Order Code RL32888

The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):

Background and Issues for Congress

Updated May 12, 2008

Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
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 The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress

Summary
The Future Combat System (FCS) is the U.S. Army’s multiyear, multibillion
dollar program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It is the Army’s
major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and
unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information
network. FCS is intended to replace such current systems as the M-1 Abrams tank
and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been
characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced
technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems
together so that FCS-equipped units can function as intended.

The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which

could significantly influence the program’s outcome. The Administration has
committed the United States to “the Long War,” a struggle that could last for decades
as the United States and its allies attempt to locate and destroy terrorist networks
worldwide. Some question if FCS, envisioned and designed prior to September 11,
2001 to combat conventional land forces, is relevant in this “Long War” where
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations feature prominently. The FCS
program has achieved a number of programmatic milestones and is transitioning from
a purely conceptual program to one where prototypes of many of the 14 FCS systems
are under development. With a variety of estimates on the total cost of the FCS
program, questions have been raised about FCS affordability, and the Army cites
anticipated budgetary constraints for the recent restructuring of the program from 18
to 14 systems.

The overall FCS program is in a variety of developmental phases, with some

technologies on the verge of being fielded to units and others still under development
with varying degrees of success. The 110th Congress, in its appropriation,
authorization, and oversight roles may wish to review the FCS program in terms of
its projected capabilities and program costs. This report will be updated as the
situation warrants.
Contents

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
FCS Program Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The FCS Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Program Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FCS Program Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2009 “Go or No Go” Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Program Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Program Schedule Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
March 2008 GAO Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Selected FCS Program Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2007 Program Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Army to Accelerate FCS Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Mounted Combat System (MCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Spin Out One Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Active Protective System (APS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FCS Program Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FY2009 FCS Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658) Markup . . . . . . . . . 14
Impact of Past Budget Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
FCS Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Potential Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Accelerating the FCS Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Increasing Role of FCS Lead Systems Integrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FCS and Possible Radio Spectrum Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FCS and Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Appendix. FCS Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Manned Ground Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Mounted Combat System (MCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and Medical Vehicle -
Treatment (MV-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
 FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Class I UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Class IV UAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE) . . 24
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Tactical UGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Urban UGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) . . . 25
Battle Command (BC) Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Warfighter-Machine Interface Package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Communications and Computer (CC) Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems . . . . . . 26

List of Tables
FCS Program Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):
Background and Issues for Congress

Issues for Congress

The Future Combat System (FCS) is the Army’s multiyear, multibillion-dollar
program at the heart of the Army’s transformation efforts. It is the Army’s major
research, development, and acquisition program for the foreseeable future and is to
consist of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive
communications and information network. FCS is intended to replace such current
systems as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The
FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture
due to the advanced technologies involved as well as the challenge of networking all
of the FCS subsystems together. The Army’s success criteria for FCS is that it
should be “as good as or better than” the Army’s current force in terms of “lethality,
survivability, responsiveness, and sustainability.”1

The primary issues presented to 110th Congress are the capabilities and
affordability of the FCS program, and the likelihood, given a myriad of factors, that
the Army will be able to field its first FCS-equipped brigade by 2014 and eventually
field up to 15 FCS-equipped brigades. Key oversight questions for consideration
include:

! The feasibility of accelerating certain aspects of the FCS program;

! The increasing role of lead systems integrators in FCs program

management;

! Possible radio spectrum and satellite problems; and

! FCS in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations.

The 110th Congress’s decisions on these and other related issues could have
significant implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and
future congressional oversight activities. This report will address a variety of issues
including the program’s timeline, budget, program management issues, current
program developmental progress and challenges, and FCS’s relevance in the current
and potential future security environments.

1
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Defense Acquisitions: Improved
Business Case is Needed for Future Combat System’s Successful Outcome,” GAO-06-367,
March 2006, p. 2.
 CRS-2

Background
FCS Program Origins
In October 1999, then Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki
introduced the Army’s transformation strategy which was intended to convert all of
the Army’s divisions (called Legacy Forces) into new organizations called the
Objective Force. General Shinseki’s intent was to make the Army lighter, more
modular, and — most importantly — more deployable. General Shinseki’s
deployment goals were to deploy a brigade2 in four days, a division in five days, and
five divisions in 30 days.3 As part of this transformation, the Army adopted the
Future Combat System (FCS) as a major acquisition program to equip the Objective
Force.4

This transformation, due to its complexity and uncertainty, was scheduled to

take place over the course of three decades, with the first FCS-equipped objective
force unit reportedly becoming operational in 2011 and the entire force transformed
by 2032.5 In order to mitigate the risk associated with the Objective Force and to
address the near-term need for more deployable and capable units, the Army’s
transformation plan called for the development of brigade-sized units called the
Interim Force in both the active Army and the Army National Guard. Some of these
seven brigade-sized units,6 known as both Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs)
or Stryker Brigade Combat Teams7 (SBCTs), have served in Iraq.8

General Shinseki’s vision for the FCS was that it would consist of smaller and
lighter ground and air vehicles — manned, unmanned, and robotic — and would
employ advanced offensive, defensive, and communications/information systems to
“outsmart and outmaneuver heavier enemy forces on the battlefield.”9 In order to

2
According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers and
a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers.
3
Frank Tiboni, “Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation,” Federal
Computer Week, February 9, 2004.
4
James Jay Carafano, “The Army Goes Rolling Along: New Service Transformation
Agenda Suggests Promise and Problems,” Heritage Foundation, February 23, 2004, p. 5.
5
Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army: Toward the Objective Force,”
in Hans Binnendijk, ed. Transforming America’s Military (National Defense University
Press, 2002), p. 106.
6
The Army currently plans to field six active and one National Guard Stryker Brigade
Combat Teams.
7
The Stryker is the Army’s name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigade’s combat and combat support vehicles.
8
Annex A (Modular Conversion) to Army Campaign Plan, Change 2, September 30, 2005,
p. A-1.
9
The following description of the early stages of the FCS program is taken from Frank
(continued...)
 CRS-3

initiate the FCS program, General Shinseki turned to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), not only because of its proven ability to manage highly
conceptual and scientifically challenging projects, but also because he reportedly felt
that he would receive a great deal of opposition from senior Army leaders who
advocated heavier and more powerful vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the
M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. In May 2000, DARPA awarded four contracts
to four industry teams to develop FCS designs and in March 2002, the Army chose
Boeing and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to serve as the
lead systems integrators to oversee certain aspects of the development of the FCS’s
18 original systems. On May 14, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board10 (DAB)
approved the FCS’s next acquisition phase and in August 2004 Boeing and SAIC
awarded contracts to 21 companies to design and build its various platforms and
hardware and software.

The FCS Program

Program Overview11
The Army describes FCS as a joint (involving the other services) networked
“system of systems.” FCS systems are to be connected by means of an advanced
network architecture that would permit connectivity with other services, situational
awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations that are currently
unachievable by Army combat forces. FCS is intended to network with existing
forces, systems currently in development, and systems that will be developed in the
future. The FCS is to be incorporated into the Army’s brigade-sized modular force
structure.

Structure. FCS units would include the following:

! Unattended ground sensors (UGS);

! Two classes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs);
! Three classes of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs): the Armed
Robotic Vehicle - Assault (Light) (ARV-A-L), the Small Unmanned
Ground Vehicle (SUGV), and the Multifunctional Utility/Logistics
and Equipment Countermine and Transport Vehicle (MULE-T);
! Eight types of Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs);
! The Network; and
! The individual soldier and his personal equipment and weapons.

9
(...continued)
Tiboni’s Army’s Future Combat Systems at the Heart of Transformation.
10
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the Defense Department’s senior-level forum
for advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)) on critical decisions concerning DAB-managed programs and special interest
programs.
11
Information in this section is taken from the Army’s official FCS website
[http://www.army.mil/fcs/overview.html].
 CRS-4

The FCS is to serve as the core building block of the Army’s Future Force. FCS-
equipped brigade combat teams (BCTs) are to consist of:

! Three FCS-equipped Combined Arms battalions (CABs);

! One Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon battalion;
! One Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA)
squadron;
! One Forward Support battalion (FSB);
! One Brigade Intelligence and Communications company (BICC);
and
! One Headquarters company.

For a more detailed description of FCS subsystems, see Appendix A.

Capabilities.12 According to the Army, the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
will be designed to be:

! Self- sufficient for 72 hours of high-intensity combat;

! Self- sufficient for seven days in a low to mid-intensity environment;
! Able to reduce the traditional logistics footprint for fuel, water,
ammunition, and repair parts by 30% to 70%;
! Sixty percent more strategically deployable than current heavy
BCTs; and
! Able to operate across larger areas with fewer soldiers.

FCS Program Timeline

FCS is currently moving towards the System of Systems Preliminary Design
Review (PDR) now scheduled for February 2009. The PDR is described as “a multi-
disciplined technical review to ensure that a system is ready to proceed into detailed
design and can meet stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, risk, and
other system restraints.”13

2009 “Go or No Go” Review.14 In 2006 Congress directed that after the
February 2009 FCS System of Systems Preliminary Design Review (PDR), that DOD
conduct a FCS Milestone Review to assess (1) if warfighter’s needs are valid and can
best be met through the FCS program; (2) whether the concept of the program can
be developed and produced within existing resources; and (3) should FCS continue
as currently structured, continue in a restructured form or; (4) be terminated. A
specific date in 2009 for this review has not yet been established.

12
Information in this section is taken from the 2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5,
2007, pp. 8-11, and FCS Brigade Combat Team 14+1+1 Systems Overview 14 March 2007,
at [http://www.army.mil/fcs/whitepaper/FCSwhitepaper07.pdf].
13
“Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms,” Defense Acquisition University,
Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th ed., July 2005, p. B-121.
14
For information in this section see P.L. 109-364, John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Section 214.
 CRS-5

Program Schedule. At present, the FCS program is operating under the

schedule depicted below:

FCS Program Schedule15

Event Date (FY) Event description

Systems of Systems 2009 A technical review to evaluate the progress and
Preliminary Design technical adequacy of each major program item.
Review (PDR) It also examines compatibility with performance
and engineering requirements.
FCS Milestone “Go or 2009 A DOD review established by Section 214, P.L.
No Go” Review 109-364 to determine if the FCS program should
continue as planned, be restructured, or be
terminated.
Critical Design 2011 A technical review to determine if the detailed
Review (CDR) design satisfies performance and engineering
requirements. Also determines compatibility
between equipment, computers, and personnel.
Assesses producibility and program risk areas.
Design Readiness 2011 Evaluates design maturity, based on the number
Review of successfully completed system and subsystem
design reviews.
Milestone C 2013 Milestone C approves the program’s entry into
the Production and Deployment (P&D) Phase.
The P&D Phase consists of two efforts — Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate
Production and Deployment (FRP&D). The
purpose of the P&D Phase is to achieve an
operational capability that satisfies the mission
need.
Initial Operational 2015 IOC is defined as the first attainment of the
Capability (IOC) capability to employ the system as intended.
(Part of the P&D Phase).
Full Operational 2017 The full attainment of the capability to employ
Capability the system, including a fully manned, equipped,
trained, and logistically supported force. (Part
of the P&D Phase).

Note: Event descriptions in this table are taken from the Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms
Glossary published by the Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA, 12th ed., July 2005.

Program Schedule Concerns. The Government Accountability Office

(GAO) has monitored of the FCS program since its inception. One of GAO’s
continuing program schedule concerns is that:

15
MG Charles A. Cartwright and Mr. Tony Melita, Future Combat Systems (Brigade
Combat Team) Defense Acquisition Board In-Process Review, June 13, 2007, p. 4.
 CRS-6

FCS design and production maturity are not likely to be demonstrated until
after the production decision is made. The critical design review will be
held much later on FCS than on other programs, and the Army will not be
building production-representative prototypes to test before production.
The first major test of the network and FCS together with a majority of
prototypes will not take place until 2012. Much of the testing up to the
2013 production decision will involve simulations, technology
demonstrations, experiments, and single system testing.16

GAO suggests that because testing occurs so close to the production decision, that
problems identified during testing will need to be resolved during the production
phase, which historically is the most expensive phase in which to correct problems.17

March 2008 GAO Reports18

Section 211 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 109-163)
requires GAO to report annually on a variety of aspects of the FCS program. In
recent reports and testimony GAO recommended:

! That the 2009 DOD FCS Milestone Review be scheduled in a

manner where it would be both “well-informed and transparent”;

! That objective and quantitative criteria be established that the FCS

program will have to meet throughout the remainder of the program;

! That DOD identify viable alternatives to FCS as currently structured

that can be considered if FCS fails to meet the criteria established for
the 2009 FCS Milestone Review; and

! That the oversight implications of the Army’s decision to contract

with lead system integrators Boeing and Scientific Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) for early production of FCS spin
outs, the Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and low rate
production of the core FCS program be fully examined.

16
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore the
Importance of Oversight,” GAO-07-672T, March 27, 2007.
17
Ibid.
18
Information in this section is taken from Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports GAO-08-408, “Defense Acquisitions: 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s
Future Combat System,” and GAO-08-409, “Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges
Ahead in Developing and Demonstrating Future Combat System’s Network and Software,”
March 7, 2008 and GAO-08-638T, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Air and Land
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions:
2009 Review of Future Combat System is Critical to Program’s Direction,” April 10, 2008.
 CRS-7

According to GAO, the Department of Defense has agreed to establish

evaluation criteria for the 2009 FCS Milestone Review and finalize these criteria at
the 2008 Defense Acquisition Board review.

Selected FCS Program Issues

FCS program officials contend that the program “is moving from the drawing
board to reality”with some prototype manned ground vehicles (MGVs) currently
being built and Spin Out technologies undergoing testing in preparation for fielding
to the operational force.19 Selected program issues are examined in the following
sections:

2007 Program Restructuring. In early 2007 the Army citing “the effects
of budget reductions [by Congress] over the past three years, and the fiscal guidance
for future years [DOD],” reduced the scope and delayed the schedule of fielding the
FCS.20 The major element of this restructuring was eliminating Class II and III
UAVs (company and battalion-level UAVs, respectively) and deferring the Armed
Robotic Vehicle - Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition until the
Army builds its FY2010 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).21 The Army also
separated the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS) from the FCS program, but will
produce IMS under another program. This restructuring reduced the FCS program
from 18 to 14 systems. In addition, the Army slowed FCS procurement to the rate
of one brigade per year starting in 2015, meaning that it will take until 2030 to field
all 15 FCS-equipped brigade combat teams — a five-year delay to field the last FCS
brigade. The Army has also reduced the number of FCS technology “spin outs” to
current forces from four to three — with the first spin out planned to start in 2008.
However, the Army will increase the number of brigades receiving spin out
technologies from three to six brigades.

The Army maintains that this restructuring will save the Army $3.4 billion over
the next six years, but will “put at risk our ability to reach the full tactical and
operational potential envisioned for FCS.”22 While the Army may believe that
reducing the cost of the FCS program by decreasing it from 18 to 14 systems will
make FCS less contentious in terms of overall cost, some suggest that while
“stretching out” the FCS program will likely decrease yearly FCS production costs,
it also means that the Army will need additional funds to keep FCS production lines
open longer.23

19
Kris Osborn, “FCS: Fielding Coming Soon,” Army Times, April 2, 2007.
20
2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, p. 8.
21
Information in this section is from Ashley Roque, “Army Retools FCS to Address
Congressional, Service Budget Cuts,” Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.
22
2007 Army Modernization Plan, March 5, 2007, p 9.
23
Ashley Roque, “Army Retools FCS to Address Congressional, Service Budget Cuts,”
Inside the Army, February 12, 2007.
 CRS-8

Army to Accelerate FCS Program? The Army is said to be examining

options to accelerate the FCS program, in part due to congressional concerns over
current readiness and the availability of future program funds. Representative
Abercrombie, Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and
Land Forces has reportedly stated that the committee’s priority would be to “address
the Army’s current readiness crisis,” and that “how FCS funding fits into that
equation is yet to be determined.”24 Representative Murtha, Chairman of the House
Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, has suggested that the Army must be more
aggressive in inserting FCS technologies into the Army’s current fleet of vehicles,
should eliminate some FCS systems, and complete the FCS program in four to five
years - offering to “find” $20 billion in the FY2009 defense budget if the FCS
program can be accelerated. The fundamental issue appears to be the overall
affordability of the FCS program as it is currently structured, with Secretary of
Defense Gates suggesting to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February
2008 that the Department of Defense might not be able to afford to complete the
FCS program.25

Possible Alternatives.26 The Army is said to be developing a proposal to

accelerate the FCS program which may be presented to Congress in the near future.
While the Army has not discussed options for acceleration publically, the following
options are said to be under consideration:

! Speeding up prototypes of selected FCS MGVs such as the Non-

Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C), the Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar
(NLOS-C), the Command and Control Vehicle (C2V), and the
Medical Vehicle, and deliver these to operational forces in 2009; and

! Deploying the first FCS-equipped brigade combat team (BCT) in

2012 or 2013 instead of 2015 as currently planned.

While these and other options may be under consideration by the Army, it is unclear
how these options would have a discernable near-term impact on improving Army
current readiness. Others contend that while accelerating the fielding of certain FCS
platforms might be possible, the FCS network and complementary Joint Tactical
Radio System (JTRS) remain technologically questionable and both systems are
central to any effort to deploy individual FCS systems or entire FCS BCTs. GAO has
also noted that

24
Information in this section is taken from Marina Malenic and Daniel Wasserbly,
“Abercrombie Skeptical of Acceleration Talk,” InsideDefense.com, February 25, 2008;
Marina Malenic and Daniel Wasserbly “Murtha Offers to Find $20 Billion this Year: Key
Lawmaker Pushes Army to Accelerate FCS, Cut Some Components,” InsideDefense.com,
February 18, 2008; Kris Osborn, “More Trouble Ahead for U.S. Army’s FCS,” Defense
News, February 11, 2008.
25
Kris Osborn, “More Trouble Ahead for U.S. Army’s FCS,” Defense News, February 11,
2008.
26
Kris Osborn, “U.S. Wants FCS Vehicles Sooner,” Defense News, March 3, 2008 and
“Battle Over Proposal to Speed FCS,” Defense News, March 24, 2008.
 CRS-9

Significant management and technical challenges have placed development of

the network and software and risk. These risks include, among others, network
performance and scalability, immature network architecture, and synchronization
of FCS with the Joint Tactical Radio Systems and Warfighter Information
Network Tactical programs that have significant technical challenges of their
own.27

Given these aforementioned challenges, it is reasonable to assume that acceleration

of these FCS complimentary programs and FCS software development would be
even higher risk and might, in fact, be detrimental to the overall FCS program.

Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C).28 According to Secretary of the

Army Geren, the Army will build only five prototype NLOS-Cs in 2008 instead of
eight previously planned for due to funding cuts over the past three fiscal years.
Secretary Geren said that the three deferred NLOS-Cs would be built in FY2009.
The Army expects the inaugural FCS prototype will be fielded in June 2008 but
program officials are still attempting to solve cooling system and power distribution
issues associated with the hybrid-electric drive system which will be common across
all MGVs. These NLOS-C prototypes would be used by the Army Evaluation Task
Force (AETF) at Ft. Bliss, TX - the Army unit designated to test and evaluate FCS
technologies.

Mounted Combat System (MCS).29 The XM360 120mm cannon for the
MCS FCS manned ground vehicle - the replacement for the M-1 Abrams main battle
tank - is currently undergoing testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. The
XM-360 is about one third lighter than the current 120mm cannon mounted on the
M-1 Abrams and supposedly can hit targets 8 km away while on the move and up to
12 kms away while stationary.

Spin Out One Preparations.30 Preparations are underway for the first “spin
out” of FCS capabilities to units in the field, which is scheduled to begin in FY2008
and run through FY2010. According to Army officials, the Army Evaluation Task
Force (AETF) at Ft. Bliss, Texas concluded its initial technical field test for the first

27
GAO-08-409, “Defense Acquisitions: Significant Challenges Ahead in Developing and
Demonstrating Future Combat System’s Network and Software,” March 7, 2008.
28
Information in this section is taken from Daniel Wasserbly, “Geren: Army to Cut Three
Copies from FY-08 NLOS-C Production,” InsideDefense.com, March 3, 2008 and “Army’s
First FCS Manned Ground Vehicle Prototype Expected in June,” InsideDefense.com, April
7, 2008.
29
Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Tests New Tank Gun,” Defense News, March 31, 2008.
30
Information from this section is taken from Daniel Wasserbly, “Future Combat Systems
Completes Technical Field Test for Spin Out 1,” InsideDefense.com, April 7, 2008; “AETF
to Complete New Equipment Training on FCS Spin Out 1 Next Month,” InsideDefense.com,
December 24, 2007; Kris Osborn, “Vehicles With FCS Gear Put Through Paces,” Defense
News, December 10, 2007, p. 20; Kris Osborn, “February Tests Set for FCS Gear,” Defense
News, October 29, 2007; and Scott R. Gourley, “U.S. Begins Set Up of FCS Spin Out One
Package,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 24, 2007, p. 30.
 CRS-10

group of technologies to be fielded during Spin Out One. These tests, which
concluded on March 25, 2008, focused primarily on Tactical and Urban Unattended
Ground Sensors and B-Kits - the communications and software kits that are installed
on current combat vehicles that link them to the FCS network and sensors. In May
2008, a more rigorous exercise simulating force-on-force combat conditions will be
conducted, and in July 2008, a large scale FCS limited-user test will be conducted to
help determine whether to approve the production of “B” Kits and other FCS
technologies.

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). JTRS radios are software-defined

radios that are to be used to provide voice, video, and data communications to FCS
ground and aerial vehicles. One of the primary benefits of JTRS is that it is intended
to operate on multiple radio frequencies, permitting it to talk to certain non-JTRS
radios that are expected to stay in the Army’s inventory. JTRS is a joint program and
therefore is not a part of the FCS program but is instead what the Army describes as
a “complimentary program.” JTRS is to form the “backbone” of the FCS Network
and therefore of critical importance to the program’s success.

JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR).31 The Boeing-led JTRS GMR team
consisting of Northrop Grumman, Rockwell Collins, and BAE Systems, with support
of Harris Communications, have begun initial production of the Engineering Design
Models (EDMs)32 of JTRS GMR which are to be used in FCS ground vehicles. These
models are scheduled to undergo testing throughout 2008 and formal government
certification and field testing is planned to begin in late 2008.

JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed (AMF) Radio.33 A Lockheed

Martin-led team consisting of BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and
Northrop Grumman beat out a Boeing-led team consisting of BBN Technologies, L-3
Communications, Milcom Systems Corp., Northrop Grumman, and Rockwell Collins
for a $766.1 million contract for the design and development of the JTRS AMF radio
for ships, aircraft, and ground sites. The Lockheed Martin team will initially develop
42 engineering development models (EDMs) for small airborne platforms and
destroyers and there are options to build EDMs for other weapons systems platforms.

31
Boeing Press Release “Boeing Begins Production of Joint Tactical Radio System Ground
Mobile Radios Engineering Model,” January 8, 2008.
32
Engineering Design Models (also referred to as engineering development models) are
defined by the Defense Acquisition University as a production representative system
acquired during the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase and may be used
to demonstrate maturing performance via an Operational Assessment (OA) or Operational
Testing (OT) and to finalize proposed production specifications and drawings.
33
Ann Roosevelt, “Lockheed Martin Tops Boeing for JTRS AMF Work,” Defense Daily,
March 31, 2008.
 CRS-11

Potential Radio Spectrum Problems.34 One report suggests that the

Army’s former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and
Technology, Claude Bolton, was concerned that within the next five years, the Army
may not have enough radio spectrum “to allow its next-generation networked force
[FCS] to work as it is being designed to.” The concern is that beginning in 2010,
when the Army introduces JTRS and additional technologies designed to transmit
vast amount of data from soldiers, sensors, and unmanned and manned ground and
aerial vehicles, the available bandwidth will become overwhelmed. To get a better
appreciation for the potential problem, both the Army Science Board and RAND
Corporation have been asked to estimate the Army’s future bandwidth needs, and the
FCS program is investigating how FCS will perform if the network is degraded by
lack radio spectrum availability and network failure. Industry officials also suggest
that the Army is having a hard time keeping up with information demands,
suggesting, for example, that Army leadership has become “addicted” to video
teleconferencing, one of the most bandwidth-consuming applications

Air Force’s Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT)

Program. Another issue that could have an impact on spectrum availability for FCS
is the Air Force’s Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) program.35
The TSAT is planned to be 100 times faster than current military satellites, taking
advantage of the latest Internet technology to more efficiently reroute
communications traffic and is expected “to provide more securely encrypted
communications for FCS to prevent enemies from intercepting or jamming signals.”36
The TSAT program has suffered from delays, restructuring, and cost cuts and it
seems unlikely that the first TSAT satellite will be launched in 2016 as planned and
some doubt the viability of the entire program. While FCS program officials contend
that they could make do with current military and commercial satellites in the event
that TSAT is further delayed or cancelled, one defense expert notes to the contrary
that:

TSAT is crucial to the secure networking capabilities that underpin FCS. Given
the cutbacks, if TSAT collapses, which looks like a distinct possibility, soldiers
may have to rely on links that are harder to access on the move, more vulnerable
to jamming and interceptions, and offer nowhere near as much bandwidth.37

Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). WIN-T is described

as the Army’s “communications network of the future consisting of a three-tiered
architecture of orbital, airborne, and ground links that will provide connectivity to a

34
Information in this section is taken from Kris Osborn “U.S. Army Faces Spectrum
Crunch,” Defense News, January 7, 2008: Sandra I. Erwin, “Army Struggling With Rising
Demand for Communications,” National Defense, April 2008; and Alec Klein, “Weapons
Upgrade Faces Big Hurdles: Problems With Wireless Technology May Threaten Army’s
Ambitious Plans,” Washington Post, April 8, 2008 .
35
Alec Klein. “Weapons Upgrade Faces Big Hurdles: Problems With Wireless Technology
May Threaten Army’s Ambitious Plan,” Washington Post, April 8, 2008
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
 CRS-12

dispersed and highly mobile force.”38 WIN-T, reportedly now expected to cost
approximately $16.4 billion, is intended to permit the Army to communicate and
transfer large amounts of data on the move.39

WIN-T Increments.40 JNN has been “rebranded” as WIN-T Increment One.

The Army plans to have fielded 50% of its units with WIN-T Increment One (which
began fielding in 2004 as JNN) by mid-2008. WIN-T Increment One is intended to
support static headquarters. WIN-T Increment Two is intended to provide network
management and the mobile portion of the system, including on-the-move satellite
communication (SATCOM) and networking line-of-sight radio. Limited user testing
is planned for late 2008, with a production decision possibly in early 2009. WIN-T
Increment Three coincides with FCS Spin Out Three and will further link FCS
platforms with testing planned to begin in 2011 and fielding in 2014. WIN-T
Increment Four is planned to consist of the Transformation Communication Satellite
(TSAT) system, which will provide a more capable and protected on-the-move
SATCOM system but as previously noted, some consider the TSAT program in
jeopardy due to budgetary and programmatic difficulties.

WIN-T Field Testing.41 The Army has reportedly approved the final designs
for WIN-T Increments One and Two for field testing in October 2008. A General
Dynamics/Lockheed Martin/BAE Systems/Harris(HRS)/L-3 Communications (LLL)
team is currently building test articles for an Increment Two Limited User Test that
will involve a division headquarters and two maneuver brigades. Successful testing
could lead to deployment of these capabilities in 2009.

Active Protective System (APS). In March 2006, a contract potentially

worth $70 million was awarded to Raytheon to develop an Active Protective System
(APS) for FCS manned ground vehicles as well as the Army’s current fleet of combat
vehicles and potentially the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The APS, divided
into a short-range system for dealing with urban-type threats such as rocket-propelled
grenades and a long-range system for dealing with anti-tank guided missiles, has been
compared to a “mini anti-ballistic missile system.” For both systems, a suite of
sensors is intended to detect an incoming threat and then hit the incoming projectile
with projectile of its own.

The APS program came under public criticism in September 2006 when a press
report alleged that the Army rejected an Israeli-developed APS called “Trophy” for
use in the FCS program, despite the system being successfully tested on U.S. combat

38
Scott Nance, “Analyst: Advanced Networks to be Rumsfeld Legacy,” Defense Today,
Volume 26, Number 233, December 8, 2005, p. 3.
39
“Army Restructures WIN-T to Meet Future Combat System Requirements,” Inside the
Army, July 3, 2006 and Josh Rogin, “DOD: Projected WIN-T Costs Soars by $2.2 Billion,”
Federal Computer Weekly, April 10, 2007.
40
Information in this section is from Giles Ebbut, “WIN-T Restructuring Fuels Greater
Demand,” Jane’s International Defence Review, December 2007, p. 17.
41
“General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin Authorized to Prepare WIN-T for Field Tests,”
Defense Daily, Vol. 238, No. 22, April 30, 2008.
 CRS-13

vehicles.42 The report further contended that the Army was favoring the APS system
in development by Raytheon over the Trophy system because of “money and
politics” and that U.S. forces in the field were suffering casualties because of this
decision.43 A GAO report however, maintains that there was no conflict of interest,
concluding that:

No officials from the offering companies participated in the evaluation and all
offers were evaluated based on the same criteria. Four proposals were evaluated
and three were determined to be comparable in terms of cost and schedule. The
winner — Raytheon — was chosen on technical merit, as being more likely to
meet APS requirements although its design had less mature technology.44

The Army contends that the Raytheon system under development can detect and
engage incoming projectiles from the front, back, sides, and the top of a vehicle
whereas the Trophy system does not detect or engage top-down projectiles thereby
creating a significant vulnerability for U.S. vehicles.45 In addition, the Trophy system
presently has a single-shot capability and once a threat is engaged from a certain
direction, the vehicle is vulnerable to a second shot from that direction. The Army
also believes that the Raytheon system will result in less collateral damage than the
Trophy system. The Army suggests that adopting the Trophy system could provide
soldiers with a “false sense of security” and also suggests that the Raytheon-
developed system is progressing favorably, noting that it was knocking down live
warheads during testing. Reports suggest that APS development has progressed
better than anticipated and that the Army may begin to install the “Quick Kill” APS
system on FCS vehicles in 2010, two years earlier than previously planned.46

FCS Program Budget

FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act.47 The Conference Report
to H.R. 1585 (P.L. 110-181) authorized $3.334 billion in research and development
(R&D) and $99.6 million in procurement budget for FCS. This was a cut of about
$229 million from the FY2008 FCS R&D budget request, but conferees fully funded
the $99.6 million procurement request for “long-lead items” and for Spin Out One
technologies. Conferees also transferred about $100 million of WIN-T R&D funding

42
Adam Ciralsky and Lisa Meyers, “Army Shuns System to Combat RPGs,” MSNBC.com,
September 5, 2006.
43
Ibid.
44
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Processes Used to Evaluate Active
Protection Systems, GAO-07-759, June 2007, Executive Summary.
45
Information from this section is from an Army FCS Briefing given on September 7, 2006.
46
Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Adapts FCS Design to Take On IEDs,” Defense News,
December 10, 2007.
47
House Armed Services Committee Press Release “Agreement Reached on H.R. 1585, The
Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act Conference Report,” December 6,
2007.
 CRS-14

to procurement accounts for JNN to support the fielding WINT-T Increment One and
stipulated that no more than 50% of these funds may be obligated until the Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation has approved the WIN-T Increment One Test and
Evaluation Master Plan and Initial Operational Test Plan.

FY2009 FCS Budget Request.48 The Administration has requested $3.6

billion for FY2009 — with approximately $3.3 billion for R&D and approximately
$300 million for procurement. Procurement funds include the manufacturing and
assembly of the first six Non-Line-of-Sight Cannons (NLOS-C) to be fielded in
FY2010 and FY2011 and for software and communications packages that are
intended to link the FCS network to M-1 Abrams, M-2 Bradleys, and modified
wheeled vehicles that will serve as surrogates for FCS MGVs during FCS initial
operational tests scheduled for FY2011.

FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658) Markup.49 The Senate

Armed Services Committee (SASC) has recommended fully funding the President’s
FCS FY2009 budget request. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Air
and Land Subcommittee recommend $ 200 million less than the President’s budget
request. In addition, $33 million was shifted within the FCS program from long-term
portions to near-term elements that could be fielded by 2011. Subcommittee
Chairman Abercrombie stated that the $200 million reduction was:

... based on the need to shift funding to higher priority Army readiness needs and
the fact that the FCS program, in addition to a history of delays and cost
overruns, continues to operate in violation of many major Department of Defense
acquisition policies, including the basic and long-standing policy requiring full
and adequate testing of equipment before production begins.50

Mark-up language is said to include the following provisions:

! Beginning with the FY2010 Budget Request, separate funding lines

for five FCS equipment classes, including manned ground vehicles,
unmanned ground vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, unattended
ground sensors, and “other FCS elements”;

48
Information in this section is taken from “The Army Budget - Fiscal Year 2009,” U.S.
Army News Release, Army Public Affairs Office, February 4, 2008 and Daniel Wasserbly,
“Army’s FY-09 Budget Includes $3.6 Billion for Future Combat Systems,”
InsideDefense.com, February 11, 2008.
49
Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, “Senate Armed
Services Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal
Year 2009,” May 1, 2008; John M. Donnelly, “Defense: House Armed Services Panel Aims
at Administration’s Defense Priorities,” CQ Today, May 7, 2008, p. 11; Statement of
Chairman Neil Abercrombie, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Mark-Up of H.R. 5658,
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, May 7, 2008; and Daniel Wasserbly,
“House Panel Votes to Cut $200 Million from FCS, Boost Oversight,” InsideDefense.com,
May 7, 2008.
50
Statement of Chairman Neil Abercrombie, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Mark-Up
of H.R. 5658, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, May 7, 2008.
 CRS-15

! A requirement for annual reports to congressional defense

committees on cost growth for the program’s eight manned ground
vehicles, as well as an independent report - to be submitted by July
1, 2009 - on possible vulnerabilities to the FCS communications
network;

! A measure that would prohibit the Army from awarding low-rate or

full-rate production contracts for “major elements” of FCS to
companies serving as the program’s lead systems integrator.

Some members however, disagree with the mark-up reductions and provisions.
Representative Saxton is said to have urged the subcommittee to “give the Army one
year of stable funding in order to let the Secretary of Defense and the Army decide
the fate of the FCS program in 2009.”51 Other members are said to have expressed
worries about the lead system’s integrator provision.52

Impact of Past Budget Cuts. The Army contends that because of

congressional budget cuts amounting to more than $789 million between FY2006
and FY2008, the FCS program will require between $700 million to $1.1 billion over
the next six years to remain on schedule.53 In order to make up part of the budget
shortfall, the Army said that it would request to reprogram funds.

Army Attempts to Reprogram Funds for FCS.54 On April 4, 2008 the

House Armed Services Committee reportedly rejected an Army request to reprogram
$27 million from outside programs into the FCS program that the Army wanted to
use to help to accelerate the fielding of the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle
(SUGV) and the Micro-Air Vehicle, a potential version of the FCS Class I
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). HASC leadership was said to be supportive of
funding these efforts to accelerate FCS systems but felt that DOD should find these
funds from within the FCS program. The Army also requested to reprogram another
$252 million - $78 million from other programs and another $174.5 million from
within the FCS program - to make up for budget cuts over the past three fiscal years.
This reprogramming request supposedly will permit the Army to keep the NLOS-C
program on schedules as well as Spin Out One. In addition, this request could enable
the Army to introduce some of the MGVs a year or two earlier than scheduled, speed

51
Daniel Wasserbly, “House Panel Votes to Cut $200 Million from FCS, Boost Oversight,”
InsideDefense.com, May 7, 2008.
52
Ibid.
53
Ann Roosevelt, “FCS Incurs Schedule Breach, Operational Capability Slips to 2017,”
Defense Daily, February 8, 2008 and Marina Malenic and Daniel Wasserbly, “Army Budget
Official Unveils Service Request, Reiterates Concerns About Supplemental Funds,”
InsideDefense.com, February 4, 2008.
54
Information in this section is taken from Marina Malenic, “Second Reprogramming Effort
Pending: House Panel Denies Army Request to Move Funds for FCS Acceleration,”
InsideDefense.com, April 7, 2008; Marina Malenic, “Another Reprogramming Action on
Capitol Hill: Army Seeks to Reallocate Over $250 Million to Sustain FCS Program,”
InsideDefense.com, April 14, 2008; and Kris Osborn, “Army Wants to Add $252 Million
to FCS,” Army Times, April 14, 2008.
 CRS-16

up the delivery of certain sensors and UAVs, and field the first two FCS-equipped
BCTs in 2013 - two years earlier than currently planned.

FCS Cost Estimates. In March 2006, GAO estimated that the current total
cost for the FCS program was $160.7 billion (then-year dollars) — an increase of
76% over the Army’s first estimate.55 In July 2006, the Department of Defense’s
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the total cost for the
development, procurement and operations of FCS had increased to more than $300
billion.56 The Army maintains that the total cost for the FCS program will be roughly
$230 billion, based on an April 2006 estimate from the FCS Program Office.57 An
August 2006 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study postulated that, given
historic cost growth in similar programs, that annual FCS costs could reach $16
billion annually, exceeding the Army’s estimates of $10 billion annually.58 The
Army has disputed CBO’s estimates, calling them “seriously flawed” suggesting that
CBO does not address the strategic environment or changing operational
requirements.59 In June 2007, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) — a nonprofit
corporation that administers three federally funded research and development centers
— reportedly concluded that the FCS program would cost $13 billion more than
what the Army has estimated, a conclusion that the Army has rejected.60 Some
maintain that this wide disparity in FCS cost estimates eight years into the program
has resulted in a lack of confidence that the FCS program can be conducted in a cost-
efficient manner.

Revised DOD Cost Estimate.61 On April 7, 2008 DOD provided Congress

with revised cost estimates on a number of defense acquisition programs. DOD
revised the total FCS program cost downward by 1.6 percent to just over $159.3
billion, primarily due to the application of revised inflation indices, but also including
past incorrect indices, decreases in other program support, and Congressional
statutory reductions.

55
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report “Acquisitions: Business Case and
Business Arrangements Key for Future Combat System’s Success,” GAO-06-478T, March
1, 2006, p. 8.
56
Megan Scully, “Army Sticks to its Guns, Rejects New FCS Cost Estimates,” National
Journal’s Congress Daily AM, July 13, 2006.
57
Ibid.
58
“The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” A CBO Study, August
2006, p. xii.
59
Ann Roosevelt, “Army Calls CBO’s FCS Report Seriously Flawed,” Defense Daily, Vol.
231, No. 52, September 19, 2006.
60
Daniel Wasserbly, “Study: Army FCS Program Will Cost $13 Billion More than
Estimated,” InsideDefense.com, July 30, 2007.
61
DOD Press Release, “Department of Defense Releases Selected Acquisitions Reports,”
Number 276-08, April 7, 2008 and Marina Malenic, “DOD Revises FCS Cost Downward
Using New Inflation Indicies,” Inside Defense.com, April 14, 2008.
 CRS-17

Potential Issues for Congress

Accelerating the FCS Program?
According to a number of press reports and recent discussions with Army
officials, the possibility exists that the Army might shortly propose accelerating the
FCS program, in part due to a perceived need to get FCS programs and technologies
to soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan more expeditiously, but also to address
aforementioned congressional concerns. While details about acceleration plans are
somewhat speculative, it is likely that any plans will contain recommendations to
eliminate some systems or capabilities, shorten program timelines, and perhaps field
less than fully capable systems to units with the intent of adding on capability as it
is developed or if funding permits.

While there may be certain FCS technologies and perhaps even major systems
that might be accelerated if funding is made available, there are critical aspects of the
program - such as the FCS Network, WIN-T, JTRS, the Active Protection System
(APS), and composite armor - that are highly dependent on scientific and
technological advancements and less so on funding. The Army maintains that FCS
is a “system of systems” whereby survivability and lethality are highly dependent on
information. If FCS information, communications, and survivability systems prove
to be less conducive to acceleration than manned and unmanned FCS platforms, a
situation could arise where accelerated FCS platforms are fielded with highly
immature information, communications, and survivability systems and a less than
optimal weapons- to- sensor interface needed to identify and engage targets. Such
a scenario, while providing forces in the field with “new” FCS systems, could instead
result in a less capable and more vulnerable force.

Increasing Role of FCS Lead Systems Integrators62

In a March 2008 report, GAO expressed its concern over FCS Lead Systems
Integrator (LSI) Boeing’s expanded responsibilities for FCS production and
increasing Army dependency on the major defense contractor for activities not
originally envisioned at the program’s outset. Initially, the FCS LSI team of Boeing
and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) were to be involved in
developmental activities that the Army felt were beyond its capabilities. In 2005, the
Army strengthened the organizational conflicts of interest clause in the FCS contract
“to preclude the LSI from competing for any further contracts.”63 Despite this
provision, GAO notes that the LSI’s involvement in the production phase has grown.
Because the Army does not believe that the first brigades equipped with FCS will
meet upper-tier operational requirements, the Army has made the LSI responsible for
planing future FCS enhancements during the production phase. The LSI is also
responsible for “defining and maintaining a growth strategy for integrating new

62
Information in this section is taken from Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
GAO-08-408, “Defense Acquisitions: 2009 is a Critical Juncture for the Army’s Future
Combat System,” March 7, 2008.
63
Ibid., p. 38.
 CRS-18

technologies into the FCS brigade combat teams.”64 GAO further maintains that the
LSI will likely play a significant role in the sustainment phase of the FCS program
which will virtually guarantee that the LSI will “remain indefinitely involved in the
FCS program.”

GAO has warned in previous reports that “the complex relationship with Boeing
increases the burden of oversight and poses risks for the Army’s ability to provide
independent oversight over the long term.”65 Given Boeing’s ever-increasing
involvement in FCS production decisions, spin-outs - as well as their lead roles in
developing the System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE) and
JTRS (GMR) - GAO is concerned that:

! The government can become increasingly vested in the results of

shared decisions and runs the risk of being less able to provide
oversight;

! The Army’s performance, such as in developing critical

technologies, may affect the LSI’s ability to perform, a situation that
can pose accountability problems; and

! It may be difficult for the Army to separate its own performance

from that of the LSI’s when making decisions on how or whether to
award fees.66

Given the likelihood of increasing LSI involvement in not only the production and
sustainment phases of the FCS program, a detailed examination of the FCS program
in terms of responsibilities - past, current, and anticipated - might be in order. In
areas that the Army does not feel it has the ability to manage, perhaps DOD, a
Defense Agency, or perhaps another service, could be asked to manage a particular
aspect of the program (not unlike how JTRS is currently being managed) as opposed
to turning increasing levels of development and management responsibility over to
the LSI. In this regard, the government might achieve a greater degree of oversight
within the program, perhaps avoiding some of the aforementioned potential problems
cited by GAO.

FCS and Possible Radio Spectrum Problems

The possibility that an FCS-equipped force could overwhelm available
bandwidth raises some potential issues for congressional consideration. The
waveforms associated with JTRS radios and other FCS technologies will use more
of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum than is used by current Army
communications systems. While there are potential future technological solutions
to this issue, such as data compression, there is a near-term concern that spectrum
limitations could have a significant operational impact on FCS, which is heavily

64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid., p. 39
 CRS-19

dependent on continuous and near real-time data from a variety of sources for not
only its combat effectiveness but its survival on the battlefield. These concerns take
on a greater sense of urgency if the Army intends to accelerate the FCS program in
the near future. The role that the TSAT program plays in the FCS bandwidth
equation might also be a subject for greater study and oversight as it has the potential
to have significant impact on the quantity, quality, security, and speed of information
available to soldiers in FCS BCTs. Given these implications, Congress may choose
to explore this issue in greater detail with not only the Army and DOD but also with
the scientific community and industry.

FCS and Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Operations

The Army contends that FCS is specifically designed for the “Long War” and
fighting insurgencies.67 Proponents of FCS’s role in counterinsurgency maintain that
the FCS network will provide the means to “share massive amounts of data -
biometric information, for instance, or detailed advice from an embedded social
scientist - and disseminate it to the lowest level.”68 In response to the use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq - which has necessitated improving
armor protection of current U.S. combat vehicles - FCS officials contend that “the
ability of [FCS] sensors and the situational awareness tools to “see first” will obviate
some of the need for heavy armour.”69

Some might argue that the Army is being overly optimistic about FCS’s ability
to achieve “continuous situational awareness,” which enables FCS to find and engage
the enemy as well as avoid potential threats that could destroy lightly armored FCS
MGVs. In terms of survivability, the Congressional Budget Office notes:

Many analysts have concluded that current technology does not permit the
construction of light-weight combat vehicles that match or surpass current
vehicles in reliability and invulnerability to enemy weapons. Furthermore, the
Army’s experience in Iraq suggests that its strategy for making lightly armored
vehicles equally as survivable as the heavily armored Abrams tank may not be
feasible. To achieve comparable survivability, U.S. combat vehicles would avoid
being targeted by exploiting superior knowledge of enemy activities. The threat
in Iraq has come primarily in urban settings from individually launched weapons,
and the ability to identify attackers’ locations may be beyond any technology
now envisioned.70

While most agree that the FCS network, as envisioned by the Army, should
provide the Army with enhanced communications, intelligence, and sensing

67
Information in this section is from Ann Roosevelt, “FCS Would Bring Significant
Advantages to Future Insurgency-Type Operations, Harvey Say,” Defense Daily, January
23, 2007, and Fawzia Sheik, “Army Leaders See Future Combat System as
Counterinsurgency Tool,” InsideDefense.com, February 19, 2007.
68
Nathan Hodge, “Avenues of Approach: The U.S. Future Combat System,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, February 20, 2008.
69
Ibid.
70
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Budget Options,” February 2007, p. 8.
 CRS-20

capabilities, some might argue that the Army is placing undue emphasis on
theoretical FCS technological capabilities in making its case for FCS relevancy in
counterinsurgency operations. Some suggest that effective counterinsurgency
operations are characterized by cultural awareness, interpersonal relationships, and
security provided through human presence, and are less a function of superior
technology and firepower.

A recent study that questions the effectiveness of modern “mechanized”

militaries in waging a successful counterinsurgency campaign might also have
relevance in examining FCS’s role in counterinsurgency.71 The study, citing
empirical historical evidence dating from 1800 to 2004 derived from 238
insurgencies, maintains that modern mechanized forces72 are unsuited for
counterinsurgencies by design “because their structures and associated tactics inhibit
the construction of information networks among the local population.”73 The report’s
authors further contend that modern mechanized forces:

Struggle to defeat insurgents because they rarely solve the “identification

problem” - how to sort insurgents from the noncombatant population selectively.
Built for direct combat, modern militaries are isolated from local populations by
their technology and thus are “starved” of the information that would enable
counterinsurgents to use their power selectively. As a result, these militaries
often inadvertently swell insurgent ranks while dissuading potential collaborators
through the indiscriminate application of coercive and non-coercive power.74

The Army has also elevated the mission of stabilizing nations involved in conflicts
to a level commensurate with that of conventional combat operations. Given the
significant new emphasis on dealing with local population and rebuilding
infrastructure and government institutions, “some Army officers have also questioned
whether the development of the Army’s Future Combat System ... is consistent with
this new view of war.”75 One Army officer, who has been credited with conducting
a highly-successful counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign in Iraq, suggests
that “the Army is finding it difficult to cut completely loose from years of
wrongheaded thinking, noting that assumptions that high-technology systems will
provide the American military with dominant knowledge of the battlefield has
formed much of the justification for the Army program to build the Future Combat

71
Information in this section is from Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the
Machines: Mechanization and the Determinants of Victory in Counterinsurgency Warfare,”
Version 2.3, May 2007.
72
The authors define modern mechanized forces as systems that combine mechanized
vehicles, aircraft, and communications technologies to destroy an adversary’s military in
direct combat. Central to this is the pattern of force employment whereby units are
employed to destroy the largest enemy force over the largest area with the fewest men (and
casualties) in the least possible time.
73
Lyall and Wilson, p. 7.
74
Ibid., p. 3.
75
Michael R. Gordon, “New Weight in Army Manual on Stabilization,” New York Times,
February 8, 2008.
 CRS-21

System.”76 The strong contrary opinions held by some analysts and Army officers
regarding FCS’s relevance in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations might
prove to be a subject for further review with the Army and DOD.

Additional Reading
CRS Report RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by
Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RL33757, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RL33161, The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s
Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RL34333, Does the Army Need a Full-Spectrum Force or Specialized
Units: background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert.

CRS Report RS21195, Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development in DOD

Programs: Policy Issues for Congress, by Gary J. Pagliano and Ronald
O’Rourke.

Appendix. FCS Subsystems

Manned Ground Vehicles
FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) are a family of eight different combat
vehicles — with some having more than one variation — that are based on a
common platform and are being designed to be air transportable by the U.S. Air
Force. They are to be equipped with a variety of passive and active protection
systems and sensors that the Army hopes will offer them the same survivability as the
current heavy armor force. In addition the Army intends for its MGVs to be highly
reliable, require low maintenance, and have fuel-efficient engines. The following are
brief descriptions of MGV types and variants. All are intended to have a range of
750 kilometers and a top speed of 90 kilometers per hour (kph) — 55 miles per
hour:77

Mounted Combat System (MCS). As envisioned, the MCS provides direct

and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) fires, is capable of providing direct fire support to
dismounted infantry, and can attack targets with BLOS fires out to a range of 8
kilometers. The MCS is intended to replace to current M-1 Abrams tank. The MCS

76
Ibid.
77
Information for these descriptions are taken from two Army sources: The Army’s FCS
18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004, and the FCS 2005 Flipbook, dated August
26, 2004.
 CRS-22

is to have a crew of two and might also be able to accommodate two passengers. The
MCS is to be armed with a 120 mm main gun, a .50 caliber machine gun, and a 40
mm automatic grenade launcher.

Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). As planned, the ICV consists of four

versions: the Company Commander version, the Platoon Leader verison, the Rifle
Squad version, and the Weapons Squad version. All four versions appear to be
identical from the exterior to prevent the targeting of a specific carrier version. The
Rifle Squad version is to have a two-man crew, and is to be able to transport a nine-
man infantry squad and dismount them so that they can conduct combat operations
on foot. The ICV is to mount a 30 or 40 mm cannon.

Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). The NLOS-C is to provide

networked, extended-range targeting and precision attack of both point and area
targets with a wide variety of munitions. Its primary purpose will be to provide
responsive fires to FCS Combined Arms Battalions and their subordinate units. The
NLOS is to have a two-man crew and a fully automated handling, loading, and firing
capability.

Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M). The NLOS-M is intended to provide

indirect fires in support of FCS companies and platoons. The NLOS-M is to have a
four-man crew, mount a 120mm mortar, and also carry an 81 mm mortar for
dismounted operations away from the carrier.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle (RSV). As planned, the RSV

will feature advanced sensors to detect, locate, track, and identify targets from long
ranges under all climatic conditions, both day and night. The RSV is to have a mast-
mounted long-range, electro-optical infra-red sensor, sensors for radio frequency
(RF) intercept and direction finding as well as a remote chemical warfare agent
detector. RSVs are to also carry four dismounted scouts, unattended ground sensors
(UGS), a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) with various payloads, and two
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In addition to the four scouts, the RSV is to
have a two-man crew and a defensive weapons system.

Command and Control Vehicle (C2V). The C2V is intended to serve as

the “hub” for battlefield command and control. It is to provide information
management for the integrated network of communications and sensors for the FCS
brigade combat teams. The C2V is to have a crew of two and carry four staff officers
and also be capable of employing UAVs.

Medical Vehicle - Evacuation (MV-E) and Medical Vehicle -

Treatment (MV-T). There are to be two versions of the MV: the MV-E and MV-T.
The MV-E would permit combat trauma specialists to be closer to the casualty’s
point of injury as it is to move with combat forces and evacuate casualties to other
treatment facilities. The MV-T is to enhance the ability to provide Advanced Trauma
Management/Advanced Trauma Life Support forward in the battle area and both
MV-E and MV-T would be capable of conducting medical procedures and treatments
using telemedicine systems. Both would have four-man crews and the capability to
carry four patients.
 CRS-23

FCS Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV). The FRMV would

be the FCS Brigade Combat Team’s recovery and maintenance system. The FRMV
is to have a crew of three, plus additional space for up to three recovered crew
members.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)78

Each FCS-equipped brigade will have a number of UAVs.79 While these UAVs
are to provide a variety of capabilities to forces on the ground, some experts note that
they could also present an air space management challenge to not only manned Army
aviation assets, but also to Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and other nation’s aircraft
that might be providing support to Army ground operations. The following are brief
descriptions of the Army’s four classes of UAVs:

Class I UAVs. Class I UAVs are intended to provide Reconnaissance,

Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) at the platoon level. Weighing less than
15 pounds each, these Class I UAVs are intended to operate in urban and jungle
terrain and have a vertical takeoff and landing capability. They are to be used to
observe routes and targets and can provide limited communications transmissions
relay. The Class I UAV are to be controlled by dismounted soldiers and can also be
controlled by selected FCS ground platforms, and have an endurance of 50 minutes
over an 8 kilometer area, and a 10,500 foot maximum ceiling.

Class IV UAVs. Class IV UAVs are intended to provide the FCS brigade
commander with a long endurance capability encompassing all functions in Class
I through Class III UAVs. It is intended to stay aloft for 72 continuous hours and
operate over a 75 kilometer radius with a maximum ceiling of 16,500 feet. It is also
planned to interface with other manned and unmanned aerial vehicles and be able to
take off and land without a dedicated airfield.

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)80

Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV). The ARV was intended to come in two
variants — the Assault variant and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target
Acquisition (RSTA) variant. The RSTA variant has been deferred as part of the
Army’s 2007 FCS program restructuring. The two variants were to share a common
chassis. The Assault variant is to provide remote reconnaissance capability, deploy
sensors, and employ its direct fire weapons and special munitions at targets such as
buildings, bunkers, and tunnels. It is also intended to be able to conduct battle

78
Unless otherwise noted, UAV information for these descriptions are taken from two Army
sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS 2005
Flipbook, dated August 26, 2004.
79
Sandra I. Erwin, “Army to Field Four Classes of UAVs,” National Defense, April 2003.
80
Unless otherwise noted, information for these descriptions are taken from two Army
sources: The Army’s FCS 18+1+1 White Paper, dated October 15, 2004 and the FCS 2005
Flipbook, dated August 26, 2004.
 CRS-24

damage assessments, act as a communications relay, and support both mounted and
dismounted forces with direct and anti-tank fire as well as occupy key terrain.

Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV). The SUGV is a small,

lightweight, manportable UGV capable of operating in urban terrain, tunnels, and
caves. The SUGV will weigh 30 pounds, operate for 6 hours without a battery
recharge, and have a one kilometer ground range and a 200 meter tunnel range. Its
modular design will permit a variety of payloads which will enable it to perform
high-risk intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and chemical
weapons or toxic industrial chemical reconnaissance.

Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE). The

MULE is a UGV that will support dismounted infantry. It is to come in three variants
sharing a common chassis — transport, countermine, and the Armed Robotic Vehicle
- Assault - Light (ARV-A-L). The transport variant is to be able to carry 1,900 to
2,400 pounds of equipment and rucksacks for dismounted infantry and follow them
in complex and rough terrain. The countermine variant is to have the capability to
detect, mark, and neutralize anti-tank mines. The ARV-A-L variant is to incorporate
a weapons package and a RSTA package to support dismounted infantry operations.
The MULE is intended to have a 100 kilometer road, and 50 kilometer cross country,
range.

Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS)81

UGS are divided into two groups — Tactical UGS and Urban UGS — and are
described as follows:

Tactical UGS. Tactical UGS include intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) sensors. These sensors are to employ a variety of sensing technologies and
integrated into the overall FCS network. They are intended to be deployed by hand,
by vehicle, or by robot and have a 48 hour endurance. They are intended to be
expendable, low-cost sensors used for such tasks as perimeter defense, surveillance,
target acquisition, and CBRN early warning.

Urban UGS. Urban UGS can also be employed by soldiers, vehicles, or robots
and are intended to provide situation awareness inside and outside of buildings for
force protection and also for previously cleared buildings and areas.

Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS). NLOS-LS is to consist

of a family of missiles in a deployable, platform-independent, container launch unit
(CLU), which can be fired in an unmanned and remote mode. Each CLU is to have
a fire control system and 15 missiles consisting of Precision Attack Missiles (PAM)
and Loitering Attack Missiles (LAM).

The PAM is to have two employment modes — a direct-fire and a fast attack
mode or a boost-glide mode. The missile is intended to receive target information

81
Ibid.
 CRS-25

prior to launch and receive and respond to target location updates while in flight.
The PAM can be fired in the laser-designated mode and transmit near real-time target
imagery prior to impact. The PAM is intended to be used against heavily armored
targets.

The LAM is to provide imagery for search, surveillance, targeting, and battle
damage assessment (BDA) and can also serve as an airborne radio retransmission
sight. LAMs are to be capable of flying long distances with significant loiter times.
LAMs are intended to be re-programmed in flight and attack, high value, fleeting
targets.

The Network82
The FCS network is considered the most crucial system of all 14 systems. The
FCS network is to consist of four interactive components — the System-of-Systems
Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE); Battle Command (BC) software;
communications and computers (CC); and intelligence, reconnaissance and
surveillance (ISR) systems.

System-of-Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE).

The SOSCOE is to enable the integration of a variety of software packages into the
FCS network. It is intended to use commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and allow for
the integration of critical interoperability packages that translate Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine Corps, and allied message formats into internal FCS message formats.

Battle Command (BC) Software. Battle Command mission applications

are to include mission planning and preparation, situational understanding, battle
command and mission execution, and warfighter-machine interface.

Mission Planning and Preparation. Consists of 16 different functions that

provide FCS units with the following automated capabilities:

! The development of deliberate, anticipatory, and rapid-response

plans;
! The ability to perform plan assessments and evaluations;
! The ability to perform terrain analysis;
! The conduct of mission rehearsals; and
! The conduct of after action reviews.

Situation Understanding. This consists of 10 different packages that allow

the user to better comprehend his surroundings. These packages employ map
information and a variety of databases that help to determine enemy locations and
capabilities, infer enemy intentions, and assess the threat to U.S. forces.

Battle Command and Execution. This package contains a variety of

planning and decision aids to help commanders make rapid, informed, and accurate

82
Ibid.
 CRS-26

decisions during battle. These packages can also be used in the training and rehearsal
modes.

Warfighter-Machine Interface Package. This package receives soldier-

generated information and displays information across all FCS platforms for soldier
use.

Communications and Computer (CC) Systems. The Communications

and Computer network is intended to provide secure, reliable access to information
over extended distances and complex terrain. This network is not intended to rely
on a large and separate infrastructure because it is to be embedded in the FCS mobile
platforms and move with the combat units. The communications network is to
consist of a variety of systems such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS);
Wideband Network Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform systems; Network Data
Link; and the Warfighter Information Network Tactical (WIN-T).

Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR) Systems. The

Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance System is to be a distributed and
networked array of multispectral ISR sensors intended to provide timely and accurate
situational awareness to the FCS force. In addition, the ISR system is intended to
help FCS formations avoid enemy fires while providing precision, networked fires
to the unit.