DPIA Windows 10

DPIA Windows 10 Enterprise v.
1809
and preview v. 1903
Data protection impact assessment on the processing of

diagnostic data
Version 1.5
Date 11 June 2019
Status public
© 2019; Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid. Auteursrechten voorbehouden. Niets uit

dit rapport mag worden verveelvoudigd en/of openbaar gemaakt door middel van druk,
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schriftelijke toestemming van het Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid.
Titel | 18 februari 2019
Colophon
DPIA by Ministry of Justice and Security

Strategic Vendor Management Microsoft
(SLM Rijk)
Turfmarkt 147
2511 DP The Hague
PO Box 20301
2500 EH The Hague
www.rijksoverheid.nl/jenv
Contact Paul van den Berg

E [email protected]
Project Name DPIA report diagnostic data processing in Microsoft

Windows 10 Enterprise
Authors Privacy Company

Sjoera Nas and Floor Terra, senior advisors
www.privacycompany.eu
CONTENTS
Summary 1
Introduction 5
1 Ongoing GDPR compliance of different Microsoft products and services 5
2 Umbrella DPIA versus individual DPIA’s 7
3 Windows 10 Enterprise diagnostic data 7
4 Scope: Security level and telemetry disabled 8
5 Technical analysis of the telemetry and Timeline data 8
6 Dialogue with Microsoft 9
7 Outline 10
Part A. Description of the Windows diagnostic data processing 12
1. The processing of diagnostic data by Windows 10 Enterprise 12

1.1 Different telemetry settings 12
1.2 Scope 12
1.3 Out of scope 13
1.4 Technical analysis of data 15
2. Personal data and data subjects 18

2.1 Data viewer tool 18
2.2 Results of detailed German telemetry inspection 22
2.3 Timeline data 23
2.4 Definition of personal data 23
2.5 Possible types of personal data and data subjects 27
3. Processing of diagnostic data via Windows 10 Enterprise 29

3.1 Opt-out choice for telemetry 30
3.2 Other privacy choices in Windows 10 Enterprise 32
3.3 Windows Timeline 33
4. Purposes of the processing 34

4.1 Sixteen processing purposes from the general privacy statement 35
4.2 Four purposes for telemetry at the Security level 38
4.3 Four purposes for Timeline 39
4.4 Purpose of disclosure to law enforcement 39
5. Controller, processor and sub-processors 40

5.1 Different international Microsoft entities 41
5.2 Microsoft’s own qualification as data controller 42
5.3 Assessment Microsoft as data processor 44
5.4 Assessment Microsoft and organisations as joint controllers 48
5.5 Assessment Microsoft as the sole data controller 49
6. Interests in the data processing 49

6.1 Interests Microsoft 49
6.2 Interests Dutch government organisations 51

6.3 Conflicting interests 51
7. Transfer of personal data outside of the EU 52

7.1 No overview of (sub-)processors outside of the EU 53
8. Techniques and methods of the data processing 54
9. Additional legal obligations: ePrivacy Directive 56
10.Retention Period 59
Part B. Lawfulness of the data processing 61
11.Legal Grounds 61
12.Purpose limitation 65
12.1 Insufficient contractual guarantees 65
12.2 Further processing for incompatible purposes 66
13.Special categories of personal data 66
14.Necessity and proportionality 67

14.1 The principle of proportionality 67
14.2 Assessment of the proportionality 67
14.3 Assessment of the subsidiarity 69
15.Rights of Data Subjects 69
Part C. Discussion and Assessment of the Risks 71
16.Risks 71
16.1 Identification of Risks 71
16.1.1 Data about the behaviour and preferences of employees 71
16.1.2 Content (document titles and web surfing) 71
16.2 Assessment of Risks 72
16.2.1 Lack of control: Microsoft as a data controller 72
16.2.2 Lack of control over third parties/processors and audits 73
16.2.3 Transfer of personal data outside of the EEA 74
16.2.4 Long retention period 75
16.3 Summary of Risks 75
Part D. Description of risk mitigating measures 77
17.Additional risk mitigating measures 77
Conclusions 79
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Summary
This report, commissioned by the Microsoft Strategic Vendor Management office

(SLM Rijk) of the Ministry of Justice and Security, is a general data protection
impact assessment (DPIA) on the processing of personal data related to the use of
the Windows 10 Enterprise operating system. This report assesses the data
protection risks for data subjects that may result from the collection of information
about the use of Windows 10 Enterprise version 1809, released by Microsoft in the
autumn of 2018. This report takes improvements into account introduced in version
1903, released end of May 2019. The report has been written by the Dutch privacy
consultancy firm Privacy Company.
Scope: telemetry data at the Security level and Timeline

This report assesses the data protection risks for data subjects caused by the
collection by Microsoft of telemetry data. Technically, Microsoft Corporation
systematically collects diagnostic data about the individual use of the Windows 10
software (not limited to the Enterprise version). Via the in-built telemetry client,
Microsoft automatically collects telemetry data on the device, and regularly sends
these to its cloud servers in the USA.
Administrators can minimise this data collection by setting the telemetry level to
Security, or block traffic to telemetry endpoints in the Microsoft cloud.
The risks of data processing at higher levels of telemetry (Basic and Ful telemetry)
are out of scope of this DPIA, because it follows from Microsoft’s public
documentation that at these levels, Microsoft can collect confidential or sensitive
personal data.
Generally, government organisations store the content they produce with the Office
software in governmental data centres, on-premises. This DPIA also assesses the
risks of hybrid deployments, with data stored in SharePoint Online/OneDrive for
Business.
This report also addresses the new Timeline functionality that allows users to
synchronise activities on multiple devices via the Microsoft cloud.
No high data protection risks

Depending on the telemetry settings, the use of the Windows 10 operating system
on the work computers may result in infringements on the right to data protection
of government officials. These risks are a result of Microsoft’s systematic collection
of data about the use of its software and online services (diagnostic data). These
diagnostic data are generally personal data.
Based on a technical analysis of the telemetry data traffic, this report concludes that
at the Security level, Microsoft processes very little, and no sensitive personal data
with the Windows 10 telemetry data. Therefore, with the telemetry set to Security,
or if traffic to telemetry endpoints is blocked, there are no high data protection risks
for data subjects.
This report identifies 4 low data protection risks caused by the diagnostic data
processing in Windows 10 Enterprise at the Security level, assuming Windows
Timeline is disabled. These risks are:
1. Lack of purpose limitation and legitimate basis for the diagnostic data
processing
2. Lack of control over third parties/processors and audit questions factual
processing
3. The transfer of (all kinds of) diagnostic personal data to the USA, while there
are two procedures pending at the European Court of Justice questioning the
adequacy of data protection guarantees.
4. The long retention period of diagnostic personal data
GDPR compliance and umbrella DPIA

The Windows 10 software is deployed on a large scale by different governmental
organisations in the Netherlands, such as ministries, the judiciary, the police and the
taxing authority. Approximately 300.000 government employees work with the
operating system on a daily basis, often in combination with Microsoft Office
software.
The Microsoft Strategic Vendor Management office (SLM Rijk) conducts negotiations
with Microsoft for the federal government, but the individual government
organisations buy the licenses and determine the settings and scope of the
processing of diagnostic data by Microsoft Corporation in the USA. This general
umbrella DPIA provides a guiding and corrective framework and is meant to help the
different government organisations with the DPIAs they must conduct. This report
cannot replace the specific risk assessments the different government organisations
must make related to their specific deployment, the level of confidentiality of their
work and the types of personal data they process.
Windows 10 Enterprise diagnostic data

Microsoft has explained that it collects circa 1.200 types of events via Windows 10
telemetry. These data are analysed by circa 10 Microsoft engineering teams. The
collection of telemetry data is dynamic. Microsoft engineers can add new types of
events to the telemetry stream without prior notice to the users. The Windows 10
telemetry data stream sent to the Microsoft servers in the United States is separate
from, and independent of, the telemetry data stream generated by Microsoft Office.
The streams are sent to different network endpoints.
In addition to the telemetry data, Microsoft also collects data on its own cloud
servers when users access SharePoint Online and OneDrive (in system generated
event logs). This data collection is invisible to end-users. In this report, both the
telemetry data and the system generated event logs are referred to as ‘diagnostic
data’.
Microsoft correctly explains that diagnostic data should not be confused with
functional data that necessarily have to be exchanged over the Internet to provide a
requested functionality. For example, a local weather or news app may request a
user’s location. In that case, the location data are functional data. Therefore, the
term diagnostic data refers to the separate registration at an individual level of
technical metadata by Microsoft from and about the use at an individual level of the
Windows 10 Enterprise software, and the use of cloud services such as SharePoint
Online.
Technical analysis of the telemetry data

This report provides an analysis of the contents of the telemetry data as collected in
the test lab by SSC-I, an IT-supplier that is part of the Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen
(the Custodial Institutions Agency). SSC-I has created this test lab for the Ministry
Page 2 of 79
of Justice and Security (hereinafter: the test lab). With the help of the Diagnostic
Data Viewer in Windows 10 version 1809 and recording of traffic with Fiddler, the
lab has recorded the outgoing traffic during, and for 3 days after, the performance
of four minutely documented scenarios simulating the daily work tasks of an
average government employee. These scenarios include the use of Windows
Timeline.
Personal data
At the Security telemetry level Microsoft collects some information about the
individual use by a government employee of the Windows 10 software. The collected
telemetry data contains several unique identifiers. These identifiers allow Microsoft
to combine information about the actions of a single user over time. Microsoft has
the technical means to identify the individual user. Therefore, even though Microsoft
collects very few data at the Security level, the collected telemetry data are
personal data as defined in Article 4(1) of the GDPR.
During this assessment, at the Security level no user content (from files or emails)
was observed in the Windows 10 diagnostic data flow.
Microsoft as a data controller

Microsoft incorrectly qualifies itself as (an independent) data controller for the data
processing via Windows 10 Enterprise. Microsoft only qualifies itself (in its Online
Service Terms) as a data processor for Windows Analytics and Windows Defender
Advanced Threat Protection.
This legal position from Microsoft is different from other online services such as
Azure and Office365, where Microsoft does qualify itself as a data processor. None
of the contractual guarantees that have been agreed in the government enrolment
framework apply to the processing of diagnostic data in Windows 10. Instead, only
the consumer-oriented assurances from the general privacy statement apply.
A factual analysis shows that it is desirable that Microsoft would behave as a data
processor. This is not the case in the current relation. Because Microsoft determines
the purposes, and the government organisations enable Microsoft to process
personal data, they are factually joint controllers for the diagnostic data processing.
This relationship has not been formalised in a joint controller agreement.
Lack of purpose limitation and legal ground

In its technical documentation, Microsoft mentions specific purposes for the
processing of diagnostic data about the individual use of its Windows 10 software.
This information is not legally binding. Contractually, Microsoft can process the
diagnostic data for almost all, broadly defined, purposes from its general privacy
statement. The 16 relevant purposes include the use of personal data for
personalised advertising in Windows 10 and in apps, to present commercial offers,
and to use the contact data for promotional communications via email, SMS,
physical mail and telephone.
The processing of the diagnostic data for so many broad and unspecific purposes
violates the principle of purpose limitation.
An organisation may only process personal data if it has a legal ground for it. The
possible legal grounds are summed up in Article 6 of the GDPR. Microsoft as (sole)
data controller cannot rely on consent of employees, while such consent is
Page 3 of 79
necessary based on Article 11.7a of the Dutch Telecommunications Act for the
retrieval of data over the internet via in-built software if the processing is not strictly
necessary.
As a joint data controller, or as a data processor, Microsoft and government

organisations may process a limited set of diagnostic data to determine what
security updates to serve, to configure the telemetry pipeline, to detect and remove
malicious software and to apply Windows Defender anti-virus and endpoint security
protection.
If the purposes would be limited to these legitimate purposes, Microsoft could

appeal to the legal grounds of the necessity for its own legitimate interest or that of
the government organisation, and (in some cases) the necessity for the
performance of the contract with the employee by the government organisation.
Conclusions
If government organisations follow the recommendation from SLM Rijk to use
Windows 10 Enterprise only with the lowest level of telemetry, the Security level (or
disable telemetry traffic), and prevent users from syncing their activities via the
Windows Timeline, there are no high data protection risks resulting from the
diagnostic data collection in Windows 10 Enterprise.
This report identifies contractual, technical and organisational measures Microsoft

and the government organisations can take to completely remove the remaining low
risks.
On 21 May 2019, Microsoft has released version 1903 for Windows 10 Enterprise.
This version enables organisations to use Windows Update for Business functionality
when the diagnostic data level is set to Security. In previous versions, this
functionality was only available at the telemetry level Basic or higher.
SLM Rijk is providing significant input to Microsoft for an upcoming structural

solution for Windows 10 Enterprise customers which is being designed for Windows
10 Enterprise 1809 and later versions. This will allow government organisations to
have a simplified compliance solution for Windows 10 Enterprise at diagnostic data
levels above Security. This solution will be ready in the foreseeable future, and
Microsoft plans to make an announcement about this structural solution later this
year.
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Introduction
This report, commissioned by the Microsoft Strategic Vendor Management office

(SLM Rijk) of the Ministry of Justice and Security, is a general data protection
impact assessment (DPIA) on the processing of personal data about the use of the
Windows 10 Enterprise operating system. This report assesses the common data
protection risks for data subjects that may result from the use of Windows 10
Enterprise version 1809, released by Microsoft in the autumn of 2018. 1 This report
takes into account an important improvement released in version 1903, the update
distributed on 21 May 2019,2 the ability to use Windows Update for Business when
the telemetry level is set to Security.
The Windows 10 software is deployed on a large scale by different governmental

taxing authority. Approximately 300.000 government employees work with the
operating system on a daily basis, often in combination with Microsoft Office
software.
1 Ongoing GDPR compliance of different Microsoft products and

services
SLM Rijk assesses the risks for all Microsoft products and services that are
commonly used by government organisations, such as Windows, Office, Dynamics
and Azure and approaches the risk mitigiting measures with a holistic view.
Microsoft releases new versions of its Windows Enterprise and Office ProPlus
software twice per year. As part of its ongoing commitment to ensure GDPR
compliance, SLM Rijk intends to regularly commission new DPIAs on new versions of
Windows 10 and Office 365, to guarantee the rights of data subjects on ongoing
basis. New DPIA’s can be necessary to examine the risks of changes in the
technology and processing methods, to take account of modifications of the
applicable laws and/or relevant jurisprudence, and to assess changes in the
contractual agreement with Microsoft,
Previously, SLM Rijk has published a DPIA on the data protection risks of the
autumn 2018 versions of Microsoft Office ProPlus (the locally installed versions of
Office 2016 and Office 365).3 SLM Rijk has commissioned a new DPIA report with an
analysis of the data processing in the new April 2019 versions of Office ProPlus 2019
1
The roll-out of Windows 10 Enterprise took place on 13 November 2018, see Microsoft IT Pro
Blog, Windows 10, version 1809 rollout resumes; now available on VLSC, URL:
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/Windows-10-version-1809-
rollout-resumes-now-available-on-VLSC/ba-p/284217 (URL last visited and recorded on 20
March 2019).
2
Microsoft Windows Blog, How to get the Windows 10 May 2019 Update, 21 May 2019, URL:
https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2019/05/21/how-to-get-the-windows-10-may-
2019-update/ (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
3
This Office ProPlus DPIA report was published on 7 November 2018, with an update on the
negotiations between the Dutch central government and Microsoft about the GDPR compliance.
See: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/11/07/data-protection-
impact-assessment-op-microsoft-office (URL last visited 20 March 2019)
Page 5 of 79
and Office 365 CTR, and has also commissioned DPIAs on the data processing risks
of using Microsoft’s Azure cloud services and Microsoft Dynamics.
Microsoft has been working constructively with SLM Rijk during the review of the
risks of the use of these products, and has made major improvements to lower the
data protection risks in Office 365 ProPlus in the new 1904 Spring version. Microsoft
has for example published a blog about the improvements4, has introduced a switch
to choose between the telemetry levels5, has published new information about the
contents of telemetry data6, has enabled administrators to view the contents of the
telemetry data with the same data viewer tool they can already use to inspect the
contents of the Windows 10 telemetry stream7, and has limited the purposes for the
processing of data of some of the most widely used Connected Services such as the
translation module (Translator) and the spelling checker (Editor).8
This DPIA report differs from an earlier DPIA report commissioned by SLM Rijk in
the spring of 2018 about the diagnostic data flow from Windows 10 Enterprise. This
previous DPIA report was written by the Dutch privacy consultancy firm Privacy
Management Partners and delivered in June 2018. This previous report (not
published) provides a risk assessment and recommendations to mitigate the data
protection risks for (the previous version of) Windows 10 Enterprise.
SLM Rijk required this analysis as a direct result of the findings of the Dutch Data
Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, hereinafter: Dutch DPA) that the
processing of personal data through Windows 10 telemetry was not compliant with
the Dutch data protection act.9 Different from that DPIA, this DPIA contains an
analysis of the diagnostic data flow from Windows 10 Enterprise, with the help of
the newly included Data Viewer Tool.
4
Microsoft blog, Increasing transparency and customer control over data, 30 April 2019, URL:
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/04/30/increasing-transparency-andcustomer-
control-over-data/ (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
5
Microsoft, Overview of privacy controls for Office 365 ProPlus, 8 May 2019, URL:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/privacy/overview-privacy-controls (URL last
visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
6
Microsoft, Required diagnostic data for Office, 16 May 2019, URL:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/privacy/required-diagnostic-data (URL last
7
Microsoft Office Support, Using the Diagnostic Data Viewer with Office (no date provided),
URL: https://support.office.com/en-gb/article/using-the-diagnostic-data-viewer-with-office-
cf761ce9-d805-4c60-a339-4e07f3182855?ui=en-US&rs=en-GB&ad=GB (URL last visited and
recorded on 5 June 2019).
8
Microsoft docs, Connected experiences in Office, 29 April 2019, URL:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/privacy/connected-experiences (URL last visited
and recorded on 5 June 2019).
9
See the press release of the Dutch Data Protection Authority, 13 October 2017, Microsoft
breaches data protection law with Windows 10, URL:
https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/dutch-dpa-microsoft-breaches-data-protection-
law-windows-10. A summary in English of these findings is available at:
https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/public_version_dutch_dpa
_informal_translation_summary_of_investigation_report.pdf (URL last visited and recorded on
20 March 2019). The original report of findings, in Dutch only: AP, Rapport definitieve
bevindingen Microsoft Windows 10, De verwerking van persoonsgegevens via Telemetrie -met
correcties 6 oktober 2017-, URL:
https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/01_onderzoek_microsoft_windows_10
_okt_2017.pdf (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019)
Page 6 of 79
2 Umbrella DPIA versus individual DPIA’s

SLM Rijk acts as a representative for the individual government organisations that
procure and use the Microsoft Enterprise software. SLM Rijk is in the best position to
negotiate improvements to lower the overall data protection risks that apply to the
use of Microsoft software as used in governmental organisations. However, this
umbrella DPIA cannot specifically determine what actual risks the processing
involves for specific data subjects whose data are processed by the different
government organisations. Only the organisations themselves can assess the
specific data protection risks, based on their specific deployment, the level of
confidentiality of their work and the types of personal data they process.
3 Windows 10 Enterprise diagnostic data

Technically, Microsoft Corporation systematically collects diagnostic data about the
individual use of the Windows 10 software (not limited to the Enterprise version).
Via the in-built telemetry client, Microsoft automatically collects telemetry data on
the device, and regularly sends these to its servers in the USA. Microsoft has
explained that it collects circa 1.200 types of events via Windows 10 telemetry.
These data are analysed by 10 Microsoft engineers.10
A typical telemetry event contains a unique number, a timestamp, several unique

identifiers for the end-user and the device, and different bits of information about
for example the hardware that is used, the screen size, operating system,
applications installed and usage details, as well as reliability information on device
drivers.
Following the investigation by the Dutch DPA into the Windows 10 telemetry data in
2017, Microsoft has published extensive documentation about the Windows
telemetry data and offers a Diagnostic Data Viewer in all Windows 10 versions. This
tool allows end-users and administrators to inspect the diagnostic data that are
collected on the device.
Microsoft correctly explains that diagnostic data should not be confused with
functional data that necessarily have to be exchanged over the Internet to provide a
requested functionality. For example, a local weather or news app may request a
user’s location. In that case, the location data are functional data. 11 Therefore, the
term diagnostic data refers to the separate registration of technical metadata by
Microsoft from and about devices with Windows 10 Enterprise through the Universal
Telemetry Client. This includes data about inking and typing.
The Windows 10 telemetry data stream sent to the Microsoft servers in the United
States is separate from, and independent of, the telemetry data stream generated
by Microsoft Office ProPlus. However, if Windows telemetry is set to full, through the
Windows telemetry, Microsoft can also collect rich event information about the use
of Office applications such as Word, Excel, Outlook or PowerPoint.
10
See the DPIA report commissioned by SLM Rijk on Microsoft Office ProPlus. Microsoft is
quoted: “Office telemetry contains between 23 and 25 thousand events, as opposed to 1.000-
1.200 events for Windows 10. While Windows 10 telemetry is controlled by maybe 8 to 10
engineers, Office telemetry is in the hands of 20-30 engineering teams.” Source: Meeting
report 28 August 2018, answer to Q1.
11
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Configure Windows diagnostic data in your organization, 4
April 2018, URL https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/configure-windows-
diagnostic-data-in-your-organization (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
Page 7 of 79
4 Scope: Security level and telemetry disabled

Microsoft offers two telemetry settings for end-users in the different Windows 10
versions, Basic and Full. In the Windows 10 Enterprise version, the IT-pro’s (the
administrators of the Enterprise version) can choose the minimum Security level or
disable the diagnostic dataflow to known network endpoints.
This report describes the differences in data protection risks for data subjects
between the lowest levels of telemetry settings: Security and telemetry disabled. In
this second scenario all traffic to known telemetry endpoints to the Microsoft cloud is
blocked. The risks of data processing at the Basic and Full levels of telemetry are
outside the scope of this DPIA. This DPIA only addresses the telemetry at Security
level, and a configuration where telemetry is disabled, to provide a technical
assessment of the recommendation from the previous DPIA to switch the telemetry
level to Security in order to minimise the data protection risks for data subjects.
The scope of this DPIA also includes the use of SharePoint Online and OneDrive and
use of the Timeline functionality. The exact scope is explained in paragraph A1.2 of
this report.
5 Technical analysis of the telemetry and Timeline data

This report provides an analysis of the contents of the telemetry data as collected by
the test lab created by SSC-I for the Ministry of Justice and Security in December
and January 2019 from Windows version 1809.12 In close dialogue with Privacy
Company, the technical lab has performed four minutely documented scenario’s on
virtual machines running Windows 10 Enterprise software version 1809.
The scenarios represent the collection of diagnostic data for the Security and
disabled telemetry settings, both executed with an on-premises Active Directory and
with a Hybrid Active Directory. In this latter hybrid network test, the cloud sync
functionality of Timeline was switched On.
The technical lab relied on Microsoft's Diagnostic Data Viewer to inspect the
outgoing telemetry. As an essential security measure, Microsoft encodes the
outgoing traffic to its own servers in a way that makes inspection of the content of
the traffic impossible with normal proxy-techniques. The technical lab recorded all
outgoing network traffic with Fiddler. This setup ensures that any unexpected
network traffic would be noticed. However, the use of Fiddler also blocked the
functioning of some pre-installed apps such as Mail, Weather and News, and blocked
traffic to Office applications in the hybrid deployment. All the captured outgoing
traffic has been stored and provided in csv format to Privacy Company. Additionally,
the lab has recorded all settings and actions on virtual disk images and has stored
these images to be able to reproduce all actions and resulting telemetry events.
The details of the executed scenario’s and main findings from the technical
investigation are described in part A of this DPIA. Privacy Company has compared
the results with the publicly available documentation from Microsoft about the
Windows 10 telemetry data. Privacy Company has also studied the results of the
detailed technical telemetry analysis conducted for the German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI), released 20 November 2018.13
12
Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen, Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, SSC-I, Rapport Windows
10 – Verkeersstromen en Diagnostic Data, Departementaal Vertrouwelijk, 11 februari 2019.
13
Bundesambt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Work Package 4: Telemetry, URL:
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Cyber-
Page 8 of 79
6 Dialogue with Microsoft

SLM Rijk has an ongoing dialogue with Microsoft and has informed Microsoft in an
early stage about this new Windows 10 DPIA. On 1 February 2019, Microsoft has
provided documents from its Supplier Security & Privacy Assurance program,
specifically the Microsoft Supplier Data Protection Requirements that are part of the
Master Supplier Services Agreement (MSSA).
SLM Rijk has asked Microsoft to give its view on the facts this DPIA is based on, as
described in the findings in part A of his DPIA. SLM Rijk has sent part A to Microsoft
by mail of 25 February 2019. Though Microsoft initially agreed to provide written
input, and a representative of Microsoft Netherlands was present during the
presentation of the results for government CIOs and CISOs on 5 March 2019, on 8
March 2019 Microsoft informed SLM Rijk that it saw no mistakes in part A but
refrained from providing input. On 19 March 2019 Microsoft did provide brief written
input, pointing to factual errors, and providing references to public sources of
information.14
Microsoft did not provide in line comments. Microsoft has marked its reply as
Microsoft confidential. Therefore it cannot be attached to this DPIA report.
Early in May 2019, Microsoft has provided further confidential input to this DPIA
report.
With the introduction of Windows 10 Enterprise version 1903, Microsoft has enabled
the Windows Update function at the Security level of telemetry. Previously this
update functionality was only available at Basic or higher levels of telemetry.15
Microsoft has provided the following quotable summary of this improvement:
“Admins in the Dutch Central Government can deploy Windows 10 Enterprise by

setting the diagnostic data level to Security and disabling the Timeline cloud sync
feature. This allows for sufficient Windows 10 Enterprise functionality while limiting
diagnostic data transfers to a level which SLM Rijk considers acceptable in the
interim. Microsoft is releasing an update in May that enables Windows Update for
Business functionality when the diagnostic data level is set to Security or higher,
which adds significant value in keeping our IT environment up-to-date, secure
and performing properly.”
Last but not least, as a result of the ongoing dialogue with SLM Rijk, Microsoft has
announced that it is working on a structural solution for Windows 10 Enterprise
customers that would want to use the telemetry level Basic or higher.
Microsoft writes: “SLM Rijk is providing significant input to an upcoming structural

solution for Windows 10 Enterprise customers, which is being designed for Windows
Sicherheit/SiSyPHus/Workpackage4_Telemetry.html (URL last visited and recorded on 20

March 2019).
14
Microsoft, Windows Insiders get first look at new privacy screen settings layout coming to
Windows 10, 6 March 2018, URL:
https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2018/03/06/windows-insiders-get-first-look-
new-privacy-screen-settings-layout-coming-windows-10/#ibJm2xFEg5wZklTV.97 (URL last
visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
15
Microsoft techcommunity, What’s new in Windows Update for Business in windows 10,
version 1903, 21 May 2019, URL: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-
Blog/What-s-new-in-Windows-Update-for-Business-in-Windows-10-version/ba-p/622064 (URL
last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
Page 9 of 79
10 Enterprise 1809 and later versions. This will allow the Dutch central government
to have a simplified compliance solution for Windows 10 Enterprise at diagnostic
data levels above Security. This solution will be ready in the foreseeable future, and
Microsoft plans to make an announcement about this structural solution later this
year.”
Following the remarks from Microsoft, the following factual corrections and
clarifications have been added.
1. The report describes that the default setting for telemetry that is presented
in the user interface to end users is set to Full. But the information is added
that if the IT administrator chooses to suppress the privacy-related set-up
experience and does not adjust the setting otherwise (e.g., by group policy),
the default diagnostic data level setting is Enhanced.16 Additionally, the
explanation is added that though these privacy unfriendly default settings
are problematic in relation to individual users, in case of the Windows 10
Enterprise software administrators only have to switch the setting once on
the image they create of a new version.
2. Microsoft confirms that privacy invasive capabilities in the operating system
have been turned on by default, such as the camera and the microphone.
Microsoft suggests that Windows 10 privacy protections for device
capabilities such as camera or microphone are managed at the app level.
But this would give an incomplete picture of the data protection risks of the
default settings. Therefore the additional explanation is given that Microsoft
itself by default grants all in-built Microsoft functionalities and apps access.
Only apps that are not included in the OS, that are downloaded via the
Microsoft Store must first ask for consent to use these capabilities.
3. The information about Windows Timeline has been corrected. Microsoft
confirms that the “Store my activity history on this device” privacy setting is
On by default. But the “Send my activity history to Microsoft” privacy setting
is Off by default. Microsoft has provided information about two Group
Policies for administrators to manage these settings: Publish User
Activities17 and Upload User Activities.18
Microsoft also proposes to add more information about the Diagnostic Data Viewer.
Microsoft explains that the tool shows data that are queued on the device. If the
diagnostic level was changed to a lower level before data was sent to Microsoft, the
queued data will continue to be displayed in the Diagnostic Data Viewer although it
will not be sent. To prevent any misunderstandings about the quality of the
technical tests, an explanation is added to this DPIA that every test session has
been performed on a separate VM. Because of the default telemetry setting to ‘Full’
during first install, it is inevitable that some telemetry data are collected on the
device before the admin is able to lower the telemetry level to Security.
7 Outline
16
Since the autumn 2018 versions, the telemetry level Enhanced no longer exists in the
different Windows 10 Enterprise versions, only for Windows 2016 server.
17
Microsoft, Policy CSP - Privacy, Privacy/PublishUserActivities, 14 August 2018, URL:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-
privacy#privacy-publishuseractivities (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
18
Ibid., Privacy/UploadUserActivities, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-
management/mdm/policy-csp-privacy#privacy-uploaduseractivities (URL last visited and
Page 10 of 79
This assessment follows the structure of the Model

Gegevensbeschermingseffectbeoordeling Rijksdienst (DPIA) (September 2017).
19
This model uses a structure of four main divisions, which are reflected here as
“parts”.
A. Description of the factual data processing

B. Assessment of the lawfulness of the data processing
C. Assessment of the risks for data subjects
D. Description of mitigation measures
Part A explains the tested Windows 10 set-up in detail. This starts with a description
of the technical way the diagnostic data are collected and describes the categories
of personal data and data subjects that may be affected by the processing, the
purposes of the data processing, the different roles of the parties, the different
interests related to this processing, the locations where the data are stored and the
retention periods. In this section, input from Microsoft has been processed.
Part B provides an assessment of the lawfulness of the data processing. This

analysis starts with an analysis of the extent of the applicability of the GDPR and the
ePrivacy Directive, in relation to the legal qualification of the role of Microsoft as
provider of the software and services. Subsequently, conformity with the key
principles of data processing is assessed, including transparency, data minimisation,
purpose limitation, and the legal ground for the processing, as well as the necessity
and proportionality of the processing. In this section the legitimacy of transfer of
personal data to countries outside of the EEA is separately addressed, as well as
how the rights of the data subjects are respected.
In Part C the risks for data subjects are assessed, as caused by the processing
activities related to the collection of usage data about Windows 10.
Part D assesses the measures that can be taken by either Microsoft or the individual
government organisations to mitigate these risks as well as their impact. Finally,
this part also contains an assessment of the residual risk attached to the collection
of diagnostic data about the use of the Windows 10 software, even after applying
measures to mitigate the risks.
This data protection impact assessment was carried out by Privacy Company as
commissioned by the Dutch ministry of Justice and Security, between January and
May 2019.
19
The Model Data Protection Impact Assessment federal government (DPIA). For an
explanation and examples (in Dutch) see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
rapporten/2017/09/29/model-gegevensbeschermingseffectbeoordeling-rijksdienst-pia (URL
last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
Page 11 of 79
Part A. Description of the Windows

diagnostic data processing
This first part of the DPIA provides an overview of established facts about the
diagnostic data collection via the Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise software. This
starts with a short description of the different telemetry levels. Paragraph 1.3
provides an explanation why higher telemetry levels are out of scope of this DPIA.
This section continues with a description of the personal data that may be processed
in the diagnostic data, the categories of data subjects that may be affected by the
processing, the locations where data may be stored, processed and analysed, the
purposes of the data processing as provided by Microsoft and the roles of the
Government and Microsoft as controller and as data processor. This section also
provides an overview of the different interests related to this processing, and of the
retention periods.
1. The processing of diagnostic data by Windows

10 Enterprise
Technically, Microsoft Corporation systematically collects diagnostic data about the

individual use of the Windows 10 software (not limited to the Enterprise version).
Via the in-built telemetry client, Microsoft automatically collects telemetry data on
the device, and regularly sends these to its cloud servers in the USA.
The Windows 10 telemetry data stream sent to the Microsoft servers in the USA is
separate from, and independent of, the telemetry data stream generated by
Microsoft Office.
The Window 10 software is deployed on a large scale by different governmental

taxing authority. Approximately 300.000 government employees work daily with the
software, often in combination with Microsoft Office software.
Generally, these organisations procure separate bulk licenses for Windows 10

Enterprise and store the content they produce with the Office software in
governmental data centres, on premise. The Dutch government currently tests the
use of the online SharePoint / OneDrive cloud storage facilities. Therefore, this DPIA
also assesses the risks of a hybrid deployment, with data created on the Windows
operating system stored in SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business.
1.1 Different telemetry settings

Microsoft offers two telemetry settings to end-users in the different versions of
Windows 10 Pro, Basic and Full. In the Windows 10 Enterprise version, the IT-pro’s
(the administrators of the Enterprise version) can choose the additional level of
Security.
1.2 Scope
The aim of this DPIA is to ensure that the data protection rights of data subjects, in
this case, employees of the Dutch government, are protected and respected in
Page 12 of 79
relation to their use of Windows 10 software at work. To achieve this goal, this DPIA
assesses
what the available privacy options are for the organisations that use the software,
and what the risks for the privacy of the employees may be. Moreover, this report
assesses how the identified risks can be mitigated by means of technical and
organizational measures.
The scope is limited to the processing of diagnostic data with the two most limited
types of telemetry settings in Windows 10 Enterprise: Security and blocking of
endpoints in the Microsoft cloud for telemetry traffic.
Generally, government organisations store the content they produce with the Office
software in governmental data centres, on-premises. This DPIA also assesses the
risks of hybrid deployments, with data stored in SharePoint Online/OneDrive for
Business.
Some attention has been paid to two relatively new components of Windows 10
Enterprise: Windows Analytics and Windows Timeline.
Windows Timeline is based on the ‘Activity History’. This functionality is switched ON

by default and stores data about user activities on the local device of the user, such
as the names and locations of files the user has worked on. When employees choose
to share their activity history with Microsoft, to be able to continue with their work
on another device, Microsoft collects and shows the history of visited URL’s with
Internet Explorer, Edge and Chrome. If those employees work in a hybrid
environment, Microsoft also collects the names of accessed (Word) files and storage
locations of documents in SharePoint Online. Timeline has been introduced in the
Windows 10 April 2018 Update, also known as Redstone 4.
Additionally, the storage of and access to documents in the cloud storage services of
Microsoft SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business are in scope of this DPIA, to
get a more realistic view of the risks for data subjects.
The different technical deployments are described in more detail in section 8 of this
report, Techniques and methods of data processing.
1.3 Out of scope

This DPIA does not describe the specific deployments chosen by the different
government organisations that procure the Windows 10 Enterprise software (see
section 8 in the DPIA). This DPIA can only provide a general overview of the risks
and different available privacy settings and options for the different organisations
and the end users. It is up to the different organisations to assess the specific risks
caused by their specific types of personal data and types of data subjects affected
by the processing of diagnostic data.
Obviously, this DPIA does not describe the telemetry data collected in the consumer
and Pro versions of Windows 10.
The Basic and Full levels of telemetry are also out of scope. The risks of data
processing at these levels are out of scope, because it follows from Microsoft’s public
documentation that at these levels, Microsoft can collect confidential or sensitive
personal data.
Page 13 of 79
This report assumes that all government organisations follow the recommendation
from the previous Windows 10 DPIA to set the level of telemetry to the Security
level. At this minimum level, Microsoft does not capture events about the content
from the different Office applications and the browser Edge. The use of the
Advertising ID is therefore also out of scope, because this ID is not collected at the
Security and Basic level of telemetry.20
The new service Windows Analytics provides information to organisations about the
efficiency and health of Windows devices in their environment, based on the
collected telemetry data. This service requires Basic or higher level of telemetry and
is therefore out of scope of this report.21
Data collection at Basic and Full telemetry levels

Microsoft describes several events that may collect sensitive personal data from the
contents of Office applications if the Windows telemetry level is set to Basic or Full.
At the Basic level, according to Microsoft’s own documentation about the contents of
the telemetry events, the company collects information about all installed apps and
add-ins (name, publisher, version, locale, and for apps the frequency of use per
boot session and the user ID known by the application), via the events Common
Data Extensions.app, Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.Core.InventoryApplicationAdd
and Microsoft.Windows.Inventory.General.InventoryMiscellaneousOfficeAddInAdd.22
Information about the installed apps and add-ins can be used to infer sensitive
categories of information, for example if the apps or add-ins are designed to aid
people with disabilities.23
At the Full level, Microsoft can collect crash dump types about different applications,
except for heap dumps and full dumps.24 Such dumps may reveal personal data
about the behaviour of individual users. At the Full level, Microsoft can also collect
user content, if a device experiences problem that are difficult to identify or repeat
using Microsoft’s internal testing. Microsoft explains: “This data can include any user
content that might have triggered the problem and is gathered from a small sample
of devices that have both opted into the Full diagnostic data level and have
exhibited the problem.”
Even though the telemetry streams generated by Windows and by Office are
separate, and independent from each other, at the full level of telemetry, the
Windows 10 telemetry can also capture rich events about the use of the different
20
At the Basic level, Microsoft explains in its information about the contents of telemetry
events that it only collects information whether the Advertising ID is collected or not.
21
Microsoft techcommunity, What’s new in Windows Update for Business in Windows 10,
version 1903. “Please note; however, that Microsoft analytics tools such as Windows Analytics
still require a higher diagnostic data level in order to surface deployment insights.”
22
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Windows 10, version 1809 basic level Windows diagnostic
events and fields, last updated 19 April 2019, URL https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-1809 (URL last visited
and recorded on 5 June 2019).
23
Microsoft, Office Accessibility Center - Resources for people with disabilities, URL:
https://support.office.com/en-us/article/Office-Accessibility-Center-Resources-for-people-with-
disabilities-ecab0fcf-d143-4fe8-a2ff-6cd596bddc6d (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June
2019).
24
April 2018.
Page 14 of 79
Office applications, such as Outlook, Word, PowerPoint and Excel. This would pose
an additional risk for the employees.
At the Full telemetry level Microsoft may collect data from the contents of files for
spelling and translation services. Microsoft explains: “At diagnostic data levels
Enhanced and Full, Microsoft uses Linguistic Data Collection info to improve
language model features such as autocomplete, spellcheck, suggestions, input
pattern recognition, and dictionary.“ Microsoft acknowledges: “Linguistic Data could
contain sensitive information, such as credit card numbers, usernames and
passwords, email addresses, or other similarly sensitive information for Linguistic
Data Collection. We guard against such events by using technologies to identify and
remove sensitive information before linguistic data is sent from the user's device. If
we determine that sensitive information has been inadvertently received, we delete
the information.”25
Regardless of organisational and technical measures introduced by Microsoft to

delete data after the collection, the processing of sensitive personal data collected
through inking and typing by Microsoft is unlikely to comply with governmental
privacy and confidentiality requirements.
Out of scope of this DPIA as well is the collection of telemetry data by customers
themselves, via the System Centre (which is based on Windows Analytics). The
default setting in Windows 10 Enterprise for System Centre diagnostic data
gathering is ‘On’. However, setting the operating system diagnostic data level to
Basic (or Security) will turn off System Centre diagnostic data, even if the System
Centre diagnostic data switch is turned on.26
Given the limited time to conduct this DPIA, other choices had to be made about the
scope. This DPIA does not address data protection risks caused by remote log-in
through a Windows client on a Windows 2016 server. In that case, Microsoft may
collect telemetry in two different ways. This DPIA also does not address possible
data protection risks resulting from the use of Mobile Device Management in the
Microsoft Azure environment. Finally, this DPIA also does not assess the risks of the
combination of Windows 10 diagnostic data with LinkedIn diagnostic data.
1.4 Technical analysis of data

This report is based on the thorough analysis of the contents of the telemetry data
as collected by the test lab created by SSC-I. In close dialogue with Privacy
Company, the technical lab has performed four minutely documented scenario’s on
virtual machines and Surface pro 3 running Windows 10 Enterprise software version
1809 and either Microsoft Office Professional Plus 2016 MST – Monthly Channel,
1811 (build 11029.20108 Click to run), or Microsoft Office 365, Subscription
Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus – Semi Annual Channel, version 1803 (Build 9126.2336
Click to run).
25
Ibid. Microsoft explains the organisational measure that Microsoft’s privacy governance
team, including privacy and other subject matter experts, must approve a diagnostics request
made by a Microsoft engineer at the Full level before the engineer can start to collect the
specific content data.
26
Ibid., header ‘Enterprise management’.
Page 15 of 79
The scenarios were written to represent actual common use of the Windows 10
software by government employees. As recommended by Microsoft the scenarios
were kept short and simple, to be able to link recorded telemetry events back to
specific activities. The tests were run for a period of 3 days each.
4 tested scenario’s diagnostic data Windows 10 Enterprise

1. Desktop, On Premise AD, Telemetry Security (Analytics On27)
2. Desktop, On Premise AD, Telemetry disabled (Analytics Off)
3. Desktop, Hybrid AD, Telemetry Security (Analytics On)
4. Desktop, Hybrid AD, Telemetry Disabled (Analytics Off)
In the scenario with a Hybrid AD, a VM with Windows 10 Enterprise client was
connected to an on-premise Active Directory domain, and the identities were synced
with the Office 365 accounts, based on the Office 365 E5 license structure.
Windows 10 comes with pre-installed apps such as Internet Explorer, Edge,

Notepad, On-screen keyboard, Magnifier, Microsoft News, Windows Maps, Windows
Mail, Weather, File Explorer, Search, OneNote 2016. All these apps have been used
in the tested scenarios.
In order to best reflect the reality of Windows 10 usage by government institutions,

in every scenario, the following additional software, apps and documents were
installed on the VM:
1. Fiddler
2. Chrome browser
3. Adobe reader
4. Citrix Workspace app
5. Microsoft Diagnostic Data Viewer
6. Microsoft Office
a. Onprem – Office2016
b. Hybrid – Office365
7. Word document in “Mijn documenten”
a. “Bijlage 1 Arbodossier Maartje Simmons.docx”
b. “Bijlage 2 CV Maartje Simmons.docx”
8. Microsoft Outlook with inbox and some test e-mails
The technical lab relied on the (separately installed) Diagnostic Data Viewer as a
means to inspect the outgoing telemetry. As an essential security measure,
Microsoft encrypts the outgoing traffic to its own servers in a way that makes
inspection of the content of the traffic impossible with normal proxy-techniques.28
The technical lab recorded all outgoing network traffic with Fiddler. This setup
ensured that any unexpected network traffic would be noticed. The lab has exported
the collected telemetry data in a .csv file and has created an archive with the used
virtual machine images.
27
Microsoft notes in its view on this report from 19 March 2019 that this scenario is invalid,
because Analytics requires at least the Basic level of telemetry. The lab research has verified
this statement by testing the use of Windows Analytics at the Security level. These tests
confirm that Windows Analytics remain empty if the Security level is selected. Analytics has
been subsequently been removed from the scope of this report.
28
Microsoft explains: “All diagnostic data is encrypted using SSL and uses certificate pinning
during transfer from the device to the Microsoft Data Management Service.” Microsoft,
Windows IT Pro Center, Configure Windows diagnostic data in your organization, 4 April 2018.
Page 16 of 79
Some apps detected the network interception by Fiddler and stopped functioning.
This was the case for the Citrix Workspace app, Microsoft News, Windows Maps,
Windows Mail and Weather app. Therefore, with the methodology used for this test,
not all data flows could be detected.
The lab tests show that disabling telemetry via the registry key or a group policy is
not enough to prevent all network traffic. While telemetry is disabled, there is still
outgoing traffic to in-built end points in the Microsoft cloud.29 To prevent the
additional risks of leaking personal data to Microsoft, in addition to the level of
disabled telemetry, all traffic to these known telemetry end points has been blocked.
The main findings with regard to the two tested telemetry levels are the following:
 Use of the internet browsers results in a large increase of the traffic data. Most of
the traffic is functional, to show the requested information about the visited
websites
 Microsoft Office ProPlus has its own telemetry end points that are not influenced
by the Windows 10 telemetry functionality
 Use of the Citrix client does not result in extra telemetry traffic
 Use of the in-built functionalities in the Windows 10 OS also does not generate
extra telemetry traffic
 It was not possible to capture potential traffic through the extra Microsoft apps
with Fiddler. The Microsoft apps are programmed to build a secure tunnel to
Microsoft. They stopped functioning as soon as Fiddler was switched on.
 If a user has enabled synching of activities in the Microsoft Cloud via Microsoft
Timeline, Microsoft registers which internet sites have been visited, and what
files have been opened. In the test, traffic from both Microsoft browsers was
shown in Timeline, but not from Chrome. At the time, Timeline only recorded
activities in Microsoft’s two own browsers. Microsoft has meanwhile released an
extension to include Chrome traffic.30 In the hybrid set-up Timeline records the
names and locations of files (folder names) in SharePoint Online. Timeline does
not show files on the local network.
In GDPR terms SLM Rijk acts as a representative for the government organisations
that use the Windows 10 software. This umbrella DPIA report can assist the
administrators to select a privacy-compliant deployment and conduct their own
DPIA’s where necessary.
In the current Enrolment framework with underlying documents signed between

Microsoft and SLM Rijk, the use of telemetry data with regard to Timeline is not
specifically mentioned. This will be explained in more detail in section 4 of this
report ‘Purposes’.
Generally, Microsoft considers itself to be the data controller for Windows 10

services, including the telemetry data, except for Windows Analytics and ATP. This
will be explained in more detailed in section 5 of this report ‘Data controller or data
processor’
29
The contents of these encoded data have not been examined and were not shown in the
Diagnostic Data Viewer.
30
Windows Central, Microsoft releases official Windows 10 Timeline extension for Google
Chrome, 19 February 2019, URL: https://www.windowscentral.com/microsoft-releases-official-
windows-10-timeline-extension-google-chrome (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June
2019).
Page 17 of 79
2. Personal data and data subjects
The Dutch government DPIA model requires that this section provides a list of the
kinds of personal data that will be processed via the diagnostic data, and per
category of data subjects, what kind of personal data will be processed by the
product or service for which the DPIA is conducted. To help readers understand the
data protection risks, this section explains in detail why the stored diagnostic data
about the use of the Windows 10 software are personal data as defined in article
4(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
This umbrella DPIA can only indicate types of personal data and types of data
subjects that may be involved in the processing via the diagnostic data, but it
cannot assess the specific risks of the factual data processing per organisation that
uses the Windows 10 software. The risks strongly depend on their privacy choices
and settings, and the nature of the work performed by their employees. Paragraph
1.3 provides examples of sensitive and confidential personal data Microsoft may
process if an organisation does not follow the advice to select the Security level of
telemetry. However, these data are out of scope of this DPIA.
Below, the diagnostic data that Microsoft collects via the Security telemetry level are
shown in a table. The different kinds of data that Microsoft processes via the
Windows 10 diagnostic dataflow, will be described in more detail in section 3 of this
DPIA, Processing of diagnostic data via Windows 10 Enterprise.
2.1 Data viewer tool

Following the investigation by the Dutch DPA into the Windows 10 telemetry data in
201731, Microsoft offers a Diagnostic Data Viewer in all Windows 10 versions issued
globally since the spring of 2018. This tool allows end-users and administrators to
inspect the telemetry data that are collected on the device. In response to the facts
stated in Part A of this DPIA, Microsoft has explained that the tool shows data that
are queued on the device. If the diagnostic level was changed to a lower level
before data were sent to Microsoft, the queued data would continue to be displayed
in the Diagnostic Data Viewer although they would not be sent.32
To prevent any misunderstandings about the quality of the technical tests, the
technical lab has performed every test session on a separate VM. This excludes
possible contagion from collection of data at different telemetry levels. Because of
the default telemetry setting to ‘Full’ during first install, it is inevitable that some
telemetry data are collected on the device before the admin is able to lower the
telemetry level to Security.
31
See the Press release of the Dutch DPA 13 October 2017, Microsoft breaches data protection
law with Windows 10, URL: https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/dutch-dpa-
microsoft-breaches-data-protection-law-windows-10. A summary in English of these findings is
available at the URL: https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/public_version_dutch_dpa_informal_translation_summary_of_investigation_report.pdf.
The original report of findings, in Dutch only: AP, Rapport definitieve bevindingen Microsoft
Windows 10, De verwerking van persoonsgegevens via Telemetrie -met correcties 6 oktober
2017-, URL: https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/ sites/default/files/01_
onderzoek_microsoft_windows_10_okt_2017.pdf.
32
Microsoft written view on Part A of this DPIA, 19 March 2019.
Page 18 of 79
A typical Windows telemetry event contains a unique number, a timestamp, several

unique identifiers for the end-user and the device, and different bits of information
about for example the type of device, screen size, operating system, software
and/or driver. These data can also form a unique identifier of a user when combined
with other over time. Paragraph 8 of this DPIA report, ‘Techniques and methods of
the data processing’ will elaborate on the fact that all diagnostic data are stored in a
short term and in a long-term database, thus providing Microsoft with many
identifiers relating to a single user over time.
Information in the telemetry events that starts with ‘data’, contains information
about the contents of a specific activity or type of information in a specific telemetry
event. All fields that do not start with ‘data’ contain generic telemetry information
that is common for all telemetry events.
The definition of personal data in the GDPR specifically includes online identifiers.
During this assessment, Microsoft was not found to collect sensitive personal data
about the use of Windows 10, nor content from files processed through Windows 10
nor otherwise remarkable data because of their confidential nature via the Windows
10 telemetry data stream.
Data observed at the Security level

At the Security level, Microsoft only collects 4 identifiers and limited types of
information. Microsoft collects data about three types of events.
 Information to configure the in-built telemetry software (The Connected

User Experiences and Telemetry component). The data gathered by the client
for this request includes OS information, device id (used to identify what
specific device is requesting settings) and device class (for example, whether
the device is server or desktop).
 Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) The MSRT infection report
contains information, including device info and IP address.
 Windows Defender/Endpoint Protection. These events collect anti-
malware signatures, diagnostic information, User Account Control settings,
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) settings, and IP address. 33
Microsoft writes: “The Security level gathers only the diagnostic data info that is
required to keep Windows devices, Windows Server, and guests protected with the
latest security updates. (…) no Windows Update information is gathered at this
level, important information about update failures is not sent.”34 At the Security
level Microsoft promises not to collect user content, such as user files or
communications, and also, to prevent collecting direct identifiers. “We take steps to
avoid gathering any information that directly identifies a company or user, such as
name, email address, or account ID.“35
The data collected at the Security level (in the Hybrid set-up)36 are described in the
table below, with the public explanations provided by Microsoft. During the test set-
up no changes were made to the Security level. That is, both the MSRT and the
33
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center,, Configure Windows diagnostic data in your organization 4
April 2018.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
At first instance, the lab did not see any telemetry messages in the Data Viewer Tool at the
Security level. Close analysis of all captured data shows which data are nonetheless captured.
Page 19 of 79
Windows Defender/Endpoint Protection were left On, and not turned off, in order to
get a complete view of the telemetry data at the Security level.
Identifier Collected by Event names Microsoft explanation

Device LocalId All A locally-defined unique ID for
the device. This is not the
human-readable device name.
Most likely equal to the value
stored at
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\SQMC
lient\MachineId
User LocalId All Represents a unique user
identity that is created locally
and added by the client. This is
not the user's account ID.
cdnIp37 Microsoft.OSG.DU. The IP address of the source
DeliveryOptClient. CDN.
DownloadCompleted
WUDeviceID SoftwareUpdateClientTelem The unique identifier of a
etry.CheckForUpdates specific device, used to identify
SoftwareUpdateClientTelem how many devices are
etry.UpdateDetected encountering success or a
SoftwareUpdateClientTelem particular issue.
etry.Download
SoftwareUpdateClientTelem
etry.Install
The full list of the observed telemetry event types at the Security level is:
• DxgKrnlTelemetry.GPUAdapterInventoryV2
• Microsoft.OSG.DU.DeliveryOptClient.DownloadCompleted
• Microsoft.OSG.DU.DeliveryOptClient.DownloadStarted
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.CompleteInstallOperationRequest
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndAcquireLicense
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndDownload
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndInstall
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndScanForUpdates
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndSearchUpdatePackages
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.EndStageUserData
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.FulfillmentComplete
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.FulfillmentInitiate
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.InstallOperationRequest
• Microsoft.Windows.StoreAgent.Telemetry.SearchForUpdateOperationRequest
• SoftwareUpdateClientTelemetry.CheckForUpdates
• SoftwareUpdateClientTelemetry.Download
• SoftwareUpdateClientTelemetry.Install
• SoftwareUpdateClientTelemetry.UpdateDetected
• TelClientSynthetic.HeartBeat_5
These events do not seem to match with the three specific categories of events
described by Microsoft (configuration of the CUET, MSRT and Windows Defender
information).
37
This is probably the IP address of a proxy, not related to the system or the user.
Page 20 of 79
For example, the event DxgKrnlTelemetry.GPUAdapterInventoryV2 provides

information about the graphic processor amd does not seem necessary to configure
the telemetry component. Microsoft describes the purpose of this category of events
as: “this event sends basic GPU and display driver information to keep Windows and
display drivers up-to-date.”38
Since all telemetry events contain a field with a very detailed timestamp (for
example: "2019-01-23T07:12:47.3865298Z"), and the unique identifiers in the user
and device localid, Microsoft is technically capable to combine multiple events about
a single user, and thus single out a user.
End-users in the Microsoft Enterprise environment have a domain account. But if

they want to use the Online Services, such as OneDrive, SharePoint Online, Skype,
the Microsoft Store or Timeline (when Timeline is used in the hybrid set-up to sync
with SharePoint Online), they must also have a Microsoft account. End-users are able
to use their work email address to sign up for a Microsoft account. The service turns
the requesting user's email address into a Microsoft account.
It is not clear in what circumstances Microsoft creates a shadow Live account if an

end-user has only created a local account, on a stand-alone device. This behaviour
was observed in the Office ProPlus DPIA, in the results of the audit log.39
During this assessment, at the Security level (and telemetry blocked) no user
content (from e-mails or files) was observed in the Windows 10 diagnostic
dataflow, nor were any file names or file paths recorded when documents
were accessed from SharePoint Online. However, outside of the telemetry
client, when users are not prevented from synching their activity history in the
Microsoft cloud and the Timeline functionality is used in a hybrid deployment,
Microsoft does collect the names of accessed (Word) files and storage locations of
documents in SharePoint Online. With the cloud synced Timeline, Microsoft also
collects and shows the history of visited URL’s with Internet Explorer, Edge and
(since February 2019) Chrome.40 Information about visited URL’s is considered
highly sensitive, as it may reveal special categories of data.
38
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Windows 10 version 1809 basic level Windows diagnostic
events and fields, last updated 19 April 2019, URL https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-
1809#dxgkerneltelemetry-events (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019). The same
information is available for version 1903, 23 April 2019, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/privacy/basic-level-windows-diagnostic-events-and-fields-
1903#dxgkerneltelemetry-events (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
39
See footnote 132 in the Office ProPlus DPIA report: “In the lab report, in scenario 4.2.2 Test
case 2, an Office 2016 MST install switches on ‘Connected services’, without having to log-in to
a Microsoft account. Perhaps in such circumstances a kind of ‘shadow account’ is created, with
a Live ID, in order to allow access to the Connected Services.” Microsoft has not provided
information about this creation of shadow accounts.
40
The Chrome functionality for Timeline was added by Microsoft on 19 February 2019, after
the technical inspection by the test lab at SSC-I. See for example Digital Trends, Microsoft
extension adds Google Chrome support for Windows Timeline, 26 February 2019, URL:
https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/google-chrome-windows-10-timeline/ (URL last
visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
Page 21 of 79
2.2 Results of detailed German telemetry inspection
The German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesambt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik) has conducted a thorough analysis of the technical
components built into Windows 10 that log events and create telemetry data. The
analysis addresses all the different consumer, professional and Enterprise versions
of Windows 10. The different reports with the results were published on 20
November 2018.41
Though BSI concludes that Microsoft is able to collect a lot of information through
telemetry about the system and the individual usage of the software, the published
reports do not provide any details about the type and content of telemetry events.
The BSI reports contain a detailed description of the inner workings of the Windows
components responsible for the local processing and transmission of the telemetry
data.
The BSI did not use the new Data Viewer Tool that is provided by Microsoft to
inspect the telemetry data, but instead, used a debugger tool to capture telemetry
data while they are being processed by the internal Windows components, before
they are encrypted and transmitted to Microsoft.
Microsoft has encrypted the network traffic and has implemented certificate pinning
as a regular security measure against unauthorised access. However, the specific
way in which Microsoft has implemented the certificate pinning, also prevents a
trusted network proxy from inspecting the data, i.e., the use of a man in the middle
proxy. That is why BSI used the debugger tool. The use of this method results in a
view of the telemetry data that is similar to the Diagnostic Data Viewer provided by
Microsoft.
The BSI report gives an in-depth technical explanation of the functionality of

telemetry. The report explains that Microsoft uses ‘Event tracing for Windows’ (ETW)
to collect the telemetry data. ETW is the core logging mechanism of the Windows
operating system. It is designed to collect system crash and usage data. The ETW
sessions deliver data to the in-built telemetry client for storage on the device, and
later, bundled, transfer to Microsoft.
The events created by ETW are produced by so called ETW providers, the entities
that are able to log the telemetry data Each ETW provider is used for logging a
specific category of events. For example, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) /
Internet Protocol(IP) driver implements its own provider logging network events. In
the public documentation of Microsoft, telemetry events are grouped by such
providers. This report calls these providers ‘categories’ of telemetry data, as
opposed to individual events within a category, and the different fields with
information in each telemetry event.
41
Bundesambt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Work Package 4: Telemetry, URL:
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Cyber-
Sicherheit/SiSyPHus/Workpackage4_Telemetry.html (URL last visited and recorded on 20
March 2019). The technical results are available at:
https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Cyber-Sicherheit/Empfehlungen/
SiSyPHuS_Win10/SiSyPHuS_node.html and https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Cyber-
Sicherheit/Empfehlungen/SiSyPHuS_Win10/AP4/SiSyPHuS_AP4_node.html (URLs last visited
and recorded on 20 March 2019). A summary in German was published in the e-zine Heise,
BSI untersucht Sicherheit von Windows 10, 20 November 2018, URL: https://heise.de/-
4227139 (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
Page 22 of 79
The number of ETW providers differs enormously per telemetry level, and is also
dependent of the actual system usage, installed software and enterprise
configuration.42
Telemetry level ETW providers43

Security 4
Basic 410
Enhanced 418
Full 422
The BSI finds the options for users and admins to determine the different telemetry
levels insufficient, because the data stream is very dynamic. BSI writes that
Microsoft is retrieving and updating the configuration telemetry data several times
per hour.44 BSI also warns that setting the telemetry level to the lowest level of
Security, does not end the data flow.
Although BSI did not publish an analysis of the contents of the captured telemetry
events, the observed behaviour of the telemetry matches with the observations
made by the lab with the Data Viewer Tool. Therefore, there are no indications that
the Data Viewer Tool would give incomplete access to all telemetry events.
2.3 Timeline data

Both with telemetry set to Security, and with telemetry blocked, Microsoft collects
document names and storage location on SharePoint Online when the Timeline cloud
sync functionality is turned On. Microsoft similarly processes URLs visited with
Microsoft browsers or Google Chrome. Timeline does not reveal document names on
the local network to which the device is connected.
2.4 Definition of personal data

According to article 4 (1) (a) GDPR,
“ ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable

natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a
name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.”
The Dutch DPA concluded in its public investigation report about Windows 10
telemetry data that the telemetry data Microsoft collects through the use of
Windows 10 are all personal data. During this investigation Microsoft claimed that
most Windows 10 telemetry data did not relate to natural persons, but only to
(technical aspects of) the operating system. The Dutch DPA explained that when
object data are combined with other data, the resulting data set may contain
information relating to an individual.
42
BSI Workpackage 4, full file, Executive Summary, p. 10.
43
BSI, Work Package 4: Telemetry. Table copied and translated from German to English.
44
Ibid. The report contains two figures that illustrate the frequency of the communication of
DiagTrack with Microsoft’s back-end infrastructure. Over a 3 hour interval, every 20 to 25
minutes a connection was established. See p. 31-32.
Page 23 of 79
Even at the Security level of Windows 10 telemetry, though Microsoft collects very
few data, the collected telemetry data contain several unique identifiers. These
identifiers allow Microsoft to combine events about a single user over time. Since all
telemetry events also contain a time stamp, Microsoft is technically capable to
combine multiple events about a single user, and thus single out a user (as
described in recital 26 of the GDPR). A Microsoft account is necessary to download
apps from the Windows Store, to use OneDrive or (if not prohibited by the
administrator) to use the Timeline functionality to sync work activities on multiple
devices. End-users generally use their work email address as Microsoft accounts.
Microsoft has the technical means to relate device ID’s to a user account, and many
Microsoft accounts contain directly identifiable information, because they are based
on the work email addresses that generally contain the initials and last name of the
employee, as well as the (domain)name of the employer.
Microsoft is able to directly or indirectly identify an individual user. The likelihood of

identifiability increases considerably with the ability to link different data events to
an individual user. As will be explained in section 8 of this report, the processing of
telemetry data involves structural data processing. At the highest telemetry level,
this may involve up to 1.200 different types of events. Microsoft has explained 10
engineering teams can add events to the data stream. Data events at the different
telemetry levels may include (user or device) names and IP-addresses. Such data
are either immediately replaced by asterixis in the original event on the device or
stored in a hashed form. All telemetry data, both from Windows 10 and from
Microsoft Office are long-term stored in the central Cosmos database in the USA.
This database may contain logs with unique user identifiers such as User GUIDs,
PUIDs, or SIDs (abbreviated by Microsoft as EUPI). These identifiers are
pseudonyms.
Microsoft accepts that the diagnostic data may contain personal data, but Microsoft
does not consider all diagnostic data to be personal data. Microsoft does not provide
documentation which Windows 10 diagnostic data it considers personal data. If
diagnostic data are personal data, Microsoft has said it will include those data in the
output of a Data Subject Request.45
During the dialogue with Microsoft about the Office telemetry data, Microsoft has
stated to SLM Rijk: “Accordingly, Microsoft agrees that Cosmos contains personal
data within the meaning of Article 4. However, we have access controls in place to
ensure that personnel with access only to scrubbed EUII and EUPI in Cosmos are not
able to identify natural persons. The means to re-identify or link a person via look-up
tables is handled as Customer Data, subject to rigorous access controls with logged
access.”46
To be clear, Microsoft has emphasized that it does not try to identify or track the
behaviour of a single user over time. However, the possibility of establishing such a
link is enough for the classification of information as personal data. It is not
necessary that this process of combining events leading to identification is actually
carried out. Similarly, Microsoft is technically capable of combining Windows 10
telemetry data with Office ProPlus telemetry data. The possibilities for Microsoft to
45
Meeting report SLM Rijk and Microsoft of 28 August 2018, answer to Q2.
46
Footnote 26 of the Office ProPlus DPIA report cites: Microsoft confidential response to this
DPIA report, 24 September 2018, p. 21. Though the meetings were about Microsoft Office, the
Windows telemetry data are long-term stored in the same Cosmos database.
Page 24 of 79
process these data for new types of machine learning and artificial intelligence are
described in section 8 of this report.
A Microsoft account is necessary to download apps from the Windows Store

(including additional Office add-ons, to use OneDrive or (if not prohibited by the
admins) to use the Timeline functionality in a hybrid set-up, if SharePoint Online is
used. In those cases, Microsoft has the technical means to relate device ID’s to a
user account, and thus directly identify the individual user. But Microsoft can also
indirectly identify users, with the help of the employer, for example through the
license number or domain account. The combination of several unique identifiers in
the Security level events, with a timestamp and sequence number combined with a
storage period of minimum of 30 days, makes it reasonably likely that Microsoft can
frequently relate the device ID’s to a domain account, by combining of several
events over time. For a specialised software company with approx. 300.000
employees, this cannot be considered an unreasonable effort.
Therefore, Microsoft must be held capable of directly or indirectly identifying the
individual end-user. Therefore, the collected telemetry data are personal data as
defined in Article 4(1) of the GDPR. The collected personal data may present a high
risk for employees if they are used to analyse work patterns and monitor employee
behaviour, either by Microsoft or by the employer.
As part of its research, the Dutch DPA filed a data access request for its research
accounts and established that it was possible for Microsoft to link the e-mail
addresses to the user identifiers, and the user identifiers to device identifiers.
As described in section 2.1 of this report, during this assessment, no user content
(from files or mails) was observed in the Windows 10 telemetry data stream at the
Security (or telemetry blocked) level. This does not mean that Microsoft does not
collect sensitive or confidential data via the telemetry stream.
First of all, when the administrator has not centrally prohibited the use of the cloud
synchronisation functionality of Timeline, in a hybrid deployment Microsoft collects
the names of accessed (Word) files and storage locations of documents in
SharePoint Online. In that set-up, Microsoft also collects and shows the history of
visited URL’s with Internet Explorer, Edge and Chrome. Information about visited
URL’s is considered highly sensitive, as it may reveal special categories of data.
Second, pre-installed apps such as Mail, News, Maps and Weather stopped working
when Fiddler was turned ‘On’. Thus, the telemetry stream via these apps could not
be analysed.
Third, the collection of telemetry data is highly dynamic. Microsoft engineers can
add new types of events to the telemetry stream without prior notice to the users, if
they follow internal privacy procedures.47 According to the BSI research quoted in
47
Microsoft Support, diagnostics feedback and privacy in Windows-10, 10 April 2019: “Specific
data items collected in Windows diagnostics are subject to change to give Microsoft flexibility
to collect the data needed for the purposes described. For example, to ensure Microsoft can
troubleshoot the latest performance issue impacting users’ computing experience or update a
Windows 10 device that is new to the market, Microsoft may need to collect data items that
were not collected previously.” URL: https://support.microsoft.com/en-
us/help/4468236/diagnostics-feedback-and-privacy-in-windows-10-microsoft-privacy (URL last
visited and recorded on 5 June 2019). Microsoft has previously confirmed that the collection of
Page 25 of 79
paragraph 2.2 the configuration of the telemetry data flow is modified several times
per hour. Each modification can mean that a new ETW provider wants access to
data, or an existing ETW provider wants access to other log data.
Microsoft engineers explain the importance of the dynamic nature of creating

telemetry events as follows: “In data-driven environments, such instrumentation is
moving towards rule-based approaches, where instrumentation can be added once
and then toggled without having to change the code itself. This functionality has
enabled data-driven organizations to collect data not just during testing, but long
after the product is deployed into retail. As Austindev remarks, “What’s really great
for us is to be able to real-time turn on and off what log stuff you’re collecting at a
pretty granular level. And to be able to get the performance back when it is turned
off is a big thing for us.”48
Microsoft has explained to the Dutch DPA in 2017 that the collection of telemetry
data in Windows 10 is controlled by organisational policy rules. There is no reason to
assume that such policy rules would not apply to the collection of telemetry data
from Windows 10 Enterprise. However, Microsoft does not provide any information
about this policy, nor any audit results with regard to compliance with those policy
rules. The limitations to these audits are described in section 5 of this report,
‘Controller, processor and sub-processors’.
In the Trust Center, Microsoft provides privacy information about Office 365, Azure,
Dynamics 365 and Microsoft Professional (support) services, but not about Windows
10. Nonetheless, Microsoft indicates that the company has privacy teams embedded
in the different service groups that do granular reviews of the data processing and
present their results to the EU Data Protection Officer.
Microsoft writes:
“Microsoft practices privacy by design and privacy by default in its engineering and
business functions. As part of these efforts, Microsoft performs comprehensive
privacy reviews on data processing operations that have the potential to cause
impacts to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Privacy teams embedded in
the service groups review the design and implementation of services to
ensure that personal data is processed in a respectful manner that accords
with international law, user expectations, and our express commitments. These
privacy reviews tend to be very granular—a particular service may receive
dozens or hundreds of reviews. Microsoft rolls up these granular privacy reviews
into Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) that cover major groupings of
processing, which the Microsoft EU Data Protection Officer (DPO) then reviews. The
DPO assesses the risks related to the data processing to ensure that sufficient
mitigations are in place. If the DPO finds unmitigated risks, he or she recommends
changes back to the engineering group. DPIAs will be reviewed and updated as data
protection risks change.”49
telemetry data in Office365 ProPlus is similarly dynamic. Meeting report 28 August 2018,
answer to Q1.
48
Titus Bank, Robert DeLine, Steven Drucker and Danyel Fisher:The Bones of the System: A
Case Study of Logging and Telemetry at Microsoft, ICSE ’16 proceedings of the 38th
international conference on software engineering companion, 1, (May 2016), URL:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PID4092213-1.pdf
(URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
49
Microsoft Trust center, Data Protection Impact Assessments FAQ, answer to the question
‘What are the responsibilities of Microsoft’?, no date provided, URL:
Page 26 of 79
2.5 Possible types of personal data and data subjects

As highlighted earlier in this report, this DPIA cannot provide the required limitative
overview of the different kinds of personal data that will be processed by Windows
10 diagnostic data. However, this report recommends that administrators set the
telemetry level to Security, and centrally prohibit the cloud syncing functionality of
Windows 10 Timeline. If that advice is followed, Microsoft processes very few
personal data.
It is up to the individual organisations however to decide about the telemetry level,

and other relevant privacy settings during the actual installation. To assess the risks
of these settings, they have to make an inventory of the types of personal data that
are factually processed in their specific organisation.
Categories of personal data

Generally speaking, users and employers can process all kinds of personal data via
Windows, especially since most government organisations also use Microsoft Office.
The Office products and other apps than can be installed on the Windows 10
operating system can be used for many different purposes by many different
organisations.
However, in this report, only the Security level of telemetry is examined, as well as
a set-up in which telemetry traffic is blocked. These settings exclude a richer data
collection by Microsoft about the contents of Office files (at the Full telemetry level).
Based on the lab tests and Microsoft’s own documentation, the diagnostic data
collection at the Security level does not include user content.
In a hybrid deployment, the use of Windows Timeline can result in the further
processing by Microsoft of data about the names of files and storage locations in
SharePoint Online, as well as the collection of surfing behaviour via the browsers
Edge and Internet Explorer. These kinds of personal data deserve some extra
attention.
Classified Information
Dutch government employees will, depending on the capacity in which they work,
often process Classified Information. The Dutch government defines 4 classes of
Classified Information, ranging from confidential within the ministry to extra secret
state secret.50
Classified Information is not a separate category of data in the GDPR or other

personal data legislation. But information processed by the government that is
qualified as classified information, whether or not it qualifies as personal data, must
legally be protected by special safeguards. The processing of this information when
related to an individual, can also have a privacy impact. If the personal data of an
employee, such as an Enterprise account ID, or unique device identifier, can be
connected to the information that this person works with Classified Information, the
impact on the private life of this employee may be higher than if that person would
only process ‘regular’ personal data. Unauthorised use of this information could for
example lead to a higher risk of being targeted for social engineering, spear
phishing and/or blackmailing.
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/trustcenter/privacy/gdpr/gdpr-dpia (URL last visited and

50
Defined in: Besluit Voorschrift Informatiebeveiliging Rijksdienst Bijzondere Informatie 2013
(VIRBI 2013)
Page 27 of 79
If government organisations have chosen a hybrid deployment of Windows 10

Enterprise, with the use of SharePoint Online or OneDrive, they have to be aware
Microsoft may further process diagnostic data from its cloud servers which may
include confidential file names and storage locations. A folder may for example have
as name: “State Secret – negotiations with country/company X”. If users are not
prohibited from switching on the cross-device sync functionality provided by
Timeline, organisations must be aware that Microsoft can further process
information from and about government employees, including information which
employees regularly access, send or receive labelled information on SharePoint
Online or OneDrive, and what websites they have visited in the last 90 days. Of
course, even if Timeline is switched Off, Microsoft still collects diagnostic data in
system-generated log files from its cloud servers about access to files.
Personal data of a sensitive nature

Some ‘normal’ personal data have to be processed with extra care, due to their
sensitive character. Examples of such sensitive data are financial data,
communications traffic data and location data. It is likely that many government
employees process personal data of a sensitive nature on a daily basis, but Microsoft
does not collect such data at the Security level of Windows 10 Enterprise telemetry.
If employees are not centrally prohibited from using the cloud sync functionality of
Timeline, Microsoft can process information via diagnostic data about web surfing
behaviour. Even if the websites do not allow for the inference of special categories
of data, they are personal data of a sensitive nature, since the URL’s reveal
information about the interests of employees and employees also have a reasonable
expectation that their fundamental right to communications secrecy is also
respected, within boundaries, on the work floor.
Employees also have a habit of including their own names in document titles, and
organisations may work with document structures in which file paths may include
confidential information or for example, qualifications or diseases of the natural
persons mentioned in the documents in the folder. The further processing of these
diagnostic data via the cloud sync Timeline functionality may thus result in
additional data protection risks, on top of the risks caused by the use of cloud
storage servers.
Special categories of personal data

Special categories of personal data are especially protected by the GDPR. According
to article 9 (1) GDRP, personal information falling into special categories of data is
any:
“personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic
data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data
concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual
orientation”.
With special categories of data, the principle is one of prohibition: special data may
in principle not be processed. There are exceptions to this rule, however, for
instance when the data subject has explicitly consented to the processing, or when
data has been made public by the data subject, or when processing is necessary for
the data subject to exercise legal claims.
If organisations allow employees to switch On the cloud sync functionality of

Windows Timeline in a hybrid set-up, where users can upload documents to
SharePoint Online or OneDrive, Microsoft can further process the name and the path
Page 28 of 79
of files on its own cloud servers and collect the URLs of visited websites. These
URL’s can be used to infer special aspects of an individual employee, such as
religious or political orientation or health data.
Categories of data subjects

Generally speaking, the different kinds of data subjects that may be affected by the
diagnostic data processing, can be distinguished in 3 groups, namely: employees,
contact persons and miscellaneous. With the Windows 10 diagnostic data processing
set to Security, the risks are limited to employees and other data subjects.
Employees
The government users of the Windows software are employees, contractors and
(temporary) workers of a governmental organisation.
Their (account and device) names are processed in connection with the use of the
Windows 10 software.
Contact persons
At the basic and security level of telemetry, Windows 10 Enterprise does not
capture data about contact persons, such as for example in e-mail addresses.
Dutch citizens and other data subjects

Besides employees there is a miscellaneous group of individuals whose personal
data may be processed in titles of documents stored in SharePoint Online or
OneDrive, for example in the name of a picture or job application.
3. Processing of diagnostic data via Windows 10

Enterprise
As summarised in the introduction and section 2 of this DPIA, this DPIA assesses the
risks of the processing of diagnostic data about the individual use of the Microsoft
Windows 10 Enterprise software. But what are diagnostic data?
For the purposes of analysis and following the logic of ePrivacy law in Europe, this
DPIA uses 3 broad groups of data:
1. Content data
2. Diagnostic data and
3. Functional data
A specific subset of user content data is qualified by Microsoft as ‘Customer Data’.

This category concerns content data that customers have consciously uploaded via
Online Services such as Azure, Dynamics and Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus to
Microsoft datacentres. Microsoft promises, via its Online Service Terms and the
specific GDPR amendment negotiated by SLM Rijk, to not use these Customer Data
for direct marketing or similar commercial purposes. Users can also determine that
Customer Data at rest are only stored in the EU.
Diagnostic data (or telemetry data) are all data about the individual use of the
Windows 10 software, including information about the use of Microsoft Office
software and other software and apps, but only to the extent that they are stored by
Microsoft and not merely transported. Technically, Microsoft collects diagnostic data
about and from Windows 10 through an in-built telemetry client. This client collects
events on the device, and regularly sends these to the Microsoft servers in the USA.
Page 29 of 79
This collection technique is described in section 8 of this report. The purposes for
which Microsoft collects diagnostic data are described in the next section of this
report.
Some data which are generated by the use of the services are functional data, data
that necessarily have to be transmitted from the user device to communicate with
services on the Internet, including Microsoft’s own apps and services. Examples of
such functional data are the location data processed by a map to provide directions,
and the data stream necessary to allow the user to authenticate or to verify if the
user has a valid license. Functional data may also include content data. The key
difference between functional data and diagnostic data is that functional data are
and should be transient. As long as Microsoft doesn’t store these functional data, or
only collects these data in a strictly anonymous way, they are not diagnostic data.
Microsoft performs the following data processing activities with the diagnostic data:
 Collection of the telemetry data on the device

 Sometimes immediate replacement of strings with letters or numbers by
asterixis (as visible in the Data Viewer Tool)
 Sending of the collected telemetry data in a batch over the public internet
to its own cloud servers in the USA
 Hashing, scrubbing (partial deletion), masking, pseudonymising or
anonymising of the collected data
 Storage of the telemetry data for different periods in a central database in
the USA
 Deletion of data.
Microsoft does not provide a public explanation why it is necessary to transmit all
telemetry data to servers in the USA, why not store these in the EU, or at least,
anonymise the data collected in the EU before they are transferred to the USA.
3.1 Opt-out choice for telemetry
In Article 25 the GDPR obliges data controllers to comply with principles of privacy
by design and privacy by default.
Article 25(2) explains: “The controller shall implement appropriate technical and
organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are
necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation
applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the
period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall
ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the
individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons.”
The qualification of Microsoft as a (joint) data controller is discussed in section 5 of

this DPIA report. But regardless of the legal qualification, the GDPR explicitly calls
on software manufacturers to implement the privacy by design and by default
principles. Recital 78 states: “When developing, designing, selecting and using
applications, services and products that are based on the processing of personal
data or process personal data to fulfil their task, producers of the products,
services and applications should be encouraged to take into account the
right to data protection when developing and designing such products, services
and applications and, with due regard to the state of the art, to make sure that
controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data protection obligations.”
Page 30 of 79
The IT-pro’s (administrators) of the Enterprise version can choose between three
telemetry options (Security, Basic or Full). If the administrator chooses to suppress
the privacy-related set-up experience and does not adjust the setting otherwise
(e.g., by group policy), the default diagnostic data level setting is Enhanced.51 At
that level, Microsoft explains it collects “Additional insights, including: how Windows,
Windows Server, System Center, and apps are used, how they perform, advanced
reliability data, and data from both the Basic and the Security levels.”52. In that
case, the setting for diagnostic data presented to end-users is set to Full.
Since Windows 10 version 1809, admins of the government organisations can use a
setting to switch the default to the Security level of telemetry. They can disable any
individual user choices with regard to the telemetry level.
Admins can also disable telemetry in the Register and block outgoing telemetry
traffic to known end points. Microsoft provides documentation about all known
telemetry endpoints in the Windows 10 Enterprise 1809 build.53 Admins can use
additional settings, such as disabling ATP and Windows Defender SmartScreen
(policy added since version 1809). Admins may also apply the Windows Restricted
Traffic Limited Functionality Baseline.54
The admin of each government organisation can apply the Security level or block
the diagnostic data flow by adjusting settings in the Group Policy or by modifying
the Registry. Microsoft explains: “You can configure diagnostic data at the
Security/Basic level, turn off Windows Defender diagnostic data and MSRT reporting,
and turn off all other connections to Microsoft network endpoints as described in this
article to help prevent Windows from sending any data to Microsoft.”55
Administrators can turn off the Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) using an
in-built functionality by Microsoft. The Windows Defender anti-virus functionality can
only be disabled permanently with difficulty, through registry keys or group policy
settings.
The processing of diagnostic data is partially influenced by the type of network:

local, or hybrid. In line with the government PIA model, these different deployments
are discussed in more detail in section 8 of this report, Techniques and methods of
the data processing.
51
Added at the request of Microsoft, remark made in its view on the report of 19 March 2019.
Microsoft refers to its documentation in the Windows IT Pro Center, Configure Windows
diagnostic data in your organization, 4 April 2018. Since the autumn 2018 versions, the
telemetry level Enhanced no longer exists in the different Windows 10 Enterprise versions as a
choice for users, only for Windows 2016 server.
52
Ibid.
53
Microsoft Windows IT Pro Center, Manage connection endpoints for Windows 10, version
1809, 16 May 2019, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/manage-
windows-1809-endpoints (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
54
Ibid. The Microsoft Windows Restricted Traffic Limited Functionality Baseline is available for
versions 1607 to 1903. Microsoft warns that Windows and Windows Defender have to be
updated before applying these settings. URL: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=828887
[URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019]
55
Microsoft Windows IT Pro Center, Manage connections from Windows operating system
components to Microsoft services, 16 May 2019.
Page 31 of 79
Microsoft describes the settings for the telemetry data in Windows 10 at the
different levels as follows56:
Level Data gathered Value

Security Security data only 0
Security data, and basic
Basic 1
system and quality data
Security data, basic
system and quality data,
Enhanced and enhanced insights 2
and advanced reliability
data
Security data, basic
system and quality data,
Full enhanced insights and 3
advanced reliability data,
and full diagnostics data
Microsoft explains: “The lowest diagnostic data setting level supported through
management policies is Security. The lowest diagnostic data setting supported
through the Settings UI is Basic. The default diagnostic data setting for Windows
Server 2016 is Enhanced.”57
3.2 Other privacy choices in Windows 10 Enterprise

Windows 10 contains many components with separate privacy settings. The use of
these components can generate extra telemetry data. The privacy choices for
Timeline are discussed in a separate paragraph below.
The Advertising ID and Tailored Experiences are turned Off by default, unless the IT
Admin takes action to enable them. In practice, the choice is up to the end user.
During the set-up (if not disabled by the admin) Microsoft presents a number of
privacy choices to the user regarding the telemetry level, location, the use of the
Advertising ID, Tailored Experiences, Inking & Typing, Online speech recognition
and Find my device.
Aside from these specific privacy choices, Windows 10 contains many services and
capabilities that may have a high privacy impact.
Many default settings, as presented in the interface for the end-user, are not privacy
friendly. By default, Microsoft switches ‘On’ the Windows Defender SmartScreen,
Website access to the language list, Suggestions for new Content and apps, tracking
of app launches, and show ‘fun facts, tips, tricks and more’ on the lock screen
(advertisements). Microsoft also preselects the highest, automatic frequency of
providing feedback.58
56
Since the autumn 2018 versions, the telemetry level Enhanced no longer exists in the
different Windows 10 Enterprise versions as a choice for users, only for Windows 2016 server.
57
april 2018.
58
Microsoft Support, General privacy settings in Windows 10, 21 May 2019, URL:
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4459081/general-privacy-settings-in-windows-10-
microsoft-privacy (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019). See also: The Star, Windows
10 privacy settings: How to stop Microsoft from spying on you, 16 February 2019, URL:
https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2019/02/16/windows-10-privacy-settings-how-
to-stop-microsoft-from-spying-on-you/ (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
Page 32 of 79
Microsoft also switches ‘On’ by default privacy invasive capabilities in the operating
system, such as location, camera, microphone, the contact list, calendar,
notifications, account data, call history, e-mail, planned activities, SMS and mms
messages, Bluetooth, access to diagnostic data about other apps, document folders
and picture and video libraries. However, in the new 1903 version of Windows 10,
launched end of May 2019, Microsoft has added a microphone icon that appears in
the notification area alerting users which apps are using the microphone.59
In its written view on part A of this report, Microsoft confirms that many capabilities
in the operating system have been turned on by default, such as the camera and
the microphone. Microsoft suggests to add that Windows 10 privacy protections for
device capabilities such as camera or microphone are managed at the app level.60
But Microsoft itself by default grants all in-built Microsoft functionalities and apps
access. Only apps that are not included in the OS, that are downloaded via the
Microsoft Store, must first ask for consent to use these capabilities.
It is up to administrators to turn off any privacy unfriendly default settings for data
collection through Windows 10 Enterprise. Administrators can determine the
settings via Group Policies (Computer Configuration\Administrative Templates\) or
through Mobile Device Management (MDM) settings. If an administrator has chosen
to centrally prohibit certain functionalities, the user will see an alert that says ‘Some
settings are hidden or managed by your organization’ when they navigate to Start >
Settings > Privacy.61
3.3 Windows Timeline

Microsoft can collect personal data when the Timeline cloud sync functionality is
turned On. This dataflow is separate from the telemetry data.
End-users see an option for ‘activity history’ in their privacy settings. This option is
switched On by default.62 Microsoft confirms in its view on the facts contained in
part A of this DPIA that the “Store my activity history on this device” privacy setting
is indeed On by default. But Microsoft also explains that the separate option “Send
my activity history to Microsoft” privacy setting is Off by default.63
59
Microsoft, What’s new for IT pros in Windows 10, version 1903, 21 May 2019, URL:
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Windows-IT-Pro-Blog/What-s-new-for-IT-pros-in-
Windows-10-version-1903/ba-p/622024 (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019). See
the specific help tekst at https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4468232/windows-10-
camera-microphone-and-privacy (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
60
Microsoft written view on part A of this report, 19 March 2019.
61
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Windows and the GDPR: Information for IT Administrators
and Decision Makers. 11 May 2018, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/privacy/gdpr-it-guidance (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
62
PC World, Windows 10 Timeline: How to use Microsoft's new organizational tool, 27 April
2018. “Windows assumes that you want Timeline turned on. If you don’t, or you’d like to
manage how Microsoft uses your information, visit the Settings menu at Settings > Privacy >
Activity History.” URL: https://www.pcworld.com/article/3263905/windows/windows-10-how-
to-use-timeline.html (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
63
Microsoft names two Group Policies settings for administrators to manage these options:
Publish User Activities and Upload User Activities. Microsoft, Policy CSP - Privacy,
Privacy/PublishUserActivities, 14 August 2018, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-privacy#privacy-publishuseractivities (URL
last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).and Privacy/UploadUserActivities, URL:
Page 33 of 79
Microsoft explains the functionality of Timeline as follows: “See a timeline of

activities and be able to resume those activities from your device. For example, let’s
say that you were editing a Word document on your device, but you were unable to
finish before you had to leave the office for the day. If you selected the Store my
activity history on this device check box on the Activity history settings page, you
would see that Word activity in your timeline the following day, and for the next
several days, and from there, you could resume working on it. If you selected the
Send my activity history to Microsoft check box and you were unable to finish before
you had to leave the office for the day, not only would you see that Word activity in
your timeline for up to 30 days, but you could also resume working on it later from
another device.”64
The Timeline cloud sync functionality is only available for users with a Microsoft
account. This is relevant if government employees work in a hybrid environment,
where the local AD is synced with the Office 365 AD. In such a hybrid environment
employees can use Microsoft’s cloud storage services SharePoint Online and
OneDrive for Business.
If users turn the separate cloud sync Timeline option On, they send their activity
history to Microsoft. The company then uses data it already has in system-
generated log files from its SharePoint online and OneDrive servers to create an
online overview of the files the employee has been working on. Microsoft explains:
“[Timeline] uses your activity history data to enable cross-device experiences.65
Microsoft writes: “You can continue activities that you started from those other
devices on your Windows device. Initially, this will be limited to Microsoft Edge
mobile, but will soon include Office mobile apps like Word, Excel, and PowerPoint.”66
When the online Timeline functionality is switched On, Microsoft also collects web
surfing behaviour by processing information about use of the three browsers
Explorer, Edge and Chrome.
4. Purposes of the processing
The Dutch government has a multi-layered enrolment framework with Microsoft to

act as data processor for the Enterprise Online Services (such as Azure and
Office365) and for Professional Services (such as customer support). But this
framework does not include Windows 10 Enterprise, because Microsoft does not
consider this to be an Online Service.
privacy#privacy-uploaduseractivities (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
64
Microsoft, Windows 10 activity history and your privacy, 10 April 2019, URL:
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4468227/windows-10-activity-history-and-your-
privacy-microsoft-privacy (URL last visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
Page 34 of 79
4.1 Sixteen processing purposes from the general privacy statement

With regard to the diagnostic data collected by Windows 10 Enterprise, Microsoft
considers itself to be a (sole and independent) data controller. Therefore, all the
purposes mentioned in Microsoft’s general Privacy Statement apply.67
Some of the purposes in the General Privacy Statement only apply to specific
customer products and services and are therefore not mentioned here.68
1. Purpose: compatible uses with providing the Enterprise service

Microsoft outlines in its General Privacy Statement that it may use data for
additional purposes it deems compatible.
“General. When a customer tries, purchases, uses, or subscribes to Enterprise and

Developer Products, or obtains support for or professional services with such
products, Microsoft collects data to provide the service (including uses compatible
with providing the service), provide the best experiences with our products, operate
our business, and communicate with the customer.”69
2. Purpose: Provide Our Products

The first specific purpose for the processing of all personal data, as mentioned by
Microsoft, is to be able to provide the products in question.
“We use data to operate our products and provide you rich, interactive experiences.
For example, if you use OneDrive, we process the documents you upload to
OneDrive to enable you to retrieve, delete, edit, forward or otherwise process it, at
your direction as part of the service. Or, for example, if you enter a search query in
the Bing search engine, we use that query to display search results to you.
Additionally, as communications are a feature of various products, programs and
activities, we use data to contact you. For example, we may contact you by phone
or email or other means to inform you when a subscription is ending or discuss your
licensing account. We also communicate with you to secure our products, for
example by letting you know when product updates are available.”70
3. Purpose: Product improvement

The second purpose mentioned by Microsoft is improving its own products.
“We use data to continually improve our products, including adding new features or
capabilities. For example, we use error reports to improve security features, search
queries and clicks in Bing to improve the relevancy of the search results, usage data
to determine what new features to prioritise and voice data to improve speech
recognition accuracy.”71
67
Microsoft Privacy Statement, last updated May 2019, URL:
https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-GB/privacystatement (URL last visited and recorded on 5
June 2019). Statement under “How We Use Personal Data”.
68
The purposes of Customer Support and Transacting Commerce are excluded, as the first is
arranged via Professional Services and it is not possible for employees to carry out a
transaction with Microsoft using the Enterprise version.
69
Microsoft Privacy Statement, May 2019, under Product-specific details: Enterprise and
developer products.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
Page 35 of 79
4. Purpose: Personalisation
Microsoft processes personal data of users to personalise its services.
“Many products include personalised features, such as recommendations that
enhance your productivity and enjoyment. These features use automated processes
to tailor your product experiences based on the data we have about you, such as
inferences we make about you and your use of the product, activities, interests and
location. For example, depending on your settings, if you stream movies in a
browser on your Windows device, you may see a recommendation for an app from
the Microsoft Store that streams more efficiently. If you use Microsoft Account, with
your permission, we can sync your settings on several devices. Many of our
products provide controls to disable personalised features.”72
5. Purpose: Product Activation

If any product offered by Microsoft needs to be activated, Microsoft also processes
data in order to carry out this activation. “We use data – such as device and
application type, location and unique device, application, network and subscription
identifiers – to activate products that require activation.”73
6. Purpose: Product Development

Microsoft pursues the purpose of developing more products.
“We use data to develop new products. For example, we use data, often de-
identified, to better understand our customers’ computing and productivity needs
which can shape the development of new products.”74
7. Purpose: Help secure and troubleshoot

Microsoft processes data in order to secure and troubleshoot its products.
“We use data to help secure and troubleshoot our products. This includes using data
to protect the security and safety of our products and users, detecting malware and
malicious activities, troubleshooting performance and compatibility issues to help
customers get the most out of their experiences, and notifying customers of updates
to our products. This may include using automated systems to detect security and
safety issues.”75
8. Purpose: Safety
Microsoft processes personal data in order to protect the safety of products.
“We use data to protect the safety of our products and our customers. Our security
features and products can disrupt the operation of malicious software and notify
users if malicious software is found on their devices. For example, some of our
products, such as Outlook or OneDrive, systematically scan content in an automated
manner to identify suspected spam, viruses, abusive actions or URLs that have been
flagged as fraud, phishing or malware links; and we reserve the right to block
delivery of a communication or remove content if it violates our terms.”76
9. Purpose: Updates
Microsoft processes personal data in order to roll out updates.
“We use data we collect to develop product updates and security patches. For
example, we may use information about your device’s capabilities, such as available
memory, to provide you a software update or security patch. Updates and patches
are intended to maximise your experience with our products, help you protect the
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
Page 36 of 79
privacy and security of your data, provide new features and ensure that your device
is ready to process such updates.”77
10. Purpose: Promotional communications.

“We use data we collect to deliver promotional communications. You can sign up for
email subscriptions and choose whether you wish to receive promotional
communications from Microsoft by email, SMS, physical mail and telephone. For
information about managing your contact data, email subscriptions, and promotional
communications, see the How to access and control your personal data section of
this privacy statement.” 78
11. Purpose: Relevant offers.

“Microsoft uses data to provide you with relevant and valuable information regarding
our products. We analyse data from a variety of sources to predict the information
that will be most interesting and relevant to you and deliver such information to you
in a variety of ways. For example, we may predict your interest in gaming and
communicate with you about new games you may like.” 79
12. Purpose: Advertising

“We use data we collect through our interactions with you, through some of our
products, and on third-party web properties, for advertising in our products and on
third-party properties. We may use automated processes to help make advertising
more relevant to you.” 80
13. Purpose: Reporting and Business Operations.

Microsoft collects and processes information for reporting and business operations:
“We use data to analyse our operations and perform business intelligence. This
enables us to make informed decisions and report on the performance of our
business.”81
14. Purpose: Protecting rights and property.

Microsoft analyses personal data of users in order to protect her (intellectual
property) rights.
“We use data to detect and prevent fraud, resolve disputes, enforce agreements and
protect our property. For example, we use data to confirm the validity of software
licences to reduce piracy. We may use automated processes to detect and prevent
activities that violate our rights and the rights of others, such as fraud.”82
15. Purpose: legal compliance.

Microsoft notes data subject access obligations under the GDPR as a purpose for
data processing: “We process data to comply with law. For example, we use the age
of our customers to ensure we meet our obligations to protect children’s privacy. We
also process contact information and credentials to help customers exercise their
data protection rights.” 83
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
Page 37 of 79
16. Purpose: Research.

Microsoft explains that it does research with the data:
“With appropriate technical and organisational measures to safeguard individuals’
rights and freedoms, we use data to conduct research, including for public interest
and scientific purposes.”84
4.2 Four purposes for telemetry at the Security level

Microsoft describes that the purpose for the collection of diagnostic data at the
Security level is to provide the customer with the latest security updates.
Microsoft writes: “The Security level gathers only the diagnostic data info that is
required to keep Windows devices, Windows Server, and guests protected with the
latest security updates.” (… This) includes data about the Connected User
Experiences and Telemetry component settings, the Malicious Software Removal
Tool, and Windows Defender.”85
Microsoft does not provide a limitative overview with a description of the contents
and purposes of the different events collected at the Security level.
On the same page, Microsoft provides more specific purposes for the diagnostic data
processing at the Security level.
Microsoft writes:
“Connected User Experiences and Telemetry component settings
If general diagnostic data has been gathered and is queued, it is sent to
Microsoft. Along with this diagnostic data, the Connected User Experiences and
Telemetry component may download a configuration settings file from
Microsoft’s servers. This file is used to configure the Connected User Experiences
and Telemetry component itself. The data gathered by the client for this request
includes OS information, device id (used to identify what specific device
is requesting settings) and device class (for example, whether the device is
server or desktop).
Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT)

The MSRT infection report contains information, including device info and IP
address. Microsoft explains in a note that administrators can turn off the MSRT
infection report. No MSRT information is included if MSRT is not used.86
Windows Defender/Endpoint Protection.

Windows Defender and System Center Endpoint Protection requires some
information to function, including anti-malware signatures, diagnostic
information, User Account Control settings, Unified Extensible Firmware
Interface (UEFI) settings, and IP address.”87
84
Ibid.
85
April 2018.
86
Microsoft refers for more information to its guidance in Windows Support for Windows 7
Enterprise, Deploy Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool in an enterprise environment,
URL: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/891716/deploy-windows-malicious-software-
removal-tool-in-an-enterprise-enviro (URL last visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
87
April 2018.
Page 38 of 79
Microsoft also explains: “No user content, such as user files or communications, is
gathered at the Security diagnostic data level, and we take steps to avoid gathering
any information that directly identifies a company or user, such as name, email
address, or account ID. However, in rare circumstances, MSRT information may
unintentionally contain personal information. For instance, some malware may
create entries in a computer’s registry that include information such as a username,
causing it to be gathered. MSRT reporting is optional and can be turned off at any
time.”88
It follows from this information that Microsoft processes the diagnostic data
collected at the Security level for four purposes, namely:
1. Providing the customer with the latest security updates

2. The configuration of the telemetry pipeline
3. Detection and removal of malicious software
4. Windows Defender anti-virus and endpoint security protection
4.3 Four purposes for Timeline
Microsoft describes the following specific purposes for the processing of data via
Timeline when users have switched on the cloud sync functionality: “Microsoft uses
the activity history data to provide you with personalized experiences (such as
ordering your activities based on duration of use) and relevant suggestions (such as
anticipating what your needs might be based on your activity history).”89 At the
bottom of this information page, Microsoft mentions the following additional
purposes: “Microsoft will also use your activity history to improve Microsoft products
and services when the setting for sending your activity history to Microsoft is
enabled. We do this by applying machine-learning techniques to better understand
how customers in general use our products and services. We also diagnose where
customers encounter errors and then help fix them.”90
Thus, Microsoft processes the Timeline data for the following four purposes, when
the activity history is shared with Microsoft:
1. Provide personalised experiences

2. Provide relevant suggestions
3. Improvement of (all) Microsoft products and service by applying machine-
learning, and;
4. To diagnose errors and help fix them.91
Microsoft does not explain how these purposes relate to the other purposes
mentioned in the general privacy statement but does refer to its Privacy Statement
“To learn more about how Microsoft products and services use this data to
personalize experiences while respecting your privacy.”92
4.4 Purpose of disclosure to law enforcement

As a data controller, Microsoft may be obliged to hand over personal data to law
enforcement.
88
Ibid.
89
Microsoft, Windows 10 activity history and your privacy, 10 April 2019.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Ibid.
Page 39 of 79
In its general privacy statement, under ‘Reasons we share personal data’, Microsoft
explains that the company may access the contents of files on OneDrive to respond
to valid legal requests from law enforcement or other government agencies
“We will retain, access, transfer, disclose and preserve personal data, including your
content (such as the content of your emails in Outlook.com, or files in private
folders on OneDrive), when we have a good faith belief that doing so is necessary to
do any of the following:
 Comply with applicable law or respond to valid legal process, including from
law enforcement or other government agencies.”93
Microsoft publishes a bi-annual transparency report. In the Netherlands, in the

period January-June 2018, Microsoft received 211 requests for personal data from
Dutch law enforcement authorities, relating in total to 474 unique accounts/users.94
These requests can relate to any Microsoft consumer or business data. In an earlier
dialogue about Microsoft Office, Microsoft explained that very few of law
enforcement requests related to business cloud customers. Microsoft states there is
a very high legal bar for blind requests in the Enterprise environment (where
Microsoft would get a nondisclosure order).The requesting authority would have to
prove that the board of that organisation cannot be trusted.
With regard to Online Services such as Office 365, Dynamics and Azure, Microsoft
promises “not [to] disclose Customer Data outside of Microsoft or its controlled
subsidiaries and affiliates except (1) as Customer directs, (2) as described in the
OST, or (3) as required by law.” This guarantee, even though only limited to
Customer Data at rest, does not apply to the Windows 10 diagnostic data.
5. Controller, processor and sub-processors

The different roles of the involved (commercial) parties in the processing of personal
data are defined in article 4(7) to (4) 9 GDPR.
“'controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or

other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of
such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the
controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by
Union or Member State law;
'processor' means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or

other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
Article 26 of the GDPR specifies the obligations for joint controllers to create a
transparent agreement about their roles and responsibilities.
Article 28 of the GDPR specifies the obligations of data controllers versus data
processors. Article 28(3) lays down 8 specific obligations of the data processor, such
as only processing the personal data on documented instructions from the
93
Microsoft general privacy statement, May 2019.
94
Microsoft Law Enforcement Requests, select jan-jun 2018 and apply filter to ‘the
Netherlands’. This shows 252 accounts/users. In the period jul-dec 2018 (the latest available
period) there were 222 acounts/users specified in the request., URL:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/lerr/ (URL last visited and recorded
5 June 2019).
Page 40 of 79
controller, and for example contribute to audits. Article 28(4) describes the
possibility for a processor to engage another processor to carry out specific
processing activities on behalf of the controller. These are sub-processors.
5.1 Different international Microsoft entities

In its 2017 investigation report, the Dutch DPA included an organisational chart,
with the different Microsoft entities, ownership and management control.
Illustration 4: Organisational chart international Microsoft entities95
In the Windows 10 Enterprise contract structure, contracts are closed with the entity
Microsoft Ireland Operations Ltd. According to Microsoft, Microsoft B.V. (the Dutch
subsidiary), specifically the account team, represents Microsoft Ireland Operations
Limited in relations with the Dutch government.
In all public documents, Microsoft Corporation claims to be the (sole) data controller
for all data processing through Windows 10 Enterprise. According to the general
(consumer oriented) privacy statement of Microsoft, the Ireland entity would be the
Microsoft data controller for all users in the EU. 96
Apparently, like many other non-EU corporations, Microsoft has confused the roles
of ‘lead establishment’ and ‘data controller in the EU’. It would make a lot of sense
95
Screenshot from the chart made by the Dutch DPA, findings report Windows 10 diagnostic
data, p. 22.
96
Microsoft privacy statement, May 2019, “for those in the European Economic Area and
Switzerland, Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited are data controllers for personal data we
collect through the products subject to this statement.”
Page 41 of 79
for Microsoft to appoint its Irish subsidiary as the ‘lead establishment’ in the EU, as
defined in art. 4(16) of the GDPR. But it follows explicitly from the definition that the
establishment itself is not the controller or the data processor.
Art 4(16) GDPR: ’main establishment’ means:

(a) as regards a controller with establishments in more than one Member
State, the place of its central administration in the Union, unless the decisions on
the purposes and means of the processing of personal data are taken in another
establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment has the
power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having
taken such decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment;
b) as regards a processor with establishments in more than one Member

State, the place of its central administration in the Union, or, if the processor has
no central administration in the Union, the establishment of the processor in the
Union where the main processing activities in the context of the activities of an
establishment of the processor take place to the extent that the processor is subject
to specific obligations under this Regulation;97
The GDPR requires non-EU based organisations that process personal data in the
context of their activities in the EU to either have one or more establishments in the
EU, or a representative in the EU. By designating a lead establishment,
organisations can profit from the One-Stop-Shop principle. From a data protection
perspective, such a lead establishment ensures that non-EU corporations are bound
by, and can be held to, European data protection standards, by a lead DPA.
It is possible that a European subsidiary also has a data controller role for specific
purposes of data processing, for example if a subsidiary provides customer service
to customers in the EU, or processes financial data to send invoices. But it is highly
unlikely that the Irish Microsoft entity has any say at all about the nature of the
processing of the diagnostic data from Windows 10 Enterprise. The data flow is sent
directly to Microsoft’s back-end servers in the USA, and the data are analysed by a
team of USA based Microsoft engineers.
The general privacy statement and the Privacy Shield certification are signed by
Microsoft Corporation. The USA mother organisation has determined, and
dynamically changes, what telemetry data are collected, for what purposes, that the
data are sent to servers in the USA and stored in the central database(s) in the
USA, where they are analysed by 10 different USA-based teams of engineers. This
was also confirmed by the Dutch DPA with regard to the consumer and Pro versions
of Windows 10.98
The following analysis therefore only addresses the role of Microsoft Corporation as
a (joint) data controller or as a data processor (not the role of Microsoft Ireland).
5.2 Microsoft’s own qualification as data controller
Microsoft explicitly considers itself to be a (sole and independent) data controller for
the functional and diagnostic data it collects via Windows 10 Enterprise software.
97
See also Art 3(1) of the GDPR: “This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in
the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union,
regardless of whether the processing takes place in the Union or not.”
98
The Dutch DPA provides a detailed explanation of the roles of Microsoft Corporation,
Microsoft Ireland and Microsoft Netherlands B.V. in the Windows 10 telemetry investigation
report. See paragraph 2.2 and the assessment on pages 105-112 of the Dutch DPA report.
Page 42 of 79
Only with regard to Windows Analytics, and with regard to the Windows Defender
Advanced Threat Protection (ATP), Microsoft qualifies itself as a data processor.
Microsoft explains in its public documentation:
“Controller scenario
For example, when an organization is using Microsoft Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection (ATP) to detect, investigate, and respond to advanced threats on
their networks as part of their IT operations, that organization is collecting data
from the user’s device – data, that might include personal data. In this scenario, the
organization is the controller of the respective personal data, since the organization
controls the purpose and means of the processing for data being collected from the
devices that have Windows Defender ATP enabled.
Processor scenario
In the controller scenario described above, Microsoft is a processor because
Microsoft provides data processing services to that controller (in the given example,
an organization that subscribed to Windows Defender ATP and enabled it for the
user’s device). As processor, Microsoft only processes data on behalf of the
enterprise customer and does not have the right to process data beyond their
instructions as specified in a written contract, such as the Microsoft Product Terms
and the Microsoft Online Services Terms (OST).
GDPR relationship between a Windows 10 user and Microsoft

For Windows 10 services, Microsoft usually is the controller (with exceptions, such
as Windows Defender ATP). The following sections describe what that means for the
related data.”99
Microsoft also mentions its position as data processor for Windows Analytics:
As a result, in terms of the GDPR, the organization that has subscribed to Windows
Analytics is acting as the controller, while Microsoft is the processor for Windows
Analytics.100
The Windows Defender ATP service is mentioned in the Online Service Terms as one
of the Core Online Services. Microsoft explains: “Enrolled devices transmit usage
data to Microsoft datacentres, where that data is analyzed, processed, and stored.
The security operations center (SOC) of the organization can view the analyzed data
using the Windows Defender ATP portal. As a result, in terms of the GDPR, the
organization that has subscribed to Windows Defender ATP is acting as the
controller, while Microsoft is the processor for Windows Defender ATP.”101
This position from Microsoft is in strong contrast with its self-qualification as data
processor for the diagnostic data it collects via the Office ProPlus software. As
analysed in the DPIA on Office ProPlus, Microsoft only considers itself to be a data
controller for the collection of personal data via and about the ‘voluntary’ Connected
Services, such as the online spelling checker and translation service.
In response to questions of the Ministry of Justice, Microsoft wrote in March 2018:

“Microsoft does not agree with the Ministry’s assessment that we are a joint
99
Windows and the GDPR: Information for IT Administrators and Decision Makers, 11 May
2018.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
Page 43 of 79
controller with our customers with respect to Windows 10 data processing. Microsoft
is the independent and sole controller, and Microsoft determines the ways and
means of processing. Enterprise customers are given substantial choice and control
over the amount of data processed, but where that data is collected by Microsoft, it
is wholly within Microsoft’s control and responsibility to comply with controller
obligations under the GDPR.”102
In the previous DPIA of June 2018 on Windows 10 versions 1709/1803, it was also
concluded that Microsoft was a joint controller with the government organisations
for the processing of the diagnostic data. This DPIA recommended that SLM Rijk and
Microsoft should define their respective roles and the measures to guarantee GDPR
compliance regarding the telemetry data in a joint controller agreement. Because
Microsoft provides partial access to the telemetry data to the administrators,
without such an agreement this access would qualify as (unlawful) further
processing by a third party.103
The qualification of parties processing personal data has to be determined by a

factual and formal analysis. The formal contractual arrangements can provide an
important indication of the roles of different parties but are not leading in the
analysis who determines the purposes, and to a lesser extent, the means of the
data processing.
In theory, there are 3 possible qualifications.
1. Microsoft as a data processor, the individual government organisation as a

data controller
2. Microsoft as a data controller, the individual government organisation as
joint data controller
3. Microsoft as a data controller, in a direct relation with the natural person
who is the end-user of the software
As will be explained below, the first scenario is desirable with regard to all diagnostic
data collected in an Enterprise environment, regardless whether the software is
Office, Azure or Windows. The third scenario (Microsoft as a unique data controller)
can only theoretically apply to the collection of diagnostic data about the use of
telemetry data in the Windows software. To start with, the employees as end-users
do not have a contractual relationship with Microsoft, but with their employer. As
will be explained below, based on a factual analysis, Microsoft and the Office
Enterprise customers have to be qualified as joint controllers for the diagnostic data
collected via Windows 10.
5.3 Assessment Microsoft as data processor

In this scenario, a governmental organisation deploys the Microsoft Windows 10
operating system to carry out regular work tasks. Following the definition of a data
processor, Microsoft may only process the personal data necessary for the exercise
of specific lawful instructions provided by the governmental organisation. In that
case, Microsoft could be qualified as a processor for the organisation in question.
If the Online Service Terms would apply, Microsoft gives the strongest privacy
protections to Customer Data at rest, if the data are provided through Core Online
Services (such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Skype for businesses and Teams).
102
Microsoft Annex 2: Responses to Ministry of Justice and Security Questions, following
confirmation of the outstanding questions on 28 February 2018.
103
Windows 10 DPIA by Privacy Management Partners - in opdracht van het Ministerie van
Justitie en Veiligheid, not published, p. 25.
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Microsoft has these data subjected to the more rigorous auditing of SOC-2 and
covers the transfer of personal data from the EU to the USA with the EU Standard
Contractual Clauses. Microsoft already promises, via its Online Service Terms and
the specific GDRP amendment negotiated by SLM Rijk, to not use these Customer
Data for direct marketing or similar commercial purposes.
This level of data protection and these guarantees unfortunately do not apply to the
processing of Windows 10 diagnostic data, and the cloud sync functionality of
Timeline. There is no limitative list of purposes and no contractual agreement on
purpose limitation. The Windows 10 software is excluded from the Online Service
Terms. The only two components in Windows 10 for which Microsoft provides
guarantees are the Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service and
Windows Analytics, but these services are tested against the requirements set forth
in ISO 27001, ISO 27002, and ISO 27018, but not audited under the strict SOC-1
and SOC -2 audit regimes.104 The transfer of personal data from these two specific
components is covered by self-adherence to the Privacy Shield (and not by the EU
Standard Clauses).
Microsoft does not make any (other) audits available about the data processing in
Windows 10 Enterprise, or other types of assessment of the compliance with the
GDPR, such as a DPIA report.
The page with compliance offerings shows no results for Windows 10 Enterprise.
Illustration 5: screenshot from Microsoft web page Compliance Offerings105
104
Appendix A of the OST version February 2019 contains the OST Core Online Services, and
explains that Endpoint Detection & Response, Automatic Investigation & Remediation and
Secure Score are included. Microsoft provides extensive documentation about audits and
compliance tests, URL: https://servicetrust.microsoft.com/ ViewPage/MSComplianceGuide
(URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019). This information shows that only the
specific Windows Defender malware software has been assessed to comply with the ISO
standards 27001 en 27018.
105
Microsoft Trust Center Compliance Offerings, URL: https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/trustcenter/compliance/complianceofferings (screenshot recorded 20 March and 5 June
2019).
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The only two types of audits that are shown for the data processing in Windows 10 if
no region and no industry is selected, are the industry self-regulatory CIS
Benchmark that applies to Cloud services, and the US Government cryptography
standard FIP 140-2.
The CIS Benchmark only applies to Azure and not to Windows 10. The Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2 defines minimum security
requirements for cryptographic modules in products and systems. Microsoft
validates the Windows 10 cryptographic modules against this standard with each
new release of the Windows operating system.
Following its own qualification as a data controller, Microsoft has not concluded a
data processing agreement with its Enterprise customers for Windows 10. Instead,
the standard consumer-oriented privacy terms and conditions of Microsoft apply.
The processing of personal data via the Windows 10 Enterprise software is not part
of the contractual guarantees in the Online Service Terms and enrolment framework
between SLM Rijk and Microsoft. The specific protections and limitations in the OST
and GDPR amendments can only apply to a subsection of diagnostic data, -if they
apply at all- if there is a hybrid deployment, and Microsoft collects diagnostic data
on its own servers (via server generated event logs) about the use of Online
Services such as SharePoint Online or OneDrive.
Since the OST do not apply to the Windows 10 diagnostic data, and Microsoft does
not offer customers the possibility to create amendments on its general privacy
terms, organisations are not able to limit the purposes for which Microsoft processes
the diagnostic data. It is true that Microsoft offers different telemetry settings and
public information (since the spring of 2018) about the nature and amount of
telemetry data. This enables organisations to minimise the processing of personal
data by Microsoft, and to opt-out from certain options. However, these options do
not allow the organisations to provide the legally required specific instructions wat
personal data may be processed for what purposes. Adding to the confusion
Microsoft uses some telemetry data for data processor services such as the Windows
Defender Advanced Threat Protection.
Following a practical analysis, Microsoft cannot be qualified as a data processor. The

administrators cannot fulfil their role as data controllers for the diagnostic data. It
follows from section 4 in this report that Microsoft has determined the 16 general
purposes of the processing outlined in its general privacy statement, the 4 purposes
of telemetry at the Security level and the 4 purposes for the cloud sync functionality
of Timeline.
One of the 16 identified purposes from the general privacy statement is that
Microsoft allows itself to determine what other purposes may be compatible for the
processing of diagnostic data. Only data controllers can determine what personal
data may be processed for what purposes. A data controller may hire a technology
company and outsource certain complicated data processing tasks, such as ensuring
the security of the processing, or providing a well-functioning, bug free service. In
order to achieve such clear objectives, the data processor has a certain liberty to
decide how the personal data are processed, in what systems (with what means).
But Microsoft has contractually maximised its liberty as data controller, and does not
contractually limit the processing to well-defined, clearly delineated purposes that
would give the government organisations the necessary control.
Other general purposes from the privacy statement are: ‘personalisation’, ‘product
development’, ‘advertising’, ‘personalised offers’, ‘business intelligence’ and
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‘research’. Microsoft also mentions the use of contact data, such as email addresses,
to send promotional communication. These purposes of the data processing
primarily serve Microsoft’s economic interest to be able to compete with ‘free’
competitors. Microsoft does not enable its Enterprise customers to explicitly request
Microsoft to perform these types of data processing.
Additionally, Microsoft itself determines the scope of the audits. If Microsoft would
be a processor for the Windows 10 diagnostic data, the data controllers (in this case
the Dutch government organisations) would have the right to ask for specific audits
and add audit questions to existing audit frameworks.
Microsoft may also take the decision, when ordered to do so, to hand over data to
law enforcement. But according to the GDPR, only data controllers may take
decisions to hand over personal data to law enforcement. Article 48 of the GDPR
106
creates an exception to this rule, acknowledging that a data processor may

sometimes be forced by a court or administrative authority in a third country,
outside of the EU, to transfer or disclose personal data. That may only be recognised
or enforceable if it is based on an international agreement such as a mutual legal
assistance treaty. This exception is titled ‘Transfers or disclosures not authorised by
Union law’. This exception therefore does not change the main rule that only data
controllers may take decisions to hand over personal data.107 So far, no such mutual
assistance treaty has been negotiated between NL and the USA, or the EU and the
USA. In February 2019, Commissioner Vera Jourová presented a proposal for an EU-
US agreement on direct access to electronic evidence. 108 According to a news article
from Bloomberg, negotiations may start in the spring of 2019.109
Finally, as will be described in section 10 of this DPIA, Microsoft determines the

retention period for the diagnostic data, rather than the Enterprise customers.
Microsoft writes: “Customer-specific diagnostic data retention practices are not
supported. The Online Services are a hyperscale public cloud delivered with
standardized service capabilities made available to all customers. Beyond
configurations available to the customer in the services, there is no possibility to
106
See for example the controller-processor opinion WP 169 from the Article 29 Working Party,
p. 11, about the SWIFT-case: “The fact itself that somebody determines how personal data are
processed may entail the qualification of data controller, even though this qualification arises
outside the scope of a contractual relation or is explicitly excluded by a contract. A clear
example of this was the SWIFT case, whereby this company took the decision to make
available certain personal data - which were originally processed for commercial purposes on
behalf of financial institutions - also for the purpose of the fight against terrorism financing, as
requested by subpoenas issued by the U.S. Treasury.”
107
Microsoft objects in its response to this DPIA that it is not free to take a decision when it is
required to hand-over personal data, but this objection seems to be based on moral principles,
not on the legal analysis of the tasks of a data controller and article 48 of the GDPR.
108
Press release European Commission, Security Union: Commission recommends negotiating
international rules for obtaining electronic evidence, Brussels, 5 February 2019, URL:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-843_en.htm (URL last visited and recorded on 20
March 2019).
109
“The European Commission wants the EU to enter into talks with the U.S., and negotiations
may start this spring” quoted in Bloomberg, Huawei Frightens Europe's Data Protectors.
America Does, Too, 24 februari 2019, URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
02-24/huawei-frightens-europe-s-data-protectors-america-does-too (URL last visited and
recorded on 20 March 2019)
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vary operations at a per-customer level. Accordingly, we cannot support a

customer-specific commitment related to storage duration for diagnostic data.”110
Determining how long data can be stored, is also a decision that can only be taken
by a data controller. Deciding how long data are available, is a decision about the
means of the processing.
In sum, based on a factual analysis who determines the types of personal data that
are processed for what purposes, including hand-over to law enforcement and
processing for compatible purposes, and who decides about the scope of the audits
and the retention period, Microsoft cannot be qualified as a data processor for
the processing of the Windows 10 diagnostic data. By taking these decisions,
Microsoft acts as a data controller. However, Microsoft is not the only data controller
responsible for the processing of personal data via diagnostic data. In the current
circumstances, it is more likely that the second scenario applies, of joint
controllership.
5.4 Assessment Microsoft and organisations as joint controllers

Following jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice, the government
organisations have to be qualified as joint controllers because of their decision to
use the Windows 10 software.
The European Court of Justice has clarified in two rulings 111 and an advice from the
Advocate General112 that parties may very soon be qualified as joint controllers,
even when they do not have access to all the data collected by the other party, and
also when the levels of responsibility are very unevenly divided. While the two
rulings and the advice originate in disputes about the European Data Protection
Directive, the definition of joint controller did not materially change in the GDPR.
The GDPR only adds extra obligations (in article 26) for joint controllers to
transparently determine their roles and responsibilities.
Windows Enterprise Customers can exercise relevant control over the processing of
diagnostic data. As explained in section 3.1 of this report, admins can minimise the
data processing via the Security level, and additionally switch off or block the
processing of some diagnostic data, by disabling certain services. Even though this
influence is limited to opt-out possibilities, organisations that choose to use the
Office software allow and enable Microsoft to collect and store personal diagnostic
data.
To paraphrase the European Court of Justice: the production of statistics (and use of
the data to show recommendations to users) about user behaviour in Windows 10 is
based on the prior collection of event data from the computers or other devices of
110
Microsoft confidential answers 1 October 2018 to the 10 follow-up questions, answer Q8
(preamble).
111
European Court of Justice, C-210/16, 5 June 2018, Unabhängiges Landeszentrum für
Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein versus Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein GmbH,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:388. See in particular par. 38-43. See also: Case C-25/17, 10 July 2018,
Tietosuojavaltuutettu versus Jehovah’s Witnesses — Religious Community,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:551, par. 66-69.
112
Advocate General Bobek of the European Court of Justice, C-40/17, Fashion ID, opinion
delivered 19 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1039.
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users of the Windows software, and the processing of the personal data of those
users for such statistical purposes. 113
Microsoft has confirmed in the ongoing talks with SLM Rijk it is considering the
scenario for joint controllership for the processing of telemetry data from Windows
10 Enterprise. However, in case of such joint controllership, Microsoft will still have
to have limit the processing to specific purposes for which either the other
government controller, or Microsoft itself, has a legal ground. This will be elaborated
in section B.11 of this report.
5.5 Assessment Microsoft as the sole data controller

Microsoft considers itself to be an (independent) data controller for the diagnostic
data it collects via Windows 10. In practice, this situation is very unclear for the
end-users of the service. Most government organisations in the Netherlands use
both Windows 10 and Microsoft Office.
It is illogical that the Office software belongs to the (modern) Online Services for
which Microsoft is a data processor, while the Windows operating system would still
be an off-the-shelf consumer product. Both Office and Windows are part of Microsoft
Enterprise 365 packages. From the perspective of end-users Office and Windows
offer comparable, and heavily intertwined services.
As a sole data controller, because Microsoft stores telemetry data on the device and
makes the software send these data to its servers in the USA, based on the Dutch
Telecommunications Act, Microsoft would need to obtain specific and informed
consent from the employees before processing their personal data. Other legal
grounds are not available. Opt-outs cannot be qualified as consent, nor from the
employees, nor from the administrators. Employees are in a dependent position
from their employer and cannot refuse to use the Windows 10 operating system.
The different legal grounds in relation to the roles of processor and (joint) controller
will be analysed in section 11 of this report.
6. Interests in the data processing
This section outlines the different interests of Microsoft and the Dutch government
(SLM Rijk acting as representative of the different government organisations that
procure the software). The interests of the Dutch government may align with the
interests of its employees. However, this section does not mention the fundamental
data protection rights and interests of data subjects. How their rights relate to the
interests of Microsoft and the Dutch government is analysed in part B of this DPIA.
6.1 Interests Microsoft

Microsoft describes Windows as “a personalised computing environment that
enables you to seamlessly roam and access services, preferences and content
113
European Court of Justice, C-210/16, paragraph 38: While the audience statistics compiled
by Facebook are indeed transmitted to the fan page administrator only in anonymised form, it
remains the case that the production of those statistics is based on the prior collection, by
means of cookies installed by Facebook on the computers or other devices of visitors to that
page, and the processing of the personal data of those visitors for such statistical purposes. In
any event, Directive 95/46 does not, where several operators are jointly responsible for the
same processing, require each of them to have access to the personal data concerned.
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across your computing devices from phones to tablets to the Surface Hub. Rather
than residing as a static software program on your device, key components of
Windows are cloud-based, and both cloud and local elements of Windows are
updated regularly, providing you with the latest improvements and features.”114
Microsoft is integrating the Windows 10 software in Microsoft Enterprise 365

packages, with an annual subscription model.115 Microsoft has a strong economic
and financial interest in transforming itself from a software company into a
(subscription based) service provider. For investors, recurring revenue models mean
stable and predictable recurring revenue, as opposed to estimates for one-time
transactions. In order to retain customers in annual recurring revenue schemes,
Microsoft has a strong incentive to gain detailed customer insight in order to cross-
sell other services and market to new customers.
In its 10-K filing with the USA Sec over 2018, Microsoft describes this
transformation as follows: “We continue to transform our business to lead in the
new era of the intelligent cloud and intelligent edge. We bring technology and
products together into experiences and solutions that unlock value for our
customers. In this next phase of innovation, computing is more powerful and
ubiquitous from the cloud to the edge. Artificial intelligence (“AI”) capabilities are
rapidly advancing, fuelled by data and knowledge of the world. Physical and virtual
worlds are coming together to create richer experiences that understand the context
surrounding people, the things they use, the places they go, and their activities and
relationships. A person’s experience with technology spans a multitude of devices
and has become increasingly more natural and multi-sensory with voice, ink, and
gaze interactions.“116
With its pricing schemes and limitation of the support lifetime for locally installed
versions of the Windows (and Office) software, Microsoft strongly encourages the
Dutch government to switch from on-premises deployments to cloud-only services.
Microsoft does not offer a sovereign country cloud to countries, with the exception
of the cloud for China and cloud for the federal USA government. The costs to build
a separate cloud for the Netherlands would be prohibitive, according to Microsoft,
approximately 90 million US dollar. Microsoft has built its cloud to be able to process
data anywhere where it operates (with the exception of China). This relates to the
economies of scale. Therefore, Microsoft only makes commitments about storage of
Customer Data at rest in specific data centres in the EU, not about other types of
data, such as the diagnostic data. Microsoft argues that committing to more local or
EU storage would involve high costs and be a barrier to innovation.
With the move to the cloud Microsoft is able to drive up the security of services.
Microsoft considers it a vital interest for society, as well as a business and economic
interest, to be able to process large amounts of data in the cloud to be able to
114
Microsoft Privacy Statement, under the header ‘Windows’.
115
“Microsoft 365 brings together Office 365, Windows 10, and Enterprise Mobility + Security
to help organizations empower their employees with AI-backed tools that unlock creativity,
increase teamwork, and fuel innovation, all the while enabling compliance coverage and data
protection.” In: Microsoft Annual Form 10K 2018, PART I, ITEM 1. BUSINESS, GENERAL,
‘Embracing Our Future’. URL: https://c.s-microsoft.com/en-
us/CMSFiles/MSFT_FY18Q4_10K.docx? version=b04fa6cd-ed0e-a4ea-6f4f-05c9f644b8a2 (URL
116
Ibid, under ‘Reinvent Productivity and Business Processes.
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detect and defend against security threats. Local solutions are inevitably more
expensive and less effective, according to Microsoft.
Microsoft has explained that it competes with other large-scale cloud providers and
considers it an essential economic interest to be able to process large amounts of
data to develop new services. Like its competitors, Microsoft also wants to monetise
user behaviour. “Our ambition for Windows 10 is to broaden our economic
opportunity through three key levers: […, …,] and monetization opportunities such
as gaming, services, subscriptions, and search advertising.”117
In sum, Microsoft has financial, economic and commercial/business interests in the

collection of diagnostic data, and the ability to use it for all the different purposes
mentioned in this report, both as a data controller and as a data processor.
6.2 Interests Dutch government organisations

The Dutch government has a security and geopolitical interest in storing data in
local data centres or, alternatively, in a limited number of data centres in the EU.
The Ministry of Defense has a military state sovereignty interest to only store data
in a sovereign cloud.
The Dutch government also has a strong general interest in providing a reliable,
always on, well integrated operating system to its employees. Well-functioning for
the Dutch government also means that the software and the files processed with it,
have to be accessible on different devices, and accessible from different locations.
The ability for employees to seamlessly work at home allows the government to cut
back spending on workspaces in offices. Given the interest in nomadic working, the
government also needs to be able to use new tools and services that allow
employees to collaborate regardless of time and place. These tools and services
have to be compatible for all employees, thus creating a strong interest for
government organisations to combine different Microsoft products.
The interests of Microsoft and the Dutch government align when it comes to the use
of a limited set of diagnostic data to keep the services secure. As part of the shared
interest in security, Microsoft needs to be able to deliver timely updates of the
software.
Microsoft explains: “Windows as a Service accelerates the cadence to provide rich

updates more frequently, and these updates require substantially less effort to roll
out than earlier versions of Windows. Since it provides more value to organizations
in a shorter timeframe, delivering Windows as a Service is a top priority for us. The
release cadence of Windows may be fast, so feedback is critical to its success. We
rely on diagnostic data at each stage of the process to inform our decisions and
prioritize our efforts.”118
Similarly, the interests are aligned that Microsoft needs to (continuously) deliver a
well-functioning OS, for the Dutch government to prevent loss of labour capacity.
6.3 Conflicting interests

However, the interests do not align when it comes to the use by Microsoft of the
diagnostic data to develop new services, to detect usage of products of competitors,
117
Ibid.
118
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Configure Windows diagnostic data in your organization,
4 April 2018.
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or to gain deeper marketing insight in current customers. These types of processing

serve the commercial interests of Microsoft, while the government already pays with
money for the software. These types of data processing are likely to create a high
data protection risk, not only for the employees that work with the Windows 10
software, but all other data subjects whose data may be processed by government
employees. The inhabitants of the Netherlands generally do not have a choice with
regard to the government organisations they interact with.
7. Transfer of personal data outside of the EU
The GDPR contains detailed requirements for the transfer of personal data outside of
the European Union. A controller may process data in a country with an adequate
level of protection of personal data, as decided by the European Commission. A
special arrangement exists between the United States and the European Union,
according to which undertakings may self-certify as to their standard of protection
of personal data (Privacy Shield).
Personal data may also be transferred from a data controller in the EU (a

government organisation) to a (joint) data controller in a third country using the
Standard Contractual Clauses, as drafted by the European Commission under the
Data Protection Directive. These clauses are meant to ensure a high level of
protection contractually.
In the Online Service Terms, Microsoft guarantees that a limited subcategory of data
from the Core Services which Microsoft defines as Customer Data, will only be
stored in EU data centres. There is no such commitment from Microsoft with regard
to the storage in the EU of data about Windows 10. As explained in section 5 of this
report, Windows 10 is not covered by the Online Service Terms, and Microsoft
considers itself to be the sole data controller for all processing of personal data
through and about Windows 10. The transfer of diagnostic data from the EU to the
Microsoft servers in the USA is only covered by the Privacy Shield.
The Privacy Shield is an uncertain guarantee. Microsoft has certified itself under this
regime.119 There is reasonable doubt about the viability of the Privacy Shield. While
the European Commission issued a review in December 2018, stating that
improvements to the Privacy Shield have been made,120 it is not clear if the
agreement will be enforced.
Similarly, there is doubt about the validity of the Standard Contractual Clauses,
another frequently used instrument to transfer personal data to companies outside
119
Microsoft is an active participant in the Privacy Shield Framework according to the
searchable list of participants, URL:
https://www.privacyshield.gov/participant?id=a2zt0000000KzNaAAK&status=Active (URL last
visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
120
European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the second annual review of the functioning of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield,
19.12.2018, URL:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/report_on_the_second_annual_review_of_the_eu-
us_privacy_shield_2018.pdf.
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of the EEA. The Standard Contractual Clauses have been drafted by the European
Commission in 2004 (controller to controller) en 2010 (controller to processor).121
Both the Privacy Shield and the SCC are the subject of pending procedures at the
European Court of Justice whether these instruments offer sufficient safeguards
against the risks of extensive surveillance.122
The diagnostic data are analysed and processed in the USA, and the different
engineering teams may cut their own cubes (select multidimensional datasets) to
analyse.
In the general privacy terms, under ‘Where we store and process personal data’,
Microsoft gives a very broad description of international transfers outside of the EU:
“Personal data collected by Microsoft may be stored and processed in your region, in
the United States, and in any other country where Microsoft or its affiliates,
subsidiaries or service providers operate facilities. Microsoft maintains major data
centres in Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong
Kong SAR, India, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands,
Singapore, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. (…).”123
7.1 No overview of (sub-)processors outside of the EU

Via its general privacy statement, Microsoft informs users about its USA-based
subsidiaries that may process the personal data. Microsoft states they all adhere to
the Privacy Shield Principles.124 Microsoft does not provide a public list of (sub-)
121
European Commission, Data Protection, Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC), URL:
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-
protection/standard-contractual-clauses-scc_en (URL last visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
122
There are two requests pending at the European Court of Justice with regard to the
guarantees for the protection of personal data when transferred to the USA. The oldest
request, from 9 December 2016, filed by La Quadrature du Net is case T-738/16. This case is
about the validity of the Privacy Shield decision from the European Commission. The European
Court will hear this case on 1 and 2 July 2019. See:
https://www.laquadrature.net/en/2019/05/24/hearing-against-the-privacy-shield-before-the-
general-court-of-the-eu/ (URL last visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
The other case is the procedure from Max Schrems against the Irish data protection
commissioner, case C 311/18. This latter case results from a prejudicial question from the Irish
High Court to the ECJ. In this case, the European Court of Justice examines the facts
established in the procedure between Max Schrems and the Irish data protection supervisor.
The Irish High Court held a hearing on this subject in February and March 2017. On 3 October
2017, the Irish Court ruled that the Irish regulator was right that the Standard Contractual
Clauses between Facebook Ireland and Facebook Inc. in the US were invalid. The judgment of
the Irish Court is available at URL: http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sh2/HCJ.pdf. Facebook
has filed an appeal with the Irish Supreme Court against this referral, but on 31 May 2019 the
Irish Supreme Court has rejected this appeal. See: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
europe-privacy-ireland/irish-supreme-court-rejects-facebook-bid-to-block-ecj-data-case-
idUSKCN1T112I (URL last visited and recorded 5 June 2019). The European Court of Justice
will now hear this case on 9 July 2019, one week after the earlier case.
123
Microsoft general privacy terms, last updated November 2018. Microsoft continues with an
explanation that personal data are usually stored near the location of the user, with a back-up
elsewhere, but this is not relevant for the diagnostic data from Windows 10, as they are
directly sent to Microsofts servers in the USA.
124
The list is available at: https://privacy.microsoft.com/nl-nl/entity-list-adhering-to-privacy-
shield (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019). The list only mentions names of the
Page 53 of 79
processors that could process the diagnostic data from Windows 10. In the general
privacy statement, Microsoft just mentions the existence of processors and that they
must abide by ‘our’ data privacy and security purposes. This does not ensure that
Microsoft only engages (sub-)processors that are legally bound to process the
personal data in compliance with the GDPR.
Microsoft writes: “We also share personal data with vendors or agents working on
our behalf for the purposes described in this statement. For example, companies
we've hired to provide customer service support or assist in protecting and securing
our systems and services may need access to personal data to provide those
functions. In such cases, these companies must abide by our data privacy and
security requirements and are not allowed to use personal data they receive from us
for any other purpose.”
8. Techniques and methods of the data processing

Microsoft collects diagnostic data through the separate telemetry client built in its
operating system Windows 10.
Telemetry data
The telemetry client inside the Windows 10 software collects events with information
about components of the software and stores these snapshots on the device. The
client is served by the ETW providers, as explained in paragraph 2.2 of this report,
based on the investigation by the German federal information security agency BSI.
Microsoft encodes the telemetry data. Each encoded packet contains multiple events
that occurred over a period of time. This practice reduces the number of packets
that are sent from Windows to Microsoft, to limit the use of the end-user’s device
resources.
It is not known how frequently the different events capture data, or how frequently
the client transmits the collected data to the Microsoft servers. However, the BSI
report shows that the telemetry client contacts Microsoft’s back-end servers twice
per hour.125 Microsoft takes note of the type of subscription plan with regard to
internet usage.
Technically, the diagnostic data from the Windows 10 software are sent through one
unified telemetry API to different network points. The network traffic captured by
the technical lab shows that telemetry traffic is sent to (at least) 3 different network
endpoints.
Hostnames Description
nav.smartscreen.microsoft.com Function in the browser Edge
to detect phishing and
malware
web.vortex.data.microsoft.com Diagnostic data collection
through a.o. Edge
v20.events.data.microsoft.com Connected User Experience
and Diagnostic component
with Windows 10 version 1803
and
companies, without any indication of the nature of their business of the purposes for which
they may process the personal data from government customers in the Netherlands.
125
BSI report, Work Package 4: telemetry. Executive summary in English, figures 27 and 28.
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Azure Analytics
fe2.update.microsoft.com Windows updates
onedriveclucprodbn20030.blob.core.windows.net Connections to OneDrive
licensing.mp.microsoft.com License check
At the Security level for a ‘local’ Windows 10 install (On Premise AD), the Data
Viewer Tool shows few events. However, as BSI also has noted, there is still
outgoing traffic to known telemetry endpoints for Windows, and connections to
OneDrive. The difference between the Security level and the disabled telemetry,
with blocking of all telemetry endpoints, is minimal. In both cases, there is still
traffic with the known Office telemetry endpoints. In the ‘disabled telemetry
scenario, no data are sent to OneDrive endpoints, but data are still being sent to
licensing.mp.microsoft.com (for a License check and to fe2.update.microsoft.com
(for Windows updates).
If an organisation allows users to use Microsoft Timeline to sync their devices (and
therefore, send activity history data to Microsoft), Microsoft will register what
website have been visited, and further process information from its cloud servers
what files have been accessed. Files on the on-premise network are not captured.
Local versus hybrid installation

Enterprise customers can install the Windows software on-premise, or in
combination with Online Services such as SharePoint Online. The Dutch government
is testing this hybrid cloud combination. In this new set-up, the content data can be
stored in Microsoft’s cloud services SharePoint Online and OneDrive for Business.
From a data protection perspective, the main difference between the different
Windows deployments is that users generally must have a Microsoft account in case
of hybrid deployment. This is not necessary if the installation is completely local (No
AD/stand-alone). In that case Microsoft does not know the local ID. However, if a
user uses Office 365 ProPlus CTR, the user needs to have an Office 365 account. If a
user with a local Windows account wants to use the Microsoft Store, Skype,
SharePoint Online, OneDrive for Business, Exchange Online or Windows Timeline, he
or she also needs to create a Microsoft account.
Dynamic big data processing

The collection of Windows 10 (and Microsoft Office) telemetry data is highly dynamic.
The German information security agency BSI has observed that the configuration of
the data stream changed several times per hour. This may be due to the use of
specific software or apps, but it is also possible for the engineering teams to add new
data and new events.
Some of the Windows 10 telemetry data are stored long term in the central Cosmos
database, just like the Microsoft Office telemetry data. Microsoft explains in its own
Office 365 GDPR compliance assessment: “Cosmos is the central audit record
repository for all service teams and audit logs are uploaded to Cosmos from all
servers in the Office 365 environment.”126 Microsoft explains that system-generated
126
Microsoft Compliance Manager Office 365, tab ‘Microsoft Managed’, Control ID: 6.9.3.
Accessible (with Microsoft account log-in) via the Microsoft Servicetrust dashboard, the
Compliance Manager, URL: https://servicetrust.microsoft.com/FrameworkDetailV2/b3d8589d-
5987-45b7-8591-235c4a2f2ca2 (URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019).
Page 55 of 79
event logs from its cloud servers, such as SharePoint Online, are stored in Cosmos as
well.127
Some of the purposes in the general privacy statement point to processing for yet
unknown purposes (such as product development, research and business
intelligence). This is a typical characteristic of big data processing, that an existing
large set of data is used to examine new correlations, to answer (new) business
questions, for statistical inferences and as training data for machine learning.
Because Microsoft has not specified what personal data it will process for what
specific and narrowly defined purposes, it cannot be excluded that Microsoft uses
the diagnostic data from Windows 10 for machine learning and development of
artificial intelligence. Another purpose is illustrated in an article from 2016, written
by Microsoft engineers, about purposes of Windows event logging: making business
decisions.
An engineer is quoted in the article: “We developed the questions first. We said:
what
are the things that we want to know? What hooks do we need to put into the system
and what kind of reports do we need to get back out in order to answer those
questions? We didn’t just take raw dumps and then try and figure out what we could
learn, we were targeting specific learnings.”
The article explains that these questions require combining multiple data sources to
provide a recommendation or decision. Another engineer remarks: “When you start
joining it against multiple data sources, that’s when you get key insights.”128
Unlike the contractual guarantees provided in the enrolment framework for the
protection of the subset of Customer Data in Office ProPlus, cloud services such as
SharePoint Online and Azure, Microsoft does not provide any guarantees with regard
to marketing, behavioural advertising and profiling with regard to data resulting
from the use of Windows 10. Following the general privacy statement, Microsoft
allows itself to to use the diagnostic data for the profiling of individual users (for
example under the purpose ‘Personalisation’.
9. Additional legal obligations: ePrivacy Directive
In this section, only the additional obligations arising from the ePrivacy Directive are
discussed. Given the limited scope of this DPIA, other legal obligations or policy
rules (for example with regard to security, such as BIR and the upcoming BIO), are
not included in this report.
It follows from section 2 in this report that Microsoft processes personal data via the
diagnostic data about the use of the Windows 10 software, however limited the
collection is at the Security level. Section 5 argues that the Dutch government and
Microsoft are factually joint data controllers for this data processing. Based on
article 3(1) of the GDPR, because the processing takes place in the context of the
127
Microsoft confidential answers 1 October 2018 to the 10 follow-up questions, answer Q4f.
128
Titus Barik, Robert DeLine, Steven Drucker, Danyel Fisher, The Bones of the System:
A Case Study of Logging and Telemetry at Microsoft, ICSE ’16 Companion, May 14 - 22, 2016,
Austin, TX, USA, p. 8-9, URL: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2889160.2889231 (URL
Page 56 of 79
activities of the employers based in the Netherlands, the regulation applies to all
phases of the processing of these data.
As outlined in the investigation report of the Dutch DPA about Windows 10

telemetry data, certain rules from the current ePrivacy Directive may apply to the
placing of information on devices through an inbuilt telemetry client that is delivered
via the Internet. Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive has been transposed in article
11.7a of the Dutch Telecommunications Act.
The consequences of this provision are far-reaching, since this provision requires
clear and complete information to be provided *prior* to the data processing, and it
requires consent from the user. Microsoft’s denial of the applicability of this
provision to the sending of information through its telemetry client has already been
extensively rejected by the Dutch DPA and therefore does not merit any further
explanation in this report.
In part B of this DPIA the difficulty is assessed of obtaining freely given consent
from employees, given their dependency in the relationship with their employer.
Similarly far reaching, the proposed ePrivacy Regulation contains separate rules
about the possibility to automatically distribute updates to users. The proposed
ePrivacy Regulation will also broaden its scope to other providers of communication
services. Microsoft and the government organisations therefore also have to take
the (existing) principle into account that all traffic data have to be deleted or
immediately anonymised after the data have been used to transmit the
communication, unless a legal exception applies.
On 10 January 2017, the European Commission published a proposal for a new

ePrivacy Regulation. The proposed Article 8(1), Protection of information stored in
and related to end-user’s terminal equipment, expanded the current consent
requirement for cookies and similar techniques to the use of all processing and
storage capabilities of terminal equipment.
The European Parliament adopted its view on 23 October 2017. It added a specific
exception for updates and with regard to employees. To article 8(1) 2 new
exceptions on the consent requirement were added:
it is necessary to ensure security, confidentiality, integrity, availability and

authenticity of the terminal equipment of the end-user, by means of updates, for
the duration necessary for that purpose, provided that:
(i) this does not in any way change the functionality of the hardware or software or
the privacy settings chosen by the user;
(ii) the user is informed in advance each time an update is being installed; and
(iii) the user has the possibility to postpone or turn off the automatic installation of
these updates;
And
in the context of employment relationships, it is strictly technically necessary for the
execution of an employee's task, where:
(i) the employer provides and/or is the user of the terminal equipment;
(ii) the employee is the user of the terminal equipment; and
(iii) it is not further used for monitoring the employee.
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The Council of ministers has been debating the proposal since October 2017. In
October 2018 the ministers proposed a similar exception for software updates, not
limited to security updates. The ministers also intend to allow employers to seek the
consent of employees, without any considerations about the conflict this will cause
with the GDPR.
(Art 8 (1) da: it is necessary to maintain or restore the security of information

society services, prevent fraud or detect technical faults for the duration necessary
for that purpose;
or
(e) it is necessary for a software update provided that:
(i) such update is necessary for security reasons and does not in any way change
the privacy settings chosen by the end-user,
(ii) the end-user is informed in advance each time an update is being installed, and
(iii) the end-user is given the possibility to postpone or turn off the automatic
installation of these updates;
The Council has also proposed to insert a similar exception for security purposes in
the use of electronic communications data, in Art. 6:
Article 6 (1) Providers of electronic communications networks and services shall be
permitted to process electronic communications data only if:
(b) it is necessary to maintain or restore the security of electronic communications
networks and services, or detect technical faults and/or errors and/or security risks
and/or attacks in the transmission of electronic communications, for the duration
necessary for that purpose;
(c) it is necessary to detect or prevent security risks and/or attacks on end-users’
terminal equipment.
With regard to employees, the Council has proposed to add the following
explanation in recital 19b (but not in article 6 or 8): Providers of electronic
communications services may, for example, obtain the consent of the end-user for
the processing of electronic communications data, at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, and any moment in time thereafter. In some cases, the legal entity 129
having subscribed to the electronic communications service may allow a natural
person, such as an employee, to make use of the service. In such case, consent
needs to be obtained from the individual concerned.
In the document with results of deliberations in the Council, published on 4 February

2019, a further explanation is added to recital 21, with reference to the need to
respect the rights of employees as defined in the GDPR and employment law. 130 In
the last publicly available document of 13 March 2019 this reference has been
removed. The recital now only refers to consent from end-users, without
acknowledging the difficulty of obtaining consent from employees.131
129
In the 13 March 2019 version the word ‘entity’ is replaced by ‘person’.
130
Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2017/0003, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_5934_2019_INIT&from=EN (URL
last visited and recorded 5 June 2019).
131
Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2017/0003, ST 7099 2019 REV 1, URL:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/AUTO/?uri=consil:ST_7099_2019_REV_1 (URL last
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10. Retention Period
Microsoft does not specify the specific retention periods for the Windows telemetry
diagnostic data. As a general rule, Microsoft retains the data for a period of 30 days,
but some information may be retained for an unspecified ‘longer’ period of time.
Microsoft explains: “Microsoft believes in and practices information minimization. We

strive to gather only the info we need and to store it only for as long as it’s needed
to provide a service or for analysis. Much of the info about how Windows and apps
are functioning is deleted within 30 days. Other info may be retained longer, such as
error reporting data or Microsoft Store purchase history.”132
In its general privacy statement, under the header of ‘Our retention of personal
data’, Microsoft indicates that it stores personal data “as long as necessary to
provide the products and fulfil the transactions you have requested, or for other
legitimate purposes such as complying with our legal obligations, resolving disputes
and enforcing our agreements.”
Microsoft mentions six criteria that may determine the retention period. Three
relevant criteria are:
 “Is there an automated control, such as in the Microsoft privacy dashboard,
that enables the customer to access and delete the personal data at any time?
If there is not, a shortened data retention time will generally be adopted.
 Is the personal data of a sensitive type? If so, a shortened retention time
would generally be adopted.
 Has Microsoft adopted and announced a specific retention period for a certain
data type? For example, for Bing search queries, we de-identify stored queries
by removing the entirety of the IP address after 6 months, and cookie IDs and
other cross-session identifiers after 18 months.”133
An example of a specific retention period applies to the personal data processed for
Windows Timeline. Microsoft explains: “If you selected the Send my activity
history to Microsoft check box and you were unable to finish before you had to
leave the office for the day, not only would you see that Word activity in your
timeline for up to 30 days, but you could also resume working on it later from
another device.134
Microsoft allows users to delete their activity history from their device, to stop
sending their activity history to Microsoft and to clear individual activities, all
activities from an individual day, or delete all activities.135
With regard to the telemetry data, the Dutch DPA noted in its investigation of
Windows 10 Home and Pro that Microsoft applied data retention periods of 30 days,
or 13 months or 37 months136
Microsoft explains that the administrators cannot change the retention periods of
the diagnostic data. Microsoft writes: “customer-specific diagnostic data retention
132
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Configure Windows diagnostic data in your organization,
4 April 2018.
133
Microsoft privacy statement, May 2019.
134
135
Ibid.
136
Dutch DPA, report of findings Microsoft Windows 10 diagnostic data processing, p. 7
Page 59 of 79
practices are not supported. The Online Services are a hyperscale public cloud
delivered with standardized service capabilities made available to all customers.
Beyond configurations available to the customer in the services, there is no
possibility to vary operations at a per-customer level. Accordingly, we cannot
support a customer-specific commitment related to storage duration for diagnostic
data.”
In 2017 it was not possible for users to exercise their right to have their personal
data deleted. Since April 2018, Windows 10 includes a function that allows users to
individually delete the diagnostic data relating to them. 137 This delete-option does
not include back-ups.
Microsoft has explained that it does not make backups the way people usually
understand back-ups, as passive copies, possibly even on tape. Microsoft does real-
time active-active replication, with a small delay in replication. Within a period of
time, the other copy would get the same delete instructions. This explains the
difference between the initial retention period, and some period afterwards in which
snippets of data may still be available in replications of the data.
SharePoint Online does not perform system-level backups. Daily incremental and
weekly full backups are conducted for SQL Server schemas, and Active Directory
information is backed up through replication across sites and datacentres. SQL
Server schemas are stored for no less than 30 days and geo-replicated to alternate
datacentres for high availability.
Standard images and scripts are used to recover lost servers, and replicated data is
used to restore customer user-level data.
137
See for example: Windows Central, How to review and manage diagnostic data on
Windows, 10 April 2018 Update, 1 May 2018, URL: https://www.windowscentral.com/how-
view-and-manage-diagnostic-data-windows-10-april-2018-update (URL last visited and
recorded on 20 March 2019).
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Part B. Lawfulness of the data processing

The second part of the DPIA assesses the lawfulness of the data processing. This
part contains a discussion of the legal grounds, an assessment of the necessity and
proportionality of the processing, and of the compatibility of the processing in
relation to the purposes.
11. Legal Grounds

To be permissible under the GDPR, processing of personal data must be based on
one of the grounds mentioned in article 6 (1) GDPR. Essentially, for processing to be
lawful, this article demands that the data controller bases the processing on the
consent of the user, or on a legally defined necessity to process the personal data.
In this case, 5 of the 6 legal grounds can theoretically apply to the processing of
diagnostic data.
As analysed in section 5 of this report, Microsoft and the Dutch government factually
are joint controllers for the processing of all Windows diagnostic data. Even though
Microsoft claims to be the sole data controller for the Windows diagnostic data,
government organisations enable Microsoft to process the diagnostic personal data
about their employees and other data subjects. Following the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice about joint controllership (as explained in section A5 of
this report), the government institutions are responsible, together with Microsoft,
for the processing of personal data about the use of Windows 10 OS. Additionally,
government organisations are able to influence the categories of data and purposes,
as well as the retention period, by blocking or limiting the outgoing telemetry traffic
and by deleting diagnostic data about users.
Below, the different possible legal grounds are assessed for the different purposes of
the processing. Only the ground of vital interest is not discussed, since nor Microsoft
nor the government have a vital (lifesaving) interest in the processing of the
diagnostic data.
Microsoft does not specify the legal grounds for the processing of diagnostic data in
its general privacy statement.
Consent
Article 6 (1) (a) GDPR reads: “the data subject has given consent to the processing
of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes”
Regardless of the role of Microsoft as a sole controller, or as a joint controller with

the government organisations, this legal ground cannot be successfully invoked by
either party. Nor Microsoft nor the government organisations currently ask for
consent from the employees for the processing of the telemetry data, nor from the
other data subjects whose data may be processed through the diagnostic data. But
even if they would, such consent would not meet the criterion of ‘freely given’.
For employers, it is almost impossible to obtain valid, freely given consent from
employees, given the clear imbalance in the labour relationship.
Microsoft as a (sole) controller would have to prove that the processing of diagnostic
data for all 16 purposes meets the strict necessity requirement laid down in Article
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7(4) GDPR. Recital 43 of the GDPR explains: “Consent is presumed not to be freely
given if it does not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data
processing operations despite it being appropriate in the individual case, or if the
performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the
consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance.”
Additionally, Microsoft does not meet the requirements of specific and informed
consent. This applies both to the telemetry data and the Timeline data.
Though Microsoft provides a description of the purposes for Security level telemetry
data, this does not equal a limitative list purposes for the different telemetry events
such as Microsoft provides for telemetry at the Basic level.
With regard to the cloud Timeline, Microsoft does seek consent of the employees,
but without informing them what personal data will be processed for what purposes.
In section 4.3 of this report, four purposes have been identified for which Microsoft
processes the Timeline data if a user has switched the cloud functionality On. These
purposes are:
1. Provide personalised experiences
2. Provide relevant suggestions
3. Improvement of (all) Microsoft products and service by applying machine-
learning, and;
4. To diagnose errors and help fix them.138
Because data subjects are not informed in advance, in a clear and understandable
manner, what these purposes entail and how this relates to the other purposes
mentioned in Microsoft’s general privacy statement, and there is no information
available what personal data are processed for these purposes, the consent is nor
informed nor specific. However, given the sensitive nature of these data (web
surfing, names of files and file paths) and the circumstance that Microsoft can
provide Windows 10 without this service, there is no other applicable ground for the
processing of these data.
Consent is also the only available legal ground with respect to the spirit of ePrivacy
legislation. Article 6 of the current ePrivacy Directive obliges all providers to erase or
make anonymous metadata when no longer required for the transmission of a
communication or obtain consent from the end-users. Though this rule does not yet
technically apply to Microsoft’s monitoring of diagnostic cloud data via Windows 10,
it is likely that this principle will be extended to other providers of communication
services such as Microsoft in the new ePrivacy Regulation. This would make consent
of the employees the only option to legitimise the processing of metadata for the
Timeline functionality.
Processing is necessary for the performance of a contract

Article 6 (1) (b) GDPR reads: “processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of
the data subject prior to entering into a contract.”
Employees are generally not given any choice by their government employers when
it comes to the operating system they must use. The vast majority of government
employees spends many hours each working day with a device running the Windows
operating system.
138
Page 62 of 79
Hence, to the extent that the processing would be limited to strictly necessary
purposes for the performance of the contract which the data subject has with the
governmental organisation, both that organisation and Microsoft as joint controllers
could successfully appeal to this legal ground.
This legal ground can only apply to a limited set of personal data, for a limited set of
purposes that are necessary in relation to each user, such as the need to keep
Windows secure and deliver timely security updates at the Security level. The list of
specific legitimate purposes for the processing of telemetry data at the Security
level, as based on Microsoft’s own technical purpose descriptions, would look as
follows:

Microsoft processes the Security level data for two other purposes, namely:
3. Detection and removal of malicious software

4. Windows Defender anti-virus and endpoint security protection
But the processing for these latter two purposes can be switched off by the
administrators, as described in paragraph 3.1 of this DPIA report.
If a controller is able to offer users a possibility to opt-out from certain data

processing, this is evidence that the data processing is not strictly necessary to fulfil
the contract with that individual user. In such cases, the legal ground of art. 6(1)b
does not apply, but sometimes the legal ground of art. 6(1)f can be invoked.
The European Data Protection Board writes in its draft guidelines on the legal
ground of necessity for a contract: “A controller can rely on Article 6(1)(b) to
process personal data when it can, in line with its accountability obligations under
Article 5(2), establish both that the processing takes place in the context of a valid
contract with the data subject and that processing is necessary in order that
the particular contract with the data subject can be performed [emphasis
added for this DPIA report].139
Microsoft does not limit the processing of diagnostic data at the Security level to the
four specific purposes described in paragraph 4.2 of this DPIA report. Legally,
Microsoft permits itself to process all personal data, including the diagnostic data,
for all 16 purposes in its general privacy statement. The processing for all these
other purposes is not strictly necessary for the performance of the contract (from
government) with the user.
The requirement of strict necessity for all data and for all purposes is addressed in
the next sections 13 and 14 of this report (purpose limitation and necessity).
139
European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 2/2019 on the processing of personal data
under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR in the context of the provision of online services to data subjects -
version for public consultation published 12 April 2019, URL: https://edpb.europa.eu/our-
work-tools/public-consultations/2019/guidelines-22019-processing-personal-data-under-
article-61b_en [URL last visited and recorded on 5 June 2019].
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Processing is necessary to comply with legal obligation

Article 6 (1) (c) GDPR reads: “processing is necessary for compliance with a legal
obligation to which the controller is subject”
This legal ground cannot successfully be invoked by either Microsoft or the

government organisations for the processing of the diagnostic data about Windows
10 Enterprise. To the extent that an employer would need to use log files to detect
for example data breaches or seek evidence of improper behaviour by employees,
such purposes could be covered, if proper guarantees are present, by the legal
grounds of e or f, necessity for the public interest, or more likely, necessity for a
legitimate interest.
Processing is necessary for the public interest

Article 6 (1) (e) GDPR reads: “processing is necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller”
This legal ground is not applicable either to the diagnostic data processing described
in this report, since the government could also carry out its tasks with different
software from other companies. The specific type of diagnostic data processing is
not necessary to perform the public tasks of government; there is no specific public
interest served by using Microsoft services.
Since Microsoft is not government, nor a public organisation, it can never rely on
this legal ground.
Processing is necessary for the legitimate interests of the controller or a

third party
Article 6(1) f GDPR reads as follows: “processing is necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where
such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the
data subject is a child.”
Both the Dutch government organisations and Microsoft may process a limited set of
diagnostic data on the basis of necessity for their legitimate interest. At the Security
level this includes processing of diagnostic data to determine what security updates
to serve, to detect and remove malicious software and to apply Windows Defender
anti-virus and endpoint security protection.
This does not include any of the other purposes for which Microsoft legally,
according to the general privacy statement, allows itself to process the diagnostic
data and the synced Timeline data.
Absent clear purpose limitation, a limitative list what diagnostic data can be
processed for narrowly defined purposes, it has to be assumed that diagnostic data
can be processed for all 16 purposes mentioned in Microsoft’s general privacy
statement, including personalised advertising and direct marketing. Such
personalisation can be based on visited URLs, if the Timeline cloud sync functionality
is switched on.
Following the order of the Dutch government DPIA model, the necessity of the
processing is separately assessed in section 14 of this report. However, in
anticipation of this assessment, the legal ground of legitimate interest requires a
double proportionality test; whether the processing is strictly necessary to achieve
Page 64 of 79
legitimate purposes, and whether the interest of the data controller outweighs the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the affected data subjects.
Based on the requirements of article 5(3) of the ePrivacy directive (article 11.7a Tw
in the Netherlands), prior user consent is required if an entity programs a device to
give access via the internet to stored data on the device. Preceding the analysis of
necessity, the special character of the telemetry data and the ePrivacy consent
requirements preclude the processing for most of the purposes mentioned in the
Microsoft general privacy statement without the explicit consent of the end-user. As
analysed above, employees are not free to give consent for other purposes.
In sum, based on the ePrivacy Directive consent is required for most of the
purposes of the processing of telemetry data collected on the end-user devices, but
as joint controllers Microsoft nor the government organisations can obtain valid
consent given the dependency in the relationship between employees and
employers.
As outlined above, a limited set of telemetry data may be processed by government

organisations based on the necessity to perform a contract, or by either party based
on the necessity for a legitimate interest. But to successfully appeal to these legal
grounds, it is essential to contractually limit the purposes for which they must be
processed. Given the sensitive character of the Timeline data, this precludes further
processing for most of the current purposes (except for ‘technically transmitting
data to provide the service’).
12. Purpose limitation
Article 5(1) b of the GDPR obliges data controllers to comply with the principle of
purpose limitation. Data may only be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those
purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in accordance with
Article 89(1), not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes.”
Essentially, this means that the controller must have a specified purpose for which
he collects personal data and can only process these data for purposes compatible
with that original purpose.
12.1 Insufficient contractual guarantees

As explained in the sections 4 and 5 of this DPIA report, Microsoft does not offer
adequate contractual guarantees with regard to purpose limitation. The Dutch
government has an extensive contractual enrolment framework with Microsoft. This
includes GDPR amendments on the Online Service Terms, with the purpose to
ensure the exclusion of commercial use or further processing for other purposes of
personal data from and about employees that use Microsoft products. But since the
Online Service Terms do not apply to Windows 10 Enterprise, there are no other
binding legal guarantees outside of the general privacy statement that limit the
purposes for which Microsoft processes the diagnostic data resulting from the use of
Windows 10.
Though Microsoft mentions four specific purposes in its technical documentation

about telemetry at the Security level, and four purposes for the processing of the
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Timeline data, these explanations are never exhaustive. The informative texts about
telemetry and Timeline are not legally binding and can be changed any time without
prior warning.
Microsoft offers no contractual commitments that limit the processing of the

telemetry data to the four specific purposes suggested in section 11 (Purpose
limitation) in this DPIA report. Thus Microsoft can process the diagnostic data for all
16 purposes mentioned in its general privacy policy.
As described in section 4.3, Microsoft mentions four different purposes for the
processing of diagnostic data for its cloud Timeline service, including the very broad
purpose of improvement of (all) Microsoft products and service by applying
machine-learning.
12.2 Further processing for incompatible purposes

Purpose limitation is the most difficult principle to comply with in big data
processing. Further processing for research purposes (as mentioned in the general
privacy statement) can possibly be based on Article 89 of the GDPR, but only if strict
guarantees are in place, such as the use of anonymous data. Such guarantees are
not provided by Microsoft.
Microsoft explicitly reserves the right in its general privacy statement to process
data for uses compatible with providing the service. As explained in section 4.1 of
this DPIA report, the purpose ‘providing the service’ already includes a large number
of commercial purposes. These commercial purposes may provide desirable results
and insights for Microsoft but are not strictly necessary to provide the service.
13. Special categories of personal data

As explained in section 2 of this DPIA, it is unlikely that the diagnostic data at the
Security level contain special categories of data.
If users are not prohibited from sending their activity history to Microsoft, the
company collects and stores the web surfing behaviour for a period of 30 days.
Microsoft can use the visited URLs to infer special categories of data.
The processing of special categories of data is prohibited by the GDPR, unless a

specific legal exception applies. The processing of these personal data (revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the
purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation) by default presents high
risks for the data subjects. This risk is aggravated because of the commercial
purposes for which Microsoft allows itself to process the online Timeline data.
In view of the assessment in paragraph 11 of this DPIA that employees are not in a
position to freely give consent to Microsoft or their employer for this type of data
processing, there are no apparent exceptions on the prohibition on the processing of
these personal data.
Page 66 of 79
14. Necessity and proportionality

14.1 The principle of proportionality
The concept of necessity is made up of two related concepts, namely proportionality
and subsidiarity. The personal data which is processed must be necessary to the
purpose pursued by the processing activity. It has to be assessed whether the same
purpose can reasonably be achieved with other, less invasive means, these
alternatives have to be used.
Second, proportionality demands a balancing between the interests of the data

subject and the controller. Proportionate data processing means that the amount of
data processed is not excessive in relation to the purpose of the processing. If the
purpose can be achieved by processing fewer personal data, then the amount of
personal data processed should be decreased to what is necessary. Therefore,
essentially, the controller may process personal data insofar as is necessary to
achieve the purpose but may not process personal data he or she may do without.
The application of the principle of proportionality is therefore also closely related to
the principles of data protection from article 5 GDPR.
14.2 Assessment of the proportionality

The key questions are: are the interests properly balanced? And, does the
processing not go further than what is necessary?
To assess whether the processing is proportionate to the interest pursued by the

data controller(s), the processing must first meet the principles of article 5 of the
GDPR. As legal conditions they have to be complied with in order to make the data
protection legitimate.140
Adherence with the principle of purpose limitation has been separately addressed in
section 12 of this report. Absent an exhaustive list of specific and legitimate
purposes, the processing cannot be qualified as proportionate as the interests
cannot be balanced.
Data must be “processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to

the data subject” (article 5 (1) (a) GDPR). This means that data subjects must be
informed of their data being processed, that the legal conditions for data processing
are all adhered to, and that the principle of proportionality is respected.
Microsoft does not publish a limitative list of events collected at the Security level.
Therefore the scope of the processing is not sufficiently transparent for users and
administrators. Even though Microsoft collects very few telemetry data at the
Security level, not all observed events are obviously necessary to achieve the stated
purpose to keep Windows devices, Windows Server, and guests protected with the
latest security updates. For example, the event
DxgKrnlTelemetry.GPUAdapterInventoryV2 provides information about the graphic
processor. Microsoft describes the purpose of this category of events as: “this event
140
According to consolidated case-law from the European Court of Justice, all data processing
must first meet with the principles, and second, have a legal ground. See for example C-
131/12 (par 71), C:2003:294 (par 65), C-468/10 and C-469/10 (par 26).
Page 67 of 79
sends basic GPU and display driver information to keep Windows and display drivers
up-to-date.”141
If an organisation has a hybrid network set-up, and users are not prevented from
sending their activity history to Microsoft, the company can also collect information
about the names and storage path of documents in SharePoint Online and OneDrive.
Such data may be confidential / restricted or even state secret. As assessed in
section 12 of this report, Microsoft legally permits itself to process these data for
broad purposes such as direct marketing, product innovation and product
development, including the use of training data for machine learning. These broad
purposes are not immediately obvious to users, as they are not available in one
place. Thus, the current processing is not transparent enough. Nor does the
processing for all 16 purposes mentioned in the privacy statement meet the
requirement of necessity.
The principles of data minimisation and privacy by default demand that the
processing of personal data is limited to what is necessary: Data must be
“adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they are processed” (article 5 (1) (c) GDPR). This means essentially that a
data controller may not collect and store data that are not directly related to a
legitimate purpose.
Following this principle, the default settings for the collection of data have to
minimise the data collection, have be set to the most privacy friendly settings. This
is not the case for the telemetry data, nor for some other default settings, as
explained in section 3 of this report.
The principle of storage limitation demands that personal data are only retained as
long as necessary for the purpose in question. Data must be “kept in a form which
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the personal data are processed” (article 5 (1) (e), first sentence
GDPR).
This principle therefore requires the deletion of personal data as soon as they are no
longer necessary to achieve the purposes pursued by the controller. The text of this
provision goes on to clarify that “personal data may be stored for longer periods
insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the
public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in
accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical
and organisational measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the
rights and freedoms of the data subject” (article 5 (1) (e), second sentence, GDPR).
Microsoft stores the cloud Timeline data for a period of 30 days and allows users to
selectively or collectively delete the data. This is in line with the storage limitation
principle.
Microsoft does not provide public information or contractual guarantees with regard
to the retention periods of the Windows 10 diagnostic data. According to the
investigation report published by the Dutch DPA, Microsoft retains the diagnostic
data between 30 days, 13 months and 37 months. Though users can delete
diagnostic data, this does not apply to the long-term storage of diagnostic data.
Since Microsoft has not provided a clear explanation about the necessity of the
141
Microsoft, Windows IT Pro Center, Windows 10, version 1903 basic level Windows
diagnostic events and fields, 23 April 2019.
Page 68 of 79
retention of the telemetry data at the Security level, not even for the minimum
period of 30 days, the current practice cannot be qualified as being in line with the
data minimisation principle.
14.3 Assessment of the subsidiarity

The key question is whether the same goals can be reached with less intrusive
means.
There are hardly any direct equivalent alternatives to Windows 10 for most Dutch
government organisations.
In practice, government organisations have been working for a very long time with
Microsoft products. They have organised their work processes and development to
integrate with the Windows and Office software. Most government employees have
never worked with other software in their life.
There is no directly equivalent software alternative for the Dutch government.

Alternative cloud providers such as Google, or open source operating systems such
as iOS, Linux or Unix do not provide the exact same functionality, nor can it be
assumed they would present no or less data protection risks. A possible switch to
either Google or open source operating systems would present serious difficulties for
the employees. It would also take a long time to test the security and privacy
aspects of a new platform, and to migrate all users and data to the new
environment.
Added to that there are the costs of migrating existing content, and redevelopment
of specific applications that interact with the Windows software. This situation can
also be described as vendor lock-in.142
In sum, there are no directly equivalent alternatives that can be deployed by

government organisations that present less data protection risks.
15. Rights of Data Subjects

The GDPR grants data subjects a number of rights. In the first place, the data
subject has the right to information. This means that controllers must provide the
data subject with easily accessible, intelligible, concise information in clear and plain
language about, among other things, the identity of the controller, the data
processing activity, the intended duration of storage, and the rights of the data
subject.
Since the April 2018 versions of the different Windows 10 products (Home, Pro and
Enterprise), Microsoft has made serious improvements to the privacy settings of the
software. Microsoft has added public documentation about the contents and
142
See for example of the principle of vendor lock-in the explanation on Wikipedia, URL:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vendor_lock-in (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March
2019). See specifically about the risks for governments in the EU of Microsoft vendor lock-in:
Computer Weekly, Locked in by choice: How European governments are handling their
Microsoft addiction, 4 May 2017, URL: https://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Locked-in-
by-choice-how-European-governments-are-handling-their-Microsoft-addiction (URL last visited
and recorded on 20 March 2019) and TheNextWeb, Europe is living under Microsoft’s digital
killswitch, 10 May 2017, URL: https://thenextweb.com/eu/2017/05/10/europe-is-living-under-
microsofts-digital-killswitch/ (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
Page 69 of 79
purposes of telemetry events at the Basic level and an option in the software to
delete historical telemetry data. Additionally, Microsoft has provided group policies
and registry key settings to admins of Windows 10 Enterprise, to block the
telemetry data flow.
Microsoft provides users with the right to access the diagnostic data stored on their
device, to individually view data on their Timeline, and to access some other data
collected via Windows 10 via the Privacy Dashboard.143
In a hybrid networking environment, when employees choose to send their activity

history to Microsoft for Timeline, the further processing of diagnostic data about file
names and folder locations from SharePoint Online and/or OneDrive may cause
extra data protection risks for some employees. For example, if they regularly work
with classified information, the collection of extra data about their usage of certain
files and documents may lead to increased risks of social engineering/spear phishing
and even stalking. Or if they visit webpages that may reveal special categories of
data. As described in section 10 of this report, users have the ability to individually
or collectively delete data from their Timeline.
Employees have a right to data portability, if their personal data are processed
based on the necessity for the government organisation to execute the
(labour)contract. As outlined in the table in section 11 of this report, the data
processing for 2 purposes can be based on this legal ground, namely,

However, the government organisations (as joint controllers) may also decide to
rely on the legal ground in art. 6(1)f for these and the other two purposes. This
would pre-empt the right to data portability.
143
Microsoft privacy dashboard, URL: https://account.microsoft.com/account/privacy (URL last
Page 70 of 79
Part C. Discussion and Assessment of the

Risks
This part concerns the description and assessment of the risks for data subjects.
This part starts with an overall identification of the risks in relation to the rights and
freedoms of data subjects, as a result of the processing of metadata and content in
the diagnostic data. The risks are described for government employees, and for
other data subjects that interact with government.
16. Risks
16.1 Identification of Risks
The risks resulting from the processing by Microsoft of diagnostic data for its own
purposes can be divided in two categories: data about the behaviour of employees
and content data (file names and locations)
16.1.1 Data about the behaviour and preferences of employees

With the telemetry set at the Security level, Microsoft collects a very limited amount
of information, without content data or data that are otherwise confidential or
sensitive. Generally, this data processing poses little risk for the data subjects that
these data are used to profile or embarrass them.
However, in view of the long retention period for telemetry data (up to 37 months),
the dynamic nature of the telemetry collection process, and the lack of contractual
purpose limitation, it is not possible to exclude all data protection risks for the
individuals concerned.
16.1.2 Content (document titles and web surfing)

If the organisation has a hybrid set-up with SharePoint Online or OneDrive, and
users share their activity history with Microsoft, the company can process sensitive
data such as web surfing behaviour, the titles of documents and their storage
locations in SharePoint Online.
With regard to these cloud Timeline data, even though the retention period is
limited to 30 days, there are some real and serious data protection risks for the
employees. The fact that Microsoft processes these data without contractual purpose
limitation could mean that Microsoft uses these data to draw conclusions for
personalised offers and suggestions. The idea of being observed for these purposes
may lead to slight embarrassment, shame, and/or to a chilling effect on the freedom
to seek information.
There is an additional risk for some types of government employees if the further
processing by Microsoft of the Timeline data about file and folder names in its cloud
servers reveal that these employees are regularly working with classified or
otherwise government sensitive materials. The employees may become the targets
of spear phishing, social engineering and blackmailing by foreign law enforcement
authorities if Microsoft, or a sub-processor of Microsoft, is ordered to hand over
some of these data.
Behavioural patterns from the Timeline data may be analysed by foreign law
enforcement authorities and/or intelligence services if Microsoft, or a sub-processor
of Microsoft, is ordered to hand over some of these data. Such further processing
Page 71 of 79
would be in breach of confidentiality requirements and the fundamental right to

protection of communication secrecy. Such analysis may also breach government
secrecy classifications.
In view of these risks, SLM Rijk recommends that government administrators

disable Timeline completely and prohibit users from exercising a choice with regard
to this data processing. Microsoft has provided information about two Group Policies
for administrators to manage these settings: Publish User Activities144 and Upload
User Activities.145 Alternatively, administrators my want to use a Registry Key.146
This assessment continues with the assumption that Timeline is switched Off.
16.2 Assessment of Risks

The risks (from the processing of the diagnostic data) can be regrouped in the
following categories:
1. Loss of control over the use of personal data
2. Loss of confidentiality
3. Inability to exercise rights (GDPR data subject rights and related rights such as
the right to send and receive information)
4. Reidentification of pseudonymised data
5. Unlawful (further) processing
These risks have to assessed against the likelihood of the occurrence of these risks
and the severity of the impact.
The UK data protection commission ICO provides the following guidance:
“Harm does not have to be inevitable to qualify as a risk or a high risk. It must be
more than remote, but any significant possibility of very serious harm may still be
enough to qualify as a high risk. Equally, a high probability of widespread but more
minor harm might still count as high risk.”
In order to weigh the severity of the impact, and the likelihood of the harm for these
generic risks, this report combines a list of specific risks with specific circumstances
of the currently investigated data processing.
16.2.1 Lack of control: Microsoft as a data controller

As analysed in section 5 of this DPIA report, Microsoft incorrectly assumes the role
of (sole) data controller for the processing of the diagnostic data from Windows 10
Enterprise. A factual analysis shows that Microsoft and the government
organisations should be qualified as joint controllers. Article 26 GDPR requires that
joint controllers create contractual arrangements to divide responsibilities and
provide clear information to end-users about these arrangements. There is no such
144
Microsoft, Policy CSP - Privacy, Privacy/PublishUserActivities, 14 August 2018, URL:
privacy#privacy-publishuseractivities (URL last visited and recorded on 20 March 2019).
145
Ibid., Privacy/UploadUserActivities, URL: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-
management/mdm/policy-csp-privacy#privacy-uploaduseractivities (URL last visited and
146
Explanations about the registry keys can be found at for example Winaearo, URL:
https://winaero.com/blog/disable-timeline-windows-10-group-policy/ (URL last visited and
recorded 5 June 2019) and Tenforums, URL: https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/100341-
enable-disable-collect-activity-history-windows-10-a.html (URL last visited and recorded 5
June 2019). These settings have not been tested for this DPIA.
Page 72 of 79
contractual agreement that outlines what personal data Microsoft may process, for
what purposes. Based on its general privacy statement, Microsoft feels legitimated
to process the diagnostic data for 16 purposes, including targeted advertising and
personalisation.
The current positioning as a data controller results in a lack of legal grounds for
most of the purposes for the diagnostic data processing in Windows 10 Enterprise.
This causes a risk for government organisations, of loss of confidentiality, unlawful
(further) processing and reputation damage.
As analysed in section 11 of this report, Microsoft and the government organisations

do not have a legal ground for the processing of the data collected at the Security
level for all the 16 purposes mentioned in the general privacy statement.
The likelihood of the risks of loss of control and unlawful (further) processing is
100%, as this report identifies that, due to the lack of purpose limitation, nor
Microsoft nor the government organisations have a legal ground for most of the
purposes for which Microsoft allows itself to process the diagnostic data. This risk
assessment has to consider that employees are in a dependent position and cannot
refuse to use the Windows 10 Enterprise software.
However, because the Security level data are minimal and do not contain sensitive
data, the severity of the impact on data subjects can be qualified as low.
As a side note, concluding a joint controller agreement would only be a cosmetic

measure. Such an arrangement will not solve the fundamental problem of lack of
control for the government organisations. It. In order for government organisations
to be in control and limit the data processing to the strictly necessary minimum, the
only acceptable role for Microsoft is a role as data processor. This in turn requires a
major overhaul of the enrolment framework, since some of the current GDPR
compliance guarantees have already been qualified as insufficient in the Office
ProPlus DPIA report.
16.2.2 Lack of control over third parties/processors and audits

As assessed in the sections 4 and 5 of this DPIA report, Microsoft provides no, or
very weak contractual assurances for compliance of the Windows 10 data processing
with the GDPR. The government organisations are treated on an equal level with all
consumers globally, and Microsoft applies the very broad purpose descriptions in the
general privacy statement.
Microsoft apparently has never audited the diagnostic data processing via Windows
10 Enterprise or has not made the results publicly available. Microsoft has not
published a DPIA report about the risks of the processing of diagnostic data from
Windows 10 Enterprise. Government organisations have no insight in the rules
governing access to the personal data stored in Microsoft’s databases, nor insight if
these rules are complied with, and how compliance is monitored.
Different from the Standard Contractual Clauses provided for the diagnostic data
processing in Office ProPlus, SLM Rijk does not have a specific contractual right to
have audits performed or add specific questions relating to for example the contents
of the telemetry data stored in the long term database, the access to these data,
monitoring of the log files with regard to access, and the further processing of these
data.
Page 73 of 79
This means that SLM Rijk is insufficiently able to verify compliance of the actual data
processing. Additionally, Microsoft does not provide a list of processors, or ‘affiliates.
This means SLM Rijk and the individual government organisations that use Windows
10 have no means to verify the integrity and GDPR compliance of these processors.
Further risks are caused by the possibility that Microsoft allows third parties to
process personal data, while there is no contractual guarantee that such third
parties are bound to the confidentiality requirements of a data processor as defined
in the GDPR.
Given the lack of information about third parties that may process the Windows 10
personal diagnostic data, and the lack of effective control of contractual promises
through audits, and the fact that SLM Rijk cannot force Microsoft to stop the
cooperation with one or more specific processors, the data protection risks must be
assessed as reasonably likely to occur, while the possible harm at the Security level
can still be qualified as low.
16.2.3 Transfer of personal data outside of the EEA

The automatic transfer of diagnostic data from Windows 10 Enterprise to Microsoft’s
back-end cloud servers in the US entails a risk for unlawful processing, since the
United States do not have privacy legislation that offers an adequate level of data
protection as defined in the (European) GDPR.
Different from the guarantees Microsoft offers in its Online Service Terms with
regard to Office ProPlus with regard to storage in datacentres in the EU of user
provided content, there are no contractually binding limits to the transfer of
Windows 10 diagnostic data.
a) The standard of protection of personal data in most countries in the world is

lower than in the European Economic Area. While Microsoft undertakes in its general
privacy statement to ensure a uniformly high standard of protection, this protection
cannot be guaranteed against government intervention of third countries. There is
therefore an appreciable risk that information held by Microsoft in a data centre in a
third country or by a data processor in a third country, can be accessed by local
governments.
b) Microsoft transfers the personal data from Windows 10 Enterprise to the United
States under the terms of the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework. Microsoft has self-
certified under this regime. There is reasonable doubt about the viability of the
Privacy Shield. While the European Commission issued a review in December 2018,
stating that improvements to the Privacy Shield have been made, it is not clear if
the agreement will be enforced.
Microsoft applies another guarantee for the transfer of personal data collected
through the use of its Online Services (such as Office, Azure and Dynamics), namely
the Standard Contractual Clauses (also called “Model Clauses”). These clauses,
drafted by the European Commission in 2010, allow a non-EU company to receive
personal data from a company the EU.
As outlined in section 7 of this report, both the Privacy Shield and the SCC are the
subject of pending procedures at the European Court of Justice whether these
instruments offer sufficient safeguards against the risks of extensive surveillance.
c) The American CLOUD act presents a risk for the personal data of employees of
the government organisations. The CLOUD act essentially extends jurisdiction of the
Page 74 of 79
US American authorities to all data held by American corporations, even when that
data is stored in data centres outside of the territory of the United States. Because
there is no mutual assistance treaty between NL and the USA, or the EU and the
USA, Microsoft risks a violation of Article 48 of the GDPR when ordered to hand over
data from Dutch government organisations.
16.2.4 Long retention period

The Windows 10 telemetry data are stored for 30 days, or 13 months, or 37 months
in the central Cosmos database in the USA.
Since the April 2018 versions of Windows, Microsoft includes a possibility for users
to delete historical diagnostic data per device ID. This is a good remedy, but there
are two remaining issues with the retention period.
First, the deletion option does not apply to data that Microsoft may incorrectly
qualify as anonymous, or to the diagnostic data that Microsoft collects on its own
servers in system generated event logs in case of a hybrid network set-up (with
SharePoint Online and/or OneDrive).
Second, the individual opt-out does not solve the principal issue that Microsoft
needs to determine what personal data necessarily need to be processed during
what maximum period of time. The retention periods of 13 or 37 months seem
excessive, pending evidence of the necessity, as should preferably be confirmed by
an independent audit.
The risks resulting from such a long retention period are high. The GDPR requires
organisations only store personal data as long as necessary, related to increased
risks of unlawful processing, of incorrect data and of data breaches. In view of the
assessment that the diagnostic data at Security level do not contain sensitive
personal and/or confidential data, the potential harm can be qualified as low.
16.3 Summary of Risks

These circumstances lead to the following low data protection risks for the
processing of Security level telemetry data:
1. Lack of purpose limitation and legal grounds for most of the purposes for the
data processing.
2. Lack of control over third parties/processors and audits
3. The transfer of diagnostic data outside of the EEA, while the current legal
ground is the Privacy Shield and the validity of this agreement is subject of a
procedure at the European Court of Justice
4. The long retention period of diagnostic data
Page 75 of 79
Based on the ICO model, this results in the following matrix:147

Serious Low risk High risk High risk
harm
Some Low risk Medium risk High risk

impact
Severity of impact
Minimal Low risk Low risk Low risk

impact
3, 4 1, 2
Remote Reasonable More likely than not

possibility
Likelihood of harm (occurrence)
147
Copied from the DPIA guidance from the UK data protection commission, the ICO. URL:
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-
gdpr/data-protection-impact-assessments-dpias/how-do-we-carry-out-a-dpia/ (last visited and
Page 76 of 79
Part D. Description of risk mitigating

measures
Following the Dutch government DPIA model, Part D describes the proposed
measures to counter the possible negative impact and risks connected to the
examined data processing.
However, in this DPIA some risk mitigating measures have already been taken for
granted in the determination of the scope. This applies to the measure to set the
telemetry level to Security. This also applies to the measure to turn off the new
Windows Timeline functionality.
In previous Windows 10 Enterprise versions admins could not use Windows Update
for Business or Intune, because this was only possible with telemetry set to Basic or
higher.148 If admins upgrade to the new 1903 version, released end of May 2019, it
is possible to use Windows Update for Business with the telemetry set to the
Security level.149
The following section therefore only discusses some additional measures to remove
the remaining low data protection risks.
17. Additional risk mitigating measures
Three of the four identified low risks related to the processing of the Security level
telemetry data can be removed through contractual measures. The fourth risk may
be mitigated with a combination of technical and organisational measures.
As outlined in section 5 and in sections 11 and 12, it would be preferable if Microsoft

would act as a data processor, and only process the diagnostic data for specific
legitimate purposes, as instructed by the data controllers (the government
organisations).
The lack of control over third parties and lack of audits on the factual data
processing can equally be remediated through contractual measures. Such an audit
could also help determine the necessary period for which the diagnostic data can be
stored.
The fourth risk related to the transfer of personal data to the US, is the topic both of
negotiations between the EU and the US in the context of the e-Evidence
framework, and of two procedures at the European Court of Justice. Pending the
outcome of these developments, Dutch government organisations should carefully
consider if they can apply technical measures (such as encryption) to the contents
of very sensitive and/or highly confidential/secret data if they use Microsoft cloud
services such as SharePoint Online or OneDrive. They may also want to consider
148
Microsoft, Manage software updates in Intune, 12 February 2019, URL:
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/intune/windows-update-for-business-configure (URL last
149
Microsoft techcommunity, What’s new in Windows Update for Business in windows 10,
version 1903, 21 May 2019.
Page 77 of 79
other organisational measures to prevent possible unlawful access, such as a policy

not to include personal or confidential data in names of files and folders.
Some additional data protection risks related to the use of the Windows operating
system described in this DPIA can be mitigated with technical measures by the
administrators of the government organisations. The admins should use group
policies or registry keys to turn off privacy-invasive components in the operating
system when the data processing is not necessary for the work of the employees.
N Risk Possible measure Microsoft Recommended measure per

r organisation
1 Lack of Become a data processor, Select Security level or block
legal major overhaul of the OST. telemetry traffic.
grounds Provide a limitative overview of Prohibit the use of Windows
and the necessary events and their Timeline by centrally switching
purpose content at the telemetry off ‘publishing of User Activities’
limitation. Security level. in Local Group Policy Editor or
Registry Key.
Provide a limitative overview of Consider creating a policy not to
the specific legitimate purposes use personal or confidential data
for which Timeline data are in file or folder names.
processed.
Provide a separate opt-in for Create or revise internal data
the collection of web surfing processing rules with regard to
behaviour. employee data, specific rules for
web surfing behaviour.
2 Lack of Organise high quality audits on Apply technical measures (such
control over compliance, conduct (or as encryption or use of stand
third parties publish the results of) a DPIA alone computers) to the contents
/processors on the diagnostic data of very sensitive and/or highly
and audits processing, allow government confidential/secret data when the
organisations to add specific organisation uses cloud services
audit questions. such as SharePoint Online or
OneDrive.
3 The transfer New contractual guarantees In addition to the technical
of data such as Standard Contractual measures described under 2,
outside of Clauses or Binding Corporate consider organisational measures
the EEA Rules and/or storage of to prevent possible unlawful
diagnostic data within the EU. access, such as a policy not to
include personal or confidential
data in names of files and
folders.
4 The long Determine, enforce and Encourage employees to use the
retention supervise compliance with right to delete historical
period of necessary retention periods. diagnostic data.
diagnostic
data
5 Use of Change the default for some Centrally turn off all privacy-
privacy- privacy invasive capacities. invasive other components if not
unfriendly necessary for the performance of
Change the technical access for
default the work.
applications, limit access to
settings
specific components and files
based on specific consent from
users.
Page 78 of 79
Conclusions
If government organisations follow the previous recommendations from SLM Rijk to
use Windows 10 Enterprise only with the lowest level of telemetry, the Security level
(or disable telemetry traffic), and prevent users from syncing their activities via the
Windows Timeline, there are no high data protection risks resulting from the
diagnostic data collection in Windows 10 Enterprise.
This report identifies contractual, technical and organisational measures Microsoft

and the government organisations can take to completely remove the remaining low
risks.
On 21 May 2019, Microsoft has released version 1903 for Windows 10 Enterprise.
This version enables organisations to use Windows Update for Business functionality
when the diagnostic data level is set to Security. In previous versions, this
functionality was only available at the telemetry level ‘Basic’ or higher.
SLM Rijk is providing significant input to Microsoft for an upcoming structural

solution for Windows 10 Enterprise customers which is being designed for Windows
10 Enterprise 1809 and later versions. This will allow government organisations to
have a simplified compliance solution for Windows 10 Enterprise at diagnostic data
levels above Security. This solution will be ready in the foreseeable future, and
Microsoft plans to make an announcement about this solution later this year.
Page 79 of 79

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What is the purpose of this report?

What is the purpose of this report?

What diagnostic data is collected by Windows 10 Enterprise?

What diagnostic data is collected by Windows 10 Enterprise?

DPIA Windows 10 Enterprise v.

Data protection impact assessment on the processing of

Date 11 June 2019

© 2019; Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid. Auteursrechten voorbehouden. Niets uit

DPIA by Ministry of Justice and Security

Contact Paul van den Berg

Project Name DPIA report diagnostic data processing in Microsoft

Authors Privacy Company

Part A. Description of the Windows diagnostic data processing 12

1. The processing of diagnostic data by Windows 10 Enterprise 12

2. Personal data and data subjects 18

3. Processing of diagnostic data via Windows 10 Enterprise 29

4. Purposes of the processing 34

5. Controller, processor and sub-processors 40

6. Interests in the data processing 49

6.2 Interests Dutch government organisations 51

7. Transfer of personal data outside of the EU 52

8. Techniques and methods of the data processing 54

9. Additional legal obligations: ePrivacy Directive 56

Part B. Lawfulness of the data processing 61

13.Special categories of personal data 66

14.Necessity and proportionality 67

15.Rights of Data Subjects 69

Part C. Discussion and Assessment of the Risks 71

Part D. Description of risk mitigating measures 77

17.Additional risk mitigating measures 77

This report, commissioned by the Microsoft Strategic Vendor Management office

Scope: telemetry data at the Security level and Timeline

No high data protection risks

GDPR compliance and umbrella DPIA

Windows 10 Enterprise diagnostic data

Technical analysis of the telemetry data

Microsoft as a data controller

Lack of purpose limitation and legal ground

As a joint data controller, or as a data processor, Microsoft and government

If the purposes would be limited to these legitimate purposes, Microsoft could

This report identifies contractual, technical and organisational measures Microsoft

SLM Rijk is providing significant input to Microsoft for an upcoming structural

This report, commissioned by the Microsoft Strategic Vendor Management office

The Windows 10 software is deployed on a large scale by different governmental

1 Ongoing GDPR compliance of different Microsoft products and

2 Umbrella DPIA versus individual DPIA’s

3 Windows 10 Enterprise diagnostic data

A typical telemetry event contains a unique number, a timestamp, several unique

4 Scope: Security level and telemetry disabled

5 Technical analysis of the telemetry and Timeline data

6 Dialogue with Microsoft

Microsoft has provided the following quotable summary of this improvement:

“Admins in the Dutch Central Government can deploy Windows 10 Enterprise by

Microsoft writes: “SLM Rijk is providing significant input to an upcoming structural

Sicherheit/SiSyPHus/Workpackage4_Telemetry.html (URL last visited and recorded on 20

This assessment follows the structure of the Model

A. Description of the factual data processing

Part B provides an assessment of the lawfulness of the data processing. This