List of cognitive biases

Cognitive biases are systematic patterns of deviation from norm or

rationality in judgment, and are often studied in psychology and
behavioral economics.[2]

Although the reality of these biases is confirmed by replicable

research, there are often controversies about how to classify these
biases or how to explain them.[3] Some are effects of information-
processing rules (i.e., mental shortcuts), called heuristics, that the
brain uses to produce decisions or judgments. Biases have a variety
of forms and appear as cognitive ("cold") bias, such as mental
noise,[4] or motivational ("hot") bias, such as when beliefs are
distorted by wishful thinking. Both effects can be present at the same
time.[5][6]
Cognitive biases can be organized into four
There are also controversies over some of these biases as to whether categories: biases that arise from too much
information, not enough meaning, the need to act
they count as useless or irrational, or whether they result in useful
quickly, and the limits of memory.[1]
attitudes or behavior. For example, when getting to know others,
people tend to ask leading questions which seem biased towards
confirming their assumptions about the person. However, this kind of confirmation bias has also been argued to be an example of
[7]
social skill: a way to establish a connection with the other person.

Although this research overwhelmingly involves human subjects, some findings that demonstrate bias have been found in non-human
animals as well. For example,hyperbolic discountinghas been observed in rats, pigeons, and monkeys.[8]

Contents
Decision-making, belief, and behavioral biases
Social biases
Memory errors and biases
Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases
Individual differences in decision making biases
Debiasing
See also
Notes
References

Decision-making, belief, and behavioral biases

Many of these biases affect belief formation, business and economic decisions, and human behavior in general.
 Name Description
The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability
Ambiguity effect
seem "unknown".[9]
The tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor", on one trait or piece of information when
Anchoring or focalism [10][11]
making decisions (usually the first piece of information acquired on that subject).
The tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other
, less
Anthropocentric thinking
familiar, biological phenomena.[12]

Anthropomorphism or The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract concepts as possessing
personification human-like traits, emotions, and intentions.[13]

Attentional bias The tendency of perception to be affected by recurring thoughts.[14]

The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead to
Automation bias [15]
erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions.
The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater "availability" in
Availability heuristic memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or
emotionally charged they may be.[16]
A self-reinforcing process in which acollective belief gains more and more plausibility
Availability cascade through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough
and it will become true").[17]
[18] cf.
The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs.
Backfire effect
Continued influence effect.
The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the
Bandwagon effect
same. Related to groupthink and herd behavior.[19]

Base rate fallacy or Base The tendency to ignore base rate information (generic, general information) and focus
rate neglect [20]
on specific information (information only pertaining to a certain case).
An effect where someone's evaluation of thelogical strength of an argument is biased
Belief bias
by the believability of the conclusion.[21]
A person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do another favor for
Ben Franklin effect
that person than they would be if they hadreceived a favor from that person.
Berkson's paradox The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities.
The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able to identify
Bias blind spot [22]
more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.
Bystander effect The tendency to think that others will act in an emergency situation.

Choice-supportive bias [23]

The tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.
The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large
Clustering illusion [11]
samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns).
The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that
Confirmation bias
confirms one's preconceptions.[24]
The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing
Congruence bias
possible alternative hypotheses.[11]
The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general
Conjunction fallacy
ones.[25]

Conservatism (belief The tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new
revision) evidence.[4][26][27]
The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been
Continued influence effect corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction
has occurred.[28] cf. Backfire effect
The enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus' perception when compared with a
Contrast effect
recently observed, contrasting object.[29]
Courtesy bias The tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one's true opinion, so
as to avoid offending anyone.[30]
When better-informed people find it extremely dif
ficult to think about problems from the
Curse of knowledge
perspective of lesser-informed people.[31]
The predisposition to view the past favourably rosy
( retrospection) and future
Declinism
negatively.[32]
Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is
Decoy effect presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in all respects) and
partially dominated by option A.
Default effect When given a choice between several options, the tendency to favor the default one.
The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g.,
Denomination effect
coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).[33]
The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset
Disposition effect
that has declined in value.
The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them
Distinction bias
simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.[34]
The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the
Dunning–Kruger effect
.[35]
tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability
Duration neglect The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value
The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in either oneself or
Empathy gap
others.
The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be
Endowment effect
willing to pay to acquire it.[36]
Based on the estimates,real-world evidence turns out to be less extreme than our
Exaggerated expectation [4][37]
expectations (conditionally inverse of the conservatism bias).
The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify
, and publish data that agree with their
Experimenter's or expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or
expectation bias downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those
expectations.[38]

Focusing effect [39]

The tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event.
The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their
personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and
Forer effect or Barnum
general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This ef fect can provide a partial
effect
explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as
astrology, fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests.
The tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot found
Form function attribution in human–robot interaction. It is argued that people base their expectations and
bias perceptions of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions which do not
[40]
necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot.
Drawing different conclusions from the sameinformation, depending on how that
Framing effect
information is presented
The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that has recently come to one's
attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards (not
Frequency illusion
to be confused with therecency illusion or selection bias).[41] This illusion is sometimes
referred to as the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon. [42]

Functional fixedness Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.
The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality
they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law
Gambler's fallacy of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times
consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than
heads."
Hard–easy effect Based on a specific level of task difficulty, the confidence in judgments is too
[4][43][44][45]
 conservative and not extreme enough[4][43][44][45]
Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" ef
fect, the tendency to see past events as
Hindsight bias
being predictable[46] at the time those events happened.
The "hostile attribution bias" is the tendency to interpret others' behaviors as having
Hostile attribution bias
hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign.
The "hot-hand fallacy" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand") is the
Hot-hand fallacy fallacious belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a
greater chance of further success in additional attempts.
Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more
immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that
are inconsistent over time – people make choices today that their future selves would
prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning. [47] Also known as current
Hyperbolic discounting
moment bias, present-bias, and related toDynamic inconsistency. A good example of
this: a study showed that when making food choices for the coming week, 74% of
participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day , 70%
chose chocolate.
The tendency to respond more strongly to a single identified person at risk than to a
Identifiable victim effect
large group of people at risk.[48]
The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they
IKEA effect partially assembled themselves, such as furniture fromIKEA, regardless of the quality
of the end result.
Occurs when a term in the distributive (referring to every member of a class) and
Illicit transference collective (referring to the class itself as a whole) sense are treated is equivalent. The
two variants of this fallacy are thefallacy of composition and the fallacy of division.

Illusion of control [49]

The tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.
Belief that our judgments are accurate, especially when available information is
Illusion of validity
consistent or inter-correlated.[50]

Illusory correlation [51][52]

Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events.
A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it iseasier to process, or if it has been
Illusory truth effect stated multiple times, regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of
truthiness.
The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling
Impact bias
states.[53]

Information bias fect action.[54]

The tendency to seek information even when it cannot af
Insensitivity to sample size The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples.
The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on
Irrational escalation the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was
probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy
.
An over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative
Law of the instrument
approaches. "If all you have is a hammer , everything looks like a nail."
Less-is-better effect The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately
, but not jointly.
An apparently statistically significant observation may have actually arisen by chance
Look-elsewhere effect
because of the size of the parameter space to be searched.
The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring
Loss aversion
it.[55] (see also Sunk cost effects and endowment effect).
The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with
Mere exposure effect
them.[56]
The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its
Money illusion
value in terms of purchasing power.[57]
Moral credential effect The tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice.
Negativity bias or Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greaterrecall of unpleasant
[58][59]
Negativity effect memories compared with positive memories.[58][59] (see also actor-observer bias,
group attribution error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[60]
The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under
Neglect of probability
uncertainty.[61]
Normalcy bias The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disasterwhich has never happened before.
Aversion to contact with or use of products, esearch,
r standards, or knowledge
Not invented here
developed outside a group. Related toIKEA effect.
Observer-expectancy When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an
effect experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see alsosubject-expectancy effect).
The tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful
Omission bias
omissions (inactions).[62]
The tendency to be over-optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes
Optimism bias
(see also wishful thinking, valence effect, positive outcome bias).[63][64]
Ostrich effect Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation.
The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the
Outcome bias
quality of the decision at the time it was made.
Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain
Overconfidence effect types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40%
of the time.[4][65][66][67]
A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant,
Pareidolia e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, theman in the moon, and hearing
non-existent hidden messages on records played in reverse.
The tendency for some people, especially those suf fering from depression, to
Pessimism bias
overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them.
Placebo effect The belief that a medication works—even if merely a placebo.

Planning fallacy [53]

The tendency to underestimate task-completion times.
Post-purchase The tendency to persuade oneself through rational argument that a purchase was good
rationalization value.
The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation's
Pro-innovation bias usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and
weaknesses.
The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one's current
Projection bias [68][69][59]
preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices.
The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but
Pseudocertainty effect [70]
make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.
The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to do out of a need to resist a
Reactance
perceived attempt to constrain your freedom of choice (see alsoReverse psychology).
Reactive devaluation Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary
.
The illusion that a word or language usage is a recent innovation when it is in fact long-
Recency illusion
established (see also frequency illusion).
A certain state of mind wherein high values and high likelihoods are overestimated
Regressive bias [4][71][72]
while low values and low likelihoods are underestimated.
Restraint bias The tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. A famous example being used in
Rhyme as reason effect the O.J Simpson trial with the defense's use of the phrase "If the gloves don't fit, then
you must acquit."
Risk compensation /
The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases.
Peltzman effect
Selection bias The tendency to notice something more when something causes us to be more aware
of it, such as when we buy a car, we tend to notice similar cars more often than we did
 before. They are not suddenly more common - we just are noticing them more.
Also
called the Observational Selection Bias.
Selective perception The tendency for expectations to affect perception.

Semmelweis reflex [27]

The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.
Sexual overperception bias
/ sexual underperception The tendency to over-/underestimate sexual interest of another person in oneself.
bias
The tendency, when making decisions, to favour potential candidates who don't
Social comparison bias
compete with one's own particular strengths.[73]
The tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours in oneself
Social desirability bias [74]
and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or behaviours.
The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same (see alsoloss aversion,
Status quo bias
endowment effect, and system justification).[75][76]
Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual
Stereotyping
information about that individual.
The tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the
Subadditivity effect
parts.[77]
Perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also
Subjective validation
assigns perceived connections between coincidences.
Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and
Surrogation
subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest.
Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently
Survivorship bias
overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of visibility
.
Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or
Time-saving bias decreasing) from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time that could be
saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively high speed.
Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater ef
fect on others than
Third-person effect
on themselves.
The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known as
bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid specialized or complex
Parkinson's law of triviality subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor
, and instead focus on something easy
to grasp or rewarding to the average participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike
shed.[78]
The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item. Strong ef
fects on the
Unit bias
consumption of food in particular.[79]
Weber–Fechner law Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities.
Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-traveled routes and overestimation
Well travelled road effect
of the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.
"Women are wonderful"
A tendency to associate more positive attributes with women than with men.
effect
Zero-risk bias Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.
A bias whereby a situation is incorrectly perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e., one
Zero-sum bias
person gains at the expense of another).

Social biases
Most of these biases are labeled asattributional biases.
 Name Description
The tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the
influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see
Actor-observer bias also Fundamental attribution error), and for explanations of one's own behaviors to do
the opposite (that is, to overemphasize the influence of our situation and
underemphasize the influence of our own personality).
The tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure
Authority bias [80]
(unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.

Cheerleader effect [81]

The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation.
Defensive attribution Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more severe or as
hypothesis personal or situationalsimilarity to the victim increases.
Occurs when people claim more responsibility for themselves for the results of a joint
Egocentric bias
action than an outside observer would credit them with.
An exception to the fundamental attribution error, when people view others as having
Extrinsic incentives bias
(situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself
The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with
False consensus effect
them.[82]
The tendency to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that
Forer effect (aka Barnum
supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough
effect)
to apply to a wide range of people. For example,horoscopes.
The tendency for people to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for
Fundamental attribution behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational
error influences on the same behavior[59] (see also actor-observer bias,group attribution
error, positivity effect, and negativity effect).[60]
The biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of
the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision outcomes reflect
Group attribution error
the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly
suggests otherwise.
The tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one
Halo effect personality area to another in others' perceptions of them (see alsophysical
attractiveness stereotype).[83]

Illusion of asymmetric People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of
insight them.[84]
When people view self-generated preferences as instead being caused by insightful,
Illusion of external agency
effective and benevolent agents
People overestimate others' ability to know them, and they also overestimate their
Illusion of transparency
ability to know others.
Overestimating one's desirable qualities, and underestimating undesirable qualities,
Illusory superiority relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect", "better-than-average
effect", or "superiority bias".)[85]
The tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be
Ingroup bias
members of their own groups.
The tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally just, causing
Just-world hypothesis
them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as deserved by the victim(s).
The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the
Moral luck
outcome of an event.
Naïve cynicism Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.
The belief that we see reality as it really is – objectively and without bias; that the facts
Naïve realism are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us; and that those who don't
are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased.

Outgroup homogeneity Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than
bias members of other groups.[86]
 Self-serving bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also
manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way
beneficial to their interests (see alsogroup-serving bias).[87]
Known as the tendency for group members to spend more time and energy discussing
information that all members are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and
Shared information bias
less time and energy discussing information that only some members are aware of (i.e.,
unshared information).[88]
The disproportionally higher representation of words related to social interactions, in
comparison to words related to physical or mental aspects of behavior , in most
languages. This bias attributed to nature of language as a tool facilitating human
Sociability bias of
interactions. When verbal descriptors of human behavior are used as a source of
language
information, sociability bias of such descriptors emerges in factor-analytic studies as a
factor related to pro-social behavior (for example, of Extraversion factor in the
Big Five
personality traits [59]
The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and
System justification political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes
even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. (See also status quo bias.)
The tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of
Trait ascription bias
personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an
Ultimate attribution error
internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.

Worse-than-average effect ficult.[89]

A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are dif

Memory errors and biases

In psychology and cognitive science, a memory bias is a cognitive bias that either enhances or impairs the recall of a memory (either
the chances that the memory will be recalled at all, or the amount of time it takes for it to be recalled, or both), or that alters the
content of a reported memory. There are many types of memory bias, including:
 Name Description
Bizarreness effect Bizarre material is better remembered than common material.
In a self-justifying manner retroactively ascribing one's choices to be more informed
Choice-supportive bias
than they were when they were made.
After an investment of effort in producing change, remembering one's past performance
Change bias
as more difficult than it actually was[90]
Childhood amnesia The retention of few memories from before the age of four
.
Tendency to remember high values and highlikelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as
Conservatism or
lower than they actually were and low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on
Regressive bias [71][72]
the evidence, memories are not extreme enough
Incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present
Consistency bias
attitudes and behaviour.[91]
That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-context
Context effect memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories (e.g., recall time and
accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at home, and vice versa)
The tendency for people of one race to have dif
ficulty identifying members of a race
Cross-race effect
other than their own.
A form of misattribution where a memory is mistaken for imagination, because there is
Cryptomnesia
.[90]
no subjective experience of it being a memory
Recalling the past in a self-serving manner
, e.g., remembering one's exam grades as
Egocentric bias
being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as bigger than it really was.
A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades more quickly
Fading affect bias [92]
than the emotion associated with positive events.
False memory A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory
.
That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people are better
Generation effect (Self-
able to recall memories of statements that they have generated than similar statements
generation effect)
generated by others.
The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by using Internet
Google effect
search engines.
The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they actually were;
Hindsight bias
also called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect.
That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones, which
Humor effect might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the increased cognitive processing
time to understand the humor, or the emotional arousal caused by the humor.[93]
That people are more likely to identify as true statements those they have previously
heard (even if they cannot consciously remember having heard them), regardless of the
Illusion of truth effect
actual validity of the statement. In other words, a person is more likely to believe a
familiar statement than an unfamiliar one.

Illusory correlation [4][52]

Inaccurately remembering a relationship between two events.
The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out over time,
Lag effect as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single session. See also
spacing
effect.
Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over time, often
concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain details that take on
Leveling and sharpening exaggerated significance in relation to the details or aspects of the experience lost
through leveling. Both biases may be reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection
or re-telling of a memory.[94]
That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of
Levels-of-processing effect
effectiveness.[95]
List-length effect A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the length of the
list increases, the absolute number of items remembered increases as well. For
example, consider a list of 30 items ("L30") and a list of 100 items ("L100"). An
 individual may remember 15 items from L30, or 50%, whereas the individual may
remember 40 items from L100, or 40%. Although the percent of L30 items remembered
(50%) is greater than the percent of L100 (40%), more L100 items (40) are
remembered than L30 items (15).[96]
Memory becoming less accurate because of interference frompost-event
Misinformation effect
information.[97]
That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items were received
Modality effect
via speech than when they were received through writing.
Mood-congruent memory
The improved recall of information congruent with one's current mood.
bias
People taking turns speaking in a group tend to have diminished recall forthe words of
Next-in-line effect
others who spoke immediately before them.[98]
That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item causes it to
Part-list cueing effect
become harder to retrieve the other items.[99]
That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the average of how it
Peak-end rule
was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it ended.
Persistence The unwanted recurrence of memories of atraumatic event.
The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more easily and
Picture superiority effect frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by viewing their written word form
counterparts.[100][101][102][103][104][105]
Positivity effect
(Socioemotional selectivity That older adults favor positive over negative information in their memories.
theory)

Primacy effect, recency That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by the items at
effect & serial position the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least likely to be
effect remembered.[106]
That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with
Processing difficulty effect
more difficulty) is more easily remembered.[107]
The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than
Reminiscence bump
personal events from other lifetime periods[108]
Rosy retrospection The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was.
That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to
Self-relevance effect
others.

Source confusion [109]

Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted memories.
That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long span of time
Spacing effect
rather than a short one.
The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your appearance or
Spotlight effect
behavior.
Stereotypical bias Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender)
Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that
Suffix effect
the subject is not required to recall.[110][111]
A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for
Suggestibility
memory.
When time perceived by the individual either lengthens, making events appear to slow
Tachypsychia
down, or contracts.[112]
The tendency to displace recent events backward in time and remote events forward in
Telescoping effect
time, so that recent events appear more remote, and remote events, more recent.
The fact that you more easily remember information you have read by rewriting it
Testing effect
instead of rereading it.[113]
Tip of the tongue When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information, but is
 phenomenon frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an instance of
"blocking" where multiple similar memories are being recalled and interfere with each
other.[90]
[114] It is related to the enlightenment
Overestimating the significance of the present.
Travis Syndrome Idea of Progress and chronological snobberywith possibly an appeal to novelty logical
fallacy being part of the bias.
That the "gist" of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim
Verbatim effect
wording.[115] This is because memories are representations, not exact copies.

von Restorff effect [116]

That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items
Zeigarnik effect That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones.

Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases

Bounded rationality – limits on optimization and rationality

Prospect theory
Mental accounting
Adaptive bias – basing decisions on limited information and biasing them based on the costs of being wrong.
Attribute substitution – making a complex, difficult judgment by unconsciously substituting it by an easier
judgment[117]
Attribution theory

Salience
Naïve realism
Cognitive dissonance, and related:

Impression management
Self-perception theory
Heuristics in judgment and decision making, including:

Availability heuristic – estimating what is more likely by what is more available in memory
, which is biased toward
vivid, unusual, or emotionally charged examples [51]
[51]
Representativeness heuristic– judging probabilities on the basis of resemblance
[118]
Affect heuristic – basing a decision on an emotional reaction rather than a calculation of risks and benefits
Some theories of emotion such as:

Two-factor theory of emotion

Somatic markers hypothesis
Introspection illusion
Misinterpretations or misuse of statistics; innumeracy.
A 2012 Psychological Bulletin article suggested that at least eight seemingly unrelated biases can be produced by the same
information-theoretic generative mechanism that assumes noisy information processing during storage and retrieval of information in
human memory.[4]

Individual differences in decision making biases

People do appear to have stable individual differences in their susceptibility to decision biases such as overconfidence, temporal
discounting, and bias blind spot.[119] That said, these stable levels of bias within individuals are possible to change. Participants in
experiments who watched training videos and played debiasing games showed medium to large reductions both immediately and up
to three months later in the extent to which they exhibited susceptibility to six cognitive biases: anchoring, bias blind spot,
confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness.[120]

Debiasing
Debiasing is the reduction of biases in judgment and decision making through incentives, nudges, and training. Cognitive bias
mitigation and cognitive bias modificationare forms of debiasing specifically applicable to cognitive biases and their fects.
ef

See also
Affective forecasting
Anecdotal evidence
Apophenia
Attribution (psychology)
Black swan theory
Chronostasis
Cognitive distortion
Defence mechanisms
Dysrationalia
Fear, uncertainty, and doubt
Feedback
Impostor syndrome
List of common misconceptions
List of fallacies
List of maladaptive schemas
List of memory biases
List of psychological effects
List of topics related to public relations and propaganda
Lists of thinking-related topics
Media bias
Mind projection fallacy
Motivated reasoning
Pollyanna principle
Positive feedback
Prevalence effect
Propaganda
Publication bias
Recall bias
Self-handicapping
Systematic bias

Notes
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