Code of Practice: Prevention and Management of Blast Generated Nox Gases in Surface Blasting Edition 2 August 2011

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Code of Practice
PREVENTION AND
MANAGEMENT OF
BLAST GENERATED NOx
GASES IN SURFACE BLASTING

Edition 2
August 2011
Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

CODE OF PRACTICE

PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT


OF BLAST GENERATED NOx GASES
IN SURFACE BLASTING
Edition 2
August 2011
Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

ABOUT THE AEISG


The Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group (AEISG Inc) was formed in
1994. It was originally known as the Australian Explosives Manufacturers’ Safety
Committee and was initially comprised of representatives from Dyno Nobel Asia
Pacific Ltd (previously Dyno Wesfarmers Limited), Orica Explosives (previously
ICI Explosives), Union Explosives Español (UEE, previously ERT) and Total
Energy Systems (TES).
Since formation, the AEISG Inc membership has expanded and broadened. Current
membership (August 2011) includes:
• Applied Explosives Technology Pty Ltd
• Thales Australia
• Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Pty Limited
• Maxam Explosives (Australia) Pty Ltd
• Orica Australia Limited
• Downer EDI – Blasting Services Pty Ltd
• Johnex Explosives

The goal of the AEISG Inc. is to continuously improve the level of safety throughout
our industry in the manufacture, transport, storage, handling and use of precursors
and explosives in commercial blasting throughout Australia.

ISBN 978-1-921308-09-3

Copyright
© AEISG Inc. 2011
This document is subject to copyright. No parts of it should be reproduced without
the written consent of the copyright owner.

Disclaimer
AEISG Inc has taken reasonable care in the preparation of the information contained
in this Code and believes it to be accurate. However, AEISG Inc does not guarantee
or warrant the accuracy, completeness or currency of the information contained
in this Code. As AEISG Inc cannot anticipate or control the conditions under
which this information may be used, each user should review the information
in the specific context of the intended application. Under no circumstances will
AEISG Inc or any of its members be responsible for, or accept liability for, any loss,
expense, cost or damage of any nature resulting from the use of or reliance upon the
information contained in this Code. To the fullest extent permitted by law, AEISG
Inc disclaims all warranties, whether expressed, implied, statutory or otherwise, in
relation to the information contained in this Code.

Edition 2 August 2011 Code of Good Practice: Prevention and Management of Blast Generated NOx Gases in Surface Blasting Page 1
Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

PREAMBLE

The use of explosives to break rock is an intrinsically hazardous process. These


hazards have been studied over the years and modern mining methods have
evolved to minimize the inherent risks of blasting under most conditions.

These guidelines have been developed to assist the safe use of explosives in
situations where a specific additional hazard may arise due to the generation of
nitrogen oxides (NOx) within the post-blast gases. These oxides are generally
regarded as products arising from imperfect decomposition of ammonium nitrate
explosives during detonation.

The purpose of these guidelines is to inform explosives users of:


- the hazards of NOx gases;
- the likely causes of their generation from blasting;
- possible measures to eliminate or minimize NOx generation; and
- to provide general management advice in the event of NOx incidents.

The information is provided in good faith and without warranty.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

CONTENTS

1. SCOPE................................................................................................................... 4
2. DEFINITIONS......................................................................................................... 4
3. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................... 5
4. CAUSES OF NOx GASES IN BLASTING..................................................................... 6
5. NOX GASES CAUSES AND MITIGATION MEASURES................................................. 8
6. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF BLAST GENERATED NOx GASES INCIDENTS..................... 18
MANAGEMENT...................................................................................................... 19
7.1 Explosives/Precursor Manufacturer/Supplier.............................................. 19
7.2 Risk Assessment.......................................................................................... 20
7.2.1 Initial..................................................................................................................20
7.2.2 Post Loading/Pre Firing Reassessment...............................................................20
7.3 Risk Management........................................................................................ 21
7.3.1 Training...............................................................................................................21
7.3.2 Post-blast Gases Identification, Reporting and Recording..................................21
7.3.3 Blast Management Plan.....................................................................................22
7.3.4 Investigation of Post-blast NOx Events...............................................................22
7.3.5 Weather Conditions...........................................................................................22
7.3.6 Exclusion Zones..................................................................................................23
7.3.7 Management Zones...........................................................................................23
7.3.8 Communication..................................................................................................24
7.3.9 Emergency Response.........................................................................................24
APPENDIX 1 - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN REPORT OF
POST- BLAST NOx GAS EVENT....................................................................... 25
APPENDIX 2 - VISUAL NOx GASES RATING SCALE................................................................ 26
APPENDIX 3 - FIELD COLOUR CHART................................................................................... 27
APPENDIX 4 - INFORMATION FOR TREATING MEDICAL STAFF.............................................. 28
APPENDIX 5 - TOXICOLOGY OF NOx.................................................................................... 29
APPENDIX 6 - EXPOSURE STANDARDS................................................................................. 31
APPENDIX 7 - REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS....................................................................... 34
APPENDIX 8 - RISK ASSESSMENT PROFORMA .....................................................................36
APPENDIX 9 - REFERENCES.................................................................................................. 39

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

1. SCOPE
Those involved in blasting operations need to be aware of the causes, risks and
consequences of the oxide of nitrogen (NOx) gases that may emanate from their
blasting activities. The aim of this Code of Practice is to provide information and
recommended guidelines to assist in the prevention and management of blast
generated NOx gases from surface blasting operations. The Code is specific to NOx
gases and covers the following areas:
• the likely causes of NOx gases from blasting
• possible control measures to prevent or minimise blast generated NOx gases
• management of NOx gases from blasting should they occur

2. DEFINITIONS
ANFO: A mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil with or without a dye
colouring agent (Definition from AS2187.0).
Customer: The person with direct management responsibility for the surface
blasting practices, including the selection of explosive products.
Dewatered hole: A blast hole which has had water removed using an in-hole pump or
other mechanical means
Dry hole: A blast hole which contains no detectable water.
Dust: Airborne particulate matter ranging in diameter from 10 to 50
microns.
Dynamic water: Water that is in motion (i.e. flowing water)
Gas bag: An inflatable bladder used to block off a blast hole and support
explosives or stemming.
Hole liner: A flexible plastic tube which is placed into a blast hole before
product is loaded into the tube, providing protection from water or
broken ground
Hole saver: A plastic funnel which is placed in the collar of a hole, allowing
product to be loaded, but preventing fallback of dirt or water ingress.
NOx: A multiple combinations of oxides of nitrogen (N2O, NO, NO2, N2O4,
N2O3, N2O5) with nitrogen dioxide (NO2) being the principal
hazardous nitrous gas.
Post-blast gases: Gases generated by the detonation of explosives during blasting.
Precursor: A material resulting from a chemical or physical change when two
or more substances consisting of fuels and oxidisers are mixed
and where the material is intended to be used exclusively in the
production of an explosive. (Definition from AEMSC Code of Good
Practice Precursors for Explosives.)
Recharge: A term used to describe the re-entry of water back into a blast hole
after it has been dewatered
Sleep time: The time between explosives being loaded into a blast hole and their
initiation (Definition from AS2187.0).
Wet hole: A blast hole that contains any amount of detectable water.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

3.0 BACKGROUND
The group of gases known as Oxides of Nitrogen or NOx, of which the most common
are nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), are often found as by-products
in the post-blast gases of ammonium nitrate-based explosives. Together, these
gases are loosely referred to as “NOx”. Nitric oxide is invisible, but nitrogen dioxide
ranges from yellow to dark red depending on the concentration and size of the gas
cloud. These gases are toxic.
NOx from blasting constitutes only a small proportion of the total NOx emissions
from human activities (primarily power generation and motor vehicles) and
natural sources. However blasting produces a sudden localised release of gases
with potentially high concentrations of NOx. Such gas emissions pose a health risk
if people are exposed to them before the plumes can dissipate.
Despite a long history of blast-related NOx emissions, very few quantitative studies
have been done under realistic field conditions. The underlying causes of high NOx
are fuel-deficiency in the explosive or detonation reactions that do not continue
to completion. There are many ways in which these conditions may arise.
In the absence of a single general cause or general solution, these guidelines
should be viewed as an aid to identifying the local cause of NOx and as a prompt
for possible ways to address those causes. It should be understood that, given the
complexity of the problem and the inherent variability in the blasting environment,
NOx events may still occur even after prevention and mitigating actions have been
put in place. The guidelines therefore include advice on managing blasts that could
produce NOx gases and recommendations for treatment of people who may have
been exposed to NOx.
As recommended in Section 7 of this code, and as outlined in Australian Standard
AS2187 Part 2 - 2006, Use of Explosives (refer Appendix 7), blast sites should
develop their own site specific systems and procedures for the prevention and
management of blast generated gases. Such site specific systems and procedures
would have more relevance and detail, focus on issues of particular importance
and provide increased clarity and direction to staff in regards to expected actions
and responsibilities. This code should assist in the development of such systems
and procedures.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

4. CAUSES OF NOx GASES IN BLASTING


Under ideal conditions, the detonation of ammonium nitrate-based explosives will
produce nitrogen, carbon dioxide and water vapour according to reactions such as
(1) (the entity CH2 represents a typical hydrocarbon fuel).
3 NH4NO3 + CH2 → 3 N2 + CO2 + 7 H2O …….(1)

Ammonium Fuel Nitrogen Carbon Water


nitrate dioxide

None of the explosive product gases are coloured, so apart from steam and dust,
there will be no visible gases.
If conditions do not allow such a complete decomposition to take place, a fraction
of the nitrate may only partially react to produce NOx instead of a full reaction to
nitrogen. For example, nitric oxide can be generated by under-fuelled (“oxygen-
positive”) explosives according to reactions similar to (2);
5 NH4NO3 + CH2 → 4 N2 + 2 NO + CO2 + 11 H2O …….(2)

Ammonium Fuel Nitrogen Nitric Carbon Water


nitrate oxide dioxide

The nitric oxide formed initially converts rapidly to orange/red plumes of nitrogen
dioxide on contact with atmospheric oxygen (3).

2 NO + O2 → 2 NO2 ……….(3)

Nitric Oxygen Nitrogen


oxide dioxide
Every kilogram of ammonium nitrate diverted along reaction paths (2) and then
(3) generates over 110 litres of NOx. In the extreme worst case of no added fuel, a
kilogram of ammonium nitrate can theoretically generate about 600 litres of NOx.
The energy release associated with NOx-generating reactions is smaller than for
the complete decomposition of ammonium nitrate as per the reaction (1) but, as
the above calculations indicate, only a small fraction of the explosive mass reacting
in the wrong way can produce noticeable volumes of NOx gases. Thus, a blast
generating noticeable volumes of NOx gases will not necessarily produce a bad
blasting result.
While the above example describes an under-fuelled explosive, anything
that prevents the ammonium nitrate from fully decomposing through to its
thermodynamically-favoured end product, nitrogen, could result in NOx. This can
happen even in perfectly oxygen-balanced explosives.
The conditions leading to post-blast NOx are varied, but can be seen as cases of
either fuel deficiencies or incomplete detonation of the explosive. These problems
may apply to the explosive composition as a whole or to localised regions within
the explosive.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

In practical terms, these NOx-generating conditions might be the result of:


1. Explosive formulation and quality assurance.
2. Geological conditions.
3. Blast design.
4. Explosive product selection.
5. On-bench practices.
6. Contamination of explosive in the blast-hole.
The various ways in which the above conditions can contribute to post-blast NOx
gases and the possible ways to prevent or mitigate their effects are explored in
more detail in Section 5. When seeking to identify which of the above conditions
are the most likely contributors to an incident where NOx gases are generated, the
fault tree analysis diagram provided in Section 6 may be helpful.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

5. NOx GASES CAUSES AND MITIGATION


MEASURES
The following tables provide more details relating to the primary causes which
may lead to the generation of NOx gases in surface blasting. The tables also include
likely indicators and possible control measures that can be taken in managing
surface blasts to prevent or mitigate the generation and effects of NOx. Specific
blasting sites may have, or develop, other control measures.

Primary Cause 1: Explosive Formulation and Quality Assurance


Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures
Explosive product • Frequent NOx gases Explosives formulated to an
incorrectly appropriate oxygen balance to
• All blasts and all
formulated minimise the likelihood of post-
locations utilising
blast gases
a specific explosive
product Explosives product to be
Authorised
Explosives product to meet
Authorised definition
Explosives supplier to test
formulations where any change in
ingredients
Explosives/Precursor supplier
to provide relevant Technical
Data Sheets and Manufacturing
directions
Explosives • Frequent NOx gases Supplier to notify user sites of
product change changes to product specifications,
• All new blasts and
Technical Date Sheets,
locations
recommendations for use
Supplier to test changed product
for adverse impacts
Inadequate mixing • Frequent NOx gases Visual check
of raw materials Density check
• NOx emitted from
blast holes loaded Ensure compliance with
from a specific supplier’s/manufacturer’s
delivery system instructions
• Product appearance
abnormal

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 1: Explosive Formulation and Quality Assurance

Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures


Delivery system • Frequent NOx gases Regular calibration of metering
metering systems
• All areas associated
incorrectly
with loading from
a specific delivery Quality control of explosives
system products conducted in
accordance with manufacturer’s
• Product appearance recommendations
abnormal
Delivery system Do not override calibration
settings for settings on manufacturing
explosive systems
product delivery
overridden
Explosive • Increased frequency Investigate with supplier of
precursors not explosive precursors
• All blasts and all
manufactured to Precursor Supplier/Owner to
locations utilising
specification manage disposal or rectification
explosive product(s)
that incorporate a
specific precursor
Precursor • Intermittent NOx Appropriate storage location and
degradation gases stock rotation management (i.e.
during transport FIFO)
• Traceable to a
and storage Appropriate transport and
precursor which has
degraded between transfer of precursors
manufacture and use Inspection and/or testing
of precursors prior to use in
accordance with supplier’s
recommendations
Precursor Supplier/Owner to
manage disposal or rectification
Raw material • Frequent NOx gases Change management procedures
changes in place by suppliers
• All blasts and
locations utilising Prior notification to suppliers
explosive product(s) from site change management
that incorporate a systems where precursors are
specific raw material supplied by sites, for example
customer-supplied fuels

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 2: Geological conditions


Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures
Lack of relief in • Frequent NOx gases Understand geology of each shot
weak/soft strata and design blast (timing and
• In specific areas
explosive product) to ensure
known to contain
adequate relief in weak/soft
weak/soft strata only
strata, for example incorporation
of a free face, reduction of powder
factor, modified timing etc.
Minimise blast size and depth
Inadequate • Frequent NOx gases Appropriate explosives product
confinement in selection – refer to supplier
• NOx occurs in specific
soft ground Change design to suit conditions
areas known to
contain weak/soft Minimise blast size
strata only
Explosive product • Intermittent NOx Follow manufacturer’s
seeping into gases recommendations on explosive
cracks product selection
• In specific areas
known to contain Use blast hole liners
a high incidence of Maintenance of accurate drill
faulted/fractured records which are used to map
ground only geological conditions
Record and monitor blast holes
which are slumped or require
excessive explosive product to
reach stemming height, but where
water is not present
Dynamic water in • Intermittent NOx Minimise or eliminate sleep time
holes gases of shot
• Preceded by the eg load and shoot
observation of
Follow manufacturer’s
slumped blast holes
recommendations on explosive
• Usually when using product selection
non water-resistant Measure recharge rates if
explosive products dewatering, and choose
explosive products according to
manufacturer’s recommendations

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 2: Geological conditions

Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures


Record slumped holes and
use this information to build
understanding of pit hydrology
Understand hydrology of pit and
plan blasting to avoid interaction
between explosives and dynamic
water (either natural or from
other pit operations)
Use hole liners where explosive
products not water resistant
Moisture in clay • Frequent NOx gases Consider water resistant
explosive products and how this
• In clay strata only
may impact sleep time.
Hole liners may be required for
ANFO.
Blast hole wall • Intermittent NOx Minimise time between drilling
deterioration gases and loading
between drilling Use blast hole cameras to
• Traceable to specific
and loading eg ascertain hole condition in critical
geological areas
cracks, voids, hole areas
contraction Use hole savers
Mine planning to ensure benches
are unaffected by backbreak
from earlier blasts, for example
presplits, buffers etc.
Use drilling mud to stabilise hole
(confirm chemical compatibility
with explosives first)
Chemistry of rock • Frequent NOx gases Appropriate explosive
type e.g. limestone product as per manufacturer
• Traceable to specific
recommendations
geological areas
Use hole liners

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 3: Blast Design

Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures


Explosive • Frequent NOx gases Reduce bench height
desensitisation Ensure adequate relief in deep
• In deep holes only
due to the blast holes
hole depth Follow manufacturer’s
recommendations on explosive
product selection and blast
design for deep holes, for example
decking where appropriate.
Inappropriate • Intermittent NOx Follow manufacturer’s
priming and/or gases recommendations on explosive
placement product initiation.
• Residue product
Review of the site approved blast
design to improve priming.
Mismatch of • Frequent NOx gases Appropriate blast design/
explosives and approval process for site.
rock type Communication between user
and supplier to determine
product suitability for application
Inter-hole • Frequent NOx gases Change blast design and timing.
explosive
• Blast holes drilled too Product and initiation selection –
desensitisation consult manufacturer/supplier
close together
Increased control on drilling with
• Blast hole deviations
deeper designs
Intra-hole • Frequent NOx gases Appropriate separation of
explosive explosive decks eg distance,
• When using decks
desensitisation in initiation timing.
only
decked blast holes Change design
Initiation of • Intensity of post-blast Reduce blast size in order to
significant gases proportional to reduce total explosive quantity
explosive explosives quantity being initiated in the one blast
quantities in a used event
single blast event Reduce powder factor

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 4: Explosive product selection


Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures
Non water- • Intermittent NOx Follow manufacturer’s
resistant explosive gases recommendations on explosive
products loaded product selection
• Blasts containing
into wet or Regular education of bench
wet/dewatered blast
dewatered holes crew on explosive product
holes only
recommendations from current
supplier
Discipline in on-bench practices
(refer also to Primary Cause 5)
Weather forecasts to be obtained
and considered
Bench design for effective water
run-off
Excessive • Frequent NOx gases Understand geology of each shot
energy in weak/ and design blast (timing and
• In specific areas
soft strata explosive product) to match, for
known to contain
desensitising example reduction of powder
weak/soft strata only
adjacent explosive factor.
product columns Follow manufacturer’s
recommendations on explosive
product selection
Obtain appropriate technical
assistance if required to ensure
optimal result
Primer of • Frequent NOx gases Follow manufacturer’s
insufficient recommendations on
• All blasts using a
strength to initiate compatibility of initiating systems
particular primer
explosive column with explosives
type / size
Desensitisation of • Frequent NOx gases Follow manufacturer’s
explosive column recommendations on
• Only in areas where
from in-hole cord compatibility of initiating systems
in-hole cord initiation
initiation with explosives
is used
Minimise use of detonating cord
for down the hole initiation
wherever possible
Inappropriate • Frequent NOx gases Communication between user
explosive product and supplier to determine
• In specific
for application product suitability for application
applications
User to follow supplier’s
Technical Data Sheets
Appropriate blast design/
approval process for site.
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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 5: On bench practices

Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures

Hole condition • Intermittent NOx Dip all holes prior to loading


incorrectly gases Record wet, dewatered and
identified dry holes on blast plan and use
• Only when using
non water-resistant this information as a basis for
explosive products explosive product selection
Measure recharge rate of
dewatered holes and choose
explosive products according to
manufacturer’s recommendations
Record actual load sheets for each
hole
Minimise time between dipping
and loading, especially in soft
and clay strata. Note: Enough
time should be allowed for any
dynamic water in the hole to be
identified
Use blast hole cameras to
ascertain hole condition in critical
areas
Minimise sleep time
Training/competence of blast
crew
Blast not drilled as • Intermittent NOx Maintenance of accurate drilling
per plan gases records and review of blast
design if required to compensate
• Can be correlated
for inaccuracies.
with inaccurately
drilled patterns
Dewatering of • Intermittent NOx Load wet holes first and dip
holes diverts gases remaining holes prior to loading.
water into holes Adjust explosive product selection
• Only when using
previously loaded according to manufacturer’s
non water-resistant
with dry hole recommendations.
explosive products
explosive products Bench design for effective water
run-off
Training/competence of blast
crew

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 5: On bench practices


Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures
Blast not loaded • Intermittent NOx Training/competence of blast
as per blast plan gases crew
• Localised or general Effective supervision
occurrence Communication of loading
requirements
Record actual loadings eg
product, quantity, height

Primary Cause 6: Contamination of explosives in the blast hole

Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control measures


Explosive product • Intermittent NOx Optimise drilling practices to
mixes with mud/ gases minimise blast hole damage
sediment at Ensure appropriate loading
• Blasts containing
bottom of hole. practices are followed during
wet/dewatered blast
holes only charging
Ensure primer is positioned in
undiluted explosive product
Insert gas bag to separate mud/
sediment from explosive product
Use blast hole savers
Use end of loading hose
dispersers to minimise
contamination
Training/competence of blast
crew
Interaction of • Frequent NOx gases Confirm compatibility of drilling
explosive product mud with explosive products
• Blasts where drilling
with drilling before use
mud is used in
muds. Ensure that drilling muds and
conjunction with
a given explosive other chemicals used on bench
product are managed through change
management systems

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 6: Contamination of explosives in the blast hole


Potential Cause Likely indicators Possible Control Measures
Penetration • Intermittent NOx Use appropriate stemming
of stemming gases material
material into
• Blasts charged with Ensure explosive product
top of explosive
fluid/pumpable is gassed to manufacture to
column (fluid/
explosive products specifications before stemming
pumpable
only
explosive products Seal top of explosives column
only) prior to stemming e.g. gas bag
Water • Intermittent NOx Training/competence of blast
entrainment in gases crew
explosive product Eliminate top loading into wet
• Blasts containing
wet/dewatered blast blast holes
holes only Ensure all primers are positioned
in undiluted explosive product.
Increase number of primers in
explosives column
Use of gas bags in dewatered
blast holes
Seal top of explosives column to
prevent water ingress eg gas bag
Use hole liners
Minimise hose lubrication during
charging
Measure water recharge rate
after dewatering and adjust
explosive product selection
according to manufacturer’s
recommendations.
Select explosive products
for wet blast holes
according to manufacturer’s
recommendations.
Verify correct hose handling
practices are in place eg operator
competence, procedures, use
explosives supplier’s personnel
Load low blast holes last where
practical
Use suitable, safe dewatering
techniques
Minimize sleep time

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Primary Cause 6: Contamination of explosives in the blast hole


Potential Cause Likely Indicators Possible Control Measures
Moisture in • Frequent NOx gases Explosives product selection
ground attacking Use hole liners where product not
• Wet ground
explosive product water resistant
occurrence
Minimise or eliminate sleep time
eg load and shoot
Load wet holes first and
dip remaining holes prior
to loading. Adjust explosive
product selection according
to manufacturer’s/supplier’s
recommendations.
Contamination of • Intermittent NOx Verify correct hose handling
explosives column gases practices are in place eg operator
by drill cuttings competence, procedures, use
during loading explosives supplier’s personnel
Training/competence of blast
crew
Minimise vehicle contact near
blast holes
Use hole savers
Rainfall on a • Intermittent NOx Review rainfall forecasts for
sleeping shot. gases planned sleep time of shot
and select explosive products
• Occurs following
according to manufacturer’s
rainfall
recommendations.
• Usually when using Minimise sleep time for non-wet
non water-resistant blast hole explosive products if
explosive products rain is predicted. Consider early
• May be preceded by firing of blast.
the observation of Bench design for effective water
slumped blast holes runoff
Seal top of blast holes to prevent
water ingress e.g. with gas bag
Consider removing affected
product
Use hole savers

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

6. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF BLAST


GENERATED NOx GASES INCIDENTS
Should NOx be produced in a surface blast the following fault tree can be used
to identify which of the fundamental causes (see Section 5) was the significant
contributor to the generation of NOx. Once the likely causes have been identified
appropriate action plans can then be put in place to mitigate and reduce the
generation of NOx from future surface blasts. The fault tree can also be used to
educate those responsible for surface blasts as to their responsibilities in ensuring
appropriate steps are taken in the design, loading and firing of the blast to minimise
the likelihood of generating NOx from the blast.

Fume Event

Product
ANFL/Non
Water
Water Waterproof
Resistant
Resistant Explosive
Heavy ANFO
Heavy ANFO

Hole
Hard Soft Hard Soft Conditions
Dry Wet Ground
Ground Ground Ground

Signicant Short/ No Short/ No Signicant Sleep Time*


Sleep Time Sleep Time Sleep Time Sleep Time

Contamination
of Explosives Contamination Geological Contamination of
On Bench of Explosives Conditions Explosives
Practices Geological Blast Design On Bench
Geological Conditions Practice
Explosive
Conditions Blast Design Product Selection Explosive Quality
Explosive
Quality Suggested
sections
to start
investigation

Geological
Conditions
On Bench Explosive Quality
Explosive Practices
Product Selective Blast Design
On Bench
Blast Design Practices
Explosive Product
Selection

*Reference to short sleep or significant sleep in this Fault Tree does not refer to the explosives manufacturer’s recommneded sleep time, but
rather is a subjective term aimed at differentiating between a load and shoot blast and one which is designed to sleep for a period of time. It
recognises that there is a correlation between increased sleep time and the generation of NOx gases from blasting. As a guide for this Fault Tree
Analysis only, a time of less than 3 days is considered a short sleep time, however conditions vary from site to site and consideration should be
given to the adverse impacts longer sleep times can have on loaded blast holes.

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7. MANAGEMENT
7.1 Explosives/Precursor Manufacturer/Supplier
The manufacturer and/or supplier of the precursors or bulk explosives must
ensure products are formulated appropriately to prevent/minimise the generation
of NOx gases during blasting. The products should be authorised, with quality
control systems in place to ensure that the manufactured/supplied products meet
specifications
The explosives manufacturer/supplier must have documented change management
procedures for modification and alterations to explosive and/or precursor
formulations. The procedures must provide for:
1. assessing and managing risk associated with the modification/alteration of
the formulation through the use of documented hazard review assessments;
2. recording any modification/alteration and updating relevant authorisations,
Technical Data Sheets, Material Safety Data Sheets, work procedures, and
training programs as and where relevant;
3. ensuring changes continue to meet the requirements of this Code;
4. ensuring that any modification or alteration does not affect the validity of an
authorisation issued by the relevant authority; and
5. notifying the user sites of changes to authorisations, Technical Data Sheets,
Material Safety Data Sheets or recommendations in relation to proper use of
the explosives or precursor products.

In cases where there is a recognised potential for the generation of post-blast


NOx gases, or where historical experience indicates such a potential, management
systems need to be in place to effectively manage the risks posed by the presence of
such emissions. These management systems need to be risk based to minimise the
impact on site operators and equipment, and on the public and the environment.
Consideration of post-blast gases, including NOx, should be included in the
development of the Blast Management Plan for any specific site as outlined in
Australian Standard AS2187 Part 2: Use of Explosives (refer Section 4 and Appendix
A). The Blast Management Plan includes the details and records of any blast that are
taken and maintained, which would have provision for the detection, assessment
and reporting of any blast generated NOx gas event. It is considered good practice
to record any significant blasting activities for possible future examination.

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7.2 Risk Assessment


7.2.1 Initial
Prior to any blasting operation, a risk assessment should be undertaken to
investigate the potential for post-blast NOx generation at a particular site and,
where necessary, to identify the appropriate control measures which need to be put
in place to minimise the likelihood and/or extent of any post-blast gases produced,
and to determine the appropriate measures necessary to ensure safety for all
on-site and off-site personnel eg effective exclusion zones and other identified
management zones.
The risk assessment should be undertaken by a competent person or team.
Representatives of any such team may include:
• the blast site management
• the explosive supplier
• the drillers
• the shotfiring crew
• other relevant contractors involved in the blasting operations.

The potential causal factors and relevant control measures outlined in Section 5
should be used in conducting the risk assessment to ensure all factors have been
considered and adequately addressed where considered necessary.
One possible proforma for conducting such a risk assessment is provided in
Appendix 8. A working tool, using such format, may be found on the AEISG website
(www.aeisg.org.au).

While the risk assessment will lead to the development of an effective exclusion
zone as a response to any proposed blast, it must also consider the implications
of any potential post-blast gases and the risks posed to areas/directions where
such gas plumes might drift, even outside the determined exclusion zone for the
blast. The risk assessment will consider what steps need to be taken, if any, in these
management zones to minimise risk to any persons, on-site or off-site.
7.2.2 Post Loading/Pre Firing Reassessment
Following the loading of any shot, and immediately prior to firing, a reassessment
of the risks posed by the blast should be undertaken with due consideration given
to the relevant factors applying at the time eg rain events, wind direction and
speed, inversions, operational factors on site.
Following the reassessment it may be necessary to apply additional risk control
measures, or defer the blast, to ensure appropriate safety levels are achieved.
One possible proforma for conducting such a reassessment is provided in Appendix
8. A working tool, using such format, may be found on the AEISG website (www.
aeisg.org.au).

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7.3 Risk Management


Blast sites with the potential for post-blast NOx gases, or which are experiencing
such gas generation, must have systems in place to effectively manage the risks
posed. These management systems would normally include the following:
7.3.1 Training
Training of all employees and contractors involved in the blasting process, and
those involved in the management of these personnel, should be undertaken to
ensure the relevant risk are understood and managed.
Training should include at least the following:
• the identification and rating of post-blast NOx gases
• the toxicology of such gas emissions
• potential causal factors
• appropriate control measures
• site specific blasting operation procedures
• reporting procedures for post-blast NOx gases
• emergency response procedures for post-blast NOx gases.

7.3.2 Post-blast Gases Identification, Reporting and Recording.


Post-blast NOx gases should be identified and rated by blast site personnel using
the rating scale outlined in Appendix 2 and 3. Such events should be reported to
the blast site management and to the explosives supplier, who should maintain
records of such events.
Note: In some jurisdictions, post-blast NOx events of a particular significance may
be required to be reported to the relevant statutory authority. Applicable legislation
should be referenced to determine requirements.
It should be noted that the visual appearance of a post-blast NOx gas plume will
depend both on the concentration of NO2 and on the size of the plume. It will
change with time as NO is converted to NO2 and as the wind disperses the plume.
Therefore the visual rating is approximate at best, but gives some indication of the
severity of the event, so is worth recording. This and other factors worth recording
in the report of post-blast NOx gas events are listed in Appendix 1.
Blast site personnel, including Blast Guards should report any noticeable post-
blast NOx gases including the extent and direction of such plumes.

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7.3.3 Blast Management Plan


The following areas should be considered for inclusion in any specific site Blast
Management Plan (refer also AS2187 Part 2 Appendix A):
• training
• drill report assessment
• hole monitoring prior to loading
• explosive selection
• explosive loading procedures, including primer placement
• hole loading sequence
• hole stemming
• sleep time
• exclusion zone determination
• any additional management zone
• blast guard posting
• PPE, including personnel monitors and/or gas masks
• changes to conditions after explosives loading
• post-blast gases identification, rating and reporting
• meteorology eg rain, wind
• emergency response for persons exposed to NOx gases
• communication with neighbours and other potentially impacted parties

7.3.4 Investigation of Post-blast NOx Events


As indicated earlier any reported significant NOx event or trends should be
investigated to minimize the potential for ongoing generation of NOx gases and to
mitigate the potential impacts of any such event. Such investigation should involve
the explosives manufacturer and/or supplier.
The fault tree (see Section 6) and the control measures for any potential causal
factors outlined in this Code should assist any investigation and ensure all relevant
factors are considered and adequately addressed. The results of any investigation
of post-blast NOx gases should then be factored into the site specific procedures to
minimize their production and to mitigate impacts.
7.3.5 Weather Conditions
Rain, wind speed and direction can significantly alter the impact and severity of
a post-blast gas event. Weather forecast knowledge regarding wind direction and
speed can be exploited when blast scheduling in order to maximize dissipation
of post-blast gases and to direct them away from sensitive areas. Temperature
inversions can also be tracked and considered when determining when best to
schedule the firing of an affected blast.

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7.3.6 Exclusion Zones


For blasting operations exclusion zones are established to minimize risks to
personnel. Post-blast NOx gases need to be considered when establishing such
zones and placement of blast guards.
The following personnel have been identified as those generally at the greatest
risk of exposure to post-blast NOx gases during blasting operations. Consideration
should be given to minimizing the numbers of personnel exposed to these
situations:
• shotfirers and support personnel may be exposed during the post-blast
period by moving back into the general blast area prior to dispersion of the
gases;
• shotfirers and support personnel may be exposed during the post-blast
inspection of the blast area as the dispersion of the gases can be very localized
and continue to leak from under the ground for some time after the blast;
• shotfirers and support personnel may be exposed during the blast guarding
process;
• general blast site personnel may be exposed during the dispersion of the NOx
gases across a site;
• personnel that gather at areas such as blast guard positions and crib huts,
close to the edge of the exclusion zone.

The extent and direction of any post-blast NOx gas plumes should be closely
monitored to minimize any adverse impacts and to facilitate appropriate emergency
response. It may be useful to increase the size and/or the duration of the exclusion
zones in some cases to provide maximum opportunity for any NOx formed to
dissipate to normal background levels eg downwind of blasting operations.
Where potential for significant post-blast NOx gases exists, consideration needs to
be given to personnel monitors, or gas masks, as an additional safety measure for
persons conducting higher risk activities eg post-blast inspections.

7.3.7 Management Zones
While steps should be taken to eliminate or minimise the generation of blast
generated NOx gases, there will be occasions where potential risk remains.
Both the initial risk assessment and the post-loading/pre-firing risk assessment
must include consideration of areas of risk outside the developed exclusion zone.
Such areas will normally be downwind of blasting operations where post-blast
gases may drift in concentrations yet to be effectively dissipated.
Following such assessments, additional risk control measures may be considered
necessary to ensure risk minimisation eg temporary evacuation of such management
zones, deferral of blasting until climate conditions are more favourable.

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7.3.8 Communication
While persons off site are unlikely to be significantly affected by blast generated
NOx gases, communication with neighbours and other potentially impacted
parties should be managed to alert them to possible post-blast gas events and
to the steps being taken to prevent/minimise any risks presented. Some safety
recommendations and guidance to such parties should also be considered.
7.3.9 Emergency Response
While it is unlikely that exposure to post-blast NOx gases will result in a fatality
due to the concentration of the gases in an outdoor, well ventilated surface blasting
site, NOx gases must be recognized as a potential health threat and managed
accordingly. Generally, NOx plumes generated during blasting will dissipate to
background levels in a relatively short time. Dissipation is highly dependent on
local atmospheric conditions. However, in cases where a NOx plume does not
dissipate and has the potential to result in the exposure to people the following
steps must be undertaken:
Persons in the path of a NOx gas plume should
• not enter the plume
• move away from the path of the plume
• if indoors, close all windows and doors and stay inside
• if in a car, stay inside and use recirculated air conditioning if possible

If a person has been exposed to NOx gases medical attention must be sought as
soon as it is safe to do so. The possibility of delayed and life-threatening pulmonary
oedema dictates that:
• any person exposed to a visible plume of NOx, and/or any person experiencing
sudden acute effects of coughing, shortness of breath or irritation of the
mucous membranes of the eyes, nose or throat following post-blast NOx
events must be examined by a medical practitioner without delay, even if no
NOx smell was noticed or symptoms are mild
• the treating medical practitioner must be informed of the potential NOx
exposure. The material included in Appendix 4 should be provided to assist
in the conveying of such NOx exposure information to the treating medical
practitioners.

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APPENDIX 1 - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED


FOR INCLUSION IN REPORT OF POST-BLAST
NOx GAS EVENT
The following factors should be considered for inclusion in any post-blast report:
• date and time of blast;
• explosives type, quantity, mixing method, depth, initiation type;
• ground geology (soft, faults, wet);
• presence of noticeable post-blast NOx gases;
• post-blast NOx gas rating, eg 0 - 5 (refer Appendix 2);
• extent of post-blast NOx gas event, eg A,B or C (refer Appendix 2);
• duration of any post-blast NOx gas event (measure of time to disperse);
• direction of movement of any post-blast NOx plume;
• movement of any post-blast NOx gas plume relative to the established
exclusion zone and any established management zone (ie maintained within,
exceeded);
• climate conditions, including temperature, humidity, wind speed and
direction, cloud cover, rain;
• results/readings of any NOx monitoring equipment employed for the blast
• video results of blast where relevant.

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APPENDIX 2 - VISUAL NOx GASES RATING


SCALE
The following table, together with the Field Colour Chart in Appendix 3, details
how NOx gases from a surface blast can be assessed.

Level Typical Appearance


Level 0 No NOx gas
Level 1 Slight NOx gas
1A Localised
1B Medium
1C Extensive
Level 2 Minor yellow/orange gas
2A Localised
2B Medium
2C Extensive
Level 3 Orange gas
3A Localised
3B Medium
3C Extensive
Level 4 Orange/red gas
4A Localised
4B Medium
4C Extensive
Level 5 Red/purple gas
5A Localised
5B Medium
5C Extensive

Assessing the amount of NOx gases produced from a blast will depend on the
distance the observer is from the blast and the prevailing weather conditions. The
intensity of the NOx gases produced in a blast should be measured on a simple
scale from 0 to 5 based on the table above. The extent of the NOx gases also needs
to be assessed and this should be done on a simple scale from A to C where:-
A = Localised (ie NOx Gases localised across only a few blast holes)
B = Medium (ie NOx Gases from up to 50% of blast holes in the shot)
C = Extensive (ie Extensive generation of NOx Gases across the whole blast)

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APPENDIX 3 - FIELD COLOUR CHART


Pantone colour numbers have been included in the following Field Colour Chart to
ensure colours will be produced correctly thereby ensuring a reasonable level of
standardisation in reporting NOx gas events across the blasting industry.

Level Colour Pantone Number


Level 0 Warm Grey 1C
No NOx gas (RGB 244, 222, 217)

Level 1 Pantone 155C


Slight NOx gas (RGB 244, 219, 170)

Level 2 Pantone 157C


Minor yellow/orange gas (RGB 237, 160, 79)

Level 3 Pantone 158C


Orange gas (RGB 232, 117, 17)

Level 4 Pantone 1525C


Orange/red gas (RGB 181, 84, 0)

Level 5 Pantone 161C


Red/purple gases (RGB 99, 58, 17)

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APPENDIX 4 - INFORMATION FOR TREATING


MEDICAL STAFF
Those exposed to NOx gases should seek immediate medical treatment and consideration should be
given to placing those exposed under observation for at least 24 hours after exposure.

To assist medical staff the following guide should be provided.

Advice to Medical Staff


in the Treatment of Those Who Have Been Exposed to NOx Gases.
The patient may have been exposed to NOx. This is a gas usually produced on mines after the
use of explosives. NOx consists of multiple combinations of nitrogen and oxygen (N2O, NO, NO2,
N2O4, N2O3, N2O5). Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is the principle hazardous nitrous gas. NOx irritates the
eyes and mucous membranes primarily by dissolving on contact with moisture and forming a
mixture of nitric and nitrous acids. But this is not the only mechanism by which injury may occur.
Inhalation results in both respiratory tract irritation and pulmonary oedema. High level exposure
can cause methhaemoglobinaemia. Some people, particularly asthmatics, can experience significant
broncospasm at very low concentrations.

The following effects are commonly encountered after NOx exposure:


ACUTE
• Cough
• Shortness of breath
• Irritations of the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose and throat
SHORT TERM
• Pulmonary oedema which may be delayed for up to 4-12 hours
MEDIUM TERM
• R.A.D.S. (Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome
• In rare cases bronchiolitis obliterans which may take from 2-6 weeks to appear
LONG TERM
• Chronic respiratory insufficiency

High level exposure particularly associated with methhaemoglobinaemia can cause chest pain,
cyanosis, and shortness of breath, tachapnea, and tachycardia. Deaths have been reported after
exposure and are usually delayed. Even non irritant concentrations of NOx may cause pulmonary
oedema. Symptoms of pulmonary oedema often don’t become manifest until a few hours after
exposure and are aggravated by physical effort. Prior to transfer to you the patient should have
been advised to rest and if any respiratory symptoms were present should have been administered
oxygen. The patient will need to be treated symptomatically but as a base line it is suggested that the
following investigations are required:
• Spirometry
• Chest x-ray
• Methheamoglobin estimation

Because of the risk of delayed onset pulmonary edema it is recommended that as a precaution the
patient be observed for up to 12 hours. As no specific antidote for NOx exists, symptoms will have to
be treated on their merits.

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APPENDIX 5 - TOXICOLOGY OF NOx


Only one study (CSIRO Australia, 2007) has been found which attempts to quantify
the size, concentration and longevity of post-blast gas plumes under realistic
conditions pertaining to open cut mining [1].
However, the toxicology of NOx is well understood from controlled medical studies
and this knowledge is embodied in exposure limits defined by organisations such
as the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and US National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
The US EPA has compiled sets of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) which
represent threshold exposure limits for the general public and are applicable to
emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours [2].
The other relevant standards are known as IDLH levels (Immediately Dangerous to
Life and Health) which have been determined by NIOSH [3]. These exposure limits
are not considered relevant for public health scenarios, but are generally applied
when selecting respirators in an industrial situation.
The toxicology of NOx is summarised below, but more information including
detailed definitions of AEGL’s and IDLH is contained in Appendix 6.

Nitric Oxide (NO)


Under normal conditions, NO is actually formed at low levels in the body and it
serves as an important regulator molecule for the human cardiovascular, immune
and nervous systems [4]. NO is even used therapeutically for the treatment of
several conditions (for example: adult respiratory distress syndrome and frequent
pulmonary hypertension in newborns). However nitric oxide can be toxic in larger
amounts because it combines with haemoglobin in the blood and prevents its
normal oxygen-absorbing function. The toxicology of NO is complicated by the
spontaneous formation of NO2 which has its own adverse effects on the body. As a
consequence, the toxicity of NOx is guided by the levels set for NO2.

Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2)


The first toxic effects observed with NO2 exposure [5] are related to irritation of
the airways and eyes. These effects have been studied many times with human
volunteers in control environments. Because NO2 is not very soluble in the moist
airways, some gas can reach deep into lungs, causing delayed effects, notably
pulmonary oedema (fluid in the lung), which can cause death. Normally, asthmatics
or people with chronic lung conditions (eg bronchitis) are considered to be the
individuals most ‘at risk’ in the general population. As with many toxic substances,
the observed effects depend on both the concentrations and duration of exposure
(Table 1).

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Table 1. Summary of toxic effects verses NO2 levels

NO2 (ppm) Exposure period Response in Healthy Adults


0.04-5 Odour threshold
0.3-0.5 2 hr Decreased lung function, cough and dry
throat and mouth.
20 30 min IDLH level (Immediately Dangerous to
Life or Health)*
30 40 min Tickling sensation in nose and throat
30 70 min Burning sensations and cough
30 2 hr Deep chest burning sensations,
shortness of breath
80 3-5 min Chest tightness
90 40 min Fluid in the lung
* IDLH is defined by the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) as the exposure that is “likely to cause death or immediate
or delayed permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such
an environment”. The IDLH standard was developed to assist in selecting
respirators in a work situation. It should be noted that delayed pulmonary
oedema may not be accompanied by any other significant symptoms. This
has been considered in the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) (see
Appendix 6). It is recommended to consult other authorities (medical) for
further advice.

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APPENDIX 6 - EXPOSURE STANDARDS


The toxic effect of any substance depends on the agent, the agent concentration,
duration of exposure and the age and health status of the exposed individuals. The
health effects of these components has been well studied in both workplace and
community situations.
There are many different exposure standards in general use, the question of which
exposure standard should be applied to the expose of both workers and the general
population to post blast gases should be considered. The most frequently applied
reference standards for occupational exposures are the Occupational Exposure
Limits as published by Safe Work Australia [6]. These exposure standards have
been prepared for work situations and to be applied for daily exposure of workers.
Additionally these standards have been derived from studies of a predominantly
health, male workers, therefore since there is the potential for general public to be
exposed to post blast gases it is believed these standards are not appropriate.
It is believed the most appropriate reference standards are the US EPA Acute
Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLS). These have been prepared after extensive
consultation between public, private and community sectors and AEGLs are
intended to describe the risk to humans resulting from once-in-a-lifetime, or rare,
exposure to airborne chemicals [2]. Other community guidelines, such as National
Research Council’s Short-term Public Emergency Guidance Levels (SPEGLs) have
been superseded by the AEGLs [7].
Included in the information below are the IDLH levels (Immediately Dangerous to
Life and Health) [3]. These exposure limits are generally applied when selecting
respirators in an industrial situation and not considered relevant for public health
scenarios.

AEGLs (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels)


AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits for the general public and are
applicable to emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours.
AEGL-2 and AEGL-3, and AEGL-1 values as appropriate will be developed for each
of five exposure periods (10 and 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours) and
will be distinguished by varying degrees of severity of toxic effects. It is believed
that the recommended exposure levels are applicable to the general population
including infants and children, and other individuals who may be susceptible. The
three AEGLs have been defined as follows:

AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million or


milligrams per cubic meter (ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above
which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible
individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain
asymptomatic non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not
disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.

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AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a


substance above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or
other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability
to escape.

AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a


substance above which it is predicted that the general population,
including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening
health effects or death.
Airborne concentrations below the AEGL-1 represent exposure levels that can
produce mild and progressively increasing but transient and non-disabling odour,
taste, and sensory irritation or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects. With
increasing airborne concentrations above each AEGL, there is a progressive
increase in the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of effects described for
each corresponding AEGL.
Although the AEGL values represent threshold levels for the general public,
including susceptible subpopulations, such as infants, children, the elderly, persons
with asthma, and those with other illnesses, it is recognized that individuals, subject
to unique or idiosyncratic responses, could experience the effects described at
concentrations below the corresponding AEGL.

Nitric oxide (NO) * AEGL (Interim 13/Dec/2004)

ppm
10 min 30 min 60 min 4 hr 8 hr
AEGL 1 NR NR NR NR NR

AEGL 2 NR NR NR NR NR
AEGL 3 NR NR NR NR NR
NR = Not recommended due to insufficient data
Short-term exposures to below 80 ppm NO should not constitute a health hazard
* AEGL values for nitrogen dioxide (see table below) should be used for emergency
planning.

Nitrogen dioxide (NO2) AEGL (Interim 13/Dec/2004)

ppm
10 min 30 min 60 min 4 hr 8 hr
AEGL 1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
AEGL 2 20 15 12 8.2 6.7
AEGL 3 34 25 20 14 11

Some effects may be delayed

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IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) exposure limits.


The following is an extract from the NIOSH (US National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health) publication on the IDLH standard setting methodology and
process [3]:
“The current NIOSH definition for an IDLH condition, as given in the NIOSH
Respirator Selection Logic, is one that poses a threat of exposure to airborne
contaminants when that exposure is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed
permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such an environment
[NIOSH 2004]. The purpose of establishing an IDLH value is:

(1) to ensure that the worker can escape from a given contaminated environment
in the event of failure of the respiratory protection equipment and,

(2) is considered a maximum level above which only a highly reliable breathing
apparatus providing maximum worker protection is permitted [NIOSH 2004].
In establishing the IDLH value, the following conditions must be assured:

A. The ability to escape without loss of life or immediate or delayed


irreversible health effects. (Thirty minutes is considered the maximum
time for escape so as to provide some margin of safety in calculating an
IDLH value.)

B. The prevention of severe eye or respiratory irritation or other reactions


that would hinder escape”.

NIOSH [2004]. NIOSH respirator selection logic. Cincinnati, OH: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control,
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, DHHS (NIOSH). Publication
No. 2005-100.

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APPENDIX 7 - REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS


A number of mining and non-mining regulators reference the ‘Australian Standard
AS2187.2 2006. Explosives – Storage and use. Part2: Use of explosives’ in relation
to safe blasting requirements. This standard outlines the need to consider post-
blast gases and manage the associated risks accordingly (refer Sections 4.8 and
9.4).

4.8 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS


The area surrounding the blast site should be inspected and assessed to determine
appropriate means of minimizing environmental impacts. Regulatory limits may
apply.
In conducting the risk management, foreseeable factors should be considered,
including, but not limited to the following:

(a) Distances to buildings, structures, and other environmental effects.


NOTE: See Appendix J for guidance.

(b) Identification of monitoring requirements and the requirement for


monitoring locations, systems and instruments.

(c) Ground vibration and airblast overpressure.

NOTE: See Appendix J for information and guidance on the environmental


effects of ground vibration and airblast overpressure.

(d) Effects of various weather patterns and wind directions.

(e) Effects of dust, post-blast gases, sediment run-off, noise.


Any of the above factors can be expected to have an impact on the blast design.
It should also be noted that significant lead times may apply to any required
interruption to utilities, e.g., gas, water, electricity.

9.4 POST-BLAST INSPECTION


The purpose of a post-blast inspection is to ascertain if it is safe for personnel to
return to the blast site and for routine operations to resume.
The extensive variables associated with not only the type of blasting operation but
also the location of the operations would necessitate specific rather than general
post-blast procedures to be included in the blast management plan. The procedures
for consideration should include but not be limited to the following:

(a) Whether there is a need for more than one person to return to the shot for
the inspection.

(b) Procedures to be adopted if the inspection reveals that the ‘all clear’ into the
exclusion zone cannot be given, including the communications mechanism of
the ‘all clear’ or otherwise.
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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

(c) Determination that oxygen, post-blast gases and dust are at acceptable levels.

(d) Continuous inspection procedures during the approach to the post-blast site
that might identify unusual or abnormal results indicating possible hazards.

(e) Whether there is a need to wash down/or scale (bar down), especially in
underground workings.

(f) Identifying a misfire or butt and the means of clearly marking misfires or
butts.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

APPENDIX 8 – RISK ASSESSMENT PROFORMA


Select Select Risk Select If the Enter who Select Select like- Risk Select
cloud likelihood Score “Yes/ risk is is respon- Cloud lihood Score “Yes/
rating from drop will be No” from unaccept- sible for Rating from drop will be No”
from drop down list. calcul- drop able the from drop down list. calcu- from
down This is the ated down (No), control down This is the lated drop
list. This likelihood list enter your list. This likelihood down
is cloud of the control is cloud of the list
Instructions for rating Primary rating Primary
completion expected Cause expected Cause
if the occurring if the occurring
primary primary
cause cause
occurs occurs.

Pre-Blast Assessment Pre-Blast Risk Review


Cloud Likeli- Risk Risk Control Action By Cloud Likeli- Risk Risk
Primary Cause Rating hood Score Accept- Rating hood Score Accept-
able? able
PC 1: Explosive Formulation and Quality Assurance
Explosive product
incorrectly formulated
Explosives product
change
Inadequate mixing of raw
materials
Delivery system settings
for explosive product
delivery overridden
Explosive precursors
not manufactured to
specification
Precursor degradation
during transport and
storage
Raw material changes
Other:
PC 2: Geological Conditions
Lack of relief in weak/soft
strata
Inadequate confinement
in soft ground
Explosive product seeping
into cracks
Dynamic water in holes
Moisture in clay
Blast hole wall
deterioration between
drilling and loading
eg cracks, voids, hole
contraction
Chemistry of rock type
e.g limestone
Other:

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

PC 3: Blast Design

Explosive desensitisation
due to the blast hole
depth
Inappropriate priming
and/or placement
Mismatch of explosives
and rock type
Inter-hole explsive
desensitisation
Intro-hole explosive
desensitisation in decked
blast holes
Initiation of significant
explosive quantities in a
single blast event
Other:
PC 4: Explosive product selection
Non water-resistant
explosive products
loaded into wet or
dewatered holes
Excessive energy in weak/
soft strata desensitising
adjacent explosive
product columns
Primer of insufficient
strength to initiate
explosive column
Desensitisation of
explosve column from in-
hole cord initiation
Inappropriate explosive
product for application
Other:
PC 5: On bench practices
Hole condition incorrectly
identified
Blast not drilled as per
plan
Dewatering of holes
diverts water into holes
previously loaded with
dry hole explosive
products
Blast not loaded as per
plast plan
Other:
PC 6: Contamination of explosives in the blast hole
Explosive product mixes
with mud/sediment at
bottom of hole.
Interaction of explosive
product with drilling
muds.

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

Penetration of stemming
material into top of
explosive column [fluid/
pumpable explosive
products only
Water entrainment in
explosive product
Moisture in ground
attacking explosive
product
Contamination of
explosives column by drill
cuttings during loading
Rainfall on a sleeping slot.
Other:

Note: A working tool using this format may be found on the AEISG Inc. website [www.aeisg.org.au]

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Australian Explosives Industry And Safety Group Inc.

APPENDIX 9 - REFERENCES
1. CSIRO 2007, NOx Emissions from Blasting Operations in Open Cut Coal
Mining in the Hunter Valley; ACARP Project C14054.
2. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) Definitions:
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/aegl/pubs/define.htm
3. US NIOSH IDLHs:
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/intridl4.html
4. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for nitric oxide (CAS Reg. No.
10102-43-9) October 2006.
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tsd309.pdf
5. Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) for nitrogen dioxide (CAS Reg. No.
10102-44-0) nitrogen tetroxide (CAS Reg. No. 10544-72-6) December 2008.
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/nitrogen_dioxide_interim_nitrogen_
tetroxide_proposed_dec_2008.v1.pdf
6. Safe Work Australia: Occupational Exposure Levels, http://hsis.ascc.gov.au/
7. National Research Council: Protecting the Public and Emergency Workers
from Releases of Chemical Hazards:
http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/best/miscellaneous/
AEGLS%20Marketing%20Brochure%202008.pdf
8. Australian Standard AS2187 Part 2-2006, Use of Explosives

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About the AEISG

The Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group (AEISG),


originally known as the Australian Explosives Manufacturers’ Safety
Committee, was initially comprised of representatives from Dyno
Nobel Asia Pacific Pty Limited (previously Dyno Wesfarmers Limited),
Orica Explosives (previously ICI Explosives), Union Explosives
Espãnol (UEE, previously ERT), and Total Energy Systems (TES), was
formed in 1994. Since then, the AEISG membership has expanded and
broadened.

Current (August 2011) membership includes:


• Applied Explosives Technology
• Downer EDI – Blasting Services Pty Ltd
• Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Pty Limited
• Johnex Explosives
• Maxam Australia Pty Ltd
• Orica Australia Limited
• Thales Australia

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