Pr i m e Ma t t e r

cases, however, will always arise in which it will be neces- all corporeal substance is composed of matter (␭␩) and
sary to balance a number of principles to ascertain the form (µ␱␳␾␩´ ), principles that reciprocally require one
correct ruling of the law. In general, one can say that a another and that exist only in the unity of a composite,
prima facie duty indicates who carries the burden of related to one another as POTENCY AND ACT.
proof in a legal contest. Aristotle’s View. This way of understanding the
structure of sensible substance also makes possible the
SEE ALSO DELIBERATION AND MORALITY; MORAL JUDGMENT; OBLI-
explanation of some of the main characteristics of the
GATION, MORAL; PROMISE, MORAL OBLIGATION OF A.
physical world: its dynamism, its mutability. For Aristo-
BIBLIOGRAPHY tle, this dynamism manifests itself on two levels: (1) the
Kagan, Shelly. The Limits of Morality. Oxford, UK: Clarendon sorts of CHANGE that do not affect the IDENTITY of the
Press, 1989. subject that changes: this is accidental change, which
Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Aristotle typically calls motion (␬ί␯␩␴␫␵); and (2) the
Translated by Lewis White Beck. Upper Saddle River, NJ: profound changes that result in the coming into being
Prentice Hall, 1989. or disappearance of a given substance: this is generation
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Edited by Roger Crisp. and corruption (½ ␥⑀´ ␯⑀␴␫␵ ␬␣␫` ½ ␾␪␱␳␣´ ), that is,
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE. In the former case some feature
Ross, William David. The Right and the Good. Edited by Philip or relationship of the substance comes into being or is
Stratton-Lake. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2002. lost, whereas in the latter the substance itself comes into
Stratton-Lake, Philip. “Introduction.” In W. D. Ross, The Right being or goes out of being. For this reason Aristotle
and the Good, edited by Philip Stratton-Lake. Oxford, UK: distinguishes these two types of change as relative genera-
Clarendon Press, 2002. tion and absolute generation (Q␲␭§␵ ␥⑀´ ␯⑀␴␫␵) (cf.
Phys. 190a 30–33). Although Aristotle limits motion to
Paul Gaffney the changes that affect three of the categories—QUAL-
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy ITY, QUANTITY, and PLACE—and denies it to substance
St. John’s University, Queens, NY (2013)
(cf. Phys. 225a 34–225b 9), he nonetheless applies the
same explicative schema to all classes of change
(µ⑀␶␣␤␱␭␩´ ): “it is clear that some subject must underlie
the contraries, and that there must be two contraries”
PRIME MATTER (Phys. 191a 4–5); the substrate (›␲␱␬⑀ίµ⑀␯␱␯) is called
matter, and the contraries are called form (⑀q␦␱␵ and
“If there is some primary stuff, which is not further µ␱␳␾␩´ ) and PRIVATION (␴␶⑀´ ␳␩␴␫␵).
called the material of some other thing, this is primary The need for a substrate that guarantees continuity
matter” (Met. 1049a 24–26, Tredennick). This statement in change is obvious for Aristotle (cf. Phys. 190b 3–4)
of ARISTOTLE (384–322 BC) can serve as an introduc- because otherwise it would be necessary to admit the
tion to the study of prime matter, ␲␳ώ␶␩ ␭␩, a term coming into being of a reality from NOTHING or its
somewhat infrequent in his writings, but important in ANNIHILATION (cf. Phys. 191b 13–14). In the case of
his explication of physical reality. Matter fulfills an motion, no difficulty exists in determining the substrate,
important function in Aristotle’s explication of SUB- because the subject (in this case, the substance itself )
STANCE as the object of study of the Metaphysics (cf. persists during the change, whereas identification of the
Met. 1028b 2–4) and of MOTION, a question studied in substrate of the change involved in any generation or
the Physics (Phys. 200b 12–14). The very fact that Aris- corruption is more complicated, because “nothing
totle considers matter in the Metaphysics is significant perceptible persists in its identity as a substrate, and the
and helps to avoid misunderstandings. The perspective thing changes as a whole” (Gen. et corr. 319b 14–16).
from which Aristotle studies matter in the Metaphysics as Yet there is still a substrate in such change.
well as in other treatises—Physics, Generation and Cor- In this context Aristotle speaks of prime matter as
ruption, On the Heavens, and Meteorology—is above all the ultimate substrate at the basis of all substantial
philosophical and not scientific in the modern sense of change, in contrast with the highly determinate or
this term. Aristotle is not so much interested in knowing proximate matter, ½ d␴␹␣´ ␶␩ ␭␩ (cf. Met. 1045b 18),
the concrete composition of matter as in understanding which is the matter proper to each physical substance.
the structure of physical reality; as he himself says, “we As he explains, “even if all things have the same primary
are trying to discover not what undergoes these changes, constituent or constituents, and if the same matter serves
but what is their characteristic manner” (Gen. et corr. as starting-point for their generation, yet there is a mat-
318b 8–9). In his explication of sensible reality, Aristotle ter proper to each. . . . And there come to be several
elaborates the hylomorphic doctrine, according to which matters for the same thing, when the one matter is mat-

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 Pr i m e Ma t t e r

ter for the other” (Met. 1044a 16–21, Tredennick). generation that occurs between them, must be the same
Bronze, for example, would be the proximate matter of (cf. De coelo 312a 30–33). To this matter belong, in a
a statue, even though the bronze, in turn, has its own preeminent way, the characteristics that Aristotle ascribes
matter and this, like any other matter, ultimately derives to matter: ingenerable and incorruptible, pure potency,
from the primary elements (cf. Met. 1015a 6–11). Prime without form and, as such, unknowable (cf. Phys. 192a
matter (though never found existing alone) is, one might 27–34).
say, the ultimate principle of potentiality that Aristotle The elements and the combinations between them
must postulate for his general account of substantial would be, in turn, the material cause required for the
change. generation of other more complex bodies that Aristotle
Aristotle stresses that the principles of substance in his study Parts of Animals calls Ώµ␱␫␱µ⑀␳␩˜ , which are
and, among these, matter, must be understood analo- dominated by a single quality: bones, tendons, blood,
gously (cf. Met. 1070b 16–21; 1071a 29–34; Phys. 191a flesh, and so on. These, in turn, will constitute the mate-
8). It is thus clear that he understands MATTER AND rial basis of the generation of bodies P␯␱µ␱␫␱µ⑀␳␩˜ ,
FORM as an explicative schema that can be reiterated which are characterized by distinct properties: vital
and applied at various levels. Where Aristotle takes his organs, the hands, the face, and so on. (cf. De part. an.
reflections on matter to their ultimate consequences is in 402a–403a). Obviously the material cause is insufficient
his treatise On Generation and Corruption. In this text to explain the generation and corruption of the different
he applies his explicative model to what he regards as parts of living substances; matter, as has been said, can-
the simplest elements that are constitutive of everything not exist apart from form. Nonetheless, this way of
else: water, earth, air, and fire. Thus, even if the formal explaining the generation and corruption of the various
schema, the composition of matter and form, can be bodies allows one to understand that prime matter, in
applied at different levels, these levels cannot be the strict sense—“some primary stuff, which is not
multiplied indefinitely. Aristotle conceives the universe further called the material of some other thing”—is not
as hierarchically structured, from the level nearest to the material substrate present in all substantial change,
prime matter, the four elements, to the first mover, but that which underlies the generation and corruption
NOUS, self-thinking thought that is pure ACTUALITY of the four elements, which are in fact present in every
and free from all contact with matter. complex body.
For Aristotle, however, the four elements are already Aquinas’s View. Fifteen centuries later, Thomas
formed in certain ways and can be transformed into one Aquinas (1225–1274) made this hylomorphic doctrine
another: they are generated and corrupted, constituting
his own. He introduced it into his metaphysical thought
a continual generation “like a circle” (Gen. et corr. 331b
undoubtedly as a result of his reading of Aristotle.
2), appropriate to a world eternally moved by an
Importantly, Thomas adds to the ontological structure
unmoved first mover, which causes the motion of the
of natural substance—matter and form—the composi-
first heavenly sphere, that of the sun (cf. Gen. et corr. II,
tion of ESSENCE and act of BEING. For Thomas, every
10–11). Aristotle explains the possibility of the reciprocal
transformation of the elements based on the primary substance except God is composed of an essence and an
qualities that distinguish each: “Fire is hot and dry, act of being (cf. Summa theologiae 1, q. 61, a.1), which
whereas Air is hot and moist (Air being a sort of vapour); are related as potency and act, and the essence of
and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and corporeal substances is in turn composed of prime matter
dry” (Gen et corr. 330b 3–5). It is precisely the qualities and substantial form (cf. De ente et essentia, c. 1).
that are in part common and in part contrary within the St. Thomas expounds his conception of prime mat-
four elements that allow Aristotle to explain the recipro- ter in his commentaries on the works of Aristotle (Com-
cal transformation among them: “Air, e.g., will result mentary on the Physics, Commentary on the Metaphysics,
from Fire if a single quality changes; for Fire, as we saw, and De generatione et corruptione), in some of his treatises
is hot and dry while Air is hot and moist, so that there (De veritate, De ente et essentia, De principiis naturae,
will be Air if the dry be overcome by the moist” (Gen et and De mixtione elementorum), in his major works (Com-
corr. 331a 26–29). But the explicative schema of change mentary on the Sentences, Summa theologiae, and Summa
must also be applied to this transformation of the ele- contra gentiles), and in general whenever it is required by
ments and, consequently, there must be a that remains the questions, frequently theological, with which he is
in the reciprocal generation and corruption of the ele- occupied. Two minor works, of doubtful authenticity,
ments (cf. Gen. et corr. 329a 28–32). This substrate are also dedicated to the theme: De natura materiae and
seems to correspond to what Aristotle considers to be De principio individuationis.
properly prime matter. Each element, as separate, pos- Thanks to Aristotle’s commentators, the notion of
sesses its proper matter and proper form; yet the matter, matter reached St. Thomas for the most part deprived of
the substrate that makes possible continuity in the the functional dimension that it had originally possessed.

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Pr i m e Ma t t e r

For this reason Thomas frequently attributes to prime SEE ALSO ARISTOTELIANISM; GENERATION-CORRUPTION; MATTER,
matter what Aristotle said of matter in general. In this PHILOSOPHY OF.

way prime matter came to be regarded as the necessary

BIBLIOGRAPHY
component, together with substantial form, of the es-
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Revised Oxford
sence of corporeal substances as well as the permanent
translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
substrate of all substantial change (cf. De principiis eton University Press, 1984. All quotations in this entry were
naturae, 2). taken from this translation with the exception of the ones
Thomas emphasizes some of the characteristics pos- marked Tredennick, which is cited below.
sessed by matter that Aristotle had discussed: prime Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes. Vols. 17, 18. Translated by
matter is pure potency, potentia tantum (De veritate q. 8, Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
a. 6), lacking all form and existing only in combination Press, 1933, 1989. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/
with substantial form, and hence unknowable. For this t e x t ? d o c = Pe r s e u s % 3 At e x t % 3 A 1 9 9 9 . 0 1 .
0052%3Abook%3D9%3Asection%3D1049a.
reason, though it is created, it is ingenerable and incor-
ruptible, and even God could not give it independent Artigas, Mariano. Filosofía de la naturaleza. 5th ed. Pamplona,
Spain: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2001.
existence: “it is something concreated rather than cre-
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas on Matter and the Elements: A Transla-
ated” (ST 1, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3). To create it directly would
tion and Interpretation of the Principiis Naturae and the Mix-
be contradictory, because “to say that matter is in act
tione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame, IN:
without form, is to say that contradictory things occur University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.
at the same time; hence it cannot be done by God” Byrne, Christopher. “Prime Matter and Actuality.” Journal of
(Quodlibet 3, q. 1. a. 1). the History of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (April 1995): 197–224.
Another fundamental point that Thomas defends is Charlton, William. “Prime Matter: A Rejoinder.” Phronesis 28,
the unicity of substantial form, for this doctrine is the no. 2 (1983): 197–211.
guarantee of the unity of the substance. The essence of Happ, Heinz. Hyle: Studien zum Arsitotelischen Materie-Begriff.
every corporeal substance, including that of the elements, Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1971.
is composed of prime matter and substantial form, Lang, David P. “The Thomistic Doctrine of Prime Matter.”
without the possibility of the simultaneous presence of Laval théologique et philosophique 54, no. 2 (June 1998):
multiple substantial forms in a single substance. This 367–385.
requires Thomas to explain the presence of the elements Lewis, Frank A. “What’s the Matter with Prime Matter?”
in mixed bodies as a virtual presence, the presence of Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 31 (2008): 123–146.
their qualities that persists thanks to the unique Mié, Fabián. “Persistencia y continuidad del sustrato material
substantial form of each corporeal substance (cf. ST 1, en la física de Aristóteles.” Tópicos 30 (2006): 69–100.
q. 76, a. 4, ad 4). Robinson, H. M. “Prime Matter in Aristotle.” Phronesis 19, no.
2 (1974): 168–188.
Thomas stresses and also develops the question of
prime matter as the principle of INDIVIDUATION . Scharle, Margaret. “A Synchronic Justification for Aristotle’s
Although his thought undergoes some variation on this Commitment to Prime Matter.” Phronesis 54, nos. 4–5
(2009): 326–345.
point, he always considers matter endowed with quantity
to be the principle that allows the individuation of the Sokolowski, Robert. “Matter, Elements and Substance in Aris-
totle.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970): 263–288.
substantial form. Prime matter, in itself pure potency, is
insufficient for individuating substantial form; for the Suppes, Patrick. “Aristotle’s Concept of Matter and Its Relation
to Modern Concepts of Matter.” Synthese 28, no. 1 (Spring
form to become the form of a specific individual, it
1974): 27–50.
needs a proportionate matter (cf. Super Sent., lib. 3, d.
1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1), which is in some way linked to Wieland, Wolfgang. Die Aristotelische Physik: Untersuchungen
über die Grundlegung der Naturwissenschaft und die sprachli-
quantity, because quantity is the only one of the ac-
chen Bedingungen der Prinzipienforschung bei Aristoteles. Göt-
cidents that, due to its dimension, contains in itself the
tingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970.
principle of its individuation (cf. Super De Trinitate, pars
Wippel, John F. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas:
2, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3). Thomas’s vacillations on this point
From Finite Being to Uncreated Being. Washington, DC:
regard the way—indeterminately or determinately—to
Catholic University of America Press, 2000.
understand the presence of dimension in matter. The
question is complex, and St. Thomas’s explanation Rev. Ignacio Yarza
should not be understood as a successive causality, but Ordinary Professor of the History of Ancient Philosophy
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross
in the manner of a double causality of form on matter Rome, Italy (2013)
and matter on form, of a distinct and complementary
order. Translated by Joseph T. Papa

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