HEALTH SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT

(CDB 1012)

MAY 2016 SEMESTER

ASSIGNMENT 1 (PIPER ALPHA TRAGEDY)

LECTURER : DR NORIDAH BINTI OSMAN

NAME MATRIC ID. Program

MECHANICAL
MUHAMMAD NAZMI BIN MOK HAT 24114
ENGINEERING

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 25th JULY 2016(Monday)

PIPER ALPHA

Introduction
Piper Alpha was a large production oil platform located in the North Sea about 180
km north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland that started production in 1976. It produced oil from 24
wells in its early life and it had also produced gas from two wells. The platform had facilities
to drill wells to the producing and extract, separate and the process the reservoir fluids, a
mixture of oil, gas and water. It was connected by an oil pipeline to shore in Flotta and by gas
pipelines and the oil production to two other platforms which were Tartan, 20 km and
Claymore, 35 km away. In 1988, Piper Alpha was operated by Occidental Petroleum
(Caledonia) Ltd ("OpCal"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

The disaster happened at 20.00 hours on 6 July 1988 with the explosion of a low lying
cloud of condensate. That caused extensive damage and a massive leakage of gas condensate
on Piper Alpha, which ignited causing an explosion which lead to large crude oil fires, the
smoke from which made access to any of the platform’s lifeboats impossible from the outset.
There was a second explosion which caused a huge intensification of the fire about 20
minutes later because of the rupture riser on the gas pipeline from the Tartan platform. After
30 minutes and an hour later, the fire continued intensively by successive ruptures of some
risers on the other two gas pipelines, to the gas gathering and the Claymore platforms. The
Alpha piper platform was completely demolished within a few hours, all its equipment and
accommodation falling into the sea was about 150 deep.

The demolition of the platform by an explosion was enormous. An explosion and

resulting fire killing 167 men and only 62 people managed to survive but most of them were
badly injured. Total insured loss was $3.4 billion. It is convinced that the leak came from
pipe work connected to a condensate pump. The day before the tragedy during the next work
shift in the evening, the primary condensate pump which have a safety valve failed and had
been removed from this pipe for repaired and maintenance. When the night shift opened the
pump which safety valve had been removed in preparation for starting-up, condensate leaked
from the hole left by the valve. Gas products escaped at high pressure, ignited and exploded.
Describe what are/is contribution toward HSE movement
The leak of condensate which ignited to cause the initial explosion originated in the
process night shift’s response to the tripping out of the pump. They already knew that a
permit-to-work (PTW) for that pump had been issued earlier in the day. However, they were
not aware, but should have been, that a second maintenance job had been started on that spare
pump during the day. The work had not been completed at the end of the day shift. When the
night shift opened up pump’s suction valve in preparation for starting-up, condensate leaked
from the site of the removed valve and caused explosion.

On Piper Alpha there were deficiencies in the operation of the PTW system with
regard to the relief valve work. The work was carried out by a contract maintenance
organisation whose supervisor did not inspect the job site before suspending the permit
overnight.

Other than that, the design stage of the platform, it had been judged that a fire could
occur due to a loss of containment in the condensate section. Nevertheless, Piper Alpha had
no explosion walls either side of the condensate area. However, there had not been a
systematic. No hazard and operability review had been made of the design. Then, no specific
provision was made to protect the pipeline end terminals where they joined the platform
against being weakened and failing allowing the pipeline contents to escalate an on-board
fire.

The accommodation block was designed to resist fire for some time but no
specifically to prevent smoke ingress. When the smoke entered the accommodation, there
was less ventilation and result in the worker inhaled smoke and gas. Lastly, there was no
orders were given by any of the supervisors. Some men of their own initiative did leave the
block and were rescued but the majority stayed inside where death was inevitable.

Describe what can be learned from the accident/tragedy

There are many lessons to be learnt from the events and background to the tragedy of
Piper Alpha. Permit-to-work systems must involve a secure method of locking valves to
prevent inadvertent opening. There also must be a systematic assessment of all potential
major hazards at the design stage and interactive effects in emergencies between linked
operating units. Other than that, a system for the timely resolution of faults in safety critical
equipment must be part of normal operating management.
 The most important lessons to be drawn from the Piper Alpha disaster which apply to
any large-scale process operations:

(a) Management is responsible. Only an operator’s management has the knowledge, the
power to act and the legal responsibilities to ensure a safe environment in which
employees work.
(b) A systematic approach is required. The deficiencies on Piper Alpha were failures in
systems. Either there was a system but it was inadequately designed and executed, for
example, the PTW system or the lack of a system for training in intern-platform
emergencies.
(c) Quality of safety management is critical. Not only does any operation have to be the
right safety systems but they have to be quality systems that is they have to meet the
defined requirement each and every time and each day. The PTW system was not a
quality system.
(d) Auditing is vital. In any organisation it is an eternal concern for management to make
sure that its decisions and procedures are carried out exactly as it has determined. It is
essential that a regular and thorough auditing system is one of the operation’s safety
management systems. On Piper Alpha there appeared to be sufficient effort put into
safety auditing.

Describe what can be improvised upon the accident by HSE approach

Firstly, when the fire worsened, many men did not know what they should do.
Therefore, they need a better training especially of supervisors. Then, they should provide
better communication with other platforms or plan for emergencies. In the tragedy, the
compartment walls blown down and fire spreads. In that case, the company must provide
explosion-resistant walls. Other than that, the supervisor should provide better hand-over
between shifts and enforce PTW system. Supervisor also need to check the quality of the
maintenance or works. Do not turn blind eye to lapses of PTW system. The train supervisors
also in need for PTW system.
 Furthermore, The Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) Offshore Safety Division
employs a team of inspectors who are responsible for enforcing both the offshore specific
regulations and the general safety legislation common to all industries. Their work includes
regular inspection visits to offshore installations. They will investigate safety incidents, and
prosecute if necessary. Lastly, the company strictly should provide better auditing and always
ensure all the systems and everything is in good condition.

Conclusion

From the tragedy Piper Alpha explosion resulted in new regulations for the offshore
oil and gas industry which require operators to do the same. In the offshore companies are
required to carry out a numerical assessment of the risk, onshore this is encouraged but is not
normally required. While the lessons above are the main ones to emerge from considering
this tragic accident it is clear that no single act or omission was responsible for the deaths of
so many men. Perhaps the most significant lesson of all that can be drawn is that the sum and
quality of our individual contributions to the management of safety determines whether the
colleagues we work with live or die.

Reference
1. Cullen, W.D. (1990).The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. London. Her
Majesty’s Stationery
2. Kletz, T. (2001). Learning from Accidents (3rd ed.). London. Gulf Professional Publishing