DUE PROCESS

Alonte vs savellano

Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura

Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before
RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of
desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness
of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish
new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both
accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about
the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case
due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his
right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver
of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano
has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The
case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.

Title: ARNOLD ALVA, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondent. (

G.R. No. 157331, April 12, 2006

Facts:

The present petition stemmed from an Information charging petitioner with having committed the
crime of estafa. It was allegedtherein that Arnold Alva, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent
representation which he made to Yumi Veranga yHervera to the effect that he could process the latter’s
application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00. He succeeded in inducing
her to give and deliver the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestationand
representation, well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is
not genuine and weremade solely to obtain the amount of P120,000.00.On 5 September 1995, the RTC
issued a Recall Order of the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner in view of the approval of his
bailbond. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After the trial on the
merits, the RTC considered thecase submitted for decision.

On 4 May 1999, petitioner’s counsel filed an Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation praying for the

resetting of the 5 May 1999 schedule of promulgation of the RTC’s decision to 17 June 1999 in view of
the fact that said counselalready had a prior commitment on subject date. The RTC granted the motion.
The promulgation, however, was deferred onlyuntil 19 May 1999. On 18 May 1999, petitioner’s counsel
again moved for the deferment of the promulgation, due to prior"undertakings of similar
importance." On 19 May 1999, petitioner and counsel both failed to appear in court despite due notice.

In his stead, claiming to be petitioner’s representative, a certain Joey Perez personally delivered to the
RTC a hand writtenmedical certificate expressing petitioner’s inability to attend the day’s hearing due
to hypertension.

In response to the aforestatedacts of petitioner and counsel, the RTC issued an Order directing the
promulgation of its decision in absentia and the issuance of abench warrant of arrest against petitioner
for his failure to appear before it despite due notice. In its decision dated 25 March1999,the RTC found
petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.Meanwhile, as appearing in the records of the RTC, a document
entitle Personal Bail Bond dated 21 May 1999 issued by MegaPacific Insurance Corporation, seemed to
have been filed before and approved by the RTC as evidenced by the signature of JudgeMuro on the
face of said bail bond.

For such reason, petitioner appeared to have been admitted to bail anew after his
conviction.Incompatible to the above inference, however, in an Order dated 25 May 1999, judgment
was rendered against Eastern Insuranceand Surety Corporation, the bonding company that issued
petitioner’s original bail bond, in the amount of P17,000.00, for failureto produce the person of
petitioner within the 10 day period earlier provided and to explain why the amount of its
undertakingshould not be forfeited. Police Superintendent Ramon Flores De Jesus, Chief of Warrant and
Subpoena Section, manifested to theRTC the return of the unexecuted Warrant of Arrest issued on 19
May 1999 for the reason that the address of the accused is notwithin their area of responsibility.
Nevertheless, De Jesus reassured the RTC that the name of the accused will be included in theirlist of
wanted persons for our future reference. Examination of the records of the case revealed that petitioner
already moved outof his address on record without informing the RTC.On 26 July 1999,petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, which was denied for lack of merit. On appealbefore the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court required petitioner to show cause why his appeal should not be
dismissed itappearing that no new bail bond for his provisional liberty on appeal had been posted.
Petitioner filed a Compliance essentiallystating therein that he immediately posted a new bond for his
provisional liberty and that the presiding judge of the lower court,which issued the questioned decision,
duly approved the new bond. A certified true copy of the bond was submitted together withthe
Compliance. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellant’s
failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive, and in view of the
fact that his personal bail bond posted in thelower court had already expired." Undaunted, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto seeking its reversal. On 19February 2003, the Court of
Appeals denied the MR stating that the appellant has failed to submit himself under the jurisdiction
of the court or under the custody of the law since his conviction in 1999 and that there was no valid bail
bond in place whenappellant took his appeal. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the appeal in view of petitioner’s
alleged failure to post a valid bail bond to secure his provisional liberty on appeal2.

Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court or to the custody of
the law despite theposting of the subject bail bond.

Held:1. NO.

The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Within the
meaning of the principlesgoverning the prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his
appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the RTC final and executory.

Petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on appeal is unimportant because underthe
circumstances, he is disallowed by law to be admitted to bail on appeal. At the time petitioner filed his
notice of appeal andduring the pendency of his appeal even until now he remains at large,
placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of thelaw.Section 5 of Rule 114 provides that the RTC is
given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has beenconvicted to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than 6 years but less than 20 years. However, the same
alsoprovides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application
upon the concurrence of twopoints:

1)if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years;

and 2) upon ashowing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the
five circumstances: (a) That the accused isa recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;(b) That the accused is found to
have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditionsof his
bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole,
or under conditionalpardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the
appeal, the accused may commit another crime.In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine(9) years and one (1) day as
minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quiteclearly, the
approval of petitioner’s application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC.

Basic is the principle that that theright to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of
the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and itwould be premature, to file a petition for bail
for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
In the case at bar,the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing
in the records of the case, neither in theRTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was
ever arrested, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the veryleast placed himself under the custody of
the law.

All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner.

It is beyond disputethat the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was
irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact thatnowhere in the records of the case is it shown that
petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor isthere showing that the RTC
issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document. Be that as itmay,
even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did
not render thesubject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not
entitled to bail on appeal. That theprosecution appears not to have been given the chance to object, as
evidently required, to the application or approval of thesubject bail bond (with notice to the accused),
fortifies the declaration as to its invalidity. Nowhere in the original records of the

RTC does it even show that the prosecution was informed of petitioner’s application for bail, much less
the ap proval of suchapplication. As when there is a concurrence of the enumerated circumstances and
the range of penalty imposed, the prosecutionmust first be accorded an opportunity to object and
present evidence, if necessary, with notice to the accused.

Approval of anapplication for bail on appeal, absent the knowledge of the prosecution of such
application or, at the very least,failing to allow it to object, is not the product of sound judicial
discretion but of impulse and arbitrariness, not tomention violative of respondent People’s right of
procedural due process.

This is especially true in this case as a close scrutiny of the original records of the case at bar reveals
that petitioner violatedthe conditions of his bail without valid justification his failure to appear before
the RTC, despite due notice, on the day of the promulgation of the latter’s judgment, absent any
justifiable reason. His absence was a clear contravention of the condit ionsof his bail bond to say the
least. While, indeed, a medical certificate was hand delivered and filed by a certain Joey Perez,

allegedly a representative of petitioner, stating therein the reason for the latter’s absence, the RTC
found insubstantial the explanation proffered. Appropriately, it ordered the promulgation of its
judgment in absentia. It also issued a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner. Upon examination, the
subject medical certificate merely states that petitioner was diagnosed to besuffering from
hypertension. It failed to elucidate further any concomitant conditions necessitating petitioner’s
physical incapability to present himself before the court even for an hour or two; thus, it considered the
absence of petitioner unjustified.Further, it should be recalled as well, that as early as 4 May 1999,
petitioner and counsel had already been notified of the 19 May1999 schedule of promulgation. The first
having been postponed in view of the Urgent Motion to Cancel Promulgation (on 5 May1999) filed by
petitioner’s counsel.

Another tell ing evidence of the violation of petitioner’s original bail bond is when he failed toinform the
RTC of his change of address. By failing to inform the RTC of his change of address, petitioner failed to
hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the RTC. It was an unmistakable complete breach
of the conditions of his bail bond.Following from the above discussion, the conviction of petitioner to a
period beyond six (6) years but less than twenty(20) years in tandem with attendant circumstances
effectively violating his bail without valid justification should have effectively precluded him from
being admitted to bail on appeal.

The issue of the validity of petitioner’s bail bond onappeal having been laid to rest by Section 5 of
Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner’s alleged failure to post a bail bond on
appeal is, therefore, unimportant as, under the circumstances, he is disallowed by lawto be admitted
to bail on appeal. Thus, for all legal intents and purposes, there can be no other conclusion than thatat
the time petitioner filed his notice of appeal and during the pendency of his appeal even until now he
remains at large, placing himself beyond the pale, and protection of the law.

Inexorably, having jumped bail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether or not
petitioner has lost his right toappeal his conviction now ensues. The Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. Withinthe meaning of the principles governing the
prevailing criminal procedure, petitioner impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumpingbail and thereby
made the judgment of the RTC final and executory. By putting himself beyond the reach and application
of thelegal processes of the land, petitioner revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a
position to speculate at hispleasure his chances for a reversal.

By jumping bail, petitioner has waived his right to appeal.

Antiporda vs. Garchitorena

G.R. No. L-133289, 321 SCRA 551, December 23, 1999

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayanwithout claiming
that one of the accused is a public officer who took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively describe
the offense charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took
advantage of his position. Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant
of arrest issued. The same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence,
this petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
RULING: YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with
the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was
filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.However, we hold that the petitioners
are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order
for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. In the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and
person, must concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial
jurisdiction over the case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it
was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

CARIAGA VS PEOPLE GR NO 180010

The Case:
Cenita was the Municipal Treasurer of Cabauatan, Isabela with a salary grade of 24, was convicted for
three counts of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Through
counsel, Cenita filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC decision, stating that he intended to appeal the
trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction on Cenita’s
case.

Cenita elevated his case to the Supreme Court, invoking the liberal interpretation of the rules and
admitted the procedural lapse committed by his former counsel, and requests the Court to transmit
the records of the cases to the Saniganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.

The Issue:

Whether or not the appeal which was wrongly taken to the Court of Appeals, should be given due
course and transmitted to the Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606,⁠1 as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:⁠2

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

xxxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade `27′ or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due
to a procedural lapse militates against the Court’s dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioner’s
plea for a relaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any
rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial
justice must always be avoided.⁠3
In Ulep v. People,⁠4 the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that

x x x petitioner’s failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omission
did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had that been
the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction – which was exactly what
happened in the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to the proper
forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered the pertinent
records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving
government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit regrettably
so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules of procedure. He
should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they should be forwarded to
the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially
in cases such as this where a person’s liberty was at stake. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The slapdash work of petitioner’s former counsel and the trial court’s apparent ignorance of the law
effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction. ⁠5

While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto,
especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or where the interests of justice so require.⁠6 It can not be gainsaid that the case of
petitioner can fall under any of these exceptions.

Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense
as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan
would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET
ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial Court is
warned against committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative sanction.

COJUANGCO, JR.

vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN

(Quisumbing, December 21, 1998)

no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon a probable cause tobe determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describingthe place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.The clause unequivocally means that the judge must make his own
determination— independent of that of the prosecutor — of whether there is probable cause toissue
a warrant of arrest, based on the complainant's and his witnesses' accounts,
if any. Supporting evidence other than the report and recommendation of theinvestigators and the
special prosecutor should be examined by the court

FACTS:1.January 12, 1990, a complaint was filed by the Office of the Solicitor Generalbefore the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
petitioner,former Administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), and theformer members
of the PCA Governing Board, petitioner among them, forviolation of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Actfor having conspired and confederated together and taking undue
advantageof their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence,connections or
relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcosand former First Lady, Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos without authority, granted adonation in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
to the PhilippineCoconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, using PCA
specialfund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits, advantage andpreference through manife
st partiality, evident bad faith and grossinexcusable negligence to the grave (

sic

) and prejudice of the Filipino peopleand to the Republic of the Philippines.

2.Subsequently, however, the Court ruled that all proceedings in thepreliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG were null and void and thePCGG was directed to transmit the complaints and
records of the case to theOffice of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

3.In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommendedthe filling of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.4.Resolution dated June 2, 1992 was referred by Assistant OmbudsmanAbelardo L. Aportadera,
Jr. to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for reviewand if warranted, for the preparation of
the criminal information.5.In a memorandum dated July l5, 1992 the Office of
the Special Prosecutoraffirmed the recommendation as contained in the Resolution dated June
2,1992.6.August 19, 1992 then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez ordered the panel
of investigators to discuss the merits of the prejudicial question posed byrespondent
Lobregat.7.In a Memorandum dated December 1, 1993 the panel of investigatorsrecommended that
the motion to suspend proceedings be granted.8.On December 3, 1993 then Ombudsman Vasquez
referred for comment tothe Office of the Special Prosecutors the Memorandum dated December 1,

1993 of the panel of investigators on the issue of the existence of prejudicialquestion.9.On February
17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by therespondent Sandiganbayan.10.On
February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. On the same day he
likewisefiled, through counsel, a Manifestation stating that he was posting bailwithout prejudice to
the Opposition To Issuance of Warrant of Arrest withMotion For Leave To File a Motion For
Reconsideration of the Ombudsman'sResolution which he filed.11.In a Resolution dated February 20,
1995, the respondent Sandiganbayanbarred petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval
of the court.12.On May 25, 1995, petitioner was conditionally arraigned pleading not guilty tothe
Information.13.In the meantime, in a Memorandum dated October 22, 1995, SpecialProsecution
Officer Victorio U. Tabanguil found no probable cause to warrantthe filing against petitioner and
recommended the dismissal of the case. Therecommendation for dismissal was approved by the
Honorable Ombudsmanon November 15, 1996.14.On December 13, 1996 petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion To Dismiss allegingthat with the reversal of the earlier findings of the Ombudsman of
probablecause, there was therefore nothing on record before the respondentSandiganbayan which
would warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest andthe assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
case.ISSUES:1.WON the warrant of arrest issued by respondent Sandiganbayan is null andvoid, or
should now be lifted if initially valid? YES2.WON the Sandiganbayan still acquired jurisdiction over
the person of thepetitioner? YESRATIO:1.Sandiganbayan had two pieces of documents to consider
when it resolved toissue the warrant of arrest against the accused:a.the Resolution dated June 2, 1992
of the Panel of Investigators of theOffice of the Ombudsman recommending the filing of the
Information
andb.the Memorandum dated June 16, 1995 of the Office of the SpecialProsecutor denying the existe
nce of a prejudicial question which willwarrant the suspension of the criminal case. The Sandiganbaya
n hadnothing more to support
its resolution.2.The Sandiganbayan failed to abide by the constitutional mandate of

personally determining the existence of probable cause before issuing awarrant of

arrest. The 2 cited document above were the product of somebody else’s determination, insufficient
to support a finding of probablecause by the Sandiganbayan.

3. Roberts vs. Court of Appealsthe Court struck down as invalid an order

forthe issuance of a warrant of arrest which were based only on "theinformation, amended
information and Joint Resolution", without the benefitof the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutor's finding of probablecause.

4.InHo vs. People

the Court the respondent "palpably committed grave abuseof discretion in

ipso factoissuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the

solebasis of the prosecutor's findings and recommendation, and withoutdetermining on its own the
issue of probable cause based on evidence otherthan such bare findings and recommendation.

5.With regards to jurisdiction, the rule is well-settled that the giving or postingof bail by the accused
is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claimexemption effect of being subject to the jurisdiction
of respondent court.While petitioner has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of
theissuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his claim has beennegated when he
himself invoked the jurisdiction of respondent court throughthe filing of various motions that sought
other affirmative reliefs.
6.In La Naval Drug vs. CA

, Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendantmay be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarilyappears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
thecourt. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably bymotion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise,he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover,"[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separatepurpose
of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
otherpurpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction overthe person.

PANGANIBAN,

J.,

concurring and dissenting opinion;As a consequence of the nullity of the warrant of arrest, the
Sandiganbayan did notacquire jurisdiction over the petitioner. The posting of a bail bond by the
petitioner despite the nullity or irregularity of theissuance of the warrant for
his arrest should not be equated with "voluntaryappearance" as to cloak the respondent court with
jurisdiction over his
person. Truly, his "appearance" in court was not "voluntary." It should be noted thatimmediately
upon learning of the filling of the Information and the issuance of thewarrant, petitioner filed an
"Opposition to [the] Issuance of [a] Warrant of Arrestwith Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration of [the]
Ombudsman['s]Resolutions." Said Opposition was based on the inadequacy of the respondentcourt's
basis for determining probable cause.

It was essentially an express andcontinuing objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person

.When petitioner posted his bail bond, he expressly manifested at the same timethat such was
"without prejudice” to his Opposition.

G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002]

Facts: Lutgarda Cruz was charged with the crime of “Estafa through Falsification of Public Document”
before the Manila Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner executed before aNotary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a
parcel of landstating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact
sheknew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not reserve the rightto file a
separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil action wasdeemed instituted in the
criminal case. On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision. On February 10, 1994,
petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration dated February

7, 1994, assailing the trial court’s ruling on the civil

aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of themotion by registered
mail. Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorariand mandamus with the Court of
Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trialcourt. Petitioner also asked the Court of Appeals
to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of the decision dated February 7,
1994.After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994acquitting
petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trialcourt rendered judgment
on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to thesurviving heirs of the parcel of land located in
BulacanIssue: Whether or not the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the civil aspect of thecase?Held:
Yes. The RTC of Manila has jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the Criminal Case.
There are three important requisites which must be present before acourt can acquire criminal
jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over thesubject matter. Second, the court must
have jurisdiction over the territory where theoffense was committed. Third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of theaccused.

[18]

In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter asthe law has conferred on
the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafathrough falsification of a
public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over theoffense charged since the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trialcourt also acquired jurisdiction over the person of
accused-petitioner because she

voluntarily submitted to the court’s authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the

subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed withinits territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues thatthe law requires the court to
resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civilliability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code

provides that “[E]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”

Article

104 of the same Code states that “civil liability x x x includes restitution.”

David v. Agbay [G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015] TOPIC: Retroactivity of laws PONENTE: VILLARAMA,
JR., J. AUTHOR: Faye NOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS: (chronological order) 1. In 1974, petitioner became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon
their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased
a lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindor. However, in the year 2004, they came to
know that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone. 2. On
April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. 3. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. 4. Meanwhile, on
October 11, 2007, while petitioner’s MLA was pending, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225 as evidenced by Identification Certificate No. 266-10-07 issued by the
Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto). 5. In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he
filed his application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured
by a CENRO officer that he could declare himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the
property from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they
have the right and authority to convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil and
criminal suits between him and private respondent’s family. 6. On January 8, 2008, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding information in court. Petitioner
challenged the said resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ). 7.
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that petitioner’s
subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was
void ab initio. 8. Petitioner argued that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to
have been lost on account of said naturalization.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225

HELD: NO. RATIO: R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003,― was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2
and 3 of said law read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.–It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.–Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic.nRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied) While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another
country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,― such is qualified by the
phrase “under the conditions of this Act.― Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories
of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are
those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who
shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking
of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens
of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, “re-acquired― for the first group, and
“retain― for the second group. The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens before (first group) and after (second group) the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is “Retention of Philippine Citizenship―, the authors of the
law intentionally employed the terms “re-acquire― and “retain― to describe the legal effect
of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of
the law using both re-acquisition and retention. In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign
country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant
to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine
citizenship may be lost. In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the
oath of allegiance under the new law. That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention
of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
wherein the following was explained: “The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine
citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63…The second aspect is the retention of Philippine
citizenship applying to future instances… eacquired for those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship]
by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future.― Considering that petitioner
was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category
of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by
naturalization in a foreign country. Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was
then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later,
the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his
dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause for
falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1. CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

Miranda vs. Tuliao •

Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela -> identified as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of respondent Virgilio Tuliao. • Petitioners -> police
officers were identified as the one responsible for the deaths • Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against petitioners • Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued
warrants of arrest against petitioners. • Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. • Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground
that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly
heard by the court. _____________________________________________ • New Presiding Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case -> ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued
against petitioner Miranda and petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio. • State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition
of Judge Anghad. • RTC - denied MR • CA - ordered the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners • petitioners
bring forth to this Court. !

ISSUE: WON accuse can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. !

HELD: NO • Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners cannot seek any judicial relief since they were
not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their â⁠œUrgent Motion
to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest. •
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is required only in applications for bail. • They also argue, assuming that such
jurisdiction over their person is required -> was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion. !

Distinction ! 2) There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative
relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one’s person to the
jurisdiction of the court. • This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. • These
pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. ! • The first two are consequences of the fact
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. • The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process
forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest. ! 3) SC- affirmed CA • Judge Anghad is directed to issue warrants of arrest for
petitioners ! ! ! ! ! PERSON IN CUSTODY OF LAW JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Required before a
court can act upon the application for bail Required for the adjudication of reliefs One can be under
custody of law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court!! (for ex: person arrested by virtue of
warrant and he files a motion to quash warrant before arraignment) One can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person and yet not be in custody of law!! (for ex: accused escapes
custody) Literally custody over the body of the accused Accused:! - has been arrested, or! -
surrendered and! - entered a plea

G.R. No. 90625 May 23, 1991PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN,accused.FACTS:
• The information was filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused. When arraigned with the
assistance of counsel
de oficio, Atty. Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty.
• At the scheduled hearing, new counsel de oficio for the accused manifested that the accused had
expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
•The court issued an order acknowledging the manifestation of the de oficio counsel and noted there
are two mitigating circumstances that maybe applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no objection but also
manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The hearing was reset to another date.
• Upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected settlement of the civil
liability of this case, the hearing was reset again. However, counsel de oficio for the accused did not
appear, hence "a report on the projected settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and
the hearing was reset again which schedule was later on cancelled due to the compulsory retirement of
the presiding judge.
• In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court.
• The initial reception of evidence took place on 4/24/1987 with the accused-appellant represented by
Atty. Benjamin Pozon. Thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the presentation of
their evidence.
•
TRIAL COURT:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
• The accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. However, Judge Cipriano de Roma erroneously
directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA. The CA transmitted to this Court on the
records which were erroneously transmitted to it.
• The accused is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and conclusion of facts by
the trial court. But that, the trial court erred in not applying the indeterminate sentence law.
• Accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of the penalty of reclusion temporal by the
trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to
a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the
righteous and humane punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate
sentence" with "all mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the accused . . .
appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian reasons."
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was denied?
RULING:
There was no denial of due process.
• REQUISITES:
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.
• People vs. Castillo: If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the
constitutional law, then he has had due process.
• All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further disclose
that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect
dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to
cancel the hearing of 2/10/1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him and to
present his own evidence
• If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the trial court
not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for more.
• Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is to
assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC or of any other provisions therein and of
special laws imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any
support. Article 294, par. 1 of the RPC has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the
1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution.
All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be
imposed in appropriate cases.
• The same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the imposition of cruel degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua.
Thus: Sec. 19(l). Excessive fines shall not beimposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua
• As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We agree with the Solicitor General that since
robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the RPC is now punishable by the single and
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of theabolition of the death penalty, it follows that the
rule prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 63 of the RPC shallapply. Consequently, reclusion
perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.

People of the Philippines versus Jose Go and Aida Dela Rosa

GR No 201644 September 24, 2014 Perlas - Bernabe, J.
__________________________________________________________________________

FACTS

On September 28, 2000, 7 informations were filed before the RTC charging various accused,
including Go and Dela Rosa, of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents for
allegedly defrauding Oriental Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC)of the amount of P159,
000, 000. 00.

The arraignment underwent several postponements before trial on the merits ensued. However,
the trial also underwent series of postponements/ cancellations caused mainly by the prosecution,
leading to its failure to present its evidence despite the lapse of 5 years. This prompted the
respondents to file a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and for violation of their right to
speedy trial.

In January 9, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the respondents’ right to speedy trial
was violated. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC granted,
resulting to the reinstatement of the case. The respondents, thereafter, moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

The respondents, then, filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA but failed to implead the People
as party to the case. The CA, without first ordering respondents to implead the People, annulled
and set aside the RTC order, resulting to the dismissal of the case.

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), the private complainant, moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. PDIC transmitted copies of the CA decision to the OSG
resulting to the filing of the instant petition. The OSG contended, among others, that the People,
who is the petitioner in this case, was neither impleaded nor served a copy of the petition, thereby
violating its right to due process of law, hence, rendering the CA without authority to promulgate
its issuances.

ISSUE

WON the criminal case against Go and Dela Rosa were properly dismissed by the CA, without
the People, as represented by the OSG, having been impleaded.

RULING

No, the CA erred in dismissing the case without impleading the People.

The People is an indispensable party to the proceedings and Sec 7 Rule 3 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure defines indispensable parties to be “parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest
the court with jurisdiction, absence of which, renders all subsequent actions of the court null ad
void for want of authority to act, not only to the absent parties but even as to those present.

PEOPLE VS SOLA

Facts:

CFI Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of thedeceased bodies of 7
persons believed in the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. On September 16, 1980 armed with the above warrant, the 332nd
PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common
graves containing the 7 bodies. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder were thus filed against
Pablo Sola and 18 other persons. The municipal court found probable cause against the accused and
ordered their arrest. However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release. Pablo Sola and two others have since been released from detention. The
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI
Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least 2
of the accused are official with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on
bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. There have been reports made to police
authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses.

Issues:

1. Whether or not change of venue is proper

2. Whether or not the bail bond should be cancelled for failure to abide by the basic requirement that
the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail
being granted.

Held:

Change of venue
Change of venue has become moot and academic with the transfer of the case toBacolod City.
However, the case proceeds with this discussion: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of
the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. The
witnesses in the case are fearful of their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or
from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this fear, they may either refuse to testify
or testify falsely to save their lives.

Right of bail

The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso
Baguio for such hearing.

Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in
a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation
of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that
ground.

Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm which is of the
very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the
opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as asserted herein, that
the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as
searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. (People vs. Sola, G.R. No. L-
56158-64 March 17, 1981)
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. RAYMUNDO VIAJE, ET AL., Respondents.

Facts

The Office of the Solicitor GENERAL filed a complaint3 for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-1001 and raffled to Branch
23. The action mainly sought the nullity of the transfer certificate of title (TCT) individually issued in the
name of the defendants therein, for having been issued in violation of law and for having dubious origins.
The titles were allegedly derived from TCT No. T-39046 issued on October 1, 1969. TCT No. T-39046, in
turn, was derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 114 issued on March 9, 1910 covering 342,842
square meters. The Republic alleged, among others, that OCT No. 114 and the documents of transfer of TCT
No. T-39046 do not exist in the records of the Registers of Deeds of Cavite and Trece Martires City.4

The OSG entered its appearance on August 7, 2001 and deputized Atty. Artemio C. Legaspi and the
members of the LRA legal staff to appear in Civil Case No. TM-1001, with the OSG exercising supervision
and control over its deputized counsel.

Thereafter, several re-settings of the pre-trial date were made due to the absence of either the counsel for
the Republic or the counsel of one of the defendants, until finally, on April 11, 2003, the RTC dismissed the
complaint due to the non-appearance of the counsel for the Republic.11

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration,12 which was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 22,
2003.13 Pre-trial was again set and re-set, and on January 23, 2004, the RTC finally dismissed Civil Case No.
TM-1001 with prejudice.14 The order reads, in part:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, and upon motion of the defendants through counsel, Atty. Eufracio C.
Fortuno, let this case be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.15 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Having been informed of this, the OSG forthwith filed a Manifestation and Motion,16 informing the RTC that
Atty. Acosta was not given notice of the pre-trial schedule. The OSG also stated that such lack of notice was
pursuant to a verbal court order that notice to the OSG is sufficient notice to the deputized counsel, it being
the lead counsel, and that they were not formally notified of such order.

Thus, the OSG filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. On November 28, 2007, the CA rendered
the assailed decision dismissing the OSG's petition on the grounds that the petition was filed one day late
and the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Civil Case No. TM-1001 and the
OSG's notice of appeal. It ruled that the OSG's failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court to which
the appeal is being taken violated Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, among
others, that "[t]he notice of appeal shall x x x specify the court to which the appeal is being taken x x x."
The CA also ruled that the OSG cannot claim lack of due process when its deputized counsel was not served
a notice of the pre-trial schedule. The CA disagreed with the OSG's contention that its deputized counsel
should have been notified. According to the CA, the OSG remains the principal counsel of the Republic and it
is service on them that is decisive, and having received the notice of pre-trial, it should have informed its
deputized counsel of the date. Aside from this, the authority given by the OSG to its deputized counsel did
not include the authority to enter into a compromise agreement, settle or stipulate on facts and admissions,
which is a part of the pre-trial; hence, even if the deputized counsel was present, the case would still be
dismissed.25c ralaw red

The OSG is now before the Court arguing that:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE JUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE DEPUTIZED
COUNSEL TO ATTEND THE PRE-TRIAL.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE NOTICE OF APPEAL.26 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Ruling of the Court

The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices
to assist it in representing the government is well settled. The Administrative Code of 1987 explicitly states
that the OSG shall have the power to "deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their
respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers
with respect to such cases."29 But it is likewise settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is "no more
than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding" and the latter remains
the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and
decisions.30 In this case, records show that it was the OSG that first entered an appearance in behalf of the
Republic; hence, it remains the principal counsel of record. The appearance of the deputized counsel did not
divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of
record.31 Thus, the RTC properly acted within bounds when it relied on the rule that it is the notice to the
OSG that is binding.32

Nonetheless, the OSG also pointed out that it specifically requested the RTC to likewise furnish its deputized
counsel with a copy of its notices. Records show that the deputized counsel also requested that copies of
notices and pleadings be furnished to him.33 Despite these requests, it was only the OSG that the RTC
furnished with copies of its notices. It would have been more prudent for the RTC to have furnished the
deputized counsel of its notices. All the same, doing so does not necessarily clear the OSG from its
obligation to oversee the efficient handling of the case. And even if the deputized counsel was served with
copies of the court's notices, orders and decisions, these will not be binding until they are actually received
by the OSG. More so in this case where the OSG's Notice of Appearance and its Letter deputizing the LRA
even contained the caveat that it is only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on the
OSG that will bind the Republic, the entity, agency and/or official represented.34 In fact, the proper
basis for computing a reglementary period and for determining whether a decision had attained finality is
service on the OSG.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90102 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. TM-1001 and all its records
are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23, for further disposition on the
merits.

The Office of the Solicitor General and its deputized counsel/s are advised to be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties as counsels for the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. chanrobl

HABEAS CORPUS

AMPATUAN vs MACARAIG Case Digest

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG

G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010

FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M.
H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District
Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1
Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report
against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1
Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being
held for other charges/legal grounds.

Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who
is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC
of Manila on 22 April 2008.

On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents
to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are
withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.

Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against
PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the
subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has
rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the
resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative
case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and
dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND
THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.

HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful.
If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of,
at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also
known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act
No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the
PNP.

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument
for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention
or restraint of liberty.

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible
precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always
accounted for.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the
writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the
latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

Datukan Malang Salibo vs Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex

Case Digest GR 197597 April 8 2015
→ Full Text ←

Facts:

Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People vs Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he
presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented to the police pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in
Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however, apprehended and detained him.
He questioned the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable
to the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted Salibo’s petition and
ordered his immediate release from detention.

On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo was
not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued
and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibo’s proper
remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest.

On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden erred in appealing the RTC decision before the CA.
Salibo argued that although the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Warden’s Return, the
RTC’s ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have been appealed directly before
the SC.
Hide

Issue 1: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally detained.

First, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the Information and Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences presented, Salibo
sufficiently established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore, Salibo was not
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was in the
presence of authorities, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense, and the police
officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also not
an escape prisoner.

The police officers have deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo
correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

MANGILA VS PANGILINAN

Facts: On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others with syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, The complaints
arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa
processing fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one
of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts
without bail.

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the headquarters on
Taft Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).4

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation;
that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of
arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a
prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)a petition for habeas
corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus
was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the
warrant of arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the
case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.5

In its resolution promulgated on October 14, 2003,6 the CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for
its lack of merit, explaining:
Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus,8 but the CA
denied the motion on November 19, 2003.9

Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue

Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention?

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review lacks merit.

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily
granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot
be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving
the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the
restraint is not illegal.

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the
detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however,
is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.12

With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint
on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not
be inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in
Quintos v. Director of Prisons:13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful
authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody
under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was
issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayon’s evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding
the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the
City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her
petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy
of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights.15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by
hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the existence
of probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,16 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public
prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should
beultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring
the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of
the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the
most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge
Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.17 We agree with the
CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.18

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and
November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

JURISDICTION OF RTC

GONZALES vs ABAYA Case Digest

EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.

FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including
petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order to
avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After
several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their
arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
they returned to their barracks.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP
Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and
directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for
coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other
accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-
2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended,
against the same military personnel.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed
with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over
all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to
the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat
before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and
in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners'
applications for bail.

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood
incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by
the AFP.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
in relation to the Oakwood incident.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004
that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is
absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of
coup d’état before the regular courts.

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD:

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-
constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed
for the same — dismissal from the service — imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is
purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the
RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making
such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction
over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take
away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer
over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only through a constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the
courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be. Evidently, such declaration
by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is,
therefore, void.

G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989

JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.

FACTS:

– On October 29, 1984, the Petitioner who was then 11 years old was playing with best friend Teodoro Almine Jr.
and three other children in their backyard. The children were target-shooting bottle caps placed 15 to 20 meters
away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbour.

– In the course of game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.

– The examining fiscal after investigation exculpated petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate appeared
to be an accident.

– Victim’s parents appealed to Ministry of Justice, who ordered fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless imprudence.

– On October 25, 1985, the petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense

b) Information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification

c) That the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person of defendant

– His primary argument was that the term discernment connotes intent under the exempting circumstance found
under Article 12, Section 3 of the RPC. If this was true, then no minor between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted
of quasi offense under Article 265 which is criminal negligence.

– On April 4, 1986, the said motion was denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied upon decision on
and part was deferred until evidence shall have been presented during trial.

– A petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUES:

2. WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT
PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON.

HELD:

2. Yes.
The petitioner’s contention that he was entitled to a two-degree privileged mitigating circumstance due to his
minority because of P.D. 1508. He argued that this can be applied to his case because the penalty imposable is
reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium as
prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC.

The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense
and not the penalty ultimately imposed.

The same principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; … (emphasis supplied)

Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:

The law says ‘punishable,’ not ‘punished.’ One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or ordinance
as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after considering the attendant circumstances
affecting criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing Section 2(3) of
P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should be considered. Hence, any
circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.

The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before. As intimated in the case of
Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs. Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not
jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary
Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the lower court for trial on
the merits. No cost.

PEOPLE AND PHOTOKINA VS. BENIPAYO (G.R. NO. 155573 APRIL 24, 2009) Facts: In the first libel case
filed against him, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman COMELEC, delivered a speech in the "Forum on
Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at UP Diliman which was subsequently
published in the Manila Bulletin. Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one 11 alluded to by
the respondent when he stated in his speech that “Even worse, the Commission came right up to the
brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350
million pesos, and an ID solution that isn’t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no
contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5
billion-peso price tag.”, filed, through its authorized representative, an AffidavitComplaint for libel. The
case was dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction since the offense was committed in relation to his
office, hence vesting the jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. G.R. No. 155573 Respondent as COMELEC
Chair was a guest of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the
ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars.", where
Respondent against discussed that Photokina’s funds are being used to campaign against him. Another
information for libel was instituted against Respondent but also dismissed by the RTC rationating that
being an impeachable officer, the jurisdiction must be with the Sandiganbayan. Issue: Whether the RTC
has jurisdiction over the crime of libel filed against Benipayo. Held: YES. The jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless
a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations in
providing that the criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. RA
7691 also did not divest the RTC of jurisdiction over libel cases because although it was enacted to
decongest the clogged dockets of the RTCs by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is
of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the
RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the
Court of First Instance) which is a general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically
override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict
between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted
by a general law on the MTC. Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC
without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is
committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.

People vs. Ocaya [No. L-47448 May 17, 1978]

Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Thursday, March 22, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the court of Hon. Ocaya charging
Esterlina Marapao, Letitia Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao of the crime of serious physical injuries.

Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial was made on merit and no warrants of arrest
were issued. Instead, the respondent judge held that the respondents should be charged of either slight
or less serious physical injuries only. This is so, even if the affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the victim,
was incapacitated for more than 30 days and a scar was left on her face, deforming it.

Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case since the crime or slight or less physical
injuries is not within the jurisdiction of the court.

The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Hon. Ocaya. Accordingly, the respondent judge
evaluated the case without hearing the parties nor the witnesses, nor having received their evidence, as
well as ruling against the deformity on the basis of themedical certificate.

The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the nullification of Hon. Ocaya’s orders.

Issue: Whether Hon. Ocaya acted with grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Held: The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID.
The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the information or
criminal complaint, and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judge’s
personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and their witnesses.
Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached to the person and subject-matter, the subsequent happening
of events, though it may have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not divest
the court of jurisdiction already attached.

SAMSON VS DAWAY Facts: Two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation
to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the
dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner
of ITTI Shoes distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments,
clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations
of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would
cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public. On April 19, 2002, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same
branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair
competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend
arraignment and other proceedings. Issue: Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in
refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on
the ground of – (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review
with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition? Held: Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides – SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment.
– Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases – x x x x x
x x x x (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. 50 While the pendency of a
petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the
deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner failed to
establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings
and annexes submitted before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice.15 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend
was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled
to a suspension of his arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule
116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who
alleges must prove his allegations.
JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

Case Digest: LUDWIG H. ADAZA v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.

Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) of 1st District of Zamboanga del
Norte awarded to Parents and Teachers Association (PTA)of Manawan National High
School (MNHS) a contract for the construction of a school building at an agreed
consideration of P111,319.50. Upon the completion of the project, PTA failed to receive
the last installment payment amounting to P20,847.17.

PTA president Felix Mejorda (Mejorda) was informed by Hazel Peñaranda, DPWH
Cashier, that the check for P20,847.17 had been released to Ludwig H. Adaza (Adaza).

Subsequently, Mejorda found out that acknowledging receipt of the check bears his
name and signature which was not his. He likewise noticed that Adaza‘s signature was
affixed on the voucher. During that time, Adaza was municipal mayor of Jose Dalman.
Upon examination of DBP Check issued to payee, Mejorada noticed that there were two
signatures at the dorsal portion of it, his forged signature and another which he found to
be that of Aristela Adaza (Aristela), wife of Adaza.

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Adaza. The Sadiganbayan
found Adaza guilty of the offense charged. It thereafter issued a Bench Warrant of Arrest.
Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the falsification case against Adaza
which was not in relation to his position as municipal mayor

HELD:

In the instant case, there is no showing that the alleged falsification was committed by the
accused, if at all, as a consequence of, and while they were discharging, official functions.
The information does not allege that there was an intimate connection between
the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense.

Clearly therefore, as the alleged falsification was not an offense committed in relation to
the office of the accused, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It
follows that all its acts in the instant case are null and void ab initio.

Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 161784-86 April 26, 2005 FACTS: On April 3, 2003, the Office of the
Ombudsman submitted three Amended Informations to the Sandiganbayan against Virginio Villamor
(Municipal Mayor) and Dinah Barriga (Municipal Accountant) of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. The
First Amended Information charged Barriga and Villamor with Malversation of Public Funds. The facts of
this information stated that on or about January 1996, the said acccused had in their possession and
custody public funds amounting to P23,047.20 intended for the payment of 5 rolls of Polyethelene pipes
to be used in the Corte-Canumong Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu. Being
public officers, they were held accountable for the funds. However, by this same capacity, the said
accused misappropriated, took, embezzled, and converted the said amount for their own personal use
and benefit . The second and third Amended Informations charged Villamor and Barriga with Illegal Use
of Public Funds. The facts of the Second Information stated that on or about November 1995, the said
accused had in their possession and control public funds amounting to P1305.00, representing a portion
of the CVWSP Fund intended and appropriated for the Construction of Deep Well and Spring Box (Level I
projects) and Water Works System (Level II projects) of specific brgy beneficiaries and recipients. By
reason of the duties of their office, they are held accountable for the said funds. However, by such
capacity, they connived, confederated and helped each other to disburse the said amount for the Spring
Box of Brgy. Natimo-an, Carmen, Cebu. - a brgy not included as a recipient of the CVWSP Trust Fund.
Thus, the accused used the said fund to a public purpose different from which it was intended or
appropriated. The facts of the Third Information stated that on or about January 1997, the accused had
in their possession P267, 537.96 from the CVWSP Fund intended for the same purpose as that in the 2nd
Information. However, the accused disbursed the said amount for the construction & expansion of Brgy.
Cantucong Water System, a level II project, thus the public funds were used for a public purpose
different from that which it was intended or appropriated. ISSUES: 1. WON the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the crimes charged. 2. If the court has jurisdiction, WON Barriga should also be held
liable: A. Despite the Amended Informations' failure to show the intimate relations between the crimes
charged and her official duties? B. Despite being only of SG 24? C. Despite the fact that she is not an
accountable officer since, as Municipal Accountant, the funds in the Amended Informations were not
under her control of administration? HELD: 1. Yes. Based on the allegations in the Amended
Informations and RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the crimes of Malversation
and Illegal Use of Public Funds. RA 8249 -SB has orig jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by
public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories thereunder
enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes. 2 classes of public office-related crimes
under Sec.4(b), RA 8249: a. Public office is constituent element - offense cannot exist without office b.
Intimately connected with public office - perpetrated by p.o./employee while in exercise of functions
The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies under the
first classification. The Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
crimes or felonies committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section(a)(1) to (5)
under the second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the
intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the
discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular. The public office of the
accused Municipal Mayor Virginio Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of
public funds or property. Accused mayor’s position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused in committing the said felonies,
the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as SG 24 and as such is not an accountable
officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged
against her.
CONSIGNA VS SANDIGANBAYAN

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On or about 14 June 1994, petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte,
together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta (Moleta),
the sum of ₱320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct
the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived.
As payment, petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime
Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna: (1) Check No.
11281104 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; (2) Check No. 9660500 for ₱130,000.00 dated 14
June 1994; and (3) Check No. 9660439 for ₱60,000.00 dated 11 July 1994.

Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions, Moleta
demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.

Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-
Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the
checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however,
she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were
again returned for the reason, "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that
the municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the
Philippines, and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.

Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against petitioner

Issue:

As defense, petitioner argued that the court a quo has no jurisdiction because (1) the crime as
charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa; and
(2) Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo because the offense
as charged can stand independently of public office and public office is not an element of the crime.4

The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not specify the provision of
law allegedly violated.5 However, based on the allegations of deceit and misrepresentation, the court
a quo allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.

On the charge of graft and corruption, petitioner argued that, "[w]hen allegations in the information
do not show that the official position of the [petitioner] was connected with the offense charged, the
accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official functions".6 Petitioner, citing Lacson
v. The Executive Secretary,7 further argued:

x x x [M]ere allegation in the information "that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere conclusion of law not a factual
averment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of
accused’s official duties."8
EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil

Procedure of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions promulgated on 17 September
2001 and 14 January 2002, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo (Crisostomo) assailing the courts
Decision[1] promulgated on 28 November 2000. The Decision found Crisostomo
guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Charge

On 19 October 1993, Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National

Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder
of Renato Suba (Renato), a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. The
Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dominador
C. dela Cruz (dela Cruz), Efren M. Perez (Perez), Raki T. Anggo (Anggo),
Randy A. Lumabo (Lumabo), Rolando M. Norberte (Norberte) and Mario
Calingayan (Calingayan), all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering
Renato

The Issues

Crisostomo continues to assail the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. He raises

the following issues:

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME

OF MURDER CHARGED AGAINST CRISOSTOMO WHO IS A SENIOR POLICE
OFFICER 1 (SPO1) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION
AGAINST HIM.
 The Courts Ruling

The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. However, the

prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo and Calingayans guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, we acquit Crisostomo and Calingayan.
The Sandiganbayan had Jurisdiction to Try the Case
Crisostomo argues that the Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to try
the case. Crisostomo points out that the crime of murder is not listed in Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (PD 1606) as one of the crimes that the
Sandiganbayan can try. Crisostomo faults the Sandiganbayan for not applying
the ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[6] to this case. In Sanchez v. Demetriou,
the Court ruled that public office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute before the Sandiganbayan could acquire jurisdiction over
a case. Crisostomo insists that there is no direct relation between the
commission of murder and Crisostomos public office. Crisostomo further
contends that the mere allegation in the Information that the offense was
committed in relation to Crisostomos office is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction
on the Sandiganbayan. Such allegation without the specific factual averments
is merely a conclusion of law, not a factual averment that would show the close
intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of Crisostomos official
duties.

We are not convinced.

Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable
provision of law is Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1861 (PD 1861), which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended
provision reads:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees

in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
 imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Crisostomo would have the Court believe that being a jail guard is a mere
incidental circumstance that bears no close intimacy with the commission of
murder. Crisostomos theory would have been tenable if the murdered victim
was not a prisoner under his custody as a jail guard. The function of a jail guard
is to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in
the jail. In this case, the Information alleges that the victim was a detention
prisoner when Crisostomo, the jail guard, conspired with the inmates to kill him.

DUNCANO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 191894, July 15, 2015

Doctrine:

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

Facts:

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713. Duncano wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002.

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner, Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. He asserted
that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No.
8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official
of the executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation
that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.

The OSP argued that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP
contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan
has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution denying the
instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. It ruled that the position of Regional Director
is one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not
Salary Grade 27.

Petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director,
irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Held:

Petitioner, Duncano is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he
hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues,
his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. In ruling in
favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling
petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional
Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that
respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.

GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 170122 OCTOBER 12, 2009 Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman
filed for a petition for the forfeiture of the properties amounting to PhP 143,052,015.29 allegedly
amassed by then Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, his wife Clarita and two children, docketed as Civil Case No.
0193 (Forfeiture Case 1). Another forfeiture case was subsequently filed to recover funds amounting to
PhP 202,005,980.55 docketed as Civil Case No. 0196 (Forfeiture Case 2), raffled to the 4th Division. Prior
to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and
three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99, docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, raffled to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. As per the Sheriff’s return, the corresponding summons involving Forfeiture 1 were
issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. The SB subsequently issued a writ of
attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of SB’s lack of
jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The SB denied the Motion to Dismiss and declared
the Garcias in default. Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions
of the SB, contending that such consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. This motion was denied by
the SB. The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the
following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the
forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements. The SB merely noted the motion. 8 As regards Forfeiture 2, the SB sheriff served the
corresponding summons. In his return, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the
OIC/Custodian of the PNPDetention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed
his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia
acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m receiving the copies of
Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the
above-named(sic).” Issue: 1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner despite improper service of
summons. 2. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the filing of the plunder
case. Held: 1. NO. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound
by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under
the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person. It is undisputed that
summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is
detained at the PNP DetentionCenter, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is
also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on
petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such
substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective. The requirements for a
valid substituted service of summons are: (1) Impossibility of prompt personal service (2) Specific details
in the return (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or regular
place of business. From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of
summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did
not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons. Also, petitioner’s special appearance to question the court’s jurisdiction is not voluntary
appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. 2. YES, Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the
plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the
assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division
in its May 20, 2005 Resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission
of a criminal offense as such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to
recover unlawfully acquired properties. Secondly, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause
of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder
charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 9 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NO. 128096 JANUARY 20, 1999

FACTS: In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of
bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements
of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel
Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the
Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco
Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner
Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually
transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out
between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and
personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a
legitimate police operation.

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor
panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26)
respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division,
while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector,
and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none
of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan. While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even
before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman
and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and
convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present
proof of arbitrariness.

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public
officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to

their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

ISSUE: Whether Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: None. An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official
duties "must be alleged in the informations. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain
which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, and not by the evidence presented by
the parties at the trial.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

Marcos, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines (2014)

Petitioners: Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.
Respondents: Republic of the Philippines
Topic: Privileges and salary of the President

SUMMARY: Proceedings for forfeiture of properties in a single suit may proceed separately for
each property, and the Sandiganbayan need not acquire territorial jurisdiction over the proceeds
of a foreign-registered dummy registered to contravene anti-graft laws to enforce its decisions.
FACTS:

 On 25 April 2012, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009
Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity
created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired
by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie
presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition, raising the issues below.

ISSUE/S:

 WoN the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
because a) the Republic had earlier stated that it will file a separate forfeiture action
regarding the assets of Arelma and b) Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated
o NO. This issue has already been raised and exhaustively discussed in our 25 April
2012 Decision. In fact, the discussion on the first issue is merely a restatement of
petitioners’ original assertions that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to render
summary judgment over the assets of Arelma.
o The said Petition for Forfeiture described among others, a corporate entity by the
name “Arelma, Inc.,” which maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch,
New York, and which was purportedly organized for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten
wealth.
o Respondent Republic’s success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss
accounts (see immediately preceding case Republic vs. Sandiganbayan) does not
 mean its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different
subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No.
0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1)
holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2)
landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties;
(4) bills amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign
currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs authorities in
Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-
denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in
the United States, among others. The ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly
characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under
Section 5 of Rule 36.
o Petitioners further insist that “Civil Case No. 0141 does not involve the Arelma
account because the respondent unequivocally reserved its right to file a separate
forfeiture petition concerning it.” However, petitioners failed to prove that such a
reservation was made, and never even substantiated how such reservation could
operate to deprive the State of its right to file for separate judgment. There is
nothing in Republic Act 1379 or in the Rules which prohibits the graft court from
taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment only because of
statements allegedly made by one party.
 WoN the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds
before the judgment may be enforced
o NO. The execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these
assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the
ruling may be effectively enforced.
o R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions
in personam, not in rem.
o In any case, the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are
held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and
indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond
the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State.

People v. Montejo, 108 Phil. 613

Crim Pro -Jurisdiction

Facts:
Mayor Leroy Brown of Basilan City, Det. Joaquin Pollisco, Patrolman Graciano Lacema, and other co-
accused where charged with murder. It was alleged in the information filed against them that from May to
June 1958, the Mayor and his "organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes" whom he
"armed with pistols and high power guns" established a camp which they called as their 'sub-police
headquarters' at Tipo-Tipo, Lamitan.

The headquarters was placed under the mayor's command, orders, direct supervision and control, and in
which his co-defendants were stationed. It was further alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in
the sub-station/headquarters where defendant Pollisco acted as "investigating officer and exercised
authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without
due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court."

Then, on or about June 4, and 5, 1958, Awalin Tebag, a Yakan, was arrested by order of Mayor Brown
"without any warrant or complaint filed in court". Tebag was then supposed to be brought to and detained
in the sub-station; but, on their way to the sub-station he was allegedly maltreated and tortured by the
defendants as also ordered by Mayor Brown. Tebag died as a result of the violence done to him and to
cover up his death, the defendants made it appear that Tebag was a member of a band of armed bandits
who attacked them prompting them to shoot Tebag to death.

Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Brown is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office which falls under
the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan

Held:
Yes, Mayor Brown committed an offense in relation to his office. A public officer commits an offense
in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing his official functions and that he could
not have committed the offense without holding his public office. Although the performance of the official
function was improper or is an irregular manner, it was alleged in the information that Mayor Brown
established the sub-station and was under his “command,... supervision and control” and that his co-
defendants were acting upon his orders. Thus, in this case, there is an intimate connection between the
offense and the office of the accused and such case falls under the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan

Rodriguez vs sandiganbayan\\

Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial

Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine
Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay
Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to
have been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro
Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and
Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without
proper permit or license.
 Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa
for safekeeping, some were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC)
Compound of Taytay and left under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC
Compound demanding the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request
addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by Mayor
Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO, it was
denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the
other herein petitioner, Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to
the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the
Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the same without the
advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor
Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound
accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took
possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A,
Palawan filed complaints for robbery and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No.
[4]

1829 (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND

[5]

PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS) against petitioners Mayor

Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Palawan.

Ruling

For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the
issue is whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of Grade 27
under the Local Government Code of 1991 , committed the offense charged in
[47]

relation to her office.

In Montilla v. Hilario , this Court laid down the principle that for an offense
[48]

to be committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the
office must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense
can not exist without the office.[49]

As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo, held that

[50]

although public office is not an element of an offense charged, as long as the

offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,
though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal
motive to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it
had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted
[51]

for an offense committed in relation to his office.

Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v.
Arceo, held that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder
[52]

as it may be committed by any person, whether a public officer or a private

citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a
member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course
of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely
within the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public
office. [53]

In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense
of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been committed by
petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have been
committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during
the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as
Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and
supervision over the local police forces , used her influence, authority and
[54]

office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul
and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation
of P.D. 705.

SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU G.R. NOS. 111771-77 NOVEMBER 9, 1993

Facts: Mayor Antonio Sanchez was charged before the RTC of Calamba, Laguna of seven informations of
homicide, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Sanchez moved to quash the information on the ground, among others that as a public officer, he can be
tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan, among others.

Issue: Whether it is the Sandiganbayan who has jurisdiction over petitioner.

Held: NO. The petitioner’s contention that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts, is untenable. Section 4,
paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code: (2) Other offenses
or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied) The crime of rape with homicide with which the
petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in
relation to the office of the petitioner.

There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime
charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance
of the petitioner's official functions.

Hannah Serana
v.
Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
FACTS:
Serana was a senior student of UP-Cebu who
was also appointed by Pres. Estrada as
student regent of UP to serve a one-year
term from Jan.1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2000. On
Sept. 2000, petitioner together with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the
SEC the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc (OSFRI). On of the projects
of the OSFRI was the renovation of Vinzons
Hall in UP Diliman, and Pres. Estrada gave
P15M as financial assistance for the said
project. The source of funds, according to
the information, was the Office of the
President.
However, the renovation failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent
and system-wide alliances of students
conseguently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with the Ombudsman. After due
investigation, the Ombudsman instituted a
criminal case against Serana and her
brother, charging them of Estafa.
Serana moved to quash the Information,
contending that the Sandiganbayan does not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged
nor over her person in her capacity as UP
student regent. She contends that Estafa
falls under Crimes Against Property and not
on the chapter on Crimes Committed by
Public Officers, only over which, she
argues, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Furthermore, she argues that it was not the
governement that was duped, but Pres.
Estrada, because the money came from the
Office of the President and not from
government funds. As to jurisdiction over
her person, she contends that as a UP
student regent, she is not a public officer
since she merely represents her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held
their positions in an ex officio capacity.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion for
lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offense charged and over Serana
HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan; Crime
of Estafa. Plainly, estafa is one of those
felonies within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin
requirements that: 1) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD No. 1606,
as amended, and that; 2) The offense is
committed in relation to their office.
It is well-established that compensation is
not an essential element of public office.
At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office. Delegation of sovereign
functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the
public makes one a public officer.
A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A
public office is the right, authority, and
duty created and conferred by law, by which
for a given period, either fixed or
enduring at the pleasure of the power, an
individual is interested with some portion
of sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers

Board of Regents. The Sandiganbayan, also
has jurisdiction over the other officers
enumerated in PD No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People, the SC held that while the first
part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provisions of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provisions
of law. Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606
explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors and
trustees, or manager of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category. As
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the Board of
Regents performs functions similar to those
of a board of trustee of a non-stock
corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by PD No. 1606.

SOLLER V. SANDIGANBAYAN

9 May 2001

Facts

:A complaint was filed against A, a municipal mayor, with the Office of theOmbudsman charging him of
giving false and fabricated information in the autopsyreport to mislead the law enforcement agency and
prevent the apprehension of theoffender. The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an
information withthe Sandiganbayan.

Issue

:Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case?

Held

:For an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offensemust have been
committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph (a) “in relation totheir office,” i.e. it should be
intimately connected with the office of the offender, andshould have been perpetrated while the
offender was in the performance of his officialfunctions. Moreover, these requisites must be alleged in
the information. In this case,1there was no allegation that the offense charged was done in the
performance of officialfunction