G.R. No.

L-16749 January 31, 1963 Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
DECEASED. accrued thereon, is exhausted..
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, x x x x x x x x x
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant. 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
LABRADOR, J.: real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character,
and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding
No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter,
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, Maria Lucy Christensen.
one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions: legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
California, U.S.A. acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but
and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil
x x x x x x x x x Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should
apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen
Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age
time of her birth.
and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she
been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California,
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.;
this appeal. his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
The most important assignments of error are as follows: Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed
I in the Philippines until 1904.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF States and stayed there for the following nine years until
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE. school in Sacramento, California.

II Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July

of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND again returned to his own country, and came back to the
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. Philippines the following year, 1939.

III Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing

stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN

SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World
IV War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the
United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF
622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-
DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
PHILIPPINE LAWS.

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to

V
California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP. (pp. 2-3)

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in
death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions
California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or which is as follows:
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
the State of California. subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29) testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California the country where said property may be found.
from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in therein.
1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance There is no single American law governing the validity of
with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
of Laws. Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But to no other than the private law of the State of California.
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
But if he went on business which would require his presence California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in California, which is as follows:
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily domicile.
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the
opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any
Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on
one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only
the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's
behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State
of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi,
the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which
citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the where the title to land is in question, and where the
law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases
the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by
authors, thus: the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of
the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?" X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court and France. The question arises as to how this property is to
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of be distributed among X's next of kin.
Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
why the reference back should not have been to Michigan succession to movables calls for an application of the law of
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked court to do would be to turn to French statute of
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law,
renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
logical reason why the original reference should be the French law, however, would show that if a French court were
internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is called upon to determine how this property should be
true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second of distributions. So on the surface of things the
reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
they look always to internal law as the rule of reference. succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and
apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is latter course, thus applying its own law.
the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign
to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the
both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in
vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process
had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-
have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in 571.)
 After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further exists, the court shall respect:
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent their personal statute, and desires that said personal
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine statute shall be determined by the law of the
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the act in question occurred.
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.) necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the x x x x x x x x x
court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been would distribute personal property upon death in accordance
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296) with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian
law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. reference back to his own law.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918,
pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its
below: conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
whole of its law. down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
x x x x x x x x x govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the
owner.
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute
of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
the following theses: states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
regards the application of foreign laws. deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely
as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary
rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of
 intestate succession, the same rules should determine the back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict
effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton recognizing them.
of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner,
is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera
had its origin in that international comity which was one of vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867;
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.) to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile
in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child,
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, by the internal law of California..
as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
domiciled abroad. partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes,
Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can
not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is
the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of
laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to
the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed