interest to advance towards a formal-
ism which takes contradiction into account “right from the start”.4 Evidently, such
a formalism could open paths not only to continue the technical developments just

4 In an analogous fashion as Décio Krause has developed a Q-set theory which accounts for indistinguish-
able particles with a formal calculus “right from the start” [21].
Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858 853

mentioned but also to understand the meaning of quantum superpositions from a new
perspective. Our proposal is twofold, firstly, to call the attention of the importance
of considering contradictory properties within the formalism and interpretation of
quantum superpositions; and secondly, to show that paraconsistent logics can open a
formal line of research. In the next section we make a first step in this same direction,
providing an outline to an approach based on paraconsistent logic.

5 An Outline of a Paraconsistent Approach to Quantum Superpositions

We bring into, now, a paraconsistent logical system ZF 1 , that is a strong set theory,
even stronger than common ZF (Zermelo Frenkel set theory). On ZF 1 and related
matters, see [5]. In what follows, we employ the terminology, notations and conven-
tions of Kleene [20].
The basic symbols of the language ZF 1 are the following: (1) Propositional con-
nectives: implication (→), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨) and (weak) negation (¬),
equivalence (↔) is defined as usual. (2) Individual variables: a denumerable set of
variables, that are represented by small Latin letters of the end of the alphabet. (3) The
quantifiers ∀ (for all) and ∃ (there exists). (4) The binary predicate symbols ∈ (mem-
bership) and = (identity). (5) Auxiliary symbols: parenthesis.
Syntactic notions, for example those of formula, closed formula or sentence, and
free occurrence of a variable in a formula, are defined as customary. Russell’s symbol
for description (ι) is introduced by contextual definition and with the help of the
description, the classifier {x; F (x)}, where F (x) is a formula and x a variable.

Definition 5.1 A◦ abbreviates ¬(A ∧ ¬A).

Loosely speaking, A◦ means that A is a well-behaved formula, i.e., that it is not the
case that one has A and ¬A both true (or, what is the same thing, that the contradiction
A ∧ ¬A is false).

Definition 5.2 ¬∗ A abbreviates ¬A ∧ A◦ .

¬∗ functions like a strong negation, a kind of classical negation in our logic. On

the other hand, ¬ is the weak (or paraconsistent) negation.

Postulates of ZF 1
(a) Propositional postulates:
1. A → (B → A)
2. (A → B) → (A → (B → C)) → (A → C)
3. A BA→B
4. (A ∧ B) → A
5. (A ∧ B) → B
6. A → (B → (A ∧ B))
7. A → (A ∨ B)
8. B → (A ∨ B)
854 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

9. (A → C) → ((B → C) → ((A ∨ B) → C))

10. A ∨ ¬A
11. ¬¬A → A
12. B ◦ → ((A → B) → ((A → ¬B) → ¬A))
13. (A◦ ∧ B ◦ ) → (A → B)◦
14. (A◦ ∧ B ◦ ) → (A ∧ B)◦
15. (A◦ ∧ B ◦ ) → (A ∨ B)◦
(b) Quantificational postulates:
C→A(x)
1. C→∀xA(x)
2. ∀xA(x) → A(t)
3. A(t) → ∃xA(x)
A(x)→C
4. ∃xA(x)→C
5. ∀x(A(x))◦ → (∀xA(x))◦
6. ∀x(A(x))◦ → (∃xA(x))◦
The preceding postulates are subject to the usual restrictions. In classical
logic, as well as in most usual logics, we are allowed to reletter bind vari-
ables and suppress vacuous variables, but it seems that this is not probable in
connection with our system. Therefore, we introduce the postulate:
7. If B is a formula obtained from A by relettering bound variables or by the
suppression of void quantifiers, then A ↔ B is an axiom.

Remark Postulates 1–15 constitute a propositional system of paraconsistent logic and

adding the quantificational postulates we obtain a first-order quantificational paracon-
sistent logic.

(c) Set-Theoretic postulates:

They are all those of classical ZF in whose formulations the symbol of negation
is replaced by the symbol of strong negation ¬∗. The postulates can be formulated
supposing that ZF 1 is a pure set theory or a theory that contains Urelemente (ob-
jects that are not sets). Our results don’t depend on the version employed of ZF 1 .
Moreover the existence of some sets that cause problems (do not exist) in ZF, like
Russell’s collection, could be postulated as existing in ZF 1 ; however, this possi-
bility is here excluded. (ZF is studied, for instance, in [23]).
From now on, capital letters stand for formulas. We have (see [5]):

Definition 5.3  A stands for A is a theorem of ZF 1 ;  A is the negation of  A.

Definition 5.4 A∗ is the formula obtained from A by replacing any occurrence of ¬

by an occurrence of ¬∗ .

Theorem 5.5 In ZF 1 :  A ∨ ¬A,  ¬¬A → A,  (A ∧ ¬∗ A) → B,  (A ∧

¬A) → B,  A → ¬¬A,  ¬(A ∧ ¬A).

Theorem 5.6 If A is provable in ZF, then A∗ is probable in ZF 1 (ZF is included in

ZF 1 ).
Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858 855

Theorem 5.7 ZF is inconsistent if and only if ZF 1 is non trivial.

ZF is, in a certain sense, contained in ZF 1 . So, in ZF 1 it is possible to system-

atize extant classical mathematics; in consequence, ZF 1 encompasses all mathemati-
cal analysis required for the treatment of standard quantum mechanics, and this treat-
ment is similar to the one with classical logic (and set theory) as the basic logic.
In the study of a quantum system S in NF 1 , we note that its states behave as in
classical quantum mechanics, in the sense that
 
ZF 1  ∃s s ∈ Ŝ ∧ ¬∗ (s ∈ Ŝ) (2)

and some other similar formulas are (apparently) not probable, where Ŝ is the set of
the states of S included in a given superposition.
When S is in the state of superposition of, say, the states s1 and s2 (classically
inconsistent), we introduce in ZF 1 the extra predicate K and expand the system with
the postulates
K(S, s1 ) and ¬K(S, s1 ) (3)
as well as:
K(S, s2 ) and ¬K(S, s2 ) (4)
Informally, for instance K(S1 , s1 ) means that “S has the superposition predicate
associated to s1 ” (or the “paraconsistent predicate associated to s1 ”). In other words,
superposition creates a contradictory situation, giving rise to contradictory relations.
In ZF 1 , we can not directly assume that the linear combination of two classically
incompatible states is an ‘inconsistent’ state; this is so because the mathematics of
usual quantum mechanics is classical, and such kind of inconsistency would make
our system trivial.
To cope with this situation, we appeal to a new postulate:

Postulate of Inconsistency Let S be a quantum system which is in the superposition

of the (classically incompatible) states s1 and s2 . Under the hypothesis, we have:
K(S, s1 ) ∧ ¬K(S, s1 ) ∧ K(S, s2 ) ∧ ¬K(S, s2 ) (5)
This means that superposition implies contradiction. Similarly when superposition
involves more than two states.
Therefore, ZF 1 constitutes the underlaying logic of an inconsistent, but apparently
non trivial, quantum mechanics that we denote by QM 1 ; usual quantum mechanics
will be denoted by QM. Thus, QM is in a certain sense, contained in QM 1 . But the
details of the construction of a paraconsistent quantum mechanics will be left to a
future series of technical works.

6 Discussion: Considering Contradiction “Right from the Start”

Our proposal focuses on the idea that it would be worthwhile to develop a new in-
terpretation of quantum superpositions which considers contradiction “right from the
856 Found Phys (2013) 43:845–858

start”. We have provided an outline of a paraconsistent approach to quantum super-

positions which shows the possibility to consider contradictions also from a formal
perspective. However, it should be clear that we do not take paraconsistent logic to
be the “true logic” which should replace classical logic; in the same way as we do
not regard quantum mechanics as a theory that should replace classical mechanics [4,
7]. From our perspective we argue that physicists should recognize the possibility to
use new forms of logic—such as paraconsistent logic—which might help us under-
standing features of different domains of reality; features which might not be neces-
sarily accommodated by means of classical logic. We do not believe there is a “true
logic”, but rather that distinct logical systems can be of use to develop and under-
stand complementary aspects of reality. Recalling the words of Albert Einstein: “It
is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed”5 it could be argued that
only within a theory it is possible to consider and account for phenomena. From this
standpoint the development of the formalism can be regarded not only as a merely
technical improvement, but also as a way to open new paths of understanding and
even of development of new phenomena. Formal development is not understood here
as going beyond the theory, as improving and showing something that “was not there
before” in the formalism—as it is the case of the GRW theory or Bohmian mechan-
ics. Rather, this development is understood as taking seriously the features which the
theory seems to show us, exposing them in all their strength, “right from the start”.
We also have to stress that non relativistic quantum mechanics, based on classical
logic and on the common specific postulates, seems to be consistent in the strict
logical meaning. So, a paraconsistent version of it has to postulate, in some way or
other, the inconsistent character of determinable situations. It appears to be that there
is no possibility that someone can “deduce”, employing any one of a majority of
extant logics, contradictory consequences of the specific axioms of non relativistic
quantum mechanics.
Evidently, we have to develop and to explore the ideas here sketched. One of the
important points to take into consideration is that there are numerous ways to obtain
such kind of inconsistent quantum mechanics. In addition, we should verify if there
are really important new results of QM 1 which are not valid in QM. The philosophical
meaning of QM 1 also deserves detailed analysis.

Acknowledgements The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee for his/her careful reading of
our manuscript and useful comments. This work was partially supported by the following grants: Uba-
cyt 2011/2014 635, FWO project G.0405.08 and FWO-research community W0.030.06. CONICET RES.
4541-12 (2013–2014).

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