The Subprime Mortgage Crisis

The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing event likely to affect buyers who purchased
homes in the early 2000s for a long time. These effects will translate to changes in the
housing market, consumer spending, changes in lending practices, and perhaps,
revamping of the home loan system. What is meant by the subprime mortgage crisis is
that many home loans taken out during a housing bubble occurring on the two US Coasts,
from 2000-2005, were given at a subprime rate, and have now led to extensive
foreclosures on home loans, and people having to leave their homes because they can’t
afford the payments.
The housing bubble, meant that for a time, houses sharply increased in value and
consumers often borrowed at a subprime (less than the lowest) rate believing that the
price of their homes would rise and they could thus refinance for lower payments. Many
people didn’t just refinance for lower payments but also for consumer spending. Inflation
of house prices meant people in possession of a home suddenly had more equity in their
home. They could access some of that equity by refinancing, and spend the money as
they chose.
Unfortunately, the bubble began to burst in late 2005 and houses began to decline in
price. People who refinanced, especially those who did so with variable interest rates,
suddenly had homes valued at much less. Many with variable rates and interest only
loans ended up unable to continue making payments on their home, flooding the market
with more homes for sale than usual and further lowering home values.
Another issue at hand was that a variety of mortgage companies that had issued subprime
loans, invested their money in hedge funds that became worthless. This meant that
several of the largest lenders of subprime loans contributed to the subprime mortgage
crisis by having to claim bankruptcy and foreclose on loans. People who now had homes
at lower values, had loans larger than the value of their homes, and were frequently
unable to refinance with other lenders. Stricter lending practices by remaining mortgage
companies has also been a factor in the subprime mortgage crisis, since some of the
homeowners were ineligible for any type of loans based on new criteria.
A country’s economy is usually affected by a wide variety of factors. Reductions in

spending, losses in the stock market, bad investments, and many other things can affect
home price. The instability of the stock market, hedge funds that failed, and reduced
consumer spending have all caused an increasing devaluation of homes and been partly to
blame for the subprime mortgage crisis. It is unclear exactly when this issue will be
resolved since so many factors have contributed. For now, it is clear that many have lost
their homes and their ability to purchase new homes, and this has affected the rental
market. Rental prices have gone up because demand for rental residences has increased in
this crisis’ wake.
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-caused-the-subprime-mortgage-crisis.htm
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Explained
The so called subprime mortgage crisis - the crisis that brought the global financial
system down - how did it happen? How did we let it happen - me, you, the Wall Street
people and the people who are now on the verge of losing their homes?
Let's get back to the time when the crisis was still just a big "ordinary" speculative
housing bubble. Back then, and for the most of the history of banking, banks would
refuse to lend money to people with poor credit history or no income. The qualification
guidelines to get a mortgage were pretty tight.
The Excess Capital

At that same time, back in the early 2000's, there was an excess capital globally. The
world did not even imagine there would be a global financial crisis and all investment
managers were concerned about was where to invest their capital in order to make it
grow. Generally, the demand was for low risk investments that paid some nice return.
However, such investment options were not easy to find. This pushed a great amount of
money straight into the US mortgage market thanks to the unique and wonderful (on
principle) vehicle - securitization.
Here is the big picture and how it works:
An individual gets a mortgage loan from a broker. Then the broker sells the mortgage to a
bank, which in its turn again sells the mortgage but this time to an investment firm on
Wall Street. Such firms collect thousands of mortgages in one big pile. This in fact
represents thousands of mortgage checks coming every month, a monthly income that
was supposed to continue for the life of the mortgages. And of course, the firm in its turn
sells shares of that income to investors who are willing to buy.
Mortgage backed securities seemed like the perfect solution to the great demand of
assets. After all, in the beginning they were wonderful, safe investments - built out of
mortgages with big down payments, proven steady income and money in the bank.
And investors loved them - and not only US investors but investors from all over the
world.
The Heavy Demand for More Mortgage Backed

Securities
The demand for those great, safe mortgage backed securities was really high. In fact, so
high, that there was a point somewhere in 2003 when everyone who qualified for a
mortgage got one, and still the global pool of money wanted more.
Thus, things needed to change. And they did. The mortgage qualification guidelines did.
At first, the stated income, verified assets (SIVA) loans came out. People didn't have to
prove their income any more. They just needed to "state" it and show that they had
money in the bank.
Then, the no income, verified assets (NIVA) loans came out. The lender was no longer
interested in what you do for a living. People just needed to show some money in their
bank accounts.
This wasn't enough to satisfy the huge appetite of global investors. The qualification
guidelines kept going looser in order to produce more mortgages, more securities.
This leads us to NINA. Have you heard of NINA?
NINA is an abbreviation of No Income No Assets. Basically, NINA loans are official loan
products and let you borrow money without having to prove or even state anything. All
you needed to have in order to get a mortgage was a credit score.
Why would a bank loosen its criteria for lending money so much? Well, banks didn't keep
these mortgages. They didn't care whether they are risky and the borrower will ever pay
them back simply because they sold the mortgages to Wall Street. The Wall Street then
sold them to global investors ... as low risk investments.
The Risk
Why would any investor consider mortgage backed securities low risk investments?
Well, investors use a special system to assess risk. Credit rating agencies, such as
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch, give ratings to every type of bond according to its
risk. Letter grades mark the safety of the investments - triple A is given to the safest ones,
for example US government bonds.
And in this case, the credit rating agencies blessed most of the mortgage backed
securities with AAA rating.
The problem with this high rating is that agencies used the wrong data to estimate the
risk. Looking back historically, what they saw was a very low rate of defaulting, a very
low foreclosure rate. However, the current situation was different - with new qualification
requirements, new mortgages given to people who would never have gotten them before,
and of course, a big speculative housing bubble that was eventually going to pop.
The Housing Bubble
Up to 2006, the housing market in the US was flourishing.
It was easy to get a home loan, so more people wanted to buy a house. The increased
housing demand increased in return the prices. The increased prices attracted investors
who were looking to buy houses as an investment, only to sell it later for more. This
further created more demand and further increased the prices - a classic speculative
housing bubble.
And because of the rising prices, the consequences from all the "bad" loans given to
people who could not afford them were delayed. Whenever people experienced
difficulties making their mortgage payments, they could easily take another loan against
the value of their house, simply because now it was worth more.
Basically, they went into more debt in order to pay off their debts. Thus, the housing
bubble made home equity loans and home equity lines of credit extremely popular.
The Breaking Point which Turned the Problem into a

Crisis
However, in contrast to the rising house prices, the average household income didn't
increase. Thus, despite all the incentives and exotic mortgage products, people just
couldn't afford those high prices and it was only a matter of time for the problem to come
out.
And it did. The big housing bubble burst, the property values stopped increasing and the
whole thing came to a point when the mortgage lending industry started witnessing
something new - many people defaulted on their very first mortgage payment.
What happened was a chain of reactions very similar to those in the housing bubble but
only in the opposite direction. The number of people who defaulted on their mortgages
increased more and more which in return increased the number of houses on the market.
The oversupply of houses and lack of buyers pushed the house prices down till they
really plunged in late 2006 and early 2007.
That was the point when people on Wall Street started to panic. They no longer wanted to
buy risky mortgages. Mortgage companies, which used to sell risky loans, experienced
the devastating consequences of going out of business.
Unfortunately it was already too late for everybody.
The market has already absorbed enormous amounts of these securities. All kinds of
investors from all over the world - individuals and big financial institutions - basically
have bought these AAA rated mortgage securities thinking that it was almost as safe as
putting money in a savings account. Now that the complexity and the real risk of these
securities came out, most of them are already worth less than half their initial value and
all those investors lost a great deal of money.
Moreover, foreclosures keep springing up. In the past mortgages were held in the books
of financial institutions such as banks, who had real interest in working with their
borrowers and making sure that everything possible is done to pay back the loans.
However, in the current situation, mortgages have been sold and resold and pooled
together into securities and sold to investors in the financial market. It is really really hard
to even find who the actual current owner of mortgage is. And it is just as hard to prevent
foreclosures.
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The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing real estate crisis and financial crisis
triggered by a dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the United
States, with major adverse consequences for banks and financial markets around the
globe.
Approximately 80% of U.S. mortgages issued in recent years to subprime borrowers were
adjustable-rate mortgages.[1] After U.S. house prices peaked in mid-2006 and began their
steep decline thereafter, refinancing became more difficult. As adjustable-rate mortgages
began to reset at higher rates, mortgage delinquencies soared. Securities backed with
subprime mortgages, widely held by financial firms, lost most of their value. The result
has been a large decline in the capital of many banks and U.S. government sponsored
enterprises, tightening credit around the world.
The immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing
bubble which peaked in approximately 2005–2006.[2][3] High default rates on "subprime"
and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), began to increase quickly thereafter. An increase
in loan incentives such as easy initial terms and a long-term trend of rising housing prices
had encouraged borrowers to assume difficult mortgages in the belief they would be able
to quickly refinance at more favorable terms. However, once interest rates began to rise
and housing prices started to drop moderately in 2006–2007 in many parts of the U.S.,
refinancing became more difficult. Defaults and foreclosure activity increased
dramatically as easy initial terms expired, home prices failed to go up as anticipated, and
ARM interest rates reset higher. Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the
mortgage loan, providing a financial incentive for borrowers to enter foreclosure. The
ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S. continues to be a key
factor in the global economic crisis, because it drains wealth from consumers and erodes
the financial strength of banking institutions.
In the years leading up to the crisis, significant amounts of foreign money flowed into the
U.S. from fast-growing economies in Asia and oil-producing countries. This inflow of
funds combined with low U.S. interest rates from 2002-2004 contributed to easy credit
conditions, which fueled both housing and credit bubbles. Loans of various types (e.g.,
mortgage, credit card, and auto) were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an
unprecedented debt load.[4][5] As part of the housing and credit booms, the amount of
financial agreements called mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which derive their value
from mortgage payments and housing prices, greatly increased. Such financial innovation
enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market.
As housing prices declined, major global financial institutions that had borrowed and
invested heavily in subprime MBS reported significant losses. Defaults and losses on
other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the housing
market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S.
dollars globally.[6]
While the housing and credit bubbles were growing, a series of factors caused the
financial system to become increasingly fragile. Policymakers did not recognize the
increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and
hedge funds, also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these
institutions had become as important as commercial (depository) banks in providing
credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not subject to the same regulations.[7] These
institutions as well as certain regulated banks had also assumed significant debt burdens
while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient
to absorb large loan defaults or MBS losses.[8] These losses impacted the ability of
financial institutions to lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability
of key financial institutions drove central banks to take action to provide funds to
encourage lending and to restore faith in the commercial paper markets, which are
integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial
institutions, assuming significant additional financial commitments.
The risks to the broader economy created by the housing market downturn and
subsequent financial market crisis were primary factors in several decisions by central
banks around the world to cut interest rates and governments to implement economic
stimulus packages. Effects on global stock markets due to the crisis have been dramatic.
Between 1 January and 11 October 2008, owners of stocks in U.S. corporations had
suffered about $8 trillion in losses, as their holdings declined in value from $20 trillion to
$12 trillion. Losses in other countries have averaged about 40%.[9] Losses in the stock
markets and housing value declines place further downward pressure on consumer
spending, a key economic engine.[10] Leaders of the larger developed and emerging
nations met in November 2008 and March 2009 to formulate strategies for addressing the
crisis.[11] As of April 2009, many of the root causes of the crisis had yet to be addressed. A
variety of solutions have been proposed by government officials, central bankers,
economists, and business executives.[12][13][14]
Mortgage market
Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories and reduced repayment
capacity. Subprime loans have a higher risk of default than loans to prime borrowers.[15] If
a borrower is delinquent in making timely mortgage payments to the loan servicer (a
bank or other financial firm), the lender may take possession of the property, in a process
called foreclosure.
The value of USA subprime mortgages was estimated at $1.3 trillion as of March 2007,
[16]
with over 7.5 million first-lien subprime mortgages outstanding.[17] Between 2004-
2006 the share of subprime mortgages relative to total originations ranged from 18%-
21%, versus less than 10% in 2001-2003 and during 2007.[18][19] In the third quarter of
2007, subprime ARMs making up only 6.8% of USA mortgages outstanding also
accounted for 43% of the foreclosures which began during that quarter.[20] By October
2007, approximately 16% of subprime adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were either 90-
days delinquent or the lender had begun foreclosure proceedings, roughly triple the rate
of 2005.[21] By January 2008, the delinquency rate had risen to 21%[22] and by May 2008 it
was 25%.[23]
The value of all outstanding residential mortgages, owed by USA households to purchase
residences housing at most four families, was US$9.9 trillion as of year-end 2006, and
US$10.6 trillion as of midyear 2008.[24] During 2007, lenders had begun foreclosure
proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006.[25] This increased
to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007,[26] and again to 2.8 million in 2009, a
21% increase vs. 2008.[27]
By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in
foreclosure.[28] By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.[29] Between August 2007 and
October 2008, 936,439 USA residences completed foreclosure.[30] Foreclosures are
concentrated in particular states both in terms of the number and rate of foreclosure
filings.[31] Ten states accounted for 74% of the foreclosure filings during 2008; the top
two (California and Florida) represented 41%. Nine states were above the national
foreclosure rate average of 1.84% of households.[32]
Causes
The crisis can be attributed to a number of factors pervasive in both housing and credit
markets, factors which emerged over a number of years. Causes proposed include the
inability of homeowners to make their mortgage payments, due primarily to adjustable-
rate mortgages resetting, borrowers overextending, predatory lending, speculation and
overbuilding during the boom period, risky mortgage products, high personal and
corporate debt levels, financial products that distributed and perhaps concealed the risk of
mortgage default, bad monetary and housing policies, international trade imbalances, and
inappropriate government regulation.[33][34][35][36] Three important catalysts of the subprime
crisis were the influx of moneys from the private sector, the banks entering into the
mortgage bond market and the predatory lending practices of the mortgage lenders,
specifically the adjustable-rate mortgage, 2-28 loan, that Mortgage Lenders sold directly
or indirectly via Mortgage Brokers.[1][37] On Wall Street and in the financial industry,
moral hazard lay at the core of many of the causes.[38]
In its "Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy," dated
15 November 2008, leaders of the Group of 20 cited the following causes:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged stability
earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time,
weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex
and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create
vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some
advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in
financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take into account the systemic
ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.[39]
During May 2010, Warren Buffett and Paul Volcker separately described questionable
assumptions or judgments underlying the U.S. financial and economic system that
contributed to the crisis. These assumptions included: 1) Housing prices would not fall
dramatically;[40] 2) Free and open financial markets supported by sophisticated financial
engineering would most effectively support market efficiency and stability, directing
funds to the most profitable and productive uses; 3) Concepts embedded in mathematics
and physics could be directly adapted to markets, in the form of various financial models
used to evaluate credit risk; 4) Economic imbalances, such as large trade deficits and low
savings rates indicative of over-consumption, were sustainable; and 5) Stronger
regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives markets was not needed.[41]
Low interest rates and large inflows of foreign funds created easy credit conditions for a
number of years prior to the crisis, fueling a housing market boom and encouraging debt-
financed consumption.[42] The USA home ownership rate increased from 64% in 1994
(about where it had been since 1980) to an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004.[43] Subprime
lending was a major contributor to this increase in home ownership rates and in the
overall demand for housing, which drove prices higher.
Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the typical American house increased by 124%.[44]
During the two decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9
to 3.1 times median household income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004, and 4.6 in 2006.[45]
This housing bubble resulted in quite a few homeowners refinancing their homes at lower
interest rates, or financing consumer spending by taking out second mortgages secured by
the price appreciation. USA household debt as a percentage of annual disposable personal
income was 127% at the end of 2007, versus 77% in 1990.[46]
While housing prices were increasing, consumers were saving less[47] and both borrowing
and spending more. Household debt grew from $705 billion at yearend 1974, 60% of
disposable personal income, to $7.4 trillion at yearend 2000, and finally to $14.5 trillion
in midyear 2008, 134% of disposable personal income.[48] During 2008, the typical USA
household owned 13 credit cards, with 40% of households carrying a balance, up from
6% in 1970.[49] Free cash used by consumers from home equity extraction doubled from
$627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the housing bubble built, a total of
nearly $5 trillion dollars over the period.[50][51][52] U.S. home mortgage debt relative to
GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching
$10.5 trillion.[53]
This credit and house price explosion led to a building boom and eventually to a surplus
of unsold homes, which caused U.S. housing prices to peak and begin declining in mid-
2006.[54] Easy credit, and a belief that house prices would continue to appreciate, had
encouraged many subprime borrowers to obtain adjustable-rate mortgages. These
mortgages enticed borrowers with a below market interest rate for some predetermined
period, followed by market interest rates for the remainder of the mortgage's term.
Borrowers who could not make the higher payments once the initial grace period ended
would try to refinance their mortgages. Refinancing became more difficult, once house
prices began to decline in many parts of the USA. Borrowers who found themselves
unable to escape higher monthly payments by refinancing began to default.
As more borrowers stop paying their mortgage payments (this is an on-going crisis),
foreclosures and the supply of homes for sale increases. This places downward pressure
on housing prices, which further lowers homeowners' equity. The decline in mortgage
payments also reduces the value of mortgage-backed securities, which erodes the net
worth and financial health of banks. This vicious cycle is at the heart of the crisis.[55]
By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their
mid-2006 peak.[56][57] This major and unexpected decline in house prices means that many
borrowers have zero or negative equity in their homes, meaning their homes were worth
less than their mortgages. As of March 2008, an estimated 8.8 million borrowers —
10.8% of all homeowners — had negative equity in their homes, a number that is
believed to have risen to 12 million by November 2008. Borrowers in this situation have
an incentive to default on their mortgages as a mortgage is typically nonrecourse debt
secured against the property.[58] Economist Stan Leibowitz argued in the Wall Street
Journal that although only 12% of homes had negative equity, they comprised 47% of
foreclosures during the second half of 2008. He concluded that the extent of equity in the
home was the key factor in foreclosure, rather than the type of loan, credit worthiness of
the borrower, or ability to pay.[59]
Increasing foreclosure rates increases the inventory of houses offered for sale. The
number of new homes sold in 2007 was 26.4% less than in the preceding year. By
January 2008, the inventory of unsold new homes was 9.8 times the December 2007 sales
volume, the highest value of this ratio since 1981.[60] Furthermore, nearly four million
existing homes were for sale,[61] of which almost 2.9 million were vacant.[62] This
overhang of unsold homes lowered house prices. As prices declined, more homeowners
were at risk of default or foreclosure. House prices are expected to continue declining
until this inventory of unsold homes (an instance of excess supply) declines to normal
levels.[63]
[edit] Homeowner Speculation

Main article: Speculation
Speculative borrowing in residential real estate has been cited as a contributing factor to
the subprime mortgage crisis.[64] During 2006, 22% of homes purchased (1.65 million
units) were for investment purposes, with an additional 14% (1.07 million units)
purchased as vacation homes. During 2005, these figures were 28% and 12%,
respectively. In other words, a record level of nearly 40% of homes purchases were not
intended as primary residences. David Lereah, NAR's chief economist at the time, stated
that the 2006 decline in investment buying was expected: "Speculators left the market in
2006, which caused investment sales to fall much faster than the primary market."[65]
Housing prices nearly doubled between 2000 and 2006, a vastly different trend from the
historical appreciation at roughly the rate of inflation. While homes had not traditionally
been treated as investments subject to speculation, this behavior changed during the
housing boom. Media widely reported condominiums being purchased while under
construction, then being "flipped" (sold) for a profit without the seller ever having lived
in them.[66] Some mortgage companies identified risks inherent in this activity as early as
2005, after identifying investors assuming highly leveraged positions in multiple
properties.[67]
Nicole Gelinas of the Manhattan Institute described the negative consequences of not
adjusting tax and mortgage policies to the shifting treatment of a home from conservative
inflation hedge to speculative investment.[68] Economist Robert Shiller argued that
speculative bubbles are fueled by "contagious optimism, seemingly impervious to facts,
that often takes hold when prices are rising. Bubbles are primarily social phenomena;
until we understand and address the psychology that fuels them, they're going to keep
forming."[69] Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky described how speculative borrowing
contributed to rising debt and an eventual collapse of asset values.[70][71]
New York State prosecutors are examining whether eight banks hoodwinked credit
ratings agencies, to inflate the grades of subprime-linked investments. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Justice Department, the United States attorney’s office and
more are examining how banks created, rated, sold and traded mortgage securities that
turned out to be some of the worst investments ever devised. In 2010, virtually all of the
investigations, criminal as well as civil, are in their early stages.[72]
Warren Buffett testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: "There was the
greatest bubble I've ever seen in my life...The entire American public eventually was
caught up in a belief that housing prices could not fall dramatically."[40]
[edit] High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices
In the years before the crisis, the behavior of lenders changed dramatically. Lenders
offered more and more loans to higher-risk borrowers,[73] including undocumented
immigrants.[74] Subprime mortgages amounted to $35 billion (5% of total originations) in
1994,[75] 9% in 1996,[76] $160 billion (13%) in 1999,[75] and $600 billion (20%) in 2006.[76]
[77][78]
A study by the Federal Reserve found that the average difference between subprime
and prime mortgage interest rates (the "subprime markup") declined significantly
between 2001 and 2007. The combination of declining risk premia and credit standards is
common to boom and bust credit cycles.[79]
In addition to considering higher-risk borrowers, lenders have offered increasingly risky

loan options and borrowing incentives. In 2005, the median down payment for first-time
home buyers was 2%, with 43% of those buyers making no down payment whatsoever.[80]
By comparison, China has down payment requirements that exceed 20%, with higher
amounts for non-primary residences.[81]
The mortgage qualification guidelines began to change. At first, the stated income,
verified assets (SIVA) loans came out. Proof of income was no longer needed. Borrowers
just needed to "state" it and show that they had money in the bank. Then, the no income,
verified assets (NIVA) loans came out. The lender no longer required proof of
employment. Borrowers just needed to show proof of money in their bank accounts. The
qualification guidelines kept getting looser in order to produce more mortgages and more
securities. This led to the creation of NINA. NINA is an abbreviation of No Income No
Assets (sometimes referred to as Ninja loans). Basically, NINA loans are official loan
products and let you borrow money without having to prove or even state any owned
assets. All that was required for a mortgage was a credit score. [6]
Another example is the interest-only adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), which allows the
homeowner to pay just the interest (not principal) during an initial period. Still another is
a "payment option" loan, in which the homeowner can pay a variable amount, but any
interest not paid is added to the principal. An estimated one-third of ARMs originated
between 2004 and 2006 had "teaser" rates below 4%, which then increased significantly
after some initial period, as much as doubling the monthly payment.[82]
The proportion of subprime ARM loans made to people with credit scores high enough to
qualify for conventional mortgages with better terms increased from 41% in 2000 to 61%
by 2006. However, there are many factors other than credit score that affect lending. In
addition, mortgage brokers in some cases received incentives from lenders to offer
subprime ARM's even to those with credit ratings that merited a conforming (i.e., non-
subprime) loan.[83]
Mortgage underwriting standards declined precipitously during the boom period. The use
of automated loan approvals allowed loans to be made without appropriate review and
documentation.[84] In 2007, 40% of all subprime loans resulted from automated
underwriting.[85][86] The chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association claimed that
mortgage brokers, while profiting from the home loan boom, did not do enough to
examine whether borrowers could repay.[87] Mortgage fraud by lenders and borrowers
increased enormously.[88] In 2004, the Federal Bureau of Investigation warned of an
"epidemic" in mortgage fraud, an important credit risk of nonprime mortgage lending,
which, they said, could lead to "a problem that could have as much impact as the S&L
crisis".[89][90][91][92]
So why did lending standards decline? In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR
correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money" (represented by $70 trillion in
worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those offered by U.S.
Treasury bonds early in the decade. Further, this pool of money had roughly doubled in
size from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments
had not grown as fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with
financial innovation such as the mortgage-backed security (MBS) and collateralized debt
obligation (CDO), which were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating agencies. In
effect, Wall Street connected this pool of money to the mortgage market in the U.S., with
enormous fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the
mortgage broker selling the loans, to small banks that funded the brokers, to the giant
investment banks behind them. By approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages
originated at traditional lending standards had been exhausted. However, continued
strong demand for MBS and CDO began to drive down lending standards, as long as
mortgages could still be sold along the supply chain. Eventually, this speculative bubble
proved unsustainable. NPR described it this way:[93]
The problem was that even though housing prices were going through the roof, people
weren't making any more money. From 2000 to 2007, the median household income
stayed flat. And so the more prices rose, the more tenuous the whole thing became. No
matter how lax lending standards got, no matter how many exotic mortgage products
were created to shoehorn people into homes they couldn't possibly afford, no matter what
the mortgage machine tried, the people just couldn't swing it. By late 2006, the average
home cost nearly four times what the average family made. Historically it was between
two and three times. And mortgage lenders noticed something that they'd almost never
seen before. People would close on a house, sign all the mortgage papers, and then
default on their very first payment. No loss of a job, no medical emergency, they were
underwater before they even started. And although no one could really hear it, that was
probably the moment when one of the biggest speculative bubbles in American history
popped.
Securitization practices
The traditional mortgage model involved a bank originating a loan to the

borrower/homeowner and retaining the credit (default) risk. With the advent of
securitization, the traditional model has given way to the "originate to distribute" model,
in which banks essentially sell the mortgages and distribute credit risk to investors
through mortgage-backed securities. Securitization meant that those issuing mortgages
were no longer required to hold them to maturity. By selling the mortgages to investors,
the originating banks replenished their funds, enabling them to issue more loans and
generating transaction fees. This created a moral hazard in which an increased focus on
processing mortgage transactions was incentivized but ensuring their credit quality was
not.[94][95]
Securitization accelerated in the mid-1990s. The total amount of mortgage-backed

securities issued almost tripled between 1996 and 2007, to $7.3 trillion. The securitized
share of subprime mortgages (i.e., those passed to third-party investors via MBS)
increased from 54% in 2001, to 75% in 2006.[79] American homeowners, consumers, and
corporations owed roughly $25 trillion during 2008. American banks retained about $8
trillion of that total directly as traditional mortgage loans. Bondholders and other
traditional lenders provided another $7 trillion. The remaining $10 trillion came from the
securitization markets. The securitization markets started to close down in the spring of
2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit
markets thus became unavailable as a source of funds.[96][97] In February 2009, Ben
Bernanke stated that securitization markets remained effectively shut, with the exception
of conforming mortgages, which could be sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.[98]
A more direct connection between securitization and the subprime crisis relates to a
fundamental fault in the way that underwriters, rating agencies and investors modeled the
correlation of risks among loans in securitization pools. Correlation modeling—
determining how the default risk of one loan in a pool is statistically related to the default
risk for other loans—was based on a "Gaussian copula" technique developed by
statistician David X. Li. This technique, widely adopted as a means of evaluating the risk
associated with securitization transactions, used what turned out to be an overly
simplistic approach to correlation. Unfortunately, the flaws in this technique did not
become apparent to market participants until after many hundreds of billions of dollars of
ABS and CDOs backed by subprime loans had been rated and sold. By the time investors
stopped buying subprime-backed securities—which halted the ability of mortgage
originators to extend subprime loans—the effects of the crisis were already beginning to
emerge.[99]
Nobel laureate Dr. A. Michael Spence wrote: "Financial innovation, intended to

redistribute and reduce risk, appears mainly to have hidden it from view. An important
challenge going forward is to better understand these dynamics as the analytical
underpinning of an early warning system with respect to financial instability." [100]
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The subprime mortgage crisis put the U.S. economy into the worst recession since the Great
Depression. This primer tracks how the subprime crisis unfolded, affecting first the real estate
market and then the economy overall. It gives you definitions of important terms. It also explains
how interest rates and real estate play an integral role in the U.S. economy. Finally, it provides
resources for those who are suffering from the subprime mortgage crisis directly. (Updated
January 2, 2010)
Definition: A subprime mortgage is granted to borrowers whose credit history is not

sufficient to get a conventional mortgage. Often these borrowers have impaired or even
no credit history. Subprime mortgages often offer interest-only loans.That's because an
interest-only loan is easier to afford. The loan doesn't require that any of the principle be
paid for the first several years of the loan. Most borrowers assume they will refinance
before the principal needs to be repaid, and the monthly payment increases. If they can't
refinance, they often are forced to default because they can't make the higher payment.
Subprime mortgages were one of the causes of the 2009 recession. For more on this, see
A Primer on the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. (Updated January 5, 2010)
Krisis Kewangan 2007-20??: Perhatian kepada Subprima
Pendahuluan: Tumbangnya Gergasi Dunia
Lingkupnya General Motor, salah sebuah syarikat automotif terbesar dunia

memperlihatkan kepada kita bahawa krisis kewangan/ekonomi tidak mengenal status
syarikat itu kecil ataupun besar – semua disapunya. Penulis cuba untuk menulis perkara
berkaitan subprima ini sejak September 2007 lagi, namun disebabkan pemahaman
penulis yang masih samar, penulis merasakan adalah lebih baik untuk penulis mengaji
dahulu isu ini sebelum cuba menerokainya dalam bentuk tulisan. Tatkala Julai 2007, tidak
siapa yang menyangka syarikat kewangan seperti Lehman Brother boleh lingkup.
Namun, pada Mei 2009, siapa pula yang boleh terfikir bahawa gergasi automotif seperti
GM pun boleh lingkup!
Isu subprima adalah sekadar sebahagian penyebab kepada krisis kewangan sekarang ini.
Ada penganalisis yang berpendapat bahawa isu ini adalah faktor utama kepada krisis ini,
ada juga yang berpendapat bahawa isu ini adalah sebahagian sahaja faktor yang berkait
dengan krisis kewangan ini. Bagaimanapun, daripada pemahaman penulis, hendak atau
tidak, subprima merupakan penyebab kepada krisis kewangan global yang sedang
berlaku – persoalan sama ada penyebab utama (main cause) atau penyebab sampingan
(additional causes) itu terpulang kepada perspektif masing-masing.
Pada mulanya, Kerajaan Malaysia dengan bangganya mengisytiharkan bahawa Malaysia

tidak akan sama sekali terjejas oleh sebab krisis subprima ini. Akan tetapi, keadaan
sebaliknya berlaku apabila banyak juga kilang di Malaysia yang turut sekali gulung tikar
dek kerana krisis kewangan ini. Sebenarnya, amat mudah untuk kita tentukan sama ada
Malaysia akan terjejas atau tidak. Amerika Syarikat (AS) adalah rakan dagang terbesar
Malaysia – mana mungkin kalau rakan dagang terjejas, satu lagi rakan dagang tak
terjejas? Pendapatan kita yang sememangnya banyak bergantung kepada eksport
menyebabkan walau apa sahaja iklim ekonomi dunia, Malaysia nak tak nak akan turut
terjejas seandainya kesukaran berlaku kepada rakan dagang besar kita!
Apa sebab, apa kes?
Jadi, apa yang berlaku di AS yang menyebabkan kesan dahsyat yang berlaku pada masa
sekarang ini? Ada pelbagai faktor yang menyebabkan kejadian ini berlaku. Sekadar
menyebut beberapa; kebangkitan kuasa ekonomi baru iaitu negara China, peristiwa 11
September, serangan Amerika terhadap Afghanistan dan Iraq, fluktuasi harga minyak dan
komoditi dunia, krisis makanan, peningkatan harga hartanah dan penurunan harga
hartanah. Serangan 11 September menimbulkan pelbagai persoalan kepada pelabur-
pelabur yang ingin melabur di pasaran Wall Street. Ada yang sangsi dan ada yang tidak
keberatan untuk terus melabur. Namun, kesannya nyata adalah pelabur takut melabur.
Dalam pada masa yang sama, peminjam takut juga meminjam.
Hal ini mendorong Simpanan Persekutuan AS untuk merendahkan kadar faedah mereka
serendah 1 peratus. Ada yang berpendapat kadar faedah serendah inilah yang
menyebabkan masalah berlaku. Namun pada asasnya kadar faedah serendah inilah yang
mampu mengekalkan kelangsungan ekonomi AS pada ketika itu yang sememangnya
sedang lemah (akibat rasa takut terhadap peristiwa 9/11). Oleh sebab itu, pengusaha-
pengusaha bank juga dapat meminjam dari Simpanan Persekutuan juga dengan faedah
yang rendah juga.
Dalam keadaan biasa, penjual hartanah akan menjual hartanah kepada pembeli, dengan
menjadikan hartanah yang dibeli oleh pembeli sebagai cagaran kepada pinjaman bank.
Masuk akal bukan? Begitulah yang berlaku di mana-mana termasuk Malaysia. Rumah
yang dibeli oleh pembeli secara teknikalnya adalah milik bank sehingga kita
menyelesaikan hutang pinjaman bank. Kita pada asalnya akan disuruh membayar bayaran
pendahuluan (down payment) sebanyak beberapa peratus sebelum boleh berurusan
membeli rumah. Dan pihak bank juga akan mengenakan pelbagai syarat tertentu bagi
memberikan pinjaman kepada pembelian rumah tersebut; kadang kala dapat penuh,
kadang kala tidak. Dan kita sebagai pemilik rumah juga mendapat faedahnya kerana
secara teorinya harga hartanah akan sentiasa meningkat (real estate 101). Andai kita
menjual hartanah kita, kita pasti akan mendapat keuntungan.
Semua berkehendakkan keuntungan
Dalam konteks krisis subprima AS, cagaran itu tadilah yang dijadikan sebagai "produk"
oleh pihak penjual rumah untuk dijual kepada pihak bank pelaburan. Bank pelaburan,
demi untuk membeli gadaian itu tadi telah membuat pinjaman pula daripada institusi lain
(contohnya Simpanan Persekutuan). Seterusnya, bank akan mengumpulkan segala
cagaran-cagaran tersebut dalam satu "bungkusan" dan akan meminta satu agensi untuk
membahagikan cagaran-cagaran tersebut kepada beberapa kategori/gred yang tertentu.
Ada yang gred baik iaitu selamat pulangan baik; gred sederhana iaitu selamat, pulangan
lebih baik tetapi berisiko dan gred berisiko tinggi dan pulangan pun... diharapkan tinggi
jugalah!
Kemudian, mereka pula akan menjual semula cagaran-cagaran yang telah digred ini
kepada pelabur-pelabur lain; seperti syarikat kewangan yang lain atau pelabur asing lain
dengan harga yang lebih tinggi bagi mengaut keuntungan. Sehingga ke tahap ini,
seandainya pembeli rumah tidak mampu untuk membayar bayaran bulanan, rumah itu
akan ditarik oleh pihak bank dan akan dilelong – bagi mengkayakan lagi pihak bank yang
sudah sememangnya telah kaya. Setakat ini, urusan belian-pinjaman-cagaran ini digelar
sebagai urusan prima. Keuntungan sebegini (yang digelar sebagai jual beli leverage)
menyebabkan pihak bank dan pelabur merasakan bahawa mereka masih boleh mendapat
lebih daripada apa yang telah disediakan.
Dasar prima kepada subprima
Oleh sebab itu, permintaan terhadap cagaran meningkat. Maka, bagi penjual pula, mereka
juga terdesak untuk mendapatkan pembeli rumah yang baru kerana mereka juga akan
mendapat manfaat daripada yuran, komisen etc. Oleh sebab itu, disebalik mencari
pelanggan yang benar-benar layak untuk membeli rumah, meminjam wang dan
sebagainya, mereka memperkenalkan pula syarat zero down payment, tanpa mengira
sebarang sejarah pinjaman, tanpa itu dan ini – menyebabkan orang yang sepatutnya tidak
boleh meminjam kini boleh meminjam untuk membeli rumah (dari satu segi,
menambahkan risiko). Tambahan pula, disebabkan peristiwa 9/11 juga, pihak hartanah
AS sangat-sangat takut akan kejatuhan harga hartanah kerana kemungkinan tidak ada
pembeli; maka hal-hal sebeginilah yang menyebabkan mereka sanggup untuk membuat
urusan yang digelar sebagai subprima – pemberian hutang kepada yang mereka tahu
tidak mampu.
Sebagaimana biasa kitar di atas berlaku semula. Cagaran ===> Bank pelaburan ==>
"bungkusan" cagaran ==> Pengredan ===> Penjualan kepada pihak ketiga dan
sebagainya; demi untuk mengaut keuntungan. Namun, mungkin mereka tidak sedar/tidak
tahu/ buat-buat tak sedar/buat-buat tak tahu bahawa pembeli mereka (yang
sebetulnya tidak layak membeli rumah) tidak akan mampu membayar harga ansuran yang
telah mereka tetapkan. Tambahan pula, kadar faedah yang makin meningkat
menyebabkan pembeli rumah itu tadi tidak mampu untuk membayar harga rumah dan
hartanah mereka akan dirampas. Pihak bank pun tidaklah berasa tertekan sangat pada
mulanya. Namun, bayangkan seandainya berlaku beribu-ribu kes yang sama melanda satu
institusi kewangan yang sama. Sudah pasti mereka tidak akan mendapat wang tunai
untuk dijadikan modal pusingan kepada kegiatan perbankan mereka. Akhirnya, pihak
bank tidak mendapat sebarang wang tunai sebaliknya hanya mempunyai hartanah yang
kononnya mempunyai nilai masa hadapan (future value) yang tinggi.
Kesan kitaran
Pun begitu, dalam masa yang sama, siapakah pula yang boleh membeli rumah dalam
harga yang terlalu tinggi? Masalah timbul apabila orang kebanyakan tidak lagi
dapat/hendak membeli hartanah yang mereka tawarkan dan akhirnya daripada harga
hartanah yang tinggi akan menjadi rendah. Pihak bank pelaburan sekali lagi dalam hal ini
tidak mendapat sebarang faedah kerana mereka ketiadaan wang tunai bagi digunakan
untuk kitaran perniagaan mereka. Kejatuhan harga juga akan menyebabkan nilai
"bungkusan" cagaran mereka menjadi rendah dan tidak akan dapat menarik pelabur lain
untuk membeli "bungkusan" tersebut! Bayangkan dengan ketiadaan wang masuk
daripada pembeli rumah, kejatuhan harga rumah yang mereka "rampas semula,"
kejatuhan nilai "bungkusan" cagaran dan keengganan pembeli baru membeli rumah (atau
sebenarnya tak siapa yang hendak membeli rumah) – segala-galanya berkait dengan isu
subprima sahaja. Hal ini menyebabkan bank akan kehilangan modal kitaran, seterusnya
menyebabkan mereka lumpuh – menyebabkan juga rakan niaga bank tadi pun turut serta
lumpuh dek terkena kesan daripada keadaan semasa.
Oleh kerana itulah kes yang berlaku di AS memberi kesan kepada Britain dan Jepun;
disebabkan mereka merupakan rakan niaga terbesar AS. Dan pastilah Malaysia yang
selama inipun bergantung kepada pengeksportan produk ke AS turut akan terkena kesan.
Kesemua inilah yang digelar oleh sebahagian penganalisis sebagai kesan kitaran (cyclic
effect) atau kesan domino (domino effect). Dicampur dengan kesan-kesan lain seperti
perang Iraq, krisis buatan AS sendiri, kemunculan kuasa ekonomi baru seperti China dan
India, itu dan ini menyebabkan masalah yang dahulunya adalah masalah AS semata-mata
kini merebak menjadi masalah dunia. Mungkin betul, isu subprima bukanlah satu-satunya
penyebab (the cause) kepada masalah kewangan sekarang namun tidak dapat dinafikan
bahawa isu ini telah menjadi satu penyebab (a cause) keadaan sekarang.
Penutup: Hala tuju dan cabaran
Pelbagai pandangan timbul tentang mengapakah krisis subprima ini berlaku. Ada yang
berpendapat disebabkan 9/11, ada yang menyalahkan sistem pasaran terbuka/kapitalisme,
ada yang menyalahkan penurunan kadar faedah Simpanan Persekutuan, tidak kurang ada
yang menyalahkan ketamakan pihak-pihak berkepentingan (stakeholder) dalam kitaran
tersebut. Namun, untuk memilih satu sahaja pesalah hal ini memang sukar. Dan
selalunya, bagi umat Islam dan mereka yang beretika, pastilah sistem kapitalisme yang
menjadi penyebab utama kepada masalah sekarang ini.
Pada pendapat penulis, memang benar bahawa sistem kapitalisme memberi kesan buruk;
bukan sahaja tatkala kewujudan masalah kewangan global sebegini, tetapi kalaupun tidak
ada masalah global pun, kapitalisme tetap mempunyai kesan buruk yang sangat-sangat
dahsyat. Yang kaya semakin kaya, yang miskin semakin tertindas.
Namun, cabaran yang lebih besar daripada menyalahkan kapitasime semata-mata adalah
untuk mewujudkan satu paradigma/weltenschauung/program/rangka kerja baru bagi
menggantikan kapitalisme itu sendiri. Sejauh manakah bank-bank Islam kita berfungsi
sebagai bank Islam? Bagaimanakah sistem kewangan Islam kita hendak dijadikan
daripada sekadar subset kepada sistem kewangan kepada satu sistem kewangan yang
menyeluruh? Sampai bilakah akan wujud dikotomi yang dikatakan sebagai "syariah
compliance" dengan yang "non-syariah compliance?" Apabila kita hendak membuat
perubahan, tidak dapat tidak perubahan menyeluruh perlu kita laksanakan. Walaupun
metodologinya sama ada beransur-ansur atau peringkat mikro kepada makro, namun
perubahan keseluruhan tetap perlu dibuat. Sama ada evolusi atau revolusi, rangka kerja
tersebut perlu kita sediakan untuk dipraktikkan pada masa akan datang. Dan penulis
yakin dan berharap agar kita benar-benar menuju ke arah itu.
Dalam pada masa yang sama, kita juga mendapati kebergantungan kepada rakan niaga
asing semata-mata tidak dapat tidak pasti mengheret kita bersama di dalam kancah
masalah mereka. Memang tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa kita mesti bergantung juga
kepada orang lain untuk hidup, namun kita juga perlu memikirkan alternatif untuk berdiri
dengan sendiri apabila keadaan kesukaran mendatang. Salah satu daripada pendapat
penganalisis yang penulis sempat kutip adalah kita hendaklah memperkasakan kuasa beli
rakyat pada keseluruhannya. Memang menyimpan merupakan amalan yang baik, namun
kalau terlalu kedekut pun tidak memberi faedah yang banyak kepada negara.
Oleh sebab itu, tidak dapat tidak, taraf kehidupan rakyat Malaysia itu sendiri perlu
ditingkatkan. Pengangguran perlu dibanteras sama sekali. Jurang pendapatan harus
dikecilkan agar semua orang mampu. Kempen Belilah Barang Buatan Malaysia adalah
langkah satu langkah permulaan yang baik. Kita perlu mengurangkan kebergantungan
kepada sumber import; maka kita sendiri perlu mewujudkan sumber domestik. Ambil
contoh daging – daging import lebih murah dari daging tempatan. Jadi, keperluan daging
boleh kita penuhi dengan membanyakkan ternakan lembu, kambing untuk kegunaan
domestik. Sudahlah karipap yang sebiji itupun sebenarnya bukan "buatan Malaysia" tulen
– tepung gandum dari luar, kentang dari India/Indonesia, kari dari India, bawang dari
India; inti daging pun dari India!
Oleh sebab itu, peningkatan kualiti hidup rakyat perlu diutamakan. Diharapkan cerdik
pandai ekonomi dan kewangan kita akan dapat mewujudkan satu mekanisme yang
terbaik bagi tujuan ini. Dan diharapkan agar kita akan benar-benar dapat bermandiri
dengan segala cabaran ekonomi yang akan datang. Bersediakah kita pada ketika itu?
Nota hujung
Penulis mendapat banyak maklumat tentang isu subprima di dalam internet dan antara yang paling
berguna dan paling mudah difahami adalah daripada satu video oleh Jonathan Jarvis yang disiarkan
dalam laman web http://cashmoneylife.com/2008/09/29/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ yang pada
penulis sangat-sangat memudahkan pemahaman kita. Artikel di atas banyak mengambil idea daripada
video tersebut. Selain itu, satu satira yang boleh dijumpai dalam You tube yang dilakonkan oleh John Bird
& John Fortune yang mana kedua-duanya berbincang tentang apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan kesan
subprima. Sebagaimana biasa, sumber Bahasa Melayu tentang isu sebegini adalah sangat-sangat terhad
dan antara tujuan penulisan artikel ini adalah bagi menambahkan sumber tersebut.
AS punca kegawatan ekonomi dunia – Stiglitz
KUALA LUMPUR 31 Ogos – Kegagalan Amerika Syarikat (AS) menguruskan ekonomi

dan polisi antarabangsanya merupakan punca utama jika berlaku kegawatan ekonomi
global yang kini diancam oleh masalah gadai janji subprima.
Pakar ekonomi terkemuka dunia, Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz berkata, jika pada tahun
1997 AS dan Dana Kewangan Antarabangsa (IMF) mempersalahkan negara-negara Asia
Tenggara termasuk Malaysia, sebagai penyebab krisis kewangan Asia, namun kali ini AS
adalah punca krisis baru itu.
“Masalah pinjaman subprima kini jelas menjadi contoh mengenai cara yang salah
menguruskan ekonomi dan polisi antarabangsa dilakukan oleh AS,” kata Stiglitz dalam
satu sidang media di sini, hari.
Stiglitz adalah bekas Ketua Ahli Ekonomi Bank Dunia yang kini merupakan Professor
Ekonomi dan Kewangan di Universiti Columbia di New York.
Beliau juga pernah menjadi Penasihat Ekonomi kepada bekas Presiden AS, Bill Clinton.
Menurut Stiglitz, dasar-dasar yang dirangka oleh pentadbiran Bush ternyata gagal
sehingga menimbulkan pelbagai masalah kepada ekonomi global.
Isu subprima ini boleh dijejaki sejak enam tahun lalu iaitu ketika mengalami kegawatan
ekonomi dunia pada 2001, katanya.
Menurut Stiglitz, Presiden Bush dan bekas Pengerusi Rizab Persekutuan AS, Alan
Greenspan ketika itu cuba merangsang perbelanjaan dengan melaksanakan dasar fiskal
dan monetari yang kurang berkesan.
“Daripada sudut fiskal, Bush dengan sokongan Greenspan telah menurunkan cukai,
namun ia lebih menjurus kepada golongan berada.
“Masalahnya, orang-orang kaya AS tidak berbelanja di negara itu,” katanya.
Apabila langkah itu gagal, AS merubah polisi monetari dengan menurunkan kadar faedah
sehingga ke paras satu peratus pada 2001, tambah beliau.
“Langkah ini juga gagal kerana masalah utama AS adalah lebihan pelaburan.
“Kadar faedah yang rendah menyebabkan orang tidak mahu melabur kerana pulangannya
rendah,” ujarnya.
Selain itu, kadar yang rendah juga menyebabkan rakyat AS meminjam lebih daripada
kemampuan, menerusi pelbagai pakej pinjaman termasuk gadai janji subprima.
Gadai janji subprima adalah pinjaman perumahan yang diberi kepada para peminjam
yang tidak memiliki latar belakang kewangan yang kukuh dengan kadar faedah yang
lebih tinggi.
Namun begitu, menurut beliau, masalah timbul apabila kadar faedah naik semula dan
harga rumah mulai turun.
“Lebih memburukkan keadaan apabila kadar simpanan rakyat AS adalah negatif.
“Ini bermakna, ketika ekonomi baik, mereka tidak menyimpan tetapi berbelanja melebihi
pendapatan mereka. AS meminjam lebih daripada AS$850 bilion (RM2.98 trilion) dari
seluruh dunia,” katanya.
Menurut beliau lagi, jika sepuluh tahun lalu, Perbendaharaan AS dan IMF mengatakan
bahawa negara Asia Tenggara tidak telus, tetapi sekarang ternyata AS yang tidak telus
dari segi kedudukan sektor kewangannya kerana sehingga kini kesan subprima itu masih
kabur.
“Ketika krisis 1997 dulu, AS menyuruh negara Asia Tenggara menaikkan kadar faedah,
tetapi sekarang mereka sendiri menurunkan kadar faedah,” katanya.
Dari sudut penarafan pula, katanya, firma-firma penarafan antarabangsa telah menaikkan
penarafan negara-negara Asia Tenggara pada pertengahan tahun 1990, namun
menurunkan taraf sejurus sebelum krisis 1997 bermula.
Keadaan sama berlaku ketika ini, di mana firma-firma itu memberi penarafan tinggi ke
atas gadai janji subprima tetapi mula menurunkannya baru-baru ini, katanya.
Apa Itu Krisis Sub Prima
Krisis sub prima berlaku apabila bank tidak lagi menggunakan sistem konvensional (riba
jahiliyyah) yang biasa mereka gunakan selama ini. Kita panggilnya sebagai sistem konvensional
tradisional.
Dalam sistem konvensional yang tradisional, apabila anda meminjam untuk membeli sebiji
rumah, rumah itu adalah cagarannya. Bila anda gagal membayar ansuran rumah tersebut, bank
akan tarik rumah anda dan rumah anda akan dilelong.
Masalah dalam sistem konvensional tradisional ini adalah, bank mempunyai had tertentu untuk
memberikan pinjaman kerana pinjaman yang mereka boleh beri adalah bergantung kepada
jumlah deposit yang mereka dapat.
Biasalah, orang bisnes selalu nak untung lebih. Dah untung 1 bilion mahu untung 10 bilion.
Jadi, institusi kewangan sebegini mencari jalan untuk mendapatkan sumber kewangan yang lebih
untuk membolehkan mereka memberikan lebih banyak hutang dan seterusnya membuat lebih
untung dengan riba’.
Akhirnya mereka berpakat sesama mereka untuk membentuk satu dana besar dimana mereka
menjual cagaran-cagaran tersebut dalam pasaran hutang atau bond market.
Mortgage bond market ini setelah dipakejkan oleh bank-bank pelaburan (investment bank), pula
dibeli oleh pelabur-pelabur seperti bank lain, syarikat insurans, pengurus dana pencen, saham
amanah dan sebagainya.
Pelabur-pelabur ini yakin dengan bond-bond yang mereka beli kerana dalam pasaran bond ada
rating agency yang memberikan gred-gred tertentu kepada bond-bond ini. Jadi, mereka ada
keyakinan yang bond yang mereka beli itu nanti akan memberikan pulangan apabila tempohnya
matang nanti.
Apabila bank mula mendapat wang tambahan dari dana baru ini untuk dipinjamkan, maka
mereka juga mula memberikan hutang kepada individu-individu yang tidak layak untuk
meminjam dalam keadaan biasa. Maka ia dipanggil pinjaman sub prima. Selain sub prima
perumahan, ada juga sub prima kad kredit.
Di Amerika, dianggarkan 25% daripada penduduknya tidak layak meminjam dengan sistem
konvensional tradisional.
Jumlah pinjaman sub prima ini pula pada Mac 2007 dianggarkan bernilai USD 1.3 trilion (RM 4.4
trilion)
Apabila institusi kewangan di Amerika mengamalkan pinjaman sebegini, dengan faktor kejatuhan
pasaran hartanah di Amerika, akhirnya para peminjam ini mula gagal membayar hutang mereka.
Apabila peminjam-peminjam ini mula gagal membayar hutang, maka pelabur yang membeli
bond-bond sub prima ini mula kerugian kerana keuntungan yang mereka jangka akan diperolehi
tidak ada.
Apabila para pelabur kerugian, maka pasaran bond sub prima di Amerika pun mula bermasalah.
Apabila bermasalah, bank mula tidak mendapat sumber baru untuk memberikan lebih banyak
hutang. Apabila hutang baru tidak boleh diberikan, maka pembeli rumah tidak dapat menjual
rumah mereka kerana pembeli baru tidak boleh berhutang dan seterusnya.
Para pelabur pasaran bond ini habis duit, untung yang dijanjikan kepada pelanggan (macam di
Malaysia ni yang bayangkan KWSP, ASB, saham amanah, insurans dan sebagainya semua rugi)
tiada.
Bank dan institusi kewangan habis duit, sebab orang yang gagal bayar hutang (defaulter) jauh
lebih ramai dari yang berjaya bayar hutang habis. (Sedangkan dalam keadaan biasa, mereka
perlu kawal jumlah defaulter biar tak terlalu ramai)
Spekulator / flipper dalam pasaran hartanah Amerika habis duit, sebab dah terbeli rumah pada
harga tinggi, nilai rumah yang sebenar adalah rendah, dan rumah tersebut tidak dapat dijual
dengan pelbagai sebab antaranya pembeli baru tidak dapat buat hutang dari bank. (Sebab tu
adalah lebih baik melabur dalam pasaran hartanah kerana cashflow, dan bukan untuk jual balik
dengan harga lebih tinggi semata-mata)
Itu belum campur dengan kerugian para pelabur yang melabur dalam syarikat-syarikat yang
terjejas secara langsung dengan krisis krediti ini. Bayangkan kerugian para pelabur Lehman
Brothers yang muflis dalam krisis ini.
Maka akhirnya ia membentuk satu chain reaction.
Dan chain reactionnya adalah sangat besar.
Inilah yang dinamakan krisis sub prima. Harapnya saya telah memudahkan anda untuk faham
krisis ini tanpa terlalu banyak menggunakan istilah kewangan yang susah nak faham.
Moga anda yang membaca blog Pakdi.my :)paid:)paid:)paidini akan lebih faham apakah krisis
yang sedang berlaku hari ini.
kredit untuk blog Pakdi.my
yang ni tak pastilah terasa bahangnya atau tidak
http://i452.photobucket.com/albums/qq246/akimaizu/funny-pictures-raccoon-subprime-
mor.jpg

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The Subprime Mortgage Crisis

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The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing event likely to affect buyers who purchased

A country’s economy is usually affected by a wide variety of factors. Reductions in

The Excess Capital

Here is the big picture and how it works:

The Heavy Demand for More Mortgage Backed

This leads us to NINA. Have you heard of NINA?

The Breaking Point which Turned the Problem into a

Unfortunately it was already too late for everybody.

[edit] Homeowner Speculation

[edit] High-risk mortgage loans and lending/borrowing practices

In addition to considering higher-risk borrowers, lenders have offered increasingly risky

The traditional mortgage model involved a bank originating a loan to the

Securitization accelerated in the mid-1990s. The total amount of mortgage-backed

Nobel laureate Dr. A. Michael Spence wrote: "Financial innovation, intended to

Definition: A subprime mortgage is granted to borrowers whose credit history is not

Pendahuluan: Tumbangnya Gergasi Dunia

Lingkupnya General Motor, salah sebuah syarikat automotif terbesar dunia

Pada mulanya, Kerajaan Malaysia dengan bangganya mengisytiharkan bahawa Malaysia

Apa sebab, apa kes?

Dasar prima kepada subprima

Penutup: Hala tuju dan cabaran

AS punca kegawatan ekonomi dunia – Stiglitz

KUALA LUMPUR 31 Ogos – Kegagalan Amerika Syarikat (AS) menguruskan ekonomi

“Masalahnya, orang-orang kaya AS tidak berbelanja di negara itu,” katanya.

“Lebih memburukkan keadaan apabila kadar simpanan rakyat AS adalah negatif.

Apa Itu Krisis Sub Prima

kredit untuk blog Pakdi.my

yang ni tak pastilah terasa bahangnya atau tidak

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