G.R. No.

192217 March 2, 2011

37. DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, Respondents.

FACTS: A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon Prudencio against
Danilo Parel with the RTC in Baguio City. Simeon alleged that he was the owner of a two-story house at
No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation in Baguio City. Simeon allowed Danilo and his parents to live
on the ground floor of the house since his wife was the elder sister of Danilo’s father, Florentino. In 1985,
Simeon needed the whole house back and thus informed Danilo and his parents that they had to vacate the
place. Danilo’s parents acceded to Simeon’s demand. Danilo, however, remained in the house with his
family despite repeated demands on him to surrender the premises. This development drove Simeon to
institute an action for recovery of possession and damages. Danilo offered a different version of events.
He maintained that the land on which Simeon’s house was constructed was in his father Florentino’s
name. He explained that his father Florentino, who had by then passed away, did not have enough funds
to build a house and thus made a deal with Simeon for them to just contribute money for the construction
of a house on Florentino’s land. Florentino and Simeon were, thus, co-owners of the house of which
Simeon claims sole ownership. The RTC ruled in favor of Danilo.

Court of Appeals: On Simeon’s appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC, declaring plaintiff-appellant
as the new owner of the subject residential building. Further, appellee is ordered to pay appellant
P2,0000/month for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same,
and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Supreme Court: Danilo challenged the CA Decision before the SC via an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. On April 19, 2006, SC issued its Decision affirming the CA Decision.

Execution: On May 9, 2007, Simeon sought to enforce this Court’s Decision and thus filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution. The RTC granted the Writ of Execution to be issued. A Motion for
Reconsideration of the February 15, 2008 RTC Order was filed by Danilo. RTC issued another Order
denying the motion. Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the judgment
against Danilo for him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly rentals from April 1994 onwards.

The Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring Simeon to file his Comment on Danilo’s Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Simeon argued that the RTC and CA correctly ruled that the prayer for a reduction
of back rentals should be denied, since Danilo never turned over possession of the subject premises to
him.

Danilo argues that he vacated the subject premises in April 1994 and claims that he stated this fact in his
Comment on Simeon’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and in his Motion for Reconsideration.
He, thus, argues that the monthly rentals he should pay should only be from April 1988 to March 1994.
He alleges that the CA committed an error in law in upholding the RTC Orders dated February 15, 2008
and July 31, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in upholding the RTC Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Danilo.

RULING: We resolve to grant the petition.

The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo’s allegation were true and accordingly modified
the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a
judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality. Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to
rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right.

Banaga v. Majaducon,19 however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:

1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;

5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property
under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.

Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation
of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. The Supreme Court finds that Danilo’s situation merits a
relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation were true
would allow a final resolution of the case.

Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court:

Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.3/4 Every court shall have power: (g) To amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances that
merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of
judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the
period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in the instant
case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994, the
period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that he had
already left the premises.
G.R. No. 141241 November 22, 2005

91. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through its trustee, the ASSET PRIVATIZATION
TRUST, Petitioner, vs."G" HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS: On 1992, the Committee on Privatization approved the proposal of the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) for the negotiated sale of 90% of the shares of stock of the government-owned Maricalum Mining
Corporation (MMC). Learning of the government’s intention to sell MMC, the respondent "G" Holdings,
Inc. signified its interest to purchase MMC and submitted the best bid.

Under the purchase and sale agreement, the Republic undertook to sell and deliver 90% of the entire
issued and outstanding shares of MMC, as well as its company notes, to "G" Holdings in consideration of
the purchase price of ₱673,161,280. It also provided for a down payment of ₱98,704,000 with the balance
divided into four tranches payable in installment over a period of ten years.

Subsequently, a disagreement on the matter of when the installment payments should commence arose
between the parties. The Republic claimed that it should be on the seventh month from the signing of the
agreement while "G" Holdings insisted that it should begin seven months after the fulfillment of the
closing conditions. Unable to settle the issue, "G" Holdings filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, against the Republic to compel it to
close the sale in accordance with the purchase and sale agreement.

RTC: It ruled in favor of "G" Holdings and held that the Purchase and Sale Agreement is indeed subject
to the final closing conditions prescribed by Stipulation No. 5.02 and conformably to Rule 39, Section 10
of the Rules of Court, accordingly orders that the Asset Privatization Trust execute the corresponding
Document of Transfer of the subject shares and financial notes and cause the actual delivery of subject
shares and notes to "G" Holdings, Inc., within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.

CA: The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal on behalf of the Republic on June 28, 1996. Contrary
to the rules of procedure, however, the notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals (CA), not
with the trial court which rendered the judgment appealed from. The Republic, through the APT, filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. It claimed that the decision should be annulled on the
ground of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It
characterized the fashion by which the trial court handled the case as highly aberrant and peculiar
because the court a quo promulgated its decision prior to the submission of the Republic’s formal offer of
evidence and without ruling on the admissibility of the evidence offered by "G" Holdings. The Republic
also asserted that the failure of the Solicitor General to file the notice of appeal with the proper forum
amounted to extrinsic fraud which prevented it from appealing the case. The appellate court dismissed the
petition. It ruled that there was no extrinsic fraud because "G" Holdings had no participation in the failure
of the Solicitor General to properly appeal the decision of the trial court. Neither was there any
connivance between "G" Holdings’ and the Republic’s counsels in the commission of the error.

ISSUE: Whether actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies and instrumentalities, if not
initiated by the Solicitor General, should be summarily dismissed.

RULING: The Court notes that the instant petition suffers from a basic infirmity for lack of the requisite
imprimatur from the Office of the Solicitor General, hence, it is dismissible on that ground. The general
rule is that only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines and that actions filed in the name of the Republic, or its agencies and instrumentalities for that
matter, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, should be summarily dismissed.
As an exception to the general rule, the Solicitor General is empowered to "deputize legal officers of
government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and
exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases."

Here, the petition was signed and filed on behalf of the Republic by Atty. Raul B. Villanueva, the
executive officer of the legal department of the APT, and Atty. Rhoel Z. Mabazza. However, they did not
present any proof that they had been duly deputized by the Solicitor General to initiate and litigate this
action. Thus, this petition can be dismissed on that ground. In the interest of justice, however, we shall
proceed to discuss the issues propounded by the Republic.

136. G.R. No. 171208 September 7, 2007

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE

FACTS: On the directive of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, its Law Department
filed an Information against respondent Ma. Leonisa Genovia, for violation of Section 261 (z) (3) of the
Omnibus Election Code which penalizes "any person who votes in substitution for another whether with
or without the latter’s knowledge and/or consent."

The accusatory portion of the Information, dated July 26, 2005, which was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City reads that the accused voted in substitution of another person by
misrepresenting herself to be Emely Genovia and voted in substitution of said Emely Genovia, a
registered voter in Precinct No. 779-A, Barangay 60, Caloocan City. Under Section 264 of the Omnibus
Election Code, any person found guilty of any election offense under this Code shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years .

RTC: By Order of September 21, 2005, Branch 129 of the Caloocan RTC dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, it citing Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980) reading:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine regardless of other imposable accessory penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, or value amount
thereof.

The COMELEC moved to reconsider the trial court’s dismissal order, inviting attention to Section 268 of
the Omnibus Election Code which reads: SECTION 268. Jurisdiction of courts. – The regional trial court
shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which
shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases. By a one sentence Order of November 15, 2005, the trial
court denied the COMELEC’s motion for "lack of merit." Hence, the present petition for certiorari under
Rule 64.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over violations of Section 261 (z) (3) of the Omnibus Election
Code the latter being punishable with imprisonment for not more than six (6) years.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. From the above-quoted provision of Section 32 of BP Blg. 129,
jurisdiction of first-level courts – the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
trial courts – does not cover criminal cases which, by specific provision of law, fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of regional trial courts (and of the Sandiganbayan).

As correctly argued by the COMELEC, Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically provides,
regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of the Code "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote."

It bears emphasis that Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdictions of various courts. Hence, it may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by a specific court. Section 268 of Omnibus Election Code is one such
and must thus be construed as an exception to BP Blg. 129, the general law on jurisdiction of courts.

In fine, while BP Blg. 129 lodges in municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts and municipal circuit
trial courts jurisdiction over criminal cases carrying a penalty of imprisonment of less than one year but
not exceeding six years, following Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, any criminal action or
proceeding which bears the same penalty, with the exception of the therein mentioned two cases, falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of regional trial courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.