II. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.

Q-4. Powers of Administrative Bodies.

1.Quasi-legistative or rule-making power

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicary power, and
3. Determinative powers. [ Note: Senator Neptali Gonzales calls them incidental powers.]

Q-5. Quasi-legistative power.

1. Nature. this is the exercise of delegated legistative power, involving no discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement
of a policy set out in the law itself.

a) Rules and regulations issued by the administrative authorities pursuant to the

powers delegated to them have the force and effect the law; they are binding on
all persons subject to them, and the courts will take judicial notice them.
b) Both Letters of instruction and executive orders are presidential issuance; one
may repeal or otherwise alter, modify or amend the other, depending on which
comes later [Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 225 SCRA
417].
c) It may be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may
be legitimacy exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
the law or amend a legistative enactment, for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law
[Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149]. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, but must remain consistent with the law they seek
to apply and implement. They are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to
modify, the law [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v, Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 368].
d) It is axiomatic that an administrative agency like the Philippine Ports Authority
has no discretion whether or not to implement a law. Thus, if ther is a conflict
between PPA circulars and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails [Eastern
Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals].
e) An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates
to specific aspects in the administrative operation of Government. It cannot be
argued that the administrative Order No. 308 (prescribing a national
computerized identification Reference System) merely implements the
Administrative code of 1987. Such as national computerized identification
reference system requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies, the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-
gathering by the government, and the choice of policies. It deals with a subject
which should be covered by a law, not just an administrative order [Ople v.
Torres, 293 SCRA 141].
2. Kinds of administrative Rules and Regulations.

a). Supplementary or detailed legislation. They are rules and regulations “to fix the details”
in the execution and enforcement of a policy set out in the law, e.g., Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code.
b) Interpretative legislation. They are rules and regulations construing or interpreting the
provisions of a statute to be enforced and they binding on all concerned until they are changed,
e.g., BIR Circulars, CB circulars, etc .. They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect;
they have in their favor the presumption of legality [Gonzales v. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520]. The
erroneous application of the law by the public officers does not a bar a subsequent correct
application of the law [Manila Jockey Club v. Court of Appeals, G,R. No. 103533, December 15,
1998].
c) Contingent legislation. They are rules and regulations made by an administrative
authority on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
See: Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil 234.

3. Requisites for validity:

a) Issued under authority of law. See Olsen v. Aldanese, 43 Phil 64..

b) Within the scope and purview of the law. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249
SCRA 149, the Court nullified DAR adm. Circular No. 9 which allowed the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for the
property taken, because Sec. 16(e), R.A 6657 is specific that the deposit must be
made in “cash” or in “Land Bank bonds”. The implementing regulation cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. See also Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v.
Drilon, 176 SCRA 24.

i) In Romulo Mabanta v. Home Development Mutual Fund, G.R No.

131082, June 19. 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that the HDMF cannot,
in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent
with the law it seeks to enforce and administer. Administrative issuances
must not override, supplant or modify the law.

ii) Where the regulatory system has been set up by the law, it is beyond the
power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Any change in policy
must be made by the legislative department [Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R No. 110526,
February 10, 1998].

iii) R.A. 8171 empowers the secretary of justice, in conjunction with the
Secretary of health and the director of the Bureau of Corrections, to issue
the necessary implementing rules and regulations. The rules, however,
authorized the director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare a manual
 setting forth the details of the proceeding prior to, during and after the
administration of the lethal injection on the convict. Because the rule did
not provide for the approval of the said manual by the secretary of Justice,
considering that the bureau of corrections is merely a constituent unit of
the Department of Justice and it is the Secretary of Justice who is granted
rule-making authority under the law, the rule authorizing the Director of
the Bureau of corrections to promulgate said manual is invalid being an
abdication of responsibility by the Secretary of Justice, G.R No. 132601,
October 12, 1998].

iv) In the same case, Sec. 17 of the rules and regulations implementing R.A
8171 which provided that the death penalty shall not be inflected upon a
woman within three years next following the date of the sentence or while
she is pregnant was declared invalid, the same being an impermissible
contravention of Sec. 83 of the revised penal code which provides that the
death penalty shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant
or within one year after delivery.

c) Reasonable. See Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848.

d) Publication. except in cases of interpretative rules and regulations, of those merely

internal in nature, or the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties. Publication must be in full, or it is no publication
at all [Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446]. See also executive Order No. 200.

i). Thus, in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998,
it was held that the administrative rules and regulations the purpose of which is to
enforce or implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, must be
published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. except
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e,. regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency, not th general public. The same rule
was upheld in Caltex (Philippines) inc. v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 273.
Likewise, in Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Commission on audit,
G.R No. 132593, June 25, 1999, it was held that the DBM Corporate Compensation
Circular (DBM-CCC) No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances
and other traditional compensation to government officials and employees starting
November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation, and must go
through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The reissuance of the CCC and its submission for publication per letter
to the National Printing office on March 9, 1999, will not cure the defect precisely
because publication is a condition precedent to its effectivity.

ii). In the Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298,
DOLE Department Order No. 16-91 ad POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and
37, while recognizes valid exercise of police power as delegate to the executive
 department were declared legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of
proper publication and filling in the office of the National Administrative Register
(as required by Art. 5. Labor Code of the Philippines). This ruling was reiterated in
Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment G.R. No. 103144, April $, 2001, where POEA Memorandum circular
no. 2. Series of 1983, which provided the schedule of placement and documentation
fess for private employment agencies, was declared ineffective because it was not
published and filed with the National Administrative Register. In Transaction
Overseas Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No.109583, September 5, 1997,
on the question of the validity of the cancellation of the petitioner’s license to
recruit workers for overseas work because the revised rules of penalties had not
been filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court said that the Revised Rules of
Penalties did not prescribe additional rules governing overseas employment but
merely detailed the administrative sanctions for prohibited acts. Besides, the
cancellation of the license was made under authority of Art. 35 of the Labor Code,
not pursuant to the Revised Rules of Penalties.

4.Administrative rules with penal sunctions; additional requisites:

a) The law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule or
regulation. See People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450.

b)The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative rule or
regulation.

5. Necessity for notice and hearing

a) There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the promulgation of a general

regulation by an administrative body. Where the rule is procedural, or where the the rules
are, in effect merely legal opinions, there is no notice required. Neither is notice required
in the preparation of substantive rules where the class to be affected is large and the
questions to be resolved involve the use of the of discretion committed to the rule-making
body. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R No. 111953,
December 12, 1997, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior hearing is not
necessity for the issuance of an administrative rule or regulation.

1. However, see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236,
where the Supreme Court distinguished between administrative rules in the nature of
subordinate legistation is designed to implement a law by providing its details, and before
it is adopted there must be a hearing under the Administrative Code of 1987. when an
administrative rule substantially adds to or increases the burden of those concerned, an
administrative agency must accord those directly affected a chance to be heard before its
issuance. In this case, prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93,
the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent were in the category of locally-
manufactured cigarettes not bearing a foreign brand. Had it not been for Revenue Memo
 Circular No. 37-93, the enactment of R.A 7654 would not have resulted in a new tax rate
upon the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent. The BIR did not simply interpret the
law; it exercised quasi-legistative authority, and the requirements of notice, hearing and
publication should not have been ignored.

b) In the Philippine Consumers Foundation v. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622, it was
held that the function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a
legistative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legistative function, the grant of prior
notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards
rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercised of its quasi-judicial function,
prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. Where the rules and the
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country., they may
partake of a legistative character. But if they apply exclusively to a particular based upon
a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

c) In Lina v. Carino, 221 SCRA 515, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of the
Secretary of Education to Issue DECS Order No. 30, prescribing guidelines concerning
increases in the tuition and other school fees.

C. Determinative Powers

1.Enabling: to permit or allow something which the law undertakes to regulate, e.g., grant
or denial of licences to engage in a particular business.

2.Directing: illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or the Bureau of Customs.

3.Dispencing: to exempt from a general prohibition, or relieve an individual or corporation

from an affirmative duty, e.g., authority of zoning boards to vary provisions of zoning
ordinances, or the authority of the Acceptance Board of the Philippines Army to relieve
certain persons from military training.

4.Examining: also called the investigatory power; consists in requiring production of

books, papers, etc., the attendance of the witnesses and compelling their testimony.

a) Power to compel attendance of witnesses not inherent in administrative body;

but an administrative officer authorized to take testimony or evidence is deemed
authorized to administer oath, summon witnesses, require production of document,
etc.
b) Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body;
and when so granted, may be exercised only when administrative body is actually
performing quasi-judicial functions. See Guevara v. Commission on Elections. 104
Phil 268; Masangcay v. Commission on Elections, 6 SCRA 27, Carino v.
Commission on Human Rights, 204 SCRA 483.
 5. Summary: power to apply compulsion of force against persons or property to effectuate
a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action, e.g., in the fields of
health inspections, abatement of nuisances, etc.

5. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power

1. Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings. Administrative body is

normally granted the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure, provided they do
not increase diminish or modify substantive rights, and subject to disapproval by the
Supreme Court [ Sec.5(5), Art VIII, Constitution]. The requisites of procedural due process
must be complied with.

2. Administrative due process [ Ang Tibay v. CIR, 40 O.G. 7th Supp. 129]. Requisites:

a) Right to a hearing
b) Tribunal must consider evidence presented;
c) Decision must have something to support itself;
d) Evidence must be substantial;
e) Decision must be based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
f) The Board or its Judges must act on its or their independent consideration of the
facts and the law of the case, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision.
g) Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the controversy
can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.

See Tolentino v. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428; Rajah Lahuy
Mining v. Pajares, 136 SCRA 415; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA 757;
Mangubat v. Castro, 163 SCRA 608; Matienzo v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 1; Bautista
v. Board of Energy, 169 SCRA 167.

i) In Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132, The Supreme Court held
that in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the allegedly prohibited article
is known, mere posting of the notice of hearing in the respondent’s Bulletin Board
does not constitute compliance with procedural due process.

ii) Due process demands that the person be duly informed of the charges against
him. He cannot be convicted of an offense with which he was not charged.
Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right
to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative
proceedings [ Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, G.R. No.127838, January 21.
1999]. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In
administrative proceedings such as one at bench, due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of; a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary [Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, 243 SCRA 155; M. Ramirez Industries v.
Secretary of Labor, 266 SCRA 483; Napolcom v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 129943, May
12, 2000]. In Arboleda v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119509, February 11, 1999, the
Supreme Court said that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings
is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. The requirement of notice and hearing in
termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings,as actual
adversarial proceedings become necessary only for the classification or when there
is a need to profound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.
This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent
right and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon. In Calma v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 122787, February 9, 1999, it was held that as long as the parties
given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactory complied with. In Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of
Appeals, supra., DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, the petitioner was
duly notified, warned and the given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies
and to comply with the pertinent orders and regulations. The petitioner had gone all
the way up to the office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and
closure orders. It cannot now claim that it did not have the opportunity to be heard.

iii) In Lumiqued v. Exenea, G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, it was held that
administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance of counsel.
But in Gonzales v. NLRC and the Ateneo de Davao University, G.R. No. 125735,
August 26, 1999, the Supreme Court held that there was a violation of
administrative due process where the teacher was dismissed by the university
without having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against her.
iv) In the evaluation by the department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of
Justice of a request for the extradition, the prospective extraditee does not only face
a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself,
which may eventually lead to his forcible article banishment to a foreign land. He
is, therefore, entitled to the minimum requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard, as basic elements of due process [Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No.
139465, January 18, 2000].

v) However, administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in

the strict judicial sense [Ocampo v. Office of the ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683,
January 18, 2000]. The standard of due process that must be met in the element of
fairness is not ignored; even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of
due process as long as the parties given the opportunity to be heard [Adamson v.
Amores,152 SCRA 237]. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of [De La Cruz v. Abille, G.R
No. 130196, February 26, 2001], or an opportunity to explain one’s side [Pilipinas
Loan Company v. Securities and exchanged, G.R. No. 104720, April 4, 2001].
 vi) The Monetary Board, as an administrative agency, is legally bound to observe
due process. In the case at bench, the Supreme Court held that the Monetary Board
complied with all the requisites of administrative due process, as enumerated in ang
Tibay. As to petitioner’s suspension, no notice was necessary because it was only
preventive in nature [Busuego v. Court of Appeals, G.r. No. 95326, March 11,
1999].

vii) Substantial is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.

3.Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not necessary for due process:

a) Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particular line of

businesses [RCPI v. National Telecommunications Commission, 184 SCRA 517; PLDT v.
National Telecommunications Commission, 190 SCRA 717].

b) Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of delinquent taxpayer.

c) Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by Secretary of

foreign affairs [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 770].

d) Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons
or property [Art. 704, Civil Code of the Philippines].

4.Rights against self-incrimination.

a) In Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064, it was held that since the administrative charge of
unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the
property under R.A. 3019, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand
without encroaching on his rights against self-incrimination. In Pascual v. Board of
Medical examiners, 28 SCRA 345, the same rule was followed in the administrative
proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his
privilege to practice medicine.

b) This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is called by the complainant
as a witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the witness stand, he can be cross-examined;
but he may still invoke the right at the time the question which calls for an answer which
incriminates him of an offense other than that which is charged is asked. See People v.
Judge Ayson, supra..

5. Power tom punish contempt is inherently judicial may be exercised only if expressly conferred
by law, and when administrative body is engaged in the performance of its quasi-judicial powers.
See Guevara v. Comelec, supra.; Dumarpa v. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478
6.Administrative decisions is not part of the legal system. Art 8 of the Civil Code recognizes
judicial decisions applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country. But
administrative decisions do not enjoy the level of recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau
head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with a shield against judicial action. For there are no
vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials
and such wrong interpretation could not place the government in estoppel to correct or overrule
the same [Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
112024, January 28, 1999].

7. Administrative Appeal and Review.

a) Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to

a higher or superior administrative officer or body.

b) By virtue of the power of control which the president exercises over all executive
departments, the President – by himself – or through the Department Secretaries
(pursuant to the “alter go” doctrine), may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the
administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees. See Araneta v.
Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328.

c) The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearing in the appealed
case, if deemed necessary [Reyes v. Zamora, 90 SCRA 92].

8. Doctrine of res judicata.

a) In Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673, the Supreme Court said
that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting with their exclusive jurisdiction. See also
Boiser v. National Telecommunications Commission, 169 SCRA 198, Nasipit
Lumber v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 93; United Housing v. Dayrit, 181 SCRA 285.
b) In United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15, the Supreme
Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine of res judicata applies to adversary
administrative proceedings. Thus, because proceedings for certification election are
quasi-judicial in nature the decisions in therein can attain finality. In Fortich v.
Corona, 289 SCRA 624, it was held that when the Office of the President declared
its decision final because the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, it
lost jurisdiction over the case; accordingly, its act modifying its decision (upon a
second motion for reconsideration) was in gross disregard of the rules and the legal
precept that accord finality to administrative decisions.
c) However, the doctrine does not apply in administrative adjudication relative to
citizenship [Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853].
 On questions of citizenship, the doctrine of res judicata can apply only when the
following conditions mentioned in Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra., obtain: (i)
the question of citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative body as a
material issue in the controversy after a full-blown hearing; (ii) with the active
participation of the Solicitor General; and (iii) the finding made by the
administrative body on the citizenship issue is affirmed by the supreme court.
d) Neither is the doctrine applicable where the administrative decision of the WWC
Referee awards the employee less than what the law provides [B.F. Goodrich
Philippines v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission. 1988].

9. Some relevant decisions:

a) Laguna Lake development authority (LLDA) has regulatory and quasi-judicial powers
in respect to population cases, with authority to issue a “cease and desist” order, and
on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages, and other aqua-
culture structures in the Laguna Bay. The Local Government Code did not repeal this
provision expressly – and the charter of LLDA being a special law prevails over the
Local Government Code, a general law [LLDA V. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42].
b) The DECS Regional Director has the authority to issue a return-to-work order (to
Striking public school teachers), to initiate administrative charges, and to constitute an
investigating panel [ Regional Director, DECS Region VII v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 110913, January 17, 1995].
c) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the successor-agency- of
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission has, therefore, assumed the latter’s
powers and functions, including the power to hear and decide cases of unsound real
state business practices and cases of specific performance [Realty Exchange Venture
Corporation v. Sendino, G.R No. 109703, July 5, 1995].
d) The Prosecution and Enforcement Division was established as the adjudicatory arm of
the Securities and Exchange Commission [Calma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122787, February 9,1999].
e) By virtue of R.A. 7638, it is now the Department of Energy Regulatory Board, That
has Jurisdiction over disputes involving direct connection of electric power. Definitely,
the exploration, production, marketing, distribution, utilization or any other energy
resource or product falls within the supervision and control of the Department of
Energy [Energy Regulatory Board and lligan Light & Power, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No.127373, March 25, 1999].
f) Disputes involving homeowners associations fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as expressly provided in R.A 580,
s amended [Unilongo v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 123910, April 5,1999].