Lecture 8

Safety Practices in Chemical and

Nuclear Industries

Nuclear Safety

Dr. Raghuram Chetty

Department of Chemical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Chennai- 600 036.
 Why concerned about nuclear safety?
 The fission products and their radiation effects are too
dangerous and it can be considered as poisons,
carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens.

 Nobody wants any more Chernobyl accident or

Hiroshima/Nagasaki nuclear weapons explosions.

 The fission products have half lives from a fraction of

second to millions of years. So, engineers are also worried
about storage of these radioactive wastages until they
reach at a safe level of decay.

 So, nuclear industries strongly believe in “Safety first and

foremost” slogan.
Operation vs. Nuclear Accidents
Major Nuclear Accidents
The three significant accidents in the 50-year history of
nuclear power generation are:
 Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was
severely damaged but radiation was contained and there
were no adverse health or environmental consequences.

 Chernobyl (Ukraine 1986) where the destruction of the

reactor by steam explosion and fire killed 31 people and
had significant health and environmental consequences.
Major Nuclear Accidents
 Fukushima (Japan 2011) where three old reactors
(together with a fourth) were written off and the effects of
loss of cooling due to a huge tsunami were inadequately
contained.
These are the only major accidents to have occurred in over
14,500 cumulative reactor-years of commercial nuclear
power operation in 32 countries.
Safety

 It should be noted that a commercial nuclear power

reactor simply cannot under any circumstances explode
like a nuclear bomb - the fuel is not enriched beyond
~5%.
 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set
up by the United Nations in 1957. One of its functions
was to act as an auditor of world nuclear safety. It
prescribes safety procedures and the reporting of even
minor incidents. Every country which operates nuclear
power plants (NPP) has a nuclear safety inspectorate
and all of these work closely with the IAEA.
Safety

 While nuclear power plants are designed to be safe in

their operation and safe in the event of any malfunction
or accident, no industrial activity can be represented as
entirely risk-free. Incidents and accidents may happen,
and as in other industries, will lead to progressive
improvement in safety.
 Basic Safety
Protect public health and safety
 Reduce the risk from releases of radioactivity to acceptable
levels.
Protect plant worker health and safety
 Provide a safe working environment and reduce risk of injury.
Protect the environment
 Provide a design that complies with all federal, state, and local
requirements.
 Build, operate, and decommission the plant in a way that
preserves environmental quality.
Protect the plant investment
 Provide plant designs, equipment, and operating/maintenance
practices to preserve investor equity and return reward.
 Associated Risks

The risks associated with nuclear power plants derive from

the following:
1) The production of energy occurs by fission of fissile
material. Radioactive fission products represent an
inventory of hazardous material which remains in the
core. The activity of the amount left in the core at
equilibrium is of the order of thousands of millions of
curies (1019-1020 Bq); some of the fission products are
hazardous at a level of microcuries or less (104-105 Bq).
 Associated Risks
2. During normal operation, energy is produced continuously
in the core of the reactor. A mismatch between power
production and cooling of the core liberates energy which
can disrupt the barriers retaining the hazardous fission
products.
3. After shutdown, fission products continue to undergo
radioactive decay and to release energy at a gradually
declining rate. This energy, too, if not appropriately
transferred to a heat sink, can damage the barriers.
Objective of Nuclear Safety
(1) Fundamental Nuclear Safety:

 To protect individuals, the members of the general

public and natural environment from harm resulting
from the commissioning, operation or
decommissioning of a nuclear facility by establishing
and maintaining in all nuclear facilities effective
defenses against radiological hazards.
Objective of Nuclear Safety (cont’d)
(2) Radiation Protection:

 To ensure that during all operations states of a

nuclear facility the radiation exposure of persons
working within the facility as well as living in the
environs of the facility due to any planed or
unplanned release of radioactive material, in either
waterborne or airborne effluents, are controlled
below prescribed limits and are as low as
reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Objective of Nuclear Safety (cont’d)
(3) Technical Safety:

 To take all reasonably practicable measures and to

mitigate their consequences should they occur; to
ensure with a high level of confidence that, for all
possible accidents taken into account in the design
of the installation including those of very low
probability.
Plant core-damage frequency
 One mandated safety indicator is the calculated probable
frequency of degraded core or core melt accidents.
 The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission specifies that reactor
designs must meet a 1 in 10,000 year core damage frequency,
but modern designs exceed this.
 US utility requirements are 1 in 100,000 years, the best
currently operating plants are about 1 in 1 million and those
likely to be built in the next decade are almost 1 in 10 million.
 While the calculated core damage frequency has been one of
the main metrics to assess reactor safety, European safety
authorities prefer a deterministic approach, focusing on actual
provision of back-up hardware, though they also undertake
probabilistic safety analysis for core damage frequency.
Philosophy & analytical approach to nuclear
safety:
The comprehensive safety analysis and evolution
involve, examination of:
a) All planned normal operational modes of the
facility.
b) Expected plant performance during normal
operation and in response to abnormal operation
occurrences.
c) Design basis failure.
d) Failure sequences that may lead to
consequences beyond prescribed limits.
Defense in Depth
 Defense in Depth is a safety philosophy that multiple
methods of high quality assurance are required in nuclear
plant design, construction, operation and maintenance.

 The central tenet of Defense in Depth is to protect the health

and safety of the public and plant workers.

 Other objectives include protecting the environment and

ensuring the operational readiness of the facility.

 Successful Defense in Depth requires creating, maintaining,

and updating multiple independent and redundant layers of
protection to compensate for potential human and mechanical
failures so that no single layer, no matter how robust, is
exclusively relied upon.
Defense in Depth
Key aspects of the approach are:
 High-quality design & construction,

 Equipment which prevents operational disturbances or human

failures and errors developing into problems,

 Comprehensive monitoring and regular testing to detect

equipment or operator failures,

 Redundant and diverse systems to control damage to the fuel

and prevent significant radioactive releases,

 Provision to confine the effects of severe fuel damage (or any

other problem) to the plant itself.

These above can be summed up as: Prevention, Monitoring,

and Action (to mitigate consequences of failures).
Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth
 Nuclear safety must be ensured with five protective barriers
(levels) as a safe philosophy:
a) The first protective barrier is to prevent occurrence of an
anomaly or failure by providing a nuclear power plant with
high quality and reliability and verified facilities.

b) The second protective barrier is to provide facilities to early

detect an occurring anomaly or failure and shutdown the
reactor in order to prevent it from escalating to an accident.

c) The third protective barrier is to provide facilities such as

emergency core cooling systems etc. to mitigate the
consequence of an accident in case of a trouble escalation.
Defense in Depth (cont’d)

d) The fourth protective barrier is establishment of the

severe accident management such as installation of
a containment to contain radioactivity, preparation of
alternative methods with diversities in response to a
multiple-failure event, preparation of the operation
procedure, and training of operators.
e) The fifth protective barrier is off-site emergency
measures for protection of residents in the vicinity
from radiation exposure when the fourth protective
barrier is broken.
 Multiple Barriers to Prevent Radioactivity
 Multiple Barriers Facility designers
include multiple, successive physical
barriers to prevent the release of
radioactive material.
 The primary barriers are the fuel (1) and
cladding (2), which is designed to
contain radioactive material under the
extreme conditions inside the reactor
core.
 The secondary barrier is the reactor
vessel (3), which contains the coolant
used to carry away heat for generating
electricity.
 Multiple Barriers to Prevent Radioactivity
 The final barrier is the primary
containment building (4,5), which is
designed to mitigate the release of
radioactive material in the event that
both the primary and secondary
barriers are compromised.
 The primary containment is designed
to withstand the most severe,
credible event -- either internal or
external -- for the location of the
plant.
 Fuel Pellet and Fuel Assembely

The smallest unit of the reactor is Fuel assemblies are bundles of fuel
the fuel pellet. These are typically rods. Fuel is put in and taken out of
uranium-oxide (UO2). They are the reactor in assemblies. The
often surrounded by a metal tube assemblies have some structural
(called the cladding) to keep material to keep the pins close but not
fission products from escaping touching, so that there’s room for
into the coolant. coolant
 Barriers to Prevent Radioactivity
As the nuclear plants are more concerned about radioactivity
protection, the following five barriers are built into the station design to
prevent radioactivity as a part of defense-in-depth concept as
prevention of the radio activities.
1. Ceramic Fuel - The ceramic uranium dioxide fuel pellets entrap
most of the fission products. These fission products would be
released if the fuel were to melt. Fortunately, the fuel has a high
melting point, but continuous cooling is nevertheless required,
whether the reactor is at power or not, to prevent fuel failures.
Another safety feature of the ceramic fuel is that it is relatively
chemically inert with the heavy water coolant. Therefore, dispersion
of fission products via corrosion and erosion when a sheath defect
permits contact between the fuel pellets and the coolant is a
relatively slow process.
 Barriers to Prevent Radioactivity
2. Fuel Rod & Cladding - The fuel pellets are enclosed in a
high integrity, welded zircaloy sheath. This sheath contains
the gaseous and volatile fission products which escape from
the pellets. It also prevents corrosion and erosion of the
pellets by the coolant, and hence dispersion of fission
products from the pellets which would result from these
processes. The sheath is designed to withstand the stresses
resulting from pellet thermal expansion, gaseous fission
product build-up, external hydraulic pressure, and forces
imposed by fire.
 Barriers to Prevent Radioactivity (cont’d)
3. Heat Transport System Boundary - The high integrity pressure
tubes, piping, and reactor vessel contain most fission products
escaping via sheath defects.

4. Containment Boundary -This is designed to withstand the

pressure surge of a worst case ‘loss of coolant accident’ (LOCA),
with a small ‘puff release’ during the overpressure transient.
Post LOCA containment venting via a filtered, monitored
pathway minimizes the environmental radioactive release.

5. Exclusion/Sterlized Zone - No permanent residence is allowed

within a 5 km radius from any reactor. This ensures significant
dilution of an airborne radioactive release before it reaches any
public habitation, thus reducing further effect.
Major Failures
Complexity: Nuclear power plants are some of the most
sophisticated and complex energy systems ever designed.
Any complex system, no matter how well it is designed and
engineered, cannot be deemed failure-proof.
In nuclear power plant, there are two major failures to be
considered in a broad sense.

 Design Basis Accidents

 Single Failure Criterion

Design Basis Accident/Failures
 Nuclear power plants are designed to maintain their integrity
and performance of safety functions for a bounding set of
normal operational events as well as abnormal events that are
expected to occur or might occur during the lifetime of the plant.
 Design basis accidents (DBA) are postulated accidents to which
a nuclear plant, its systems, structures and components must
be designed and built to withstand loads during accident
conditions without releasing the harmful amounts of radioactive
materials to the outside environment. Any DBA is controlled by
the reactor safety systems with insignificant off-site
consequences, but may require long shutdown for correction or
repair.
Design Basis Accident/Failures
 They are very unlikely events. DBA are mainly the
following:
a) Reactivity control
b) Positive void coefficient
c) Loss of coolant accident
d) Core melting
Design Basis Accidents
(a) Reactivity Control: The power output of the reactor is adjusted by
controlling how many neutrons are able to create more fissions. The
effective neutron multiplication factor, keff, is the average number of
neutrons from one fission that cause another fission.
 Reactivity ρ = (keff -1 )/ keff
 Reactor power P = exp(ρ/l)
where l=average life time of neutrons in the reactor.
 As one can easily see that if reactivity increases, power will increase
at an exponential rate. And reactor will become over critical. To
maintain just criticality, keff should be one. So, control rods should be
designed accurately.

(b) Positive void coefficient: As the temperature of the coolant rises,

reactivity must come down as the part of negative feedback control
system. But in some reactors, the reverse is there due to faulty design.
 Design Basis Accidents (Cont’d)
(c) Loss of coolant accident (LOCA):
A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is a mode of failure for a
nuclear reactor. If not managed properly and effectively, the
results of a LOCA could result in reactor core damage. If sufficient
amount of the coolant is not there in the core, temperature of the
core will rise dramatically which in turn result in core melting.
(d) Core melting: It is considered as the worst scenario as
radioactive fission products directly expose to the environment if
sufficient provisions are not there.
Once the fuel elements of a reactor begin to melt, the primary
containment has been breached, and the nuclear fuel (such as
uranium, plutonium, or thorium) and fission products (such as
cesium-137, krypton-88, or iodine-131) within the fuel elements
can leach out into the coolant.
Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
 The heat generated by fission reaction is removed by a
coolant system to produce steam and is converted into
useful electrical power.
 If this coolant flow is reduced or lost, the nuclear reactor's
emergency shutdown system is designed to stop the
fission chain reaction automatically.
 Moreover, even after reactor shut down, due to radioactive
decay of the fission products, the nuclear fuel will continue
to generate a significant amount of heat. This decay heat
needs to be taken out through secondary cooling system
to maintain integrity of the fuel.
Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
 In every nuclear reactor, a separate Emergency Core
Cooling System (ECCS) exists specifically to deal with the
situation like LOCA.
 If all of the independent cooling systems of the ECCS fail
to operate as designed due to some reason such as failure
of the pumps, this heat can increase the fuel temperature
to the point of damaging the fuel and the reactor.
Initiating Events
 Design Basis Events (DBE), which form the basis of design of
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), include normal operations,
operational transients and Postulated Initiating Events (PIE).
 Various initiating events are as follows.
 Decrease in heat removal
 Increase in system pressure
 Decrease in coolant flow
 Reactivity anomalies
 Multiple failure events
 Station blackout (SBO)
Beyond Design Basis Events
 DBE can be classified on the basis of their consequence
and expected frequency of occurrence.
 Consequences of a rare event can be permitted to be
severe while those of a frequent event can be accepted
only at very low severity.
 Acceptance criteria for consequences of a DBE, thus,
also depend on frequency of their occurrence.
 Events of very low probability of occurrence which are
considered only for offsite emergency plan or site
selection issues, are called as Beyond Design Basis
Events (BDBE).
Design Basis Safety
Nuclear reactor safety includes control of reactor,
removal of heat generated in the core and containing
the radioactivity. The design basic safety principles
are:
1. Fail safe philosophy
2. Redundancy, diversity and independency
3. Two out of three logic
4. Physical separation
5. Reliability and quality assurance.
(1)Fail safe philosophy:

 Fail safe philosophy: Components or systems are

designed to bring them to safe conditions automatically,
if they fail.

 Fail-safe reactors do not rely on human judgment to shut

them down but on the laws of nature.
(2) Redundancy, diversity and independency
 Redundancy: It is a concept to provide more numbers of
equipment/subsystems in safety system than that are
needed so that if one equipment/subsystem fails, the
other can do the function.
 Thus "Redundancy" is a concept that important-to-safety
facilities are composed from independent multiple trains
with sufficient capability, and a failure of one train does
not cause loss of their safety functions.
 For example, design is such that multiple trains of power
source required in an emergency are provided, and even
if one of them failed, other power source would be
available.
(2) Redundancy, diversity and independency
 Diversity: It is a concept to have two or more systems
based on different design or functional principle to does
a particular safety function.
 Thus "Diversity” is a design concept to prevent the
function loss of multiple facilities simultaneously due to
one common cause by providing different types of
facilities.
 For example, two driving sources of cooling-water
injection pump systems are to be different types such
that one is electric drive and another is steam-turbine
drive, so injection of a required amount of cooling water
is ensured.
(2) Redundancy, diversity and independency
 Independency: Independency means to maintain each
independency of multiple trains so that facilities formed
in multiple do not loose their function simultaneously
due to a single failure.
 For example, power sources, control circuits etc. of
cooling-water injection pumps in multiple systems to
cool a reactor core in an emergency are designed such
that they consist of a power source, detectors and
control devices independent from each other, and even
if one of them were lost, the other independent cooling-
water injection pump could be operable.
(3) Two out of three logic
 Two out of three logic: In order to reduce the
number of unnecessary firings, a two out of
three logic is used by each of the shutdown
systems.
 Each shutdown parameter is related to three
measuring devices, and each of these devices is
associated to one of three electrical chains of
the shutdown system.
 Another advantage of the two out of three logic
is to permit the verification, by frequent tests, of
the availability of different parts of the system,
from transmitters up to the last relays of the
shutdown system.
Physical separation & Reliability
4) Physical separation: Components or systems
intended to perform the same function can be
separated physically, so that they are protected
against simultaneous failures due to extraneous
events like fire.

5) Reliability & quality assurance: This ensures the

availability of equipment or system to perform the
function.
 Multiple safety systems
 Serious accidents such as reactor failure, a meltdown of
the reactor core, and a jet aircraft crashing into the site are
all being taken into account in the design of new nuclear
reactors.
 Quadruple redundancy – featuring four parallel, physically
separated sub-systems, each capable of handling safety
operations independently – supports all aspects of the
design. Quadruple redundancy covers components,
equipment, and electrical and control systems.
 Multiple safety systems
 The containment will be completely pressure-proof,
ensuring safety in the event of a failure in the reactor's
main circulation or steam pipes. The containment will be
automatically isolated should an accident occur.
 In the very unlikely event of a severe reactor accident and
the failure of associated safety systems, the melted core
will be led into a “core catcher”, which will carry it to the
lower part of the reactor building.
 State-of-the-art safety systems

European Pressurized
Water Reactor (EPR),
Olkiluoto 3: Finland’s
Nuclear Reactor

The safety system consists of four redundant trains, each capable of

handling safety requirements independently. They are located in different
parts of the reactor building to eliminate the possibility of simultaneous
failure.
Single Failure Criterion
 A single failure means an occurrence which results in the
loss of capability of a component to perform its intended
safety functions.
 Fluid and electric systems are to be designed against an
assumed single failure if neither a single failure of any
active component nor a single failure of a passive
component, results in a loss of the capability of the
system to perform its safety functions.
 The intent is to achieve high reliability (probability of
success) without quantifying it. Human errors are not
considered to be single failures.
 Severe Accident in Nuclear Plant
Courtesy: Google Images

Schematic representation of the major physical phenomena that may occur during
severe accident, and the safety systems involved.
Hydrogen Control and Mitigation
Main counter measures are:
 Inertization of the atmosphere (pre or post inertization)
 Dilution of burnable gases

 Removal of hydrogen by burning or recombination

 Inertization
 Containment atmosphere is filled with nitrogen

 Dilution of Containment atmosphere by CO2

 Some plants can inert/dilute Containment atmosphere

by venting
 Venting is a process in which Containment is vented

deliberately when the pressure of the Containment

atmosphere exceeds design pressure.
 Passive Autocatalytic Recombiner (PAR)
• Catalytic recombiners use catalysts to recombine hydrogen and oxygen
• Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PAR) do not need external power or
operator action

Courtesy: Google Images

Safety facilities
 To prevent any of the above Design Basis Accident
situation(s), and/or in case of a certain trouble in a nuclear
power plant, in order to prevent it from developing to a big
accident, safety facilities to safely shutdown the reactor,
cool the reactor core, contain radioactive materials and
the equipment that supplies electricity and cooling water to
those safety facilities are provided as

(1) facilities to control and shutdown a reactor,

(2) facilities to cool a reactor,

(3) facilities to contain radioactive materials.

Safety facilities in the nuclear plant

Courtesy: Google Images

(1) Facilities to control and shutdown a reactor
 A reactor shall not go out of control (an excessive power
by an abnormal-rate nuclear fission reaction) during
operation.

 Moreover, in case of a trouble, it is required to

immediately stop nuclear fission reaction. Therefore,
reactor control systems to maintain the nuclear fission
reaction rate at a constant level, and if necessary,
facilities to shutdown the reactor by immediately
inserting control rods are provided.
 SCRAM

 SCRAM is an emergency
shutdown of a nuclear reactor.
 This emergency shutdown is
often referred to as a "SCRAM"
at boiling water reactors
(BWR), and as a "reactor trip"
at pressurized water reactors
(PWR).
 SCRAM is achieved by a large
insertion of negative reactivity.
This is achieved by inserting
neutron-absorbing control rods
into the core. Courtesy: Google Images
(2) Facilities to cool a reactor
 In a reactor core, decay heat (7% of rated power) is
generated even after shutdown of the reactor in the decay
process for radioactive materials to become more stable
nuclei. Therefore, it is necessary to continue cooling of the
reactor core not only during power operation but also after
shutdown.
 Especially, if a break of reactor cooling system piping, etc.
causing loss of cooling water occurred, the reactor core
would become dry-out and reach a high temperature,
probably resulting in core damage. In preparation for such
a case, facilities to immediately inject cooling water into the
reactor core in an emergency are provided.
(2) Facilities to cool a reactor
 ECCS (Emergency core cooling systems) are provided
to prevent melting of fuel cladding tubes containing
radioactive materials due to residual heat even in case of
an accident and the resulted emergency reactor shutdown.
The ECCSs immediately inject cooling water into the
reactor pressure vessel and to cool the fuel by flooding the
core when the water cooling the fuel has flowed out of the
core due to the accident. When the cooling water in the
reactor core decreases, this is detected and ECCSs are
actuated automatically.
 ECCS
 An emergency core cooling system (ECCS) comprises a
series of systems that are designed to safely shut down a
nuclear reactor during accident conditions.
 These systems allow the plant to respond to a variety of
accident conditions, and additionally introduce redundancy
so that the plant can be shut down even with one or more
subsystem failures.
In most plants, ECCS is composed of the following systems:
 Coolant injection system: This system consists of pumps
that inject coolant in high-pressure and low-pressure
modes into the reactor vessel .
ECCS
 Core-spray system: This system uses special spray
nozzles within the reactor pressure vessel to spray water
directly onto the fuel rods, suppressing the generation of
steam. Reactor designs can include core-spray in high-
pressure and low-pressure modes.
 Containment spray system: This system consists of a
series of pumps and nozzles which spray coolant into the
primary containment structure. It is designed to condense
the steam into liquid water within the primary containment
structure to prevent overpressure, which could lead to
involuntary depressurization.
 Emergency core cooling system
Courtesy: Google Images

Emergency core cooling systems for PWR

 (3) Facilities to contain radioactive materials
 A core catcher is a device
provided to catch the molten
core material (Corium) of a
nuclear reactor in case of a
nuclear meltdown and prevent
it from escaping the
containment building.
 A core catcher is made from a
special concrete ceramic to
prevent material from dripping
through; it also uses material
of cooler construction to cool
down the core material.
Courtesy: Google Images
Core catcher

Courtesy: Google Images

 Core catcher
Courtesy: Google Images

Construction in China
(3) Facilities to contain radioactive materials
 Nuclear power plants are provided with the barriers
such as a containment etc. in preparation for an
accident releasing radioactive materials from their
reactor cores. These barriers will close immediately
in an abnormal event, and constitute an airtight
container. Moreover, in order to avoid the damage
by internal pressure rise due to decay heat etc., it is
designed to be cooled appropriately as needed.
 Monitoring

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Russian Nuclear Power Plant

Power Station Control Room Control Room
Provide two control rooms from either of which:
 the plant can be shut down
 decay heat can be removed
 barriers to release of radioactivity can be maintained
 the plant state is known Courtesy: Google Images
Computer Simulation/Code
fully integrated real time desktop systems thermal
hydraulic simulation package
Courtesy: Google Images

RELSIM-
RELAP/
SCDAPSIM
desktop
simulator
Computer Code Development

Various
organizations
collaborate on
the development
and assessment
of codes to
describe the
complete
evolution of a
nuclear reactor

Courtesy: Google Images

International Nuclear and Radiological Event
Scale (INES)
The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
(INES) is a scale of nuclear incident and accidents to report to
the public like earthquake scales.
 Level 1: Anomaly. This level is when minor problems with
safety components, breach of operating limits at a nuclear
facility, loss or theft of low activity radioactive sources.

 Level 2: Incident. 10 times higher than Level-1. Exposure

rate more than 50 mSv/hour with significant contamination
within the facility.
International Nuclear and Radiological Event
Scale (INES)
 Level 3: Serious Incident. 10 times higher than Level-2.
Exposure rate is more than 1 Sv/hour in an operating area
with severe contamination. Low probability of significant
public exposure.

 Level 4: Accident with local consequences. 10 times higher

than level-3. Fuel melt or damaged and release of
significant quantities of radioactive material within an
installation with high probability of public exposure. Level-4
is called for if at least one death from radiation and minor
release of radioactive material so only local controls are
necessary.
International Nuclear and Radiological Event
Scale (INES)
 Level 5: Accident with Wider Consequences. This level is
10 times higher than level-4 and is called for when the
reactor core is severely damaged and large amount of
radioactive materials are released with a high probability
of significant radiation exposure to the public. And also
when several deaths from radiation exposure and planned
radiation control is needed.
International Nuclear and Radiological Event
Scale (INES)
 Level 6: Serious Accident. 10 times higher than level-5.
This level is declared when significant amount of
radioactive material is released in the environment and
planned controlling procedures need to be taken.
 Level 7: Major Accident. This is 10 times higher than
level-6 and the highest level of accident. This is declared
when significant amount of radioactive material is released
into the environment which can affect public health.
Implementation of planned and extended radiation safety
programs are needed at this level.
 INES Scale

Courtesy: Google Images

The purpose of INES Scale is to facilitate communication and understanding

between the technical community, the media and the public on the safety
significance of events. The aim is to keep the public, as well as nuclear authorities,
accurately informed on the occurrence and potential consequences of reported
events.
Licensing of nuclear power plant
 The regulatory process for nuclear power plant
evolved into following specific stages of licensing:
 Site evaluation

 Design

 Construction (Construction License)

 Commissioning

 Operation (Operating License)

 Decommissioning

 Release from Regulatory Control

Licensing
Two major players in Licensing

 Regulatory Body defines the safety criteria,

requirements, guidelines and documents to be provided
by the applicant (operating organization) and establish a
mechanism to solve safety issues with the applicant.

 Operating Organization: Prepare and submit the

required documentation and also be prepared to respond
to the requests of the regulatory body.

 The public will be given an opportunity to provide their

views during certain steps of the licensing process.
Licensing of nuclear power plant
Site evaluation
 To verify the acceptability of the site, whether the selected
site is suitable to host a nuclear installation. The following
parameters are very important:
 Characteristics of the site, including surrounding
population, seismology, meteorology, geology and
hydrology, distance from airports, water bodies;
 Design of the nuclear plant;
 Anticipated response of the plant to hypothetical
accidents;
 Discharges from the plant into the environment (i.e.,
radiological effluents);
 Emergency plans.
Dose Limits

Courtesy:
Google
Images

Serious accident: accident possible to occur in worst case.

Hypothetical accident: The accident beyond serious accident. There is no
possibility to occur in terms of technical commonsense.
Site Elevation at Kudankulam
 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant
Courtesy: Google Images

In the basements of turbine and reactor buildings, diesel generators

shuddered to a halt as the floodwaters drowned them. Other generators cut
out when their power distribution panels were drenched leading to station
blackout (SBO).
Design

The following important considerations must be made at the

design stage:
 Design should be developed according to the “defense in
depth” approach
 Be in accordance with the design basis (conditions,
events manageable by the installation)
 Be in compliance with relevant standards, codes and
regulatory requirements
Design

 Consider the replacement of heavy and large components

during its life (steam generator, reactor pressure vessel
heads, etc.) by taking into account: buried pipes and
conduits, openings in structures for equipment access,
obstructions.
 Consider the access of components important to safety
for maintenance, inspection and testing, replacement
occupational exposure, decommissioning consider
transport of radioactive materials
 Based on site characteristics.
Construction
 Before granting an authorization for the construction,
followings should be reviewed, assessed and inspected
by the Regulatory Body (AERB):
 Site evaluation.
 Demonstration of the selected design meets safety
objectives and criteria.
 Appropriate organizational and financial arrangements
for mid/long-term issues (decommissioning, radioactive
waste and spent fuel management).
 Management system of licensee and vendors as
necessary in place covering all aspects of construction.
 Commissioning & Operation
Commissioning can be divided into main stages:
 Non nuclear testing: Before introducing nuclear/radioactive
material to ensure, to the extent possible, the installation has been
constructed and equipment manufactured and installed properly.
 To prove the design performances should be put into service after
being inspected, tested and approved by the licensee in
accordance with the requirements set out in the design as agreed
by the AERB.
 Nuclear testing: after introducing of nuclear or radioactive
material to confirm the nuclear installation is safe before
proceeding to routine operation, may require an authorization from
the RB.
Commissioning & Operation

Operation
 Based on the results of commissioning tests and
arrangements the following two things to be considered:
 To operate safely (Management of installation
modifications –Significant or not).
 To face an emergency situation (Long-term shutdown).
Decommissioning
 Decommissioning: Preparation and approval of an
updated decommissioning plan, which may comprise
several sub-stages. Installation remains licensed
throughout the decommissioning period.
 Release from Regulatory Control: After completion of
the decontamination and dismantling and/or removal of
radioactive material, including waste and contaminated
components and structures. Before delicensing the
nuclear installation, a radiological survey should be
carried out to guarantee regulatory criteria and
decommissioning objectives have been fulfilled.
Uranium Fuel Cycle
Courtesy: Google Images

PHWR Fuel
Bundle

Disposal

Natural
Uranium

LWR Fuel
Assembly
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Waste management and storage
 The nuclear waste management (NWM) plays a key role
in the nuclear power industry. The NWM strategy involves
short-term management which deals with immediate
treatment of the waste and long-term management which
involves storage, disposal or transformation of the waste
into a non-toxic form.
Waste management and storage
 The immediate nuclear waste treatment methods are as
follows

 Vitrification – where high-level waste is mixed with

sugar and then calcined to evaporate the water from
the waste and denitrate the fission products to assist
the stability of the glass produced.

 Ion exchange – used for medium active wastes in the

nuclear industry to concentrate the radioactivity into a
small volume. For example, it is possible to use a ferric
hydroxide flocculation to remove radioactive metals
from aqueous mixtures.
Long-term nuclear waste management
The long-term nuclear waste management has the
following options:
 Storage: high-level radioactive waste is stored
temporarily in spent fuel pools and in dry cask storage
facilities. This allows the shorter-lived isotopes to decay
before further handling.
 Geological disposal: it is a process of selecting
appropriate deep final repositories. There are other
options such as: sea-based options and filling empty
uranium mines.
Long-term nuclear waste management
 Transmutation: there are possible nuclear reactor
designs that consume nuclear waste and transmute it to
other, less-harmful nuclear waste.
 Reuse of waste: there are isotopes in nuclear waste
that can be reused, such as cesium-137 and strontium-
90 in the food irradiation and radioisotope thermoelectric
generators.
Nuclear Safety: 3Cs

 Control

 Cool

 Contain
Absolute safety??

Zero risk is unattainable: There is no such thing as

absolute safety, only relative safety.