Cagang Vs.

Sandiganbayan

FACTS:Both Petitions question the Sandiganbayan’s denial to quash the Informations and Order
of Arrest against Cagang despite the Office of the Ombudsman’s alleged inordinate delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation.

In February 10, 2003, Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint

alleging the graft and corruption at the Vice Governor’s Office, Sarangani Province by diverting
public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as “dummies.” The
complaint was referred to the Commission on Audit for audit investigation.

On November 17, 2011, the OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.

Cagang filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest.

Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and Roque v. Ombudsman, he argued that the
delay violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. The
OMB, on the other hand, filed a Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that
delay in the filing was intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons.

The Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.

It also found that there was no inordinate delay in the issuance of the information,
considering that 40 different individuals were involved with direct participation in more or less
81 different transactions.

Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him violated his
constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not inordinate delay exists in this case.

RULING:

What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by “mere
mathematical reckoning.” It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time
required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the
application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision.
Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be
taken into account.

Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query on when a case is deemed to have
commenced.

In Dansal v. Fernandez, this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases does
not only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.

Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus, the right may be
invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.

To summarize, inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation

violates the accused’s right to due process and the speedy disposition of cases, and may result in
the dismissal of the case against the accused. The burden of proving delay depends on whether
delay is alleged within the periods provided by law or procedural rules. If the delay is alleged to
have occurred during the given periods, the burden is on the respondent or the accused to prove
that the delay was inordinate. If the delay is alleged to have occurred beyond the given periods,
the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay was reasonable under the
circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Courts should appraise a reasonable period from the point of view of how much time a
competent and independent public officer would need in relation to the complexity of a given
case. If there has been delay, the prosecution must be able to satisfactorily explain the reasons for
such delay and that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result. The timely invocation
of the accused’s constitutional rights must also be examined on a case-to-case basis.

Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases. Inordinate delay
in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will result in the dismissal of the
case against the accused. Delay, however, is not determined through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.

Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her constitutional rights in a timely manner. The
failure to do so could be considered by the courts as a waiver of right.
Admittedly, while there was delay, petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights during this
period, choosing instead to wait until the information was filed against him with the
Sandiganbayan.

The ruling in People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division that factfinding investigations are
included in the period for determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED.

Cesar P. Guy vs People

Facts: Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin C.
Martinez (Ripalda, et al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineer’s Office of the City of
Tacloban. Meanwhile, petitioners Cesar P. Guy (Guy) and Narcisa A. Grefiel (Grefiel) are the
Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District,
Tacloban City (Barangay 36). Said petitioners, together with Edgar Amago, a private individual,
owner and proprietor of Amago Construction were charged in three (3) separate Informations
with violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, in connection with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay
36, namely: an elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center.

The audit team found that the Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-
Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bid proposals from Amago
Construction and General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing the proper plans and
specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work programs for the
day care center and the elevated path walk were prepared long after the construction had been
completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction of the projects to the City
Engineer’s Office only after they had already been completed; thus, petitioner employees
inspected the projects only after they had already been accomplished. Petitioner employees
approved the accomplishment of the projects despite the absence of material documents,
according to the audit team’s report. Finally, the audit team found material defects in the projects
and discovered that the contract cost for the basketball court and elevated path walk was
overpriced.

Guy maintained that the three projects were authorized by resolutions duly-enacted by the
Sangguniang Barangay. He claimed that a public bidding was conducted before the construction
of the projects and that Amago Construction was the winning bidder. He added that Amago
Construction constructed the projects and was accordingly paid for the work done and the
materials supplied by it.

Issue: THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
Ruling of The Court: Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty verdict handed down
by the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and
the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds
other than those that the parties raise as errors. We have examined the records of the case and
find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the
evidence on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. The
elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.

First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for their
official duties or functions as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in relation to
their duties and functions underlies their violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Second, the
undue injury caused to the government is evident from the clear deviation from the material
specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the case of the basketball court and
elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard materials in the case of the day care center.
Otherwise stated, "the People did not get the full worth of their money in terms of the benefits
they will derive from the (above) sub-standard infrastructure projects."37 Third, unwarranted
benefits were accorded to Amago Construction when the three projects were not inspected and
supervised during construction, allowing it to cut costs and save money by using substandard
materials and deviating from the specific materials and measurements prescribed in the work
programs. Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments for the projects even
before the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government from
refusing or deferring payment on account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is
clear that from the very inception of the construction of the subject projects up to their
completion, petitioners had exhibited manifest partiality for Amago Construction, and acted with
evident bad faith against the government and the public which they had sworn to serve.

Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. 180122, March 13, 2009

FACTS

Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr., an engineer
and chair of the National Housing Authority(NHA). He allegedly used public funds amounting
to P230,000 to pay a Makati-based construction company for a ghost project(financing a project
that is not part of a plan) in Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring with fellow officers;namely, Josephine Angsico, Virgilio
Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine Espinosa. They filed a motion to quash the allegation, and
after a thorough investigation, the court dismissed the charges of the alleged conspirants for
failure to prove participation, but it retained Lazarte’s charge.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the
inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual
participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27
March 2005.

Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash

Issue: Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to
the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the validity and sufficiency of the Information despite its
failure to make out an offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to
quash considering that the remaining averments in the Information have been rendered
unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused.

Ruling: It should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari.
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy
is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the
special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory
orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court

This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the
Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law.

Francisco Salazar, petitioner vs. Reynaldo De Leon, respondent

G.R. No. 127965 January 20, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for the recovery of real property and damages against
petitioner. Respondent alleged he is the registered owner of a parcel of land which was tilled by
herein petitioner by respondent’s mere tolerance and petitioner refused to surrender possession of
the land despite demand. The case was brought to the RTC which ruled in favor of the herein
respondent and against the herein petitioner by applying Article 428, NCC. Petitioner filed a
Motion for New Trial and Lift Order of Default but was denied for lack of merit. He filed an
appeal with the CA essentially invoking the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between
respondent and he while at the same time initiated before the DARAB (DAR-Adjudication
Board) a Case #-1380-ISA’94. The DARAB with its finding that petitioner was a bona-fide
tenant of respondent who should be maintained in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property which petitioner submitted to the CA but CA in turn rejected petitioner’s
arguments.

Issue: Whether or not there is an agrarian dispute between petitioner and respondent.
Ruling: The Court has previously held that substantial evidence, defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required to establish a tenancy relationship. To support a finding that a tenancy relationship is
present, the Court has repeatedly required the presentation of concrete evidence to prove the
element of sharing, compensation in the form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the
landholding involved. Going over the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB and the
documentary evidence considered therein, which were likewise presented by the petitioner
before this Court, the Court can only conclude that there is substantial evidence to establish the
existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent. The receipts presented by
petitioner covering his rental payments to respondent for the subject property, unrebutted by the
latter, constitute concrete evidence of tenurial relations between them.

Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the
DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA’94; consequently, the same has attained finality42 and
constitutes res judicata43 on the issue of petitioner’s status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance
with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by
the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as
res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata
cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as
courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers
have been conferred.

Heirs of Jane Honrales vs. Jonathan Honrales

Facts:
Jane Honrales (Jane) was fatally shot be her husband Jonathan Honrales (Jonathan) which
caused his immediate death. An information for parricide was filed against Jonathan in RTC.
Then prosecutor moved for the withdrawal of the Information for parricide. During the pendency
of the Motion to Withdraw the Information, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting to
parricide was filed against Jonathan in the MeTC. Thereafter Jonathan was arraigned in the
MeTC and plead guilty to the offense (reckless imprudence resulting to parricide) and moved for
the dismissal of the the crime of parricide in the RTC which was thereafter granted by the court.

Issue:
Whether or not Jonathan would be put on double jeopardy in case the parricide case would be
reopened.
Ruling:
No. The court ruled that for double jeopardy to exist the following requisites should be present:

1. a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

2. the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
3. a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first;

A first jeopardy attaches only:

1. after a valid indictment;

2. before a competent court;
3. after arraignment;
4. when a valid plea has been entered;
5. when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case is dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

The MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide
while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. Once jurisdiction is
acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, the MeTC
has no jurisdiction over the case filed before it since the RTC retained its jurisdiction over the
offense to the exclusion of other courts. The judgment rendered by the MeTC is null and void for
not acquiring jurisdiction over the case.

MONICO LIGTAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015.

Facts: Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) was charged for theft for taking of the harvest of Abaca in the
plantation of belonging to Anecita Pacate, having feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca
Þbers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00per kilo, without the consent of said owner. Where
Ligtas pleaded not guilty, alleging himself as the owner of the said property as he is the one who
cultivated such, he further alleged the following defenses; setting an alibi that the alleged taking
did not happen since he claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta
at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged harvesting happened but
later onwhen confronted he admitted harvesting the abaca but claimed as plantation owner, being
a tenant of 1.5 to twohectares of land that he just prevented the men to harvest from the land
which he himself cultivated.
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful
Possession on November 21, 2000. On January 22, 2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision
ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land. While records are bereft as to when the
DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that
the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and without
any objection onthe part of the People of the Philippines. In the Decision dated August 16, 2006,
the Regional Trial Court held that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft Ligtas
defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor was his claim of
harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness.

Ruling: The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine
whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse parties. This court has held that "judicial
determinations [of the a DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a
regular judicial body." Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies
relating tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of such tenurial arrangements.

In Salazar v. De Leon, this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary
jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between landowners and
tenants. The DARAB Decision is conclusive and binding on courts when supported by
substantial evidence. This court ruled that administrative res judicata exists in that case:

Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the
DARAB in DARAB Case # II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and
constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance
with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res
judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the
Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication may be pleaded
as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial
powers have been conferred.
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions
rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative
proceedings

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative
powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination,
with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations
of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the
respective rights and obligations of the parties.
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment
and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock
Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39,
Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39,
Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept
of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in
the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as
between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action,
then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" appies.
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals, the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the
parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB Decision in Martillano attained finality when the
landowner did not appeal the Decision. This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered,
through its adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian
disputes and controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law.
Section 51 thereof provides that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days and no appeal was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there
being no appeal interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the
status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents
issued in his favor are settled and no longer open to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and
Emancipation patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-
Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and
Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has
attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no strenuous legal
interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB
Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-
defendant in the case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally
impleaded on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability
of the doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already
been litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior
judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the
case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. The
dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties as
long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be
resurrected anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the
principle of res judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.

Navaja vs. De Castro

Facts:The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT
Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in
Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana
Navaja), of the crime of falsification of a Private Document, docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-
1238. In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms. Marilyn Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a
material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol on
March 15, 2004 in order to shed light on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana
Navaja. On March 9, 2004, petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband, allegedly went to Ms.
Magsigay's workplace in Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and told her that as per instruction from
Ana Navaja's lawyer, Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance in the
scheduled hearing is no longer needed (March 9, 2004 incident). Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer
attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented
an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando
Grapa (Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15, 2004
incident).Resultantly, I.S. Case No. 04-1238 was dismissed.
Atty. Borje filed the following criminal complaints before the OPP-Bohol and the City
Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City: the first one, charging petitioner of Obstruction of Justice,
specifically, for violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1829 in connection
with the March 9, 2004 incident; and the second one, charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of
Obstruction of Justice as well, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law in
connection with the March 15, 2004 incident. After due proceedings, separate Informations were
filed. The case relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the MCTC-Jagna,while
that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
of Tagbilaran City, Bohol (MTCC-Tagbilaran).

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for different
acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same
law allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding.

Ruling: While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different
locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single
violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single
criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S.
Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol.33 The foregoing
conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.
The Court explained the principle of delito continuado as follows:

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of
acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of
the same criminal purpose or aim

Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes

but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.

Petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly
motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is
to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus,
applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count
of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was
allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran
City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case. 40 However,
since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment41 dated July 3, 2007 - in the
MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in
Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design.