People v. Valeriano
People v. Valeriano
People v. Valeriano
TUMAHIG
FACTS:
Engracio Valeriano et.al were charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder with the
RTC. That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, the accused attack, assault and
use personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Silvano while she was about to leave her
house and inflicting upon her serious injuries and then set her house on fire while the victim was
inside still inside the house trying to escape thereby resulting to her death. That the crime was
committed with attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, by means of fire,
craft [,] fraud or disguise employed; and that means have been employed which brought added
ignominy to the natural effects of their acts. In the evening of the 28th of January 1980 —
immediately after the commission of the such murder, the accused hacked and struck Wilson
Silvano, son of the victim in the murder case, with bladed weapons thereby inflicting upon him
multiple hack wounds which would have produced the crime of murder were it not for the
timely and able medical assistance given to him. The elements of murder in this case, Criminal
Case No. 4585 for the killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano having been proved by the prosecution
beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO
NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire
by burning the house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her
house and hack her to death, the abuse of superior strength, the penalty impossable [sic] here
will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua,
and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,00.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson
A. Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused
Engracio Valeriano only. But since the person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim
Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio Valeriano only is nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to
the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is
beyond the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO
RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any
criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide.The bail bond put up by the three accused,
namely: Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered
cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement. 34
ISSUE: THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CANCELLING THE BAIL
BONDS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND ORDERING THEIR IMMEDIATE ARRESTS WHEN
THE ONLY PENALTY IMPOSED BY IT FOR ALL THE ACCUSED IS "TO INDEMNIFY THE
HEIRS OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.
RULING: In support of the first assigned error, they claim that: (a) the trial court could not have
ordered the cancellation of their bail bonds and their arrest and immediate confinement because the
only penalty it imposed on them was "to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of thirty thousand
(P30,000.00) pesos" without imposing any sentence; it merely suggested that " . . . the penalty
impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion
perpetua . . . "; and (b) since they already perfected their appeal immediately after the promulgation of
the sentence, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and could not validly cancel their bail bonds
and order their arrest. 39
In its Brief, 40 the Appellee asserts that the judgment appealed from is valid and enforceable.
Although the word "impossable" [sic] is "imprecise," it is clear that what the judge actually
meant was that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was what the law allowed or mandated him to
impose. As to the grant of bail, since they committed a capital offense and the court had already
found that the evidence of their guilt is strong, the accused-appellants should not be entitled to
bail.
We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it did
sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of conviction shall state (a)
the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice
or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved
or waived. 41 As we earlier observed, the challenged decision does not contain the usual
dispositive portion. The last two paragraphs of the decision merely embody its conclusions that:
(1) the appellants are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of the victim, . . . the
abuse of superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will be in its maximum degree, that is
reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." While the decision leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless contains the
court's findings of facts, the law applicable to the set of facts and what it believes to be the
imposable penalty under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty
imposed on the accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case
No. 4585. Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to
appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have subsequently
filed their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so cannot cancel
anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate commitment because it already
lost jurisdiction over their persons when they perfected their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in
People vs. Cortez 42 that: an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter convicted of the offense charged, shall no
longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
We have already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the
order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is
apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in
question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-
appellants. For too obvious reasons, their notices of appeal which they claim have put to an end
to the trial court's jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the promulgation of
the decision. The order is therefore valid and enforceable.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental in Criminal Case No. 4585 is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellants MACARIO
ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are ACQUITTED on ground of
reasonable doubt, and their immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless other
lawful and valid grounds exist for their further detention.