EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24170. December 16, 1968.]

ILLUH ASAALI , HATIB ABDURASID , INGKOH BANTALA , BASOK

INGKIN , and MOHAMMAD BANTALA , petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS , respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. COURTS; COURT OF TAX APPEALS; APPEAL FROM DECISIONS THEREOF

TO SUPREME COURT; FINDINGS OF FACT BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, BINDING —
There is no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety the conclusion reached by the
Court of Tax Appeals. Nor even if the persuasive element therein were not so
overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is now beyond
question that its nding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us, only questions
of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former category,
we lack the power to review.
2. TAXATION; SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF VESSELS AND CARGO FOR
SMUGGLING; JURISDICTION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IN RELATION
THERETO — From the apprehension and seizure of the vessel in question on the high
seas beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of
Commissioner of Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is
without merit. It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The
Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only
within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship . . . . The
principle of law that sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a rm
foundation for the seizure of the ve sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated
the applicable provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPIRATION OF R.A. 650 DID NOT DIVEST THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS OF JURISDICTION — Despite the expiration of Republic
Act 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained his jurisdiction over the case and could
continue to take cognizance thereof until its nal determination, for the main question
brought in by the appeal from the decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality
or illegality of the decision of the Collector of Customs and that question could not
have been abated by the mere expiration of R.A. No. 650. We rmly believe that the
expiration of R.A. 650 could not have produced the effect: (1) of declaring legal the
importation of the cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of
declaring the seizure and forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null
and void; in other words, it could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the
decision of the Collector of Customs which was rendered while the law was in force
and which should stand until it is revoked by the appellate tribunal.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEIZURE IN INSTANT CASE
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS — There could be no denial of due
process. There was nothing arbitrary about the manner in which such seizure and
forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of petitioners-appellants was respected.
They could not have been unaware of what they were doing. It would be an affront to
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 reason if under the circumstances they could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a
due process question. Such a conditional guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly
should not be allowed to lend itself as an instrument for escaping a liability arising from
one's own nefarious acts.

DECISION

FERNANDO , J : p

The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not

to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would
be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent Commissioner of
Customs in this case, as a rmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and
this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling
principles of law do not call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the
legitimate authority vested in the government were not to be reduced to futility and
impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed
epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of ve sailing vessels and
the cargo loaded therein declared forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs
for smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by customs o cials on
high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the
seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to
common sense and placing the law in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of
the case and the ndings of facts as set forth in the decision now under review, of the
Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the late
Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting
Commissioner of Customs in Customs Case No. 113, dated September 26,1961, (Jolo
Seizure Identi cation Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, & 42) decreeing the forfeiture of ve
(5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing 111,' 'Sulu
Area Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes
and rattan chairs, for violation of Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code
and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with Section 1363(f) of The Revised
Administrative Code." 1
The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It
appears that on September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on
board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the ve (5) sailing vessels in question on the high
seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-
tawi, Sulu. After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs o cers boarded and found
on board, 181 cases of Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some
pieces of rattan chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and
manned by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They
came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the
Commissioner of Customs to engage in the importation of merchandise into any Port
of the Sulu sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code.
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 Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No.
426, otherwise known as the Import Control Law. 2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, a rmed the
decision rendered by the Collector of Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture
under the law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He was, as also already
made known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The rst two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs to institute seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the
forfeiture of the vessels in question and their cargo. They would justify their stand thus:
" In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein were
apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the
Philippines, the said vessels could not have touched any place or port in the Philippines,
whether a port or place of entry or not, consequently, the said vessels could not have
been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into any Philippine port or
place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture
under Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code." 3
Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals.
It met the repudiation that it deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the
petitioners but considering the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the
vessels in question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code
should be apprehended to the case at bar. It has been established that the ve vessels
came from Sandakan, British North Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of
them were heading towards Tawi- tawi, a domestic port within the Sulu sea. Laden with
foreign manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by
the Republic Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of
Customs to engage in importation into any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced
loudly their intention not merely to skirt along the territorial boundary of the Philippines
but to come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their
prows were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary
but for the intervention of a customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than
eager to accomplish its mission." 4 The sense of realism and the vigorous language
employed by the late Judge Luciano in rejecting such a plea deserve to be quoted.
Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the thought that these vessels were probably not
bound for a Philippine port would be too much a concession even for a simpleton or a
perennial optimist. It is quite irrational for Filipino sailors manning ve Philippines
vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to British North Borneo, and come a long
way back laden with highly taxable goods only to turn about upon reaching the brink of
our territorial waters and head for another foreign port." 5
1. We nd no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion
reached by the Court of Tax Appeals. Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above
view were not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts as found by it. For it is
now beyond question that its nding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us,
only questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the
former category, we lack the power of review. 6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute
our own discretion for that of the Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the
relevant facts and its appraisal of their signi cance. As we had occasion to state in a
relatively recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to
set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which
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 is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and
consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the
subject .,. there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority." 7
2. We thus could rest our decision a rming that of the Court of Tax Appeals
on the above consideration. It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of
attention to the legal points raised in the above two assignment of errors, discussed
jointly by petitioners- appellants, alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation of
property without due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the
repeal of Republic Act No. 426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon su ces to
call for reversal of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of Customs, even
if the facts presented a situation less conclusive against the pretension of petitioners-
appellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas
beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of
Commissioner of Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-appellants is
without merit.
It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised
Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction
against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship . . . 8 The principle of law
that sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a rm foundation for the
seizure of the ve sailing vessels found thereafter to have violated the applicable
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. 9
Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Church v. Hubbart, 1 0 an 1804 decision, that a state has
the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but
extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of a
nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within
the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile
act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly
be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the
seizure of the vessels in question and the cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the
territorial waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from
such forfeiture and seizure. The argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action
taken by the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the fact that the alleged
offense imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not
Section 1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear. "Property subject to forfeiture under
customs laws." The rst subsection thereof, (a), covers any vessel including cargo
unlawfully engaged in the importation of merchandise except a port of entry.
Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the
importation of which is effected or attempted contrary to law and all other
merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector of Customs have been used are or
were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or exportation of the former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most
clearly that the due process question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on
which the seizure was based were not unknown to petitioners-appellants. On those
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 facts the liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the statute
would appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs
was in accordance with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about
the manner in which such seizure and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of
petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have been unaware of what they
were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they
could be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a
constitutional guaranty, basic and fundamental, certainly should not be allowed to lend
itself as an instrument for escaping a liability arising from ones own nefarious acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken
by the respondent Commissioner of Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic
Act No. 426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred thereunder. This
argument raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any
persuasive force. The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v.
Commissioner of Customs 1 1 to the effect that the expiration of the Import Control
Law "did not produce the effect of declaring legal the importation of goods which were
illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of
Customs illegal or null and void."
Roxas v. Sayoc 1 2 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are
concerned with the effect of the expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law,
and we hold the view that once the Commissioner of Customs has acquired jurisdiction
over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his
jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we
believe that despite the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of
Customs retained his jurisdiction over the case and could continue to take cognizance
thereof until its nal determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal from
the decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of
the Collector of Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere
expiration of Republic Act No. 650. We rmly believe that the expiration of Republic Act
No. 650 could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the importation of the
cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and
forfeiture ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words, it
could not have the effect of annulling or setting aside the decision of the Collector of
Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which should stand until it
is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs, 1 3 we had
occasion to rea rm the doctrine in the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice,
speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period of effectivity of
Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of
Customs of the jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture
pending before him, which are in the nature of proceedings in rem.. . ."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused
to adhere faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach and a re ection on the
law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the
vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal
competence of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of petitioners-
appellants. Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved
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 re ection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must
not be hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced
reliance on a constitutional guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19,
1964, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro
and Capistrano, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. I-II.
2.Ibid, p. II.
3Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. 9-10.

4.Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, Brief for Petitioner-Appellants, pp. VIII-IX.
5.Ibid, p. IX.
6.Cf . Sanchez v. Commissioner of Customs 102 Phil. 37 (1957); Castro v. Collector of Internal
Revenue, L-12174. April 26, 1962; Yupangco & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-
22259, Jan. 19, 1966; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Priscilla Estate, L-18282, May
29, 1964; Phil. Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-22074, Sept. 6, 1965;
Republic v. Razon, L-17462, May 24, 1967; Balbas v. Domingo, L-19804, Oct. 23, 1967.
7.Alhambra Cigar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue L-23226, Nov. 28, 1967.
8.Article 2, Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815)

9.Section 1363 (a) and (f).

10.2 Cranch 187, 234.
11.106 Phil. 777, 783 (1959)
12.100 Phil. 448, 452-453 (1956)
13.L-20460, September 30.

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